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GEORGE CHRISTIAN KNAPP,

Professor of Theology.

HALLE.

LECTURES

ON CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY Y

BY HENRY STODOLSKY, D.D.

NEW YORK: THOMAS WATSON & CO.

1845.

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1845.



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LECTURES

ON

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

BY

GEORGE CHRISTIAN KNAPP, D.D.

PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HALLE.

TRANSLATED BY

LEONARD WOODS, JUN. D.D.

PRESIDENT OF BOWDOIN COLLEGE, BRUNSWICK, MAINE.

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.



AM happy in being able to present to the friends of biblical theology the translation of DR. KNAPP'S LECTURES. The prevailing preference of the method adopted by this author above other methods of pursuing theological study, leads me to hope that this work will be an acceptable offering to the public. It was the ultimate object of that eminent servant of Christ who composed these lectures, to promote vital piety and practical religion even by his more theoretical writings. If the translation of these lectures may conduce to the same end, the translator will feel abundantly rewarded for his labour.

On opening a book we naturally feel a desire to know something of the author; and if he treats on controverted points, to know on what principles he wrote, and with whom he stood connected. I shall endeavour to satisfy this curiosity, by giving some account of the school of *Biblical Theology* in Germany, to which our author belonged, together with an outline of his life and character. I cannot expect, however, within the narrow limits of a preface, to do full justice to either of these subjects.

The school of Biblical Theology was established by Spener at Halle, in 1694, for the avowed purpose of having theology taught in a different manner from that common in the German universities. Spener states that it was usual for persons to spend five or six years at the universities without hearing, or caring to hear, a single book, chapter, or verse of the Bible explained. In the few cases where exegetical lectures were commenced by such teachers as Olearius and Carpov, they were soon abandoned. The Bible was perhaps less used before the time of Spener in Protestant universities than it had been, under penalty of excommunication, by pious Catholics before the Reformation. In place of the Scriptures, the different symbols established by the Protestant church were taught and studied. The minutest distinctions established by them were contended for with the greatest zeal, and the least deviation from them was pronounced heresy as decidedly as if they had been given by inspiration of God, and was

punished accordingly with the greatest severity. The spirit of Protestantism seemed to have thrown off the hierarchal yoke, only to assume another and perhaps a more degrading form of bondage. In explaining and defending these symbols, the Aristotelian dialectics were employed, and in the use of them the students were thoroughly exercised. As to the practical effect which the doctrines of Christianity should have upon their own hearts, and the manner in which they should exhibit them for the benefit of others, nothing was said to them by their teachers. Thus disciplined, they went forth to repeat from the pulpit what they had learned at the university, and fought over their idle battles, in which their own learning and skill were carefully displayed, to the neglect of every thing which might arouse the careless, persuade the doubting, or satisfy the deep desires and assuage the sorrows of the heart.

This was a state of things which Spener explored. Others before him, especially pious laymen, had noticed these evils, but had withdrawn, like the mystics of a former period, and sought in private contemplation that satisfaction of their spiritual wants which they could not obtain from the learned jargon of the pulpit; or if, like Andreæ and Arndt, they had lifted up a voice of remonstrance against the prevailing disorders, it had been drowned in the noise of angry polemics. But the reputation and influence of Spener were too great to allow his remonstrances to pass unnoticed. Without aiming at the name, he performed the work of a reformer. In the unpretending form of a preface to an edition of Arndt's Sermons, he published in 1675 his *Pia Desideria*, in which he urged the necessity of amending the prevailing mode of instruction and preaching. It was his great object to divert attention from the symbols, and direct it to the scriptures. He wished every student to derive his system for himself directly from the Bible; and to feel and enjoy the truths thus learned, rather than contend about them; and especially he wished the teachers in the universities, and the preachers in the desk, abandoning for ever their foolish questions and subtle dialectics, to labour to promote the solid instruction and the true piety of those committed to their charge. This was the object which more and more en-

grossed his attention, as he saw more of the deadening influence of scholastic theology; and he at length pursued it with such zeal that he awakened the jealousy and hatred of those who loved the letter more than the spirit, the form of godliness more than its power. After removing from place to place, and being at length driven from Dresden by the violence of the opposition against him, he found refuge and rest in Berlin. He there exerted his influence with Frederick III. to procure the establishment of a new university at Halle. For various reasons, political and religious, his proposal was adopted, and to Spener was committed the organization of the Theological Faculty. He selected for this purpose Anton, Breithaupt, and Franke, men of congenial spirit with himself, who had visited him in Berlin, imbibed his views, and were then labouring in different places, and under great discouragements, to promote the revival of scriptural knowledge and practical Christianity. They were now united in the new university at Halle; and though denounced by the theologians of the sister universities, and especially those of Wittenberg, as pietists, innovators, and heretics, they were not to be hindered from appointing a new course of studies, nor from pursuing a new method in teaching.

The establishment of the Theological Faculty at Halle forms an epoch in the history of theological science; and to those who founded and composed it, especially to Spener and Franke, are Protestants indebted for the revival and perpetuation of the spirit of the Reformation. They entered a new protest against the reign of ecclesiastical authority, and asserted anew the right of Christians in matters of faith. That we are free to judge for ourselves as to what we shall believe, in opposition to the decretals of Popes or Councils, whether Catholic or Protestant; that the holy scriptures are the pure source whence we must draw our religious knowledge, and not symbols, confessions, or systems framed and established by men; and that the doctrines of the Bible are to be used, by the learned as well as the unlearned, to promote holiness of heart and life, rather than merely as objects of speculation,—these were the great principles upon which Luther and Melancthon, Spener and Franke, alike proceeded.

It is not uncommon to see the founders of this school classed with those narrow-minded and bigoted enthusiasts who regard learning and science with hatred and contempt, and presume upon a miraculous illumination, superseding the necessity of studying divine truth. But to this class Spener and Franke did not belong; and decided as was the stand which they took against the scholastic learning of the times in which they lived, they were far from falling

into the opposite and equally dangerous extreme. Their principles respecting the study of theology are so often misstated that I feel induced, after a perusal of some of their own writings, to exhibit them here more at length.

I. They believed that God had revealed himself directly to men, and that this revelation is contained in the books of the Old and New Testament, which are the only source of our religious knowledge, to the exclusion of those pretended revelations of which theosophy boasts. To obtain the meaning of these scriptures they made therefore the first duty of the theological student. *In scripturis theologus nascitur*, was their constant maxim. They did not, like their contemporaries in the other universities, suffer the student to rely indolently on the *traditional* interpretation of the word of God, nor to adduce, without examination, exactly the same proofs, neither more nor less, as had been used in every preceding system; nor did they suffer him to expect, like some ancient and modern visionaries, that a culpable ignorance would be removed by supernatural illumination. On the contrary, they insisted upon the importance of his becoming acquainted with the original languages in which the holy scriptures were written, and diligently using the whole apparatus of hermeneutical helps, (then indeed comparatively small,) in order to ascertain the very sense in the mind of the inspired writer.

II. By these means, however, important as they are, the student attains only to what they called a *natural, human*, and *literal* knowledge, in distinction from a *spiritual* and *divine* perception of the doctrines of revelation. The sacred writers did not invent new words and expressions to designate the new relations to God into which men were brought by Christianity, and the feelings belonging to those relations; but rather employed language used to designate relations and feelings previously known, analogous to those intended. To every man, therefore, their language, even with respect to the peculiar states of which the Christian is conscious, conveys a general meaning—viz., the notion of something in the thing intended, answering to something in the analogous relation or feeling from which the representation is taken. But what is the very thing, among the many things in this new relation, which would justify the metaphor,—what is the very thing intended by the evangelist or the apostle in the use of it, can be understood only by one who has in reality been brought into this new relation, and experienced the feelings belonging to it. To be more definite: the new relation instituted by Christianity is most frequently denoted in the sacred writings by the words *sonship*, *adoption*, and those of a similar import, which clearly convey to every reader a general notion of what this

new relation is; and this general notion is the *literal* knowledge of the subject which the natural man may possess. But there are many things in the human relation of a son to a father which might be the foundation of the metaphor employed. Resemblance, imitation, obedience, love, or actual descent and possession of the same nature, and many other things which might be mentioned, would furnish a proper foundation for the metaphor of *sonship* and *adoption*. And so these have all been made by different commentators the point of analogy between this common and this Christian relation. But what is the very thing in this new relation which the evangelists and apostles had in view when they called it *sonship*, he only can understand who, by believing in Christ, has had the power given him to become a *son of God*. And even he will understand it better in proportion to the depth and liveliness of his Christian experience, and then only attain to its full import when, in the world of glory, what is here begun in him shall be perfected. This is the *spiritual* perception spoken of, arising from the *personal experience* of the things signified in the holy scriptures; and this experience results from *faith*, which receives the doctrines of revelation in their sanctifying and enlightening power. *Faith*, therefore, has the same relation to divine things that *sense* has to natural things; and it is equally true in one case as in the other, that sense or experience is the only foundation of knowledge,—*sensus est principium cognoscendi*. This seems to be the meaning of Spener and Franke when they say so often that the Holy Spirit is indispensable to the study of theology. That this personal experience, or feeling perception, must precede all true knowledge of the things of revelation,—in other words, that the doctrines of the Bible must be felt, in order to be truly understood, have root in the heart before they can be rightly apprehended by the understanding,—though often deemed an exploded proposition, and in the ears of many perfectly paradoxical, is yet as philosophically just as it is conformed to scripture. This view cannot be better expressed than in the following remarkable words of Pascal:—"Les vérités divines sont infiniment au-dessus de la nature. Dieu seul peut les mettre dans l'ame. Il a voulu qu'ils entrent du cœur dans l'esprit, et non pas de l'esprit dans le cœur. Par cette raison, s'il faut connaître les choses humaines, pour pouvoir les aimer, il faut aimer les choses divines, pour pouvoir les connaître." "Divine things are infinitely above nature, and God only can place them in the soul. He has designed that they should pass from the heart into the head, and not from the head into the heart; and so, as it is necessary to know human things in order to love them, it is necessary to

love divine things in order to know them." Let not the student, then, who would penetrate into the real meaning of the sacred text, rely upon the Grammar and the Lexicon, upon Commentaries and Institutes of Interpretation, which cannot lead beyond the letter. *All true knowledge of the scripture must proceed from the life of faith*; we must believe in order to experience, and experience in order to understand. Such is the import of the following words of Anselmus, which have been chosen by Schleiermacher, one of the profoundest theologians in Germany, for his motto, and which deserve to be engraven on the memory of every student in theology:—"Non enim quæro intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. Nam qui non crediderit, non experietur, et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelliget."

III. When the literal sense of scripture has been ascertained by grammatical and historical interpretation, and when the hidden meaning of the sacred hieroglyphics has been unlocked by a believing experience of the things signified, then are the materials provided for theological science; as yet, however, confused and disorganized. With these insulated experiences, and the direct processes of the spiritual life, many would have us remain contented, and are jealous of the reflective and systematizing acts of the mind. This is the mistake of the *Mystici impuri*, and of many sincerely pious, but less enlightened Christians in modern times. They justly ascribe much of the coldness, contention, and heresy that has disturbed and corrupted the church, to the influence of speculative reason, and would gladly exclude it wholly from the province of faith. But they overlook the imperfections of religion when it exists merely as *feeling*, and the darkness, confusion, and extravagance which result from the want of strict science in the doctrines of Christianity. These evils are not merely incidental to simple faith, but almost inseparable from it; for what can prevent that exaggeration of its particular objects, to which feeling always tends, and give to each its due importance, but that view of the whole which science alone can furnish? These evils were not overlooked by Spener; and he contended for the proper use of system and science in religion with a zeal only inferior to that with which he contended against their abuse. He held the just medium between the pious enthusiast and the cold speculator; and wished that the system might proceed from a living faith and be pervaded by it, and that faith might be regulated and rectified by thorough system; and he thus aimed to secure to Christianity, what it may justly claim, *the whole man*; the powers of the understanding and the feelings of the heart.

The effort to attain to an insight into the in-

ternal connection of the various objects of our experience, to attain to the one principle under which the phenomena we witness may be classed,—the effort, in short, which lies at the foundation of science in every department, is one of the original and higher efforts or instincts of the human soul; and though in some periods, and in individual minds, it is less predominant, at other times, and in other minds, it is wholly irrepressible. Its utility in reducing to order the disconnected elements of human knowledge, and in constructing from them an organized whole, cannot be questioned; and why should not this systematizing, organic instinct of the mind be suffered to employ itself upon the nobler elements of religious knowledge, scattered over the page of revelation and of experience, collecting and classifying them, and from them constructing an harmonious system of religious truth?

Here it must be remarked, that a believing experience is equally essential to a truly scientific combination of all the doctrines of Christianity as to an adequate understanding of each particular one. In every scientific system, the parts should have a real relation to one great object, for which the whole is constructed; and if we would have it a living, and not a lifeless organization, we must have this great object *within ourselves*. The name of *science* cannot justly be applied to a mere artificial collocation of particulars, wanting internal unity, and destitute of a pervading soul. Hence it may be safely affirmed, that true theological science is possible only on condition of personal Christian experience; this alone can furnish the last end, the point of unity, the living spirit of the whole. Where this does not exist, combining the results of the mere philological study of the Bible furnishes at best a piece of lifeless mechanism, where the parts cohere, as the cards in the puppet, and not as the limbs in the body. It was from the exegetical school in Asia Minor, and from the feet of the philologist Lucian, that the heresiarch Arius proceeded; and his error arose, in a great measure, from his making the Bible grammatically interpreted, separately from the light of experience, the foundation of theology.* The elements of theological science should not, therefore, be drawn solely from the written page of revelation; the contents of this page must be first transferred to the tablets of the heart; these inward tablets must then be studied, and strictly compared with the outward letter; and from this faithful and living transcript, corresponding with the original revelation, and from this revelation thus transferred to the heart, the elements of the system must be derived. The direction here given, to make the results of Christian ex-

perience, derived from and regulated by the written word, rather than the mere fruits of the exegetical study of the Bible, the elements of theological science, is, I believe, in the spirit of the founders of this school of biblical and practical Christianity. Theological study is happily turning more and more to the inward scroll of experience; and instances might easily be mentioned, did my limits permit, in which the established ecclesiastical system has been rectified, by being made to answer more entirely to the demands of pious feeling.* When Christian faith shall receive and hold the pure and unadulterated truths of revelation, and Christian theology shall wholly correspond to Christian faith, then will the science of Christianity attain its highest perfection.

IV. The system of truth which was adopted by the founders of this school agreed substantially with that of their contemporaries, although the eagle-eyed malignity of Deutschmann of Wittenberg espied no less than two hundred and sixty heresies in a single writing of Spener. The latter, however, and his associates, professed to hold the doctrines contained in the established symbols, and differed from the theologians of the other universities only with respect to the grounds on which they believed them, and the ends for which they employed them. While their contemporaries believed in these doctrines because they were contained in the symbols, the theologians of Halle believed them because, after independent investigation, they found them contained in the word of God, and confirmed by their own experience. And while their contemporaries employed these doctrines for no other purposes than speculation and contention, they insisted *that the doctrines of revelation should be taught in the universities, as well as exhibited in the pulpit, with the ultimate design of promoting personal piety*. This was their fourth general principle respecting the study of theology, and that which procured for their school the honourable distinction of a school of *practical* theology. They regarded it as almost certain that students in theology would treat the doctrines of Christianity as public teachers very much as they had been accustomed to hear them treated at the university,—that if they had been taught theology in a scholastic method, they would probably fall into the same method in preaching. Such had really been the effect of the speculative turn given to theological instruction. Students of theology had come from the university expert and disputatious metaphysicians, rather than evangelical pastors, well qualified by their own experience of divine truth to impart it with sincerity and earnestness to others; and the piety of the church wanting its

* Vide Neander, Allgem. Kirchengeschichte, b. ii. Abth. 2, s. 770.

* Vide Schleiermacher, in the last article in his "Zeitschrift," s. 29, and especially s. 299—304.

proper nutriment, the simple truth of the gospel had long been declining. The first theologians at Halle sought to remedy these evils at their very source, to apply the doctrines of salvation to their own case, and keep their own hearts alive to the practical influence of revealed truth; and then to induce their hearers to abstain from useless questions, and see to it that they themselves were built upon that foundation, which it would be their duty to point out to others, and to show them how the doctrines of the Bible should be exhibited in order to answer the ends for which they were given—the conviction and conversion of sinners, and the consolation and encouragement of believers. It was in pursuance of these objects that Franke delivered his “*Lectiones Paræneticæ*,” which were followed by more real and lasting benefit than any other part of his academical labours. They were first delivered by him in his own study, and afterwards in the public hall of the theological faculty, one hour a week—viz., from 10 to 11 o'clock on Thursday, when other exercises were suspended, that all the students in the theological department might be at liberty to attend. In the preface to the first collection of these lectures, Franke gives the following account of them:—“I have not been accustomed to follow any particular method in these lectures, but have made it my rule to say on each occasion what I saw then to be most necessary to the students in theology, either to promote their thorough conversion and Christian walk, or the wise and orderly prosecution of their studies, that they might be at length sent forth as faithful, wise, and useful labourers in the vineyard of the Lord, each according to the gift granted to him by God.”

Such were the principles of the founders of the university at Halle respecting the study of theology; and it deserves to be remarked that on these principles, and these alone, theology is a distinct and independent science. On these principles, it is the science of truths revealed by God and received by faith, and is thus, in a twofold sense, *divine*—viz., as to the *original source* of its truths, and the *organ* through which they are transmitted to the reflecting mind; that faith which the Holy Spirit produces in the heart. It is in this way distinguished from all human sciences; not that the scientific effort of the mind (the effort to bring connexion and unity into our various experiences) is different in the two cases, for this is not supposed; but that the materials about which this scientific effort is employed are different in theology and in human sciences. This is a distinction which the immortal Bacon acknowledges in a passage which deserves careful consideration at the present time:—“*Scientia aquarum similis est; aquarum aliæ descendunt cœlitus, aliæ emanant e terra.*

*Etiam scientiarum primaria partitio sumenda est ex fontibus suis; horum alii in alto siti sunt; alii hic infra. Omnis enim scientia duplicem sortitur informationem. Una inspiratur divinitus; aliter oritur a sensu. Partiemur igitur scientiam in theologiam et philosophiam. Theologiam hic intelligimus inspiratam, non naturalem.”** By this division of the sciences according to their sources, a perfect independence of all others is secured to theology. The believer in revelation draws the doctrines of his creed from a higher source, and so holds them with perfect certainty, without waiting for the results which may be attained in the lower sphere of philosophy. Indeed, he considers them not only as true, but as the test and standard of all truth, and so he looks without fear for the stability of his faith upon the highest advances of light and knowledge. Are any discoveries alleged, or any hypotheses maintained in opposition to the truths of revealed religion, he presupposes the latter to be true, and concludes that the former, however plausibly supported, are false. In short, he acknowledges the correctness of the principles of science and philosophy only so far as they admit a source and order of truth above their measure; and the validity of their results only so far as they illustrate and confirm, or at least are consistent with, the doctrines and facts of revelation. This is indeed an elevated stand, but one which the believer in revelation is entitled to assume, and has always been able to maintain. Where is the declaration of Scripture which has been fairly disproved by philosophy, or by any of the sciences, most of which have begun to exist since the Bible was written? On the other hand, how universally have the theories and alleged discoveries, which were supposed to invalidate the Scriptures, proved in the end false and imaginary. From every attack of an infidel philosophy the truth of revelation has come off triumphant, justifying the confidence of those who implicitly receive it, and putting to shame the exultation of unbelievers. So far from bringing up the rear, the science of revelation has led the van in this general march of knowledge and improvement, and has in many cases from the first held forth truths which philosophy afterwards adopted when it became more enlightened.†

How unworthy, then, of the dignity and independence of the true theologian is the procedure of some of the modern professors of theological science, who are ready to relinquish the clearest doctrines of the Bible on the first semblance of discrepancy between them and a philosophy which acknowledges no revelation. There are

* De dignit. et augm. Scientia. l. iii. cap. 1.

† Consider—e. g., the doctrine of *creation from nothing*, long a doctrine of theology, but only lately of philosophy.

many styled theologians who do not hesitate to abandon such truths as the creation of the world, the fall of man, native corruption, vicarious atonement, future resurrection, heaven and hell, on the first flourish of arms from the corps of infidel *dilettanti*. But they forget that geology, anthropology, and the kindred sciences, which they seem to consider infallible, are from their very nature as *experimental*, incomplete, and cumulative, continually leaving earlier results behind. They forget that there are other hypotheses equally supported which tend to confirm revelation, and that what God has spoken—the firm prophetic and apostolic word—is not subject to human revision. By their gratuitous concessions to philosophy and science, they deprive Christian theology of its proper elements, and Christian faith of the ground of its reliance. They make the great truths upon which the heart must rest for consolation and hope, dependent upon the advances of the experimental sciences. We are thus left to drift about on this dangerous sea, while the holy heights to which we once lifted our eyes, and beheld them kindled with the revealed glory of heaven to guide us on our passage thither, now burn only with the uncertain fires of this modern illumination. These are, indeed, unhappy consequences, but we are told they are inevitable. Theologians, it is said, have no choice left them, and must adopt the splendid results which are every day disclosed in all departments of knowledge; and if they would not suffer theology to fall into contempt, must admit some compromise between its antiquated doctrines and the rapid progress of light. To effect this compromise is the office assigned to modern RATIONALISM by one of its ablest apologists. Rationalism, says Bretschneider,* designs to restore the interrupted harmony between theology and human sciences, and is the necessary product of the scientific cultivation of modern times. But whence the necessity of this compromise? It is a necessity with which the believer in revelation can never be pressed, and which certainly was not felt by theologians of the old stamp. They had not asserted their independence of the pope and the schoolmen only to yield it again to the empiric; and as to the advantages of this compromise, what has really been accomplished by this far-famed rationalism after all its promises? It professed friendship for Christianity, but has proved its deadly foe; standing within the pale of the church, it has been in league with the enemy without, and has readily adopted every thing which infidelity could engender, and as studiously rejected every thing which true philosophy has done to confirm the truths of revelation. It promised to save theology from

contempt; and how has this promise been performed? In the days of Spener, theology was the queen of sciences, so acknowledged by the mouth of Bacon, Leibnitz, Haller, and others, their chosen oracles. She wore the insignia of divinity, and “filled her odorous lamp” at the very original fountain of light; but, in an evil hour, she took this flattering rationalism to her bosom. Now, stripped of every mark of divinity, cut off from her native sources of light, and thrust out into the dark, this foolish virgin is compelled to say to her sister sciences, “Give me of your oil, for my lamp has gone out.”

The establishment of the school of theology at Halle forms, as was above remarked, an epoch in the history of this science. It gave an impulse which is still felt both for good and for evil, and which will probably be still felt for many ages to come. To the direct influence of this school, considered as reviving and perpetuating the spirit of the Reformation, may be attributed all the favourable results of free and unshackled inquiry in matters of faith. To its indirect influence—to the abuse of the principles upon which it was established—must be ascribed those unprecedented evils which have been lately inflicted upon the German church. In one way or another, this school stands connected with those great diverging tendencies, whose violent conflict have made the last period of theological development more interesting and important than any which have preceded. The principles of Spener, made effective by the labours of his faculty at Halle, are the secret leaven which has wrought all this commotion in the once lifeless mass of orthodoxy. It would be highly interesting to follow down the history of this school, and trace minutely the salutary influence of its principles, as far as they have been observed, and the evils resulting from the abuse of them. My narrow limits, however, will permit me only to describe very briefly the issues of these principles in *pietism* on the one hand, and *rationalism* on the other, and to show in what points these two opposing directions deviate from the just medium of this Protestant school of biblical and practical theology, to which they both claim to belong.

We have seen, that according to the principles of this school, *faith* and *science*, πίστις and γνῶσις, are made essential to the theologian. And in the early teachers of this school, and some of their immediate successors, we have fine examples of the just balance and mutual influence of piety and learning. Their piety was regular, enlightened, and uniform, through the influence of their knowledge of religious truth; while their knowledge was humble, vital, and sound, through the influence of faith and piety. But one acquainted with the imperfection of human nature, and with the history of the church, could

* Vide his “Sendschreiben,” s. 78.

hardly expect that this happy combination would long continue. Piety, which has its seat in the feelings, has ever tended to shun the restraints and regulations which reflection and system impose; and speculation has been equally prone to dissociate itself from piety, and to abandon the Word of God and Christian faith as the only foundation of religious knowledge. At an early period of the church, we see the practical and theoretical spirit in violent opposition, under the peculiar forms and names of *montanism* and *gnosticism*. At a later period in the western church, the elements of *πυρ* and *γνῶσις* were again separated and in conflict, assuming the new type of *mysticism* and *scholasticism*. And in the period now under consideration, the same contention again exists, under the still different aspect of *ascetic pietism* and *rationalism*. The practical tendency of the founders of this school, being unaccompanied in some of their successors by the theoretical tendency, degenerated into a dark, ascetic, bigoted pietism. Their theoretical tendency, being in others of their successors separated from the practical,—the head divorced from the heart, degenerated into that cold and malignant form of speculation known by the name of rationalism.

The first instance in the latter period in which we discover the incipient alienation of the practical from the theoretical direction of mind, is the opposition which arose at Halle to the philosophy of Wolf. It was very natural for theologians to feel, that Wolf allowed too much scope to speculative reason when he attempted to demonstrate the highest problems of metaphysics, the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, &c., with mathematical precision and certainty. And in condemning these assumptions of reason respecting matters of faith, the theologians of Halle only anticipated the sentence which Kant and his followers afterwards pronounced upon the dogmatism of the earlier philosophy. The jealousy in guarding the province of faith against the invasions of speculative reason thus excited, was heightened by the writings of the English and French deists and free-thinkers, then beginning to be known and circulated in Germany. Upon these writings they looked with abhorrence; and at length the thought naturally arose, that if such were the results of philosophy, it was the foe of religion, and should be wholly discarded. But when they arrived at this partial and rash conclusion, and acted according to it, they fell into the excesses with which the same mistake has always been attended. From the neglect and contempt of scientific cultivation, their views of divine truth soon became superficial. Their piety became more and more a matter of mere feeling, and, wanting the re-

straints of reflection, degenerated into wild enthusiasm, or dark, severe, and ostentatious bigotry. These results have almost invariably followed an undue jealousy of learning in matters of faith, and teach, in a language too loud and distinct to be disregarded, the importance of a thorough acquaintance with systematic theology. Too much practical religion we cannot have; but that the highest purity and safety of the church demand more attention than is usually paid in this country to the *science* of the Christian religion, can hardly be questioned. It should be remembered, that it was upon this degenerate and corrupt pietism, which began to infect the body of the church when the science of religion was neglected, that the corrosive poison of infidelity first seized and fed. Had the ardent and practical piety of all the successors of the first teachers at Halle been associated with the theoretical spirit, as it was in Freylinghausen, Baumgarten, and a few others, infidelity could never have made such ravages in the church.

Far more fatal, however, is the other of the above-named divergences from the principles of the biblical school of theology. Speculation on the subject of religion, where living faith is not associated with it, is attended with a twofold danger. The true spiritual understanding of the truths of religion being dependent upon the principle of faith, where this does not exist, error in doctrine is almost inevitable. But, what is more important to be considered, the only antidote to the pride and blindness of natural reason is the corrective, sanctifying influence of faith as a living principle in the heart. Where reason is unhumbled, and its disorders are unrectified by the pervading influence of true piety, its exercise on the subjects of religion cannot be salutary, or even safe. The unbeliever is therefore doubly disqualified for forming a right judgment upon the particular doctrines of religion, and for combining them into a correct system; he wants that experience by which alone he can truly understand them, and that humility and reverence for the deep things of God, which is the only spirit of inquiry congenial with the truths of the gospel.

The nature and effects of rationalism, the great object of which is, to deny that the Holy Scriptures and Christian faith are the only and essential foundation of religious science, and to proclaim the reason of man as the source and arbiter of the truths of religion, has been already briefly described. A few words in addition, respecting its relation to this protestant school of theology, will be sufficient for my present object. It is well known that rationalists profess to act in accordance with the principles of protestantism, when they carry their freedom of investigation even to the point of denying alike the

fact and the possibility of revelation. But this freedom is entirely different from that for which the protestants contended. In performing their work as protestants, they assumed both the fact and authority of revelation. They had, indeed, in the legitimate use of reason, well investigated these points, and did not receive the Scriptures as the word of God without conclusive evidence. But they contended only for entire freedom from ecclesiastical authority in determining what the Scriptures, admitted to be a revelation from God, really taught to men. They asserted the right of the Christian believer to derive the truths of Christianity from revelation itself, in contradistinction to the authority of any uninspired men; but by no means the right of any man to receive or reject at option the fact or the authority of a revelation. This right, by whomsoever claimed, is not the right which Luther or Spener advocated. In performing their work as reformers, they thus assumed the principles which rationalists deny. They came forward appealing to the testimony of Christ, of prophets and apostles, against the errors and abuses of the church. Rationalists claim fellowship with them, while they question and deny the validity of this very testimony. The protestants did not undertake to lay another foundation than that which is laid; and wished only to prove the work of every man who builds thereon. But rationalists strike at the foundation itself; they set aside the whole historic basis of Christianity, and would substitute for the unerring word of God and Christian faith, which are the same in every age, the fallible, unsanctified, and changing reason of man. The protestants were *reformers* only, but rationalists are *innovators* and *revolutionizers*, aiming to overturn the whole Christian system. The protestants, in short, protested against the errors of the Romish church; rationalists, against the truth of the gospel. It must be obvious, then, that rationalism can claim but little kindred with the true spirit of protestantism, and bears a much nearer affinity to that wild, revolutionary, infidel spirit, which arose at nearly the same time in France, and swept over the face of Europe.

It would be a mistake also to suppose, that rationalism, like the Alexandrine Gnosis, or the scholasticism of the middle ages, is objectionable only in the excess to which it carries speculation on subjects of faith. This excess is indeed contrary to the maxims which we have been considering, which require a just proportion between faith and knowledge. It is not so much, however, the *quantity* as the *quality* of speculation, which constitutes the malignity of rationalism. It is speculation without the corrective influence of a sanctified heart; it is reason in all its natural pride and darkness, unhumbled and unenlightened by divine influence;

it is science wanting that heavenly *CHARITAS*, *cujus mixtio*, says Bacon, *temperat scientiam, eamque saluberrimam efficit*, and without which, *omnis scientia malignum quid habet venenosumque, flatuosius symptomatibus plenissimum*; it is this character and quality of speculative reason, and not its mere excess, which makes rationalism the terror and abhorrence of religion.

These diverging tendencies had already become distinct when our author appeared upon the stage, and the theologians of Halle were then divided into different schools, according as they adhered more closely to the principles of Spener and Franke, or fell in either with the more ascetic or the more free and liberal principles then prevailing. His father had been elected in 1737 to the theological faculty at Halle, and was associated with the younger Franke in the direction of those institutes of learning and charity which are generally known by the name of the Orphan House. He had seen the example, and heard the instructions, of the founders of the university, and was one of the few who had walked in their footsteps. He laboured, though with a mildness and moderation which won the praises even of his opponents, to promote practical Christianity, in opposition to the bold and reckless speculations of some of his colleagues. His only son, the author of these lectures, George Christian Knapp, was born in the Orphan House at Glaucha in Halle on the 17th of Sept., 1753, and received his early education in the Royal Pædagogium, one of the cluster of institutes there established by Franke.* In a brief account which he himself has given of his early life, he mentions a fact not a little creditable to the personal character of his father. "Nec tamen acquievit pater," says he, "in publica illa, qua in scholis fruebar institutione; sed ubi vacuus a negotiis erat, ipse me instituit; et quid in schola profecissem percunctando cognovit, variis que exercitationibus, ingenium excitare et judicium acuerè studuit."

He entered the university at Halle, Sept. 1770, in the 17th year of his age, and there attended the lectures of Semler, the first herald of the false illumination then breaking upon the world, and of Noesselt, Gruner, and others, who were one in feeling and action with Semler. During the first year of his course, he sustained a great loss in the death of his father. But in pursuance of his counsels, and in the very spirit of those early teachers at Halle whom he had been taught from his youth to venerate, he devoted himself to the study of the original Scriptures; and made it his great object to become thoroughly acquainted with the language, the facts, and the doctrines of the Bible. With what unusual success he prosecuted these exegetical studies,

* For an account of these institutes, vide *Biblical Repository*, vol. i. No. I. p. 30.

may be inferred from his programm, "Ad Vaticinium Jacobi," Genesis, xlix. 1—27, and from his disputation, "De Versione Alexandrina," both contained in his "Scripta Varii Argumenti;" and also from his translation of the Psalms, all of which were composed and published, either during his pupilage at Halle, or shortly after its completion.

While at the university he also pursued the study of the Latin and Greek classics with great zeal. Of the value of this study to the theologian there can be little doubt. It not only prepares him to understand the language, and relish the beauties of the sacred classics, but furnishes him with those analogies of feeling and opinion which are highly important in the illustration of revealed truth. The writings of Dr. Knapp are everywhere enriched by the various illustrations of scriptural ideas, which he draws from Grecian and Roman literature.

He completed his studies at Halle, in April, 1774; and after an absence of a few months, which he spent in study at Göttingen, in visiting the most celebrated cities in Germany, and forming acquaintances with the most distinguished men, he returned, and in 1775 began to lecture upon Cicero, and also upon the New Testament, and some of the more difficult portions of the Old. He was at that time in feeble health, and probably could hardly have believed that he should be continued half a century in the employment which he then commenced. The unusual approbation with which he was heard in these courses obtained for him the appointment, first of Professor Extraordinary (1777), and then of Professor Ordinary (in 1782). In addition to his exegetical courses, he now lectured on church history and Jewish and Christian antiquities. But he was not, like the great majority of the professors in the German universities, employed merely in academical labours. On the death of Freylinghausen (1785), he and Niemeyer were appointed Directors of Franke's Institutes, and continued jointly to superintend these noble and extensive establishments for more than forty years. In the division of duties, the oversight of the Bible and missionary establishment fell to Dr. Knapp, and he was thus brought into connection with the Moravian brethren.

It was in the summer of the same year in which he received this appointment, and after he had often lectured on subsidiary branches, that he commenced the composition of the lectures on history now presented to the public. As he continued his regular courses in exegesis and history, was occupied partly in the concerns of the institutes, and was moreover often interrupted in his studies by severe illness, he did not complete them before the summer of 1789, when he first read them before a class of 186.

After this time he continued to lecture on theology (though latterly in shorter courses) until near his death, and always to numerous auditories.

But while his life passed away in these pursuits so congenial to his taste, he was not freed from those pains and sorrows which are the common lot of man. His peaceful professional career was frequently interrupted by the political disorders of the times, and the repeated occupation of Halle by foreign troops. His domestic peace was also invaded by the long-continued illness of his wife, and by the violent sickness with which he himself was often attacked, and the constant infirmity under which he laboured. These evils, however, great as they might be, must have appeared trivial in comparison with those with which he saw the church afflicted. He was called to behold new principles, which he regarded as false and dangerous, rapidly supplanting those in which he had been educated, and to which, from his own conviction, he was attached. He was compelled to hear the truths which he held most sacred and precious treated with profane levity. He found himself, at last, the only decided advocate of evangelical religion among the professors at Halle, and exposed to ridicule and contempt for teaching the very doctrines in which Spener and Franke had most gloried. These were trials under which his natural firmness and composure must have failed him, and in which he could be supported only by a pious confidence in God. He cherished this confidence, and through its influence remained unmoved during times of unparalleled darkness and danger. Nor was his confidence misplaced. Towards the close of his life the prospect seemed to brighten. The *better times* which Spener thought so near, but which had been long delayed, seemed again approaching, and it was not difficult to discern the signs of a new epoch at hand. On the third centennial festival in commemoration of the Reformation, which occurred in the year 1817, the slumbering spirit of the evangelical churches was awakened. In a programm which our author delivered on that occasion, and which is inserted in his "Scripta Varii Argumenti," he poured forth his pious supplications in behalf of the German church and his beloved university in a strain of unusual eloquence. From that time he had the joy of beholding the cause which he held most dear gradually gaining ground. His own reputation, too, increased with his declining years. And among the most cheerful passages in his life, is that which occurred just before its close. On the first of May, 1825, he had been fifty years connected with the theological faculty of the university, and, according to an established custom, a jubilee festival was then held in his honour; and many were the marks of personal

affection and esteem, as well as the civic and academic honours, then heaped upon the venerable and happy jubilar.

Not long after this, while he was continuing his summer course of theology, he was seized with a violent illness, from which he never recovered. He died in peace and Christian confidence, on the 14th day of October, 1825, in the 73d year of his age. According to his particular direction, his remains were interred privately, early on the third morning after his decease, in his family tomb, by the side of his wife, who had died eight years before. He requested, with that genuine modesty for which he was always distinguished, that in the public notices of his death nothing should be said to his honour, and that it should only be witnessed of him that he lived by faith in the words, "I know that my Redeemer liveth."

Few are the men whose lives are so uniform, happy, and useful. Born and educated in the midst of those noble institutes which stand a living monument of the faith of their founder—blessed with the example and instructions of a father, high in office and eminent for excellence and learning,—the inheritor of his virtues, and called afterwards by Providence to succeed him both as director of Franke's Institutes and as theological professor,—richly provided with the means of improvement, and freed from the embarrassments with which the acquisition of learning is often attended,—received with favour at the very commencement of his professional duties, and through all the variations of public opinion and feeling thronged by pupils who loved and revered him,—encircled in his family with children and friends, by whom he was fondly cherished,—in his old age permitted to witness the brightening prospects of the cause which was nearest his heart, and honoured with every mark of public confidence and esteem;—he was indeed signally favoured of God. He was faithful in the trust committed to him, and found God faithful to his promises. His labour was not in vain in the Lord; he was blessed during his life, and in death his remembrance does not perish. "Wherever the news shall reach," says Niemeyer, his colleague and eulogist, "that this gifted teacher is for ever removed from the sphere of his labours, there will witnesses arise who will acknowledge how much they owe to his instructions; and even beyond the sea his memory will be cherished and his name not forgotten."

I shall close these prefatory remarks with a general view of the character of Dr. Knapp, and with some more particular information respecting the Lectures now offered to the public.

His bodily constitution was frail and sickly, even from his childhood. He had a complication of disorders, which would have consigned

one less zealous for a life of usefulness, and less resolute in adopting and pursuing the means necessary to attain it, to an indolent and unprofitable existence, or to an early grave. That sickness and bodily infirmity had not this effect upon him, must be attributed to the exact course of discipline which he pursued. In all things he practised the most rigid temperance, and daily took bodily exercise in the open air, measured almost by the minute, and uninterrupted by any severity of weather. "We could hardly have thought," says Niemeyer, in his funeral address, "when we saw him, weak and exhausted, contending with the rude elements, supported by his pilgrim staff, that his frail earthly tabernacle could endure so long." Such was the effect, however, of the rigid discipline which he maintained, that he reached an advanced age, in the midst of arduous public duties, in which he was rarely interrupted, and died at length without having kept his bed for a single day—an example worthy of the consideration of the irresolute hypochondriac who broods over his ailments, and lives a burden to himself and those about him.

In his personal character he was rather amiable than commanding. He possessed in an unusual degree that mildness, benignity, and gentleness of disposition which wins affection, and that integrity, guilelessness, and perfect simplicity of heart which secures confidence. In his intercourse with others he was unassuming, and entirely free from suspicion and jealousy. He was distinguished for punctuality in the fulfilment of all his engagements, and was one of the few men who do every part of duty in its proper time and place. His personal faults were those which almost invariably accompany the excellent attributes of character for which he was distinguished—a degree of timidity, too great desire to please, and fear to offend, and pliability in trying emergencies, where the highest degree of energy is required.

As to the religious character of Dr. Knapp, the evidence in favour of his strictly evangelical piety is clear and decisive. There is no proof of any sudden alteration in his views and feelings on the subject of personal religion, and there are no means, therefore, of ascertaining the precise period when his spiritual life commenced. His is one of the thousand cases in which early parental instruction, by exciting the religious sensibilities of the soul, prepares the way, through the divine blessing, for the higher life of faith. The influence of these early parental instructions, in restraining from hardening vices, and in awakening the moral impulses of the soul, cannot be better described than by his own words:—*"Vitæ morumque præcepta, quæ mihi puero et juveni a. b. parente graviter quidem, sed tamten peramanter, inculcabantur, crebræque exhortationes ad studium pietatis in Deum ac veri*

rectique amorem, menti meæ tam alte infixæ hæserunt, ut earum memoria nunquam deleri poterit. Nam post ejus obitum quoque, si forte adessent peccandi illecebræ, quibus tentari juvenilis ætas solet, statim ejus imago animo meo observabatur, simulque in memoriam revocabam cohortationes omnemque institutionem paternam, qua juvenilis animus mature erat imbutus. Hac cura ac diligentia parentum effectum est unice, ut varia pericula atque incitementa ad peccandum, quibus multos æqualium, optimæ spei juvenis, in academia præsertim, succumbere vidi, feliciter superarem."

The good effect of these pious counsels was in some degree counteracted for a time by the extremely dangerous circumstances in which he was placed at the university, and especially by the instructions of the neological professors, which were as unfavourable to vital piety as they were to sound doctrine. He was naturally somewhat affected by the spirit of the times, though he was never carried so far as to lose his confidence in the authority of the Scriptures, or to join with the scoffers by whom he was surrounded in deriding things sacred. Through the blessing of God he was speedily recovered from this temporary aberration, and became more and more in earnest about his salvation. About the time he was chosen ordinary professor, he began to keep a diary, on the first leaf of which he wrote as follows:—"I have resolved to-day, with the help of God, to write something from time to time respecting my spiritual condition. It is my hope that by this means I shall render myself more observant of my whole character and conduct than, as I must confess to my shame, I have hitherto been. If by the grace of God I succeed in this, oh, how shall I bless this day!" It was not, however, until eight or ten years after this period that he gave that clear evidence of evangelical piety which he exhibited during the latter part of his life. In 1794 he became more decided in opposition to the prevailing unbelief, and in the love and defence of truth; and it is at this period that one of his eulogists* dates his conversion. The fact, however, probably was, that at the time specified the inward life of God in his soul, before hidden, and by adverse influences almost extinct, became more evident and vigorous. As the ways of God in leading men to Christ are often secret and unknown, so too is the operation of the Spirit dwelling in believers. Its presence is often undiscovered; and while it secretly works the mortification of sinful nature and conformity to Christ, the believer himself may be unconscious of the inward mystery of grace; and to others certainly it is wholly imperceptible.

* Dr. Scheibel, of Breslau.

The question *when* his spiritual life commenced is, however, of little interest compared with the question, *how it was exhibited*,—*what were its principal characteristics?* It has been already remarked, that in place of the enlightened and scriptural piety of the first teachers of theology at Halle, some of their successors exhibited a gloomy, exclusive, pharisaical religion, the principal marks of which were an ostentatious display of sanctity, and total abstinence from the innocent enjoyments of life. Very far from this was the character of Knapp's piety. With the deep feeling of his own unworthiness he always associated the genuine evangelical enjoyment arising from the consciousness of the Divine forgiveness and favour. This consciousness diffused a peace and composure within which influenced his external deportment, and made his religion attractive to beholders. Nor was the piety of Knapp of that high-toned mystical cast which appears in many of the speculative theologians of modern Germany. So intense is the process of sublimation to which they sometimes subject their religious feelings, that the solid substance of their piety seems the while to be quite evaporated. To any thing like this, Knapp was wholly indisposed by the natural plainness and simplicity of his character. Among the most prominent characteristics of that piety which he exhibited is the sense of unworthiness, and of dependence on the grace of God. When on the day of his jubilee his merits were largely recounted, he frequently spoke of *what he had omitted to do*, and was prone to confess himself an unprofitable servant. He gratefully ascribed his success in whatever he undertook to the blessing of God, and especially acknowledged him as the author of every good thought, word, and work. His piety was in a high degree *active*; he was unwearied in his efforts to promote the prosperity and enlargement of the kingdom of Christ. By his practical writings he contributed much to revive the declining flame of piety in the German church, and by his exertions in behalf of missions to spread the gospel over the earth. In the severe pains and heavy afflictions which he was called to endure, he honoured religion by his quiet submission to the will of God. His private walk was strictly conformed to the precepts of the gospel; and to all with whom he was associated it was evident that his conversation was in heaven; and this it was which gave to his explanations of the Bible, his lectures on theology, and all his religious instructions, an energy and effect unknown in the labours of those whose lives do not bear witness to their sincerity.

But we are here concerned with Dr. Knapp principally as a teacher and theological professor. For this office he was eminently qualified,

both by the natural endowments of his mind and by his acquisitions. His thoughts on the different subjects to which he turned his attention were plain, natural, and solid. His knowledge was deep and thorough; and he always cautioned his pupils against whatever was showy or superficial in their attainments, as tending to foster that pride of learning which from his very soul he abhorred. To know a little well, rather than a great deal imperfectly, was his invariable direction. The clearness and distinctness of his conceptions rendered his style uncommonly lucid and perspicuous. His hearers were never left in doubt as to his meaning by any vagueness or indefiniteness in his expressions. These were the qualities which made him so highly popular as a teacher. Although he by no means fell in with the prevailing taste of theological study, his lecture-room was always thronged. Students who are really in pursuit of the truth prefer to follow the slow, but certain steps of a teacher, who proceeds in the orderly demonstrative method, rather than of one who is hasty and headlong in his decisions. No teacher was ever more popular in Germany than Baumgarten, and none ever more logical, or painfully slow and moderate in his delivery. In judging of the opinions of others, Knapp was distinguished for *fairness and candour*. He allowed the full weight of their arguments; and while he never spared that profane trifling and contempt with which the doctrines of religion were treated by many of his contemporaries, he did not assume to condemn those who differed from him merely in opinion. Through the exercise of this Christian candour and charity, he was enabled to live in perfect harmony with colleagues whose system of belief and manner of instruction were directly opposite to his own.

The Lectures on Theology now offered to the public were composed, as has been already remarked, between the years 1785 and '89, and first publicly read during the latter year. Although often repeated after that time, and at each reading corrected in minor particulars, they remained, in all their essential features, the same as when first written. This will appear less strange, when it is considered that the author came to the composition of them well versed in all the branches of subsidiary theology. But there is another reason which will perfectly account for the stability of Knapp's theological system, during a period distinguished above all others for rapid fluctuations of opinion, and the rise and fall of philosophical theories. *It was built on the sure foundation of the Holy Scriptures*, and therefore fell not, though the rains descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew. He assumed at the very outset of his theological course, the principle, *that lead where they may,*

the decisions of inspiration are to be fearlessly followed. In the truth of this principle he became more and more confirmed, the more he saw of the uncertainty, pride, and blindness of human reason, in the speculations of contemporary philosophers. And most of the few changes which he made in his lectures were owing to the stricter application of this essential principle in cases where he had before hesitated to apply it, under the influence of the very different principles respecting the word of God which he had learned in the school of Semler. In his earlier statements respecting the doctrines of the Trinity, demoniacal possessions, the prophecies relating to the Messiah, the endlessness of future punishments, &c., as they are given by his German editor Thilo, he was more conformed to the loose and arbitrary principles of his neologian associates, than in his later statements, which the reader will find in the following pages.

In the composition of these lectures, Dr. Knapp followed strictly the principles of the school of Spener and Franke. The Holy Scriptures and Christian experience were the source from which he derived the elements of his system. He endeavoured to illustrate the doctrines of revelation by analogies from classical writers, by showing to what ideas in the human mind they correspond, and what wants of our nature they are intended to meet, and by giving a history of the opinions entertained, and the various learned distinctions adopted respecting them in ancient and modern times. He then endeavoured to combine these doctrines, thus illustrated, into a thorough system. The philosophy which he adopted, and by which he was influenced as far as by any, is that popular eclectic system which prevailed between the downfall of Wolf and the ascendancy of Kant. But he was especially faithful to the requisition, that the *practical effect* of the doctrines of revelation should be ever kept in view by theological teachers. Under each of the important doctrines he gave directions respecting the best mode of presenting them in popular discourse; and these directions constitute a very considerable part of the value of this work.

I will only add a word respecting the translation of these Lectures. I undertook it at the commencement of my theological studies, at the suggestion and with the approbation of my instructors, and soon completed a hasty translation of most of the Articles. In correcting the copy and preparing it for the press, I felt myself tempted to relieve the tediousness of simple revision by entering upon the wide field of theological investigation to which I was pointed by the references of the author, and for which the library in this seminary furnishes ample means. This was in many cases necessary to enable me to understand fully the meaning of the author

These collateral studies have occasioned an unexpected delay in the publication of this work, though I hope they will contribute to render it more complete. I have endeavoured to bring down the *literature* of the more important Articles to the present time, and in doing this have made use of the excellent Manual of Hahn of Leipsic, and of Bretschneider's "Dogmatik." I have frequently introduced important passages from authors referred to by Knapp, but not accessible to readers in general. In some cases in which Knapp differs from the opinion commonly received by theologians in this country, as in the doctrine of decrees; or in which his statements have been corrected or mended by later investigations, as in some portions of the history of the Trinity; I have either stated the opposite opinion, with the reasons for it, or referred to authors where different statements can be found. It must not be inferred, however, that whenever this is not done, the author's opinions are considered to be unexceptionable. It should be distinctly stated, that neither the translator nor the gentlemen by whose advice this work was undertaken, are vouchers for the exact truth of all its doctrines. Of its general correctness they are well satisfied, and this is all for which they are responsible.

The additions made by the translator are in-

cluded in brackets, and are sometimes printed uniformly with the text, though more generally thrown into notes; they are in most cases, though not always, designated by the abbreviation Tr.

The translation which I have given will be found, if compared with the original, to be somewhat free. I have endeavoured to express the meaning of the author, as he himself would have expressed it in English, rather than to follow the German, to the violation of the purity of our own language. The imperfect state of the original text justifies a greater freedom of version than would otherwise be allowable. These lectures were published after the death of their author, without any alteration, from manuscripts which he had never prepared for the press. Many passages are therefore quite incomplete, and could be intelligibly rendered only by a copious paraphrase.

I embrace this opportunity to express my thanks to the gentlemen who have rendered me assistance; and especially to my honoured father, to whose careful revision much of the correctness of this work is to be attributed.

LEONARD WOODS, JUN.

Theological Seminary, Andover,
Sept. 26, 1831.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace for the year 1870, in the several townships of the County of York, Ontario.

In the Township of York, the following persons have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace:—
 In the Township of North York, the following persons have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace:—
 In the Township of East York, the following persons have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace:—
 In the Township of West York, the following persons have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace:—
 In the Township of South York, the following persons have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace:—

INTRODUCTORY


INTRODUCTION.

INTRODUCTION.

SECTION I.

OF RELIGION AND THEOLOGY; AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM.

I. Of Religion.



RELIGION, understood subjectively, and in the widest sense, is commonly defined, *reverence for God, or piety to him*. The objection which Stäudlin and some other modern writers have urged against this definition is not important enough to require us to abandon it. We say of one who performs what he acknowledges to be agreeable to the will of God, that *he reverences God, or is pious*, (*colere deum, cultus dei*.) Thus Kant defines religion to be, *the acknowledgment of our duties as divine commands*. It is clear that two things are essential to piety to God—viz., (1) The knowledge of God, as to his nature, attributes, &c.; of his relation to men, and his disposition towards them; and also of his will. (2) Affections and conduct correspondent with this knowledge; or the application of this knowledge. The *science of religion*, then, is that science which comprises every thing relative to the knowledge and reverence of God. The human understanding is employed about the former, which is called the *theoretic* part of religion, (*γνώσις, πίστις, τὸ πιστεύειν*.) The human will is employed about the latter, which is called the *practical* part of religion, (*τὰ ἔργα, τὸ ποιεῖν*.) These two parts must coexist. One is equally essential with the other. They are, therefore, always connected in the discourses of Christ and the writings of the apostles. Vide John, xiii. 17; Titus, i. 1; Jas. i. 22—27. Vide Morus, p. 2. *biblica nomina religionis*, φῶδος Θεοῦ, &c. τ. λ.

The correctness of this knowledge of God is very important in regard to our conduct. The human mind is compelled to conceive of God as the great ideal of moral perfection, and consequently, to make him the pattern for imitation. False notions, therefore, respecting his nature, attributes, and commands, are in the highest degree injurious to morality.

But religion is often used in a more limited sense, denoting either the theoretic or the practical part merely. And in either of these re-

spects a man is called *religious*. *Religion* is a name which is also very frequently given to the external rites of divine service. And thus a man who lives devoutly, frequents public worship, and observes the ordinances, is called a *religious* man. But this is a perversion of the word, which has bad consequences. Vide Morus, s. 2, not. extra.

Thus far we have considered religion *subjectively*—i. e., in respect to those who possess it. But,

(b) The word *religion* is often used *objectively*, to designate *the whole sum of doctrines respecting God and his will*. But since the notions of men respecting God, and accordingly their piety to him, are very different, *religion* frequently signifies in common language the manner in which God is regarded, according to these preconceived opinions. Thus we speak of the Christian, heathen, and Mahomedan *religion*—i. e., the manner in which God is regarded according to the ideas of Christians, heathen, and Mahomedans. We also speak of changing, professing, denying, embracing, renouncing one's religion, using *religion* in the same sense.

Note.—The Latin word *religio* is derived from the old word *religere*, and from the derivative *religens*, synonymous with *diligens*, *careful*, *strict*. Cic. De Nat. Deor. II. 28, and Gell. Noct. Att. IV. 9. It signifies, literally, *strictness, punctual care, conscientiousness*. Those who exhibited zeal and earnestness in the service of God, as the most important concern, were therefore called *κατ' ἐξοχήν, religiosi*; and their conduct was called *religio* (the name of the Deity being frequently annexed) *dei, or erga deum*. The word *religio*, however, and especially the plural *religiones*, was most commonly used in reference to external worship, rites, and ceremonies. Vide Jerusalem, Betrachtungen über die Wahrheiten der Religion, Th. I. Vide especially, die achte Betrachtung.

II. Of Theology.

Theology is properly *λόγος περὶ Θεοῦ*, (like *ἀστρολογία*.) and this is either *narratio de deo*, or *doctrina de deo*. The most ancient heathen Greeks used it in the first sense. Those who wrote the history of the gods, their works (e. g., cosmogony) and exploits, in short, the mythologists, were called *θεολογία*. Pherecydes of Seyros, who wrote a work entitled *θεολογία*, was

the first who was so called. Homer and Hesiod, too, were theologians in this sense. Moses is said by Philo *θεολογεῖν*, when he gives the history of the creation. The fathers of the church use the same word, sometimes in reference to the doctrine concerning God as a part of all religion, and sometimes in reference to the doctrine of the divine nature of Christ, in opposition to *οικονομία*, the doctrine of his human nature. Whence the phrase, *θεολογεῖν Χριστόν* or *Πνεῦμα ἅγιον*—i. e., to acknowledge Christ or the Holy Spirit as God. Vide Suicer, Thes. Eccles. in verb.

But in the twelfth century, Peter Abelard began to employ this word to denote, particularly learned and scientific instruction in religion. He wrote a system which he called *theologia*; in which respect he was followed by most of the schoolmen. This use was preserved by most of the succeeding theologians. In the seventeenth century, many in the protestant church varied from it, and gave the name *theologia* to any knowledge respecting God and divine things, using the word in its etymological sense. So Musæus, Baier, and others. But in later times, Mosheim, Semler, and others, have endeavoured to revive the ancient use of the schoolmen. Accordingly, when *theology* is taken in *abstracto*, as synonymous with *divinity*, we understand by it *learned or scientific instruction respecting God, subtilior modus discendi doctrinam de deo*. Morus, p. 11.

In general, therefore, theology is the knowledge of God carried to the highest degree of perfection in respect to correctness, clearness, and evidence of which it is susceptible in this world. And a theologian or divine is one who not only understands himself the doctrines of religion, but is able thoroughly to explain, prove, and defend them, and teach them to others.

There is nothing in itself objectionable in using *theology* and *divinity* (Gottesgelehrsamkeit) as synonymous. But, as Morus observes, p. 11, s. 1, it is inconvenient, to say the least, to oppose theology to religion, and to understand by the latter, as many modern writers do, a knowledge of God which is not learned and scientific. Theology is employed about religion, and has the truths of religion for its object. Theology, then, should not be opposed to religion; but *theological* instruction and the *theological* knowledge of religion, to the *popular or catechetical* instruction and knowledge of religion. The latter is suited to men at large; the former, only to the learned, or those wishing to become so.

What we call *divinity* was frequently called by the fathers *γνώσις*, who accordingly called *divines* *γνωστικοί*. Morus, p. 11, n. 2. Divinity is also called *theologia scholastica*, because it is designed for the school, or for learned instruction; also, *theologia aëroamatica*, or *academica*,

in opposition to *popularis* and *catechetica*, religious instruction suited to the comprehension of common people. In the latter, the language of the school and of the science must be avoided; but it cannot be in the former without the sacrifice of thoroughness and distinctness. The terminology of this science and the mode of treating it have always been influenced by the prevailing character of the age, and the current philosophy. Vide s. 9. In the present state of the church a systematic knowledge of religion is indispensable even to the popular teacher. Morus, p. 12, s. 2, and Præf. ad Mori Epit. especially p. xiv. seq. He needs it, as an educated man, for the establishment and confirmation of his own faith, and for the instruction of others. He should only be careful to avoid the systematic or scientific tone in the instruction of the common people and of the young, and to speak in an intelligible, catechetical, and popular manner. The various abuses of the scientific language of theology do not disprove its utility, or decide against its proper use. Vide Steinbart, Gründe für die gänzliche Abschaffung der Schulsprache in der Theologie, 1776, 8vo; and the answer, Brackmann, Apologie der theologischen Systemsprache; Braunschweig, 1778, 8vo.

Theological or scientific religion consists, as well as *popular religion*, of two principal parts: viz. (1) *The theoretic part*, or *theoretic theology*, (Glaubenslehre,) because it proposes dogmas, *θεωρήματα*, *theses*, *propositiones de religione*, which are discovered and established by reflection and investigation. Vide Morus, Præf. p. v. seq. It is also called *theologia dogmatica*, (dogmatik.) For the explanation of this term, let it be observed that *δόγμα* has various significations—viz., a *resolve*, *decree*, *determination*, *ordinance*; then, in the philosophic sense, (a) *an opinion* which we have respecting any doctrine or principle, Col. ii. 14; (b) *the principle or doctrine* (doctrina) *itself*. Hence Pliny expresses it by *placitum*, and Cicero by *decretum*; as, *decreta philosophorum*, Acad. II. 9. Many of the old fathers, as Origen, Basil, Cyril of Jerusalem, employed *δόγμα* in this sense—viz., to designate not merely an opinion respecting certain principles and theoretic doctrines; but these *principles and doctrines themselves*. Used in the former sense, *theologia dogmatica* is properly *theologia historica*, a relation or exhibition of the opinions of theologians respecting particular doctrines. So, for the most part, it was used in the Romish church. Thus we have *Petarii opus de DOGMATIBUS theologorum*—i. e., concerning the opinions of the fathers, &c. In this sense, too, it was commonly employed by protestants until the commencement of the eighteenth century. Employed in the latter sense, *theologia dogmatica* is the same as *theoretic*, in

opposition to *practical* or *moral* theology. In the same way, Seneca, Ep. 95, and others of the ancient stoics, divided philosophy into *theoretic* (dogmatica) and *practical* (parænetica). This name of the theoretic part of theology was introduced into the protestant church principally by Pfaff and Buddeus, who, in 1721—23, published their manuals under the title, *Theologia dogmatica et moralis*. Vide Stange, Symmicta, I. 156. (2) *The practical part*, morals, ethics. This was formerly always united, even in scientific instruction, with the theoretic part of religion. So it was in Melancthon, (Loc. Theol.,) in Chemnitz, and in all the systems of the sixteenth century. These two connected sciences were called *theologia thetica*, and the doctrines contained in them, *theses*, in opposition to *theologia antithetica*,* or *polemica*, (critical theology.) Calixtus of Helmstadt, in the seventeenth century, was the first who undertook to separate *doctrinal* from *moral theology* in scientific instruction. Since his time this division has remained.

Cf. Morus, Epitome Theologiæ Christianæ, p. 1—3, s. 1—4.

SECTION II.

OF RELIGION, AS THE MEANS OF THE MORAL IMPROVEMENT AND PERFECTION OF MEN.

1. It is an established point that men *can* become morally better than they actually are. Each individual must acknowledge that *he himself* can become morally better than he actually is. He thus confesses that there is a *possibility*, an internal capacity (Anlage) in his nature for becoming better than he is. Now this capacity of human nature for moral advancement is an incontrovertible proof that man is designed for a higher moral perfection than he commonly possesses or attains; for, from the internal capacity which we perceive in a thing we always must determine its destination. From the nature of the seed, we conclude that it was designed to develop the germ; from the nature and properties of the foot, that it was designed for walking, &c. It is exactly the same in respect to the whole intellectual constitution. Man was designed for all that for which he has an original capacity, and God can require of him no less perfection than that for which he has designed him.

Note.—The true destination of man, as a reasonable being, is, *ever progressive moral perfection*, (holiness, as the Bible calls it,) and the *happiness proportionately connected with it*. The

moral feeling by which we determine what is right or wrong, morally good or evil, is essentially founded in our very natures. Every thing which opposes the great end of man, or interferes with his higher destination, is morally evil; and every thing which promotes this destination, or leads to this end, is morally good. Vide infra, sec. 51. II.

2. Many, however, do not attain that moral perfection for which they were designed by God in the constitution which he has given them. In all men, without exception, in their natural state, we find *bodily appetite* predominant, and far more strong than *moral principle*. Men are either deficient in the power requisite to govern their appetites, and to perform what is good, or they do not properly employ the power which they possess. In either case the result is the same; for if the powers which man possesses sleep unemployed, a new power is necessary to move, animate, and strengthen them.

3. But man must be *able* to attain to that for which God has designed him. His destination, as learned from his constitution, is to increase continually in moral perfection. He must then be able to attain to this end. But man has not the power *in himself* of increasing in moral worth; he must consequently obtain it elsewhere. God must have appointed a means, the employment of which has an efficacy in promoting the moral improvement of men; since he cannot be supposed to have designed them for an end which is absolutely unattainable.

4. It might seem, perhaps, that this means should be sought in a merely philosophical knowledge and belief of the duties which natural law prescribes, or in the clear and lively perception of moral truths. Many have held that man could in this way be made morally perfect and virtuous without *religious* motives. When men, they say, are convinced of the necessity of obedience to the precepts of natural law, and believe that rewards and happiness are inseparably connected with obedience, they will find this conviction, and this hope of the reward which virtue always bestows, sufficient to impel and empower them to the practice of goodness.

This theory might be true in application to a being purely rational, such as man is *not*. But it is wholly untrue in application to a being composed, as we are, of reason and sense. This philosophical reward of virtue, and consequently, this merely philosophical conviction, are insufficient to prompt the more noble virtues, such as the sacrifice of one's own interest to the happiness and advantage of others.

Experience, too, speaks clearly against the sufficiency of this means. It teaches that the fullest conviction of duty is far from giving men the power to overcome their sinful inclinations and desires. Let every one question himself on

* *Refutation* (antithetik) is called in the Scriptures ἀντιχρῆς, 2 Tim. iii. 16; Tit. i. 9. Hence the phrase *theologia elenctica*, ἐλεγκτική, (elenktik,) which Turretin uses. Friedmann Bechmann, a theologian of Jena, in the seventeenth century, first used the phrase, *theologia polemica*, and wrote a book under that title. Stange, ubi supra, p. 161.

this particular. Let him carefully examine one single day of his life. Besides, does it appear that the great multitude of the philosophical teachers of morals, in Christian and heathen lands, at present and formerly, are actually better and more virtuous, with all their clear light and conviction, than the great mass of other men? Vide Flatt, *Magazin für Dogm. und Moral.* St. I. s. 240. f. Tübing. 1796.

As this means, considered separately, is insufficient, it cannot be the only one appointed by God. For God cannot be supposed to have indicated to men an insufficient means. The knowledge and belief of the requisitions of natural law and of moral truths are, in themselves, very good and necessary. But from what has been said, it follows that some quickening power is needed to give this knowledge an influence upon the human will, and a power to overcome the appetites of our animal nature.

5. This power to overcome moral evil, and to perform what is morally good, is to be sought and found only in *religion*, or in our *relation to God*, or in *belief in God* as our supreme governor, lawgiver, and judge. This power operates by means of that lively conviction and assurance which religion imparts respecting the will of the supreme lawgiver, and the reward of virtue and punishment of vice, depending upon him. We neither possess, nor are acquainted with, any stronger power than this for promoting the moral perfection of the human race. This, then, must be the divinely appointed means, in the use of which men may obtain the strength which they need.

In respect to religion, we find that the whole human race proceed in one and the same path. Some, indeed, deviate from it for a time, but, in adverse circumstances, in those hours when they need consolation for themselves and others, they soon feel the necessity of returning. It must, then, be according to the nature of man, of which God is the author, to proceed in this path.

Let not the great variety of religions which frequently stand in opposition to one another, be objected against us. Subtracting from all these different religions whatever in them is *false* or *incidental*, there will always be left the idea of piety to God, and of a righteous retribution to be expected from him, as supreme lawgiver and judge. This idea appears among all people and nations, as soon as they begin to exercise their reason. It is, indeed, very differently modified and developed, according to the difference of the circumstances and of the intellectual and moral capacity of each. But, as to all which is essential, the whole human race are agreed. And it is just this essential part of religion which is the very best spring of real or supposed virtues, and therefore the means appointed by God for the moral improvement of

men. And since religion is appointed to man as the means of fulfilling his destiny, it must have *truth* for its foundation; for it cannot be supposed that God would deceive man by the appointment of a false and unsuitable means.

Cf. Morus, s. 4, et passim.

SECTION III.

OF NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION.

THE knowledge of God, his moral government over the world, and his will, can be obtained in two ways. *First*, by means of *nature*. Vide Morus, p. 3, 4. s. 5, 6. This is a source of knowledge which even the *heathen* possess, and for the neglect of which even they have no excuse, Rom. i. 20. *Secondly*, by means of an *immediate* or *direct revelation from God*. Vide Morus, p. 7, seq. In reference to this twofold source of knowledge, religion has been divided into *natural* and *revealed*. This distinction is made by Paul, Rom. ii. 12, seq., coll. i. 19, seq. He calls the direct divine revelation *νόμος*; and those who do not enjoy it, and know God merely from nature, *ἀνόμοι* and *νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες*. Cf. Ps. xix. 1—6. Here belongs Acts, xiv. 16, seq., coll. xvii. 26, seq.

But when nature is spoken of as a source of the knowledge of God, *external* nature alone is not meant, as is often supposed; but also our *internal*, *moral* nature, our *moral consciousness*. Every man capable of reflection finds (1) one source of the knowledge of God in *surrounding nature*, which, when he reflects upon it, invites and conducts him to a knowledge of its author, Ps. xix. 1—6; Rom. i. 20; Acts, xiv. 17; coll. xvii. 24, seq. He finds (2) another source of the knowledge of God in *himself*, in his *own conscience*, which distinctly acquaints him with a supreme and invisible judge of his thoughts and actions, Rom. ii. 12—16; Acts, xvii. 27—31.

The following remarks may serve to illustrate this division:—

1. We have before proved that the strong belief and assurance of the will of God, the supreme lawgiver, and of a retribution to be expected from him as governor and judge, are the means of our moral perfection. Vide s. 2, No. 5. We might hence conclude that God would give certainty to both of these particulars by a direct revelation. The results to which natural religion leads the few who have opportunity and ability to understand it in its best state, are indeed important, in themselves considered. Yet even the natural knowledge of God of this purer kind, leaves men in perplexing doubt on many very important points, as soon as they begin rightly to feel their wants. It cannot, therefore, afford them *all* that assistance which they need for their moral improvement and perfection. What Pliny said (*Hist. Nat.*

XXX. 1) of his own and earlier times still holds true—*ad religionem maximè etiamnum caligat humanum genus*. Gesneri Chr. Plin. 757. 5, cf. 760, not. We should therefore naturally expect that God would supply these defects in natural religion by means of direct revelation.

We must not, however, found our belief in a direct revelation upon an *a priori* demonstration. The simple question is, *Has a revelation actually been made?* This is a question of fact, the answer to which must, of course, be sought from *history*. That a revelation has *not* been made, or is not *possible*, can by no means be proved *a priori*. If the fact can be historically proved, all reasoning to the contrary amounts to nothing. Now, Christians believe that the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament are the records of the true divine revelation. In the article on the holy scriptures we shall inquire whether this opinion is historically true. In the remarks which here follow we shall discuss some subjects by way of introduction to this inquiry. Cf. Jani, Versuch einer Beantwortung der Frage: Ob eine allgemeine reine Vernunftreligion in dieser Welt möglich, und von der Umschaffung oder Abschaffung der christlichen Religion zu erwarten sey? Berlin, 1804, 8vo.

2. All history shows that men have deeply felt the necessity of a direct revelation. Those institutors of religion who have pretended that their whole system was revealed from heaven and positively prescribed, have always been the best received, and have succeeded best in their object. Some pretended, deceitfully, that they were the confidants of God; others doubtless believed themselves to be such, and supposed that God spake and taught by their instrumentality. It does not concern our present purpose to determine whether they were in the right or wrong, but only how it happened that their claims were so readily and willingly admitted by their hearers. It was because they answered the wishes and expectations, and satisfied the wants, of the multitude.

Besides, nothing but positive injunction and prohibition produces a deep and lasting impression on the great mass of mankind. The voice of natural law alone is altogether too feeble to control the most numerous class of society. Natural law does not sufficiently compel the attention of men when left to themselves. And even if they should reflect upon it, they would find it destitute, in many cases, of that evidence and certainty which quiets the mind. They will find, therefore, positive commands, which give them this certainty after which they long, in the highest degree welcome. The conviction of having the authority and direct command of God for any course of conduct has more effect than the strongest arguments on the duty and end of man which the greatest sage could offer. For but

few are capable of understanding the grounds of moral reasoning; and *they* will often at least suspect that the truth may be different from their system, and perhaps will discover solid objections to their own views. But one who is firmly convinced that God has directly commanded a certain course of conduct, will obey the requisition, although he may not understand the reason and internal necessity of it; he will comply with the requisition because it comes from God, and therefore must be right and good. Experience, too, teaches that a merely natural religion is not suited to be the religion of the people at large. It has far too little evidence and power, and soon becomes corrupt, even among civilized nations. Let a merely natural religion, independent of authority, once become the religion of the great mass of mankind, and social order and morality are at an end.

Since the necessity of a direct revelation is felt so universally, the bestowment of it by God, in condescension to our wants, cannot appear to the unprejudiced inquirer either inconsistent or incredible. We shall hereafter inquire whether there is one, among all the pretended revelations, which is really of divine origin. This is a question of fact. In the mean time, so much we may boldly assert, that the scriptures of the Old and New Testament have a decided preference to the sacred books of all other nations and religions. The best among these is the Koran, to which our scriptures are certainly superior. We may therefore establish this as an axiom: *if a divine revelation has ever been committed to writing, it is contained in our holy scriptures.*

3. All will admit that God has, as a matter of fact, made use of the doctrines contained in the holy scriptures, and of the holy scriptures themselves, in the benevolent work in which he is engaged of extending the knowledge of truth, and of diffusing over the earth just ideas respecting his character and our destination. Many of the truths contained in these books are, indeed, perfectly discoverable and demonstrable from nature. But these same truths were discovered sooner, and were diffused more rapidly, than they would otherwise have been, by means of these books, possessing, as they do, the authority of a divine revelation. This is proved by the example of nations unacquainted with these books and the doctrines contained in them. How ignorant and unenlightened on religious subjects were the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, in the midst of all their intellectual cultivation! The peculiar privilege of the Israelites—that which made them, in an eminent sense, the people of God—is represented by Moses and the prophets to be this: that God had taught them *his word, his statutes, and judgments*, as he had not taught any other people at that time, Deut. iv. 7, 8; Ps. cxlvii. 19, 20.

So the New Testament everywhere; as Rom. iii. 2; coll. ix. 4; and i. 19, 32; which shows how the light of nature given to the heathen had been misimproved by them.

The studious and learned among the Greeks and Romans retained almost the sole possession of all that was valuable in the schools and in the writings of the enlightened philosophers. Resting, as their doctrines did, upon long, artificial, speculative, and abstruse reasonings, they accomplished very little for the religious and moral improvement of the most numerous class of society; though this class stood most in need of instruction. Add to this the observation, that it is easier to find proofs for a truth when once discovered than to discover the truth itself in the first instance. The nations of Europe and other parts of the world were destitute of just ideas of religion before they embraced Christianity; but no sooner had they learned the truths of religion from Christianity than they began to prove and establish them by reason, which they could now do in a more convincing manner than any of their predecessors could have done without the light of revelation. Hume said, very justly, that the true philosophy respecting God was only eighteen hundred years old. Respecting the partial diffusion of divine revelation, vide s. 121. Cf. Morus, s. 8, seq. p. 4—6. Vide Reimarus, Abhandlung von den vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion; Ziegler, Theol. Abhand. Num. 1., über Naturalismus und positive Religion, Gött. 1791, 8vo; and Stäudlin, Ideen zu einer Kritik des Systems der christlichen Religion, Gött. 1791, 8vo.

4. But although natural religion must appear, from what has been said, to be defective and imperfect, it should not be despised or undervalued. Notwithstanding all its imperfections, it is, in itself considered, a true religion. As Paul teaches us, Rom. i. 20, we acquire even from nature a knowledge of the invisible things of God. In ver. 19 of the same chapter, he says, God has *revealed* himself even in nature—i. e., in the wise constitution which he, as Creator, has given to our minds and to the external world. Vide supra, No. 1. Through this wise constitution, according to the express testimony of scripture, God addresses himself to all men, from without and from within. He is not far from any one of them, and leaves himself without a witness in none, Acts, xvii. 27; coll. xiv. 17.

Genuine and pure natural religion can therefore never contradict revealed religion. Such a contradiction would prove clearly that the religion pretending to be revealed was not so in reality. God cannot contradict himself, nor exhibit himself in one light in nature, and in an entirely different light in revelation. The knowledge of God acquired from nature is recommended and honourably mentioned in the Bible.

Vide Psalm xix., where ver. 1—6 treat of the knowledge of God derived from nature; ver. 7—11, of that derived from revelation. Cf. Acts, xiv. 17; Rom. i. 19, seq.; coll. ii. 12, seq.

5. It pleased God, as the Bible represents, to give men, from time to time, such direct instruction as they needed. He taught them in this way many things which they might never have discovered of themselves, and which they would not, at best, have discovered for a long time; and many things in which, perhaps, they had already erred. By this immediate revelation he confirmed, illustrated, and perfected that revelation of himself, as the invisible creator, preserver, and judge, which he had already made in the external world, and in the conscience of man. By this immediate revelation, he thus causes the revelation of himself in nature, which is commonly too little regarded, and often wholly neglected, (Rom. i. 21; Acts, xiv. 16,) to become intelligible, impressive, useful, and welcome to man. Ps. xix. 7—14.

Instruction given by God to men on subjects of which they are ignorant and incapable of discovering the truth by reasoning, is called *positive* (arbitraria) *instruction*; by which is meant simply, that we cannot show the necessity of the truth revealed by the principles of our own reason, and not that God proceeds capriciously and unreasonably in this case, which is not supposable. Morus, p. 7, s. 1. When God thus imparts to men the knowledge of those religious truths of which they are and must remain ignorant if left to their own reason, he is said in the scriptures to *reveal the mystery of his will, the deep things of the Deity*. Morus, p. 8, s. 3.

But *revelation* (φανερός, ἀποκάλυψις) is used, even in the Bible, in a wider, and in a more limited sense. Morus, p. 9, s. 4. (1) In the wider sense it is the annunciation of such truths as were, indeed, unknown to men, but at the same time within the reach of their minds. Thus φανερόν is used in respect to the knowledge of God derived from nature, (Rom. i. 19,) and ἀποκαλύπτειν, Phil. iii. 15. (2) In the narrower sense, it is instruction respecting things which are not only unknown, but undiscoverable by the human mind. (3) In the narrowest sense, it is divine instruction on the truths of religion concerning the salvation of men, which neither have been, nor can be, taught by natural religion, and which cannot be derived from reasoning on the nature of things.

Revealed religion, then, is not opposed, but added, to natural religion. It repeats, confirms, and illustrates many of the precepts of natural religion, and at the same time brings to light much that was before unknown.

All this admits of an easy application to the Christian religion. Although the doctrines of the Christian religion must not be contradictory

to reason, they need not be precisely the same as the doctrines of natural religion, as many at the present day contend. Although the Christian religion is perfectly reasonable, it is still a *positive* religion, because it rests on positive instruction. That it is a *revealed* religion cannot be doubted, as long as the yet uninvalidated miracles of Jesus, and other proofs, are sure evidence of his immediate divine mission. To exhibit the great and peculiar doctrines of Christianity as constituting a system of *revealed* truth, is the object of the present work.

Note.—It is false to conclude, that because positive religion must be consistent with reason, it can contain only such truths as are deducible from reason. Positive religion must indeed embrace such doctrines, and such only, as we are capable of understanding, and as correspond with the laws of our minds. But from this it does not follow that it can embrace only such truths as unaided reason clearly teaches. The works and the will of God contain mysteries which men are incompetent, of themselves, to explore. Vide Ernesti, *Opuscula, Vindiciæ arbitrii divini in constituenda religione*.

The positive part of religion promotes the moral part of it, as much as religion in general promotes morality.

The positive part of religion is that which contains the instructions which God has given us respecting those subjects in religion which are not demonstrable, or which cannot be reasoned out and made evident by argument. Positive doctrines require belief and assent; but they do not require an acknowledgment or proof of their essential truth from principles of reason. The doctrines that there is a God, and that he loves men, and the other doctrines of natural religion, are not positive; but the doctrine that God has revealed himself to us through Jesus Christ, in and through whom he will bless us, is positive; for it cannot be proved from the common principles of reason.

What is *positive* (*positivum*, *θετικόν*) is that *quod ponitur, sive docetur sic esse; non quod demonstratur geometricè*. The following is the origin of this term:—The Greeks say, *νόμος τεθέναι*—i. e., *præscribere, præcipere*; for a law is laid down and imposed, and not demonstrated. This phraseology was transferred to *doctrines* (*dogmata*) which were prescribed or established without being improved.

6. Any one who would attain to a settled assurance of the divine origin of the Christian religion must begin his examination with the *moral system* of Jesus. He will find, on an unprejudiced inquiry, that this system is more exalted and reasonable, and more decidedly useful, than any other system of morals. But when he comes to put it into practice, he will soon find that he is no more able to obey its require-

ments, although he acknowledges their excellence, than he is to obey the requirements of a merely *philosophical system of morals*. Vide s. 2, No. 4. In short, he will experience the same difficulties which Paul did; and find the account, Romans, vii. 7—25, copied as it were from his own soul.

How, then, can we, who are so weak, attain the strength which is requisite for the practice of virtue? Jesus and the writers of the New Testament everywhere answer, *By believing on the person and whole doctrine of Jesus Christ; and in no other way*. But those only really believe on him who are convinced that he is the very person which the Bible represents him, and which he himself everywhere claims to be. Now the Bible represents him as a direct messenger from God to men; as the greatest among all who have been sent by heaven to earth; as the Saviour,—the Christ. If we are convinced of this, we shall (a) believe that Christ and his doctrines are the means appointed by God for the moral improvement and happiness of men; and shall (b) make use of these means for the purpose for which they were given, and in the manner prescribed by Christ. Doing this, we shall not want strength to practise the moral system of Jesus.

We see here what an intimate and necessary connection there is between Christian morals and Christian doctrines, or theology, and what a mistake it is to separate them. Christian morals are supported by Christian doctrines. Christian theology teaches us where we can obtain the strength which we need in order to obey the moral precepts of Christianity. Whoever, then, preaches the morals without the doctrines of Christianity, preaches not the gospel of Christ, and preaches Christ in vain. When any are convinced that Christ is a messenger sent from God, and their moral lawgiver and judge, but are at the same time conscious that they are unable to obey his moral requirements, their duty obviously is to follow the directions which he has given them, and to proceed in the manner which he has prescribed, in order to attain to a full certainty that he and his doctrine are the means appointed by God for the real moral perfection and consequent salvation of men. Vide John, vii. 17; xiv. 6. Now these directions are fully exhibited in Christian theology.

Note.—The division of religion into natural and revealed is entirely rejected by Socinus, Ferguson, Gruner, and some other theologians. Vide Gruner, *Theol. Dogm.* p. 9, and *Diss. censura divisionis religionis et theologiæ in naturalem et revelatam*, Hal. 1770. These maintain that we owe all our knowledge of God, originally, to divine revelation, such as our first parents received in paradise, and thence transmitted to their descendants. They deny that

we have any knowledge of God, which, as to its origin, is *natural*.

The scriptures do indeed teach that God revealed himself to men even in the earliest ages of the world; and much of this original revelation has doubtless been transmitted from age to age until the present time. But still this division is not to be rejected. For (a) many religious truths which have been revealed are discoverable, and have actually been discovered, by reason and the light of nature. In this division, then, we have respect, not to the *actual source* of our knowledge of these truths, but to the *ground* on which we rest our knowledge of them. (b) The elements only of many revealed truths were communicated to our first parents. Men were left to examine, in the diligent use of their powers, the grounds of the revelation given them; to build higher upon the foundation already laid; and to deduce the proper consequences from what had been already taught. They obtained this additional knowledge by the study and contemplation of nature; and why may not this religious science, thus derived from nature, be called *natural religion*?

SECTION IV.

IS THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD INNATE?

THE natural knowledge of God has been divided, especially by the ancients, into *innate* (insita, congenita, ἔμφυτος) and *acquired*, (acquisita, ἐπίκτητος.) The *acquired* knowledge of God is that which we obtain by the use of reason and by the observation and study of the world. By the *innate* knowledge of God the ancients understood an idea of God actually innate in all men, brought directly into the world with them, and obtained neither by instruction nor reflection. Pythagoras, the Platonists, and many ancient philosophers, believed in these innate ideas, (*anteceptæ animo notiones*.) Vide Cic. De Nat. Deor. I. 11, seq.; Seneca, Epist. 117. This opinion was connected by Plato with his theory respecting the existence of the human soul before its union with the body. He taught that all our ideas previously existed in our minds; and that learning was only the recollection of what belonged to our former condition. Des Cartes also advocated this innate knowledge; and many theologians considered it as a remnant of the Divine image in man.

This opinion doubtless arose from the known fact, that the belief of the Divine existence always precedes the knowledge of any *theoretic* proof of it. The conclusion then was, that because men do not derive their belief in God from speculation, the idea of God must be *innate*.

But the mind possesses no such innate ideas. It obtains all its ideas by the use of its natural

faculties. Vide Locke, Essay on Human Understanding. The soul may be compared in this respect, according to Aristotle, to an unwritten leaf, (tabula rasa,) upon which any thing of which it is naturally susceptible may be written. The mistake on this subject originates in this way: The belief in the existence, nature, and attributes of God does not depend upon speculation, of which but few men are capable; the idea of God is not admitted to be true, because it is proved by theoretic, speculative reason, but rather because it perfectly agrees with the *principles of moral reason*, with *moral consciousness*, or *conscience*; and because it is demanded by these principles, as has been abundantly shown by Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, and elsewhere. This is the reason that the belief in the Divine existence always precedes the knowledge of any theoretic proof of it. Speculative reasoning must be awakened and improved before we shall begin to inquire for the theoretic proof of the truths already made known to us by *practical reason*, or *conscience*.

Experience, too, stands in the way of the belief that the idea of God is innate. The most uncultivated men, those in whom practical reason has not yet been sufficiently exercised and developed, have no idea of God and religion, and of course no words standing for these ideas. Vide Robinson, History of America; Steller, Beschreibung von Kamtschatka, s. 268; Oldendorp, Geschichte der Mission auf den Caribischen Inseln, s. 64. The same has been found true of individuals who have grown up in the woods, entirely separated from the society of their fellow-men.

If the innate knowledge of God means what Musæus, Buddeus, and others, understood by it, a natural capacity of the mind, (potentia propinqua,) by means of which the knowledge of God is easily attained, then, indeed, we possess such innate knowledge. This natural capacity consists in the *practical reason*, which begins to act before the other powers of the mind. This natural capacity, however, is very improperly called *cognitio insita*.

Some have endeavoured to prove this innate knowledge from the writings of Paul. But they mistake his meaning. The doctrine of Paul, contained in the two passages referred to, entirely agrees with the theory just stated.

1. Rom. ii. 14, 15. The subject of this passage is the *moral sense* or *feeling* which appears in all men, even in childhood, as soon indeed as the practical reason is developed. This feeling renders it impossible for men, whether extremely barbarous or highly cultivated, when free from prejudice and passion, to withhold approbation of right and admiration of virtue. But this moral feeling, as was remarked above,

stands in close connection with the idea of God, and leads directly to it. Paul says that even the heathen (μη νόμον ἔχοντες) have this feeling. They, indeed, have no direct revelation (νόμον); but they know from their own nature (φύσει) that the same things are right and wrong which revelation declares to be so, and they act accordingly. In ver. 27 he presents the same contrast, and in ver. 15 he explains his meaning. They show (ἐνδείκνυνται) by their judgments and actions that the precepts of the law (τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου, what the moral law commands to be done or avoided) are written upon their hearts.

This last expression is frequently cited in proof of innate knowledge; but it denotes merely an acquaintance with a subject so fixed and thorough that it cannot be obscured or obliterated from the mind. So, Heb. viii. 10, God wrote his commands in the hearts of the Israelites; and Cic. Acad. IV. 1, *Res in animo suo insculptas habere*. Vide Wetstein, ad h. l. "Their conscience condemns them when they do wrong, and acquits them when they do right. They cannot, therefore, be destitute of the certain knowledge of right and wrong."

2. Rom. i. 19, 20. The doctrine advanced is, that the heathen are as liable to punishment, when they transgress the law of nature, as the Jews when they transgress the precepts of revelation: for the knowledge of God (τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ for γνῶσις Θεοῦ) is attainable even by the heathen. It is evident even to them, (φανερὸν ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς for αὐτοῖς;) for God has revealed it to them—i. e., has given them the means of attaining it in the natural world. So that even they (passing to the last clause in ver. 20) cannot excuse themselves with the plea of ignorance, (εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς ἀναπολογία τους.) The words τὰ γὰρ ———— δεύτης are parenthetical, and explanatory of the declaration that God had revealed himself to the heathen, ver. 19. They show in what manner this revelation was made. The attributes of God, in themselves invisible and inscrutable, (ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ,) his omnipotence and other divine perfections (δεύτης), can be discovered, since the creation of the world, (ἀπὸ πρῶτου κόσμου,) while the world stands, cf. Luke, xi. 50,) by the observation of the things that are made, (ποιήμασι, by reflection upon the works of God.) The knowledge here spoken of is, therefore, *acquired knowledge*, (cognitio acquisita.)

The first of these passages treats, then, of the moral sense which the heathen, the civilized, and the savage, alike possess. The second treats of the knowledge of God acquired from the creation; such knowledge as the enlightened heathen philosophers had obtained by the study of the natural world; for with these had Paul, and his readers at Rome, at that time, to deal, and of these, therefore, he here principally speaks.

SECTION V.

OF THE ARTICLES OF FAITH; AND THE ANALOGY OF FAITH.

1. Of the Divisions of the Doctrines.

THE particular parts which compose the system of theoretic religion are called *doctrines of faith*, (articuli fidei, capita fidei Christianæ;) also, *loci*, from the sections and rubrics into which they are collected; whence the phrase *loci theologici*. The whole sum of the truths of theoretic or doctrinal religion, exhibited in their proper order and connection, constitutes a system of doctrines, or a system of theoretic theology. The articles of faith are divided—

1. Into *pure* and *mixed*, in respect to the ground upon which our knowledge of them rests. *Pure*, are those truths which we learn wholly from the holy scriptures; *mixed*, are those which we not only learn from the scriptures, but which we can discover and demonstrate by reason. Morus, p. 10, ad finem.

2. Into *fundamental* or *essential*, and *unessential* or *less essential*, in respect to their internal importance, and their connection with the whole system of Christian truth. Vide Morus, p. 12, s. 3, 4. This division has been rendered more accurate by the controversies which have arisen in relation to the different doctrines of theology. The *fundamental* doctrines are those without which the system taught in the Bible is unfounded, and with which it must stand or fall. Such are the doctrines enumerated by Morus, p. 8. They may also be defined to be those which cannot be denied or contested without subverting the ground of Christian faith and hope. The *unessential* doctrines are those which do not concern the vitals of religion, and which we are not required to believe in order to salvation. Vide s. 4. The fundamental doctrines are subdivided into *primary* and *secondary*.

We subjoin the following remarks to this important division of the doctrines into essential and unessential:—

(a) This division was first distinctly stated in the first half of the seventeenth century, by Nic. Hunnius. It was afterwards adopted by Calovius, Musæus, Baier, and others.

(b) The term *fundamental* is taken from 1 Cor. iii. 10, 11. Paul here compares himself and other Christian teachers to architects; the Christian community to a building; the doctrines of Christianity to the materials for building. The elementary truths of Christianity, which Paul and other teachers preached at the establishment of churches, are here called the *foundation*, in opposition to the *superstructure*, which some other one at Corinth had built upon this foundation, (ἐπιικοδομεῖ, and ver. 6, 7.) Cf. Eph. ii. 20, where the same comparison is found.

Paul calls the instruction which he had given in the elements of Christianity, *γάλα*, 1 Cor. iii. 2; Heb. v. 12; also, *λόγος τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, Heb. vi. 1. *Fundamental doctrines*, then, in the sense of Paul, are those elementary truths which should be communicated to such as wish to understand and embrace the Christian religion. These elementary doctrines, as well as the higher truths suited to those who are more advanced, should all be related and never opposed to the great doctrines respecting Christ as the saviour of the world. 1 Cor. iii. 11.

It is not, in reality, a difficult thing to determine what doctrines the apostles regarded as essential to Christianity, since they themselves have so often and so distinctly informed us. We only need to pursue the *historical* method; and to follow the same principles as when we inquire what doctrines were considered essential by the founder and first teachers of the Mahomedan or any other positive religion. The theologians of different sects have, however, been always at variance on this subject. They look at the doctrines of religion from points of view entirely different from that of the early Christian teachers, and, of course, differ widely from the latter in their estimate of these doctrines. How, for example, can a theologian who denies that Christ is, what he is declared to be in every page of the New Testament, a messenger sent from God, agree in opinion with the first Christian teachers respecting him, his doctrine, and the essentials of his religion! Now the theologian whose belief on this point does not accord with that of the apostles, is bound in honour to say so. He ought not to pervert their language in order to adapt it to his own system. Many decide on philosophical principles what the religion of Christ and the object of his mission should be, and then interpret the scriptures according to their preconceived opinions.

If we would determine what doctrines were regarded by the apostles as essential to Christianity, and were preached by them as such to Jews and Gentiles, we must consult those passages in which Christ and his disciples intentionally introduce the elementary truths in which all were instructed. Such passages are those in Acts, which describe the founding of new churches by the apostles, that in Matt. xxviii., which contains the commission given by Christ to his disciples; and those in which the writers distinctly profess to give the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. Cf. 1 Cor.; iii. 1 Thess. i. 8—10; Heb. vi. 1, seq. The following doctrines are in this way ascertained to be fundamental.

1. The doctrine of the divine unity, in opposition to the polytheism, and other connected errors of the heathen world. This one God, revealed as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, was

represented by the apostles as the author, preserver, and governor of all things.

2. The doctrine respecting Jesus. (a) He is the MESSIAH, the SAVIOUR, (*Σωτῆρ*) the SON OF GOD, predicted by the prophets, and attested by miracles. In this character he possesses an authority to which no other prophet could pretend. This is a point upon which Christ and the apostles always insist, as the peculiar and distinctive doctrine of Christianity, 1 Cor. iii. 11. And no teacher of religion who sets aside this authority of Christ can be called a *Christian* teacher, however true and useful his instructions may be in other respects. This doctrine, that Jesus is the Christ, is, as Paul says, the foundation upon which all the other great truths of Christianity are built. Vide Storr, Ueber den Geist des Christenthums, in Flatt's Magazin für Dogmatik und Moral, St. I. s. 103, f. Tüb. 1796. (b) He became man, died, and rose again. He is now gone into the heavens, where he is exalted over all, and enjoys that divine glory which is his due, and whence he will come on a future day to be our judge. (c) He not only gave us ample instruction respecting our duty, but procured us *forgiveness* with God, and freedom from the punishment of sin through his *sufferings* and *death* (*αἵμα*), the remembrance of which is solemnly renewed in the Lord's supper. These truths respecting Christ are always represented as fundamental.

3. The doctrine of the depravity and moral degeneracy of man is always presupposed and frequently stated in the strongest terms.

4. The doctrine of a special divine instruction and guidance, (*πνεῦμα ἅγιον, χαρίσματα πνεύματος*.) These were afforded in various ways, naturally and supernaturally, to Christians of that period, and promised to those who should follow.

5. The doctrines of the immortality of the soul, of future retribution, and of the resurrection of the dead. The latter doctrine was taught in opposition to the heathen and to the Sadducees.

6. The doctrine of the destination of man. This is holiness, and the happiness proportionately connected with it. He only who has experienced a true change of heart, and who lives according to the precepts of Christ, can share in the rights and blessings which belong to Christians in this life, and the life to come.

7. The doctrine of gratuitous forgiveness. Men cannot merit forgiveness and salvation by obedience, either to the civil or ecclesiastical law of Moses, or to the universal moral law, although obedience to the latter is their indispensable duty. Paul argues this point against the Jews, who held the opposite opinion; he also shows that the law of Moses is no longer obligatory upon Christians.

8. The doctrine of baptism. By this ordinance Christian rights are imparted and assured to all who are admitted into the Christian church.

These are the fundamental doctrines which were taught by the apostles.

Note.—The whole Mosaic dispensation, as all will admit, rested on the principles of theocracy. But it is equally clear from the New Testament, that the new or Christian dispensation rests on principles of theocracy and Christocracy. Christ is not merely a *teacher*, now deceased, like Socrates and Plato, and other sages of antiquity, who live indeed in remembrance, but who now no longer exert a *personal* influence upon men. He is now, as he was formerly, and will always continue to be, a true and living king (κύριος) and judge, (κεφαλὴς ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν.)

Christianity, then, in the purely scriptural view of it, is no more an institute for mere instruction than the ancient Mosaic dispensation. It does not rest its precepts upon the weight of the reasons by which they might be supported. It is a divinely constituted *government*, in which Christ is king, legislator, and judge. To his will, in furtherance of their improvement and blessedness in time and in eternity, the hearts of men should be united. To his authority, as lawgiver and king, God has given abundant testimony. His will and command are therefore the only ground which the Bible offers for the unconditional obedience to him which it requires of all the subjects of his rule. Christ does not indeed omit, as our teacher, to give us reasons for his precepts; but, at the same time, as our Lord and judge, he requires obedience to his simple authority. These views might be proved from the writings of the apostles and the discourses of Jesus. Vide Matt. v., seq.

II. Of the Analogy of Faith and of Scripture.

The *analogy of faith* is the connection which subsists between the doctrines of the Christian religion and the relation, arising from this connection, of these doctrines to one another and to the whole system. Intimately connected with this is the *analogy of Scripture*, which is the connection and agreement which subsists between all the truths contained in the holy scriptures. The analogy of scripture lies at the foundation of the analogy of faith, since the scriptures are the ground of the doctrines of faith. This agreement should subsist in every system; the parts should conspire harmoniously to one end. The propositions should be connected together into a complete whole, without chasms; and follow, one after another, in natural order, without contradiction. But this is eminently important in the Christian system.

The phrase *analogy of faith* is borrowed from

Rom. xii. 6. But there *ἀναλογία τῆς πίστεως* is the proportion or degree of theoretical and practical faith or Christianity; like *μέτρον πίστεως*, ver. 3. The meaning is, Christians should devote the different degrees of knowledge and experience in religion which they may possess to the general good of the church. Those, for example, possessing the gift of prophecy, should be content with this gift, and employ it, according to the best of their ability, for the good of others.

But although this term, as used in this passage, has a different sense from that attached to it by theological writers, the thing itself which they mean to designate by it is just and important. The analogy of faith, as they use it, implies,

1. That no one doctrine of faith may contradict the other doctrines of the system; and that all must conspire to promote the one great end—the moral improvement and perfection of men. The doctrine of the divine justice, for example, must be explained in such a way as to be consistent with the doctrine of the divine goodness, and as to be promotive, and not destructive, of the improvement of men. Vide Morus, s. 6.

2. That the doctrines of faith should mutually explain and illustrate each other, and be drawn from one another by fair conclusion. Any doctrines may belong to the system of faith which may be derived, by just consequence, from the holy scriptures, although not contained in them in so many words; and all the doctrines should be carefully preserved in the relations which they bear to each other. When isolated and viewed by itself, alone, a doctrine is apt to appear in a false light. This is the case with the doctrine of the divine attributes, and with much of the doctrine respecting Christ.

3. That the particular doctrines of the system should be exhibited in a natural connection, in a proper place, and a regular order. No one determinate method can be prescribed; and yet some fixed plan should be followed through the whole, and into all the particulars. The doctrines in which other doctrines are presupposed should not hold the first place. It would be absurd, for example, to begin a system with the doctrine respecting death, the Lord's supper, or baptism, since these doctrines presuppose others, without which they cannot be understood and thoroughly explained. Cf. Morus, p. 14, s. 5.

SECTION VI.

OF THE MYSTERIES OF RELIGION.

1. The Greek *μυστήριον* is commonly rendered *mystery*. It answers to the Hebrew סֵפֶת, and signifies in general *anything concealed, hidden, unknown*. In the New Testament it generally signifies *doctrines which are concealed from men*,

either because they were never before published, (in which sense every unknown doctrine is mysterious,) or because they surpass human comprehension. Some doctrines are said to be mysterious for both of these reasons, but more frequently doctrines which are simply *unknown* are called by this name. *Μυστήριον* signifies, therefore, in its biblical use, (1) Christianity in its whole extent, because it was unknown before its publication—e. g. *μυστήριον πίστεως*, 1 Tim. iii. 9; (2) Particular truths of the Christian revelation—e. g. 1 Cor. iv. 1; xv. 51, and especially in the writings of Paul; (3) The doctrine that the divine grace in Christ extends, without distinction, to Gentiles as well as Jews, because this doctrine was so new to the Jews, and so foreign to their feelings—e. g. Eph. i. 9; iii. 3; Coll. v. 6, seq. &c.

2. The word *mystery* is now commonly used in *theology* in a more limited sense. Here it signifies a doctrine revealed in the holy scriptures, the *mode* of which is inscrutable to the human understanding. A doctrine, in order to be a mystery in the theological sense, must be shown to be (a) a doctrine really contained in the holy scriptures; and (b) a doctrine of such a nature as to *transcend* though not *contradict* the powers of the human understanding. Of this nature are the doctrines respecting Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—the union of two natures in Christ—the atonement, &c.

To the above definitions we subjoin the following observations :—

(1) Whether such religious mysteries are really contained in the holy scriptures can be determined only by the principles of hermeneutics. The mysteries which, through ignorance of the original languages of the Bible, were supposed to be contained in many texts, disappear on a fair interpretation. They were greatly multiplied by the fathers of the church, since mysteries were in great request in their day, and in high esteem even among the heathen; they were accordingly attributed in great abundance to the Christian system. There is ground, therefore, for the caution given by Morus, p. 41, s. 32, n. 3, not to seek to increase the number of mysteries. But this caution is unnecessary at the present day, when many theologians, in consequence of their philosophical objections against mysteries, banish them wholly from their theories; and, not content with this, seem bent to exclude them, by a violent interpretation, even from the holy scriptures.

(2) Since we are unable to decide, beforehand, what a divine revelation will contain, we should not undertake to say that it must *necessarily* contain mysteries. Mystery is not, in itself considered, an *essential* mark and requisite of revelation. But, on the other hand, we should

not undertake to say beforehand that a revelation *cannot* contain mysteries. Whether the revelation which God has given us contains mysteries or not is a question of *fact*; and in such questions, demonstrations *à priori* have no place.

(3) The great object of divine revelation is the promotion of the moral improvement of men. Those dark and unintelligible doctrines, which are either themselves subversive of this end, or are wholly disconnected with the practical truths which tend to promote it, do not belong, we may be sure, to the system of revealed religion. But of such a character are not the mysteries of the Christian religion! They stand throughout in so close a connection with the most clear and practical truths, that removing them would render these truths very different from what they are exhibited to be in the holy scriptures. The mystery of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, for example, stands in close connection with what we are taught respecting Christ, and respecting our duties and relations to God; and to remove this mystery would render our duties and relations to God essentially different from what they are represented in the New Testament. This suggests the important rule: *to consider the mysteries of the Christian religion not as solitary and isolated, but as connected with the other truths revealed in the holy scriptures.*

(4) The reason of the mystery and obscurity which covers many of the doctrines revealed in the Bible is, that the great first principles upon which these doctrines rest lie beyond the circle of our vision, in the *sphere of spirit*, with which we have only a very imperfect acquaintance. This is the case with the mysteries of the work of redemption,—God and man united in one person,—God reconciled with man through the innocent death of his own Son, &c. Could we rise above the sphere of sense, and understand the great principles upon which these doctrines rest, we should doubtless find them clear, consistent, and connected, and lose all our suspicions concerning them. Even among the objects of our senses there are many things of which we cannot see the reason, and yet cannot doubt the reality. How many more, then, in the world of spirits, which is almost inaccessible to us in our present state!

(5) Since these objects lie so wholly beyond the conceptions of our minds, confined as they are within the horizon of sense; the human understanding, in its present circumstances, should abstain from anxious inquiry after their internal and essential nature. On these subjects it becomes us to be modest, and to remain contented with the information which the holy scriptures have given us. A proud and inquisitive spirit, on subjects like these, always leads to hurtful results. We are taught by the Bible, that we

can never fully comprehend the objects which lie beyond the circle of our bodily vision, and that yet we must believe in them, notwithstanding all objections, as far as they are found by experience to be effectual means of promoting our holiness or moral improvement. We must believe in Christ, as Redeemer and Saviour; in God, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and we must make a practical use of these doctrines for the end and in the manner prescribed by Christ, however unable we may be to understand their grounds and internal connection.

(6) Religion, as we may conclude from all that has been said, is a necessary result from the principles of human reason. It therefore rests upon a faith, which is grounded on these principles of reason; otherwise it would be superstitious. The great inquiry, then, on this subject, is, whether this faith is *rational*, conformed to the laws of our thinking nature, and such that we can justify it to ourselves and others. And this faith will be rational, if it is not contradictory to reason and morals. If it be contradictory to either of these, we can neither justify it to ourselves nor find grounds on which to commend it to others. This faith, then, may be rational, whether the doctrines to be believed are *comprehensible* or not. This is a point not at all essential to the reasonableness of faith; because the objects of this religious faith belong to the spiritual world, and are, therefore, from the very nature of the case, incomprehensible to man. The *comprehensibility* of the doctrines of religion cannot therefore be made the criterion by which their truth is to be determined, as has been done erroneously by many modern philosophers and theologians. Proceeding on the principle, that every thing in the doctrines of religion which was *incomprehensible* must be explained away or rejected, they came at last, in order to be consistent with themselves, to renounce all religion, natural as well as revealed; or, at best, to leave only the name of it behind. The nature of God is, and must ever remain, wholly incomprehensible. We know not what he is in himself, nor the manner in which he acts. And we may say the same even with respect to our own souls. If we consider this, we shall easily see that we must either give up the *comprehensibility* of the doctrines of religion as the criterion of their truth, or wholly renounce religion. As we have intimated above, religion is a product of our moral nature. It is eminently a concern of the *heart*; and we believe in its truths because they influence our hearts. If we withheld our assent to the truths of religion till we could comprehend them, we should never believe; but, as human nature is constituted, we firmly believe, not because we fully understand, but because we deeply feel.

Cf. Morus, p. 41, 42; s. 32, 33.

SECTION VII.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE USE OF THE SCRIPTURES, REASON, AND TRADITION, AS SOURCES OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES.

I. Of the Use of the Holy Scriptures.

THE Bible is the proper source of our knowledge of those truths of religion which Christians receive as revealed. The New Testament is the more immediate source of the *Christian* system; not exclusively, however, of the Old Testament, to which constant reference is made, and which is always presupposed, in the New.

If any teacher who lived before our own times left written monuments behind, these are the surest sources from which we can learn what his opinions and doctrines were. If he himself wrote nothing, the writings of his disciples and familiar friends are our best authority. Our knowledge will be more easy and sure, in proportion to the number and completeness of these written records. The writings of disciples who were contemporary with their teacher, and his personal friends, are far more important in ascertaining his principles than the writings of later followers, who are apt to introduce opinions foreign to the system which they undertake to exhibit. Socrates wrote nothing himself; but Plato, Xenophon, and others of his early disciples, wrote abundantly respecting him and his doctrine. The disciples of these men styled themselves, still, the followers of Socrates, and continued to expound his system, but they ascribed to him many opinions which he did not profess. All this is applicable to the New Testament. Jesus wrote nothing himself; but many of his early disciples left records respecting him which are collected in the New Testament. If these records are truly the productions of those disciples of Jesus whose names they bear (the proof of which will be given in the Article on the holy scriptures), they furnish, doubtless, the most authentic information which we can possess respecting the doctrines which Jesus himself taught, and wished his disciples to teach. The writings of the apostolical fathers, the followers of the first disciples of Christ, are of inferior authority; and still less authentic are the traditions transmitted orally in the church.

If it is true that Jesus is, what these writings affirm him to be, a teacher divinely commissioned, and the greatest among all whom God has sent into the world; and if the books of the New Testament were composed under that peculiar divine guidance, called inspiration, then we must admit that the doctrines of Christ and the apostles contained in them are true and divine. These two suppositions are the ground of the doctrine of the symbols of the protestant

church, that the holy scriptures, and especially the New Testament, are the only sure source of Christian truth, and, consequently, the only rule of Christian faith and practice, exclusively of all commandments and traditions of merely human origin.

Our system of faith and morals depends, therefore, solely upon the *authority of Christ and his apostles*, regarded as teachers commissioned by God. If any one does not regard them as such, he cannot hold himself bound to believe their doctrines solely on their authority; he must demand that his reason should be convinced by rational proofs. He may, indeed, hold the memory of Christ and the apostles, as he does of Socrates and Epictetus, in high respect, as worthy teachers; but he cannot feel himself obliged to believe *on their word*. We here see the cause of the real importance of the controversy which has existed on the question, Whether, in matters of faith, the Bible or reason is the true *principium cognoscendi*.

II. Of the Use of Reason.

The frequent abuses of reason, when applied to matters of faith, led Luther and many of the older theologians to express themselves severely respecting the use of reason on these subjects. Their objections, however, were directed only against the arrogance and perversion of reason, and especially against the Aristotelian philosophy, then prevalent in the schools. Paul objected in the same way to *φιλοσοφία*, (Col. ii. 8;) or *γνώσις ψευδώνυμος*, 1 Tim. vi. 20. All these writers have, in other passages, done full justice to reason in itself, as the noblest gift of God.

Reason (*Vernunft*) is that power which guides and regulates, by its spontaneous action, the other faculties of our minds in the acquisition of knowledge; it constitutes the peculiar characteristic of humanity, and is that by which alone we are capable of religion. Reason alone can acknowledge and receive the truths of either natural or revealed religion, and give them an influence upon the human will. *Vides*, 6, No. 6. It is therefore always mentioned with respect in the Bible; and the use of it, in the study and examination of religious truth, always recommended. Cf. Rom. i. 20; Psalm xix.; Isaiah, xl. xli. Indeed, the use of reason is presupposed in a revelation; since without the use of reason we should be incapable of enjoying a revelation. It is the object of revelation to supply the deficiencies of the knowledge which we acquire in the use of unaided reason; and this very revelation cautions us against the two extremes, of relying wholly upon reason for our knowledge, and of neglecting the use of it altogether.

Human reason, as the Bible teaches, is not

the *only* source of the truths of religion; which are not, therefore, to be deduced from *nature alone*. None but the *rationalist* would pretend, that the only sources of our religious knowledge were the nature of our own minds, and of the external world. The Bible teaches us that, in respect to objects of the spiritual world, which lie beyond the sphere of sense, and which could not be known except from revelation or history; reason is merely the *instrument* of our knowledge. But we are not at liberty to neglect to use reason as the instrument of our knowledge of the objects of revelation. On the contrary, we are sacredly bound to employ our reason in examining the credibility of the history of revelation, and the correctness of the facts gathered by experience, and in discovering and estimating the suitableness and sacredness of the duties imposed upon us.

Reason may properly be used, as the instrument of our knowledge of revealed truth, in the following particulars:—viz.,

1. In the discovery and arrangement of *arguments* in support of these truths, and of *results* flowing from them. (a) The proof of many doctrines which are clearly revealed is not distinctly stated in the Bible, but thrown upon reason. The proof of the divine existence, for example, is not drawn out in the Bible, but is presupposed. (b) Proofs, auxiliary to those given in the scriptures, may be suggested by reason in favour of the *articuli mixti*; the providence of God, &c. (c) Without the use of reason we cannot ascertain the truth of Christianity, the credibility of the history of the sacred books, their divine authority, or the rules by which they should be interpreted. (d) We must employ our reason in developing such doctrines as are not distinctly expressed, but only implied, in the holy scriptures. Reason may be further employed.

2. In the *exhibition* and *statement* of the truths of revelation. We find the truths of religion brought together in the Bible in a loose and disconnected manner, and must therefore make a diligent use of our reason in collecting, arranging, and uniting them into such a system as shall suit our own convenience or the advantage of others. We must also illustrate the truth, excellence, and fitness of the particular parts of the system of revealed religion, by analogies drawn from human things, by the observation of human nature, by historical illustrations, and in many other ways which call reason into exercise.

3. In the *defence* of revealed religion, and of the particular doctrines which it embraces (*usus rationis humanæ apologeticus*). How much reason is needed in this particular must appear sufficiently from the preceding remarks.

III. *Of the use of Tradition.*

The words *παράδοσις* and *traditio* are used by the older ecclesiastical fathers, to denote any instruction which one gives to another, whether *oral* or *written*. In the New Testament also, and in the classical writers, *παράδομαι* and *tradere* signify, in general, *to teach, to instruct*. Tradition in this wider sense was divided into *scripta*, and *non scripta sive oralis*. The latter, *traditio oralis*, was, however, frequently called *traditio* by way of eminence. This oral tradition was often appealed to by Irenæus, Clemens of Alexandria, Tertullian, (De Præser. cap. 7,) and others of the ancient fathers, as a test by which to try the doctrines of contemporary teachers, and by which to confute the errors of the heretics. They describe it as being instruction received from the mouth of the apostles by the first Christian churches, transmitted from the apostolical age, and preserved in purity until their own times. Tertullian, in the passage above referred to, says, that an appeal to tradition is the most direct way of confuting heretics, who will often evade the force of an appeal to texts of scripture by misinterpreting them. This tradition is called by Origen *κλήρυμα ἐκκλησιαστικόν*, and by the Latin Fathers *regula fidei* (i. e. doctrinæ Christianæ) *sive veritatis*. The latter title was given by them, more specifically, to the ancient symbols, which contained the instruction received from the apostles, and transmitted and preserved in the church.

Oral tradition is still regarded by the Romish church as a *principium cognoscendi* in theology. "Sacrosancta œcumenica synodus . . . hoc sibi perpetuo ante oculos proponens, ut, sublatis erroribus, puritas ipsa evangelii in ecclesia conservetur, . . . perspicuensque hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in libris scriptis et *sine scripto traditionibus*, quæ ex ipsius Christi ore ab apostolis acceptæ, ab ipsius apostolis, spiritu sancto dictante, quasi per manus traditæ, ad nos usque pervenerunt: orthodoxorum patrum exempla secuta, omnes libros tam veteris quam novi testamenti, cum unus Deus sit auctor, nec non *traditiones ipsas, tum ad fidem tum ad mores pertinentes, tamquam vel ore tenus a Christo vel a spiritu sancto dictatas et continua successione in ecclesia catholica conservatas, pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia, suscipit ac veneratur* Si quis autem traditiones prædictas sciens et prudens contemserit, anathema sit." Concil. Trident. Sess. IV. Decr. 1.

Note.—The ancient Latin writers use the word *traditio* in the sense of *delivery* or *surrender*—e. g. of a person or thing into the hands of another. What we mean by *tradition*, in the ecclesiastical sense, Livy or Sallust would express by the phrase *res, doctrina, or historia per manus tradita*,—*voce*, if the tradition were oral, *scripto* or *litteris*, if it were written.

OBSERVATIONS on the merits of the question respecting doctrinal tradition (*traditio oralis dogmatica*). In coming to a decision on this subject, every thing depends upon making the proper distinctions with regard to *time*.

1. In the first period of Christianity, the authority of the apostles was so great that all their doctrines and ordinances were strictly and punctually observed by the churches which they had planted. And the doctrine and discipline which prevailed in these apostolical churches were, at that time, justly considered by others to be purely such as the apostles themselves had taught and established. This was the more common, as the books of the New Testament had not, as yet, come into general use among Christians. Nor was it, in that early period, attended with any special liability to mistake. In this way we can account for it, that the Christian teachers of the second and third centuries appeal so frequently to oral tradition.

2. But in later periods of the church, the circumstances were far different. After the commencement of the third century, when the first teachers of the apostolical churches and their immediate successors had passed away, and another race came on, other doctrines and forms were gradually introduced, which differed in many respects from apostolical simplicity. And now these innovators appealed, more frequently than had ever been done before, to apostolical tradition, in order to give currency to their own opinions and regulations. Many at this time did not hesitate, as we find, to plead apostolical tradition for many things, at variance not only with other traditions, but with the very writings of the apostles, which they had in their hands. From this time forward, tradition became, naturally, more and more uncertain and suspicious. And especially after the commencement of the fourth century, the more judicious and conscientious teachers referred more to the Bible, and less to tradition. Augustine established the maxim, that tradition could not be relied upon, in the ever-increasing distance from the age of the apostles, except when it was universal and perfectly consistent with itself. And long before him, Irenæus had remarked, that no tradition should be received as apostolical, unless founded in the holy scriptures, and conformable to them. Adv. Hær. IV. 36.

3. From these remarks, we can easily determine the value of doctrinal tradition in our own times. We have but little credible information respecting the first Christian churches, of as early a date as the first or second century, beside that which the New Testament gives us. And the information respecting them of a later origin is so intermingled with rumours and fables as to be quite uncertain. We cannot hope, therefore, to obtain by oral tradition any information

respecting the doctrines held in the first Christian churches, beyond what we obtain from the books of the New Testament, the only genuine records of the early period of Christianity. Lessing affirmed, indeed, that the Christian religion would have been handed down from age to age, even if the writings of the New Testament had never existed. And true it is, that by oral tradition, by writings of a later origin, by baptism, the Lord's supper, and other Christian rites, much of Christianity might have been preserved to our own times, without the aid of the sacred books of our religion. But it is equally true, that without the New Testament any certainty with regard to the doctrines of Christianity would be impossible; the sure, historical basis of the system would be removed, and Christianity soon become greatly disfigured; as may be learned from the example of the Romish church, where the use of the Bible was limited. Christianity did, indeed, exist for some time before the books of the New Testament were written. And during that early period, while the apostles and their immediate successors still lived and taught, these books might be dispensed with by Christians without serious injury. But not so in after times.

The reformers, therefore, justly held, that tradition is not (certainly *for us*) a sure source of knowledge respecting the doctrines of theology; and that the holy scriptures are to be received as the only *principium cognoscendi*. Cf. Walch, *Untersuchung vom Gebrauche der heiligen Schrift unter den Christen in den vier ersten Jahrhunderten*, Leipzig, 1779, 8vo; a work which appeared on occasion of the controversy with Lessing.

Note.—On all the subjects which have been thus far introduced and briefly considered, the student will find very full, thorough, and instructive discussions in Müller, *Theophil, oder Unterhaltungen über die christliche Religion mit Jünglingen von reiferem Alter*, Th. I. Zürich, 1801, 8vo; a work which deserves to be highly recommended to the student in theology.

SECTION VIII.

OF THE OBJECT, DIFFERENT DEGREES, PRINCIPAL PERIODS, AND BIBLICAL APPELLATIONS OF THE DIVINE REVELATIONS.

I. Of the Object of Revelation.

WHEN man is in the savage state, and left entirely to himself, he follows his appetites and passions, and leaves his moral powers unexercised. Instead of allowing his will to be governed by the moral law, he chooses animal propensity (*das sinnliche princip*) as its determining motive. He thus constantly recedes from that holiness and happiness for which he was made. Now to show man the

true way of fulfilling his destination, from which he is thus wandering, is the chief object of all direct revelations. Cf. sec. 2, 3. So even reason decides. Vide Fichte, *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung*, Königsberg, 1793.

To enable man to attain his destination, it was requisite (1) that he should be instructed by God respecting the means to be employed by a divine revelation, or in some superhuman way; since left to himself, he could never have discovered these means; and (2) that his moral power should be so strengthened and supported as to enable him to control his stronger animal propensities. These two things are absolutely and equally requisite. For the mere knowledge of the divine will does not impart to man the *power* which he needs in order to obey it, his bodily desires having already the preponderance over his moral faculties. Cf. sec. 2, 3. Now to these two points—to show man his destination, and to enable him to attain it—we may reduce all the objects which the scriptures ascribe to God in the revelations he has made to man.

II. Of the different Degrees of Revelation.

Although the plan of God in leading men to their destination was always the same, yet the manner in which he imparted instruction through direct revelation, and the whole method which he pursued in the education of the human race, were very different. We are led by reason to this result, which is confirmed by the history of revelation contained in the holy scriptures. The instruction given to men must, of course, be adapted to their wants and capacities, which differ at different times. Hence Paul remarks, very justly, (Heb. i. 1,) that God revealed himself to men in ancient times *in various ways* (*πολυτρόπως*). Nor did this difference concern solely the form and costume of the divine instructions; it extended even to the doctrines which were taught. Vide Gal. iii. 20, seq. et alibi.

God treated the human race as human instructors treat their pupils. There is a great deal of knowledge which is useful, and indeed indispensable to a person of mature age, which would be altogether useless, unintelligible, and perhaps hurtful, to one in childhood. Now the wise teacher will withhold this knowledge from the child, or communicate it to him only so far as it will be serviceable to him, and in such a way as will be most intelligible, proceeding from the known to the unknown, and from the easy to the difficult. And this is the manner in which God proceeds in the instruction and education of men. He cannot, therefore, at any time have revealed such things as were unnecessary, or would have been useless, to the people to whom the revelation was given. He must also have so planned the instruction to be communicated by direct revela-

tion as to produce a growing conviction in the minds of men of the necessity of a more perfect instruction and a more effectual assistance before they could hope to succeed in controlling their natural desires. Such a course is the only one adapted to the nature of the human mind, of which God is the author. Accordingly, God so regulated his instructions from the beginning as to make men sensible of their wants, and then to supply them; for until men have been brought, by some elementary instruction, to be deeply conscious of their need of something further, they will never inquire with earnestness for a more perfect instruction.

III. *Of the Principal Periods of Revelation.*

The sacred records contain a *history of the divine revelations*. This history will be found to confirm the general remarks which have just been made.

1. The great doctrine which we find exhibited in the earliest revelations recorded in the holy scriptures is this: those who obey the laws which God has revealed shall be rewarded, those who disobey shall be punished. This assurance from God, sometimes expressed in plain language, sometimes represented by images, ceremonies, and examples, and in various other ways, was calculated to strengthen and encourage men to obtain their mastery over their passions with which the divine favour, guidance, and support were connected.

This first period of revealed religion, the account of which is given by Moses, is called the *patriarchal period* (*œconomia patriarchalis*), and is divided into *antediluvian* and *postdiluvian*. Revealed religion was at that time extremely simple, suited to the wants of the infancy of the world, and highly practical. All the institutions of religion had the benevolent end of preserving among men the knowledge of the one living and true God, and of leading them to exercise towards him that love and confidence upon which the scriptures everywhere set so high a value. The more to exercise and strengthen this pious confidence they were made acquainted from time to time with their own future destiny and that of their descendants, and with the great divine economy for the welfare of the human race at some distant time; as yet, however, as Paul expresses it, (Heb. xi. 13,) they only saw the promised blessings *from afar* (πρόσθεον ἰδόντες).

2. Next followed the *civil and religious institute of Moses*; and here again the same divine assurance was at the foundation of the whole. But in this infancy of the world God found it necessary to confine his promises for the most part to *temporal* good, and his threatenings to *temporal* evil; because such promises and threatenings were best adapted to influence a people who were as yet extremely rude, and who derived their pains

and pleasures from the objects of the present life. Intimations, however, of the destiny of man beyond the grave were by no means withheld from those who were cultivated to such a degree as to be able to understand them. But in general, so much only of these higher truths could at that time be made known as would be intelligible to the people at large. And even this small portion of spiritual truth needed to be embodied, as far as possible, in sensible representations, before it could gain access to the uncultivated mind.

In accordance with these principles, the New Testament teaches that the Mosaic institute was indeed (*a*) of *divine origin*, (Moses being always regarded by Christ and the apostles as a prophet sent by God,) but that still this institute, in comparison with the Christian, was (*b*) very *imperfect*, and indeed could not well have been otherwise, considering the times and the men it was designed for, Gal. iv. 3, 9 (στοιχεῖα); Col. ii. 8, 20, et alibi; and therefore it was (*c*) only a *temporary religion*, designed by God to continue only for a time, and then to give place to a higher and more perfect scheme, 2 Cor. iii. 11, seq.; Gal. iv. 1—5; Heb. viii. 6, et alibi.

But God excited in the minds of the very people who enjoyed this preparatory revelation, a sense of their need of one more full and perfect. And in various ways he deepened this impression: (1) by such instruction respecting the design of the sacrifices and rites of the Mosaic institute as should turn their attention from the mere external ceremonies of religion, and lead them gradually to a more pure and spiritual worship. Vide Ps. 1. Isaiah, lviii., lx., seq. (2) By prophecy respecting that great economy for the moral perfection and welfare of the human race which God would at some future time establish. These prophecies were at first only distant and obscure intimations, but they became gradually more clear and intelligible as men became more convinced, by a long trial and experience, that such a new economy was absolutely necessary. And this conviction of the necessity of some new economy became stronger the more men learned by experience that the mere knowledge of the divine will, connected though it might be with the certainty of rewards and punishments, was insufficient to enable them to lead a life of virtue and self-government. Accordingly, the prophecies respecting the Messiah, and the new economy which he would introduce, became more and more clear and distinct, especially from the time of David until shortly after the Babylonian exile. The prophets now plainly predicted that the economy under which they lived would come to an end, and that a new economy would commence, which would bring relief to the wants of men, Jer. xxxi. 31—36, coll. Heb. viii. 7, seq.

Note.—A revelation of the truths of religion, in order to convince men that it actually pro-

ceeds from God and should be obeyed as his will, must be attended with such *events* as prove its author to be their lord and creator, and the creator, proprietor, and governor of the world. Accordingly, the divine revelations have always been attended with events in the natural world of such a miraculous kind, as could seem to the most savage and unlettered mind to proceed from none other than the author and governor of nature. But the Bible claims not only that its doctrines should be received as divine, but that the teachers by whom they are published should be acknowledged to be sent by God, as is implied in the word *prophet*—the title commonly given them. Now in order to establish this *extraordinary claim*, it is natural that the Old and New Testaments should narrate *extraordinary events*. And these narrations, when given, must not be explained away, but taken as they stand, according to the obvious intention of the narrator; for the extraordinary mission which the Bible claims for Moses, Christ, and other teachers, could be confirmed in no other way than by extraordinary events. Those, therefore, who, like Eck, in his Inquiry, explain away the miracles of the Bible by a violent and arbitrary interpretation, counteract their own purpose. Instead of vindicating the Bible in this way from objection and reproach, they render it a very inconsistent book.

3. After all these preparatory revelations, calculated to produce in the minds of men a sense of their need of more complete instruction, God founded a new institute, which, without infringing the liberty of man, exerted a more powerful influence than any which had preceded, and embodied, in the most perfect manner, every means of holiness and happiness. This was the *Christian institute*. Its object sufficiently appears from its nature and influence; its authority, like that of the ancient economy, was abundantly confirmed. We shall hereafter treat of its divine origin, its internal excellence, &c. In this connection we shall notice only two of its principal advantages, which are often mentioned in the New Testament.

(a) *Its universality*. By this we mean that the Christian religion is adapted, in its whole constitution, to be the religion of all men. Its precepts are not confined to any one nation or country, but are applicable to all people, in whatever climate and under whatever form of government they may live. Accordingly, Christ commands (Mark, xvi. 15) that his religion should be preached to *all men* without distinction, (*πᾶσιν τῇ κτίσει*); for he is the Saviour of all men, of Jews and Gentiles, of the world, (*Σωτὴρ τοῦ κόσμου*). Vide John, x. 16; Rom. i. 16, seq.; Ephes. ii. 11—18, et al. And experience has shown, both in ancient and modern times, that the truths of the gospel, when exhi-

bited in the native simplicity in which they appear in the New Testament, produce the same effects in all ages and upon all classes of men. They have thus proved themselves to be the power of God unto salvation to all those who believe in them, Rom. i. 16; 1 Cor. i. But Christ and his apostles never laboured to make converts in great multitudes, or to bring *whole nations* to an external profession of Christianity; nor has a *whole people*, as a matter of fact, been ever thoroughly reformed by the Christian religion. Many thousand *individuals*, however, in different nations, have been reformed by it, and have by their example exhibited to others the advantages of obedience to the precepts of Christ; and so it will always be in Christian communities. The tares and the wheat will always grow together, though in different proportions at different times, according to the prediction of Christ, Matt. xiii.

(b) *Its perpetuity*, (perennitas.) Jesus and the apostles assure us that we can expect no farther revelations of religious truth after the full disclosures which Christ has made. Vide Matt. xvi. 18; 1 Cor. xv. 24. The institute founded by Christ, unlike other religions, and unlike the schools of philosophy, which soon pass away, will continue to the end of the world. Hence the Christian ministry is called *τὸ μένον*, in opposition to the Jewish ministry, which is called *τὸ παρέρχον*, 2 Cor. iii. 11; cf. Heb. xii. 27. This contradicts the opinion of some ancient and modern writers, that a still more perfect religion will hereafter arise, to which Christianity in its turn will give place. Montanus in the second century, and many fanatics in succeeding ages, adopted the notion that this more perfect religion would be founded in a new revelation; but some modern philosophers and theologians suppose that the *religion of reason* is the only perfect religion, and is destined to become universal, after gradually abolishing all positive religions, and the Christian among the rest. This is a favourite idea of Lessing, *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, and of Krug, *Briefe über die Perfectibilität der geoffenbarten Religion*, Jena, 1795. Vide Meyer's prize essay, *Beytrag zur endlichen Entscheidung der Frage: In wie fern haben die Lehren und Vorschriften des N. T. bloss eine locale und temporale Bestimmung, und in wie fern sind dieselben von einem allgemeinen und stets gültigen Ansehen?* Hanover, 1806, 8vo.

Note.—Biblical names of revealed religion and of a religious institute. Some of the most important are the following:—viz.

הוֹרָה, *νόμος*. This name is frequently given, by way of eminence, to the Mosaic religion, in opposition to the Christian. Sometimes, however, it denotes the precepts of revealed religion in general, as Rom. ii. 14, *νόμον μὴ ἔχον*.

νόμος, διαθήκη. When God made a law, or published his will, he was said to enter into a *covenant* or *league* with men. He promised, on his part, to bestow blessings upon men if they were obedient to his law; and they promised, on their part, to do his will. Accordingly, διαθήκη signifies a *law* with a *promise*, and also the whole economy founded on the law and promise. It is applied sometimes to the ancient Jewish economy and sometimes to the new Christian economy, and sometimes to both without distinction. Vide Gal. iv. 24; 2 Cor. iii. 6.

The Christian economy is called πίστις Χριστοῦ, νόμος Χριστοῦ, νόμος πίστεως, πνεῦμα, (in reference to its divine origin and perfection,) and especially εὐαγγέλιον. The last term was originally the name of the *joyful promises* which Christianity contains; but it is frequently used in the New Testament in a wider sense, to denote the *whole Christian economy*, as containing not only promises but precepts as conditions of those promises. In this sense it may be applied to the whole of Christ's sermon on the mount, which is for the most part of a preceptive nature. It is also adapted to particular doctrines of Christianity.

SECTION IX.

OF THE SCIENTIFIC TREATMENT OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

1. In the apostolical church the Christian religion was not taught in a scientific manner. All Christian instruction, as we may see from the Acts of the apostles, and the epistles, was then popular, practical, and hortatory. This appears from the terms παράκλησις, παρακαλεῖν, παραμυθεῖσθαι, which are used in reference to the teaching of Christianity, (κῆρυγμα.) Neither in the times of the apostles, nor shortly after, did Christianity need the aid of science and learning; and among the first Christians there were no learned men, except Paul, Apollos, and a few others, who were versed in the Jewish law.

2. In the third century, many heathen who were versed in science and philosophy became members of the Christian church. At the same time learned men arose among the heathen in opposition to Christianity, and heretics, among Christians themselves, in opposition to the original principles and doctrines of the apostolical churches, from which they wished to advance to something more elevated and perfect. In order to this, they misinterpreted the writings of the apostles, parts of which, at this distance of time, had become obscure. In consequence of these circumstances, learning was soon needed in the statement and defence of Christianity. The learned men who had been converted from heathenism now applied the doctrines and terms of

their philosophy to the truths of the Christian religion. This they did partly from the influence of habit, and partly from the desire of rendering Christianity in this way more popular. They had also the example of the Grecian Jews, who frequently at that time treated the Jewish religion in the same way. This was done by Justin the Martyr; and also by Pantænus, Clemens, and Origen, the teachers of the catechetical school at Alexandria. They supposed that this was the best way to defend Christianity, not only against their learned heathen opponents, but also against the heretics. For the interpretation of the New Testament, also, literary knowledge was now becoming more requisite than formerly, since the language, customs, and whole mode of thinking, had gradually changed since it was written. This department of learning was cultivated with great success, in the third century, by Origen, who gave the tone to the scientific interpretation of the scriptures.

3. From that time forward the reigning philosophy of every successive age has been connected, and indeed wholly incorporated by the learned with Christian theology and morals. The theology, of course, of each successive period has, with few exceptions, received the form and colour of the contemporary philosophy. The Grecian church, after the second century, began with the Platonic philosophy; it next adopted the Aristotelian, in which it was followed by the western church. Through the influence of the schoolmen, the Aristotelian philosophy, after the eleventh century, became universal in the western church. This philosophy had the longest reign. The reformers of the sixteenth century did indeed banish it from the theology of the protestant church; but the theologians of the latter part of the sixteenth, and of the seventeenth century, readmitted it. Then followed the systems of Des Cartes, Thomasius, Leibnitz, Wolf, Crusius, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and others, which first supplanted the school of Aristotle, and have since kept up a constant warfare among themselves. In this contest the theologians have ever taken a lively interest; and, what is worthy of remark, they have always been able, however opposite their theological systems might be, to find arguments for their own support, and for the refutation of their opponents, by a peculiar and subtle application of the very same principles of the contemporary schools of philosophy. Thus both Clemens of Alexandria and Porphyry drew arguments from the philosophy of Plato; and thus, in every succeeding age, the friends and enemies of Christianity—the advocates and opponents of particular doctrines of Christianity—have alike furnished themselves with weapons from the philosophy of Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant, and others, down to our own times.

From these facts we should learn that philosophy can never afford a permanent basis for theology, and should never be relied upon as a sure pillar of a theological system. Those who found their belief upon philosophy never have any thing firm and abiding. As soon as the system which they had adopted gives place to another, the opinions which they before regarded as true have no longer any evidence, and their faith founders like a ship which the storm has torn from its anchor. The belief which rested upon the philosophy of Wolf till the year seventeen hundred and eighty was undermined when Kant prevailed; and the belief which rested upon the philosophy of Kant till the year eighteen hundred, was undermined when Fichte and Schelling prevailed. The same fate will, doubtless, hereafter attend every belief which rests upon a merely philosophical basis.

4. Particular portions of theology had been discussed in a scientific manner, from time to time, ever since the second century; so that abundant materials were soon furnished for the composition of a complete system of theology: they only needed to be collected, arranged, and brought into a perfect whole. This was first attempted, in the sixth century, by Isidorus of Sevilla, in his work, *Libri tres Sententiarum*. It was accomplished much more successfully, in the eighth century, by John of Damascus, in his *ἐκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως*. We do not mention the books of Origen, *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, in this connection, because they contain a scientific statement of only some particular doctrines in theology. After the twelfth century, many such systems were published by the schoolmen in the western church. The principal among these were, *Theologia Christiana*, by Abelard, and *Libri quatuor Sententiarum*, by Peter of Lombard. The doctrines (*sententiæ*) of these systems were taken from Augustine and other fathers of the church, and connected and illustrated in the method and phraseology of Aristotle.

5. The application of learning to religion is so far from being objectionable in itself considered, that it has become absolutely indispensable to the teachers of religion. But they have been at variance on this subject from the first; since there were always some to whom this necessity was not very obvious, and who perceived, on the other hand, that learning was often and greatly abused in religious instruction.

(a) There always were learned theologians who treated the truths of religion as if they were given for no other purpose than speculation, and who, directly or indirectly, turned away the attention of their pupils from the great object to which it should have been directed—the practical influence of the doctrines of the Bible. They taught their pupils to acquire knowledge,

as Seneca says, not for *life*, but for the *school*; and, consequently, many even of those who were designed to teach the common people and the young in the duties of religion acquired an aversion to every thing practical. That such should be the result of this course must appear almost inevitable, if we consider how common a fault it is with young men of liberal education to feel a distaste for whatever is merely practical, and a strong inclination to speculation. If academical teachers live in mere speculation, as too many of them do, they will infuse this disposition into their hearers and readers, who will again infuse it into others, to the great disadvantage of the common people. It was common for those who had been educated in this way to assume an extremely authoritative and dogmatical tone; for there is no other pride which can compare with the pedant's pride of reason. These theological teachers, in their devotion to the philosophy to which they had once pledged themselves, either wholly neglected the scriptures, or so interpreted them as to render them consistent, if possible, with their own preconceived philosophical opinions. This fault is chargeable upon the schoolmen of former times, and upon too many teachers of religion at the present day.

(b) In opposition to such theologians, who composed what may be called the *scholastic* party, there always were others, who composed what may be called the *ascetic* party. They insisted upon the *personal application of known truths for the purposes of piety*, rejected every thing which interfered with practical religion, and regarded theological study as important only so far as it contributed to this end. But some among them fell into extravagant and fanatical notions, and pronounced an unconditional sentence against all learning of whatever kind. Such were some of the *mystics*, as they are called, who appeared, even in the western church, especially after the eleventh century, in opposition to the schoolmen. The mystics have been divided, in consequence of this difference of opinion among them, into *puri* and *mixti*. The *mystici puri*, as the more moderate and unprejudiced of the ascetic party were called, blamed only the abuse of philosophy and learning, and wished to have them regarded, not as an end in themselves, but as the means of a more important end. To this class belonged the Waldenses, Wickliffites, and the Bohemian and Moravian Brethren; and, in more modern times, the German and Swiss reformers of the sixteenth century, and in the protestant church, at the end of the seventeenth and commencement of the eighteenth century, Spener, and the first theologians of Halle, who were of his school.

The state of theology during particular periods, and especially in modern times, is exhibited in ecclesiastical history.

6. The course of theological study to be pur-

sued by the student, with special reference to the circumstances of our own times.

(1) Since the holy scriptures are the true ground of our knowledge of the truths of Christianity, so far as they are of a *positive* nature, (vide s. 7,) the study of theology must commence with the Bible. The truth of the maxim, *theologus in scripturis nascitur*, cannot be controverted. The first business of the theologian is, to search and discover, in the use of his exegetical helps, the sense of the passages upon which the proof of any doctrine depends. He should then faithfully exhibit the doctrine itself, as drawn from these texts, without any addition or diminution. He should entirely forget, while thus engaged, what ancient and modern teachers have said respecting the doctrine in question, and endeavour to come to a result which shall be purely *scriptural*.

(2) When he has done this, he may arrange the doctrines which he has thus discovered in such an order as shall suit his main design, and defend, confirm, and illustrate them by whatever he can draw for this purpose from philosophy, history, or other departments of learning. Proceeding in this way, the theologian will always be able to ascertain how much of any doctrine is expressly taught in the holy scriptures, and how much of it is merely derived from them by inference, or added by men for the purposes of defence or illustration.

(3) The theologian should always be careful to notice the *practical influence* of the several doctrines of theology, and of the particular propositions of which they are composed. He should also, as far as possible, suggest advice, in passing, respecting the proper manner of exhibiting the truths of religion before a popular assembly; for those who are to be the religious teachers of the people need to be taught how they may enter into the views and understand the wants of hearers of a far different intellectual culture from their own. A modern theologian has well remarked, that most of the students of theology know no better than to address a promiscuous audience on the various subjects of religion in the same way in which they themselves, as educated men, have been addressed for their own conviction by their theological instructor. The necessity of such advice to popular teachers of religion is apparent, from considering that they are often wholly destitute of a deep internal conviction and personal experience of the truths which they are expected to teach to others. It cannot be said with respect to them, *pectus est quod disertos facit*. The want of this personal experience cannot be made good by any thing else; the teacher of religion can never be qualified for his office if he has not felt, with joy in his own heart, the truth of the doctrines to which his understanding has assented.

(4) It is now very generally admitted, that the circumstances of our age require that the *history of doctrines* should be connected with the study of theology. Many attempts have accordingly been made to produce a complete history of doctrines, which, however, must prove unsuccessful until the particular portions of which such a history is composed have been more thoroughly studied. The latest works in this department are those of Lange, Münscher, Münter, and Augusti. The historical method of treating the subject of theology has indeed been abused; but when properly employed, it possesses great advantages. It is useful in the following respects:—

(a) It presents us with different views of these most important subjects of knowledge, makes us acquainted with the opinions of others respecting them, and shows us briefly the causes which led to these different views, and the arguments for and against them. In this way it serves to quicken the judgment of the teacher of religion, to confirm and settle his own convictions, and to preserve him from illiberality in his estimate of others. He is often enabled by a simple historical view to decide upon the validity or invalidity of the different arguments by which a doctrine may be supported.

(b) In the established system of our churches, of which no teacher of the church should remain ignorant, there are many philosophical and technical phrases, which have been introduced in consequence of the various errors and controversies which have existed. These phrases cannot be understood and properly estimated unless we are acquainted with the time and manner in which they originated. And this we learn from the history of doctrines.

(c) There is another very important point of view with respect to the history of doctrines, which is too often overlooked.

There is a certain universal *analogy* in the knowledge and opinions of men on the subject of religion; like the analogy existing, for example, among human languages. This analogy may be often used by the theologian to greater effect than many logical demonstrations. The opinions and conceptions of men respecting God and divine things are indeed very different; and so are their languages. But in the midst of all this variety, both of religion and language, we find a striking similarity in some principal points; and this similarity leads us at last to the result, that even on the subject of religion men proceed everywhere on certain universal principles, which must have their ground in the original constitution which God himself has given us. Cf. s. 2, 3. The thousand different modifications of these principles and modes of conception are owing to the different degrees of intellectual and moral culture, and to other ex-

ternal circumstances by which men are affected. And it is for this reason that the analogy of human opinions on the subject of religion is most visible and striking in the infancy of society.

Knowing now these universal ideas, and modes of conception and expression on the subject of religion, we may safely presume, that if God has actually given a direct revelation to men, he has adapted it to these ideas and conceptions, founded as they are in the original constitution of the human mind. This is demanded by the nature of man; and this is found to be actually the case in the divine revelations which we enjoy.

These ideas and conceptions, which belong essentially to the nature of man, give us the thread, as it were, by which we may traverse the labyrinth of religious opinions, and ascend up to their very origin. They illustrate the doctrine of divine revelation, and render the wisdom of the divine plan in the different degrees of revelation (vide s. 8) everywhere conspicuous.

The theologian, therefore, who would cast the light of history upon the doctrines of revelation, must acquire, from all the sources of information within his reach, both of ancient and modern date, a comprehensive knowledge of the religious opinions and conceptions of different nations, especially in the infancy of their existence, and from all these various sentiments deduce some universal results. In this inquiry, he will find the careful study of the Old Testament peculiarly important and instructive. For here he will discover the germs which were afterwards developed in the religions of the Jews, Christians, and other nations. With the sacred books of the Jews he should compare the writings of other nations, especially those which belong to their early history. Among all the writings of the people of the ancient world, none are so important as those of the Greeks, particularly the poems of Homer. They contain those fundamental ideas which, in all their various modifications among the later Greeks, disclose their common origin in the essential nature of man. The passages which exhibit these fundamental ideas should therefore be frequently cited, in order to render this analogy of principles obvious, in cases where important results are depending upon it.

Note.—In the study of theology, the following works may be read with profit, and used as manuals. (1) Morus, *Commentarius Exegetico-historicus, in suam Theologiæ Christianæ Epitomen*, Tom. 2, edited by M. Hempel, Halle, 1797—98, 8vo. (2) Reinhard, *Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik*, edited with literary additions by Berger, Amberg, and Sultzbach, 1801, 8vo. (3) Storr, *Doctrinæ Christianæ pars theoretica*

e s. *litteris repetita*, ed. 2, ex MS. auctoris emendata, 1808. (4) Storr, *Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik*, with additions by Flatt, Stuttgart, 1803, 8vo.

The manuals of Ammon, Schmidt, Stäudlin, and others, may be recommended, in many respects, to the more advanced student, who can examine for himself. The work of Storr deserves special recommendation, as a very thorough system of *biblical* theology. The works which give a merely historical view of the various theological opinions are less suitable for beginners. One of the best among the works of this kind is Beck, *Commentarii historici decretorum religionis Christianæ et formulæ Lutheriæ*, Lips. 1801, 8vo. The work of Augusti, above mentioned, gives a briefer sketch. Another work of the same author, *System der christlichen Dogmatik, nach den Grundsätzen der lutherischen Kirche, im Grundrisse dargestellt*, Leipzig, 1809, 8vo, contains much that is valuable.

ARTICLE I.

OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES AS THE SOURCE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

SECTION I.

NAMES AND DIVISIONS OF THE BOOKS BELONGING TO THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

THE holy scriptures are a collection of the productions of the prophets, evangelists, and apostles, containing the doctrines and the history of revealed religion. They are the archives of the records of revealed religion, and of its history. They consist of two principal parts: the Old Testament, or the sacred national books of the Israelites; and the New Testament, or the sacred books of Christians. Διαθήκη and *ברית* denote *laws, religion, and religious writings*; also *the books, or the collection of the books, which embody all the precepts of religion*. Βιβλίον διαθήκης is used in the latter sense, 1 Mac. i. 57, and παλαιά διαθήκη, 2 Cor. iii. 14. The sacred books of Christians are called, in distinction, *καινή διαθήκη*.

The books of the New Testament have been differently divided. At a very early period they were divided into τὸ εὐαγγέλιον and ὁ ἀπόστολος, of which we shall speak hereafter. They have also been divided into the *historical* part, containing the gospels and the Acts of the apostles; the *doctrinal* part containing the epistles, and the *prophetical* part, the Apocalypse. The history of the remarkable events of the life of Jesus stands first in the collection; because the divine

revelation contained in the New Testament depends upon events, and upon the divine authority of Jesus, which was confirmed by these events. For the same reason, the history of the remarkable events of the life of Moses, and of his times, stands first in the Old Testament.

The Old Testament was divided by the Jews into three parts: (1) *תורה*, *the law*, containing the five books of Moses (*πεντάτευχος*); (2) *נביאים*, *the prophets*, subdivided into *ראשונים נביאים*, *prioriores*, containing the books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings, and *אחרונים נביאים*, *posteriores*, containing the prophets, properly so called; (3) *כתובים*, *Hagiographa*, containing Job, Psalms, Proverbs, and the remaining books.

This division of the books of the Old Testament, at least the division into *νόμος καὶ προφήται*, occurs in the prologue of Jesus Sirach, and in the New Testament, Luke xvi. 16; and *νόμος προφήται, καὶ ψαλμοί* (*libri poetici*), in Luke, xxiv. 44, in Josephus, and very frequently in the Talmud. All the books of the Old Testament are sometimes designated in the New by the word *νόμος*. They are also called *ἑρὰ γράμματα*, *γραφαὶ ἁγία*, and simply *γραφὴ*. They are sometimes called by the Jews *ארבעה וְעשר*, *the four and twenty books*.

The holy scriptures are frequently called the *Word of God*; especially since the time of Hutter, who gave them this name. Töllner, Semler, and others, object to this phrase, as inconvenient and liable to mistake. It may be allowed, however, if it is properly explained. This phrase, as used in the Bible, does not denote the sacred books; but (1) oracles, predictions, and other divine declarations; and (2) the doctrines and precepts of religion. So Rom. iii. 2; Acts vii. 38. The Word of God may therefore be distinguished from the holy scriptures, of which, strictly speaking, it composes only a part. It cannot, therefore, in strict propriety of language, be used to signify the *books* belonging to the Bible.

Cf. Morus, p. 16, s. 1.

SECTION II.

OF THE AUTHENTICITY OR GENUINENESS OF THE BOOKS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

THE word *ἀξιοπιστία* properly denotes the credibility (*ἀξιοπιστία*, Gloss. Vet.) of a work in respect to its author. In investigating the authenticity of the books of the Bible, we inquire, therefore, whether the opinion that they are the productions of the authors to whom they are ascribed is worthy of credit.

We shall first exhibit the evidence of the genuineness of the books of the New Testament; after which the genuineness of the books of the Old Testament can be more easily and satisfactorily proved. The proofs for the genu-

ineness of the books of the New Testament may be divided into *internal* and *external*.

I. *Internal proofs of the Genuineness of the Books of the New Testament.*

1. Their *contents*. They contain nothing to awaken the suspicion that they were composed in another age, or by other authors, than are commonly supposed. They agree in every respect with what we know from other sources of the history and circumstances of the age in which they are supposed to be written, and exhibit no traces of a later composition; facts which, considering the variety of subjects introduced, are wholly inconsistent with the supposition that they are spurious.

2. Their *dialect*. It is clear from the dialect in which the books of the New Testament are written, that they are the productions of native Jews of the first century; for all the Jewish writers of the first century who made use of the Greek language employed exactly that Hebraistic Greek in which the New Testament is written; but after the second century, this dialect was no longer employed by Christian writers, who then wrote in an entirely different manner. Now if these books are supposititious, they must have been forged during the second century, when the dialect in which they are written was fallen into disuse among Christian writers. Besides, a very extraordinary and incredible skill would have been requisite to invent for each of the writers of the New Testament such a peculiarity of style as appears in the writings of Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, Peter, Paul and the rest; and still more, to carry through successfully a fiction like this.

II. *External proofs of the Authenticity of the Books of the New Testament.*

1. The testimony of *Christian writers* of the first three centuries. We necessarily derive our earliest evidences of the existence of these books from those who read and used them—from Christian writers. Now we know that the fathers of the first three centuries possessed these books, and considered them to be the genuine productions of those whose names they bear. The testimony of the early Christian fathers on this subject has been carefully collected by Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. III. 25; VI. 25; and Demonstratio Evangelica. This whole subject has been ably and accurately investigated in modern times by Lardner, Credibility of the Gospel History. A more brief survey is taken by Storr, Doctrinæ Christianæ pars theoretica e sacris literis repetita, Stuttgart, 1795, 8vo. He has executed the article, De sacrarum literarum auctoritate, pages 1—82, with great diligence, acuteness, and accuracy. Cf. the Introductions of Michaelis, Hug, and others.

2. The assent of the *heretics* of the first centuries. The Gnostics, who were the heretics of the first period of the church, never questioned the credibility of the books of the New Testament. They even received some books as *genuine* which, from regard to their philosophical views, they could not admit to be inspired. From this quarter, therefore, no reasonable doubt can arise with respect to the authenticity of the books of the New Testament. Vide Storr, *ubi supra*, p. 1—4.

3. The evidence from *heathen* writers. Celsus, Porphyry, Lucian, Julian, and other heathen writers, who attacked the doctrines contained in these books, confirm their *genuineness*. Vide Storr, *ubi supra*, p. 1—4.

4. The evidence from the *ancient versions*. The books of the New Testament were translated as early as the second century into Syriac and Latin, and during the third and fourth centuries into *Æthiopic* and Gothic.

Note.—From the foregoing remarks we may conclude that since no important objection can be urged against the authenticity of the books of the New Testament as a whole, they are therefore genuine; and even intelligent deists will now universally admit that no valid *historical* arguments can be urged against the authenticity of most of these books.

The genuineness of *some* of the books which belong to this collection was indeed doubted in ancient times by some Christians. This, however, so far from disproving the genuineness of the rest, is a strong argument in its favour. It shews how cautiously the early Christians proceeded in distinguishing the true from the false. Besides, their doubts respecting the authenticity of the Apocalypse, the general epistles, and some other books, arose very obviously from the doctrines contained in them, and not from any deficiency in the historical evidence by which they were supported.

The books of the New Testament were divided in consequence of the doubts respecting their authenticity, into (1) *ὁμολογούμενα*, the books whose authenticity was never doubted by the orthodox or catholic church, Morus, p. 28; (2) *ἀντιλεγόμενα*, the books whose authenticity was doubted by some, although, according to Eusebius, it was admitted by most—viz., James, Jude, the second epistle of Peter, and the second and third epistles of John; (3) *νῶσα*, the books which, although received by the uninformed as genuine, were doubtless spurious—viz., the epistle of Barnabas, the Shepherd of Hermas, &c. This division occurs first in Origen, and afterwards in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* III. 25. It has been adopted in part by some modern theologians, who, however, have altered the terms, calling the *ὁμολογούμενα*, *protocanonical*, and the *ἀντιλεγόμενα*, *deuterocanonical*.

SECTION III.

OF THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

THE proof of the authenticity of the books of the Old Testament is attended, indeed, with some difficulty, and is destitute of that degree of evidence, with respect to particular parts, which belongs to the proof of the authenticity of the New Testament. The reasons of this are very easily understood. We are wholly ignorant of the authors of many of these books, and of the age in which they were composed; and in general, so high is their antiquity, and so few are the written accounts transmitted from that early age, that we are very deficient in sure, historical information concerning them, and are, of course, unable to decide correctly in every case on the question of their authenticity. However, it can be shewn, from many combined reasons, that with respect to most of these books, either the whole of them or their most important parts were composed in the ages to which they are assigned.

I. *Internal Proofs of the Genuineness of the Books of the Old Testament.*

1. The language, style, costume, and the whole mode of representation in the Hebrew scriptures, are in the spirit of the times in which they were written. In the earlier books, the ideas, expressions, and in short everything about them, is such as it naturally would be in the infancy of the world. Now, if Ezra, or any number of Jews living at the time of the exile, or afterwards, had composed these books, as some have supposed, they could hardly have avoided allusions to the language, manners, or history of their own age, by which the deception would have been betrayed. Consider, too, that notwithstanding the general agreement of the sacred writers of the Hebrews in language, style, and the mode of thought and representation, each has some peculiarity which plainly distinguishes him from all the rest. Vide the Notes of Michaelis to his Bible; also the Introductions of Eichhorn and Michaelis.

2. The accounts which the sacred writers give us of the history, polity, customs, and institutions of the oldest nations of the world agree exactly with those which we obtain from other sources. The accounts which Moses gives us of Egypt, for example, agree with those which we obtain from oriental and Grecian writers. And it is quite incredible that impostors of a late age should have given a description like this, which is true even to the slightest characteristic shades. They must have committed anachronisms and historical mistakes; especially considering how much the critical study of antiquity and of general history was

neglected by the ancients. Jerusalem, Briefe über die Mosaischen Schriften und Philosophie, Braunschweig, 1762, 8vo. C. Gottlob Lang, Versuch einer Harmonie der heiligen und Profanschreibern, 1775.

II. *External Proofs of the Authenticity of the Books of the Old Testament.*

1. These books are full of allusions to each other. Not only are the events which are recorded in the earlier writings often mentioned in the later books, as Psalms lxxviii., cv., cvi.; 1 Samuel, xii. 8—12; but the earlier writers themselves are often afterwards cited by name—David, e. g., in 2 Chron. xxiii. 18; Moses, Josh. viii. 31; and Jeremiah, Dan. ix. 2. That the authenticity of these books cannot be proved from a large number of contemporary witnesses is nothing strange; the case is the same with all the writings of the ancient world. In those early times little was written, and still less is preserved. All the evidence which we can reasonably ask of the authenticity of such ancient works is, that they possess internal marks of truth, which are not invalidated by any external testimony to the contrary. There is no contemporary testimony for the poems of Homer or the history of Herodotus; but since they possess sufficient internal credibility, and there is no external testimony against them, their antiquity and genuineness are universally admitted.

2. The written records of the Jewish nation were preserved from the earliest times with the greatest care. The law of Moses was deposited among the sacred things in the temple (Deut. xxxi.), and with it, from time to time, other public documents which the Jews wished to preserve with special care, or to which they wished to give a solemn sanction, Josh. xxiv. 26; 1 Sam. x. 25. Thus a kind of sacred library was gradually formed in the temple, from which our present collection of the books of the Old Testament was taken. Josephus mentions, Antiq. V. 1, ἀνακείμενα ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ γράμματα.

3. The Greek translation, called the Septuagint or Alexandrine version, is a proof that the Jews, at a very early period, acknowledged the books of the Old Testament to be genuine. This translation was commenced, beginning with the Pentateuch, in the reign of the Egyptian king Ptolemy Philadelphus, and completed a considerable time, certainly a century, before the birth of Christ.

4. The Jews who lived at the time of Christ, and in the centuries immediately preceding and following, were all united in the opinion that these books were authentic and credible. The Grecian Jews agreed with those of Palestine on this point. Vide the catalogue of the wise and distinguished men of the Jewish nation, Sirach, xliiv.—xlix. The testimony of Philo on this

subject is very important; and also that of Josephus, (Contra Apionem, I. 8,) whose opinions were always remarkably candid. The old Jewish rabbins, whose testimony is collected in the Talmud, agree with the writers above mentioned in supporting the authenticity of the books of the Old Testament.

5. The testimony of Christ and his apostles confirms that which has already been adduced. They frequently quote passages from Moses, the prophets, and the historical books, thus admitting their authenticity, Morus, p. 23, s. 13, and Storr, p. 61—70. Even Paul, who was so intent on the subversion of Judaism, and who always gave his opinion against it without any reserve, never expressed the most distant doubt respecting the authenticity of the sacred books of the Jews, or the credibility of the Jewish history. Jesus, Paul, and the other apostles did not indeed themselves institute critical examinations and inquiries respecting these books; nor was it necessary that they should. On supposition that they were inspired teachers, their mere word is sufficient security for the truth of what they uttered; and since the authenticity of the books of the Old Testament was admitted by them, it must also be admitted by all who consider them to be inspired. This consideration alone is sufficient to support the faith of the Christian, when attacked with specious objections which he is unable to answer.

Note.—Some additions have indeed been made in later times to the oldest writings of the Israelites; but these interpolations can generally be distinguished from the original. Nor have the scriptures of the Old Testament fared worse in this respect than the writings of Homer, and indeed most of the written records composed at an early period. These additions inserted in the books of Moses consist of names of towns and countries, which were not given to them till after his time—the account of his death and burial, Deut. xxxiv., &c. Here the nature of the case and the alteration of style sufficiently indicate another hand.

Note 2.—At this distance of time it cannot be determined with entire accuracy whether the authors to whom the several books of the Old Testament are ascribed, gave them the very form which they now have, or only furnished the material, which others have brought into the shape in which they now appear. But even on the latter supposition, the credibility of these books is not at all diminished. Rhapsodies and disconnected compositions are frequently collected and arranged, for the first time, by some compiler living a long time after the original author. Many of the prophetic books—for example, the book of Isaiah, and most of the historical books, and perhaps even those of Moses—were composed in this way. But al-

though Moses, for example, may not have written his books exactly in the manner in which they appear at present, he may still be said to have written them; and Jesus properly speaks of what Moses wrote. The books which bear his name are undoubtedly composed from very ancient, credible, and authentic narratives, which breathe everywhere the very spirit of the ancient world. They are his writings, although they may have been arranged, and sometimes perhaps newly modelled, by another hand. The same may be said with respect to the writings of Homer, and many others. They were collected and modelled anew, some time after they were originally composed, and yet their authenticity as a whole remains unimpaired. Vide Wolf, Prolegg. ad Homerum.

SECTION IV.

OF THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, OR THE COLLECTION OF THE BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT INTO A WHOLE.

Introductory Remarks.

THIS section and the following comprise all the topics which are usually introduced under the title of the canon of the holy scriptures. The word *canon*, which is often misunderstood, means anything determined according to a fixed measure, rule, or law; hence, a list or catalogue made by a law—e. g., *canon martyrum*.

But the phrase *canonical books* has not always been used in the same sense in the Christian church. (1) The canonical books were originally those which Christians commonly used, according to the appointment of the church, in their public assemblies for divine worship; so that, under this name, many books were formerly included which did not belong to the authorized collection of the Old and New Testament scriptures, while many books whose divine authority was undoubted were not regarded as canonical—that is, were not read in the churches. (2) But after the fourth century the phrase *libri canonici* was taken in a more limited sense, and became synonymous with the term *εὐδαίμονες*, which was common among the ancient Greek fathers. *Libri canonici*, in this sense, were the books belonging to the authorized collection of the Old and New Testament scriptures, and containing, as such, the rules of our faith and practice. In this sense the word *canonical* was formerly used by Augustine, and is still used by theological writers at the present day.

In contradistinction to the canonical are the *apocryphal* books. And the latter term, as well as the former, has been used in a wider and a more limited sense. (a) The apocryphal writings were originally those books which were

not publicly used in the Christian assemblies, which were laid aside, or shut up, the public use of which was forbidden, (*βιβλία ἀπόκρυφα*, πύκν.) A book therefore of the Old or New Testament, whose divine original and authority were undoubted, might be *apocryphal* in this sense. But (b) after the fourth century the apocryphal books were understood to be those which did not in reality belong to the collection of the Old and New Testament scriptures, although frequently placed in it by the uninformed, and esteemed by them of equal authority with the inspired books. This is the sense in which the word *apocrypha* is now used by theological writers.

The history of the canon of the Old-Testament scriptures is obscure, from the deficiency in ancient records. Still there are some historical fragments and data from which it may be composed; though, after all, it must remain imperfect.

I. The Origin of the Canon of the Old Testament before the Babylonian Exile.

MOST of the books of the Old Testament were composed, and some of them (a considerable number of the Psalms, to say the least) collected and arranged, before the time of Ezra, or the Babylonian exile. The books of Moses had been collected and arranged in the order in which they now stand before the ten tribes were carried captive by the Assyrians. They were therefore adopted by the Samaritans. The book of the law was kept in the sanctuary of the temple, in order (1) to secure it more effectually from injury, and (2) to give it a more solemn sanction. Vide s. 3, II. 2. The oracles, sacred songs, and various other compositions of Isaiah, Hosea, and other prophets and teachers of religion, were afterwards preserved in the same manner, and doubtless with the same intention. But it does not appear that before the exile any complete and perfect collections were made of all the oracles of any one prophet, or of all the Psalms or Proverbs. And even supposing such collections to have been made, they did not agree throughout with the collections which we now possess, which were made and introduced soon after the exile. The original collection of the Psalms, for example, has been enriched by the addition of many, which were not composed till after the captivity. The other original collections have been altered and improved in a similar manner.

Note.—It is usually the case, that as soon as a nation comes to the possession of many works which have different degrees of merit, or which are in danger of being corrupted or neglected, or which perhaps have already experienced this fate, persons appear who are versed in literature, and who interest themselves in these works.

They take pains to preserve their text, or to restore it when it has become corrupt; they shew the distinction between genuine and spurious writings, and they make collections, or lists, comprising only those which are genuine, and among these only the more eminent and distinguished. Such persons appeared anciently among the Israelites, and afterwards among Christians. And such among the Greeks were the grammarians of Alexandria, under the Ptolemies. They distinguished between the genuine and spurious works of Grecian literature, and composed catalogues (canones) of the best among the former. The books admitted into their canon were called *ἐμπροσθεν* (classici), and the books excluded, *ἐκπρόσθεν*. The excluded writings were of course less used, and have since mostly perished. Vide Ruhnken, *Historia Oratorum Græcorum critica*, p. xcvi. Quintillian, (I. O.) I. 4, s. 3, and Spalding, ad h. l. These remarks illustrate the origin of the collection of the holy scriptures.

II. *The Completion of the Canon of the Old Testament after the Babylonian Exile.*

It is a current tradition among the Jews that the complete collection of their sacred books was made by Ezra. Another tradition, however, ascribes the establishment of the canon to Nehemiah, 2 Macc. ii. 13. But neither of these traditions is supported by sure historical evidence. It cannot be doubted, however, that in so important a work as the collection and arrangement of their sacred books, the priests, and lawyers, and all the leading men of the nation, must have been unitedly engaged, as the grammarians of Alexandria were, in determining the Greek classics. And it is very probable that both of the distinguished men above mentioned may have had a principal share in this undertaking.

Our collection of the Old-Testament scriptures appears to have originated somewhat in the following manner:—When the Jews returned from captivity, and re-established divine worship, they collected the sacred books which they still possessed, and commenced with them a sacred library, as they had done before with the book of the law. To this collection they afterwards added the writings of Zachariah, Malachi, and other distinguished prophets and priests, who wrote during the captivity, or shortly after; and also the books of Kings, Chronicles, and other historical writings, which had been compiled from the ancient records of the nation.

The collection thus made was ever after considered complete; and the books composing it were called **THE HOLY SCRIPTURES, THE LAW AND THE PROPHETS, &c.** It was now circulated by means of transcripts, and came gradually into

common use. The canon of the Old Testament was closed as soon, certainly, as the reign of the Syrian king, Antiochus Epiphanes, and probably somewhat before. After this time the spirit of prophecy ceased, and no new writings were added to the approved collection. What was done by the Grecian grammarians under Ptolemy, towards securing the existence and literary authority of Grecian works, by the establishment of the canon of the Greek classics, was done by the Jews, after their return from exile, towards securing the existence and religious authority of Hebrew books, by the establishment of the canon of the Hebrew scriptures.

The books belonging to this collection were the only ones translated as sacred national books by the first translators of the Old Testament, the authors of the Septuagint. But to some manuscripts of this version, other books, apocryphal, as they are called, were found appended. From this circumstance some have supposed that the Egyptian Jews had a different canon from those of Palestine, and included in it the apocryphal books, as of equal authority with the rest. This was the opinion of Semler; but it cannot be shewn from Josephus or Philo that the Egyptian Jews, though they held the apocryphal books in high esteem, both before and after the commencement of the Christian era, ever thought them of equal authority with the canonical books. Philo, in the first century, does not once mention them, although Sirach wrote about 237 years before the birth of Christ. They cannot, therefore, have been counted, even by the Egyptian Jews of the first century, among the books of the Old Testament. Besides, they were never cited by the apostles, who, however, always follow the Septuagint. During the second century, Sirach was held in high esteem among the fathers; and gradually he and the other apocryphal writers obtained great authority in the churches. At a still later period they were admitted into the canon by Christian writers, who mistook their high reputation for divine authority. Vide No. III. Cf. Eichhorn, *Einleitung in das A. T. Th. I.*, and also in die *apokryphischen Schriften des A. T. Leipzig 1795*; Storr, in the work above mentioned, p. 71, ff.; especially Jahn, *Einleitung in die göttlichen Schriften des alten Bundes*, Wien, 1802. The latter work contains a full examination of the latest objections.

Can it be shewn by historical evidence that *all* the books which now stand in this collection belonged to it originally? Of most of these books this can be satisfactorily shewn; but respecting some particular books it cannot be ascertained from historical records, either that they belonged to the collection originally, or at what time they were received as canonical; for no complete list of all our canonical books can

be gathered from the works of the oldest Jewish writers.

The following observations, however, may enable us to come to some conclusion:—(1) We see from Sirach, xlv.—xlix., that *most* of these books belonged to his canon. (2) The citations which Philo, in the first century, makes from the Old Testament, shew that most of these books belonged also to his collection. (3) But Josephus has left a list of the books, of which, at his time, the collection was composed; but there is some obscurity attending the passage, *Contra Apionem*, I. 8, in which this catalogue is contained. We cannot be certain from this passage that Josephus intended to include the books of Chronicles, Ezra, Esther, and Nehemiah, in his catalogue; though the probability is that he did. Vide Eichhorn, *Einleitung*, Th. I. s. 113. (4) The frequent citations which the evangelists and prophets made from these books render it certain that most of them belonged to the canon at the time of Christ. The passage, Matt. xxiii. 35, coll. Luke, xi. 51, deserves to be specially noticed. Christ here declares that the Jews should be punished for the murder of all the just men who had been slain from Abel (Gen. iv. 8) to Zachariah, 2 Chron. xxiv. 21, 22. From this passage we are led to conclude that the disputed book of Chronicles not only belonged to the canon of the Old Testament at the time of Christ, but that it was then, as it is now, placed last in the collection. (5) Add to this, that these disputed books are contained, as belonging to the canon, in the Alexandrine version.

Note.—Since the free inquiry respecting some of the books of the Old Testament, which Oeder published at Halle, 1771, many protestant theologians have employed themselves in suggesting doubts respecting the genuineness of some of the canonical Hebrew scriptures, and in attempting to prove them to be either spurious, uncertain, or adulterated. Among these theologians, De Wette is the latest. They commenced the attack upon the books of Esther, Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah; proceeded to Isaiah (xl.—lx.) and other prophets, and then to the books of Moses; against the genuineness of all of which they arrayed specious objections, and finally endeavoured to subvert the foundation of the whole canon of the Old Testament. The student can become acquainted with the principal modern writers who have either assailed or advocated the canon of the Old Testament, and with the principal arguments used on both sides, from Jahn's *Introduction to the Old Testament*, and the theological work of Storr and Platt, which notice all, except perhaps a few of the very latest objections.

To all these objections but few Christians are able to give a satisfactory answer. But if they

allow to Christ the authority which he claimed for himself, and which the apostles ascribed to him, they can relieve their minds from doubts by the considerations already suggested in s. 3, II. 5, and by those which here follow.

III. *The Reception of this Canon by Christians.*

Since the primitive Christians received the books of the Old Testament from the Israelites, they may naturally be supposed to have admitted into their collection all the books which belonged to the canon of the contemporary Jews. It has been always said, from the earliest times of the church, that Christians received the books of the Old Testament on the simple testimony of Christ and his apostles; and whatever some Christians may think of the *authority* of this testimony, they must allow that it is at least important in ascertaining the canon of the Hebrew scriptures. But to this testimony it has been objected, especially in modern times, (a) that it did not extend to *all* the books of the Old Testament; for example, to the books of Esther, Nehemiah, &c.; and (b) that it cannot be regarded as decisive, because Christ and his apostles made it no part of their object to examine critically the history of the Hebrew scriptures; and made the Old Testament the basis of their own instructions only because it was regarded as the source of religious knowledge by the Jews among whom they taught.

But it appears from No. II. that the whole collection existed at the time of Christ and his apostles, and indeed for some time previous, and that it was approved by them. Whoever, therefore, acknowledges them to be divine teachers, must receive the books of the Old Testament on their authority. If he refuses to do this, he is either inconsistent in rejecting the authority of those whom he acknowledges to be divine teachers, or dishonest in acknowledging Christ and his apostles to be divine teachers, while he really does not believe them to be such.

After the times of the apostles, the fathers of the church disagreed with respect to the books belonging to the canon of the Old-Testament scriptures. (1) The fathers of Palestine, their disciples, and others who were acquainted with the original Hebrew, or the tradition of the Jews, composed catalogues containing all the books which belong to our Bible. This was done in the second century, by Melito, bishop of Sardis, cited in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* IV. 26; by Origen, cited VI. 25 of the same history; by Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* IV.; by Gregory Nazianzen, Athanasius, and Epiphanius. (2) But some of the fathers included the apocryphal writings, which are usually appended to the Alexandrine version, among the canonical books. They, at least, ascribed to these writings a great

authority, and called them *Scriptura* although they were never considered as divine by the Jews, who lived either before or at the time of Christ, and were never quoted by the writers of the New Testament or by Philo. Vide No. II. These fathers believed the fable of the inspiration of the Septuagint; and finding the apocryphal books appended to this version, and in high repute among the Egyptian Jews of the second century, they considered them, at length, as *divine*, and placed them on a level with the canonical books. The Egyptian fathers, Clements of Alexandria and Irenæus, first adopted this opinion, in which, as in many other things, they were followed by the Latin fathers. At the council at Hippo, in the year 393, in can. 36, and at the third council at Carthage, in the year 397, can. 47, the apocryphal books were, for the first time, expressly included *inter scripturas canonicas*. This decision was then received by the African fathers, and generally in the western church.

But there were some of the fathers of the Latin church who carefully distinguished the apocryphal from the canonical books. Hieronymus, in his Prologus Galeatus, says respecting the Book of Wisdom, &c., *non sunt in canone*. In his Præf. in libros Salomonis, he says, "Hæc duo volumina (ecclesiasticum et sapientiam) legat ecclesia ad ædificationem plebis, non ad auctoritatem ecclesiasticorum dogmatum confirmandam." Hence the books properly belonging to the Old Testament were called *libri canonici*, and the apocryphal books, *libri ecclesiastici*. Rufinus, Expositio Symboli Apost., after enumerating the canonical books of the Old Testament, says, "Hæc sunt quæ patres intra canonem concluserunt, et ex quibus fidei nostræ assertiones constare voluerunt: sciendum tamen est, quod et alii libri sunt, qui non sunt canonici, sed ecclesiastici a majoribus appellati." He then enumerates them, and adds, "Quæ omnia legi quidem in ecclesia voluerunt, non tamen proferri ad auctoritatem ex his fidei confirmandam."

But after all, the Romish church, through ignorance of the subject, placed the apocryphal books on a level with the canonical, and even appealed to them as authority on the doctrines of the Bible. They were induced to do this the more, from the consideration that some of the peculiar doctrines of their church were favoured by some passages in these books; intercession for the dead, for example, by the passage 2 Macc. xii. 43—45. Accordingly the council at Trent, in the sixteenth century, set aside the distinction between the canonical and apocryphal books, and closed its decretal by saying, "Si quis autem libros ipsos integros, cum omnibus suis partibus, prout in ecclesia catholica legi consueverunt, et in veteri vulgata Latina editione

habentur, pro sacris et canonicis non suscipiunt, et traditiones prædictas, sciens et prudens contemserit, anathema sit." Sess. IV. Decr. I. The more candid and enlightened theologians of the Romish church have, however, never allowed quite the same authority to the apocryphal as to the canonical scriptures; and have adopted the convenient division of the books into *protocanonici* and *deuterocanonici*, in the latter of which they place the apocryphal writings.

Cf. Morus, p. 38.

SECTION V.

OF THE CANON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, OR THE COLLECTION OF THE BOOKS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT INTO A WHOLE.

I. Origin of this Collection.

It was natural that the first Christians, who had been in the habit of using a collection of the sacred books of the Jews, should feel induced to institute a similar collection of their own sacred books. This was the more necessary, as many spurious writings, which were ascribed to the apostles, were in circulation, and even publicly read and used in the churches. Even during the life of the apostles, such spurious writings were palmed upon them by impostors, 2 Thess. ii. 2; Col. iii. 17. In consequence of these circumstances, Christians were induced very early to commence the collection of their sacred books into a complete whole, with particular reference to Christian posterity, which otherwise would have had a very groundless and disfigured Christianity. Vide Introduction, s. 7, ad finem. Into this collection only such writings were admitted as were considered to be the genuine productions of the apostles and first disciples of Christ; although many other books were still regarded as *canonical*, in the old ecclesiastical sense of the word, and were still publicly read in Christian assemblies. Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. III. 3, and others of the ancient fathers, said expressly that many books were *ἀναγινωσκόμενοι*, which were not *ἐνδιάδηχοι* (*ἐγχειρόμενοι*). Thus the epistle of Barnabas, the Shepherd of Hermas, and the sermon of Peter, were used in Egypt; and even in the fifth century, the revelation of Peter, in Palestine.

But with respect to the manner in which this collection originated, and with respect to those who were chiefly instrumental in forming it, we can obtain only very disconnected and imperfect information from the history of the church during the first centuries. The information which we possess on these points is, however, more complete than that which relates to the canon of the Old Testament; and indeed amounts to a satisfactory degree of evidence.

In order to confirm the credibility and genuineness of the collection, it was formerly sup-

posed that some inspired man must have either made or approved it; and because John outlived the other apostles, he was fixed upon as the individual; just as Ezra was, by the Jews, for the compilation of the Old-Testament scriptures. In this supposition there is a mixture of truth and error. We have no historical evidence for believing that John either made or approved the *whole* collection. In order to arrive at the truth on this subject, we must consider the collection divided into its two principal parts, *εὐαγγέλιον* and *ἀπόστολος*.

1. It was commonly reported in the early ages of the church, that John was acquainted with the first three gospels, that he sanctioned them by his authority, and completed the history of Jesus which they contain, by his own gospel. Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. III. 24. And this report appears to be true, on a moment's reflection. Vide Michaelis, Herder, and Storr. John either wholly omits to mention, or at most only briefly notices, for the sake of connexion, even such important events as the baptism and the ascension of Christ, and the institution of the Lord's supper, if they have been fully described by the other evangelists. On the other hand, he relates many things which the others omit. He enlarges, for example, on the incidents and discourses which *preceded* and *followed* the supper, the passion, the resurrection, and other events, the histories of which are given by the other evangelists. He may therefore be supposed to have known and sanctioned the first three gospels, which, in connexion with his own, were of course received by the Christian church.

2. But it cannot be shewn from historical testimony, or any other evidence, that John either made the collection of the other books (*ἀπόστολος*) now belonging to the New Testament, or sanctioned it by his authority, when made. This supposition is, on the contrary, extremely improbable. If John had sanctioned the entire collection of our New Testament scriptures, how could doubts have arisen respecting his second and third epistles, the Apocalypse, and some other writings, even in the midst of the Asiatic church, where he himself lived? His decision would have for ever settled the question as to the sacred canon.

It is evident from the historical information which we possess, that this collection was not finished at once, but was commenced a considerable time before it was made complete. It was divided into two parts, *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*, and *ὁ ἀπόστολος* οἱ *τὸ ἀποστόλου*.

(1) As to the *gospels*, the genuine and the spurious were early distinguished from each other. Justin the Martyr distinctly speaks of the gospels as productions of the apostles. Irenæus, Contra Hæres, III. 11, cites the gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, as those

which he knew to be genuine. The same was done by Clemens of Alexandria, and Tertullian. Vide Storr, s. 12. Tatian, at the end of the second century, and Ammonius, at the beginning of the third, composed harmonies of the four gospels, and Origen wrote a copious commentary on Matthew and John. The gospels were, therefore, collected as early as the second century; and in the third and fourth centuries were regarded as of undoubted authority throughout the Christian church. They were prefixed to the other books of the New Testament; because the history of Jesus was considered, at that early period, as the basis of Christian truth, and was taught wherever the gospel was preached, (John, xx. 31;) just as the historical books, especially the writings of Moses, were prefixed to the Old Testament, as the basis of the Mosaic economy.

(2) As to the *epistles*, a collection of them was commenced at a very early period, and was gradually enlarged and completed. It appears, indeed, to be of somewhat later origin than the collection of the gospels; but both of them must have existed soon after the commencement of the second century; for Ignatius, Ep. ad Philadelph. cap. 5, speaks of the *gospels*, and of the *apostolical writings*. The apostolical epistles were first sent to the churches, for which they were principally written. They were then communicated by these churches, either in the original or in transcript, to other connected churches, (Col. iv. 16;) and each church collected as many as it could obtain. From such small, imperfect beginnings, our present collection was formed. It is probable that some celebrated teacher, who possessed more epistles than any other man, or perhaps some distinguished church, first instituted this collection in the second century; and that it was afterwards adopted by others, in deference to this authority. The place where this collection was first made, is unknown. Mill supposes it was Rome; but without sufficient reason.

This collection of the epistles was designed to include only those which were most distinguished, and whose authenticity was universally allowed. The *ἀποστόλων*, therefore, originally contained only the thirteen epistles of Paul, and the first epistles of Peter and John; since these only were considered by the oldest fathers as belonging to the *ἐκδιαζῆτοι*. But afterwards the *ἀντιλεγόμενα* were gradually admitted into the canon. And as early as the third century, most of the copies of the collection contained all the books which now belong to it, the *ἀντιλεγόμενα* not excepted; as appears from the catalogue of Origen cited by Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. VI. 25; and from that of Eusebius himself, Hist. Eccles. III. 25, where he appeals to *ἐκκλησιαστικὴ παράδοσις*, and excludes the *Apocry-*

pha from the *ἐνδιάσκητοι*. Vide Griesbach, Hist. epp. Paull. Jenæ, 1777, 4to. The catalogues of Cyril of Jerusalem and of Gregory Nazianzen agree with these, except that the Apocalypse is wholly omitted by the former, and is mentioned by the latter as doubtful.

II. *The Principles on which this Collection was made, and the Authority which it possesses.*

We discover these principles from the writings of the fathers of the early ages of the church.

1. It was a rule to admit only such books into the canon as could be proved to be the productions of the apostles themselves, or of their first assistants in office. Those only, therefore, were allowed to be *ἐνδιάσκητοι* which had credible testimony in their favour from the earliest times. The gospels of Peter, Thomas, and others, were on this principle rejected by Origen and Eusebius.

2. The doctrines taught in a book were also examined before it was admitted into the canon. If any book disagreed with the doctrines which the apostles taught, or with the regulations which the apostles established, it was excluded from the canon as clearly spurious. This rule was needed even at that early period; for many books written in support of error had from the first been ascribed to the apostles, in order to procure more influence and currency.

3. The custom and example of other churches, which might reasonably be supposed to have judged on good and solid grounds, and which were free from the suspicion of credulity or carelessness, were in some cases referred to in determining whether a book should be admitted into the canon. So Hieronymus (Catal. Script. Eccles.), when speaking of the book of Jude, says that it had indeed been doubted and rejected by some, but *auctoritatem jam vetustate et usu meruit*.

The question upon what the canonical authority of the books of the New Testament depends may now be easily answered. It depends principally upon the decision of the first Christian teachers and churches; as the authority of the Greek classics depends upon the decision of the grammarians of Alexandria. Their decision, however, was not arbitrary, but founded on sober examination of the authenticity of these books. No public and universal law was ever passed in the ancient church, determining that all and each of the books of the New Testament should be adopted without further examination and inquiry. The learned always were, and always must be, free to inquire on this subject. If we are convinced at all, it must be by reason and not by authority. We should not, therefore, *blindly* credit the testimony of the ancients, whether given by particular churches or by distinguished individuals; nor, on the contrary, should

we *blindly* reject their testimony. We ought rather to examine the evidence upon which they decided, and then believe according to our own sincere conviction. The authenticity of some of the books (the *ἀντιλεγόμενα*) which stand in our present collection was disputed even in ancient times; and the decision respecting them was very different, even in the ancient orthodox church.

The canonical books were indeed, as we find, in some cases determined by formal decrees, which seem to cut off and discountenance all further inquiry, as in the *Canones Apostolici*, which, however, are spurious; also in can. 60 of the council at Laodicea, about the year 360, in which only the Apocalypse is omitted. But this council was composed of only a few bishops, and its determinations were not adopted by the other churches; besides, the sixtieth canon is probably spurious. Vide Spittler, *Kritische Untersuchung des sechzigsten Laodic. Canons*, Bremen, 1777, 8vo. The council at Hippo, in the year 393, and at Carthage, in the year 397, also established similar catalogues. But neither of these councils was general. Many other enactments were made on the subject of the canon in the Romish church at a later period; but the council of Trent, in the sixteenth century, for the first time established the canon for the Romish church by a general and formal decree.

But the protestant church has never acquiesced in those decrees which preclude or prohibit further investigation. Luther considered it allowable to call in question the authenticity of the Apocalypse and the epistles of James; and he was followed in this opinion by many theologians of the sixteenth century. And other protestant theologians have doubted respecting other books of the *ἀντιλεγόμενα*.

Note 1.—Even if we should allow that the *ἀντιλεγόμενα* are spurious, and cannot be relied upon in proof of the Christian system, we should not be compelled either to relinquish or to alter a single doctrine. For the books whose genuineness is undisputed contain all that is necessary for a complete knowledge of Christian faith and duty.

Note 2.—If we examine the reasons which led some of the ancients to doubt the authenticity of the *ἀντιλεγόμενα*, we shall find that they were derived rather from the doctrines taught in these books than from any historical evidence against them. Such were Luther's objections. But none of the objections of this nature which are alleged are, in my view, sufficiently weighty to justify us in considering any one of these books as doubtful, not even the Apocalypse, as most at present acknowledge. In the following work, therefore, the doctrines of the Christian religion will be supported by texts taken from the differ-

ent books of the New Testament, without any reference to this distinction.

Works to be consulted:—Gerh. de Mastricht, Canon SS. secundum seriem seculor. N. T. collectus et notis illustratus, Jenæ, 1725. This work contains the opinions of the fathers, catalogues of the canon extracted from their writings, and the decrees of the councils. Stosch, De librorum V. T. canone, Frankfort an dem Oder, 1755, 8vo. Semler, Abhandlungen von freyer Untersuchung des Canons, 4 Theile, Halle, 1771—75, 8vo. Weber, Beyträge zur Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Canons, Tübingen, 1791. Corrodi, Versuch einer Beleuchtung der Geschichte des jüdischen und christlichen Bibelcanons, 2 Bände, Halle, 1792. Other works are referred to in Jahn, and in the Elements of Storr and Flatt.

SECTION VI.

ON THE UNADULTERATED CORRECTNESS AND INTEGRITY OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES.

THE integrity of the holy scriptures implies (1) that none of the books which formerly belonged to the canon are now wanting (*integritas totalis*;) (2) that these scriptures are transmitted to us in such a state as still to promote the object for which they were originally written, (*integritas partium*, or *partialis*.)

I. *Integritas Totalis*.

If some of the scriptures which formerly belonged to the canon had perished, the loss would not be very essential. If those that are left give us all the information which we need respecting the Jewish and Christian economy, no other books are necessary. That any books, however, have ever belonged to the canon of the Jewish or Christian scriptures, which do not now belong to it, cannot be proved. It is true, indeed, that the apostles and prophets wrote many books which have not come down to us—books, too, which were inspired. For if inspiration is conceded to those books of theirs which were admitted into the canon of the Old and New Testament, and which are therefore preserved, it must also be conceded to those which were not admitted into the canon, and have therefore perished. The *oral* discourses of Jesus and the apostles were doubtless inspired, and yet many of these discourses are lost; and even of those which were committed to writing, only extracts of the more important parts were in many cases preserved. There is nothing inconsistent, therefore, in the supposition that God should suffer even an inspired book to be left out of this collection, and consequently to be lost to posterity. But there is no evidence that any of the books which are lost ever belong-

ed to the canon. Paul wrote, as we see from his epistles, at least *one* letter to the Corinthians more than we have at present. Many memoirs of Jesus, as we find from Luke, i. 1, were written at a very early period. The historical books of the Old Testament were extracted from larger historical works, which are often cited in the books compiled from them, but which are now lost. Other collections of songs are mentioned; as, *בְּקֶר הַיִּשׁוּר*, Joshua, x. 13. Writings of the prophets Gad, Nathan, Semaja, and Jehu, are mentioned in Chronicles; but none of these ever belonged to the collection of the Old and New Testament scriptures. Cf. Jahn, Einleitung.

II. *Integritas Partialis*.

The integrity of a book is not affected by variations of the text, and by false readings. These could not have been avoided, except by miracle, in the numerous transcripts which have been made of these ancient scriptures. The integrity of a book requires only that its text be in such a state that the object for which the book was written is fully answered. When we assert the integrity of the Bible, therefore, we do not pretend that every letter, word, and expression in our present copies exactly answers to the original text, but that the general contents, the doctrines of the Bible, are taught in it with uncorrupted correctness and certainty.

The variations of the text of the New Testament amounted, according to the estimate of Wetstein, to sixty thousand; and of the text of the Old Testament to a still greater number. But by all these variations no doctrine of any importance is undermined or altered, and no history of any interest is disfigured or changed. A few of the texts by which some doctrines were supported have, indeed, been discarded—e. g., 1 John, v. 7; but there are other texts which afford to each of these doctrines an ample proof; so that the doctrines themselves remain unaltered. Besides, the most important variations, those which affect the sense most materially, do not concern the doctrines of religion or the objects of faith, but some indifferent circumstances, trifling historical minutiae, &c. Without giving up the integrity of the Bible, then, we may freely concede that in some few places the true reading is lost beyond recovery.

The Text of the Holy Scriptures is not so corrupt as to prevent the attainment of the object for which they were written.

1. Of the text of the New Testament. The supposition that the text in all the manuscripts of the New Testament has been intentionally and generally falsified cannot possibly be made. Any falsifications must have been made either by the reigning ecclesiastical body (*catholici*)

or by some of the sects (*hæretici*) during the *first three centuries*. But among the former, there was no man during this period of sufficient authority to cause the alterations which he might have made to be generally adopted. The jealousy existing among individual churches and teachers was far too great, and the use of the Christian scriptures far too general, to allow an intentional falsification to be made. These scriptures were publicly read, and were therefore familiar to every Christian. This was the case certainly with those more important parts, which, if any, would have been falsified. There were also many translations made from the various manuscripts of the original Greek, the text of which still agrees in every important particular with our own.

The text of the New Testament was, indeed, intentionally altered and corrupted by some of the heretics—e. g. Marcion; but those alterations were immediately discovered and condemned by the orthodox churches. In fact, these heretics freely acknowledged that they themselves had fabricated them, and did not pretend to follow the original text.

2. Of the text of the Old Testament. The opinions which formerly prevailed respecting the integrity of the text of the Old Testament were much more extravagant than respecting that of the New. These opinions were founded on the exaggerated accounts which were given by the later Jews respecting the pains which their ancestors, especially the Masorites, had taken to preserve the sacred text unaltered. They went so far as to say, that in consequence of this caution, not a single mistake or false reading had been able to creep into the original Hebrew text. And they extended the same remark even to the accents and vowel points. John Buxtorf, father and son, professors of the Hebrew language at Basel, during the last part of the seventeenth century, adopted these fabulous Jewish opinions and stories, and advocated them with great zeal. Through their influence and that of their disciples, as the principal cause, these opinions became very prevalent among the Swiss, and even Lutheran, theologians at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century. In Switzerland they were regarded as essential points of orthodoxy, and placed as such in the *Formula consensus Helveticæ*. But,

(1) The exactest agreement of all our present manuscripts would not prove the present text to be throughout true, for all our present Hebrew manuscripts follow the same Masoretic recension; and their agreement would only prove that this recension had suffered no corruption.

(2) This supposed agreement has, however, been disproved since our manuscripts have been compared. They differ widely from one another,

as appears from the vast number of various readings collected by Kennicott and De Rossi.

(3) The Hebrew manuscripts from which the ancient versions—for example, the Septuagint—were made differed still more widely; and in some instances quite another recension of the Hebrew text was at the foundation of these versions.

But however great may be the corruptions which are found in particular books or passages of the Old Testament, they do not materially affect the Christian religion, which does not stand in such an intimate connexion with any parts of the Jewish scriptures that it must stand or fall with them. But the same is true on this subject with respect to the Old Testament as was remarked above with respect to the New. Not a single doctrine is undermined or weakened by all these various readings. Nor can it be proved that the text has in a single instance been intentionally corrupted in favour of particular doctrinal prejudices. Even the Samaritan text of the five books of Moses, the most important of the Hebrew scriptures, exhibits their contents with entire fidelity, and in entire accordance with the texts of our common Hebrew manuscripts.

Cf. Rich. Simon, *Hist. critique du V. T.*, Rotterdam, 1685, 4to. Capellus, *Critica Sacra*, Paris, 1650. Eichhorn, *Einleitung ins alte Testament*, Th. I. Cap. II. Lichtenstein, *Paralipomena critica circa textum Vet. Testamenti*, Helmstädt, 1799, 4to. Jahn, *Einleitung*. Also the writings of Kennicott and De Rossi.

SECTION VII.

OF THE TRUTH AND DIVINITY OF THE DOCTRINES TAUGHT BY CHRIST AND HIS APOSTLES.

THE truth and divinity of the doctrines contained in the Christian scriptures must be considered before the divinity of these scriptures themselves.

The principal proofs which Jesus himself and his apostles produced in favour of the divinity of their doctrines are the following:

I. *Proof from the Claims which Jesus himself made.*

Jesus frequently called himself an immediate divine messenger. He declared that he taught his religion by the express command of God, and as his deputed ambassador, Matt. xxvi. 63; John, v. 43; xvi. 27, 28, et passim. This declaration of Jesus, so often repeated, is, in itself considered, of great weight. The same pretensions have, indeed, sometimes been made by impostors and enthusiasts; but the whole character and conduct of Jesus were such as to free him from the imputation of being either an honest enthusiast or a crafty impostor. He is the very opposite of what impostors and enthusiasts,

even of the best description, usually are; he practised none of the arts of deception, and he appealed confidently and unreservedly to his innocence, even in presence of his enemies; and challenged them to convict him, if they were able, of a single act of dishonesty, John, viii. 46, seq.

This proof has been carefully stated by Storr, *Doctrina Christiana*, p. 28—34, and by Dr. Hensler, *Die Wahrheit und Göttlichkeit der christlichen Religion in der Kürze dargestellt*, p. 26—32, Hamburg, 1803, 8vo.

II. *Proof from the Excellence, Suitableness, and Beneficial Tendency of this Religion.*

This proof is called *argumentum internum pro veritate et divinitate religionis Christianæ*. Jesus himself makes use of this argument, John, vii. 17. It is also employed by the apostles, and by the ancient apologists of Christianity, Justin, Athenagoras, Tertullian, and Clemens of Alexandria. That the Christian religion is surpassed by no other in the purity, simplicity, and practical utility of its doctrines, is perfectly obvious, and, even at the present day, is generally acknowledged. No sage or moralist, of ancient or modern times, has accomplished so great a work as has been done by Christ; has taught such salutary doctrines—doctrines which exert so benign an influence in comforting and renovating the heart of man. And this every one may know from his own experience who makes a personal application of these doctrines in the manner which Christ has prescribed. Vide Introduction, s. 3, ad finem.

The religion which, by its doctrine and discipline, accomplishes all this, and which is so taught as to effect what had never before been done by man, deserves to be called *divine*; and must be acknowledged, even by the rationalist, to be, on this account, at least important and worthy of respect.* But the internal excellence of the Christian religion does not, in itself considered, satisfactorily prove that this religion is, as a matter of fact, derived immediately from God; the utility and benevolent tendency of a doctrine prove only that it is *worthy of God*, and not the fact that it is derived from him. As this is a question of fact, it can be proved only by other facts. Vide Introduction, s. 8. III. 2, note. Hence it is that this proof from the internal excellence of the Christian religion is always insisted upon, to the exclusion of the proof from miracles, by those who deny any immediate divine revelation in the higher sense. That divine revelation in this sense cannot be sufficiently established by this internal argument may be seen from the Introduction, s. 7, I. ad finem.

But although this internal argument does not, separately considered, satisfactorily prove the

immediate divine origin of the Christian religion it is still of great importance—

1. *To the sincere inquirer.* A conviction of the inherent excellence of the Christian religion, and of its benevolent tendencies, is of the greatest importance to the candid inquirer in seriously examining the other proofs by which the divinity of our religion is supported. It prepares his mind to receive them, and predisposes him to believe any evidence that may be offered, or any declarations that may be made, by one who gave such excellent precepts, and lived himself in a manner so conformed to them, as Jesus did. Jesus declared that his instructions were derived immediately from God. Vide No I. Now if the inquirer finds that the religion of Christ accomplishes what might be reasonably expected of a religion of divine origin; if he finds that its founder possessed a pure moral character, and was neither an impostor nor a deluded enthusiast; he will give credit to his pretensions, and feel himself bound to admit the evidence that may be offered of his divine mission.

2. *To the practical Christian.* The belief of the truth and divinity of the Christian religion arising from its internal excellence and its beneficial effects, is in the highest degree important to every practical Christian. His whole estimation of this religion depends upon his having felt this excellence, and joyfully experienced these benefits, in his own heart. These experiences produce a firm conviction in his mind of the truth of this religion, which no theoretic doubts are able to shake.

These feelings arising in the heart of the true Christian, as he studies, applies, and practises the instructions of his religion, and the firm conviction of the truth and divinity of his religion, arising from these feelings, is called *testimonium spiritus sancti internum*—i. e., a conviction of the divinity of the Christian religion produced in the mind of man by the Spirit of God. This conviction is not a conclusion, but a feeling, from which the truth is inferred. Vide Morus, p. 39, 40. The term *testimonium* (μαρτυρία), taken from Rom. viii. 16, and 1 John, v. 6, was applied to this inward persuasion, in contradistinction to the name *testimonium externum spiritus sancti*, taken from Heb. ii. 4, which was given to the proof afforded by miracles.

The internal witness of the Spirit denotes those pious feelings and dispositions which God or the Holy Spirit awakens in us by means of the Christian doctrine, and which are the evidence, the internal proof, to us, that this doctrine is true. “Ultima ratio, sub qua et propter quam fide divina et infallibili credimus, verbum Dei, esse verbum Dei, est, ipsa intrinseca vis et efficacia verbi divini, et spiritus sancti in scriptura loquentis testificatio et obsignatio,” Quonstedt, *Systema*, I. p. 110.

This intimate persuasion is perfectly rational, and by no means visionary. It is not produced in us in a miraculous manner, by direct divine agency, but it results from the truths which we have understood and obeyed. We are conscious in our inmost souls that since we have embraced this heavenly religion, and have faithfully obeyed its precepts, we have had more peace and happiness, and more strength to execute our virtuous resolutions, than ever before. In this way we are brought to the conviction that the Christian religion is the true and only means of promoting our happiness, and of imparting that quiet of mind, and that strength for virtue, which we need. And from this conviction we pass to the conclusion, that the Christian religion is *true and divine*, and that Jesus and his apostles are to be believed when they declare it to be such. We have found this doctrine to be possessed of higher excellences and of a greater efficacy than any other with which we have been acquainted, and hence conclude that it is the very means which God himself has appointed for our good.

This proof of the divine origin of the Christian religion, derived from its happy effects, is often urged by Christ, John, vii. 15—17, coll. viii. 47; and also by the apostles, 1 Thess. ii. 13; 2 Cor. iii. 1—4; Acts, ii. 14—37; and particularly from the effect of the discourses of Jesus, Matt. vii. 28, 29; Luke, xxiv. 32. This proof, explained in this way, is conformed both to reason and observation; and the feelings upon which it rests must have been experienced by every true Christian. Cf. s. 124, II.; Nösselt, Diss. inaug. de interno testimonio spiritus sancti, Halle, 1767. Gehe (Superintendent at Oschatz), Diss. inaug. de argumento, quod pro divinitate religionis Christianæ ab experientia ducitur, Göttingen, 1796. Morus, p. 40.

III. Proof from Miracles.

In this place we shall consider only what we are taught on this subject by the writers of the Old and New Testaments, and the point of view in which they regarded it; adding a few observations for the purpose of illustration. Hereafter, in the Article on Divine Providence, s. 72, we shall consider the arguments and objections of a philosophical nature.

1. The following names are given to miracles by the sacred writers, and by Jesus himself:—גִּבּוּרִים, גִּבּוּרִים, correspondent to which in the Septuagint, and in the New Testament, are the words *δυνάμεις*, *δυνάμεις*, because miracles are proofs of the divine power. מִפְּלֵאוֹת, θαύματα, something extraordinary, which excites wonder. מִפְּלֵאוֹת, τέρας, τέρατα, prodigia, portentosa, something monstrous, which excites the idea of a tremendous force. מִפְּלֵאוֹת, σημεῖα, ostenta, because miracles are signs or evidences of divine interposition; whence they are also called

the hand of God, the finger of God. יְדֵי אֱלֹהִים, ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ. The miracles of Christ are frequently called ἔργα, by way of eminence. The divine power by which miracles were wrought was called רִחוּת קָדוֹשׁ, רִחוּת קָדוֹשׁ, πνεῦμα ἁγίου, πνεῦμα Θεοῦ, πνεῦμα.

2. These biblical names of miracles clearly shew that the sacred writers considered miracles to be events effected by divine power, unlike those which commonly occur in the known order of nature, established by God, and inexplicable to us by the laws of nature, and therefore calculated to excite surprise and wonder. Such events are not necessary for the establishment of a *natural* religion; but they are indispensable to the establishment of any religion which announces itself as revealed from God in any other way than through the reason of man,—of a religion, in short, like the Christian, which is a *positive* religion, and in which Christ appears in the character of a divine messenger to disclose the mind of God. The peculiar doctrines of this religion are not cognizable from the nature of things, but are taught us by persons who assert that they themselves were taught by God. Now if they would obtain credit in this assertion, they must be able to prove their divine mission by proper evidence. They cannot do this by proofs drawn from reason; they therefore resort to miracles.

Properly speaking, these miracles are wrought by God. In performing them, he does not alter or disturb the course of things which he himself directs, or counteract the laws which he himself has established; but he accomplishes, by means of nature, which he has thus constituted and which he governs, something *more* than is common, and in connexion with unusual circumstances.

[Note.—This is here maintained in opposition to some theologians of former times, who held that in case of a real miracle the course of nature was disturbed, or the laws of nature counteracted. “*Miracula vera et proprie dicta sunt, quæ contra vim rebus naturalibus a Deo inditam, cursumque naturalem, sive per extraordinariam Dei potentiam efficiuntur; ut cum . . . aqua in vinum convertitur, mortui suscitantur,*” &c. Quenstedt, Systema, P. I. et II. p. 471, Vitebergæ, 1685, fol. The same opinion is expressed by Buddeus. Miracles, he says, are “*operationes quibus naturæ leges ad ordinem et conservationem totius hujus universi spectantes, re vera suspenduntur.*” Instit. theol. dogm. p. 245. They are likewise defined by Wegscheider as “*eventus insoliti admirationem excitantes; ideoque a cooperatione cause, humanas vires superantis, et rerum naturæ cursum consuetum, legesque in efficiendo ejusmodi eventu tollentis, plerumque repetiti.*” Institutiones, p. 173, s. 46. But with respect to this opinion, Augustine pro-

perly asked, "Quomodo est contra naturam, quod est voluntate Dei, quum voluntas tanti utique creatoris, conditæ rei ejuslibet natura sit." De Civ. Dei, XXI. 8. This opinion led to the supposition that in connexion with every miracle there was a *miraculum restitutionis*, by which the confusion occasioned was obviated, and the proper order restored. Vide J. Jac. Ebert, *Dubitationes contra miracula restitutionis*.

The following remarks on this subject are from Tieftrunk, *Censur des chr. protest. Lehrbegriffs*, s. 263—265: "The efficient supersensible Being may not suspend the laws, or disarrange the course of nature; but must employ nature as the means of producing the designed result. What is miraculous is not therefore *contrary* to nature (*widernatürlich*), but extraordinary, preternatural, (*aussernatürlich*.) The wonder-working Being produces in the sphere of sense, and by the laws which govern this sphere, such an effect as does not occur in the ordinary course of things, and could not be produced by the mere powers of nature. A miraculous event seems to encroach upon the course of nature, without disturbing or displacing it. But this encroachment cannot be accounted for by any natural causality, and must be ascribed to a higher power working according to the laws of sensible nature. But we must not suppose that this supersensible cause acts in a *lawless* manner in working miracles; for although we are unacquainted with the laws which prevail in the sphere of spirit, we must still believe that some laws are there in force; and if we knew what they were, we should consider the same events which now appear miraculous as perfectly natural." Vide Hahn, *Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens*, s. 24, Leipzig, 1828.]

In this extraordinary exertion of his power, God has ever some great moral end in view; since it is inconsistent with reason and scripture to suppose that he acts without respect to an end. Now the end for which miracles are performed is clearly revealed. They are the credentials of the divine messengers, and invest with a divine authority their precepts, promises, threatenings, and whatever else they may declare; for no teacher ever did or can work a miracle by his own power: he can only act as the instrument in the hand of God, the author and governor of nature. When God, therefore, raises the dead, or performs any other miracle, through the instrumentality of a teacher, he thus declares that this teacher is divinely commissioned, that through him he shall speak, and act, and accomplish his purposes. He thus furnishes his ambassador with credentials, secures him the attention of his fellow men, calls upon them to acknowledge the divinity of his mission, and to receive his heavenly doctrine. This,

then, as we are taught by the Bible, is the end for which miracles were wrought. *True* miracles are the credentials which God gives his ambassadors of their divine mission; and every teacher who performs them should be received as a messenger sent from God. For it cannot be supposed that the God of truth would enable an enthusiast, or a crafty impostor, or any false teacher, to perform *real* miracles, since he would thus set his own seal to a falsehood. Hence we may safely argue the falsity of all the alleged miracles which are wrought for the confirmation of doctrines and declarations which are demonstrably untrue, and therefore not of God,—such, for example, as were wrought by the false prophets in ancient times, and which are declared in the Bible to be deceptive.

On these principles, Christ and his apostles prove the divinity of their mission and doctrine, by the miracles which they performed in view of their contemporaries, Matt. xi. 3, seq. John, xiv. 11. Vide *Scripta Varii argumenti*, ed. 2, p. 187. And in consequence of the miracles which he wrought, Jesus was received by many of his contemporaries as a teacher sent from God, John, iii. 2; ix. 35—38. This belief in his character arising from his miracles, was approved by Jesus himself, Matt. xi. 2—6, 20—24. Sometimes, however, he justly blamed the Jews for seeking constantly after signs and wonders. As to the object of the miracles which he performed, he distinctly declared, that they should be considered as proof (*σημείον*) that he, as a man, did not teach his own wisdom, nor act from his own will, but as the organ of God, the creator and governor of the universe; and that his instructions should therefore be considered as divine instructions (*λόγοι*), and received and obeyed as coming from God. Vide John, iii., v., vi., viii., xii., xiv., xvi.; Acts, ii. 22; x. 38. Miracles are regarded by Christ and the apostles as always intended by God to promote the success (*συνεργεῖσθαι*) and confirm the authority (*βεβαιῶναι*) of the doctrine taught by the one through whom they were performed. Mark, xvi. 20. The apostles refer, in the Acts and in the epistles, to three kinds of miracles—viz., (1) those wrought *upon* Jesus, to prove his authority, especially his resurrection from the dead; (2) those wrought *by* him; and (3) those which they themselves performed.

The proof from miracles, impressing, as they do, the bodily senses, often produces a strong conviction, and is especially adapted to those who are insensible to the proof drawn from the internal excellence of the Christian religion, and the effects which it produces on the hearts of men.

3. How far is the proof from miracles still valid? May it be urged at the present day? It has been rejected, in modern times, as wholly

destitute of evidence, by Rousseau, Hume, and all the rationalist theologians. Hume maintained, that however strong might be the evidence in favour of any miracle, there was always stronger evidence against it; and that every miracle was contradictory to the reason and experience of all ages. In order to render the miracles of the Bible suspicious, he collected all manner of marvellous histories, and endeavoured to shew that the miracles of the Bible had less evidence to support them than many of these pretended miracles, which were universally allowed to be false. The proof from miracles was also abundantly canvassed in the controversies with Lessing.

We may freely concede, (a) that this proof must have carried a stronger and more resistless evidence to the minds of those who themselves saw the miracles with their own eyes, than to the minds of others living at a distance from the scene, or after the time in which they were performed; and (b) that Christ and his apostles intended their miracles primarily for their contemporaries, who expected and demanded evidence of this nature, and who would receive the true religion more readily, and believe it more firmly, if it came to them supported by such evidence as was conformed to their previous opinions and expectations; and that this proof may so far be said to be *temporary*. But (c) it can by no means be said to be destitute of evidence for all who were not the contemporaries of Christ and the apostles. If any at the present day are convinced of the *historical truth* of the miracles wrought by Christ, to them the proof derived from miracles must still be perfectly valid. For to attempt to prove *à priori*, as is usually done, that miracles are *impossible*, is the height of folly and presumption. Moreover (d) the system of truth which was taught by Jesus, the apostles, and prophets, is consistent with itself only on the supposition that it was corroborated by miracles. They laid claim to the character of extraordinary divine messengers—a claim which could not be supported except by extraordinary events. Vide Introduction, s. 7, 8. The reason, now, that so many deny the evidence of miracles is, that they are unwilling to admit this extraordinary claim, which miracles are intended to establish.

The *historical credibility* of the miracles of Christ may be proved in two ways:

(1.) From the testimony of the apostles themselves. We reason thus: (a) they were *able* to know the truth. They were contemporaries of Christ, and eye-witnesses of his works. They enjoyed the best opportunity for examining and scrutinizing everything which he did. Nor were they credulous; but, on the contrary, slow to believe, as Christ himself says, Mark, xvi. 14. They perfectly agree in their testimony, and in

open court refer to the miracles of Christ as to undisputed facts, known to the world, Acts, ii. 22. (b) They *intended* to speak the truth. Their whole character is such as to free them from the suspicion of intentional deception. If they had been influenced by considerations of worldly interest they would not have embraced Christianity, from which they had little to hope, and everything to fear, as to their temporal prospects. Besides, the style of their narratives is so simple, artless, and unaffected, that every unprejudiced reader must feel himself compelled to acknowledge that they understood and believed what they wrote, and had no intention of deceiving their readers. 1 John, i. 1, seq. Cf. Morus, p. 16—20.

(2) From the testimony of those who were not followers of Christ, and even of those who were opposed to his religion. The Jews who were contemporary with Christ allowed that he had wrought miracles, (John, xi. 47,) and did not venture to accuse him, before a judicial tribunal, of deception in performing them. Even the Talmud makes mention of his miracles, and allows their historical truth, although it undertakes to account for them in different ways. And so the pharisees, when they were unable to deny the reality of the miracles of Christ, pretended, as a last resort, that they were the work of the devil. And even the apostate Judas, who lived on terms of perfect intimacy with his Master, could not bring against him the charge of deception, and confesses at last, in despair, that he had betrayed innocent blood; whereas, if he had known or suspected any dishonesty, he would surely have justified his crime. And if he did not know of any dishonesty, we may safely conclude that there was none; since the imposture could not have been executed without pecuniary means, which were placed in the hands of Judas. Matt. xxvii. 4, seq. Those who opposed Christianity during the first periods of its existence—namely, Celsus, Hierocles, and Julian, did not doubt the historical truth of the miracles of Christ, although they ascribed them to magical arts. Morus, p. 26, 27.

IV. *Proof from the fulfilment of Ancient Prophecies in Christ.*

In urging this proof, Jesus and his apostles had primary, though by no means exclusive, reference to the Jews, in whose sacred books these predictions respecting the Messiah were contained. This proof will be particularly considered in connexion with the office of Messiah, s. 89, 90, in the Article on Christ.

V. *Proof from the Prophecies of Christ himself.*

Every prediction of future incidents may properly be regarded as a *miracle*. All which was said, therefore, respecting the proof from mira-

cles, may be applied to this proof and the one preceding, both of which are parts of the general proof from miracles.

With respect to the proof from prophecy, we remark now more particularly, that in order to its validity, (1) The prediction must be *historically true*—i. e., must have been actually made before the events to which it relates, and not fabricated afterwards, nor even enriched by the addition of any circumstances which may have occurred in connexion with the fulfilment of the original prophecy. (2) It must not, like most of the oracles of the ancient heathen world, hide its meaning under an artful ambiguity of expression. (3) The exact and perfect fulfilment of the prediction must be capable of proof from history. If any prediction answers these conditions, it must be allowed to come from God, and to be of the nature of a miracle, 2 Pet. i. 19.

God only can foresee future and fortuitous events. When a man therefore foretells events of this nature, he proves that he is instructed and commissioned by God. The Jewish prophets who laid claim to the title of divine ambassadors were required, therefore, in proof of their pretensions, to foretell the future. Christ himself made use of this proof to support his own claims, John, xiii. 19; xiv. 29. He foretold, in the most distinct and accurate manner, his own impending fate, (Matt. xvi. 21, seq. Luke, xviii. 31—33;) and also that of his disciples, Matt. x. 18, seq. He predicted that his religion would prevail upon the earth, and continue to the end of the world; and this, too, at a time when its destruction must have appeared to every one in the highest degree probable. He predicted the destruction of the temple, and the overthrow of the Jewish state by the Romans, Matt. xxiv.; Luke, xxi. This latter prediction was very minute, and was fulfilled, according to the testimony of Josephus, in every particular. Cf. the valuable treatises on the prophecies, collected by Hurd and Halifax. Thomas Newton, Treatise on the prophecies which have been remarkably fulfilled. Less, Wahrheit der christlichen Religion, s. 472, ff. Göttingen, 1785.

Morus, p. 24, seq., s. 14, seq.

Note.—It thus appears, that in investigating the truth of Christianity we must proceed as we do when we investigate any subjects of an historical nature. We must believe what we are taught in the holy scriptures, upon the *authority of the testimony* by which it is supported. We are indeed gratified to find other reasons, beside positive divine testimony, on which to found our belief in the truths of religion; but these additional reasons are not essential to our belief. And in cases where we are unable to discover them, we may believe upon the simple divine testimony. Nor are we chargeable with credu-

lity in so doing, any more than when we believe, on credible testimony, any fact which may for a time be incomprehensible.

Cf. Joh. Friedr. Klenker, Neue Prüfung und Erklärung der vorzüglichsten Beweise für die Wahrheit und den göttlichen Ursprung des Christenthums, wie der Offenbarung überhaupt, 3 Bde, Riga, 1787—94, 8vo. Köppen, Die Bibel ein Werk der göttlichen Weisheit, Ausg. 2, Rostock und Leipzig, 1797—8, 8vo. Storr, Doctrinæ Christianæ, &c., p. 21, seq. Süsskind (Prof. of theology at Stuttgart), Eine historisch—exegetische Untersuchung, In welchem Sinne hat Jesus die Göttlichkeit seiner Religion und Sittenlehre behauptet? Tübingen, 1802, 8vo. Hensler, Die Wahrheit und Göttlichkeit der christlichen Religion, in der Kürze dargestellt, s. 33—48.

SECTION VIII.

OF THE INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS, OR THE HIGHER DIVINE INFLUENCE ENJOYED BY THE SACRED WRITERS.

Introductory Remarks.

1. THE two following positions—viz., *the doctrines taught in the books of the Bible are of divine origin, and these books themselves are given by God*, are by no means the same, and need to be carefully distinguished. The divinity of the *doctrines* of the Bible was considered in s. 7; but this does not necessarily involve the divinity of the Bible itself. The doctrines of revelation are frequently contained in books of devotion, for example, but it is not pretended that on this account these books are of divine origin. The truth and divinity of the Christian religion might be satisfactorily proved if the books of the New Testament were acknowledged to be merely genuine, and the authors of them merely credible; so that the *divinity of the Christian religion* need not be considered as depending on the *divinity of the holy scriptures*. The two things were distinguished from each other as early as the time of Melancthon.

Religion, therefore, is more concerned, as Michaelis has justly observed, in having proof for the authenticity and genuineness than for the inspiration of the sacred volume. Still the sincere friend of truth will surely be rejoiced in finding reason to believe in the immediate divine origin of the books of our religion. If this higher divine influence, called *inspiration*, were not enjoyed by the apostles in those instructions which they have left us, how easily could we be disturbed by the suspicion that they misunderstood some of the doctrines of Christianity, or failed to exhibit them in a proper manner! They were liable, we might then say, from their devoted attachment to the person of Christ, and

their high esteem for his character, to adopt false and exaggerated opinions respecting his nature, and his future exaltation. In this way, if these books were not believed to be given by inspiration of God, the most important positive doctrines of Christianity might be considered doubtful; as has been done, in fact, in modern times, by those who deny the inspiration of the scriptures.

2. Inspiration has been defined in different ways. Cf. the historical sketch, s. 9, 10. It may be best defined, according to the representations of the scriptures themselves, to be an *extraordinary divine influence by which the teachers of religion were instructed what and how they should write or speak, while discharging the duties of their office*. There is no need of any distinction between their *oral* and *written* discourses. Morus, p. 30, s. 24. The correctness of this definition will hereafter appear from the texts which will be cited from the New Testament.

Note.—It may be regarded as a settled point that inspiration is not *impossible*, and that no argument *à priori* can be urged against the historical evidence of the fact. This was truly remarked by Kant, Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der reinen Vernunft, 2 Ausg. Königsberg, 1793, 8vo; and also by Fichte, Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung, 2 Ausg. Königsberg, 1793, 8vo.

I. Inspiration of the New Testament.

1. This cannot be proved from the testimony of the fathers. They can command belief only when they testify respecting things which could be known by observation; such as the authenticity of a book, or the age of the writer. Nor can the divine origin of the Bible be proved by the argument by which we prove the divine origin of the doctrines it contains—viz., the internal witness of the Holy Spirit, s. 7. Still less can it be proved from the miracles which the sacred writers performed. These arguments for the inspiration of the Bible were unknown to the ancients, and were first employed in the seventeenth century by the theologians of Helmstädt, who succeeded Calixtus.

2. The great argument upon which protestants rely in proving the inspiration of the scriptures presupposes only the genuineness of the books, and the credibility of the authors of the New Testament. Vide s. 7; cf. Morus, p. 17—20, s. 3—9, and p. 32, s. 28. We hold that every book of the New Testament which is genuine, and which was really written by an apostle, is inspired, or written under a special divine influence. In proof of this point, we rely upon the express testimony of Jesus, who explicitly and solemnly promised to his disciples a peculiar divine assistance whenever they should be called

upon to teach, confirm, or defend his religion, to the service of which he had consecrated them.

Christ promised his disciples this peculiar divine assistance on four different occasions:—(a) when he first sent them forth, Matt. x. 19, 20; (b) in a discourse in which he commissions them to publish his religion, Luke, xii. 11, 12; (c) when he predicted the destruction of Jerusalem, Mark, xiii. 11; Luke, xxi. 14; (d) in his last address to his disciples, John, xiv.—xvi. On these occasions he promised them τὸ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, an extraordinary divine influence to attend them constantly, and secure them against error. He said to them in Mark, that when they spoke under this divine impulse, it would not be they who spoke, but the Holy Spirit, (οὐκ ἐστε ὑμεῖς οἱ λαλοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον.) He forbade them to premeditate what they should say before judicial tribunals, since they should then be taught by the Divine Spirit, not only *what* but *how* they should speak, (μὴ μερμηρῆσθε πῶς ἢ τί λαλήσῃτε· δοθήσεται γὰρ ὑμῖν κ. τ. λ.) The object of the apostles, in those discourses in which the divine assistance was promised, was not only to defend themselves, but to give instruction in Christianity.

Now, if the apostles were assisted in this manner in their discourses, which were merely oral, and of course of a very temporary and limited advantage, how much more should they be assisted in their written instructions, which were destined to exert a more lasting and extended influence! “Est enim scripturæ et prædicationis par ratio. Quæ enim voce prædicabatur doctrina, ea postea juvandæ memoriæ causa consignabatur literis, et quæ causa erat cur prædicationem ex divina inspiratione oporteret peragi, ea militabat pro scriptione eo magis, quod scriptura deberet esse medium doctrinæ ejusdem incorrupte ad finem mundi usque conservandæ, et ad posteritatem propagandæ.” Joh. Musæus in Spinosismo, p. 69. Divine assistance was promised to the apostles, in general terms, in the discharge of their duties as teachers, whether they spake or wrote; and the words λαλεῖν and παρακαλεῖν are applied with equal propriety to speaking and writing. According to John, xiv.—xvi., Christ promised his disciples that so often as the circumstances of time and place might require, they should enjoy the *constant, uninterrupted* assistance of the Holy Spirit, as their Paracletus, their counsellor, and assistant. According to John, xvi. 7—11, the Holy Spirit would convince the world through them, (by their *writing*, therefore, as well as *speaking*.) And finally, the apostles and evangelists themselves ascribe the same authority to their writings as to their oral instructions, John, xx. 31; 1 John, i. 1—4; 2 Thess. ii. 15; 1 Cor. xv. 1.

coll. ii. 13; Ephes. iii. 3, seq.; Acts, xv. 23, seq.

The Holy Spirit, beside the general assistance which he would render the apostles, should, according to the promise of Christ, reveal to them many things of which Christ had not spoken, John, xvi. 12—15. That in their teaching they might be secure from mistake, even with respect to knowledge which they might have acquired in the unaided use of their own faculties, he should remind them (*ὑπομνήσει*) of all that Christ had taught them; and himself instruct them in everything (*διδάξει πάντα*) necessary for the discharge of the duties of their office, John, xiv. 26. He should reveal to them future events, John, xvi. 13; endow them, when necessary, with miraculous powers, Mark, xvi. 17; correct their mistakes, and impart to them new instructions whenever they were called for, John, xvi. 12; xiv. 26. So that whatever the apostles taught might be regarded as coming from God.

This testimony of Christ is the foundation of the doctrine of the inspiration of the New Testament. And from this testimony we see clearly the propriety of the definition of inspiration given in the introductory remarks. In order to shew in what estimation the apostles held their own writings and those of their fellow-labourers, it deserves to be mentioned, that the epistles of Paul were placed by Peter on a level with the scriptures of the Old Testament, which were then regarded by both Jews and Christians as divine, 2 Pet. iii. 16.

These promises of special divine assistance were not, indeed, originally made to Mark and Luke, who were not apostles. But each of them was the disciple and assistant of an apostle. "Μάρκος μαθητής καὶ ἑρμηνεὺς Πέτρου, καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ ὑπὸ Πέτρου κηρυσσόμενα ἐγγράφως ἡμῖν παρέδωκε," Irenæus, *Adversus Hæres.* III. 1. Luke stood in a similar relation to Paul, by whom his writings were supposed to be sanctioned. "Lucæ digestum Paulo adscribere solent," Tertullian, *Adversus Marc.* IV. 5. The writings of Mark and Luke, therefore, being either dictated or sanctioned by inspired apostles, must be regarded as possessing divine authority. "Potest magistrorum videri, quæ discipuli promulgarint," Tertullian, *ubi supra*, IV. 5. Besides, as they were the companions and fellow-labourers of the apostles, they may be supposed to have been endowed, as such, with the higher gifts of teaching, to have enjoyed the same divine influence when they wrote and spake, and therefore to be entitled to equal credit with the others in what they teach. Nor were these promises originally made even to Paul, who was not, like the other apostles, a companion of Jesus; but they were afterwards extended to him, since he was appointed an

apostle by Jesus himself, and enjoyed all the privileges of an apostle, and was acknowledged by the others as one of their own number. Morus, p. 19, s. 7.

II. *The Inspiration of the Old Testament.*

The Jews at the time of Christ generally considered the books of the Old Testament to be inspired; by which they did not mean, merely that the doctrines contained in them were of divine origin, but that the books themselves were divine, being the productions of inspired prophets. Vide Josephus, *Contra Apionem*, I. 7. They all agreed in this point, although they had different opinions respecting the mode and the degrees of inspiration. It is not enough to say that Christ and the apostles did not disclaim this prevailing opinion of the Jews; they assented to it, and presupposed and confirmed its truth. They received the Old Testament, in all its parts, as divine. The texts in which the several books of the Old Testament are cited, are enumerated by Storr, *Biblical Theology*, vol. 1, s. 13, 14 (of the translation.)* Now if Christ and his apostles were inspired men, as has been shewn, No. 1, their testimony with respect to the inspiration of the ancient scriptures is decisive. And this testimony affords the most brief and convincing proof which can be offered for the inspiration of the Old Testament. Vide Morus, p. 23, s. 13.

It is worthy of remark, that though Christ and his apostles laboured to subvert the Jewish dispensation, and to establish a more perfect one in its place; they still regarded the Mosaic doctrine, institute, and writings, notwithstanding their imperfections, as divine. These imperfections were inevitable to the ancient economy, which was designed for the world while yet in its infancy, and incapable of a higher instruction.

That the apostles assented to the Jewish opinion respecting the inspiration of the Old Testament, is abundantly evident from various and explicit passages in their writings. Their opinions on this subject are exhibited with most clearness in the two following texts:—

1. 2 Tim. iii. 14—17. In this passage, Paul exhorts Timothy to hold fast the doctrine which was taught by the apostles, because they were inspired teachers, and because their doctrine was accordant with the ancient scriptures. In ver. 14, he mentions the first reason: "Continue thou in the things which thou hast learned εἰδὼς παρὰ τίνος ἔμαδες." In ver. 15 he mentions the second reason: Continue thou in the things which thou hast learned (for this is the

* Pages 66—72, in the edition forming part of
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force of καὶ,) *because thou hast from a child known the holy scriptures* (of the Old Testament,) *τὰ δυνάμενά σε σοφίσαι εἰς σωτηρίαν διὰ πίστεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, which can instruct you in the knowledge of that salvation which we obtain by the Christian doctrine.* Here Paul expresses his opinion that the Old Testament leads to Christ, and is preparatory to Christianity. In ver. 16, he proceeds to say, *Πᾶσα γραφή θεόπνευστος* (for *θεόπνευστος* οὖσα, according to Clemens of Alexandria, Theodoret, the Syriac version, the Vulgate, and nearly all the theologians of the sixteenth century; otherwise the article must be inserted before *γραφή*, and the comma after it be retained,) *καὶ ὠφέλιμος πρὸς διδασκαλίαν, πρὸς ἔλεγχον, πρὸς ἐπιανορθώσασιν, πρὸς παιδείαν τὴν ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, All inspired scripture* (no part of it excepted) *is also profitable for instruction* (in the Christian religion), *for conviction* (confutation of errors, &c.), *for improvement, and for discipline in virtue or piety.* Ver. 17, *Ἵνα ἅπτερος ᾗ ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος, πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἐξηρτισμένος, By means of the Old-Testament scriptures the servant of God* (Christian teacher) *may become fitted, and truly qualified for his important work.* In this passage, therefore, Paul expresses the opinion, that the books of the Old Testament are inspired, and that, when rightly employed, they are useful even in Christian instruction.

2. 2 Pet. i. 19, 20. Vide Scripta Varii Argumenti, t. i. p. 1, seq. In this passage, Paul shews, in opposition to Jews and judaizing heretics, that Jesus was the true Messiah. In shewing this, he now appeals to those predictions of the Jewish prophets which had been fulfilled in him. Ver. 19, "We (apostles) find the oracles of the prophets (respecting Christ) much more convincing now (since they have been fulfilled;) and ye will do well to attend to them. Formerly, before their fulfilment, they were obscure, like a lantern shining feebly on a dark path, until the appearance of Christ upon the earth, from which event a clearer light now proceeds, and we can better understand the prophecies." Ver. 20, "Nor could the prophets themselves of the Old Testament give a clear explanation (*ἐκλύουσιν* from *ἐκλύειν*, *explicare*, Mark, iv. 34,) of their own oracles, because they had only indistinct conceptions of the subjects on which they spake, and knew only so much as was communicated to them, from time to time, by divine revelation." (This is the context of ver. 21; and what is here said agrees with the passage, 1 Pet. i. 10—12.) Ver. 21, *Οὐ γὰρ δελήματι* (*ἵνα, ἔπειτα*) *ἀνθρώπου ἡνέχθη ποτὲ προφητεία, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου* (divine impulse and guidance) *φερόμενοι* (*φέρεσθαι, moveri, agitari*),—the word by which the Greeks commonly described the inspiration of their

minstrels, prophets, soothsayers of the temple of Apollo, &c.; vide s. 9;) *ἐλάλησαν ἅγιοι Θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι* (the prophets of the Old Testament,) *for no oracle was delivered from the mere will of man,* (i. e., whether they should speak, and what and how they should speak, did not depend on the will of the prophets;) *but the ancient prophets spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit.* The prophets themselves acknowledged, that whatever they taught, whether by speaking or writing, was dictated to them by God, or the Divine Spirit, and was published by his command, Ex. iv. 12, 15, 16; Deut. xviii. 18; Jer. i. 6, seq.; Amos, iii. 7; Is. lxi. 1; Cf. Morus, p. 20, seq.

This passage from Peter proves the inspiration only of the prophetic part of the Old Testament, and not, strictly speaking, of the rest. But from the two passages taken together, it is obvious that the apostles believed the Old Testament, as a whole, to be inspired. We can find no evidence in all the New Testament that Christ and his apostles dissented in the least from the opinion commonly received among the Jews on this subject. But the Jews regarded the entire collection of the Old-Testament scriptures as divine. They were frequently called by Josephus and Philo, *Σεῖα γραφαί, ἱερὰ γράμματα*, and always mentioned with the greatest veneration. Divine inspiration (*ἐπίπνοια Θεοῦ*) is expressly conceded by Josephus to the prophets: and as none but prophets were permitted by the Jews to write their national history, and none but priests to transcribe it, (as appears from the same author;) we conclude that inspiration was also conceded by him and his contemporaries to their historical books. Josephus, Contra Apionem, I. 6, 7, 8. Cf. Morus, p. 20.

Such were the prevailing opinions of the Jews of the first and second centuries, and long before the birth of Christ; and to these opinions Christ and his apostles plainly assented; they must, therefore, be adopted by all who allow Christ and his apostles to be divine teachers. The contemptuous expressions which many have permitted themselves to use with regard to the Old Testament are, as Morus justly observed, Epitome, p. 24, *Christiano indignæ voces.*

The doubt may arise whether some of the *historical* books can be considered as the productions of prophets, as they were *compiled* from other works after the Babylonian exile. But no essential difference is made, even if what is supposed be true; since the most important parts of these historical books were extracted from larger histories, and ascribed to the *prophets* by whom they were originally written. So the extracts made in the books of Kings and Chronicles, from a larger history of Jewish kings, are ascribed to Isaiah.

SECTION IX.

HISTORICAL OBSERVATIONS, COMPARING THE CONCEPTIONS AND EXPRESSIONS OF THE ANCIENT WORLD RESPECTING IMMEDIATE DIVINE INFLUENCE.

I. *The Idea of Inspiration Universal.*

We find that every nation of the ancient world believed in immediate divine influences, although the particular conceptions which they entertained on this subject varied with their local circumstances, and the different degrees of their intellectual culture: but in consequence of the prevalence of a strict and scholastic philosophy in modern times, our own conceptions on this subject have become widely different from those which formerly prevailed, and can hardly be brought into agreement with them. The attempt has frequently been made to reconcile the modes of thinking and speaking respecting divine influences, which were common in all antiquity, with the philosophical principles of our own day. But this attempt has not been very successful; and the entirely different methods which have been adopted by writers to effect this reconciliation are a sufficient proof of the difficulty of the undertaking.

From the above remarks we may conclude—

1. That since these conceptions are found to exist among all people, and to be everywhere very much alike, especially in the early stages of cultivation, they must be natural to the human mind, and result directly from its original constitution.

2. That if God has seen fit to make a direct revelation to any particular man or nation, he has accommodated himself in so doing to these original conceptions of the mind, and has, as it were, met them on the way in which they were coming towards him. This might be reasonably expected from the Divine wisdom and goodness; for how should a wise and good father deem it improper to adapt the instructions which he gives to his children in their education to their natural expectations, and to answer the demands of their minds? This shews us the reason why *true inspiration*, such as the apostles and prophets enjoyed, resembles so much in its external signs, how wide soever the internal difference may be, the *false* and *imaginary inspiration* to which the prophets and teachers of the heathen world pretended. The reason of this resemblance between real and pretended inspiration should be carefully noted, because the comparison of the two has been frequently turned to bad account.

3. That the explanations which are frequently given of those passages of the Bible which treat of inspiration cannot be true. Some modern writers explain away the sense of these passages till nothing seems to be left of literal inspira-

tion, and everything accords with their philosophical system. But by applying these historical observations to these passages, we find that the sacred writers intended to teach a literal inspiration in the proper sense, and were so understood by their contemporary hearers and readers.

II. *Rude Nations believed Great Men to be Inspired.*

Nations in the first stages of improvement believe that everything which is great, which excites their wonder, or surpasses their comprehension, is the result of immediate divine agency, and overlook the second causes to which these effects are to be ascribed. Accordingly, they regard useful inventions, laws, and religious institutions, as gifts bestowed directly by God, and the distinguished men through whom these blessings are bestowed as the favourites and messengers of God, and therefore entitled to the highest reverence. This statement is abundantly proved from the mythology of the ancient nations, and especially of Greece. Through these men God was supposed to speak; and what they said was regarded as the *word of God*, and they themselves as *holy* or *consecrated*, as is implied in all the ancient languages. Thus minstrels and prophets were called by the ancient Greeks ἀγιοι and θεοι, by the sacred writers קְדוֹשִׁים אֱלֹהִים, 2 Kings, i. 9, αἱ τοὶ Θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι, 2 Pet. i. 21; also נְבִיאִים, which, according to its Arabic etymology, would denote *messengers, ambassadors*, (of God.) The term θεοπρόπος (Homer, Iliad, XII. 228) signifies *one who speaks in the place of God, vates*. Cicero, Pro Archia Poeta, VIII., says that poets were supposed *divina quodam spiritu inflari*, and that they were called *sancti, quod quasi deorum aliquo dono atque munere commendati nobis esse videantur*; and XII., that they *semper apud omnes sancti sunt habiti atque dicti*. Cf. Dresde, Proluss. duo de notione prophetæ in codice sacro, Wittenberg, 1788—89. Morus, p 20, 21.

III. *Great Men believed themselves to be Inspired.*

Those who felt themselves urged on to great and noble deeds, or irresistibly compelled to communicate their feelings to others, believed the impulses by which they were actuated to be supernatural, and that they were the organs through whom the Deity spake and acted. Many of the sages and philosophers of early antiquity expressed this belief respecting themselves; and to doubt their sincerity, or to suppose that they made such pretensions, as artful politicians, for the purpose of deceiving their contemporaries, would betray great ignorance of the history of mankind. The minstrels and prophets among the ancient Greeks believed no less firmly than their hearers or readers that they

Cf. *Odyssey*, XV. 172. They also believed that the soothsayer or minstrel did not himself understand, and could not explain to others, what he spake, or rather, what God spake through him, while he was inspired. This opinion was a natural consequence of the former. In conformity with this general belief was the opinion of the Jews, as expressed in the Talmud, *the prophets themselves did not, in many cases, understand the import of what they predicted*. The same opinion is expressed by Josephus and Philo; and Peter says, 2 Pet. i. 20, *προφητεία ιδίας ἐπιλύσεως οὐ γίνεται*. Vide s. 8. We find the same thing expressed in innumerable passages of the Grecian writers. Plato, in his dialogue περὶ Ἰλιάδος ('*Ion*'), puts the prevailing notion of the Greeks into the mouth of Socrates:—Κοῦφον χρῆμα ποιητῆς ἐστὶ, καὶ πτηνόν, καὶ ἱερόν· καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἶσθε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἐνθεὸς τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς μᾶρξτε ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνθῇ. ἔως δ' ἂν τοῦτ' ἔχη τὸ πτῆμα, ἀδύνατος πᾶν ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἀνδρῶτος, καὶ χρημοφδεῖν . . . οὐ γὰρ τέχνη ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ δαίμα δυνάμει . . . ὁ θεός, ἔξαιρούμενος τούτων νοῦν, τοῦτοισι χρῆται ἰπηνρέταις, καὶ τοῖς χρημοφδοῖς, καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς δαίμοις· ἵνα ἡμῆς οἱ ἀκούοντες εἰδῶμεν ὅτι οὐχ οὔτοι εἰσὶν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες, οὗτω πολλοὺ ἀξίω, οἷς νοῦς μὴ πάρεστιν, ἀλλ' ὁ θεός ἐστιν ὁ λέγων. διὰ τούτων δὲ φέγγεταί πρὸς ἡμᾶς. "The poet cannot compose, nor the soothsayer prophesy, unless he is inspired by the Deity, and transported, as it were, beyond himself. He then loses sight of the rules of art, and is borne away by the divine impulse. The Deity deprives him of his own consciousness and reflection, and employs him as an ambassador. *It is not he who speaks, but God who speaks through him.*" True inspiration is described in very much the

same way, Mark, xiii. 11. Again, Plato says in his dialogue *περὶ Ἀρετῆς* (Μένων), Ὁρῶνς ἂν καλοῖμεν θεῖους, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες, πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσι, "poets and prophets are justly called *divine*, because while they declare important things, they themselves do not understand what they say." In the *Odyssey*, I. 347—350, Telemachus thus checks Penelope in attempting to control the bard,

Μῆτερ ἐμῇ, τί τ' ἄρ' αὖ φθονέεις ἐρίρην ἀοιδῶν
 Τέρπειν ὅπη οἱ νόος ὄρνυται; οὐ νὺ τ' ἀοιδοῖ
 Αἴτιοι, ἀλλὰ ποθὶ Ζεὺς αἴτιος, ὅς τε δίδωσιν
 Ἀνδράσιν ἀλφειστῆσιν ὅπως ἐδῆλθσιν ἐκάστω.

Phemius declares, *ODYSSEY*, XXII. 346,

Ἀποδοῖακτος δ' εἰμί· θεός δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἶμας
 Παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν.

In the Sybilline Oracles, an inspired speaker says,

οὔτε γὰρ οἶδα,
 Ὅ τι λέγω, κέλεται δ' ὁ θεός τὰ ἔκαστ' ἀγορεύειν.

So it is said respecting Balaam, (Num. xxiii. 5,) that the *Lord put words into his mouth*. The ancient minstrels and poets, in whose productions art had as yet no share, were called simply *δοῖδοί* and *δοιοῖ* *δοῖδοί*. So they are always called in Homer. The word *ποιητής* is of later origin, and was unknown until poetry had become an art. Cf. *Scripta Varii argumenti*, p. 28, 29, ed. 2.

VII. *Inspiration described by terms indicating Violence.*

The impulse which is felt by those who are inspired is commonly very strong and irresistible. They often betray their emotion by an unusual strength of voice, and very violent bodily movements; hence, in all the ancient languages the terms which designate the words and actions of those who are inspired convey the idea of violence of mental feeling and bodily action—e. g., ὄρμη (impetus), ὀρμαῖμαι. Those who were inspired were said, *corripi, agitari Deo, κατέχεσθαι ἐκ Θεοῦ, φέρεσθαι*, (2 Pet. i. 21), *pati Deum*; and inspiration itself was called *furore divinus, μανία* (μαίνεσθαι.) Accordingly, the words which in the ancient languages signify *to predict*, generally signify too, *to rage, to act like a madman, insanire*—e. g., *vaticinari* in Latin, and in Hebrew נִבְּנָה, 1 Sam. xviii. 10. The impulses attending inspiration were likewise represented in the writings of the Asiatics as a spiritual and sacred *intoxication*; because they transported a man beyond himself, and strained and elevated all the powers of his soul. Hence the figurative language employed, Luke, i. 15; Ephes. v. 18. The ancient prophets and poets, as we see from Homer, were accustomed

to employ *music and song* as a means of exciting and increasing inspiration. Elisha did the same, 2 Kings, iii. 15. And the members of the schools of the prophets were ever engaged in these exercises, 1 Sam. x. 5, seq.

SECTION X.

OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES RESPECTING THE MANNER AND DEGREES OF INSPIRATION.

I. *The Theory that Inspiration in the highest sense was extended equally to all Scripture.*

THE theory that the divine assistance which the sacred writers experienced extended to everything which they wrote, words and letters not excepted, is doubtless one of the oldest in the Christian church. In this view of the subject, the sacred writers were merely the *scribes* or *amanuenses*, of the Holy Spirit; and were often compared by the ancients to flutes, upon which the Spirit of God played. This comparison is found in the writings of Justin, Athenagoras, Macarius, and other fathers; and also of the modern theologians, Musæus, Baier, Quenstedt, and even of Schubert, in the middle of the eighteenth century.

This theory accords very well in many respects with the mode of thought and conception which prevailed in the ancient world, (vide s. 9;) but it is very unlike the ideas which are entertained on the subject of inspiration at the present day. But it is still more important to remark respecting it, that the sacred writers themselves never profess to have enjoyed, while writing, inspiration of such a nature. And that they were not in reality the mere organs of the Divine Spirit, whatever may have been supposed by their contemporaries, must appear from a moment's observation. For (1) we find that each of the writers of the Bible has his own peculiar style, which perfectly distinguishes him from all the rest. It has indeed been said, that the Holy Spirit accommodated himself to the style of each particular writer; but the one who dictates is not wont to accommodate himself to the style of the amanuensis. (2) The manner in which the sacred writers treat the subjects which they introduce,—the costume with which they invest them, is often, notwithstanding the dignity and excellence of the subjects themselves, rude and unpolished, and such as might be expected from illiterate and uncultivated writers. This trait, at least in their writings, must be ascribed to their own agency. (3) In many cases the inspired writers evidently made use of the productions of others: the evangelists composed their histories in part from the previous accounts of the life of Jesus; the later prophets, Ezekiel and Jeremiah, frequently borrowed from the

oracles of Isaiah, &c. (4) The sacred historians frequently appealed to the evidence of their own senses for the facts which they relate, to the testimony of others, to the records from which they derived their information, and to their own investigations, (Luke, i. 1;) from all which it appears that they were not *passive* under the divine influences, and that they were not miraculously endowed with any knowledge which they could obtain in the diligent use of their own intellectual powers, since God does not work miracles when they are unnecessary. (5) They frequently speak in their own names, send greetings, mention their private affairs (2 Tim. iv. 13, seq.), &c. (6) In some cases they themselves make a distinction between their own advice and the express command of God, or of Christ, 1 Cor. vii. 25, coll. v. 40; 2 Cor. viii. 10.

According to the conceptions of the ancient world, (vide s. 9,) the very words employed were in some cases, though not always, inspired; and by many writers, both of ancient and modern times, the inspiration of the Bible has been thought to extend even to the words in which it was written. This opinion is advocated by Ernesti, *Neue Theol. Bibliothek*, b. iii. s. 468, ff. The argument which he used, and which is commonly urged, is this: thoughts cannot be clearly communicated to the mind without words; and therefore the latter, as well as the former, must have been given to the inspired writers by the Holy Spirit. But I may obtain a person to write a book under my superintendence and direction; I may communicate to him the ideas to be expressed, furnish him with all the materials of the composition, and suggest, whenever it is necessary, particular words; and all this without dictating to him every syllable and letter to be employed: I may leave him, under my close supervision, to execute the work in his own way. So Paul might have been left by the Spirit to pursue his own method in shewing that the Mosaic institute must be abolished. But in other cases it seems to be necessary that the Holy Spirit should have communicated the very words in which the things revealed should be expressed; as, for example, in certain numbers, or names of persons and places, which could not have been known except from revelation. Vide Morus, p. 35, n. 6. Considerations like these prepared the way for the views which follow.

II. *The Theory that Inspiration was extended in different degrees to different portions of Scripture.*

This theory was adopted in order to avoid the difficulties resulting from the former. In this view of the subject, the degrees of inspiration vary with the character of the writer and the nature of the subject. This was believed by

some of the ancients; but theologians have never been able to agree in deciding how many degrees of inspiration there were, or in what way they should be defined; nor is it probable that, on these points, they will ever perfectly agree, since the inspired writers have left them undecided, and we are unable to determine with respect to objects which lie so wholly beyond the circle of our experience. The following are some of the principal attempts that have been made to determine the manner and degrees of inspiration:—

1. Some theologians are contented with the general position, that there are different degrees of inspiration, and do not think proper to determine under what particular degree any given passage was written. They go no further than to say, that in writing on subjects of the first importance, in communicating facts which could have been learned only from revelation, and in cases where there was peculiar liability to mistake, the sacred writers enjoyed the highest degree of divine influence—the inspiration of words (*inspiratio verbalis*); but that in treating of subjects of inferior interest—for example, of those of a merely historical nature—they enjoyed no higher assistance than was necessary to secure them against error, to refresh their recollection with the knowledge which they had before acquired, or perhaps to give the first impulse to speak or write. These views of inspiration were entertained by Michaelis, Döderlein, and others. Calixtus thought that it was sufficient to say, in general terms, that the sacred writers were secured by divine influence against the possibility of mistake. Cf. Morus, p. 36, s. 29, n. 7. But considering that we are unable, at the present time, to determine how much the sacred writers knew respecting the several subjects of which they have treated, from their own unaided study, and how much from the direct teaching of the Holy Spirit, none of the theologians above mentioned have attempted to define accurately the degree of inspiration under which particular portions of holy writ were composed.

2. Other theologians have denied that *all* the books of the Bible were inspired, or that *the whole* of the inspired books was written under special divine assistance. Those who have entertained this opinion may be subdivided into different classes. Some go so far as to say, that some parts of a book may be of divine origin, while other parts of the same book are of human origin only, and must therefore be carefully distinguished from the former.

If we ask, now, which parts—of the epistle to the Romans, for example—are divine and which human, we shall receive various answers. Henry Holden, as cited by Richard Simon, would say, that only those parts were to be received as inspired which the sacred writers

themselves expressly declared were spoken by God; and that the other parts, whether they related to history or doctrine, were to be regarded as human. Others would say, that whatever related to the doctrines of religion was inspired. Semler, in his Treatise on the Canon, and likewise Kant, maintained that the general *moral utility* of a work was the only criterion by which its inspiration could be judged; that an inspired book must therefore be calculated to promote the moral improvement of all men in all ages; and that consequently those parts only of our scriptures which had this tendency were inspired.

According to the last opinion, some parts of a book—those of universal application, and of general moral utility—are inspired, while other parts of one and the same book, not possessing these marks of divinity, are merely human. To this view it may be objected, (1) that by subjecting inspiration to the criterion of utility it does the same as to deny it altogether; since what might be received as divine by one, from the general utility which *he* might suppose it to possess, might be denied this character by another, as wanting, in *his* view, this mark of inspiration. (2) It is chargeable with the error of reasoning *à priori* upon a question of fact—an error which cannot be justified; for if God has seen fit to give special divine aids to any individual, we are not to determine by our reasonings, and prescribe as it were to God, what and how great they may or must have been. (3) It does not correspond with the view of the inspiration and divinity of a book entertained by the ancient world, and of course by the sacred writers. Vide s. 9. It is easy to see, that while those who hold this opinion retain the ancient words *inspiration* and *divinity*, they endeavour to use them in such a sense as will accord with the prevailing conceptions of our own age, and with the principles of their philosophy.

This opinion is not of recent origin. Tertullian says, “A nobis nihil omnino rejiciendum est, quod pertinet ad nos: et legimus, omnem scripturam *ædificationi habilem* divinitus inspirari.” De habitu mulierum, c. 3. He says this in order to defend the book of Enoch.

Note.—We may indeed decide that a divine revelation cannot contain any doctrines subversive of the moral improvement and happiness of men, which we have before shewn (Introduction, s. 3, 6) to be the great objects for which a revelation was made. And we may consequently determine, that no book which contains such hurtful doctrines can be inspired. So far Kant, Fichte, and others, are right. But when they undertake to prescribe to Supreme Wisdom the means by which this end is to be attained, they transcend their proper limits. These

means, it is obvious to every one, must vary with the age, character, and other circumstances of those for whom they are intended. And who can say, that positive religion may not be a means of moral improvement, by giving efficacy to moral religion, and hence be revealed and inspired? If positive doctrines were not contained in the Bible, philosophers would soon demonstrate that they must be contained in a revelation made from God.

3. The great body of modern theologians, both of the Romish and protestant churches, prefer a middle course between the theory first mentioned and the opinions last cited. They adopt, for the most part, the theory of Claude Frassen, a Franciscan monk and a scholastic theologian of the seventeenth century, and suppose three degrees of inspiration.

(a) The first and highest degree of inspiration is, the *revelation* of things before unknown to the sacred writers. This is called by Frassen, *inspiratio antecedens*, but commonly by other writers, *revelation*; who thus make a distinction between *inspiration* and *revelation*, and hold that revelation is indeed always attended by inspiration, but that inspiration is not, in every case, preceded by revelation. Everything in the sacred scriptures, they say, is inspired, but everything there is not revealed; for much which is contained in the Bible was known to the sacred writers from their own reflection.

(b) The second degree of inspiration is, the security against error which God affords the sacred writers in the exhibition of doctrines or facts with which they are already acquainted, the care which he takes in the selection, truth, and intelligibility of the subjects introduced, and the words by which they are expressed, &c. This is called by Frassen, *inspiratio concomitans*.

(c) The third degree of inspiration is, the divine authority stamped upon writings, originally composed without inspiration, by the approbation of inspired men, and is called *inspiratio consequens*. This degree of inspiration is predicated of the historical books of the Old Testament, which were approved by Jesus and the apostles; and of the gospels Mark and Luke, which were approved by Peter and Paul, and afterwards by John.

This theory is developed by Doddridge, and still more fully by Töllner; the latter of whom endeavours to shew, that the authority of the holy scriptures as the source of our knowledge in matters of faith is perfectly secured, even in cases where only the lowest degree of inspiration is admitted. Vide Töllner, *Die göttliche Eingebung der heiligen Schrift*.

4. Other theologians deem it sufficient to shew that the prophets and apostles enjoyed a higher divine assistance and support. Vide s.

8. They were induced in various ways, sometimes by natural means, and sometimes by immediate divine direction, to write the sacred books. They always wrote, as well as spoke, as persons enjoying the influence of the Spirit of God. This is the light in which inspiration is regarded by Morus, p. 32, seq. s. 27, 28. He did not think necessary to determine what particular *actus* *θεοπνευστίας* was exerted in each particular *actus scribendi*.

It may be well to remark the striking contrast between the meagre productions of the fathers of the first century and the rich and instructive writings of the apostles, most of whom were illiterate men. But how, the unprejudiced inquirer will be compelled to ask, could the latter have written in such a widely different manner, and one so superior to that of the fathers, if they had not enjoyed a higher divine assistance?

Note.—The following works on this subject may be recommended to the attention of the student. Rich. Simon, *Histoire Critique du V. T.*, especially ch. 23—25; and the *Letters of a Dutch divine on the critical History of Simon*, edited by Le Clerc. The opinions contained in this work, some of which are true, and others false and partial, have been developed by modern theologians. Among modern works, the following are most distinguished:—(1) Semler, *Abhandlung von freyer Untersuchung des Canons*, 4 Thle, Halle, 1771—75, 8vo. The different theories are here illustrated and examined. This work induced Schmid, Müller, Pittiscus, and others, to undertake the defence of the common doctrine. (2) Töllner, *Die göttliche Eingebung der heiligen Schrift*, Mitau und Leipzig, 1782, 8vo. (3) Köppen, *Die Bibel ein Werk der göttlichen Weisheit*. This book contains many excellent observations on the origin and collection of the different parts of the Bible. (4) Fichte, *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung*, Königsberg, 1793, 8vo—a profound inquiry respecting the possibility of direct revelation, and the criteria by which it is to be judged. (5) Sonntag, *Doctrina inspirationis, ejusque ratio, historia, et usus popularis*, Heidelberg, 1810, 8vo.

Note 2.—The teacher of religion should not trouble the common people and the young with the recondite investigations of ancient and modern theologians respecting the nature, manner, and degrees of inspiration, or respecting the ancient mode of thought and expression on this subject. In his public instructions he should confine himself to the scriptural view of inspiration exhibited in s. 8. He should, as Calixtus and Morus have done, give prominence to the truth, that the sacred writers were, by divine aid, perfectly secured against error. He should explain to his hearers the promises of assistance which Christ gave his disciples. In doing this,

he will sufficiently establish and confirm their faith. But he ought not by any means to withhold this doctrine from those whom he is appointed to teach, since it is a doctrine taught in the Bible, and is calculated, as there exhibited, to produce a deep and happy persuasion of the truths of revealed religion. Nor should he attempt to modernize this doctrine, but should rather labour to restore it to its early simplicity.

SECTION XI.

OF SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

SINCE the sixteenth century, the theologians of the protestant church have endeavoured to obviate various opinions, respecting the nature and use of the Bible, which appeared to them erroneous, by treating in their systems of the attributes of the holy scriptures. Most of what they say on this subject is aimed against the doctrines of the Romish church. The following are the principal attributes of the Bible:—

I. *The Intelligibleness of the Holy Scriptures.*

The protestant church has maintained from the first, in opposition to the Romish, that the holy scriptures are intelligible. The popes have always been anxious to crush a spirit of free inquiry in the members of their church, to subject belief to human authority, and to arrogate to themselves a judicial power, even in matters of faith. But they saw, at once, that the free use of the Bible would be very much in the way of the success of their designs; and therefore either wholly interdicted, or at least encumbered the common use of it, under the pretence that it was full of obscurities, calculated to mislead or confound the faith of the laity, which ought to depend upon tradition or ecclesiastical authority. Vide Introduction, s. 7, III. and Art. I. s. 13. This extravagant opinion, however, is only received by the more zealous adherents of the papal see, and is rarely entertained by the theologians of the Gallican church.

On the other hand, many protestant theologians have entertained opinions respecting the intelligibleness of the Bible which are equally extravagant. The truth on this subject may, perhaps, be best expressed as follows:—The holy scriptures are so written, that the *first* readers, for whom they were especially designed, could understand the greater part of them without the necessity of laborious interpretation, and that even *we* can obtain from them a clear acquaintance with those doctrines of religion which are essential to our improvement, comfort, and salvation. There is no need of proving more than this. The following remarks will illustrate the view here expressed:—

1. Many parts of these books must have been unavoidably obscure even to the contemporaries of the sacred writers, from the *nature of the subjects* of revelation. Many of the subjects brought to view in the epistles of Paul were hard to be understood, even at his own time, 2 Pet. iii. 16. And much that was written under divine influence was unintelligible even to the sacred writers themselves. Vide s. 9, V. But as Buddeus justly observes, "*alia est perspicuitas rerum, alia verborum.*"

2. The writers of the Bible employed the language and style which were common in the age in which they lived, and understood by the public for which they wrote; they expressed themselves in conformity with the modes of speech and thought then prevalent: of course, their writings must have been, for the most part, intelligible to their contemporaries, to whom they had always primary reference in what they wrote.

3. But in consequence of this very circumstance, much which was then perfectly intelligible is so no longer. Our language is wholly unlike the Hebrew or Hebraistic Greek in which they wrote. And our manners, customs, opinions, and modes of thinking, are equally changed. If we were able to place ourselves in the circumstances and enter into the feelings of the inspired authors, we should find their writings comparatively easy and intelligible. But common Christians cannot do this; and even the most learned will find passages in the Old and New Testaments which, after all their efforts, will remain doubtful and obscure. If, however, we set aside all passages of this nature, we shall find enough left to give us a clear and sure knowledge of the essential doctrines of religion. These difficult and obscure passages commonly have no bearing, or, at most, a very remote one, upon the truths of salvation. And it is frequently the case, that when an important doctrine or duty is expressed with apparent obscurity in one place, it is exhibited elsewhere with so much the greater clearness. Experience shews, that people in common life have been able to acquire, by the exercise of a sound understanding, and by the aids of the divine Spirit, a fund of useful knowledge and of important principles, even from very defective translations of the Bible. Indeed, an illiterate man, who possesses a sound understanding and good character, and studies the Bible without prejudice, will often understand it better, and with more ease, than the scholar, who first adopts his opinions and then endeavours to find them in the Bible. The latter looks upon all the doctrines of the Bible through a discoloured medium. The holy scriptures were not written for the scholar, as such; nor were they intended to afford materials for speculation, but rather enjoyment for the

heart. Hence they are often misunderstood and despised by those whose feelings are deadened, and who have little taste for anything but speculation. Most of the writers of the Bible were themselves illiterate men, and lived in familiar intercourse with common people. They therefore meet the wants of this class of society, and agree with the common mode of thought and expression better than the learned commonly do. This consideration is overlooked by those who would take the Bible from the hands of the common people. It is truly remarked by Thomas à Kempis, that the holy scriptures must be read with the assistance of the same Spirit by which they were inspired. Now this may be enjoyed by all—by the unlearned as well as the learned, if they only sincerely wish to obtain it.

It should be remembered, too, that the very difficulties and obscurities which occur in the Bible have been very beneficial to the human race by exercising, and of course strengthening, the powers of the mind. If the scriptures were so plain that all parts of them could be understood without study, they would not furnish nourishment and employment for the spirit of inquiry. Lessing made the bold assertion, that the human race had not been benefited so much by the doctrines taught in the Bible as by the inquiries and investigations to which the Bible had given occasion.

Some have attempted to prove the intelligibility of the Bible from texts of scripture; but an opponent would not allow the testimony of a writer in his own behalf to be valid proof; nor do these texts (such, for example, as compare scripture with a light, enlightening men, and shewing them the way to true happiness, *Psa. xix. 8; cxix. 105*) apply so much to the scriptures themselves as to the doctrines which they contain.

II. *The Efficacy of the Holy Scriptures.*

When we say the holy scriptures have an efficacy, we use figurative language; for this efficacy belongs rather to the doctrines and principles contained in the scriptures. Theologians have been led to adopt many fine distinctions on this point, by the controversies which have existed respecting the means of grace. We shall consider these distinctions in connexion with the means of grace, s. 133, II.

III. *The Infallibility of the Holy Scriptures.*

When we assert the infallibility of the holy scriptures, we mean to say, that if any doctrine of religion can be clearly shewn to be taught in them, it must be received as true, and needs no further evidence; according to the maxim, *sensus hermeneuticæ verus, est etiam dogmaticæ verus*. This position is grounded on the fact, that the authors of the Bible were rendered infallible by

divine influence, according to the promise of Christ, John, xiv. 26. It is taken in opposition to those who rely unduly upon unaided reason in matters of faith: Vide Introduction, s. 7, II. and s. 8, 9. But before we can prove that any doctrine is taught in the holy scriptures, we must be sure of the uncorruptedness of the sacred text, and of the justice of our interpretation of it; and as both of these points are sometimes attended with difficulties, we cannot apply this maxim to much purpose in particular cases, although, abstractly considered, it is perfectly true.

IV. The Authority of the Holy Scriptures.

1. *Auctoritas normativa.* By this is meant the authority of the Bible to bind men to believe and do what it teaches and prescribes. This is likewise called *auctoritas canonica* (petito vocabulo ex Gal. vi. 16.) Vide Morus, p. 37. This authority depends upon the infallibility of the scriptures, and also upon their divine origin. Moreover, the writers of the New Testament require that every doctrine should be examined by the instructions of Jesus and his apostles, and should be received as obligatory, if found to agree, but otherwise, should be rejected, 1 John, iv. 1, coll. 2 John, v. 10; Gal. i. 8. Paul exhorts Timothy to hold fast the doctrines of true Christianity (*ὑγιαίνοντες λόγους*), the sum of which (*ὑποτύπωσις*, what we now find in the writings of the apostles) he had taught him with his own mouth, 2 Tim. i. 13. Jesus himself required that the doctrines which he taught should be received on his mere authority, and frequently brought no other proof than the simple assertion, *Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν*. He gave Nicodemus to understand that he acted very inconsistently in acknowledging his divine authority, and yet questioning the truth of his assertions. The question which Nicodemus asked, "How can these things be?" was indeed very natural; and the serious inquirer after truth will always rejoice to have it answered. But if it cannot be answered, he must be content with the mere assertion of a teacher whose divine authority he must acknowledge: he must say with respect to Christ, as Pliny the younger said of a certain wise man, *tua mihi auctoritas pro ratione sufficit*.

2. *Auctoritas judicialis.* By this is meant, that the scriptures are the final appeal in matters of faith and practice. No doctrines opposed to the Bible can be admitted as true by those who receive it as an inspired book. Christ and the apostles everywhere appeal to the Old Testament, and thus shew that they, and the Jews generally, regarded it as divine, John, v. 39; Matt. xxii. 44; Acts, xv. 15. But in applying the judicial authority of scripture to particular cases, everything depends upon the justice of the interpretation; and we must frequently say,

that it is rather the interpreter than the scripture which decides. Most theological controversies owe their origin to the different interpretations of the Bible; and every theologian pleads the *auctoritas judicialis* of scripture in behalf of his own opinion, because he regards one particular sense of the words as true. The question is, how he proves that this sense is the true one, and whether he interprets the Bible on just principles?

The text, Heb. iv. 12, 13, where the word of God is said to be *κρητύκος ἐνδυστήσεων καὶ ἐννοίων καρδίας*, is often cited in this connexion. But the phrase *λόγος Θεοῦ* here signifies the *divine threatenings* against sinners and apostates. The meaning of the text is, the threatenings of God relate not merely to the outward actions, but to the most secret purposes of evil.

V. The Sufficiency or Completeness of the Holy Scriptures.

1. *The sufficiency of the doctrines of the Bible.* All the doctrines affecting the improvement, comfort, and salvation of men, which were taught by Jesus, the apostles, and prophets, are contained in the holy scriptures, without any omission. This completeness (plenitudo) of the scriptures is called by Paul, Acts, xx. 27, *πᾶσαν βουλὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, the whole divine plan of salvation. This attribute of scripture is maintained in opposition both to those who receive from tradition some doctrines of faith which are not found in the Bible, and to those who, under the influence of enthusiasm, would make additions from new, pretended revelations to the doctrines really revealed. In opposition to both of these classes, this attribute may be truly predicated of the holy scriptures; for the instructions which the Bible contains respecting the way of real happiness here and hereafter are so complete that we have no occasion to resort either to the dark sources of tradition or the asseverations of fanatics. But, on the other hand, when we affirm the sufficiency of the scriptures we must not be understood to mean that the Bible is a repertory of information respecting the arts, sciences, literature, and every object of human knowledge. These things do not fall within the scope of the sacred writers, because they do not stand immediately connected with the great end of man. The instructions contained in the Old and New Testaments were adapted to the comprehension and wants of those for whom they were primarily written. But we are permitted, according to the example of Jesus and his apostles, yea, we are required, to adapt these instructions to our own wants, and, by the help of these scriptures, to make constant progress in spiritual knowledge and experience. This progress, however, must still accord with the Bible, and be regulated by the principles of

Christianity. The Bible, from which these principles are learned, must be the star by which we are guided in all our advances. In this view, Paul recommends the use of the Old Testament, even to Christian teachers, 2 Tim. iii. 15. Vide Introduction, s. 5. I.

2. *The sufficiency of the books.* This implies, that our canon contains books enough to furnish the Christian with all necessary knowledge of the truths of religion. This cannot be proved from the sacred writers themselves; for the canon must have been incomplete while any one of them was as yet writing. The passage Rev. xxii. 18, 19, *ἐάν τις ἐπιθήῃ ἐπ' αὐτά, κ. τ. λ.* was formerly cited in proof of the sufficiency of the books of the Bible, by Tertullian, Adv. Herm. c. 22, and has since been frequently called, as well as the whole book in which it stands, *sigillum canonis*. But the prohibition here expressed strictly relates only to the Apocalypse. So much, however, is beyond dispute, that the great truths of salvation are repeated so often in the Bible, that they might all be learned from a much smaller collection of books than we have at present. If therefore some part of the canon should be rejected as spurious, the completeness of the holy scriptures would be unaffected, and the system of divine truth remain entire.

SECTION XII.

OF THE USE OF THE BIBLE AS THE SOURCE OF THE DOCTRINES OF REVELATION.

I. *The Use of the New Testament.*

FROM the remarks already made, it appears that the scriptures of the New Testament are to be regarded as the source from which we are to derive the knowledge of the principal doctrines of the Christian religion. But in deriving the doctrines of Christianity from the New Testament, we must be governed by the following considerations:—

1. The authors of the New Testament had their contemporaries principally in view in what they wrote. Paul, for example, in his epistle to the Romans, had primary and principal reference to the church then existing at Rome, and not to the Christian church in succeeding ages. These scriptures would have been very differently composed if they had been throughout intended for all ages of the world. Instead of containing salutations, allusions to local interests, and temporary disputes and errors, and a disconnected view of the doctrines of revelation, they would have exhibited a complete, connected system of religious truth. Those texts of the Bible, then, which relate merely to circumstances then existing, but never afterwards, cannot be regarded as sources of Christian doctrine.

Such texts are indeed useful, in making us acquainted with the history of the times in which they were written, and in furnishing examples for imitation, if similar circumstances should recur; but in themselves they have no binding authority at the present time. Texts of this nature are those in the Acts of the Apostles, and in the epistles to Timothy, which relate to the constitution of the apostolical church. For these texts the sacred writers do not claim an universal and perpetual authority, still less do they claim this for all parts of their writings without exception, although they do distinctly for the Christian doctrines which they teach. Vide Introduction, s. 5, I. and s. 8, III. 3, b.

2. Since the scriptures of the New Testament were originally adapted to the age in which they were written, and always presuppose the oral instructions which were given by the apostles, we cannot expect that all the doctrines of faith should be taught in them with equal fulness and clearness. The slight and unfrequent mention of a doctrine in our sacred writings does not prove its unimportance, since the authors of the Bible might have known that it was already sufficiently understood and duly regarded by those for whom they wrote. Nor does the frequent and extended discussion of any subject in the Bible prove its internal and lasting importance, since the local circumstances of some churches, or the character of certain individuals, may have required a more repeated and urgent inculcation of particular doctrines than would be otherwise advisable. Thus the circumstances of the church at the time when the apostles wrote led them to insist more frequently and strongly upon the abolition of the Mosaic institute than they would have done in other circumstances.

3. The case is exactly the same with the manner in which the apostles taught the doctrines of religion. Their manner was adapted to the conceptions, views, and capacities of their contemporary hearers and readers, and is often wholly inappropriate to other persons in other circumstances. In bringing the instructions of Christ and his apostles in proof of any doctrine of religion, we must therefore, in many cases, pay more regard to the truth itself which they teach, than to the manner in which they illustrate it. For many of the proofs and illustrations employed successfully by the first teachers of Christianity have now lost their force and evidence. It is frequently true, that those very considerations which must have made the strongest impression on the contemporaries of the apostles, are least of all convincing to us; while, on the contrary, the proofs by which we are most influenced would have been scarcely intelligible to them. The proofs which Jesus adduced from the Old Testament in behalf of

many of his doctrines were far more convincing to the Jews than the most powerful arguments which could be drawn from human reason. The same may be said of many of the illustrations contained in the epistles to the Hebrews and Galatians. The *doctrines* of the Bible are unalterably true, and intended for all ages of the world; but the method in which they are taught, the costume in which they are invested, the arguments by which they are proved, were all designed primarily for the Jews, and are therefore by no means obligatory on the present teachers of religion.

We may therefore affirm, that while it was the design of God that religious knowledge should be communicated by means of these books to all the successive ages of the world, this was not the design which the authors of the Bible had in view, in a great portion of what they wrote. But for the very reason that these sacred books were designed for the good of all succeeding ages, each particular portion of them could not possibly be designed for each successive age. What is most useful and necessary for one period is not equally so for another. But we should expect, that the wants of the present and future would be alike provided for in the codex of revelation; and this we find to be done in the Bible. Many parts of it, which seem hardly to answer the demands of the present day, were perfectly adequate to the wants of a former period; and the reverse: and many parts which were once in the highest degree useful, and have ceased to be so now, may perhaps, in after times, become as useful and important as ever.

4. Those texts of the Old and New Testaments which exhibit particular doctrines with the most fulness and clearness, and are therefore most frequently cited for proof or illustration, are called *sedes doctrinarum, dicta probantia*; more frequently *loci classica*—i.e., *primaria, præstantissima*; like *auctores classici*, first used by Gellius, XIX. 8; and *cives classici*, the name given to those belonging to the first class of Roman citizens, into which such only were admitted as possessed a certain amount of property, decided by law.

In using these proof-texts many of the ancient systems followed a kind of doctrinal or hermeneutical tradition, employing such texts only as had been adduced by the authors of the symbols, who, on their part, had employed those mostly which had been previously adduced by the ecclesiastical fathers, and the theologians of the Romish church. As the theologians of former times strictly followed the doctrines of the symbolical books, they were inclined to adopt the arguments and proof-texts by which these doctrines were there supported. Hence we find almost the same proof-texts, explained in the same way, constantly recurring, with

very slight alterations in the theological systems, as late as the middle of the eighteenth century. Some of these traditionary texts had no bearing on the point which they were intended to prove, or at best were doubtful and obscure; while on the other hand, some of the most direct and pertinent texts were never cited.

In making use of these texts we should never lose sight of the above remarks. As Luther well observes, we must treat the Bible cautiously, and inquire not only whether any particular truth is taught in the word of God, but whether it concerns *us* or others. “Man muss mit der Schrift säuberlich handeln und fahren. Man muss nicht allein ansehen ob es Gottes wort sey; sondern vielmehr zu wem es geredet sey, *ob es dich treffe, oder einen andern*. Den Unterschied sollen wohl merken, fassen, und zu Herzen nehmen *die Prediger*, ja alle Christen,” Luther, Unterricht wie man sich in Mosen schicken soll. We should also carefully distinguish between the truth itself which is taught in these passages, and the manner in which this truth is illustrated.

II. The Use of the Old Testament.

1. Christianity and the Jewish institute are not so nearly related that they must stand or fall together. It is possible that one who knew nothing of the Jewish religion, and had never read the Jewish scriptures, might believe on Jesus as the Saviour of the world. And we find, accordingly, that when the apostles were called to teach the principles of the Christian religion to those who were unacquainted with Judaism, they rarely alluded to the Old Testament. Christ and the apostles regarded the divine revelations as gradual, and the instruction given in the Old Testament as elementary, adapted to the state of society while yet in the infancy of improvement, and calculated to deepen the sense of the higher and more spiritual wants of the mind. Vide Introduction, s. 8, II. In this light is Judaism regarded by Paul, who compares the ritual of the former institute with a schoolmaster (*παιδαγωγός*) who is deserted by the children, as they approach towards manhood, Gal. iii. 24; iv. 1, 9. The books therefore containing the principles of the Jewish religion, taken by themselves, cannot be regarded as a principal source of our knowledge of the Christian system, although they are of essential service, and indeed often indispensable. They are recommended in the New Testament to our careful study; but always in connexion with Christian instructions. For we, as Christians, are no longer bound by many things which are commanded in the Old Testament; and must learn from Christian instructions what these things are, and why their obligation has ceased.

2. The books of the Old Testament may be

used for various purposes, which differ very much, according to time and circumstances.

(1) *Usus polemicus* or *elencticus*. The Old Testament may be employed to prove the truth and divinity of the Christian religion against Jews and infidels. From these ancient books we can shew that the Christian institute was promised and expected from the earliest times; and can correct many of the mistakes which have prevailed among the Jews and other nations. For this purpose they were used by Christ and his apostles, and sometimes in the instruction even of the heathen, but more frequently when Jews were to be convinced. We may see the different method in which they addressed Jews and heathen, by comparing the discourses of Paul contained in the Acts, and also his epistles to the Hebrews and Galatians, with those to the Thessalonians.

When Christ wished to convince the Jews of the truth of his religion, and the divinity of his mission, he exhorted them to study their own scriptures, in which he was predicted. But although this advice of Christ was first given to the Jews, it must apply in full force to all who allow the authority of Christ, and acknowledge that the Old Testament contains predictions respecting him. Christ thus addresses the Pharisees, (John, v. 39,) Ἐρευνᾶτε (indicative, not imperative, as many suppose) τὰς γραφάς, ὅτι ὑμεῖς δοχεῖτε ἐν αὐταῖς ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἔχειν· καὶ ἐκείναι εἰσὶν αἱ μαρτυροῦσαι περὶ ἐμοῦ, "Ye search the scriptures (of the Old Testament), because ye suppose that ye shall find in them the means of attaining salvation; and these very scriptures testify of me—i. e., of the Messiah, the character which I sustain, and of the way of salvation through me." In 2 Tim. iii. 14—17, Paul distinctly states that Timothy (even as a Christian and Christian teacher, verse 17) would find the Old Testament very useful in connexion with the Christian instruction which he had received (ver. 14), in acquainting himself with the way of salvation (ver. 15), in teaching this way to others (πρὸς διδασκαλίαν, ver. 16), and in refuting the objections of the Jews and other enemies of Christianity, (πρὸς ἑλεγμον, ver. 16.) Cf. s. 8, II. 1. 2 Peter, i. 19, "The predictions of the Old Testament respecting Christ, are now, since their fulfilment, much more certain than formerly; and ye (converts from Judaism, who are accustomed to read the Jewish scriptures) will do well to attend to them." In this very connexion, however, Peter likens the Old Testament to a lantern, casting a feeble light, when compared with the day which had risen, since Christ had appeared, upon those who had embraced his religion. Cf. s. 8, II. 2.

Note.—However imperfect the Jewish institute may be in comparison with the Christian,

it must not be despised or undervalued. Morus, p. 24, note. It was perfectly adapted to the age for which it was intended, and to the country where it was established, and could not have been different in any respect. It betrays a poor judgment to blame a teacher for not introducing into his book of elements everything which is found in a complete system, or for pursuing a different method in the instruction of little children and advanced scholars. This, so far from deserving blame, constitutes the highest merit of the teacher. The instructions given by God in the Old Testament are regarded in this light by Christ and the apostles, and are highly esteemed as adapted to the age for which they were given. Vide s. 8, II. ad finem.

(2) *Usus dogmaticus* and *historicus*. The Old Testament is of use in ascertaining the doctrines of Christianity, inasmuch as it is very full upon many doctrines presupposed in the New Testament, and gives intimations on many doctrines on which the latter enlarges. (a) As the primitive Christians were for the most part native Jews, they were naturally supposed to have known from the Old Testament many of the most important truths of religion. Accordingly we find that the instructions given them in the New Testament respecting the nature, attributes, and providence of God, the creation of the world, and the fall of man, are less full and explicit than those contained in the Old. (b) The Old Testament also contains traces, intimations, and, as it were, the germs of many doctrines which were afterwards followed out and developed by Christ and the apostles. This is exactly as it should be in a book of elementary instruction. The Old Testament pointed to the distant blessings which were promised. The passages of the Old Testament which treat of the Messiah, the life beyond the grave, and subjects of the same kind, are useful in shewing that these ideas have been brought to light and developed by Christ (*usus historicus*), and that all the divine revelations compose one complete system.

The false opinions which were formerly entertained respecting the use of the Old Testament and its relation to Christianity led many writers to attribute too many Christian ideas to the ancient Jewish prophets, and to carry back, without any distinction of time, all the light of the New Testament into the Old. That the light enjoyed under the former dispensation was inferior to that which Christians enjoy appears from the declarations of an apostle, 2 Peter, i. 19, seq.; 1 Pet. i. 10, seq. Christ himself says, Matt. xi. 11, that among those who had been born of women there had not been a greater prophet than John, his precursor; but that the least who enjoyed Christian instruction, and had kindled his torch by the Christian light,

was better acquainted with the peculiar doctrines of the Christian religion than John.

(3) *Usus hermeneuticus.* As Christ and the apostles were native Jews, and had their own countrymen for their first hearers, they conformed, as far as they could consistently with duty, to the manners and opinions, to the mode of thought and expression, common among those with whom they were conversant. It is therefore impossible for any one who is ignorant of this prevailing mode of thought and expression to understand fully their instructions. And this knowledge, which is so essential to the right understanding of the Christian doctrine, can be obtained only from the Old Testament. The service which it renders us in this respect is of the greatest importance. How many mistakes respecting the doctrines of faith, and how much confusion would have been avoided, if theologians had brought to the study of the Christian scriptures a thorough acquaintance with the Old Testament!

(4) *Usus moralis.* The books of Moses, the Psalms, Proverbs, and other portions of the Old Testament, are full of precepts relating to the wise conduct of human life, and calculated to awaken religious and pious sentiments. Even the historical portions of the Old Testament are highly useful in this view, and should be employed by religious teachers, and especially the teachers of youth, for the promotion of virtue and piety, more than is commonly done. It was the manner of Moses, and of all the ancient Jewish teachers, to give instruction by means of history—a manner which is always interesting, and which was imitated by the first Christian teachers, who always built their instructions upon the history of the Old Testament and of Christ.

CAUTIONS to be observed in the use of the Old Testament for moral instruction.

(a) All the precepts contained in the Old Testament are not of universal obligation; some of them are applicable only to those living under the peculiar constitution of the Jewish nation. Christians commit a great mistake when they apply to themselves the promises of temporal good and the threatenings of temporal evil which are contained in the Old Testament, but which are valid only under a theocratical form of government. Christians can make application to themselves of such only of these precepts as relate to all men in every age. By neglecting this distinction, and applying to the present time what has long since ceased to be valid, the teacher of religion frequently draws contempt upon himself and his doctrine, and awakens unnecessary suspicion of the truth of what he utters. Every act of disobedience to the divine law will indeed be punished, and every act of obedience rewarded. But that this will be visibly accomplished

in the present life is nowhere taught in the Christian system, but rather the contrary. Temporal rewards and punishments are peculiar to a theocratic constitution, and ought not to be expected under a different divine dispensation.

(b) The rudeness of the early ages, and the degeneracy of the Jewish nation, called for a strictness of discipline from which Christianity has now released us. The spirit of Christianity is in many respects essentially different from that of Judaism. The latter terrified by punishments those who were too depraved to be influenced by love; the former teaches us to love God as our father and benefactor, and moves us by mildness and benevolence. Rom. viii. 15, "Ye (true Christians) have not received (by Christianity) a slavish spirit, leading you still (*πάλιν*, as Christians) to tremble before God; but ye have a filial, confiding disposition (*πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας*) produced in your minds by God, under the influence of which you can supplicate him in all circumstances as your beloved Father." Cf. Heb. xii. 18—24; Gal. iv. 1—4. When, therefore, as Christians, we obey any part of the law of Moses, or of the precepts of the Old Testament, we yield this obedience, not because it is required by the law of Moses or the Old Testament, but partly because it is commanded by the universal moral law, and chiefly because it is commanded by Christ. For Christ did not come, as he himself said, to annul the *moral law* of the Old Testament, but to fulfil and enforce it, Matt. v. 17, seq. So depraved were the Jews at the time of Moses, and long afterwards, that he was compelled to proceed with them as a teacher does with ignorant, rude, and untractable pupils. The first measures which the teacher takes in the education of such pupils are, to separate them from others of the same character with themselves, to impose compulsory restraints, to awe them with threatenings, and to make to them such sensible representations as are most calculated to produce an effect. And these are the measures which Moses adopted. Those for whom his institute was intended were, in a great measure, incapable of any higher religious knowledge, which was not therefore given them, except in such obscure intimations as were proper in elementary instructions. Vide Introduction, s. 8, II. Cf. Gal. iv. 3; Col. ii. 8, 20. Warburton, *Divine Legation of Moses*.

(c) Christians ought not to adopt, without some limitation, the life and example of the persons described in the Old Testament, even of those there mentioned with approbation, as models for their own imitation; for, in consequence of their better instruction, Christians are now in many respects far advanced beyond the best of former times. In those ages of ignorance many

things were allowed or palliated which, in this period of higher illumination and improvement, would be without excuse. Many events in the histories of David, Samson, and others, for which they might perhaps have been excused, cannot be adopted by Christians as models for their imitation. These remarks are sufficient to shew the necessity of caution in the use of the characters of Old-Testament history, in recommending moral duties, and in popular instruction. Vide Joh. Aug. Wolf, Diss. duo de exemplis biblicis in theologia morali caute adhibendis, Lipsiæ, 1786, 4to. Christian teachers would do well to follow in this respect the example of the writers of the New Testament. They never deal in indiscriminate praises and encomiums of the characters of the Old Testament, but always select those parts of their example which are worthy of commendation, and of the imitation of Christians; such as the piety and faith of Abraham, and others mentioned, Heb. xi.

SECTION XIII.

OF THE READING OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

I. *History of the Dispute respecting the Reading of the Bible.*

THAT the holy scriptures were less read by the ancient Jews and primitive Christians than at the present day is beyond dispute. Books were formerly very rare and costly, and the reading public was extremely small. Even in Europe it was not so large by half, a century ago, as now. The great body of society, in former times, had little taste for reading, or indeed ability, as a general thing, either to read or to write. They were not therefore required, by any precepts of the Bible, to read the scriptures themselves. This was made the duty of the teachers of religion, who were then required to read the scriptures before the people. Thus the sons of Levi were required to read the law of Moses in the hearing of the people, Deut. xxxi. 11, 12; and Timothy was required to study the scriptures in order to qualify himself to teach others, 2 Tim. iii. 15. The passage, John. v. 39, is also addressed to the teachers of religion. In consequence of the fact, that, in ancient times, the great body of mankind received instruction more by *hearing* than by their own reading, the learner was called ἀκροατής, and instruction, ἀκροή, Rom. x. 15.

But, on the other hand, the common people and the ignorant are nowhere *forbidden*, in the Old or New Testament, to read the scriptures; but were rather encouraged to instruct themselves by their own study of the Word of God, if they had sufficient leisure and ability. The letters of the apostles were addressed to the

whole church, and were publicly read in the hearing of all, Col. iv. 16. Now, if the apostles did not fear any harm from having their epistles read in public, in the hearing of all, they could have no reason to apprehend danger from having them perused in private. The Jews also were always permitted the free use of their scriptures, cf. Acts, viii. 28; nor is there a passage in all the Old Testament in which this is prohibited. In the early Christian church, too, the reading of the Bible was universally allowed, and, indeed, encouraged and facilitated by frequent versions. As early as the second century the Bible had been rendered into Syriac and Latin, and was accessible in these versions to as many as wished to own or study them. Hieronymus commends Pamphilus, “quod scripturas quoque sanctas, non ad legendum tantum, sed ad habendum tribuebat promptissime, non solum viris sed etiam feminis, quas vidisset lectioni deditas,” Apol. I. Contra Rufinum. Julian objected to Christians, “quod mulieres puerosque paterentur scripturas legere,” Cyril. Alex. Contra Jul. VI. 9. Cyprian recommended the study of the Bible to Christians: “Scripturis inquam sacris incubat christianus fidelis, et ibi inveniet condigna fidei spectacula,” Cyprian, De Spectac. p. 342. From all this it appears, that at this period of the church the use of the holy scriptures was unincumbered. Vide Walch, Vom Gebrauch der heiligen Schrift unter den alten Christen, Leipzig, 1779, 8vo.

At a later period the great decline of learning commenced. And to such a point of darkness did western Europe arrive, that the whole learning of the clergy of the middle ages often consisted in their being able to read. In a state of things like this, the Bible was not, of course, much read by the laity, if, indeed, they were able to read at all. And as the Latin version was retained, although the Latin language had ceased to be vernacular after the seventh century, the common people became more and more ignorant of its contents.

In the midst of this darkness the pope and clergy established many doctrines, which were as promotive of their own interests as they were contrary to the Bible. These innovations and errors were soon discovered and opposed by some of the more intelligent and inquisitive even among the laity. Hence, to take the Bible from their hands was the obvious policy of the clergy. Accordingly, Pope Gregory VII., of the eleventh century, declared himself against the free and general use of the scriptures. But as many of the laity, who had obtained more enlightened views from the use of the Bible, opposed themselves to the designs of the pope, the prohibition was repeated by Innocent III., at the commencement of the thirteenth century. The use of the Bible was again forbidden the

laity, on account of the Waldenses, by the council held at Toulouse, in the year 1229. "Prohibemus, ne libros V. T. aut N. laicis permittatur habere; nisi forte Psalterium vel Breviarium pro divinis officiis ac Horas Beatæ Virginis aliquis ex devotione habere velit; sed, ne præmissos libros habeant in *vulgari translatione*, arctissime inhibemus," Concilium Tolosanum, Can. XII. At a synod at Beziers, in the year 1233, the laity were forbidden to possess any books of theology in the Latin language, and both clergy and laity to possess any in the vernacular. In the year 1338, John Wickliff was declared a heretic by a synod at Oxford for publishing an English translation of the Bible; and in the year 1408, the third synod at the same place ordained, "ne quis *textum aliquem* ex scriptura transferat in linguam Anglicanam, nisi a Dioecesano vel Concilio provinciali translatio approbata sit."

Still there were many among the different sects, and some even of the catholic church, who read the Bible for themselves. And by comparing the existing state of faith and practice with the Bible, they were soon convinced of the errors and corruptions of the church. At last, in the sixteenth century, Luther and the Swiss reformers appeared, and restored the free use of the Bible. Luther especially very much promoted the general circulation of the scriptures by his German translation, which was the principal means of the Reformation. The council at Trent did not now venture to renew the prohibition of the Bible, and undertook only to establish the Vulgate edition as alone authentic. But afterwards, Pope Pius IV. issued an *Index librorum prohibitorum*, in the preface to which he writes, "Cum experimento manifestum sit si sacra Biblia vulgari lingua passim sine discrimine permittantur, plus inde ob hominum temeritatem detrimenti quam utilitatis oriri; hac in parte iudicio Episcopi sive Inquisitoris stetur, ut cum consilio parochi vel Confessarii Bibliorum a catholicis auctoribus versorum lectionem in vulgari lingua eis concedere possint, quos intellexerunt ex huiusmodi lectione non damnum, sed fidei atque pietatis augmentum capere posse; *quam facultatem in scriptis habeant*. Qui autem absque tali facultate ea legere sive habere præsumserit, nisi prius Bibliis ordinario redditus, peccatorum absolutionem percipere non possit." But even this permission was afterwards limited by Clement VIII., who declared that by this indulgence of Pius IV., "nullam de novo tribui facultatem Episcopis vel Inquisitoribus aut Regularium Superioribus concedendi licentiam emendi, legendi, aut retinendi Biblia, vulgari lingua edita, *cum hæcenus mandato et usu sanctæ romanæ et universalis Inquisitionis sublata cis fuerit*

facultas concedendi huiusmodi licentias legendi vel retinendi Biblia vulgaria, aut alias sanctæ scripturæ tam Novi quam Veteris Testamenti partes, quavis vulgari lingua editas; ac insuper summaria et compendia etiam historica eorundem Bibliorum, seu librorum sanctæ scripturæ, quocunque vulgari idiomate conscripta; quod quidem inviolate servandum est." And at last this permission was wholly withdrawn by Gregory XV., who says, "De plenitudine apostolicæ potestatis et ex certa scientia, ac matura deliberatione revocamus, cassamus, et annullamus omnes et singulas licentias legendi et habendi bibliis quoscunque prohibitos."

It is injustice, however, to the catholic church, to suppose that this prohibition of the free and general use of the Bible was ever universally approved. There have always been theologians, especially in the Gallican church, who have advocated the lawfulness and necessity of the unlimited use of the scriptures. Paschasius Quesnel published at Paris, 1687, and Brussels, 1702, a French translation of the New Testament, (*Le Nouveau Testament, avec des réflexions morales sur chaque verset*), from which a hundred and one propositions were extracted at the instigation of the Jesuits, and condemned by the pope in the bull *Unigenitus*, 1713. Among these propositions were the following:—"Lectio sacræ scripturæ est pro omnibus." "Obscuritas sancti verbi Dei non est Laicis ratio dispensandi se ipsos ab ejus lectione." "Abriper e Christianorum manibus Novum Testamentum, sive eis illud clausum tenere, auferendo eis modum illud intelligendi, est illis Christi os obturbare." "Interdicere Christianis lectionem sacræ scripturæ, præsertim Evangelii, est interdicere usum luminis filijs lucis, et facere ut patiantur speciem quandam excommunicationis." It should be remarked, too, that the use of the Bible has never been prohibited *without some limitation*; so that it is not unfrequent in our day for the most distinguished theologians of the Romish church to advocate the general use of the scriptures; while there are still many Jesuites, or Exjesuites, who hold to the prohibition of the Bible. Vide Hegelmeier, *Geschichte des Bibelverbots*, Ulm, 1783, 8vo.

[*Note*.—The following passage from the historian Olaus Magnus, will shew on what pretences the court of Rome has sometimes proceeded in forbidding the translation and circulation of the holy scriptures. "Gregorius VII., Vratislao (a Bohemian nobleman) scripsit (2 Jan. 1080) ac prohibuit, ne, ut optavit, scriptura sancta verteretur in linguam vulgarem; quoniam tam secreta majestas in ea est, ut difficulter translata sensus secretorum Dei poterit in ea postmodum deprehendi; immo nunquam devotius fieret populus, quando sciens facilitatem, in con-

temptum verteret, quod in reverentia consueverat admirari et jam in cerevisiaria taberna irrisorie decantatur," Hist. Lib. XVI. c. 39.

At the time of the Reformation, the Bible was translated by many catholic theologians, in order to prevent the use of the "heretical" Bible by the members of their communion. The New Testament was translated by Hieron. Emser, in 1527, and by J. Dietenberger, in 1533; and the whole Bible by J. Eck, Casp. Uhlenberg, and others.

The condemnation of the maxims of Father Quesnel by Clement XI. occasioned a controversy in the catholic church, which resulted in larger views respecting the use of the scriptures. These views were patronised by Benedict XIII., in the synod held at the palace of the Lateran, and afterwards more successfully by Maria Theresa and Joseph II., of Austria.

Since the commencement of the present century, the Bible Society has found patrons in many distinguished members of the catholic church. The Archbishops of Mohileff and of Gnesne sanctioned a Polish version of the scriptures, and promoted its circulation in their dioceses; for which, however, they were severely reprimanded by Pius VII., in his brief of June 29, 1816. Among the distinguished catholics who have made common cause with the protestants in the circulation of the Bible, in opposition both to papal authority and the active jealousy of the Ultra-montanists, the names of Van Ess, Gossner, and De Sacy, deserve to be particularly mentioned. In our own country, the "bishops of the church" are content with "earnestly cautioning the laity against the indiscriminate use of the unauthorized and extremely defective and erroneous versions which are placed within their reach," and with recommending "the Douay translation from the Vulgate of the Old Testament, and the Rhemish translation of the New Testament." Vide Pastoral Letter of the Prelates of the catholic church, Baltimore, 1829.

While these more liberal views are obtaining in the Romish church, it is worthy of remark that many protestant divines have so far deserted the principles of the Reformation as wholly to disapprove of the general reading of the Bible, or at least to allow it only under very narrow restrictions. Several bishops of the episcopal church, both in England and America, have publicly avowed their hostility to the Bible Society, pretending that its exertions menaced the safety of the established church. Vide Christian Observer, vol. xx. p. 28. The same hostility to the unrestricted use of the Bible has been manifested by several German theologians. Vide Lessing, Theol. Nachlass, Berlin, 1784. J. G. Becker, Tract. ad questionem, utrum lectio literarum sacræ scripturæ omnibus omnino

Christianis, maxime imperiæ multitudini, valde sit commendanda, Rostochii, 1793, 4to. Voigtländer, Die Bibel kein Erbauungsbuch, in the Predigerjournal für Sachsen, November, 1809. Voeckler, De eo, an bene actum sit, scripta Veteris et Novi Testamenti omnia ac singula cum imperitorum multitudine communicandi, Lipsiæ, 1823, 8vo. Vide Hahn, Lehrbuch des christ. Glaubens, Leipzig, 1828.]

II. *How may the Bible be best adapted to common use?*

It appears from the preceding historical sketch that religion has always suffered from the prohibition or restriction of the use of the scriptures; and, on the contrary, has always gained from their free and unrestricted use. To establish this declaration, we need only appeal to the time of the Reformation. The most direct way to render Christianity obsolete is to take the Bible from the hands of the common people. And already have we begun to experience the evils resulting from the efforts of some modern teachers to banish the reading of the scriptures, especially of the Old Testament, from our schools, or at least to diminish the degree of attention formerly paid to them.

But however useful the simple perusal of the scriptures in the common method may be to common people of no education, it may doubtless be rendered in different ways more useful and less objectionable. The following are the principal methods adopted to promote the general utility of the Bible:—

1. *New translations.* Before the perusal of the scriptures can be instructive and edifying to the common people, they must be able to obtain clear and definite conceptions of what they read; and they can do this only by means of good and intelligible translations. It were, indeed, desirable that the established version, which has a classical authority with the great body of society, should be gradually improved, if circumstances were such as to allow this to be done. Considering the period at which this version was made, it is a masterpiece in its kind, and is in many respects worthy of the study and imitation of the modern translator. But since that period we have made great advances in the art of interpretation, and have many exegetical helps, which were not then enjoyed. Our language, too, has undergone great alterations since this translation was written; and many of the words and phrases which are used in it, and which were then common, are now obsolete and unintelligible; but the period has not yet arrived, either for introducing a new version into the protestant church, or for making considerable improvements in the one now established. Indeed, to attempt this at the present crisis of the affairs of religion, and while opposing sects are inflamed with such a

zeal against each other, would be extremely dangerous. In these circumstances we could hardly expect that any one plan of improvement would gain the assent of all parties. Since, therefore, neither a new version can at present be authorized, nor any considerable improvements be made in the old, we can do nothing better to excite the interest and enlist the feelings of the common people in the reading of the Bible, than to recommend to them new translations and practical expositions, to be used in connexion with the established version.

2. *Allegorical interpretation and compends.* Every part of the Bible was not intended for all ages or for all classes of readers. Considerable portions both of the Old and New Testaments have no immediate connexion with the Christian religion and the truths of salvation, and contribute little to the instruction and edification of believers, and are therefore of service merely to the scholar. Vide s. 12. In order now to render the reading of the scriptures truly profitable to common people, and to save them from wasting their time upon subjects which lie beyond their sphere, and from which they can derive no profit, their attention should be directed to such passages as exhibit the great truths of Christian faith and practice, and especially to the instructive narratives of the Bible. The inconveniences resulting to the greater portion of readers from the indiscriminate and unaided perusal of the Bible, and the necessity of doing something to adapt it better to their spiritual profit, have been for a long time perceived and felt; and, accordingly, two methods have been taken to obviate these inconveniences, and to render the perusal of the Bible more useful to common readers.

(a) A mystical and allegorical mode of interpretation has been applied to the historical parts of the Old Testament, and to other parts of the Bible, which have no immediate bearing on the doctrines of salvation, or the moral improvement of men; and in this way a new sense has been ascribed to these passages better calculated to instruct and edify. This method was formerly adopted by Philo and other Jews, who were followed in this respect by many of the Christian fathers, especially by Clemens of Alexandria, Origen, and others of the Egyptian church. This method has also been adopted in modern times. It has doubtless been the means of good in some former periods, and to certain classes of readers; but it involves so many inconveniences, and gives occasion to so many errors, that the revival of it at the present day can hardly seem desirable. It has lately, however, though under the different name of *moral interpretation*, received the sanction of Kant. Vide Nösselt, *Progr. Animadversiones in sensum sacrorum librorum morale*, Halle, 1795.

[*Note.*—Those who apply this mode of interpretation suppose that every passage of the Bible contains a concealed, spiritual, and higher sense, either in *connexion with* or *under* its literal and grammatical sense; and that the Holy Ghost thus gave two or more senses to the words which he inspired. The catholic church held to a *fourfold* sense of the Bible—viz., (1) *GRAMMATICUS*, (2) *MYSTICUS*, subdivided into (a) *tropologicus*, s. *moralis* (1 Cor. ix. 8, seq.), (b) *allegoricus* (Gal. iv. 21, seq.), (c) *anagogicus*. This theory of catholic hermeneutics was expressed in the following distich:—

*Litera gesta docet; quid credas, allegoria;
Moralis, quid agas; quid speres, anagogia.*

Tirinus, a Jesuit, thus writes:—"Sub unis, iidemque sacræ scripturæ verbis, præter *sensum literalem*, primario a spiritu sancto intentum, latere subinde etiam alium, *sensum mysticum* sive spirituale, secundario a spiritu sancto intentum, patet ex John. iii. 14, ubi per exaltationem *serpentis Mosaici*, Christus suam crucifixionem; ex Matt. xii. 20, ubi per occultationem *Jonæ in ventre ceti*, suam sepulturam designat," &c.

In opposition to this, Sam. Maresius, of the reformed church, writes—"Absit a nobis ut Deum faciamus *δύλωτον*, aut multiplices sensus affingamus ipsius verbo, in quo potius, tamquam in speculo limpidissimo, sui autoris simplicitatem contemplari debemus, Ps. xii. 6; xix. 8. *Unicus* ergo *sensus* scripturæ nempe *grammaticus*, est admittendus, quibuscunque demum terminis, vel propriis vel tropicis et figuratis exprimitur. Sed cum res illo sensu grammatico expressæ, (sunt enim verba rerum imagines) sæpe sint typicæ, hinc fit, ut sensus ille *unicus* et simplex debeat extendi non solum ad typum, sed etiam ad prototypum, cui præfigurando typus ille a Deo destinatur; quo spectant pleraque exempla hic Tirino citata, et in quibus sensum hactenus *mysticum* agnoscimus, quatenus res ipsæ mysticam habuerunt significationem."

Such was the opinion of the reformers, and of most of the older evangelical theologians; but Musæus, Calovius, Quenstedt, Hollaz, Carpovius, Mosheim, and others, contended for a *mystical* sense, besides the literal sense discovered and determined by the *usus loquendi* and the context. By this mystical sense they meant, however, only a spiritual application of the literal sense. On the contrary, Baier, Buddeus, Baumgarten, and others, maintained that this spiritual, hidden, second, remote, sense of the scriptures was the one intended by the Holy Spirit. In later times, Dr. Olshausen distinguishes between the *literal* sense of the Bible and a deeper sense (*ὑπόνοια*, *Untersinn*), which he calls *spiritual*. Vide Olshausen, *Ein Wort über tiefen Schriftsinn*, Königsberg, 1824, 8vo.

Hahn, Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens, Leipzig, 1828.]

(b) Another means of rendering the Bible more useful to all classes of people—a means far better than the former, and more adapted to the present time, is that of making compends, containing the most important, instructive, and practical portions of the scriptures. The idea of making extracts from the Bible is not of recent origin. Soon after the Babylonian exile, the Jews made selections from the various historical works of their prophets. The books of Kings, Chronicles, &c., are compends, composed from larger historical works therein named. Compendes of the same kind were early attempted among Christians. According to Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. IV. 26, Melito of Sardis, in the third century, composed a *Synopsis Veteris Testamenti*, which, however, is now lost. And we learn from a catalogue of the writings of Augustine, given by Possidonius, an African bishop of the fifth century, and a disciple of Augustine, that he also made a selection of such portions of the Old Testament as were interesting and instructive to Christians, to which he gives the title of *Speculum*.

These compendes of the scriptures may be constructed on different plans, according to the various ends for which they are composed. But we are speaking here of that kind only which is intended for the instruction and edification of the common people and of the young. During the last twenty or thirty years many compendes of this nature have been composed in the protestant church. Some theologians of that party which would banish from religion everything *positive* have made use of this method, in order to give a direction to the religious instruction of the common people and of the young, conformably to their own maxims. They have selected such portions only of the Bible as inculcate the truths of natural religion, or exhibit the general precepts of morality, and have either wholly omitted or very slightly noticed the positive doctrines of the Christian faith. Many of them have gone so far as to insist that such compendes should be used in the schools instead of the Bible, and have boldly declared that they might be made gradually to supersede wholly

the original scriptures; as in very many cases the extracts made from a work have led to an entire neglect of the original from which they were taken.

If we consider these abuses, and the present very doubtful tendency of this method, we cannot deny that there are weighty objections to the regular use of compendes of the Bible in popular religious instruction. Indeed, Eichhorn (*Bibl. der bibl. Lit. Th. I. s. 828, f.*) and many other neologists have declared themselves against this method.

If, however, these compendes are properly constructed and rightly used they may be very useful. In order to avoid the mistakes just mentioned, and to answer the ends for which these selections should be designed, they should be composed in view of the following considerations: (1) The author of the compendium and the teachers who use it must carefully guard against the appearance of undervaluing the Bible itself, or of wishing to supersede it by their selections. (2) They must rather labour to prepare those whom they teach by means of these extracts to read the Bible itself with understanding and profit. In short, a compend of the Bible should be made a practical introduction to the Bible itself, and should be calculated to awaken the desire of reading the original from which it is taken. (4) The historical portions of the Bible should be carefully retained, and the attention of the reader should be directed to their practical use. (5) The author should especially labour to render everything clear and intelligible, preserving, however, as far as may be, the language of the Bible itself, and indeed, for the most part, that of the authorized version, to which the readers have been accustomed from their youth. Cf. Köppen, *Die Bibel ein Werk der göttlichen Weisheit*, Th. II. s. 737. Some of the best compendes are those of Trinius, Bahrde, Seiler, Hufnagel, Schneider, Treumann, Risler, and others mentioned in Noesselt's *Bucherkenntniss*. One of the latest compendes is that of Zerrenner, which, however, does not answer all the conditions above stated. The student will find a number of essays for and against compendes of the Bible in some of the volumes of the *Predigerjournal*.

BOOK I.

DOCTRINE OF GOD.

THIS Book comprises what may be called *theology* in the strict sense of the term. The several doctrines belonging to it will be considered in the following order:—

PART I.

OF THE NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

1. Of the existence and the notion of God Art. II.
2. Of the nature and attributes of God Art. III.
3. Of the doctrine of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost Art. IV.

PART II.

OF THE WORKS OF GOD.

1. Of the creation of the world :
 - (a) The creation of the world in general, and of the earth . . . Art. V.
 - (b) The creation, and original condition of man Art. VI.
 - (c) The doctrine of angels Art. VII.
2. Of Divine Providence and the preservation of the world Art. VIII.

BOOK I.

DOCTRINE OF GOD.

PART I.—NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

ARTICLE II.

OF THE EXISTENCE AND THE NOTION OF GOD.

SECTION XIV.

OF THE NOTION OF GOD.

I. *Can God be defined?*



O this question, which was frequently asked by the schoolmen, some writers have returned a negative answer, for the reason that no definition can perfectly exhaust the idea in question. And if the definition of a thing must necessarily contain a complete description of its whole nature and all its attributes, a definition of God is indeed impossible. But all which is necessary in a definition is, that it should give us so many of the characteristics of the thing defined as to enable us to distinguish it from all other things. And in this sense God can certainly be defined.

II. *What is the best definition of God?*

The difference between the various definitions which philosophers have given of God is, for the most part, merely verbal. Some of the metaphysical definitions are obscure and otherwise objectionable. This is the case with the definition given by Wolf: "God is a self-existent being, in whom the ground of the reality of the world is to be found," or, "God is a being who has the ground of his existence in himself." Others define God to be an independent being, or an independent spirit, or an infinite, necessary, eternal being. By these definitions, which enumerate particular divine attributes, God is distinguished from all other

beings. As a general thing, all the divine attributes may be derived by inference from any one; which may, therefore, be made the ground of the definition of the Divine Being. This was done by the ancient philosophers, who defined God to be *πάντων αἰτων, τὸ ὄντως ὄν, οὐσία αἰδίου, ἀθάνατος, ἀνάρρητος, κ. τ. λ.*

But the best definition of God—the one in which all the others are comprehended—is the following: *God is the most perfect being, and is the cause of all other beings.* (a) The first clause of this definition is comprehensive of all the particular attributes by which God is distinguished from other beings, such as eternity, necessity, independence, freedom, and perfection of will, &c. This definition may be expressed in more popular and scriptural language, by saying, God is the Supreme Being, the Most High (*ὑψιστος*), exalted over all, to whom none can be compared. (b) The second clause of this definition is added, because the contemplation of all other beings, the aggregate of which is the world, facilitates the knowledge of this most perfect being by rendering it obvious that no other beings possess all the perfections which are united in him. In this view, God is regarded not only as he is in himself, but also in relation to other existing things. But Kant has pronounced this definition of God, and all the common definitions, defective, because they make no express mention of *moral* perfection, which, in the description of a being like God, should be far more prominent than mere metaphysical perfection. He would therefore connect with the idea of the most perfect being that of a *free* being, provided with a *pure moral will*. But the latter idea being implied in the former does not require to be expressly mentioned in a general definition.

But the first clause of the definition above given, however intelligible it may be to the learned, who are accustomed to abstract ideas, is too transcendental and metaphysical for an-

educated people. And as the principal part of our knowledge of God is derived from the contemplation of the natural world, and the conclusions to which we arrive from this contemplation; the second clause of this definition will be far more generally intelligible than the first. In popular instruction we should therefore define God to be the creator, preserver, and governor of all things; for we always conceive of God principally in relation to ourselves and the world around us, and without the contemplation of the world we should not have come to the knowledge of God as the most perfect being; so that the first part of the definition is a consequence of the last.

This is the light in which God is presented to us in the Bible, Gen. i. 1; Jer. x. 10—16; Amos, v. 8; Acts, xvii. 24, coll. Psalm clxvi. 6; Isa. xlii. 5; xlv. 6, seq.; Matt. xi. 25. Vide Morus, p. 44. And this, too, is the view of God which is most calculated to inspire the minds of men with reverence for his character, which is the great object of all religious instruction. Vide Morus, pages 43, 44.

SECTION XV.

OF THE PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.

I. *Statement of the Proofs of the Existence of God.*

THE belief in the divine existence is always presupposed in the Bible, and the truth of this belief is not, therefore, formally proved, although it is supported by many convincing arguments, Rom. i. 19. On this account Baier and some other theologians contended that the divine existence should be presupposed in Christian theology, and that the proofs of it should be wholly omitted; and it must be confessed that the full and scientific statement of these proofs belongs rather to metaphysics and natural theology than here. The proofs of the divine existence may be divided into two principal classes.

1. *Proofs à priori.* The most celebrated of these is that derived from THE IDEA of the most perfect being, and called the *ontological* or *Cartesian* proof. It was first used by Anselmus, and often repeated by the schoolmen who succeeded him, and only renewed by Des Cartes. It was afterwards improved by Leibnitz, Wolf, and Baumgarten. It may be briefly stated thus: *The most perfect being is possible, and therefore actually exists; for existence is a reality or perfection, and necessary existence is the highest perfection. Consequently necessary existence must be predicated of the most perfect being.* The validity of this argument was disputed by the monk Gaunilo, a contemporary of Anselmus, and by many others in succeeding ages. In modern times it has at last been proved by Kant to be entirely futile. The mere supposableness or logical possibility of a perfect being is no proof

of the objective or real possibility of such a being; and existence cannot be inferred from a mere idea. This proof *à priori* entirely surpasses the comprehension of common minds.

2. *Proofs à posteriori, or from experience.*

(a) From the *contingency* of the world. We perceive a constant motion and change in the objects around us, from which we conclude that they are contingent. These contingent things must have some ground for their existence and change extrinsic to themselves. And this ground must be a *necessary* being, one who has the ground of his existence in himself; and this being is God. Otherwise we must make the absurd supposition that effects exist without their causes, or that there is an infinite series of contingent causes (*progressum causarum in infinitum*), which is equally absurd. This proof, when stated in connexion with others, and especially with the moral proof, is well calculated to produce conviction. The Bible frequently contrasts the eternity and immutability of God with the perishable nature of the material world, Psalm xc.; cii. 26—28; Heb. i. 10, seq. And this proof, when exhibited in this way, is highly adapted to produce impression even on the common mind. [It is commonly called the *cosmological* proof.]

Note. This argument, in its scientific form and development, has been ascribed by many, from their ignorance of ancient philosophy, to Thomas Aquinas. It was used, however, by Carneades in opposition to the stoics, who ascribed divinity to the world; according to the testimony of Cicero, *De Natura Deor.* III. 12. It was also used by many of the ecclesiastical fathers. Vide Petavius, *Dogm. Theol.* l. i. c. 2.

(b) The proofs from *final causes.* These may be stated in a very popular and intelligible manner, and are therefore best adapted to the instruction of the common people and of the young. They are called by the schoolmen *argumenta physica*. In these, however, the proof from the contingency of the world is presupposed. The argument stands thus: If the things of the world stand connected as means and ends, and follow one after another in this relation, they must be ordered by an intelligence, a being of reason and supreme wisdom. Now the things of the world are found actually to exist in this relation and order, so that we are compelled to believe that the world has sprung from an intelligent author.

The full evidence of this conclusion depends upon the following particulars. (1) The world exhibits the most astonishing marks of order, perfection, and design. Although we are unable to survey the boundless extent of the universe, we find abundant proof of this in the animate and inanimate creation which surrounds us.

(2) The order and design exhibited in the world are not the effect of blind chance. This cannot be supposed without contradicting the most fundamental principles of the human mind. (3) This order, so observable in the material creation, is *contingent*. We may be very easily satisfied that it does not result from anything existing in the world itself. From all this we conclude that the order exhibited in the material world must have a ground beyond the world itself; and that the author of the visible creation must be an intelligent being, who proposes to himself certain ends to be attained in the production and wise arrangement of contingent things.

The science by which we attain the knowledge of the existence and attributes of the Divine Being from the wisdom displayed in the constitution of the natural world, is called *physico-theology*; and that which develops the ends or final causes of this constitution, *teleology*. [Hence this proof of the divine existence is commonly called the *physico-theological* or *teleological*.

This argument, so well adapted to common apprehension, was employed more frequently than any other by the ancient writers. Cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, I. 4. IV. 3. Plato, *De Legg.* X. 68. XII. 229. Galen, *De usu partium*. Philebus, 244. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* II. 2, 38, seq. *Quæst. Tusc.* I. 28, 29. It was likewise often employed by the Christian fathers. Vide Gregory Nazianzen, *Orat.* 28. Gregory of Nyssa, *De officio hominis*. Lactantius, *De officio hominis*. Theophilus, *Ad Autolychem*, I. 23. Cf. Athanasius, John of Damascus, and others. The best modern writers on the general subject of physico-theology are, Fenelon, Van Nieuwenty, Derham, Wolf, Scheuchzer, Bonnet, and Sander. Particular branches of physico-theology have also been frequently laboured in modern times. Cf. Frabicius, *Hydrotheologie*. Lesser, *Lithotheologie*. Derham, *Astrotheologie*. Bode, *Anleitung zur Kenntniss des gesternten Himmels*. Reimarus, *Ueber die Triebe der Thiere*. Lesser, *Insekttheologie*, &c. This general argument is often exhibited in the holy scriptures. Vide *Ps.* viii. xix. civ.; *Is.* xl. 21—26; *Job*, xxxvii. xli.; *Matt.* vi. 25, seq.; *Acts*, xiv. 15, seq. xvii. 24—28; *Rom.* i. 19.

(c) The *moral* argument, lately elucidated by Kant. Vide No. II.

(d) The *historical* proof, drawn from the agreement of all, even the most uncultivated nations, in the belief of the divine existence. Against this proof it has been objected, (1) that the fact of this agreement could not be satisfactorily proved from history; vide *Introduction*, s. 4; (2) that this agreement, even if it could be satisfactorily established, would not prove this belief to be true; since many acknowledged

errors and superstitions have been universally believed. But notwithstanding these objections, this *almost* universal agreement of men with regard to the divine existence must be acknowledged to furnish an argument of some weight. It shews that the common sense of mankind, on a little reflection, leads to the idea of God, and that the conclusion from these effects to such a cause is very obvious and natural to the human mind. *Acts*, xvii. 27. It should be here remarked, however, that the belief of the divine existence precedes the knowledge of any theoretic proof of it. Vide *Introduction*, s. 4, and *infra* No. II.

[This argument was used by the ancient philosophers. Πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ὑπόληψιν, Aristotle, *De Cælo*, I. 3. Ἀπαντες ἄνθρωποι σχεδὸν Ἕλληνες τε καὶ βάρβαροι, νομίζουσιν εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Mathem.* I. 8. The same writer mentions as one of four proofs of the divine existence, ἡ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις συμφωνία, *Adv. Mathem.* IX. 60. Ἐν βαρβάρους οὐδεὶς ἐστὶ τὸν θεὸν ἀγνοῶν, Maximus Tyrius, *Dissert.* 38. Cf. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* I. 17, 23. Seneca, *Epist.* 117.

(e) The proof of the divine existence from *miracles*. The miracles recorded in the Old and New Testaments must have afforded to those who saw them irresistible proof of the existence and perfections of God. They were accordingly employed by Moses, and the other ancient prophets, to convince the Jews and Egyptians not only that God existed, but that Jehovah was the only true and the almighty sovereign of the universe. And these miracles are calculated to produce the same conviction in us, although we have not seen them with our own eyes, if we believe the truth of the Bible in which they are recorded. Vide Storr and Flatt, *Elements of Biblical Theology*, vol. i. p. 309, of the translation.

II. Observations on the Use of the Proof of the Divine Existence.

1. The proofs of the divine existence have been the subject of much controversy among the philosophers of modern times. Kant has endeavoured to shew, in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, der *Urtheilskraft*, and other works, that all the *theoretic* proofs of the divine existence are imperfect, and that we do not hold the notion of God to be true on the ground of speculative reason, but because it perfectly agrees with the principles of our moral nature. And he would therefore have our belief in the existence of God to depend solely upon the moral proof, which may be briefly stated as follows:—There is a moral order of things in the world,—all things are connected together as means for the attainment of moral ends. To this moral order we ourselves belong, as we learn from the

moral feeling which we all possess, and which is exerted in the *conscience*. Now we are led by our *practical* reason to conclude, that there exists some cause, by which alone this order could be established—i. e., that there is a God. Vide Jacobi, Prüfung der Mendelssohn'schen Morgenstunden, oder aller speculativen Beweise für das Daseyn Gottes, Leipzig, 1786, 8vo. Cf. Jacobi, Ueber den moralischen Beweis vom Daseyn Gottes, Libau, 1791, 8vo.

[This argument will be placed in a clearer light by the following passage from Kant himself. "The highest good of man consists of two parts, the greatest possible morality and happiness. The former is the demand of his spiritual, the latter of his animal nature. The former only, his morality, is within his own power; and while, by persevering virtue, he makes this his personal character, he is often compelled to sacrifice his happiness. But since the desire of happiness is neither irrational nor unnatural, he justly concludes, either that there is a supreme being who will so guide the course of things (the natural world not of itself subject to moral laws) as to render his holiness and happiness equal, or that the dictates of his conscience are unjust and irrational. But the latter supposition is morally impossible; and he is compelled, therefore, to receive the former as true." Kritik der reinen Vernunft, s. 620, f.]

2. An impartial examination of this controversy leads us to the following general result:—

(a) The metaphysical proofs of the divine existence are imperfect, as well as all proofs of this nature, to whatever subject they may relate. But they are not requisite for the establishment of our faith. If we should begin with the principle of believing only what we could *prove* on speculative grounds, we should end with doubting many of the most established truths, and our own existence among the rest. The demonstration which Spinoza has given of pantheism is inconclusive, because it is founded on merely speculative grounds, as Kant has shewn beyond all dispute. The person who hopes to attain to certainty in the way of metaphysical speculation, will be disappointed, and will fall into the depths of cheerless scepticism.

(b) It is an established fact, that all who believe in the divine existence, are convinced of it before they come to the knowledge of any theoretic argument by which it might be proved. Men in general admit the idea of God to be true, because it perfectly agrees with the principles of their moral nature, and is demanded by these principles; and not because it is proved by speculative reason. Vide Introduction, s. 4.

(c) This moral proof is therefore very true and just; and we shall do well if we search for the grounds of it in our own minds, in order to

establish our own personal conviction. This proof should likewise be used, divested however of technical language, in popular instruction; for so it is actually employed in the holy scriptures.

(d) As soon, however, as the speculative reason is awakened, and in some measure cultivated, the mind, agreeably to its nature and its usual course, searches for the theoretic proofs of the same truths with which it had become previously acquainted from practical reason. But the man deceives himself who supposes that these theoretic proofs alone would have ever led him to conviction. They are not, however, by any means to be rejected; since they result directly from the very constitution of the speculative reason, and serve to confirm our belief in truths which were before made known to us in another way. If with these views we find imperfection and inconclusiveness in these theoretic proofs, we shall not be wavering in our faith, knowing that it depends upon other grounds than these. In connexion, therefore, with the moral proof, the physico-theological and teleological should also be used. What God, the author of our nature, has joined together in the very constitution which he has given us, let not the philosopher or religious teacher put asunder.

3. The use to be made of these remarks in popular instruction. If the human mind comes to the knowledge of God in the manner just described, we must conform ourselves in our instructions to this natural progress, if we would compass our object. In so doing, we shall follow the example of the sacred writers, who always proceed in this way. We must accordingly inculcate upon our hearers the truth, that the conscience of man is the ground of all our knowledge of God, and the source of all true religion. Every man has a law within his own bosom, by which he judges his feelings, actions, and his whole moral character. This law commands his obedience so imperatively, that he is compelled to regard it as the standard, to which alone his conduct must be brought, and where it must be tried independently of human opinions. And he acquits or condemns himself, according to this law, as if he stood before a judicial tribunal, Rom. ii. 12—16; Acts, xvii. 27—31; Rom. i. 19, 20, 32; Cf. Introduction, s. 4. Now when a person acknowledges this law, he at the same time acknowledges, that there is an invisible lawgiver and judge, who annexes rewards to what is morally good, and punishment to what is morally evil, to whom therefore homage and obedience is due from us his subjects. Vide loc. sup. cit. In this way does man come to the knowledge of a moral order of things, to which he himself is conscious of belonging in the nobler portion of his nature, and from which he cannot but infer the exist-

ence of a cause upon which this order depends—i. e., of a free and moral being. In short, the conscience of man distinctly utters the voice of an invisible and supreme judge of our thoughts and actions.

But we do not stop at this point. Though this judge of our hearts is invisible, he is yet the object of our knowledge. His existence is made known to us by his works, which we see with our eyes, and perceive by all our bodily senses, (*νοούμενα καθ' ὁράται*, Rom. i. 20;) for as long as the world exists (*ἀπὸ κρίσεως κόσμου*) we may find proof of the divine existence, and revelation of the divine attributes, in the works of his hand. Here, then, according to the example of the sacred writers, we may introduce the proofs from the contingency of the world, and the marks of design which it exhibits, in all their force.

If we impart religious instruction in this manner, we shall proceed both psychologically and scripturally; for conscience within, and nature without us, furnish a twofold source of the knowledge of God. But if we follow the example of the Bible, we shall connect with these truths, derived immediately from the human conscience, the more peculiar doctrines of the Christian system; such, for example, as the doctrine that Christ will, at a future day, sit in judgment upon all the actions of our lives, Rom. ii. 16. It follows from the views here expressed, that we should begin to instruct *children* in the knowledge of God at a very early period; as soon, indeed, as they shew the movings of moral feeling, or begin to reflect upon the things which surround them, or to reason from effect to cause.

Vide Jacobi, *Leichter und überzeugender Beweis von Gott, und von der Wahrheit der christlichen Religion*; also, *Versuch eines Beweises eines in der menschlichen Seele von Natur liegenden Eindrucks von Gott, und einem Leben nach dem Tode*.

III. Of Atheism.

The error of those who deny the existence of God is called *atheism*. Atheists are such either theoretically or practically. Practical atheists are those who derive the motives of their conduct from the denial of the divine existence. In the common sense, however, they are those who, while they profess religion, live in reality like atheists. It is of such that the Bible speaks, *Psa. xiv. 1*; *Ephes. ii. 12*. But we shall here treat only of theoretic atheism. Some have denied that theoretic atheism is possible. This opinion, so contradictory to all experience and history, is generally entertained by those who believe in innate ideas, or who would prove the existence of God from the common consent of all mankind; but notwithstanding this opinion, there have always been those who have denied the being of God. Some, like Sextus the Em-

piric, and Hume, are *sceptical* atheists, and consider the evidence against the divine existence as equivalent to that in its favour, and therefore leave the question undecided. Others are decided, *dogmatical* atheists, and think the arguments against the divine existence preponderate.

But we must here notice a species of atheism which is more refined, and which has been better received, than any other. God, as we conceive of him, is the most perfect being *distinct* from the world which is dependent on him. Whoever, therefore, believes that the world itself, or any part or power of it, is God, is an atheist. But there have always been some philosophers who have held that the world itself, or that the air or fire, or some other portion, or that the power of motion, (which was the opinion of many of the Stoics and Epicureans), was God himself. But this atheism was for the first time thoroughly systematized by Benedict Spinoza, in his *Ethics*, published among his posthumous works in 1677. According to him, there is but *one* substance, which, however, is variously modified. It has two principal attributes, infinite extension (matter) and infinite thought (intelligence.) Spinoza speaks indeed of God; his God, however, is not personally distinguished from the world, but is the universe itself, *τὸ πᾶν*. Hence the name of *pantheism*, which is given to his system. He is commonly supposed to have derived his views from Xenophanes of Colophon, and from Parmenides and Zeno of Elea. He did not, however, agree so well with the principles of that school as with the ideas of the system of emanation, which he enlarged, refined, and adapted to his own theory. The weakness and inconclusiveness of the reasoning of Spinoza has been exposed with great sagacity by Kant. The whole subject is fully considered in the writings of Jacobi, Heydenreich, and Herder, respecting Spinoza.

Very similar to the system of Spinoza is that of many theosophists. Pantheism has likewise been received into favour, in modern times, by many philosophers in Italy and France; and in Germany, the visible tendency of many of the adherents of the critical philosophy is to derive atheism from the ideas of Kant, and thus establish it on a new foundation. This appears to be the case particularly with Fichte, Niethammer, Forberg, and Schelling. Vide Fichte's and Niethammer's *Philosophisches Journal*, St. I. Fichte is very unwilling to be thought an atheist; and, to be sure, he speaks of God; but he cannot speak of him in the sense in which others do, for he denies the existence of a being who is self-existent and independent of our conceptions; and such a being is intended by every one who speaks of God. The term God, accord-

ing to Fichte, means nothing more than the *moral order* of things; and this order, according to his system, exists only in relation to us, and as belonging to ourselves, and not at all independent of our conceptions. Vide the Essay, Ueber Fichte's Lehre von Gott, und der göttlichen Weltregierung, in Flatt's Magazin für christliche Dogmatik und Moral, St. 5, s. 1—83, and 174—239; and Briefe über Kant's, Forberg's and Fichte's Religionslehre, St. 6, s. 184—210. Cf. the Essays of Dr. Vogel, in the Neue Theol. Journal, 1799 and 1800. Also two treatises in Süskind's Magazin, St. 11, 12, No. 8, Ueber die Gründe des Glaubens an eine Gottheit als ausserweltliche und für sich bestehende Intelligenz; and No. 9, Ueber das Fundament des Glaubens an die Gottheit. For remarks respecting Schelling's doctrine of religion, vide Dr. Vogel's Essay in Gabler's Journal für auserlesene theol. Litteratur, Bd. V. St. 1, s. 1, ff., and Süskind's Magazin, St. 17.

[Note.—The name *atheism* would seem to be improperly given to the error of those who in any way allow the idea of God, however much their conceptions of him may vary from the truth. These different conceptions may be designated by names more appropriate and less injurious than that of atheism. Thus the doctrine of Fichte, who allows the subjective validity of the idea of God, though he denies its objective reality, is properly called *idealism*; the doctrine of Spinoza, who removes the individual existence of nature, and transfers it to God, while he retains unaltered the idea of God as a self-conscious individual, would be properly called *ideal pantheism*; and that of Schelling, who transfers the individual being of God into nature, *natural pantheism*. These remarks are confirmed by the following quotation from Henke:—

“Summa injuria omnes illi Atheorum numero accensentur, qui summum numen ab hoc universo secretum ac desperatum cogitare nesciunt, maluntque Deum rerum omnium causam *immanentem*, quam *transeuntem*, dici, nec tamen id quod perpetuo est, commiscere cum illo quod perpetuo fit: quorum error, profecto magis fanaticus quam impius, *Pantheismus et Spinosismus* vocatur.” Lineam. Inst. fidei Christ., p. 54.

Among the ancient Greek philosophers to whom the name of atheist would truly apply, we may mention, Leucippus, Diagoras of Melos, Protagoras of Abdera, Critias of Athens, Prodicus, and Theodorus of Cyrene; among the Romans, Lucretius; among modern writers, De la Mettrie, Von Holbach, or La Grange, (the author of the System of Nature), Helvetius, Diderot, and D'Alembert, (the authors of the French Encyclopædia,) and Joseph Priestly. Mandeville, Edelmann, and Voltaire, appear to

have been rather promoters of atheistical principles than themselves decided atheists.]

SECTION XVI.

OF THE UNITY OF GOD.

I. Proof of the Divine Unity.

1. THE unity of God is proved from the idea of absolute perfection, which cannot be conceived as divided, or as residing in different subjects. This proof was sometimes employed by the ecclesiastical fathers—e. g., Tertullian, Contra Marcionem, I. 3.

2. From the unity of the world. All the objects existing extrinsically to God himself compose one great whole. And since the most perfect being affords sufficient ground for the existence of the world, the supposition of another being is unnecessary. This metaphysical proof was used by Ambrosius, De fide, I. 1.

3. From the creation and preservation of the world. This proof may be stated in the most popular manner. If many deities participated in the creation and preservation of the world, we must suppose, (a) either that they divided the powers among themselves, one possessing one power, and another a different power,—to which it might be said that the supposition of a God with only one power is a contradiction,—or (b) that one among them possessed more power than the rest; in which case he alone is worthy of the name of God, and the others are unnecessary, or at most are only subservient to the supreme God; or (c) that they all possessed equal powers and perfections; in which case, either one among them created the world, and is, therefore, alone entitled to the name of God; or they all united their powers in the work of creation, which implies that their single powers were insufficient, and that their united powers alone constitute God, and thus leads us back to unity, (*μόνας*.) On the supposition that many different gods participate in the government of the world we could hardly avoid the conclusion that they would disagree in their views and plans, and thus introduce disorder and confusion into the world. This argument was formerly employed by Abelard.

For a more full discussion of the proofs of the unity of God the student may consult the following works: Töllner, Versuch eines neuen strengen Beweises von der Einheit Gottes, in his Vermischten Aufsätzen, Samml. I. Num. 3, 1766. Just. Christ. Henning, Die Einigkeit Gottes, nach verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten geprüft; Altenburg, 1779, 8vo. Platner, Philosophische Aphorismen, th. i.

The doctrine of the unity of God is taught in the most clear and explicit manner in the Old

and New Testaments. "Jehovah is God, Jehovah is ONE" (יהוה)—i. e., one God, Deut. vi. 4; iv. 35, 39; xxxii. 39. "I am God, and there is none else," Isaiah, xlv. 5, 21, 22; Ps. lxxxvi. 10. The doctrine of the unity of God was at the foundation of the whole Mosaic religion and institute, and also of the Christian religion. "And this is eternal life, that they might know thee," τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεόν, John, xvii. 3. 'Ἡαὶν εἰς Θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, "we believe in one God," 1 Cor. viii. 4—6; James, ii. 19, seq.

II. Historical Illustrations of the Doctrine of the Divine Unity.

1. The error of those who maintain that the universe was created, and is sustained and governed by more than one God, is called *polytheism*. And those who had fallen into this error being the great body of the nations of the ancient world, were called by the Jews, גוים (τὰ ἔθνη, gentes); rendered by Luther, *Heiden* (lit. Völker) and by our translators, *heathen*, (lit. gentiles, pagans.) Hence *polytheism* is called by Luther *Heidenthum*, and by our translators, *heathenism*.

2. The notion of the unity of God is commonly supposed to be very obvious to the mind of every one. But if it is as clear and comprehensible to the human understanding as the idea of the divine existence, for example, how comes it to pass that so many nations, even those who must be allowed to have possessed the highest mental cultivation, should have been from the first so decidedly inclined, and so obstinately attached, to polytheism? The Israelites themselves, who in the times of the patriarchs had been taught the truth on this subject by immediate revelation, relapsed afterwards into the errors of the surrounding nations. The idea of the unity of God cannot, therefore, as Grotius justly observed (*De jure belli et pacis*), be so obvious to the mind as is commonly supposed. In fact, it presupposes an acquaintance with many subjects far too abstract and transcendental for the uncultivated mind. But if this necessary knowledge is previously acquired, this idea results very naturally, and when it is once obtained it is not easily surrendered. This point has been ably illustrated by Meiners, *Historia doctrinæ de deo vero*; Lemgo, 8vo.

Note.—The remarks just made strikingly confirm the observation, that it is very easy to establish by proofs drawn from reason any truth which is once made known, but often very difficult to discover in the first instance even the most simple truth. When we consider that the writers of the Old Testament taught the doctrine of the unity of God at a time when all the nations of the world were sunken in polytheism, we must regard them with great veneration. Could they, in the situation in which they were

placed, have obtained this truth by their own reflection? The neglected writers of the Old Testament speak on this subject with more truth and clearness than the enlightened philosophers of Greece and Rome. And to whom are we indebted for our just apprehensions on this subject? Our conduct with respect to the Bible, to which we owe so much, resembles that of ungrateful children and scholars with respect to their parents and instructors.

3. But the idea of the unity of God which the great multitude of the Jews entertained before the Babylonian exile was very imperfect, which accounts for their inclination to idolatry. They regarded Jehovah as merely the first and greatest among the gods, as their God, and the God of their fathers and their country. They admitted the real existence of the deities of the heathen, and only claimed for their God a precedence over the rest. Such, doubtless, were the conceptions of the great multitude of the Jews, although Abraham, Moses, the prophets, and the more enlightened part of the nation, were in possession of better views. Vide No. I. ad finem. If it were not so, how could they have revolted so frequently from the worship of the true God to idolatry, in order to make trial as it were of another god who might please them better? Jacob himself appears to have entertained opinions like this at first, (*Genesis*, xxviii. 16;) and his family were therefore, for a long time, in the practice of idolatry. He at least permitted it in his wives. And Moses was compelled to ask God for the name by which he would be known to the Israelites, so imperfect were their conceptions with respect to his unity, *Exodus*, iii. 13. Solomon, too, permitted his concubines to practise idolatry even in the holy land, not, however, so much from the want of sufficient theoretical knowledge on this subject as from a false toleration, resulting from weakness and a misplaced pliability.

But it was not till after the Babylonian exile that the Jews became the zealous professors and stanch advocates of this doctrine. Then, however, and especially after they came under the yoke of the Persians, who were at that time the avowed haters of polytheism, the unity of God became the prevailing belief of the Jewish nation. But the establishment and diffusion of Christianity has done more than anything else to propagate this doctrine, which is now received by a great majority of mankind. To this result the spread of the Mahomedan religion has contributed not a little; for Mohammed was one of the most zealous advocates of the unity of God. He, however, was indebted for his purest views on religion to Judaism and Christianity.

4. The question has been asked whether

there were any among the heathen nations who entertained just conceptions respecting the unity of God!—to which various and contradictory answers have been given. The following observations may be of use in deciding the controversy:

(a) Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and other sages of the heathen world, either expressly asserted the doctrine of the unity of God, or (which is the case with most of them) regarded it as highly probable. Vide Hennings, *Die Einigkeit Gottes nach verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten geprüft*, Altenburg, 1779, 8vo. Some of them, however,—the philosophers of Elea for example,—formed different conceptions of the unity of God from those which we derive from the Bible, and were rather inclined to pantheism than to monotheism.

(b) There have always been various systems of polytheism among the heathen nations; and in judging of them, two extremes should be avoided. They should not be so much depreciated as they sometimes are by modern writers, nor should they, on the other hand, be so much extolled as they were by many of the church fathers, (Justin the Martyr, Athenagoras, Clemens of Alexandria, and others,) who supposed that by giving such favourable representations of the established religions of the heathen, they might induce them the more easily to embrace Christianity. Cudworth, in modern times, has fallen into the same extreme.

It is doubtless true that many heathen nations acknowledged a supreme God. But besides him, they believed in many subordinate deities, to whom the government of the world was committed. Such we find was the belief of most of the oriental nations. They supposed that the supreme God lived in rest and inaction, unconcerned with the affairs of the world, and in all respects like an eastern despot, and who, as for any influence beyond himself, might as well cease to exist. This being they conceived to be *one*, and yet *material*. And in general, the pure idea of *spirit* is far too transcendental for the infancy of the world, and we see from the description of God in all the ancient languages, the Hebrew not excepted, that he was supposed to exist as a subtile, corporeal essence.

The manner in which these unjust conceptions originated may be best explained as follows:—When man is in a savage state and ignorant of the powers of nature, he ascribes every effect, the cause of which is unknown to him, to some invisible being like himself, whom he imagines to be more or less powerful, good or bad, according to the nature of the effect which he witnesses. In every body there is a superior being, from which its motion and existence depend. This led naturally to the worship of this being; and hence philosophy, when

it afterwards arose, abstracted the system of emanation; which, accordingly, is one of the oldest philosophical systems. Vide Meiners' *Essay concerning the origin and differences of false religions*, in *Comment. Soc. scient. Gotting.* vol. vii. page 58, seq. 1784—85. Cf. Kleuker's *Zend-Avesta*.

[*Note*.—The following quotations from Lactantius shew the manner in which this subject was treated by the Christian fathers in their controversies with the early enemies of Christianity. In defending the monotheism of Christians against the polytheism of the heathen world, he says, “Sed omittamus sane testimonia *prophetarum*—et eos ipsos ad probationem veri testes citemus, quibus contra nos uti solent, *poetas dico et philosophos*. Poetæ igitur, quamvis *Deos* carminibus ornaverint, et eorum res gestas amplificaverint summis laudibus, sæpissime tamen confitentur, *spiritu vel mente una contineri regique omnia*.” He then passes to the philosophers, “quorum gravior est auctoritas certiusque iudicium,” and after enumerating several who had given intimations of the doctrine of the unity of God, adds, “Nunc satis est demonstrare, summo ingenio viros *attigisse veritatem et prope tenuisse*,” Instit. l. i. c. 5. In a similar manner, M. Minuc. Felix concludes his defence of Christian monotheism by the somewhat extravagant result, “aut nunc *Christianos philosophos esse, aut philosophos fuisse jam tunc Christianos*,” Cap. XX.]

5. Some sects even of the Christian church have been accused of receiving a number of gods, and especially of believing in a good and an evil being, or the doctrine of dualism, which was held in the second and third centuries by many Persian and other oriental philosophers. Such was the doctrine of Carpocrates, Marcion, and many other Gnostics, and especially of Manes and his followers in the third and fourth centuries. These sects, however, according to the testimony of Beausobre, did not suppose that these beings were themselves the *supreme God*, but that they were dependent upon him, and that the evil principle could not in any sense be properly denominated God. In fine, Christians in general have been charged by Jews and Mahomedans with believing in a *tritheism*. And it must be confessed that too much ground for this charge has been afforded by the incautious expressions with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity which were common, especially among the ancient teachers of Christianity. And even at the present day there are many common and unenlightened Christians who fall into the same error. They make profession with their mouth of their faith in one God, while at the same time they conceive of him in their minds as three.

Morus, s. 5, p. 44.

SECTION XVII.

OF THE SCRIPTURAL NAMES OF GOD.

THERE is no way so good for ascertaining the manner in which anything is regarded as by considering the names by which it is called. We may, accordingly, find in what light God was regarded by the Hebrews by examining the names by which they called him. In this view, the subject of the present section is very important. It shews how proper, worthy, and elevated, were the ideas which the Jews entertained of God.

I. *General names applied to Deity, without distinction of true or false.*

1. אֱלֹהִים, *augustus, the one to be revered*, synonymous with קָדוֹשׁ. It is derived from the

Arabic اَللّٰه, *colere, venerari*, which is still extant. Hence it comes to pass that it is frequently applied to kings, magistrates, judges, and others to whom reverence is shewn, and who are regarded as representatives of the Deity upon earth. Vide Psalm lxxxii. 6; Exodus, vii. 1. It is almost always rendered in the Sept. version, even when it occurs in the plural, by the words Θεός, Θεοί, which are also applied by the Grecian Jews to other subjects besides the supreme God. Vide John, x. 34—36. The plural of this word, אֱלֹהִים, although it denotes but one subject, is appropriately used to designate Jehovah by way of eminence. In this fact, many theologians have thought they perceived an allusion to the doctrine of the Trinity, though they have no sufficient ground for supposing that this doctrine was known at so early a period. And without resorting to this supposition, the application of this plural name to a singular subject may be explained from an idiom of the ancient oriental and some other languages, by which anything *great or eminent* was expressed in the plural number, (pluralis dignitatis, or majesticus.) Vide Glass, Philol. Sacra, p. 58, seq. ed. Dathe. Accordingly אֱלֹהִים, *augustus*, may be considered as the positive degree, of which אֱלֹהִים, *augustissimus*, is the superlative. Cf. Genesis, xxix. 3; Exodus, xxi. 4, 9.

2. אֵל, Θεός, sometimes literally rendered in the Septuagint and in the version of Aquila, ὁ ἰσχυρός, *the Almighty*.

3. אֲדֹנָי, δεσπότης, κύριος, *dominus*. This is a name of dignity, applied to rulers, leaders, and persons of distinction, and, like the word, בָּרָךְ, sometimes given even to heathen deities. Psalm cxxxvi. 3; Numbers, xxxii. 25, 27, coll. 1 Cor. viii. 5. The form אֲדֹנָי, however, is the appropriate designation of the supreme God. It is an ancient form of the plural found in several other Hebrew words, and still preserved in the Syriac. Here, as in the case of אֱלֹהִים, the plural אֲדֹנָי is

doubtless superlative, and signifies *lord of lords*, or *supreme lord*.

II. *Names given to the true God by way of distinction.*

1. The most ancient name, by which the supreme God was distinguished from the gods of the heathen, is, אֵל שֵׁרֵי, which first occurs in the history of Abraham, (Gen. xvii. 1;) and afterwards in Exodus, vi. 3, where God expressly says, "I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name אֵל שֵׁרֵי." From a false etymology this title has been supposed to signify the *All-sufficient*. But it is derived from

the Arabic شَدِيد, *robustus, potens esse*, and in

the plural signifies, *potentissimus*, and is therefore rendered in the Septuagint, παντοκράτωρ, *omnipotens*.

2. יְהוָה. When the Israelites lived in Egypt, in the midst of an idolatrous people, to whose practices they themselves were inclined, Moses was commanded (Exodus, iii. 13, seq.) to announce to them the true God as the same Being who had been worshipped by Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and who would prove himself equally powerful and gracious to the children as to the fathers. God therefore called himself יְהוָה, *I will be*—namely, the God of the Jews as well as of their ancestors; and directed Moses, when he addressed the Israelites, to call him יְהוָה—i. e., *he shall be*, from יָרָה, or rather, יָרָה, *fruit*, according to a form which afterwards became obsolete in Hebrew, but which was preserved, and in common use in Chaldaic. Such was the origin and occasion of this appellation.

With respect to the manner in which it was pronounced, as it is the third person future, it would be uttered, according to grammatical analogy, יְהוֹה. Accordingly, the Samaritans, Epiphanius, and Theodoret, pronounced it *Jave*. But the Jews believed that this name was *not to be uttered*, and Josephus said, Antiq. II. 12, that he dared not to communicate it. In place of it, the Jews were accustomed to enunciate אֱלֹהִים or אֲדֹנָי; from the latter of which its common punctuation is borrowed. It is always rendered by the Alexandrine translators by the word Κύριος. The Talmud says that the angels themselves dared not to utter it, and denounces all who should be so presumptuous with frightful curses. The Jews went so far as to believe that it *could not be uttered by man*, or that one who might speak it would be able, by its enunciation, to work miracles. Such a superstitious regard for this name does not seem to have existed before the Babylonian exile, for we meet with the names Jehoiakim, Jehoiadah, Jehozadak, &c., in which the word יְהוָה evidently makes a part of the composite proper noun. But

these names were afterwards altered, in conformity with this superstition, into Eliakim, &c. And in Daniel, Esther, and other of the latest books of the Old Testament, this name is wholly omitted. For this mystery, as well as many others relating to divine things, the Jews are indebted to the Chaldeans. Vide Reland, Diss. de vera pronuntiatione nominis Jehovah; Ultrajecti, 1705, 8vo.

This name is appropriated to the supreme God, and is never applied to the gods of the heathen. Vide 1 Kings xviii. 21, 24; Isa. xlii. 8; xliii. 11. It has been asserted, however, that this name was sometimes given, by way of metonymy, to such things as were consecrated to the service of God, and especially to the *ark of the covenant*. This was urged by Socinus and his followers, and has been repeated in modern times as an answer to the argument for the divinity of Christ, drawn from the application to him of the name יהוה. They refer to the passage, Numbers, x. 35, 36, "When the ark set forward, Moses said, Rise up, JEHOVAH! And when it rested, he said, Return, JEHOVAH." Cf. Ps. lxviii. 1; cxxxii. 8. But in this passage Moses does not address the ark, but God himself, who was supposed to dwell or sit upon it.

3. יה. This name occurs only in the poetical portions of the Bible, and is frequently rendered in the Septuagint by the word Κύριος. It is derived by many from ירה, *decui*, (Jeremiah, x. 7,) and thus signifies, *the magnificent, the majestic*; but this derivation is contrary to analogy, and the word, more probably, is a mere abbreviation of the name, יהוה.

4. עֵלִיּוֹן, from יָרָה, ὁ ὑψίστος, Luke, i. 35,) *Deus supremus, the Most High*. God was supposed to dwell in the highest heaven, which was called יְרוּשָׁלַיִם, τὰ ὑψιστά. Hence the name שָׁמַיִם is sometimes given to God himself, Luke, xv. 18, 21.

5. יהוה צְבָאוֹת, אֱלֹהֵי צָבָה, κύριος σαβαώθ, παντοκράτωρ, &c. &c. This title is explained in various ways. Some translate it *God of gods*, others, *God of hosts*, (the stars of heaven;) others still, and with more probability, *Lord of the universe, and Governor of the world*, παντοκράτωρ; since צָבָה frequently denotes all creatures, so far as they are employed by God in his service, Psalm ciii. 21. Cf. s. 45.

6. Several other titles, which will be hereafter enumerated in connexion with the subject of the divine attributes, Art. III., are used by the sacred writers to distinguish the true God from the imaginary deities of the heathen world. Among these we may mention the title אֱלֹהֵי חַיִּים, Θεὸς ὁ ζῶν, ὁ μόνος ἀληθινὸς Θεός, *the living and true God*, in opposition to the gods of the heathen, who are called μάταιοι, εἰδωλα.

ARTICLE III.

OF THE NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

SECTION XVIII.

INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

I. What is meant by the Nature and Attributes of God.

THE *nature* of God is the sum of all the divine perfections; the *attributes* of God are the particular distinct perfections or realities which are predicable of the divine nature, (prædicata dei necessaria, ob essentiam ei tribuenda, Morus, p. 58, note 1.) The divine attributes do not therefore differ *materialiter* from the divine nature, but only *formaliter*, [i. e., the difference between nature and attribute is not *objective*, or does not appertain to God himself; but is *subjective, formal*, or, as the older theologians say, *secundum nostrum concipiendi modum*.] The attributes of God are merely our notions of the particular distinctions which, taken together, compose the divine nature. We are unable to take in the whole object at a single glance, and are compelled, in order to accommodate the weakness of our understanding, to consider it in separate portions. It should be remarked, moreover, that from any one of the divine attributes all the rest may be derived. Vide s. 14.

Note.—(1) Cf. Morus, p. 57, s. 22. The attributes of God were called by the Jews שְׁמוֹת, *nomina dei*; for a thing is usually named from the attributes which it is seen to possess. (2) The divine attributes are called by the Greeks ἀρεταί, (1 Pet. ii. 9,) answering to the Latin *virtutes*, and the Hebrew הַדְּרוֹת, (Isaiah, xlii. 8; xliii. 21,) *laudes dei*, rendered ἀρεταί in the Septuagint. They are called by the ecclesiastical fathers (e. g., by Cyrill of Alexandria), ἀξίαι, ἀξιώματα, also ἔννοαι, ἐπίνοαι, νοήματα, whence the Latins have their *conceptus*. In the western church they are called *virtutes, attributa, proprietates, qualitates*. (3) The whole sum of the divine attributes is called by the Hebrews הַדְּרוֹת, δόξα Θεοῦ, inasmuch as they are admired and revered by men, Psa. xix. 1; cxlviii. 13. The phrase, *to do anything for the glory of God*, often means therefore nothing more than to live in such a manner as to testify the reverence we owe to God and his glorious perfections, Phil. ii. 11. And hence the phrase, *I will not give mine honour to another*, (Isa. xlviii. 11; xlii. 8,) conveys the idea, *I will not permit that other gods should be regarded with as much reverence, or supposed to possess the same attributes, as be-*

long to me. Accordingly, the terms כבוד, *δόξα Θεού*, *majestas Dei*, are mere periphrases for *God*, or the *nature* of God, which Paul expresses by *θεϊότης*, Rom. i. 20. Sometimes the term *δόξα* is used in a more limited sense; as, Rom. vi. 4, *Χριστὸς ἡγήσατο διὰ δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς, κ. τ. λ.*, where *δόξα* signifies *power*.

II. What we know respecting the Nature and Attributes of God, and whence we derive our Information.

1. *The nature of our knowledge respecting God.*
On a subject of this kind it is impossible that we should have perfectly clear and distinct notions. For,

(a) All our notions are *sensible*, and therefore inadequate. We indeed acknowledge that when we conceive of God we must abstract everything *sensible* from our notions; but to do this is very difficult, and often quite impossible. And after all our attempts at abstraction, our knowledge of God will ever remain *anthropopathic* and *anthropomorphic*, as the philosophers and theologians say—i. e., we shall ever transfer to God the notions and expressions which we derive from human things, attributes, actions, &c. These expressions, borrowed from human things, very naturally give rise to gross conceptions of God, especially among those who have but few words to express abstract ideas, or but few ideas of this nature to be expressed. This was the case with the language of all the sacred writers, and especially those of the Old Testament; and this observation should always be kept in mind by those who undertake to explain their meaning. In order to be intelligible, they must needs have adopted the language of the rude and uncultivated people whom they were called to address; and in the first place must have condescended to the capacity of their hearers, in order to raise them gradually to their own level. But in this more improved period we must understand the gross expressions which the sacred writers were thus compelled to use, in the purer and more correct sense which they themselves attached to their language. Hence the rule laid down by the older theologians, *Dicta anthropopathica et anthropomorphica Deo digne* (*θεοπροκεινώς*) *sunt explicanda*. Vide Morus, p. 45, s. 7, n. 4.

Note.—In popular instruction, the terms employed should be neither wholly anthropopathic and anthropomorphic, nor, on the other hand, wholly proper and literal, but, according to the example of the Bible, should be wisely selected from both of these classes, as the circumstances of those to be instructed may require. In former times, the teachers of religion inclined too much to the use of figurative expressions, which they employed without any explanation; but at the present day the reverse of this is true. The

modern teachers of religion carefully avoid every figurative expression, in the hope of rendering their discourse very clear and interesting to their hearers, while, in fact, they make it in this way extremely dry and powerless. The same may be said respecting many of the sacred songs of modern composition, which, for the same reason, are far less interesting, and far more obscure, to the common people, than those formerly used. God, as he appears in the discourses of many modern teachers, is a mere metaphysical being, who, in all his intercourse with men, acts in a manner wholly unlike anything which we witness among ourselves. How, then, is it possible that men should feel love for him, or confidence in him? Such a mode of expression and representation is extremely adverse to the interests of the common people and of the young. It gives rise to doubts respecting the providence of God, the hearing of prayer, and other consoling truths of religion, which should be exhibited in a manner consisting indeed with the perfections of God, and yet figuratively, and according to the analogy of human affairs, or their whole effect will be lost. On this subject the teacher of religion may learn a useful lesson from that neglected book—the Bible. He will there find nothing of this abstraction, but an example of the only correct and of the most approved method of practical instruction. The sermon on the mount, the parables, and other discourses of Christ, should be particularly studied with reference to this subject.

(b) We reason mostly from the constitution of the world to the nature and attributes of God; but in ourselves, in the first instance, do we observe the perfections which we ascribe to him, nor can we form any conception, or even imagine the existence, of any attribute or perfection which we ourselves do not to a certain extent possess. A man who had never seen could form no conception of the sense of sight, nor would he ever suppose that there was such a sense, unless informed of it by others. The case is the same with regard to the divine perfections. We can form no conception of any attributes belonging to the Divine Being for which we cannot find at least some analogy in ourselves. We must therefore give the same names to the divine perfections which we are accustomed to give to those of which we ourselves are conscious, in some humble degree; but for this very reason our views of the divine nature must be extremely poor and imperfect. We may indeed have some right apprehensions with regard to the *quality* of some perfections of God,—such as his goodness and wisdom; but our conceptions as to their *quantity*—their extent and greatness—ever remain in the highest degree imperfect and infantile. The ideas which the child forms of the sun and its attributes are just

as to quality, inasmuch as he conceives of it as a round, luminous, and hot body; but they are incorrect as to quantity, inasmuch as he supposes that its size is less than it actually is, its light no clearer than he beholds it, and its heat no more intense than he feels it.

In conformity with these views are the passages, Prov. xxx. 3; Is. xl. 22, xlv. 5. When speaking of this pure knowledge of God, David says, Psalm cxxxix. 6, "it is high, I cannot attain unto it." And Paul says, 1 Tim. vi. 16, that God dwells in *light inaccessible*, (*φῶς ἀρρόσιτον*),—i. e., the infinite and perfect God is exalted above the comprehension of our feeble and limited faculties. Parallel with these passages is that in John, i. 18, "Θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακε πώποτε, but the Messiah has revealed to us as much of him as it is necessary for us to know."

With respect to the true nature of the objects even of the visible world, we can have no distinct knowledge, owing to the inadequacy of our senses; and in regard to the nature of the human soul, we are in equal ignorance. We may therefore, with Simonides, reasonably decline to give an answer to the question concerning the true nature of the Divine Being. When he was asked, *Quid aut quale sit Deus?* he replied, *quanto diutius considero, tanto mihi res videtur obscurior*. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. I. 21. Considerations like these should not, however, deter us from the investigation of truth, but only render us humble and cautious. In the exercise of this temper, it is our duty to make constant advances in divine knowledge, and to render our conceptions of God as pure and just as possible.

Note.—The representations which were common in any particular nation respecting the character and employments of their gods, discover the degree of cultivation and of moral improvement to which that nation had attained at the time when these representations prevailed. The mythology of the Greeks, the histories in which their gods are described as licentious, violent, and deceitful, originated among them at a time when the practical reason was as yet but imperfectly developed, and when the morals of the nation agreed perfectly with these representations. At a later and more improved period, a new meaning was given to these ancient histories by means of allegorical interpretation.

2. *Sources of our knowledge respecting the nature and attributes of God.*

(a) The instructions of the holy scriptures. God is described in the Bible in different ways. He is sometimes described in plain and literal language, without tropes or figures; or (as these are sometimes unavoidable both in popular and scientific discourse) at least by such as are level to the common capacity. Of this kind are the descriptions of the immutability of God con-

tained in Psalm xc., cii., cxxxix.; Job xxxvii. In the New Testament, the figures employed in the description of God are still more intelligible, and still better adapted to general use. But God is also sometimes described in the Bible in a symbolical or typical manner, the symbols and types employed being in a good measure derived from the taste and mode of thinking peculiar to the early age and the oriental countries in which the sacred writers lived. But these symbolical representations, however important they may be in the history of the mode of thought and representation common in early ages, are of very little importance in elucidating the *ideas* themselves which we entertain of the Divine Being. Among these symbols we may mention that of fire (Ex. iii. 2, seq.), of a gentle wind (1 Kings, xix. 12), of an eastern ruler and judge (Is. vi. 1), and those exhibited in Ezek. i. coll. Rev. i. These are all symbolical representations, shadowing forth some real perfections of the Divine Being, and should therefore be explained by the teacher of religion. He must not be content with saying that these are symbols, but must also shew what attributes of God they are intended to represent. He should shew, for example, that by the symbol of *fire*, the activity of God, his power to restore and destroy, the moral purity of his dispositions, are exhibited; by the symbol of a *gentle wind*, his goodness and mildness; by the symbol of a *prince* or *ruler*, his supremacy and power, and his justice in bestowing rewards and punishments.

(b) Nature is another source of our knowledge of God. (1) *Internal, moral nature*. In s. 15, II., we have shewn how the idea of the character and law of God is derived from the conscience of man. (2) *External nature, or the sensible world*. Here we argue from the effect to the cause, from the attributes of the creature to those of the Creator; and for so doing, we have the authority of the Bible. Vide s. 15, I. II. A very important passage in this connexion is Psalm xix., in the former part of which the visible creation is commended as a source of the knowledge of God; and in the latter part, direct revelation. Cf. Ps. civ.; Job, xxxvii.; Is. xl.; Matt. vi. 26, and especially Rom. i. 20, 21. There are three methods of arriving at the knowledge of the divine attributes from the contemplation of nature. Vide Morus, p. 43, s. 2, note 2. (a) We abstract all defects, weaknesses, and imperfections, from the attributes which we ascribe to God. In this way we pass from the imperfect degrees of power and wisdom which we possess to the omnipotence and omniscience of God; from the frail and perishing nature of man, and of all created things, to the eternity and immutability of God. Cf. Ps. cii. 25—28. This method is denominated by the schoolmen *via negationis*, and by

Dionysius the Areopagite, θεολογία ἀφαίρετική.
 (3) We conclude that God must possess, in a peculiar and extraordinary degree, all the perfections which we perceive in ourselves or in other creatures. Here we employ the argument *a minori ad majus*. By this mode of reasoning especially do we obtain our notions of the *moral* attributes of God, his justice, wisdom, and goodness. Cf. Ps. xciv. 9. This is called by the schoolmen *via eminentiæ*. (γ) There is a third method of reasoning: since the production of certain effects can be accounted for only by ascribing certain attributes to their cause, these attributes must truly belong to this cause. Thus we conclude that the author of the world possesses supreme power, wisdom, and knowledge, because these attributes are requisite for the production and government of the world. This mode of reasoning is called *via causalitatis*, or *causæ*. It might also be called *via positiva*, in opposition to *via negativa*, because we thus obtain positive ideas and direct knowledge of the divine attributes. Thus it appears that all our knowledge of God is drawn from *analogy*. We ascribe to God the perfections which we observe in ourselves, after abstracting from them whatever of limitation or imperfection they may possess, as existing in us. Cf. No. I.

III. Division of the Divine Attributes.

All the divisions of the attributes of God, which have been adopted by philosophers and theologians, are in some respects imperfect and inconvenient, but not equally so. The following are some of the most common:—

1. *Negative*, and *positive* or *affirmative*. The negative attributes are those by which we remove from God certain imperfections of which we are conscious. Thus we ascribe to God infinity, independence, eternity, in opposition to the limitations of our own being. The positive attributes, on the contrary, are those divine perfections for which we find some analogy in ourselves—e. g., holiness, justice, wisdom. We derive our knowledge of the negative attributes, *via negationis*; of the positive, *via causalitatis et eminentiæ*. The ground of this division, however, does not exist in God himself, (for all his attributes are positive,) but in the imperfection of our conceptions.

2. *Active* (attributa operativa, or transeuntia, ἐνεργητικά,) and *passive*, (quiescentia, or immanentia, ἀνενεργητικά.) The active attributes are those which involve the idea of action; the quiescent are those which imply rest and inaction. Omnipotence, justice, and goodness, belong to the former class; immensity, eternity, &c., to the latter. But from this division mistaken notions respecting God might easily result. For rest, properly speaking, cannot be predicated of God. Besides, the passive attributes are,

for the most part, only the modes in which the active attributes exist. Thus infinity and immensity are only the *manière d'être* of the omnipotence, wisdom, holiness, and other attributes of God.

3. *Physical* or *natural*, and *moral*. We are conscious of two principal powers, *understanding* and *will*; and accordingly we ascribe these to the Supreme Being. But whatever analogy may subsist between the divine and human intelligence, the former is infinitely different from the latter. Now the attributes which we conceive to be connected with the divine will are called by theologians *moral*; the others, standing in no connexion with the will, but belonging to the *understanding* and to the power of God as a spirit, *natural* or *physical*. These terms are indeed inconvenient, since the *moral* attributes of God belong to his *nature*. Still there is ground for the division itself, where it is correctly stated; which may be done by substituting the phrase *not moral* for *natural*.

The *natural* attributes of God are beyond the reach of our attainment; but we may be conformed to his *moral character*. And this is the conformity which the Bible intends when it requires us to resemble God, Matt. v. 45, 48; Col. iii. 10. Through this *moral perfection* it is that we are as it were related to him, Acts, xvii. 28; and by which we first obtain our idea of him. Vide s. 14, and s. 15, II. He is a *free* being, possessed of the purest moral will.

Morus (p. 45, s. 7) adopts this third division of the divine attributes as the most useful. To this opinion we assent, and shall accordingly treat (1) of the spirituality of God, (for most of his physical and moral attributes are founded in this,) s. 19; (2) of his eternity and immutability, s. 20; (3) of his omnipotence, s. 21; (4) his omniscience, s. 22; (5) omnipresence, s. 23; (6) supreme wisdom, (though perhaps this attribute should be ascribed to the divine will, as has sometimes been done,) s. 24; (7) the nature and the perfections of the divine will, Introduction, s. 25; its freedom, immutability, and efficiency, s. 26. In connexion with the divine will are the following moral attributes, which are cursorily described in s. 27—viz., (8) truth, and (9) goodness, s. 28; (10) holiness, s. 29; (11) justice, s. 30, 31. The Appendix, s. 32, exhibits the doctrine of divine decrees, (de decretis divinis, sive predestinatione,) which is directly derived from the attributes of the divine will.

Morus, p. 58, note, extr.

SECTION XIX.

OF THE SPIRITUALITY OF GOD.

I. Statement of the Doctrine.

By the word *spirit* we mean to denote a nature possessed of *intelligence* and a *free moral*

will (natura intelligens et moralis.) A material or corporeal substance acts only by motion; a spiritual substance, on the contrary, by *thought*, or *free will*. Now, as we perceive that God possesses, and that too in the highest perfection, those qualities of intelligence and will which constitute a spiritual existence, we justly conclude that he is a Spirit. Hence it follows, that all the attributes which he possesses as a Spirit are connected either with his understanding or his will. And as he possesses these attributes in the highest perfection, he is the *most perfect Spirit*. Among the attributes which belong to God as a Spirit, the following may be enumerated:—

1. *Simplicity*, (simplicitas, immaterialitas.) Nothing of a material or bodily nature can appertain to spirit. Matter possesses no power of thought or will, and is governed by laws entirely different from those which prevail in the sphere of spirit. The former is governed by the law of *necessity*, the latter by that of *freedom*. If this is so, and *spirit* is so wholly unlike *matter*, it cannot be compounded, and is therefore simple. The Grecian philosophers call God ἀπλούς καὶ ἄνλον, *expers materiæ*; and with this description the sacred writers perfectly agree. John, iv. 24, Πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός. Here belong those texts which teach that God cannot be represented, Isa. xl. 25; Exod. xx. 4.

2. *Invisibility*. Whatever is immaterial is also invisible, for our bodily sight acquaints us only with the objects of the material world. Accordingly, God is called by the sacred writers ἀόρατος, Col. i. 15; Rom. i. 20; 1 Tim. i. 17. We are indeed told in the Bible that *we shall see God*. But by this phrase we are to understand merely that we shall know God, or that he will honour us with his favour and intimacy. Thus Moses was said to have *seen God face to face*, and the righteous are promised as their reward in eternal life that they shall *see God*—e. g., 1 John, iii. 2. This figure is taken from a custom of eastern courts, in which it was regarded as a great privilege to stand in the presence, or enjoy the intimacy, of the king. Cf. Matt. v. 8; xviii. 10; Heb. xii. 14.

3. *Indestructibility*. Whatever is composed of divisible parts may be destroyed; but spirit, which is uncompounded and simple, cannot be divided or destroyed. Hence the attribute ἀφθαρσία is ascribed to God, and he is called ἀφθαρτος, 1 Tim. i. 17, and ἀφθαρτος Θεός, in opposition to φθαρτός ἄνθρωπος, Rom. i. 23.

From these attributes which belong to God as a Spirit we may deduce the following conclusions—viz.:

(a) God cannot be *represented*, since he is both immaterial and incorporeal. The attempt to exhibit him by means of sensible images always leads to gross and unworthy conceptions

of his nature. For this reason Moses forbade the Israelites to make any images of God, Exod. xx. 4; and with this prohibition all the sacred writers agree, Isa. xli. 5; Acts, xvii. 29; Rom. i. 23, &c. The worship of images is not *necessarily* connected with that of idols. The Israelites in the wilderness worshipped their own God, Jehovah, under the image of a golden calf; and this, properly speaking, was not idolatry; but experience shews that the transition is easy from the worship of images to idolatry; and such was the case even with the Israelites. The fact that Moses and other writers of the Old Testament, notwithstanding their zeal against the gross representations of God, still described him in terms which were highly figurative, may be accounted for by the consideration that the Jews, as a nation, were extremely rude and uncultivated, and had no words in their language for the expression of abstract ideas and spiritual things. The sacred writers accordingly, in speaking to them of God and divine things, were compelled to use terms which had before been applied only to material objects in a metaphorical sense; and these terms, whenever they occur in the Bible, must therefore be interpreted δεσπεπῶς. Vide s. 18. When we undertake to speak of God to uncultivated men, we can make ourselves understood in no other way than by the use of the words descriptive of the organs which men employ in their affairs, or by which they exhibit their various powers. To denote the commandment of God, we must speak of his *mouth*; to denote his knowledge of the actions of men, we must speak of his *eyes* and *ears*; we must describe his power by speaking of his *hand*; his disposition and feelings by speaking of his *heart*, &c.

(b) A merely *external* and *bodily* service is of no avail with God, who is a Spirit. So we are taught by Christ himself, John, iv. 21—24. One reason why so many believe that God will be satisfied with an outward form of worship is, that they entertain low conceptions of his nature, and regard him as like themselves.

II. Historical Sketch of this Doctrine.

1. It is a great mistake to suppose that the same pure and abstract ideas which are attached to the word *spirit* in our metaphysics were associated with it in the minds of the ancient Israelites. Ideas of such a nature were far too high and transcendental for so early a period. The Hebrew word רוּחַ, which is translated *spirit*, signified, properly and originally, *wind*, *breath*, (and so *speech*,) and *life*. Vide s. 9. The power of the wind is great, and yet the wind itself is invisible. Hence in nearly all the ancient languages every power which was at the same time great and invisible was denoted by some word which in its literal signifi-

cation stood for the *wind*,—e. g., רוח, πνεῦμα, *spiritus*. That invisible power which moves and animates our bodies is indicated by the *motion of the air, or breath*, and thence derives its name; for as soon as we cease to inhale the air, we cease to move and to live. Hence even this invisible power, which gives motion and life to our bodies, is also called רוח; cf. Eccles. viii. 8; xii. 7. The body, which serves as the organ through which this power acts, is called גוף, and is thus widely distinguished from the power itself by which it is moved. In this way, רוח and גוף are always opposed one to the other. According to this analogy, the Hebrews gave the name רוח to all the invisible powers, whether physical or moral, which they saw in operation in the universe, and consequently to God himself, who is possessed of all conceivable powers in the highest possible degree. Thus רוח and יהוה רוח came to signify (a) the *nature of God in general*; (b) his invisible power, as exercised both in the material world, in its creation (Gen. i. 2), &c., and in the soul of man, in promoting its moral improvement, in the act of inspiration, and in various other ways. Vide 2 Sam. xxiii. 1, 2; cf. s. 9. But the ancient Hebrews justly ascribed *thought and will* to the same principle which moves and animates us, and so denominated them רוח, πνεῦμα, which term they then applied, by way of analogy, to the divine intelligence and will. Now, since the body, when destitute of this animating principle, is incapable of will and action, the term גוף was made to stand for whatever is weak and powerless, and the term רוח, for whatever is great and strong, both in the material and moral world. Vide Isa. xxxi. 3. Hence it appears that the Hebrews made sufficient distinction between spirit and body, although in their notions respecting spirit they may not have agreed exactly with modern metaphysics. Their views on this point were sufficiently distinct for all practical purposes; and of anything more—of whatever possesses a merely speculative interest—they were as well ignorant as are the common people of our own day. Many among them did indeed suppose that God, like man, was of a corporeal as well as spiritual nature, as appears from many of the ancient terms employed in their language; and this accounts, in some measure, for their strong and invincible propensity to the worship of images. The same thing is found to be true in regard to other nations who have worshipped God under some human resemblance, respecting which there is a remarkable passage in Cicero, Nat. Deor. I. 27, seq.

2. But even among Christians there have been some who have conceived of God as material and corporeal. The Ebionites of the second century, Audæus the Syrian, and a great part of the Egyptian monks of that period, are accused

of entertaining this error. Even some of the fathers, as we find, ascribed somewhat corporeal to God. Tertullian asks, *Quis negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est?* Melito and many others expressed the same opinions. They were opposed, however, by Origen and others, who earnestly contended for the truth, that God is ἀσώματος. In the seventeenth century, Hobbes, and in the eighteenth, Priestley, contended that God possessed a body, as otherwise he could stand in no relation to bodily things. Accordingly they ascribed to him the attribute of extension.

This opinion may be traced to various causes. (1) With some it was mere ignorance, or the use of unguarded expressions, like those employed by illiterate people at the present day. This was probably the case with the Ebionites, Audæus, and some of the fathers. (2) Others seem to assert these views when they do not in reality entertain them, the mistake arising from the different use of language. Such is the case with Tertullian, who meant to denote by the word *corpus* nothing more than substance and individuality. He, however, believed extension to be an attribute of spirit. (3) Others still are gross *materialists*, and deny the possibility of simple substances. Such are Hobbes, Priestley, and others. (4) Some of the mystics ascribe extension to God, and consequently somewhat of a material nature. This may be said of the Egyptian monks; and, as a general thing, the *mystici impuri* have been very much inclined to pantheism.

Morus, p. 45, s. 7, extr. et not. 4.

SECTION XX.

OF THE ETERNITY AND IMMUTABILITY OF GOD.

I. What Eternity is, and upon what it depends.

THE word *eternity* is used, as philosophers observe, in a figurative and a literal sense. In the figurative or popular sense it denotes an existence which may indeed have had a beginning, but will have no end; like that of the angels, of the human soul, &c. Instead of *eternity* in this sense, the schoolmen use the words *æternitas, sempiternitas*. In the literal sense it denotes an existence which has neither beginning nor end, like that of God. The eternity of God, considered as without beginning, is called by the schoolmen *æternitas à parte ante*, or *à priori*, and sometimes *primitas Dei*; considered as without end, it is called *æternitas à parte post*, or *à posteriori*, more commonly called *immortality, ἀφθαρσία, ἀśavasia*. This immortality of God, however, unlike that of created spirits, is *necessary*; with him there is *necessitas absoluta vivendi*; nor can he, like the creatures of his power, ever cease to exist.

The eternity of God depends upon the necessity of his existence; since we cannot suppose that there ever was, or will be, a period in which a necessary being did not or will not exist. To suppose this would be contradictory, and equivalent to saying that a necessary being is not necessary. Such was the reasoning of Plato in *Timæus*; of Proclus in his *Commentary* on the same; of Parmenides and Plotinus.

The question is sometimes asked in this connexion, whether the notion of the eternity of God implies the exclusion of all succession of time in his existence, so that in him the past, present, and future are indistinguishable. Clericus and other Socinian and Arminian theologians, and some philosophers, have contended for a succession of time in God. This subject lies so wholly beyond the circle of our knowledge, and is so little analogous to anything with which we are acquainted, that at first sight it might seem not to admit of a definite determination. At least, we are incapable of forming any conception on this subject, as we can never contemplate an object as without *time* and *space*. In everything in the material world around us, and even in ourselves, there is a constant succession of time; and however much we may strive to lift our minds above this necessity, we shall still find ourselves compelled to conceive of any event—for example, the creation of the world—which with us is past, as past also with God, and as future with him before it took place. Most writers, however, will admit of no succession of time in God; they justly consider that this succession as it exists in us involves imperfections of various kinds, and especially dependence and limitation, and cannot therefore be admitted to have existence in the divine nature. But it is best to pass by this metaphysical subtlety, and to represent God to our minds as existing without beginning or end, as coeval through all time, past, present, and future, with all the creatures of his hand. In intimate connexion with this doctrine is that of—

II. The Immutability of God.

Since the existence of God is necessary, we cannot suppose that his nature possesses any attribute at one time of which it is destitute at another. If he changes, it must be for the better or for the worse; neither of which can be supposed with regard to him. Accordingly, his relation to his creatures, which first arose on the creation of the world, can have produced no alteration in God himself; he continues the same amidst all the changes of created things. To doubt this truth would involve us at once in contradiction. We must therefore believe it, although we have no analogy for it, and of course cannot form any clear conception of it.

This immutability relates to the decrees and the actions, as well as to the nature, of God. Cf. Morus, p. 53, s. 15, n. 1. The immutability of God in respect to his actions is most frequently mentioned in the Bible; nor is this attribute denied by those passages which affirm that God repents, &c. When God appears to be displeased with anything, or orders it differently from what we expected, we say, after the manner of men, that he repents. That this is the meaning is plain from other texts, in which the immutability of the divine decrees is expressly asserted. Vide s. 25, which treats of the will of God, and Morus, p. 45, n. 5.

In these attributes which have just been named, two others are involved—viz., *self-existence* (*aseitas*), by which is meant that God has the ground of his existence in no other being than himself; and *independence*, by which is meant that God cannot be determined or controlled, either as to his existence, his will, or his actions, by any other being. Morus, p. 45, s. 8.

III. The Biblical representation of these Attributes.

The pure idea of eternity is too abstract to have been conceived in the early ages of the world, and is not accordingly found expressed by any word in the ancient languages. But as cultivation advanced, and this idea was more distinctly developed, it became necessary, in order to express it, either to invent new words, or to employ old words in a new sense, as was done with the words *æternitas*, *perennitas*, &c. The Hebrews, like other nations, were destitute of any single word to express the idea of eternity. The word עולם, like αἰών and αἰώνιος, signifies *any duration*, especially a long period, whether past, present, or future. They were compelled, therefore, to have recourse to circumlocution. To express *æternitas à parte ante*, they said, *before the world was*; *æternitas à parte post*, *when the world shall be no more*.

Some of the principal texts of scripture respecting these attributes.

1. Respecting the eternity of God. God is said to be the *first* and the *last*—i. e., the being who existed before the world began, and who will continue when it shall be destroyed, Isaiah, xlv. 6, coll. xli. 4. The same meaning is conveyed when God is said to be *Αἰών* *ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος*, Rev. i. 8; or, as the Rabbins say, from *κ* to *ν*—i. e., *ab initio usque ad extremum*. In Psalm xc. the eternity of God is described in a very sublime manner. The length of human life, which had previously been from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty years, had been suddenly abridged in the desert to seventy or eighty years. Moses hence takes occasion to compare the perishable nature of man with the eternal nature of God. The

phrase "before the mountains were brought forth" is a periphrasis for *æternitas à parte ante*, like $\pi\rho\omicron$ καταβολῆς κόσμου, John, xvii. 24. In the phrase עולם ער עולם, the former word denotes past, the latter, future time; like $\alpha\pi\alpha\lambda\omega\omicron\nu\omega\varsigma$, $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ τοῦς αἰῶνας, in the New Testament, John, vi. 51, seq. The meaning of the Psalmist, ver. 3, seq., is briefly this: short and transitory is the life of man; but it is otherwise with God: the being who made us mortal is himself immortal. Of the same import is the passage, Ps. cii. 24—28. "Thy years are throughout all generations (בְּרַר דּוֹרִים)." "Of old (לְפָנִים) hast thou laid the foundations of the earth"—i. e., God existed before the creation of the world. Verse 27, "Thou art the same"—i. e., God himself is immutable amidst the alterations of the world; he changes not with the changing universe. "Thy years shall have no end"—i. e., God is immortal—a periphrasis for *æternitas à parte post*. So Paul describes God, 1 Tim. vi. 16, $\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\ \mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\varsigma\ \xi\chi\omega\nu\ \alpha\delta\alpha\nu\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha\nu$ —i. e., immortal in a peculiar sense, necessarily so—a being who can have no end. Cf. 1 Tim. i. 17. The passage, Rom. i. 20, $\alpha\iota\delta\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\epsilon\iota\omicron\tau\eta\varsigma$, belongs in this connexion.

2. Respecting the immutability of God. This attribute is described by the text before quoted, Ps. cii. 28, (וְהוּא, $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$, *semper idem*.) It is also implied in the names אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהֵינוּ, and אֱלֹהֵי in the Pentateuch. Vide s. 17. In Ps. xc. 4, it is expressly said, that time produces no alteration in God, as it does in creatures: "A thousand years pass away before thee like yesterday, or like a watch in the night." Vide Uebersetzung der Psalmen. Parallel with these texts is that in 2 Pet. iii. 8, 9, "Be not ignorant of this one thing, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." If it appears (ver. 9) that God does not immediately accomplish his promises and threats, we may yet be certain that he will not forget to accomplish them. For (ver. 8) he is not mutable. Length of time makes no alteration in Him, that he should forget anything, as we do. What took place a thousand years ago, is as new and as present to him as what takes place to-day. This is the proper practical view of this subject. In other texts the immutability of the divine decrees is spoken of, and they are called $\alpha\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\tau\alpha$, Rom. xi. 29; also, $\tau\omicron\ \alpha\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\tau\omicron\nu\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$, Heb. vi. 17, 18; Mal. iii. 6; Ps. xxxiii. 10, 11. The passage, James, i. 17, may be connected with these, as it does not properly treat of the immutability of the nature, but of the purposes and dispositions of God. He is there said to be the creator and preserver of the lights of heaven, ($\pi\alpha\tau\eta\rho\ \tau\omicron\omega\nu\ \phi\acute{\omega}\tau\omega\nu$), with whom is no variableness ($\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\gamma\eta$), nor shadow of alteration ($\tau\rho\omicron\pi\eta\varsigma\ \alpha\pi\omicron\sigma\sigma\alpha\iota\sigma\mu\alpha$)—i. e., his favour is not changeable, like

that of a prince, but he is always equally gracious to men.

3. Respecting the self-existence of God. The passages Ps. xc. cii. &c., which speak of the eternity of God, teach this attribute implicitly, and by way of consequence. Vide also Acts, xvii. 24, 25. Cf. Philo, De Opif. mundi, p. 28, ed. Pf. Μηδενὸς προσδεόμενος ἄλλον.

4. Respecting the independence of God. Here belongs the text just quoted from Acts. This attribute is also exhibited very intelligibly and plainly in Rom. xi. 33—36. $\tau\iota\varsigma\ \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\mu\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\tau\omicron$; $\eta\ \tau\iota\varsigma\ \pi\rho\omicron\epsilon\delta\omega\kappa\epsilon\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omega$, $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \alpha\pi\alpha\tau\omicron\delta\omicron\lambda\eta\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\i\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omega$. Cf. Isaiah, xl.; 13, seq. Morus, p. 46, note.

Morus, p. 44, s. 6, coll. p. 53, s. 15.

SECTION XXI.

THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD.

I. Definition, Ground, and Proof of this Attribute.

THE omnipotence of God, defined in philosophical language, is that attribute by which he can bring to pass everything which is possible. It is, then, nothing else than an exertion of the divine will. But since its object is rather physical than moral good, it is here placed among the physical attributes of God. The ground of this attribute lies in the supreme perfection and infinity of the divine nature. Since God is infinite, his power cannot admit of bounds or limitations. But that God can do only what is possible, as they say in the schools, is still true in itself, and perfectly consistent with his infinity. For an impossibility, in the philosophical sense of the word, is something which implies a contradiction, and is a nonentity. One who should contend that God could perform what is impossible, would contend that he could act contradictorily, which would be an imperfection not ascribable to the most perfect being. This metaphysical definition should, however, never be used in popular instruction, since it can never be made sufficiently intelligible; and the words *possible* and *impossible* are not used in the same sense in common life, and in the schools of philosophers. Common people, who are unaccustomed to reflection, will always find difficulty in the assertion, that God can do only what is possible. To them, therefore, this attribute should be described, according to the language of scripture, to be that by which God can do everything which *he will*. This definition comprehends the whole, since God can never will anything which is impossible.

In proof of the unlimited power of God, we may here mention the greatness of his works. Vide Rom. i. 20; Job, xl. 41.

The omnipotence of God is divided, in the philosophical and theological schools, into *ab-*

soluta and *ordinata*. The absolute omnipotence of God is that immediate, miraculous exertion of his power, which is seen in the creation of the world, &c. His *omnipotentia ordinata* is that common, regular exercise of his power, by which he makes use of the course of nature, which he himself has established for the promotion of his own designs. Thus he produces the warmth of the atmosphere, not *per potentiam absolutam*, but *ordinatam*, in causing the sun to shine. The same thing is expressed by saying, he acts *per causas secundas*.

II. The Biblical Representations of the Omnipotence of God.

1. The common *literal* representations which the Bible gives of the omnipotence of God, are *יהוה* and *יְהוָה*, *ἐνέργεια*, *δύναμις*, *μόνος*, *δυναστεύς*, the *Almighty*. Jer. x. 12, "He created the earth by his power (*בְּכֹחוֹ*)."¹ The plural *יְהוָה* is applied to the actual exertions of the divine power, and so, like *δυνάμεις*, signifies *miracles*.

2. Besides these literal, there are many *figurative*, *anthropomorphical* representations of the divine power contained in the Bible. Among these are the following: *the hand, strong hand, right hand, of God*; also, *the arm, the long arm* (*μακρόχευρ*), of God, in opposition to a short arm, the index of weakness, &c. Vide Deut. xxxii. 39; Isa. lix. 1, seq. The representation that God works by *speaking*, by his *word*, or his *command*, is also figurative. Vide the history of the creation, Gen. i. 3, seq. In Ps. xxxiii. 6, it is said, "by the *word* of the Lord the heavens were formed;" and in ver. 9, "He spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." In this sense *ῥῆμα Θεοῦ* is used, Heb. xi. 3; and *ῥῆμα δυνάμεως* (*δυνατόν*) αὐτοῦ, the word of his power, his command, Heb. i. 3. All these are figurative expressions, intended to shew the ease and certainty with which God performs his works and executes his will. He is represented by this image as a powerful ruler, to whose mere *word* and command everything is subject. He does not need to give his own hand to the work: it costs him only a *word*. In other passages, we find that what is done is ascribed more directly to the *will* of God (for the language of the Bible is wisely varied)—e. g., Rev. iv. 11, "Thou hast created all things, *καὶ διὰ τὸ θέλημα σου ἔσαν*," i. e., they owe their existence to thy mere will.

3. The following are some of the texts in which unlimited power is ascribed to God in the clearest manner: Ps. cxv. 3, "Our God is in heaven; he does whatsoever he will." Rom. iv. 17, *Καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ὡς ὄντα*, he called them from nothing; he created what did not exist. Jer. xxxii. 17, "Thou hast made the heaven and the earth with thy great power, and

thine outstretched arm." In Ephes. iii. 20, Paul describes the infinity of the divine power by saying that God is able *ἐπὶ πάντα ποιῆσαι ἐπὶ ἐκ περισσοῦ ὧν νοοῦμεν*—i. e., to do infinitely more than all that we imagine. In Ephes. i. 19, he speaks of *ὑπερβάλλον μέγεθος δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ*. The phrase *οὐκ ἄδυνατόν* παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ πάν ῥῆμα, Luke, i. 37, is to be classed among the preceding. It is a proverbial phrase, which conveys the meaning that God can perform what may appear to us impossible, or rather, that God is never unable to fulfil his promise, (*ῥῆμα* דְּבַר). Cf. Gen. xviii. 14, whence these words are taken.

Morus, p. 50, s. 13.

SECTION XXII.

OF THE OMNISCIENCE OF GOD.

THIS attribute is ascribed to God, to denote that he possesses the *most perfect knowledge*. That it is rightly ascribed to him may be easily shewn, even by reasoning *à priori*. Since God is a Spirit, he possesses cognitive power, and of course knowledge. And since he is the most perfect Spirit, he possesses the most perfect intellect and intellection, which is called *omniscience*.

I. The Extent, or the Objects of the Divine Knowledge.

How the divine intelligence can comprehend and survey so vast a number and exhaustless a variety of objects, is quite inconceivable to our finite and feeble capacities. Paul speaks of the *βάθος γνώσεως Θεοῦ*, Rom. xi. 33. The Bible often says, "there is no searching of his understanding," Is. xl. 28; "his understanding is infinite," Ps. cxlvii. 5. The ancient Grecian philosophers frequently express very just and pure conceptions of the omniscience of God. When Thales was asked if some of the actions of men were not unknown to God, he answered, "Not even their thoughts." Xenophon records similar sentiments of Socrates, which are repeated by Plato in Parmenides. The objects of the divine knowledge have sometimes been divided, in accommodation to the weakness of human understanding, into several classes.

1. *His own nature* is one object of the knowledge of God. And from this knowledge it results that he must have had from all eternity the ideas of the things which he has made, and which were then only possible. This knowledge is called by theologians *cognitio naturalis*—(i. e., *naturæ suæ*). It is this of which Paul speaks in 1 Cor. ii. 11, "No man knoweth the thoughts of a man, but the spirit of a man which is in him. *Ὅτω καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐδεὶς οἶδεν, εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ*."

2. *All objects* EXTRINSIC to himself are also included in the knowledge of God. These may be divided into

(a) *Possible things*, which are known by God, although they may never become real. The knowledge which respects these subjects is called *scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*, because it remains in the mind of God, without calling forth the exercise of his will. In close connexion with this knowledge is what is called *scientia Dei media*, or *conditionata*, or *scientia de futuro conditionata*, the knowledge of what is conditionally possible—i. e., the knowledge of those things which, although they have never come to pass, might have taken place under certain presupposed possible conditions. For example: God foresees that this youth, if he had lived to a certain age, would have become, under particular circumstances and in a particular situation, a very bad man. He therefore takes him from life at an early period, or brings him into a situation in which he is unable to do the injury foreseen. This injury, therefore, never becomes real; but God foresaw it *per scientiam mediam*, and prevented it from taking place. This *scientia media* must necessarily be ascribed to God, since many other divine attributes depend upon it—e. g., the wisdom of God, which consists in his determining which is the best among many possible things, and his choosing according to this determination. Examples of the exercise of this *scientia media* are furnished in the Bible, Jer. xxxviii. 17—20; 1 Sam. xxiii. 5—14; Matt. xi. 21—23. The term *media* was first employed by Fonseca, a Portuguese Jesuit, and an Aristotelian, of the sixteenth century. But its use in theology was principally authorized by Lud. Molina, a Spanish Jesuit of the seventeenth century, and a disciple of Fonseca, in his book, *De concordia gratiæ et liberi arbitrii*. He intended, by the introduction of this term, to obviate the objections which had arisen to the doctrine of Augustine concerning predestination. The thing itself, however, which is designated by this term, did not originate with him, but is found in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, (*De dono perseverantiæ*, c. 9,) and other of the ecclesiastical fathers.

(b) *Real things*. God, accordingly, knows the nature of all things, animate and inanimate, physical and moral. He knows the thoughts and desires of the human heart. This knowledge is called *scientia libera*, or *visionis*—immediate, intuitive knowledge. It is involved in the idea of the most perfect being; it was requisite in the creation of the world, and is essential to the rule and providence which God exercises over the works of his hand. He who created, constructed, and preserves the universe, must necessarily understand it perfectly; and especially the moral Governor of the world must

perfectly understand the moral character of his subjects, in order to the just distribution of rewards and punishments. This doctrine is one, therefore, of the highest practical importance. It is calculated, on the one hand, to impart consolation to the pious, and, on the other, to awaken a salutary dread in the thoughtless and impure, and to urge them to repentance. On this account it is often exhibited in the holy scriptures. We read in 1 John, iii. 20, *Θεὸς γινώσκει πάντα*, and in Heb. iv. 13, *πάντα δὲ γυμνὰ καὶ τετραγλωσμένα τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς αὐτοῦ*. The Bible frequently enters into a specific enumeration of the different classes of objects which are comprehended in the knowledge of God. He knows things animate and inanimate, Matt. vi. 32; x. 29; the destinies of men, Matt. vi. 26; their thoughts and secret purposes, Jer. xi. 18—20; Psa. xciv. 11; their sufferings and sorrows, Psa. lvi. 8; their virtues and vices, 1 Pet. iii. 12, &c. One of the most sublime descriptions of the knowledge of God is contained in Psa. cxxxix.

But in consequence of the form of *time* which is inherent in our constitution, we are compelled to regard objects as *past*, *present*, and *future*; and, the same being transferred to God, his knowledge has been differently denominated, as it respects the first, second, or third of these classes, *reminiscentia*, *visio*, and *præscientia*. That God should possess recollection and vision, we may easily understand, from the analogy which we find for these attributes in our own minds. But he also possesses prescience, and this relates to future objects of three different classes. (1) *Futura necessaria*—those things which result from the established course of nature, or from a fixed divine decree; (2) *futura conditionata*—those things which will take place only on certain conditions,—the evil or good that will be done by a person under given circumstances; (3) *futura contingentia*—those events which depend on the free will of man, or other rational beings, and therefore may or may not come to pass. The knowledge of God relating to the last of these classes is called *κατ' ἐξοχὴν*, his *prescience*.

This divine foreknowledge of the events depending upon the free will was denied by some of the ancient philosophers. [Cicero uses the following argument:—"Si præcitta sunt omnia futura, hoc ordine venient, quo ventura esse præcitta sunt. Et si hoc ordine venient, certus est ordo rerum præscienti Deo. Et si est certus ordo rerum, est certus ordo causarum; non enim aliquid fieri potest, quod non aliqua efficiens causa præcesserit. Si autem certus est ordo causarum, quo fit omne quod fit, *fato* fiunt omnia, quæ fiunt. Quod si ita est, nihil est in nostra potestate, nullumque est arbitrium voluntatis." De Divinatione, II. 5—7.] The same ground is taken by some of the schoolmen, and

by Socinus and his followers. [Socinus says:—"Animadvertendum est, infallibilem istam Dei præ notionem a nobis non admitti, nisi prius probetur."—"Quædam sunt quæ Deus scire nulla ratione dici potest, nec tamen ipsius omniscientiæ quidquam derogatur."—"De futuris contingentibus non est determinata veritas." Prælec. Theol. c. 8—11.] The common argument is briefly this: the foreknowledge of God, which is contended for, invades the freedom of the will in man and other moral beings. For if God foreknows all things, and is infallible in his knowledge, whatever he foreknows must take place, is therefore necessary, and no longer dependent on the freedom of man.

But this reasoning is fallacious; for man does not perform one action or another because it was foreknown by God; but God foreknew the action, *because* man, in the exercise of his free will, would perform it. Our own knowledge of the future bears some analogy with this, since it is always founded upon a knowledge of the past and present. But on account of the imperfection and limitation of our view, the future is to us only *probable*, and our knowledge of it only *conjunctural*; while to God the future is *certain*, and his knowledge with respect to it infallible. [The same answer, in substance, was given by Augustine to the passage above cited from Cicero: "Non est consequens, ut si Deo certus est omnium ordo causarum, ideo nihil sit in nostræ voluntatis arbitrio; *et ipsæ quippe voluntates nostræ in causarum ordine sunt*, qui certus est Deo, ejusque præscientia continetur, quoniam et humanæ voluntates humanorum operum causæ sunt. Atque ita, qui omnes rerum causas præscivit, profecto in iis causis etiam *nostras voluntates* ignorare non potuit. Interim nullo modo cogimur, aut præscientiæ Dei retenti tollere voluntatis arbitrium, aut retento voluntatis arbitrio Deum negare præscium futurorum, sed *utrumque* amplectimur, illud, ut bene credamus, hoc, ut bene vivamus." Augustine, De Civ. D. V. c. 9, 10. The same distinction between *foreknowing* and *foreordaining* is also suggested by John of Damascus: "Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὡς πάντα μὲν προγινώσκει ὁ Θεός, οὐ πάντα δὲ προορίζει. Προγινώσκει γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἧμιν, οὐ προορίζει δὲ αὐτὰ, οὐ γὰρ θέλει τὴν κακίαν, γίνεσθαι, οὐδὲ βιάσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν· ὥστε τῆς θείας προγνωστικῆς κελεύσεως ἔργον ἐστὶν ὁ προορισμός. Προορίζει δὲ τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἧμιν κατὰ τὴν πρόγνωσιν αὐτοῦ· ἥδη γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πρόγνωσιν αὐτοῦ προέκρινε πάντα ὁ Θεός κατὰ τὴν ἀγαθότητα καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ." Ἐκδοσις ἀκριδῆς, x. τ. λ. L. ii. c. 30.]

Besides, the free actions of men are never wholly arbitrary, but, on the contrary, are performed in view of some motive, which, however concealed it may be from our short-sighted eyes, is visible to God, who knows intuitively the whole extent of the present and future; who is

the author of the laws by which we act; and who, without this knowledge, would be incompetent to the government of the world, which must then be abandoned, in a great measure, to the control of chance. [This appears to be the most perfect solution of the difficulty in question. So long as liberty was supposed to consist in a choice undetermined by motives, there remained an irreconcilable disagreement between the divine prescience and human freedom; and consistent writers saw themselves compelled to reject the one or the other. But when freedom came to be considered more justly, as the power which we possess of determining our actions by the ideas of reason, this disagreement was removed. Cf. Bretschneider, Dogmatik, b. i. s. 406; Leipzig, 1828.]

This doctrine must therefore be admitted to be true, although the *mode* of it must be for ever unintelligible to us, who look at everything under the limitations of time and space. The mistakes into which we fall on this subject are owing to the words which we employ, and to the poverty of our conceptions. The terms *chance* and *contingent* may facilitate, to our minds, the understanding of certain ideas, and are intended for the illustration of certain attributes of things; but to the divine intelligence, in which there is no succession of time, and by which the past, present, and future are immediately comprehended, nothing can appear *contingent*. Since every event takes place according to fixed laws, the infinite intelligence must perceive what is free and contingent to be as *certain* in the course of future events as what is necessary or less contingent. The Stoics were accustomed to say that the actions of men were rendered *certain*, but not *necessary*, by the divine foreknowledge. [On this subject Augustine inquires, "Quid est præscientia, nisi *scientia* futurorum? Quid autem *futurum* est Deo, qui omnia supergreditur tempora? Si enim scientia Dei, *res ipsas* habet, non sunt ei *futuræ* sed *præsentēs*; ac per hoc non jam præscientia, sed tantum scientia dici potest," De diversis quæst. l. ii. Cf. Boëthius, De consol. philos. l. v. pr. 6. "Scientia Dei omnem temporis supergressa motionem, in suâ manet simplicitate præsentia, infinitaque præteriti ac futuri spatia complectens, omnia quasi jam gerantur in sua simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si præscientiam pensare velis, quâ cuncta dignoscit, non esse præscientiam, quasi futuri, sed scientiam nunquam deficientis instantia, rectius æstimabis. Unde non *prævidentia*, sed *providentia* potius dicitur, quod porro ab rebus infimis constituta, quasi ab excelso rerum cacumine cuncta prospiciat." Vide Leibnitz, Theodicæe, under the titles, *pre-vision* and *science de Dieu*. Cf. Eberhard, Vermischte Schriften, Num. 5, *Verschiedene Aufsätze über die Freyheit des Willens*; Halle, 1778, 8vo.

Callisen, Beytrag die Lehre von der Allwissenheit Gottes, und die Lehre von der menschlichen Freiheit in Harmonie zu bringen, in Schmidt's Bibliothek der theologischen Literatur, b. viii. s. 247; Giessen, 1805, 8vo.

We can therefore bring no objection against the Bible, when it ascribes to God this *scientia futurorum contingentium*. Vide Psalm cxxxix. 16, "Thou knewest the whole course of my life, when thou sawest me in the first stages of existence." Cf. v. 2, "Thou understandest my thought afar off,"—i. e., before I myself think it. Isaiah adduces it as a proof of the greatness of God, that he foresees and announces to his prophets those future contingent things which are beyond the reach of the human understanding, ch. xli. 26; xlv. 8; xlviii. 4—8.

II. The Mode of the Divine Knowledge.

The faculties which we possess for the acquisition of knowledge are very limited, and the knowledge which we acquire in the use of them is very imperfect. In forming conceptions, therefore, of the divine intelligence, we must abstract all those limitations which relate to time and space; and in this way we obtain, for the most part, merely negative ideas. The difference between our understanding and that of God may be rendered evident by the following particulars:—

1. Our knowledge is mostly derived from *sensation*, from which we obtain, either directly or indirectly, all our ideas. This is a limit beyond which we cannot pass; and being such, it is wholly inapplicable to the mind of God. Our souls, in the present life, act and feel through the body and its senses. But as these do not belong to God, he cannot be supposed to have either sensation or passions. Vide Morus, p. 54, s. 15, not. extr.

2. Our knowledge is obtained *gradually*. We first receive our notions from sensation; we then treasure them in our memory; and afterwards compare them with one another, and form judgments concerning them. We then proceed gradually, by means of the conclusions to which we have arrived, from one truth to another, attaining sometimes to a *probability* in our knowledge, but remaining often uncertain and wholly uninformed. But this process of acquisition is in various ways imperfect, and cannot, therefore, be attributed to God. He does not recollect what is past, nor form images or symbols in his mind, nor come to the conclusions of reason. He does not form *abstract* ideas; for to his mind each particular thing is equally present; he regards all things with immediate intuition; and is independent of the aid of memory. Everything like succession in knowledge must be absolutely excluded from the knowledge of God. This is called *scientia simultanea*; and God is

said by the schoolmen to know *immediatè, sine discursu, uno actu*. Vide Castner, Wie die allgemeinen Begriffe im göttlichen Verstande sind; Altenburg, 1768.

When every imperfection is abstracted from the divine understanding, it appears, from what has been said, to surpass human understanding in the following respects:—(a) It is *simultaneous*,—God knows by *one act*; (b) *most true*, without error or mistake; (c) *most clear*,—without darkness or confusion; (d) *most certain*,—without doubt or ambiguity.

But those who live in the sphere of sense, and are limited by time and space, are unable to form distinct conceptions of the perfection and immeasurableness of the divine understanding. There is, therefore, in all the languages of men, especially the more ancient, an entire destitution of terms which *literally* express these ideas; and even had such terms existed in former times, they would have been unintelligible. There is no way, therefore, when this subject is mentioned, but to take language borrowed from the objects of sense, and to employ it with a purer and more refined meaning. This is the method of the Bible. It speaks of God as *remembering* either in a good sense, meaning that he bestows favours after he has for a long time inflicted punishments, (e. g., Gen. viii. 1; Acts, x. 4;) or in a bad sense, meaning that he calls to mind—i. e., punishes, the sins of men, (e. g., Psalm xxv. 7; ciii. 9.) In the same manner it speaks of God as *forgetting*—i. e., leaving men without help, or suffering their sins to pass unpunished. It speaks too of his *hoping* and *expecting*, and finding his hope and expectation, as it seems to us, disappointed. On the same principle, the terms taken from the bodily organs, through which we obtain all our knowledge, are applied to God—e. g., רָאָה, ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, which are synonymous with רָחַם, ἠρώσκειν, רָחַם ἐρωσάν, &c.

Morus, p. 46, s. 10.

SECTION XXIII.

OF THE OMNIPRESENCE OF GOD.

I. Statement of the Doctrine.

THE *omnipresence* of God is that power by which he is able to *act everywhere*. This attribute, when correctly viewed, cannot be distinguished from the divine omnipotence and omniscience taken in connexion; and so it is exhibited by Morus. We justly conclude, that he who knows all things (s. 22), and whose power is so unlimited, that he does whatsoever he will (s. 21), must be present in all things, and cannot be separated from them by time or space.

In thinking on this subject, we have need to guard against gross conceptions, and especially

against the danger of predicating of God what can only be said of the presence of *body*. This caution is particularly necessary here, since we are apt to transfer the forms of time and space, which are applicable only to the sphere of sense, into the world of spirits; and in so doing, to come to conclusions which are false and contradictory, and dishonourable to the purely spiritual nature of God. Vide s. 20, I. The following points should be considered in reference to this subject:—

1. *Extension* is not predicable of God, who is a Spirit. To say, therefore, that he is in infinite space, or, with Philo, the Cabbalists, and many modern writers, that he is himself infinite space, is altogether erroneous. Such expressions necessarily involve a material and limited nature. Space is a mode of thought, in which, as in a frame, we must range everything which belongs to the sphere of sense, but within which nothing relating to the spiritual or moral world can be brought. The omnipresence of God was often mentioned by the ancient philosophers who ascribed to him a corporeal nature, or who regarded him and the world as composing one whole. He was called by Novatianus and other Grecian writers, *τόπος τῶν ὅλων*, or *τοῦ ὅλου*, *locus omnium rerum*; and by the Rabbins, *ספא*, *spatium universale*. But this is an incorrect notion of the divine omnipresence. Baier and many of our older theologians spoke of the omnipresence of God as *substantialis*, or *essentialis*, in opposition to that which was merely *operativa*, or *actualis*. This substantial presence of God they called *ἀδιασπασία*, or in Latin, *indistantia*, or *adessentia substantiæ divinæ*. These expressions, however, convey no distinct idea, and often lead to erroneous conceptions.

[*Note*.—Some of the older theologians entertained the more scriptural opinion, that both the substantial and efficient presence of God were involved in his omnipresence. Thus Calovius defines the omnipresence of God to be that attribute, “*vi cuius ille, non tantum substantiæ propinquitatem, sed etiam efficacia ac operatione, adest creaturis omnibus.*” System. tom. ii. p. 612. He adds, p. 613, “*Omnipræsentia Dei est attributum ἐνεργητικόν, nec solum ἀδιασπασίαν, indistantiam adessentia, sed etiam ἐνέργειαν, operationem præsentis Dei, subinfert.*” In this view of the subject Calovius was followed by Quenstedt, who writes that this attribute, “*non solum essentia divinæ propinquitatem, sive adessentiam Dei ad creaturas, sed etiam operationem quandam, importet.*” He therefore distinguishes between the *immensity* and the *omnipresence* of God, the former of which he supposes to be absolute and eternal, the latter relative, and coeval only with the creation.

Hahn remarks, that from the history of the

various opinions which have prevailed respecting the omnipresence of God, it appears that most of the errors have arisen from confounding the ideas of *body* and *substance*. In doing this, our author has followed the example of Reinhard, Morus, Doederlein, and others, who adopted the philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf. In denying to God a body, and thus avoiding the errors of pantheism, they seemed at the same time unconsciously to deny him *substance*, and to transmute him into an unessential thought, and then to locate him somewhere beyond the limits of the universe, from whence he looks forth, and exerts his power upon all his works; in which, therefore, he is no otherwise present than by his *knowledge* and *agency*.]

2. By the presence of a spiritual being with us, we mean, that he *thinks* of us, and in this way *acts* upon us. But in order to this, we need not suppose his local presence, or the approximation of the spiritual substance. We are present in spirit with an absent friend, when we think of him, and thus act upon him. Paul says, 1 Cor. v. 3, *ἀπὸν τῷ σώματι, παρὼν δὲ τῷ πνεύματι*, cf. v. 4. We see that our minds have an agency, and an agency different from that of matter, though we are ignorant of the mode of their operation. How, then, can we hope to understand the manner in which God acts? From what we observe of the operation of our own minds, we may, however, reason with respect to God, if we are on our guard against transferring to him the imperfection and limitations which we perceive in ourselves. He sees and knows all things; nor is he removed from objects extrinsic to himself in respect either of time or space, as we are, the operation even of whose minds is limited by the sphere of sense, to which we are chained by our connexion with our bodies. The power of his Spirit, or rather, the power of him, as the most perfect Spirit, is infinite; that of our spirits, finite. He therefore understands and controls all things; which is the same as to say, he is present in all things. If we attempt to go beyond this, we fall at once into fruitless subtilities. We should be content to say with Morus, *Deus rebus præsens, est Deus in res agens*.

II. The Scriptural Representations.

These are accordant with the views which we have here expressed. The Bible exhibits this attribute of God in such a manner as to lead us to reverence his character, to place our confidence in him, and to walk circumspectly before him. And it accomplishes this practical end without the aid of metaphysical subtilities. In Psalm cxxxix. 7—10, the *knowledge* and *power* of God are mentioned in close and inseparable connexion with his *presence*—“Whither shall

I go from thy spirit? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me." The omniscience and omnipresence of God are connected in the same manner in Jer. xxiii. 23, 24, "Am I a God who is near, and far from no one; and can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him?" For other passages, cf. Morus, p. 52, and Hahn, S. 188, s. 43.

The Bible contains some figurative representations of the omnipresence of God, which are indeed perfectly adapted to popular discourse, but which seem, if not properly understood, to contradict the true idea of this attribute. Among these representations we may mention the following:—

1. *God fills (σπν) heaven and earth*—i. e., the universe. Vide Jer. xxiii. 24. This representation does not involve the notion of that *spiritual extension* of which the Rabbins and some of the schoolmen speak, but is intended to expose the error then prevalent in the east, that God dwelt in heaven, removed from the affairs of the world, and unconcerned in what might befall the children of men.

2. *He dwells in heaven, or in his temple.* We find it very difficult to conceive that it should be otherwise with the presence of God than with our bodily presence. We cannot understand how it is, that his presence should not bear some relation to a particular place, or how it should be possible for him to be at the same time in different places. We are under the necessity of using expressions borrowed from space, because it is a form of thought inherent in our minds. But we should always remember that these expressions, in application to God and divine things, are figurative. Accordingly, we represent God, in general, as at least more present in one place than in another; we make him in our apprehensions to resemble ourselves; and are unable to conceive that he should act upon nature, when at a great remove, or that he should not be materially present, although invisible, wherever his power is exerted. We therefore assign to him an abode, where he is at least eminently present.

(a) *He dwells in HEAVEN.* There he gives the most awful displays of his power, in the lightnings and flying tempests, and thence he sends down the most visible marks of his favour in the light and vital warmth of the sun. The heavens are therefore called the *palace, throne, or temple of God*; and the earth, in contradistinction, his *footstool*. For this reason, the face and hands were directed heavenwards in prayer, and the temples and altars of God were built upon mountains and hills. What is intended by these figurative representations may be literary ex-

pressed after the example which is given even in the scriptures, by the phrase, *God is exalted over all*. We sometimes find the phrase, *he dwells on high*, instead of the phrase, *he dwells in heaven*. Vide Psalm cxv. 3; Job, xvi. 19.

(b) *He dwells in HIS TEMPLE*, which is sometimes called his *dwelling-place*. The Jews believed that prayer offered there, where they supposed God to be specially present among his worshippers, would be more certainly heard than when offered elsewhere; and they therefore turned their faces and hands thitherward when absent from Jerusalem. They represented God as sitting on a throne above the ark of the covenant, and placing his feet upon its lid. This representation, which occurs frequently in the Bible, and especially in the Old Testament, was doubtless believed literally by some of the Jews. The prophets, however, improved every opportunity of teaching them to raise their thoughts above the mere sensible representation, and to connect with these figures those just and worthy apprehensions of God which they were intended to convey. At the consecration of the temple, (1 Kings, viii. 27,) Solomon inquires, "But will God indeed dwell on the earth? Behold the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house that I have builded?" Cf. Is. lxvi. 1, and Acts, xvii. 24, οὐκ ἐν χειροποιήτοις ναοῖς κατοικεῖ. Even Homer appears to have had some just views of the presence of God. In Il. xvi. 515, Glaucus thus addresses Apollo:

Κλῆθε, ἄναξ, ὅς που Λυκίης ἐν πίονι δήμῳ
Εἴς, ἣ ἐν Τροίᾳ δύνασαι δὲ σὺ πάντας ἀκούειν.

The opinion of some of the Jews that God could be rightly worshipped only at Jerusalem, which was contradicted by Christ, (John, iv. 20—24,) originated partly from their erroneous views of the presence of God, and partly from that prejudice so dishonourable to him, that they alone had any title to his love and favour.

3. *He approaches his people, or withdraws from them.* These also are figurative expressions, adapted to popular discourse. When they wished to describe God as knowing anything perfectly, they said, *he drew near, and closely inspected it*. The representation that God *draws near* to any one, or *dwells with him*, is also used to designate the support, love, and special favour of God, Psalm xci. 15; Matt. xxviii. 20; John, xiv. 23, 24. It likewise denotes the hearing of prayer, Matt. xviii. 20. On the other hand, when God is said to *withdraw* from his people, and to be *far off*, the meaning is, that he withholds his assistance and support, and leaves them helpless. Cf. s. 22, ad finem, and Morus, p. 52, note 4. Cf. Morus, p. 51, seq. s. 14.

SECTION XXIV.

THE WISDOM OF GOD.

I. *Statement of the Doctrine.*

THIS attribute of God, as well as his omnipresence, stands in the closest connexion with his omniscience, and can be directly derived from it. The omniscience of God implies that he possesses the clearest knowledge of the connexion of all things, and therefore of their relations as *means* and *ends*, and this knowledge is commonly called *wisdom*. And because God possesses the most perfect knowledge of this kind he is said to possess *supreme wisdom*. He is accordingly styled by Paul, (1 Tim. i. 17), *μόνος σοφός*, *the all-wise, sapientissimus*; cf. Jude, v. 25. The wisdom of God implies two things:—

1. God proposes to himself the best *ends* (fines, consilia.) The question is here asked, what is the end of God in the creation and preservation of the world? The earlier theologians generally assign *the glory and majesty of God* as the final cause of the creation, and refer to the texts which speak of him as doing everything *for his own glory*—i. e., that it might be seen and acknowledged. And we may say, indeed, that in relation to men and other rational beings, who are bound to acknowledge the glory of God, this is one end of the creation. But *glory*, in itself considered, cannot be looked upon as the sole, universal end, for which the world exists. For God himself can be in nothing dependent on the glory which others ascribe to him, nor can he receive any increase of honour from their praises. Other theologians, therefore, say that the welfare of men was the object of God in the creation of the world. This may be true, if it is not understood to mean that God created everything solely for this object. It were judging very proudly concerning ourselves and very poorly concerning God to suppose that he proposed to himself no other object than this, and had created everything for our sake who constitute so small a part of the boundless universe. We prefer the following answer to this question: The end of God in the creation of the world was to impart to all his creatures that degree of perfection of which they are severally susceptible; in accomplishing this end he employs the most suitable means, and thus displays before our eyes his wisdom, power, and goodness. This is what is meant when it is said in the scriptures, *he made everything for his own glory*. We should learn the majesty and glorious attributes of the Creator from the creatures of his hand. But this can be done only by moral beings like ourselves. Vide Psalm xix., et alibi. Cf. s. 18, I. Note. Also s. 48, IV. Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 271. Bretschneider, Handbuch, band. i. s. 584.

2. He chooses the best *means* (media, instrumenta) for the attainment of these ends. He not only knows, as omniscient, what the best means are, but is able, as omnipotent, to employ them. In the choice of means he cannot be deceived, since he is omniscient, and consequently infallible. Hence he will never choose unsuitable, ineffective, or injurious means; nor will he employ means which are superfluous, or more than are necessary for the attainment of his object in the shortest way. To suppose this would be to impeach his omniscience. This is sometimes expressed as follows: God acts *by the rule of economy*, (ex lege æconomie;) *Deum ire viâ brevissimâ*; according to the axiom: *Quod fieri potest per pauca, non debet fieri per plura*. That God acts upon this maxim, both in the material and moral world, we see from innumerable observations. But since we are unable to survey the whole system of things we cannot and should not presume to decide in given cases what might be the shortest way and what might be the best means for attaining the divine ends. Many things appear to us useless, unsuitable, or superfluous. The observation of Paul, (1 Corinthians, i. 25,) that even those actions and works of God which appear to us foolish and unwise far surpass all human wisdom is abundantly confirmed both in the physical and moral world. Vide Reimarus, Abhandlungen über die Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion, s. 206; and Jacobi, Betrachtungen über die weisen Absichten Gottes, 4 thle. Hannover, 1765, 8vo. The science in which the ends and objects of God are investigated is called *teleology*. Vide s. 15, 68, ad finem.

II. *Scriptural Representations.*

The doctrine of the wisdom of God is in a high degree practical. It is calculated to inspire our hearts with pious, thankful, and reverential feelings towards God. It offers to us an unfailing source of consolation and peace in the midst of our cares and sufferings, and is therefore frequently exhibited by the sacred writers. The most important texts relating to this attribute may be divided into two classes.

1. The texts which treat of our knowledge of the wisdom of God derived from the creation and preservation of the physical world. These are, Psalm civ., especially ver. 24; Prov. iii. 19, seq.; Is. xl. 13, seq.; also Prov. viii. 22—30, where the wisdom of God is personified, and in which Solomon bestows upon it all possible praises, and shews that it is that attribute by which God so especially glorifies himself in the creation and preservation of the world. In the preceding and succeeding context he describes folly and ignorance by way of contrast.

2. The texts which treat of the wisdom of

God as displayed in the various institutions of the moral world, especially those which he has established to promote the moral perfection and happiness of the human race. For moral perfection, and the happiness which stands in an immediate connexion with it, are the ultimate destination of men and of all moral creatures. The writers of the New Testament especially love to dwell upon these great plans of God. Christ says, (Matt. xi. 19,) ἡ σοφία (Θεοῦ) ἐδικαιώθη ἀπὸ τῶν τέκνων αὐτῆς—i. e., the wisdom of God (as displayed in the calling and preparation of teachers, and in the publication of their doctrines) is approved by all the wise. Paul says the same respecting the wisdom of God as displayed in the Christian doctrine so generally condemned at that time, 1 Cor. i. ii. Those very doctrines which appeared the most revolting to Jews and heathen contained, in his view, the greatest proof of the divine wisdom. He calls the doctrine of redemption σοφία, by way of eminence, (1 Cor. i. 25, seq. coll. Rom. xi. 33;) although it appeared foolishness to men. Morus, p. 47, note 7. A taste for these moral subjects, and a perception of the wisdom of God in the provisions he has made for the moral improvement and for the recovery of our race, is, as it were, the test by which we can judge of the degree of moral improvement to which any one has attained. He who has no taste for these objects has made as yet but little progress; for the Bible assures us that the most pure and perfect of the moral creatures of God—the angels in heaven, admire the wisdom displayed in his plan for the redemption of men, and ponder them with delight, and inquire into them with earnestness, Ephes. iii. 10; 1 Pet. i. 12. In Col. ii. 3, Paul says that in this plan lie concealed all the treasures of the wisdom of God.

Note.—The Hebrew חכם, and the Greek σοφός, signified originally, *skilful, expert*, and were applied especially to *artificers*; cf. Ex. xxxi. 3; Homer. II. xv. 412. They signified, secondarily, *able and knowing* in any way. Thus the חכמים are *docti*, Eccl. i. 18; Is. xix. 11; 1 Cor. i. 20, (σοῦ σοφός; σοῦ γραμματεὺς.) They came gradually to have that more general signification which belongs to them in all the ancient languages. The same is true of the corresponding substantives חכמה, and σοφία.

SECTION XXV.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS RESPECTING THE NATURE AND PERFECTIONS OF THE DIVINE WILL.

I. What is meant by the Will of God.

We derive our notions and expressions respecting this divine attribute, as well as the others, from what we know of the human soul;

rejecting here, as before, all imperfection. This is the only way in which we can come to a knowledge of God. Vide s. 18, ad finem. Now we ascribe to the human soul two powers, or rather, a twofold modification and exercise of its power—viz., *thinking* and *choosing*, or *intelligence* and *will*. And we call the attributes of God which are analogous to these by the same name.* Of the understanding of God, and of the attributes in which it is principally developed, we have before treated. We now come to speak of the divine will, and the attributes which belong to it. The will with us is dependent upon the understanding. We are said to *will*, when we feel an inclination for anything which appears agreeable, and disinclination for anything which appears disagreeable. And it is the same with God. What the will either of men or of God is, must be learned from its effects, or by the actions.

The following words are used in the Bible to designate the will of God. צַוָּה and the substantive צִוָּה; also רָצוֹן, and the substantive רָצוֹן. The former words are translated in the Septuagint by βέλλω, βούλομαι, βέλημα, βουλή, and the latter by εὐδοκεῖν and εὐδοκία. The last word often denotes the sovereignty, or rather, the freedom of the divine will (רָצוֹן רַחֵם.) These are the senses, therefore, in which these words are used by the Hellenistic Jews, and the writers of the New Testament. Cf. Ephes. i. 11; Ps. cxv. 3. These words, moreover, often designate the thing itself which God reveals as his will, or which he commands by his precepts; as, γενηθήτω τὸ βέλημά σου, Luke, xi. 2. Cf. Ephes. v. 17; Romans, xii. 2. Βουλὴ Θεοῦ (רָצוֹן רַחֵם, Is. liii. 10,) means the *decree of God*, or his plan for the good of men; and so denotes, by way of eminence, the *dispensation of grace through Christ*, Acts, xx. 27, coll. ver. 20. Connected with this, there is one more signification of these words, which deserves to be noticed. When the verbs *volendi* and *eligendi* are construed, in Hebrew with א, or in Greek with ἐν or εἰς, (as אֶבְרָא or בְּרָא, and εὐδοκεῖν ἐν τίνι,) they signify, *to be well-disposed towards any one, to love him, to shew him favour*; i. q., *bene cupere, velle, to wish well*; also, *to like to do anything*; in short, i. q., *φιλεῖν*. Indeed, the latter word is used in Luke, xx. 46, instead of βέλειν, which occurs in the parallel text, Mark, xii. 38. The same meaning, *to love, to have pleasure in a thing*, belongs also to βέλειν with the accusative, Matt. xxvii. 43. Hence βέλημα, βουλὴ, εὐδοκία, often signify the *GRACIOUS will of God, his benevolence, the proofs which he gives us of his friendship*.

II. Divisions of the Will of God, and Divine Decrees.

The will of God that anything exterior to himself should take place, is called his *determina-*

tion, or decree. Morus, p. 51, note. The objects of the divine will are as many and various as the objects of the divine knowledge. Cf. s. 22, 1. For God, like all rational beings, chooses only such things as are perceived by his understanding to be good. His will, therefore, as well as that of others, depends always upon his knowledge. And he chooses or rejects, as the objects which are presented to his mind appear in his judgment desirable or otherwise. Since now his knowledge is the most perfect, his will must be the best.

God is frequently represented in the Bible as favourably inclined towards all men, and as desiring their happiness. But in some passages it seems to be intimated that he does not desire the welfare of *some* men, but, on the contrary, their condemnation. Now, many things which we, in our philosophical style, should say took place under the divine permission, or with the distant concurrence of his will, were ascribed by the ancient world to the immediate agency and express decree of God. Traces of this common opinion appear in Homer and other ancient writers. Passages occur which exhibit the most exalted and worthy conceptions of the Deity, while other passages ascribe to him the designing and performance of such actions as are inconsistent with his perfections. Those of the latter kind, which occur in the holy scriptures, being taken by themselves, and considered by those who were unacquainted with this ancient mode of thinking and speaking, were made to contain a sense which was never intended by the original writers. This mistake gave rise to the vehement controversies respecting *predestination*, which continued in the Romish church from the fifth even to the eighteenth century, and which raged with great violence between the Lutheran and Reformed churches, especially during the seventeenth century. In the progress of these controversies it was found convenient, in order to remove the apparent contradiction in these texts, and to render the whole subject more intelligible, to introduce various divisions into the divine will. The following are the most common:—

1. *Antecedens* and *consequens*. *Voluntas antecedens* is also called *prima*, or *primitiva*; and *voluntas consequens* is called *secunda*, *finalis*, or *decretoria*. This division is very ancient, and occurs not only in John of Damascus, in the eighth century, (since whose time it has been always preserved by the schoolmen,) but even in Chrysostom, in the fourth century, who distinguishes between *βέλημα πρῶτον* and *δεύτερον*, *προηγούμενον* and *ἐπόμενον*, (Homel. I., in Ephes.,) and who is said by Semler to have derived it from Plato. This division is derived from the analogy of the human mind. We possess a certain original bias, or impulse, which,

as long as it is not directed to any particular object, is called *voluntas antecedens animi humani*; but as soon as it is directed to definite objects, is called *voluntas consequens*. Thus love and hate, while not directed to particular objects, belong to the former; when so directed, to the latter. If we apply this to God, we say that he wills the happiness and perfection of all his creatures by his *voluntas antecedens*; and that he makes application of this general will to particular objects, by his *voluntas consequens*. Now when God bestows upon any individual all the good of which he is susceptible, he is said to treat him according to his *consequent* or *determining will*. This *voluntas consequens* is therefore principally exhibited in the decrees of God. These two volitions thus often differ in their results, although they do not clash among themselves; although there may be succession in the objects of the divine will, there can be no succession in his will itself; for as God knows, so he wills everything *instantaneously*. Now, if I say God wills to make all men happy, (1 Tim. ii. 4,) this is, in the language of the schools, the *voluntas antecedens Dei*—the end or object of God; but if I add the distinction, that he actually bestows this happiness only on the pious, they alone being susceptible of it, (Mark, xvi. 16,) this is the *voluntas consequens*. God, then, *ex voluntate antecedente*, wills the happiness of all men, without exception; but, *ex voluntate consequente*, he wills the condemnation of the wicked.

With regard to the propriety of this division we would say, that so far as it helps us to understand and express many things relating to the attributes, decrees, and providence of God, it may be allowed, if what is intended by it be considered, and not the form of expression. For the language in which it is expressed is very inconvenient, and conveys the idea of succession and mutability in the divine decrees. Literally understood it involves a contradiction; for God never, in fact, willed a thing which he is said to have willed *antecedenter*, but which has never taken place *consequenter*; since he has no ends which he does not attain. This language must be understood, therefore, to represent this thing as it appears to us. Vide Töllner, Vermischte Aufsätze, Samml. II., No. I. Kann Gott Endzwecke haben, die er nicht erreicht?

2. *Voluntas absoluta*, and *conditionata* or *ordinata*. This division relates principally to the will of God in regard to *moral beings*. He is said to will *absolutely* when he determines anything without connecting it with a condition, or, which is the same thing, without having respect to the free actions of moral beings. Thus, for example, he frequently allots the external condition of particular men, or of whole nations, without reference to their moral worth. Vide

Rom. ix. On the other hand he wills *conditionally* when he determines anything on certain conditions, or in respect to the free actions of moral beings. Thus he declares ὁ πιστεύσας σωθήσεται ὁ δ' ἀπιστήσας κατακριθήσεται, Mark, xvi. 16. When the annexed condition is fulfilled on our part, and the will of God thus accomplished, his will is said to be *efficacious* (efficax); when the condition is not fulfilled, and the thing falls out differently from what God *appeared* to have designed, his will is said to be *ineffectual* (non efficax.) Here again the language employed is very inconvenient; for God always willed that which he foresaw would take place, and never willed that which he foresaw would not take place. Many other divisions have been adopted by theologians, to all of which the remarks made at the close of the first division may be applied. Vide Morus, p. 47, s. 11, p. 51, s. 13, note.

SECTION XXVI.

OF THE FREEDOM, IMMUTABILITY, AND EFFICACY OF THE DIVINE WILL.

I. The Freedom of the Divine Will.

1. WHAT is meant by the *freedom* of the divine will (libertas voluntatis, *arbitrium Dei*), and why is this attribute ascribed to God?

To us in our present circumstances, as related to the two spheres of sense and spirit, this subject is encompassed with difficulties. To investigate and remove these difficulties is not, however, so much the province of theology as of philosophy. The latter has of late done much towards clearing up the ground, by the inquiries instituted in the critical school. If by *freedom* is meant a power of choosing between different objects presented to the mind, without any motive for the choice of one rather than another, then the will of God is not free. But freedom is not such a power, and to act in this way is not to act *freely* but *arbitrarily*, *pro libitu*, *arbitrio*, *ut stet pro ratione voluntas*; and to suppose this of God is to ascribe to him the greatest imperfection, and to transform him into a fearful tyrant, who pardons or condemns *without reason*, and may thus make the pious eternally miserable, and the wicked eternally happy. The freedom of a moral being consists rather in his being able to choose and to act *according to his views*, without being forced to do otherwise, either from an internal or external necessity; but he cannot choose without having a motive for his choice. For every act of the will in a moral being there must be some ground, and this ground is to be sought in the understanding. The understanding discerns what is good and bad; this knowledge awakens affection or aversion; this, in its turn, moves the will to elect or

reject; and the will then determines itself to act accordingly. Whenever, then, any one has chosen according to the dictates of his understanding, without feeling compulsion from within or from without, he has *willed freely*; and if under the same circumstances he has acted, he has then *acted freely*. But, on the contrary, when he has been compelled to choose or to act by passions from within, or by unconquerable difficulties or irresistible power from without, he has not willed or acted *freely*.

Freedom of will and action, thus explained, must necessarily and in the highest degree belong to God, as a pure moral being; in such a manner, however, as not to imply any succession of acts in his mind, s. 25. This freedom must be ascribed to him, (1) because he is a *spiritual* being, and possessed of the purest moral will. Vide s. 19. We regard it as the greatest perfection that we and other moral beings are able to choose and act freely, and as the greatest imperfection to be compelled to choice and action either from within or from without. We therefore justly conclude, *viâ eminentiæ*, that God must choose and act with the highest degree of freedom. (2) Because he is perfectly *independent*, which he could not be without freedom. Throughout the sphere of sense the law of necessity prevails; but in the moral world, the law of freedom. In the former, everything is limited, conditioned, and subjected to the vicissitudes of time and space; but everything in the latter is unlimited, free, and independent of time and space. Of this moral world we ourselves are members in the better portion of our nature, and as such we are possessed of freedom and are capable of understanding what it is, although our connexion with the bodily world makes it difficult for us not only to exercise it, but even to obtain any clear conception of its nature. (3) Because he is the *creator*, *preserver*, and *wise ruler* of the world, which character he could not sustain unless he were possessed of freedom. He has so constituted and ordered the world that none of his creatures are able to disturb or destroy it with all their skill or power. Cf. what was said respecting the omnipotence and the wisdom of God, s. 21, 24.

Against this view of the subject the objection has sometimes been made, that God never *can* act otherwise than from a regard to the ends which he has in view, and *can* only choose what is the best; that he thus acts and chooses *necessarily*, and that necessity therefore must be predicated of him instead of freedom. But there is a fallacy in this argument, arising from the improper use of words. That is here supposed to be *necessary* which has its ground in the essential and infallible knowledge of God. He, like every other rational spirit, chooses only what his understanding acknowledges as good.

Since now his understanding is infallible, and he sees everything as it actually is, his choice is called *necessary*, and not at all because it results from any compulsion. The human understanding is subject to mistake, and our choice is frequently free only in appearance; but *always* to will and to do that which the understanding discerns as best is the highest degree of freedom in a moral being.

2. *The doctrine of the Bible respecting the freedom of the divine will.*

This rests upon the principles above stated, and is to be explained in the same way; especially as far as it relates to the freedom with which God bestows or withholds his favours. In the ancient languages, however, there were no definite terms answering to the pure idea of freedom; and if there had been such terms invented for the use of the schools of philosophy, they would have been ill adapted to popular instruction. But they had not learned, at that early period, to discriminate with sufficient accuracy between their ideas, and they therefore often employed words which indicate *caprice* to express the idea of freedom. We observe, however, that just conceptions on this subject are found everywhere in the Bible, although they are expressed in popular rather than in philosophical language. So, when God is said in the Bible to bestow blessings *when he will*, and to be severe *when he will*, the meaning is, not that he acts like a tyrant, in passion, or according to blind caprice, but that he does that which in his infinite wisdom he sees to be best. Thus 1 Cor. xii. 11; Isaiah, xlv. 9, 10. We regard human rulers as happy on account of the great freedom they possess, and their independence of external control; they possess the right of pardoning, of condemning, &c. Now the popular language of the Bible ascribes to God this unlimited use of freedom, which we consider as the prerogative of earthly princes and rulers. But this language must be interpreted in such a way as not to involve those imperfections which belong only to men. From this language it must not be supposed that when God pardons or condemns according to his own will, he acts, as human rulers often do, from passion or caprice; for there is no true freedom where the will is not obedient to the understanding. When God, therefore, prospers and exalts one particular individual or a whole nation, and afflicts and depresses another, in so doing he acts freely—i. e., for wise reasons, though they may be inscrutable to us, and not from wilfulness or caprice. But from the fact that we cannot see the reasons for what God does, we are sometimes disposed to think that he has none in his own mind, and that he acts in an arbitrary manner; and as we think we usually express ourselves. The popular language, therefore, which seems to affirm that God

decides and acts in an arbitrary manner, often means no more than that we are ignorant of the reasons which influence his decisions and conduct. Vide Morus, p. 51, note. And in this sense God's government, even in the *intellectual* and *moral* world, is free; to one people he gives more religious knowledge and more advantages for mental improvement, to another less; and what he bestows at one time he takes away at another. Cf. Ephes. i. 4—14. To us short-sighted beings there often appears to be something unjust, contradictory, and inexplicable in all this. At such times there is nothing more quieting than the firm conviction that God wills and acts with the most perfect freedom—i. e., according to the views of his understanding, by which he always knows infallibly what is best. The passage Rom. ix. is one of the most important in relation to this subject. Paul here contends against the error of the Jews, that God preferred their nation to all others, and looked upon them with exclusive favour. The Jews believed that God could not reject them, and could not transfer to others the blessings he had bestowed upon them. Paul undertakes to shew that, on the contrary, God proceeded *freely* in the dispensation of his benefits; that he did not govern himself by the supposed deserts or the personal efforts of men; and that men could not presume in this matter to prescribe to him, or to complain of his government. Verse 11, ἵνα ἡ κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόβουλος τοῦ Θεοῦ μένη—i. e., the will of God (ἐκλογή, *libertas in eligendo*, as Josephus uses it) must be acknowledged to be *free*. (Cf. the phrase εὐδοκία δαλμάματος, Eph. i. 5, 11.) Ver. 7, seq., Abraham had many children, but Isaac only received the promise. Ver. 10, seq., Isaac had two sons, Jacob and Esau, born at the same time. God made the posterity of the one to be subject to that of the other. From these and other examples Paul now concludes, ver. 18, that God ὃν θέλει, ἐλεεῖ ὃν δὲ θέλει, σκληρύνει, (Job, xxxix. 16.) Cf. ver. 15, ἐλεήσω ὃν ἂν ἐλεῶ, καὶ οἰκτερήσω ὃν ἂν οἰκτεῖρω, quoted from Exod. xxxiii. 19, I bestow blessings at pleasure (*pro lubitu*), on whomsoever I will, according to my infallible wisdom. Paul afterwards, ver. 22, mentions some reasons why God frequently proceeds in this way. He does so sometimes, to deter men from wickedness, by a display of his anger, or in some manner to promote the general good; but should we in any case be unable to discover these reasons, we must humbly acquiesce in the divine will, ver. 20, 21. This passage, therefore, does not treat of the predestination of particular men to happiness or misery by an *absolute decree*. This predestination is not *absolute*, but dependent on the fulfilment of certain conditions on the part of man. In this passage Paul is speaking of the general government of the world, and of the or-

dering of the *external* circumstances of individuals and nations; and he says that in this matter God is not confined to those rules by which we might think his conduct should be regulated. He acts on principles and maxims which, though perfectly wise, are often wholly beyond our comprehension. Vide Noesselt, Opusc. ad Inter. S. S.—Interpr. Gramm. c. ix. ep. ad Rom.—Fasc. 1, p. 125, seq.

II. Immutability of the Divine Will.

The immutability of the will of God results from that of his nature; vide s. 20, ad finem. Since his will is always founded upon his perfect knowledge, and his judgment is infallible with regard to whatever it may relate, he cannot be supposed to fluctuate in his choice. The mutability of the human will is owing to the uncertainty and defectiveness of human knowledge. The Bible often speaks of the unchangeableness of the divine will. Psalm xxxiii. 10, 11, "Jehovah bringeth the counsel of the heathen to nought; but his counsel standeth for ever." Ps. cxix. 89—91, Rom. xi. 29, ἀμεταμέλητα χαρίσματα Θεοῦ. 1 Sam. xv. 29, "He is not a man, that he should repent;" coll. s. 20. When therefore we meet with texts in which God is said to repent, (as Gen. vi. 7,) or in which he is said to have done differently from his intentions, (as Isa. xxxviii. 1, seq.; Jonah, iii. 9,) we must interpret them so as to be consistent with his perfections; for Moses and the prophets well knew that *God was not a man, that he should repent*, Num. xxiii. 19. These representations become consistent when we consider that whenever an event occurred otherwise than had been expected, or affairs took a turn, under the divine government or permission, different from what had been common in human experience, then, in the customary dialect of antiquity, God was said to *repent and alter his purpose*.

III. Efficacy of the Divine Will.

Whatever God *wills*, that he can *accomplish*; and his power has no limitations. And this is his omnipotence, which, as a necessary attribute of the divine nature, was considered in s. 21.

SECTION XXVII.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DIVINE WILL.

1. We ascribe *truth* or *veracity* to God, so far as whatever he reveals or declares, directly or indirectly, is true and certain, s. 28.

2. We ascribe *goodness* or *benevolence* to God, so far as he is disposed to bestow upon his creatures all that happiness of which they are susceptible; s. 28.

3. We ascribe *holiness* to God, so far as he possesses all moral perfections, and consequent-

ly loves what is good, and hates what is evil; s. 29.

4. We ascribe *justice* to God, so far as he exhibits his love of goodness and hatred of wickedness, in his dealings with his creatures; s. 30, 31.

Note.—Leibnitz, in his Theodicée, (p. ii. s. 151,) considers the *holiness* of God as nothing else than his *supreme goodness, or benevolence*. In the same manner he explains the *justice* of God, and in this respect is followed by Wolf, Baumgarten, Eberhard, and many other modern philosophers and theologians, especially those belonging to the school of Wolf. The last-mentioned writer, following the example of Leibnitz, defines the justice of God, *benignitas ad leges sapientiæ temperata*; others define it still more briefly, *the relative goodness of God*.

These philosophers were led thus to refine upon the idea of justice, by the desire to obviate the objections to which the common idea of it appeared to be exposed. There can be no doubt of the truth which they affirm, that the goodness of God is relative; and whenever we speak of the divine holiness or justice, we must proceed on the principle, that the goodness of God is always directed by his wisdom, and is always and wholly relative, since he bestows blessings upon his creatures in exact proportion to their susceptibility for receiving them. But while this is true, the definition of divine justice given by Leibnitz is not, considered as a definition, sufficiently precise and accurate, as Kant has shewn. Without going at large into the objections which might be urged against it, it will be enough for our present purpose to observe, in the first place, that it is not sufficiently *intelligible*, and cannot be conveniently used, at least in popular instruction; and, in the second place, that it does not exhibit the common idea connected with this term, which is of itself proof enough that it is not just as a definition. We feel at once, on hearing this definition, that there is something wanting to complete the idea. When we are contemplating the nature of God, we consider it, after the analogy of human beings, as different according to the different *objects* about which it is employed. On this common mode of conception the common use of language is built, and in conformity with this usage we must make a distinction between the goodness, holiness, and justice of God, especially as the scripture follows this common usage. Now the object of the holiness of God is, *general, universal good*; of his justice and benevolence, *the welfare of his creatures*. We here see how closely connected these ideas are, and what induced Leibnitz to define them as he did. But, following the general usage, we make the following distinction in the employment of these terms: one is called *good* or *benevolent* who is

inclined to benefit another, *qui bene cupit, vult*; one is called *holy*, in respect to the purity and blamelessness of his *disposition*,—one who loves what is good, and hates what is evil, *qui recte, sentit, sanctus est*; just, who acts according to this disposition, *qui recte agit*, and who therefore *actively exhibits* his pleasure in what is good, and displeasure at what is evil. But since God has no other end but to promote the welfare of his creatures, he acts, even when he proceeds with *justice*, at the same time *benevolently*, and even those things which we call *evils* and *punishments*, from the manner in which they affect us, are only so many results and proofs of the divine goodness, as we shall shew hereafter.

SECTION XXVIII.

OF THE VERACITY AND THE GOODNESS OF GOD.

I. The Truth or Veracity of God.

THIS attribute of God is sometimes divided into *metaphysical* (interna) and *moral* (externa). By the former is meant merely that he is the true God, in opposition to false, imaginary deities; and in this sense he is called אֱלֹהִים אֱמֶת, Is. xlv. 21; Θεὸς ἀληθινός, 1 John, v. 20; John, xvii. 3. But we here speak of the truth of God in the *moral* sense; and by this is meant that he is true in all which he declares or reveals, and that he does not alter from what he has once spoken; ἀδύνατον ψεύσασθαι Θεόν, says Paul, Heb. vi. 18. This attribute is also designated in the Bible by the words אֱמֶת, אֱמֻנָה, אֱמֶת, אֱמֶת, ἀλήθεια and opposed to it is falsehood, variableness in speech, trustlessness, ψῆψ, ψῆψ, מרמה, ψεῦδος, &c. &c. This attribute implies,

1. That the instruction which God gives us contains no untruths or contradictions. Hence it is called in the scriptures, κατ' ἐξοχήν, אֱמֶת, ἀλήθεια and Christ says, John, xvii. 17, ὁ λόγος ὁ σὸς ἀληθεύς ἐστι. Cf. Ps. xix. 8; cxix. 75, 138.

2. That all the divine promises and commitments are sure, and will be accomplished without fail. Since the will of God is *immutable*, (s. 26, No. II.), whatever he has once announced as his will must inevitably take place. So far as he fulfils his promise or threatening, he is called πιστός, אֱמֶת, and truth אֱמֶת, אֱמֶת, πίστις, is ascribed to him. Ps. xxxiii. 4, "The promise of the Lord is faithful, and everything which he does is truth." 2 Cor. i. 18, πιστὸς ὁ Θεός, and ver. 20, "the divine promises which are given through Jesus Christ (ἐν αὐτῷ, sc. Χριστῷ, ver. 19), are τὸ ναὶ, καὶ τὸ ἀμὴν—I. e., firm, sure. Πίστις Θεοῦ is opposed to the ἀπιστία ἀνθρώπων, Rom. iii. 3. An important passage in this connexion is found in Ps. cxix. 89—91. This passage contains a proof of the certainty of the divine promise, and the immutability of

the divine laws drawn from a comparison of them with the laws of the natural world. Sure and immutable as are the laws of the material world, so sure are those laws by which God proceeds in fulfilling his declarations, in rewarding virtue and punishing vice; and foolish as it would be to blame the former, equally foolish is it to blame the latter. Cf. Prov. viii. 22—26.

The Bible gives great prominence to this attribute of God, and justly, considering the influence which a belief in it must have in promoting piety and godliness. Vide Heb. xi. 6, seq.; Rom. iv. 3. This conviction, and the confidence flowing from it, is called by the very same name as the attribute itself,—viz., πίστις, the opposite of which is ἀπιστία. But the Bible represents God as faithful in fulfilling his threats as well as his promises. Heb. iv. 12, is a classical text upon this subject. Ζῶν γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἐνεργής, καὶ τομώτερος ὑπὲρ πάσαν μάχαιραν δίστομον, &c. &c., καὶ κριτικὸς ἐνθυμήσεων καὶ ἐννοιῶν καρδίας, "The threatening of God, (λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ) is active and efficacious, (ζῶν καὶ ἐνεργής, not vain and empty,) and sharper than any two edged sword, &c.; and he sits in judgment on the thoughts and purposes of the heart." The gospel is not more full and explicit in its promises to those who comply with its conditions, than in its threatenings against those who reject them.

Note.—Some passages of the Bible seem, at first view, to be inconsistent with the veracity of God. On this point we may remark that there are some truths which are not intended for all men of all ages, and which would do more hurt than good if exhibited indiscriminately, without regard to the circumstances of those to whom they may be addressed. The question therefore arises, whenever we undertake to instruct our fellow-men, whether this or that truth will be useful to them; whether they are able to bear it; or whether, considering their circumstances, it may not do them more hurt than good? To teach men those truths which they are not prepared to receive, is like putting useful instruments into the hands of a child, who can turn them to no account, and may perhaps injure himself by using them, and is therefore inconsistent with true prudence, and with an enlightened regard for their welfare. This is a maxim which must be adopted by all who engage in the work of instruction and education, or who are in any way conversant with men. It is indeed liable to abuse, and has been abused by human teachers, but it is true notwithstanding; and we are warranted by all the divine perfections to believe that it will not be abused by God, while, at the same time, we believe that his wisdom and goodness must lead him to proceed in accordance with it, in his dealings with men. And so we find, that God has

sometimes withheld particular truths from men, or has indulged them in particular prejudices and errors, and this in perfect consistency with his veracity; since it would have been attended with injury for him, considering the circumstances of men at that particular period of the world, to have substituted better views in place of those which prevailed among them. The Old Testament furnishes many instances in which prevailing prejudices were indulged, and many truths were left for a time in comparative obscurity, and a more clear revelation was deferred to a distant period, when men should become more capable of receiving it. Thus God sometimes exhibits in his dealings with men what the Grecian philosophers call *συγκατάβασις*, a condescension to the views and capacities of men, which is as indispensable in the education of nations, and of the whole human race, as in that of individuals. Vide Dr. Senff, *Von der Herablassung Gottes*.

As an instance of this condescension, we may mention the fact, that God sometimes appears to remit something of the severity of his threatenings. And this he does in accommodation to our views of his character; somewhat, in this case, as the father remits the severity of the punishment which is due to his child, in order to inspire him with more confidence, and to convince him, in an unexpected manner, of his entire affection. Cf. Jonah, iii. 4, coll. ver. 9, 10, and iv. 2, 9—11. Add to this, that while some of the promises and threatenings of God are unconditional and absolute, (such as the promise of a numerous posterity to Abraham, and the threatening of the servitude of the posterity of Esau,) most of them are conditional, and depend upon the obedience or disobedience of those to whom they are addressed; but that this condition is sometimes so obvious from the nature of the case, or in some other way so well known, that it is not expressed in words, but only tacitly implied—e. g., Jonah, iii. iv. Another example which must be explained on this principle of the condescension of God to the views of men, and the conceptions prevailing in any particular age, is the sacrifice which Abraham was required to make of his son Isaac, Gen. xxii. 2, seq. Morus, p. 54. Still another instance of the condescension of God to human opinions and customs: men are accustomed to regard an *oath* as preeminently sacred; God, therefore, in order to shew that his declarations agree perfectly with his mind and will, *swears* that they are true, Heb. vi. 13, seq.

It may be remarked, in general, that the more any one is acquainted with the history of men, and with the mode in which they expressed themselves in ancient times, and which still prevails among the common people at the present day, the less will the phraseology of the Bible

appear obscure, strange, or revolting. In this view the study of Homer may be highly recommended to theologians. For they are peculiarly liable, from their familiarity with technical and philosophical phraseology, to misunderstand such representations as those under consideration, and which are perfectly intelligible to plain and practical men. The latter find little difficulty in understanding the most figurative representations of the Bible, and in entering into their full spirit, because they are familiar with such representations; whereas men of learned pursuits find great difficulty even in obtaining the meaning of a figurative and popular phraseology, and greater still in making use of it in their instructions. They have too little intercourse with men in the common walks of life. This is a common fault with us all.

II. *The Goodness or Love of God.*

This attribute consists in the determination or inclination of the will of God to bestow upon his creatures all the good of which they are susceptible. It is ascribed to God, because it forms an essential part of that character which we must ascribe to him as the most perfect being. It is proved in the clearest manner by the fact, that God has so created and constituted the universe, that the whole, and each particular portion, possesses that degree of perfection and well-being of which it is susceptible. It is also proved in the preservation and government of the world, in a manner which must be perfectly satisfactory to every rational being. The proof of the divine goodness derived from the benevolent constitution of nature may be exhibited in a very intelligible and practical manner, and on this account is frequently employed in the holy scriptures. The passage in which this proof is exhibited most fully and distinctly is Psalm civ., a good commentary on which may be found in Cicero, *Nat. Deor.* ii. 39. Cicero says, very truly, (*Nat. Deor.* i. 44,) that all religious and pious feeling would cease, if love and benevolence were denied to God. If we would excite the heart to affection, obedience, and gratitude towards God, and warm it with religious sentiments, we must bring to view the divine benevolence. John therefore declares, in his first epistle, iv. 8, 16, *Θεός ἡ ἀγάπη*, and Plato says, *God is beauty and love itself*. But in order that this truth may have its full effect, every one should consider how much goodness God has shewn to him as an individual. The Bible directs our attention particularly to those proofs of the divine benevolence, commonly less regarded, which appear in all which God has done, from time to time, to bring men to happiness, in his great plan of instruction and salvation. The texts which treat of the blessings conferred by Christianity belong to this con-

nexion—viz., John, iii. 16; 1 John, iv. 9, 10; Rom. v. 6—12; Tit. ii. 11—14. This great proof of the love of God is called, by way of eminence, ἡ ἀγάπη, χάρις. Morus, p. 56, n. 7. For a further discussion of this subject, vide the Articles concerning Divine Providence, and concerning Christ.

The love of God has different names given it in the Bible, according to the different ways in which it is expressed, and the different relations which it bears to his creatures, and their condition. ἡ χάρις, ἔλεος, are very common names, signifying *unmerited* love or goodness, and implying God's greatness, and our unworthiness. ἡ χάρις is another common name for this attribute; whence δικαιοσύνη in the New Testament often signifies benevolence. These Hebrew words are sometimes rendered by ἀγαθὸν and χρηστότης. So far as the love of God has respect to *men in general*, it is called *philanthropy*, φιλανθρωπία Θεοῦ, Tit. iii. 4; and from the possession of it, God is called the *father* of men. The texts in which this is done are cited in Morus, p. 55, n. 1. So far as the love of God has respect to the *miserable* and the *suffering*, it is called *pity* and *compassion*, *misericordia*, *benevolentia erga miseros*, ἐλεος, ἡ σπλάγχνα Θεοῦ, ἔλεος. Men in this condition have the promise given them that God will protect and comfort them, and provide a way for their deliverance where they could see none. And to such persons it must be an inexpressible consolation that God has not merely enabled them to attain a hope, in the use of their reason, that he would assist and stand by them, but has expressly promised them that he will certainly do this. To the afflicted nothing can be more consoling than the *sure promise* of God; and of this the religious teacher should be mindful in his instructions. So far as the love of God is exercised in deferring or abating deserved punishments, it is called *forbearance*, *long-suffering*, *patience*, *indulgence*, ὑπομονή, μακροθυμία, ἀνοχή, Psal. ciii. 8, seq.; Rom. ii. 4; ix. 22.

The love of God is described in the scriptures as,

1. *Universal and impartial*. God bestows upon each of his creatures as much good as he is capable of receiving. Philo says, Οὐ πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος ἐνεργεῖται (ὁ Θεὸς) τῶν αὐτοῦ χαρίτων—πρὸς δὲ τὰς τῶν ἐνεργετούμενων δυνάμεις· οὐ γὰρ ὡς πέφυκεν ὁ Θεὸς εὐποιεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ γενημένον εὐπάσχειν, &c. De Opif. Mundi, p. 13, ed. Pf. This is the great principle upon which God proceeds in the distribution of his favours, whether greater or smaller, more or less frequent. Psal. cxlv. 9, "The Lord is good to all; and his tender mercies are over all his works." Cf. Psal. xxxvi. 7; ciii. 11—13, "For as the heaven is high above the earth, so great is his mercy toward them that fear him," &c. This

doctrine of the universal and impartial love of God, though it was believed and taught by the prophets of the Old Testament, was for the first time exhibited in its true light and in its whole extent in the New Testament, in opposition to the prejudices of the Jews, which very much limited the divine goodness. To assert, however, that the teachers of the Old Testament and especially Moses, were wholly destitute of correct ideas respecting the love of God, is very untrue; and the contrary may be proved from innumerable passages of scripture. Vide, e. g., Exodus, xxxiv. 6, 7; Num. xiv. 17, 18. The blame of their mistaken views of this subject rested upon the great body of the Jewish nation, and not upon their teachers. The moral perceptions of the Jews were so perverted that they misunderstood what they were taught respecting the moral attributes of God.

2. *Unmerited, gratuitous*. And in this respect, particularly, the love of God is called χάρις, ἡ, Rom. iv. 4, seq.; xi. 5. There is no opinion more prejudicial to the interests of true morality than the opinion so prevalent among the Jews at the time of Christ, and recurring under different forms in every age of the church, that the love of God can be merited or procured by men; and accordingly there is no opinion which was more opposed by the writers of the New Testament. It is impossible that desert of any kind should come into consideration with *love*, as such; for wherever desert is regarded, love must be exchanged for *obligation*, Rom. iv. 4, seq. The free goodness of God is never exercised, however, inconsistently with his wisdom and justice. Hence the pious may always be sure that rewards will be bestowed upon them by God; while the wicked can have no such expectation, Rom. ii. 4, 5. Cf. Thomas Balguy, Divine Benevolence Asserted, translated into German by J. A. Eberhard.

SECTION XXIX.

OF THE HOLINESS OF GOD.

THE *holiness* of God, in the general notion of it, is his moral perfection—that attribute by which all moral imperfection is removed from his nature. The holiness of the *will* of God is that, therefore, by which he chooses, necessarily and invariably, what is morally good, and refuses what is morally evil. The holiness and justice of God are, in reality, one and the same thing; the distinction consists in this only, that holiness denotes the internal inclination of the divine will—the disposition of God; and justice, the expression of the same by actions. Vide s. 27, ad finem. This attribute implies,

1. That no sinful or wicked inclination can be found in God. Hence he is said, James, i. 13, coll. 17, to be ἀπειραστός κακῶν, incapable

of being tempted to evil, (not in the active sense, as it is rendered by the Vulgate and Luther;) and in 1 John, i. 5, to be light, and without darkness—i. e., holy, and without sin. In this sense he is called *ἅγιος, καθάριος ἄγιος*, 1 John, iii. 3; also *ἁπλός, integer*, Psal. xviii. 31. The older writers described this by the word *ἀναιμάσθητος, impeccabilis*. [The sinlessness of God is also signified in the New Testament by the words *τέλειος*, Matt. v. 48; and *ὁσιος*, Rev. xvi. 5.]

2. That he never chooses what is false and deceitful, but only what is truly good—what his perfect intelligence recognises as such; and that he is therefore the most perfect teacher, and the highest exemplar of moral goodness. Hence the Bible declares that he looks with displeasure upon wicked, deceitful courses, Psal. l. 16, seq.; v. 5, ('Thou hatest all workers of iniquity;') but that, on the contrary, he regards the pious with favour, Psal. v. 7, 8; xv. 1, seq.; xviii. 26, seq.; xxxiii. 18. Cf. the texts cited by Morus, p. 47, s. 11, note 3—5. The ground, therefore, of the holiness God is in his understanding and the freedom of his will. Vide s. 26.

As to the use of the words *ἅγιος* and *ἄγιος*, some philologists (particularly Zachariä, *Biblische Theologia*, th. i. s. 240, f.) remark, that they are never used in the scriptures, with reference to God, in the sense here ascribed to them, but rather describe him as the object of awe and veneration. And it is true that this is their prevailing meaning—e. g., Isa. vi. 9; John, xvii. 11, (*ἄγε πάτερ*;) and that accordingly *ἀγαλλεῖσθαι* signifies, *to be esteemed venerable, to be revered*. Still these words are in many passages applied to God undeniably in a moral sense—e. g., Lev. xix. 2, "Be ye holy, for I am holy;" cf. 1 Pet. i. 14—16. Thus also *δοσιότης*, Eph. iv. 24, and *ἀγαπώνη, ἀγαπασμός*, by which all moral perfection is so frequently designated, especially in the New Testament. The different meanings of the words *ἅγιος* and *ἄγιος* stand connected clearly in the following manner (cf. s. 126)—viz. these words signify (a) *the being externally pure*—e. g., 2 Sam. xi. 4; Lev. xi. 43, 44; xx. 7, 25, 26, &c.; (b) *the being separate*, since we are accustomed to divide what is pure from what is impure, and to cast away the latter; and therefore (c) *the possessing of any kind of external advantage, distinction, or worth*; so the Jews were said to be *holy to God*, in opposition to others, who were *κοινῶι, profane, common, unconsecrated*. Then everything which was without imperfection, disgrace, or blemish, was called *holy*; and *ἅγιος, ἄγιος, sacrosanctus*, came thus to signify what was *inviolable*, Isa. iv. 3; 1 Cor. iii. 17, (hence *ἁγία, asylum*.) They were then used in the more limited sense of *chaste*, (like the Latin *sanctitas*)—a sense in

which they are sometimes used in the New Testament—e. g., 1 Thess. iv. 3, 7, (cf. Wolf, in loc. ;) but not always, as Stange supposes, (*Symmikta*, II. 268, f.) They then came to denote any or all *internal, moral perfection*; and finally, perfection, in the general notion of it, as exclusive of all imperfection. Cf. Morus, p. 47, s. 11.

SECTION XXX.

OF THE JUSTICE OF GOD.

THE justice of God is that attribute by which he actively exhibits his approbation of what is good, and his disapprobation of what is evil. It is therefore the same in essence with his holiness, vide s. 29. So far as God *has* complacency in what is good he is called *holy*; so far as he *exhibits* this complacency in his actual procedure in the government of the world he is called *just*. The word *holiness*, accordingly, refers rather to the internal disposition of God; and justice, to the display or outward manifestation of this disposition in his actual government. Both of these attributes stand in close connexion with the divine *benevolence*; they may be deduced from it, and indeed must be regarded as expressions of it. Cf. the remarks made on this subject and on the definition of Leibnitz, s. 27, note.

Respecting the biblical use of the words *צדק, צדק, and δίκαιος*. In its primary, original meaning, *צדק* doubtless denotes what is *fit, suited, adapted to a particular end, appropriate, right*. The Greek *δίκαιος* has the same signification as *δίκαιος ἥπιος, δίκαιον ἔργον, &c.* also the Latin *justus*, the German *gerecht*, and the English *right*. These words came afterwards to denote *one who acts justly and rightly*, a virtuous man in the moral sense. Accordingly *צדק*, and *δικαιοσύνη* (both in the Septuagint and in the New Testament) signify *virtue, piety*, also *truth*, (Isaiah, xlii. 6,) *veracity, fidelity, honesty, goodness, beneficence, alms*, and then what is more properly called *justice*, as exercised in courts. Hence *הצדק, δίκαιον*, signify, *to acquit, pronounce innocent, pardon*, and in general, *to favour*. The proper meaning must in each case be determined by the connexion.

God exhibits to men his complacency in what is good and useful, and his disapprobation of what is evil and injurious, in two ways:—(1) By laws and various institutes, which are intended to teach us, on the one hand, what is good and salutary, and on the other, what is evil and injurious, in order that we may know how to regulate our feelings and our conduct. This is called *legislative justice* (*justitia legislativa*, sive *antecedens*, sive *dispositiva*.) (2) By actions, in which he manifests his approbation of what is good, and of those who practise it;

and his disapprobation of what is evil, and of those who live wickedly. This is called *retributive justice*, (*justitia retributiva, judiciaria, rectoria, distributiva, compensatrix, consequens.*) Since this division, which has long been common in the schools of theology and philosophy, is founded in truth, we shall here adopt it, after the example of Morus. The same thing may be expressed in other words, as follows:—God, as he is holy, accurately estimates the distinction between what is morally good and evil, and accordingly between the good and evil actions of men; he has made known to men this distinction by means of his laws, (to a knowledge of which we are led by reason, scripture, and experience,) and upon this he insists; and that men may not only know the difference between good and evil, but experience and feel it, he has inseparably connected certain necessary advantages (rewards) with what is good, and disadvantages (punishments) with what is evil. We proceed, therefore, to treat,

I. The Legislative Justice of God.

All the divine laws have respect to the true welfare of men, since they prescribe what is good and useful, and forbid the contrary. Vide Psalm xix. 8—12; Rom. xii. 2, *Θέλημα Θεοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον.* The divine laws are commonly divided into—

1. *Natural*—i. e., such as necessarily flow from the constitution of human nature. They may be learned from human reason and conscience, and are constantly alluded to, repeated, explained, and enlarged by the Bible. Cf. Introduction, s. 3.

2. *Arbitrary, or positive.* Such are those which stand in no necessary connexion with human nature, and cannot therefore be discovered or demonstrated by reason, but depend merely upon the express command of God. They are not written upon the human heart, but made known to us by God from without. Among positive laws may be counted those which concern the institution of public worship and the ritual, also the political precepts of Moses, and many other precepts and doctrines of religion contained in the scriptures of the Old and New Testament.

The common belief is, that such positive precepts have been given by God both to Jews and Christians. And this belief is justified by the following reasons:—(1) Positive precepts are useful as affording to men an exercise of obedience, piety, and devotion. A father often imposes upon a child an arbitrary rule in order to accustom it to obedience, or with some other wise intent; but always with the good of the child in view, although the child may not be able to understand the *why* and the *wherefore*. Positive precepts should therefore always be

obeyed, although they may not appear to us to have any natural or obvious connexion with our welfare; for they are given by God, who cannot command anything without reference to our good. (2) All experience shews that even the most cultivated men, when left to themselves, fall into absurd religious observances and forms of worship. It cannot, therefore, be improper for God to prescribe even arbitrary services, and to give positive laws and doctrines relating to religion. (3) By being expressly revealed and positively prescribed, even natural laws may obtain a positive authority, receive a more solemn sanction, and thus exert a better influence. They may be explained, confirmed, enlarged, and enforced by positive precepts. But since positive precepts are designed in many cases to promote particular objects, which cannot be known from the nature of things, they are not necessarily *universal* and *unalterable*, unless they are declared to be so by God; nor are they binding upon persons who, without any fault of their own, remain unacquainted with them.

Many, on the contrary, deny that God has given any positive precepts, and consider them all as of human origin. They pretend, that much harm has been and will be done in human society by pleading a divine origin for positive precepts and doctrines. So thought Tindal, and many of the English rationalists, and the same opinion has lately been expressed by Dr. Steinbart in his *System der reinen Glückseligkeitslehre*, s. 62—71, 130, ff. Many of the ancient Grecian philosophers, too, believed that the supposition that God had given positive precepts was merely a popular error, since all which were affirmed to be such were obviously contrived by men, and promulgated under the divine authority. In opposition to this argument, Ernesti wrote his *Vindiciæ arbitrii divini in religione constituenda*, Opusc. Theol., p. 187, seq. He was strongly opposed by Töllner, in his *Inquiry, Utrum Deus ex mero arbitrio potestatem suam legislatariam exercent*; also by Eberhard in his *Apologie des Sokrates*, th. i. But no objections which are merely *à priori* can disprove the existence of positive precepts.

The following arguments have been used to render the objection to positive laws somewhat plausible:—(1) It is thought that experience proves that the promulgation of positive laws, which are received as of divine origin, exposes natural laws to be neglected and transgressed, and in proof of this the example of the Israelites and Christians is adduced. To this it is justly replied, that the abuse of a thing does not prevent its proper use. The fact that many have made an improper use of positive precepts cannot prove that they are without use, injurious, and reprehensible, and that they cannot be of

divine origin. The most useful objects and the most benevolent arrangements in the natural world have often been abused by men; but this is no proof that they were not made and appointed by God. (2) Oppressive burdens and severe and intolerable laws, it is said, will be imposed upon men, on pretence of divine authority, wherever the existence of positive laws is admitted; and in proof of this, the history of the Jews is again referred to. To this it may be replied, that these very pretended divine laws have made it so much the more necessary for God to interpose in our behalf by his own positive commands. Again: the evil consequences spoken of do not flow from positive divine ordinances, but from arbitrary human ordinances, which men have falsely pretended to be divine. In reply, it is said that both experience and history teach that it must be difficult to distinguish between those laws which are really of divine origin and those which are only pretended to be such. (3) God founded and arranged everything so wisely in the beginning that no alterations or additions in the established natural laws are necessary; and that he should do what is unnecessary cannot, it is said, be supposed. To this it may be replied, that positive divine precepts do not alter, contradict, annul, or in any way repeal, the natural laws. To prove, *à priori*, either that positive laws do not exist or are unnecessary, is quite impossible. Whether there are or are not positive laws is a question of fact; and if it can be shewn that positive divine precepts actually exist, all reasoning to the contrary, *à priori*, is of no avail. If no evil existed in the world, our philosophers would prove *à priori*, from all the attributes of God, that a world in which evil should exist was utterly impossible. But since the existence of evil is beyond a doubt, they must be content to shew how it is reconcilable with the divine attributes. Cf. Morus, p. 48—50, s. 12.

Note.—The following remarks shall suffice us, without going further into the philosophical investigation of this disputed point. The history of man in all ages shews that the natural obligation to perform certain duties cannot be made intelligible to the greater part of mankind by merely rational considerations and proofs. They depend upon authority; and if authority be wisely employed, more influence over their minds is obtained than in any other way. Nor is this the case with the ignorant and illiterate only, but almost equally with the learned and educated, though they are unwilling to acknowledge or believe it. The authority of God must, of course, exert a more powerful influence over the mind than any other authority. Hence from the earliest times, and even among the heathen nations, the natural law has been promulgated, as if expressly and orally given by God. Men felt

the necessity of having positive divine precepts. They must also of necessity have some external rites and ceremonies addressed to the senses in their worship of God. But to secure to these rites and ceremonies (so necessary and beneficial to men) the needful authority, and a truly solemn sanction, they were prescribed even among the heathen, by those who contrived them, as coming directly from God. The ancient legislators published even their *civil* laws in the same way, and with a similar intention. Hence among the Grecians, Romans, and Mahomedans, as well as the Israelites, the civil and religious laws were interwoven and united. Can it now appear surprising, inconsistent, or contrary to the natural expectations of men, for God to publish positive laws among the Israelites, under his own authority, by Moses and the prophets? By his doing so, the Jews might be preserved from all the positive laws which men would otherwise have imposed upon them. If it is once conceded that authority is necessary for men, and that the authority of God has and must have greater weight than any other, then for God to publish laws on his own authority must be considered as highly beneficial. Whether he has actually done so, by means of immediate revelation; whether universally or to a particular people; are questions of fact which depend upon testimony, and cannot be determined *à priori*. Vide Introduction, s. 2, 3.

The writers of the Old and New Testament consider the fact, that God made known his will to the Israelites, and gave them laws, as one of their principal advantages over other people, Psalm cxlvii. 20; Rom. iii. 2. But the positive laws given to the Israelites are, in part, of such a nature, that they cannot and ought not to be universally observed. They were mostly intended only for a particular age, a single people, country, and climate. By degrees, as circumstances changed, they were found deficient and inadequate, and gave occasion to various abuses. At this juncture Christianity appeared. It promulgated the law of nature on divine authority, as had been done in the former dispensation. But with this, its founder enacted various positive religious precepts and laws, which, however, were few in number, and of a nature to be easily and universally obeyed. He then declared men free from all those positive laws of the Mosaic dispensation which had not at the same time a natural obligation, or were not again enacted by himself. The ceremonial law had now performed its service. It was not intended to be of perpetual and universal obligation. But during that state of ignorance and superstition into which Europe relapsed, this religion, which was simple in its nature and benign in its influence, as established by Christ, became so overloaded and corrupted by positive

precepts, for which divine authority was pretended, that Christian nations were in a state little better than that of the Jews at the coming of Christ. This fact, however, so far from disproving the claims of Christianity to be regarded as given by God, proves only the perversions of those to whom it was entrusted. The best gifts of Heaven have been abused by men; but this abuse does not disprove their divine original.

SECTION XXXI.

OF THE JUSTICE OF GOD—(continued.)

II. The Retributive Justice of God.

WHEN God exhibits his approbation of such actions as correspond with his laws, and his displeasure at such actions as he has forbidden, we see his retributive justice. This approbation which he expresses of what is morally good, is called *reward*; his disapprobation expressed against what is evil, *punishment*. The former is frequently called in the Bible by the figure synecdoche, ἀγάπη Θεοῦ, and the latter, ὀργή Θεοῦ, אהבה, וגו', Rom. i. 18; ii. 8. Those who believe in the existence of God will generally allow that he is not only the supreme ruler, but also the disposer of *our* destiny; that our happiness and misery are in his power. And since we find, both by experience and observation, that obedience to the divine commands has happy consequences, and disobedience unhappy consequences, we conclude that God rewards virtue and punishes vice; that happiness is a proof of his love, and misery a proof of his displeasure and anger. According to this simple notion, by which God is represented as acting after the manner of men, the language of the Bible on this subject is to be understood and explained. This notion which we form of God, as acting after the manner of men, and which we express in the language common to men, gives rise to the scholastic division of the divine justice, into *remuneratoria* and *punitiva*. We shall here exhibit only the general principles upon which we shall proceed in the further discussion of this subject in the Article on Sin, s. 86, 87, where a history of this doctrine will be given.

1. Remunerative justice.

When God rewards good actions by favours immediately bestowed or promised hereafter, he exercises his remunerative justice. From these blessings bestowed upon us as rewards, we justly conclude that our actions agree with the divine will, and that God loves and approves us; and by these blessings we are thus induced to regulate our conduct according to the divine commands: this, then, we may suppose to be the object which God has in view in the bestow-

ment of these rewards. Here belong the following texts of scripture: Ps. xxxvii. 37; lxxiii. 24, seq.; Rom. ii. 6—10; 1 Cor. iii. 8; Hebrews, vi. 10; 2 Tim. iv. 8, &c. The rewards bestowed by God are commonly divided into *natural* and *positive*. *Natural* rewards may be explained as follows:—God has so wisely constituted the natural world, that good actions have happy consequences; that there is a *nexus commodi NECESSARI cum bono, sive recte facto*, as Morus expresses it. The advantages spoken of have their ground in the wise constitution which God himself has given to the natural world, and are therefore called *præmia naturalia, sive ordinaria*. Among these natural rewards may be enumerated, peace and tranquillity of mind, the approbation of the good, the enjoyment of external advantages, bodily strength and health, increase of possessions, &c. Vide Ps. xxxvii. 16—40; cxii. This is what is meant by saying, *Virtue rewards itself*. *Positive* rewards are those which stand in no *necessary* connexion with the actions of men, but are conferred by an express and particular divine appointment, constituting what Morus calls the *nexus commodi NON NECESSARI cum bono, sive recte facto*. The question is here asked, if positive rewards are ever conferred during the present life; and if so, what they are? To this we may answer, that in the Christian dispensation positive rewards during the present life are not universally promised, as in the ancient dispensation; and that it is impossible to determine, in any particular cases, whether a reward is positive or natural. The texts commonly cited in proof of present positive rewards refer either to the natural consequences of virtue, (e. g., 1 Tim. iv. 8; Mark, x. 29, 30; Prov. iii. 2, seq.,) or to the particular promises made to the Jews, which are no longer valid, (e. g., Num. xxviii. 5, 29; Exod. x. 23; Ephes. vi. 2.) But when speaking of the rewards of the *future* world, the writers of the New Testament plainly declare, that besides the natural consequences of good actions which the righteous will enjoy, God will bestow upon them positive rewards, which cannot be considered as the *natural* consequences of virtue. Vide Article xv. This remunerative justice of God may be farther described as *universal*; the smallest virtues of every individual man will be rewarded, for they are all known to God, Matt. x. 42; 1 Cor. iv. 5; Heb. vi. 10. It is also *impartial*. This is called in the Bible, ἀποστομοληψία Θεοῦ, Rom. ii. 10, 11. Unlike human judges, who are often deceived by external appearances, God rewards actions according to their moral worth, and real, internal excellence. The full display of the divine justice, either in rewards or punishments, is not seen in the present life; but is reserved, as we are taught in the Bible, for the future world. In the Bible we are also taught

that our present life is but the feeble commencement of our being; and that by far the largest and most important part of our existence—our *vita vere vitalis*—will hereafter commence; and we are thus enabled to comprehend what would otherwise be inscrutable, how it is consistent with the justice of God to appoint affliction to the righteous and prosperity to the wicked, as he often does in the present world. Vide the excellent parable of the tares among the wheat, Matt. xiii. 24—30, coll. ver. 36—40; Cf. Rom. ii. 5—12; 2 Thess. i. 4—12; Luke, iv. 13, 14.

2. Penal Justice.

When we say the justice of God is exhibited in *punishment*, it is as much as to say that he causes unhappiness to follow upon moral evil, in order to convince men that he disapproves of disobedience to his commands. *Necit commoda bono, sive recte factis; incommoda malo, sive male factis.*

1. The ends of God in punishing.

God punishes, (a) in order to prevent or diminish moral evil, with reference therefore to the good of the whole, and of particular individuals. 1 Cor. xi. 32, *Κρινόμενοι ὑπὸ Κυρίου παιδεύομεθα, ἵνα μὴ σὺν τῷ κόσμῳ κατακριθῶμεν*—i. e., the divine punishments suspended over us are intended for our improvement, and unless, warned by them, we really become better, we shall fail of eternal blessedness, and share the fate of the unbelieving world. Isaiah, xxvi. 9, *When thy judgments are in the earth, the inhabitants will learn righteousness.* Ps. cxix. 67, *Before I was afflicted I went astray; but now have I kept thy law*, lest I should draw upon myself additional afflictions. Ver. 71, *It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learn thy statutes.* God punishes (b) in order to shew that sin is displeasing to him, and that only the truly obedient can count upon his approbation; in order, therefore, to preserve inviolate among men the authority of his benevolent laws, intended for their best good. And since nothing can be more important or desirable to men than the approbation of God, he is actuated by the same benevolence in punishing with this intent as with the former. The Bible teaches us that God has this end in view in the punishments which he inflicts, by saying, *he will be sanctified by means of his judgments*, Lev. x. 3. This is the same as to say that by punishing men he designs to be seen and acknowledged by them as a holy God, or as one who disapproves of wickedness. The same thing is taught in Rom. i. 18, *Ἀποκαλύπτεται ὀργὴ Θεοῦ—ἐνὶ πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ἀνθρώπων*. But the justice of God also requires that as he rewards the good which others do to us (s. 30), he should also punish the evil which they bring upon us, (2 Thess. i. 6, 7; Ps. ix. 15, seq.; and this is

called, in the popular language which the Bible employs, his *revenge*, *ἐκδίκησις*, Rom. xii. 19.

Thus it appears that the true final cause of the divine judgments upon men is their moral improvement; and in this respect it may be said, with entire truth, that the penal justice of God is his goodness, wisely proportioned to the capacity of its objects. But it is not the improvement of those only whom he punishes which God intends in the judgments which he inflicts, but that of others also, who may take warning from these examples. So that even should God fail of his object in reforming the offender himself, he would still benefit others who might witness the punishments inflicted upon him. Vide Ps. l. 16, seq.; lii. 6, seq.; Rom. ii. 4—6; 2 Pet. ii. iii.; 1 Cor. x. 11, *Now all these punishments were inflicted upon the Israelites as examples (τύποι, see ver. 6) to us, who live in the latest period of the world, (in New-Testament times.)* Some think, with Michaelis, (Gedanken über die Lehre der heiligen Schrift von der Sünde, u. s. w. Göttingen, 1779, 8vo,) that the final cause of the divine judgments is not so much to benefit and reform the offender, as to terrify and deter others from the commission of crime. Michaelis does not indeed deny that punishment *might* be made to promote the reformation of those who are the subjects of it; but he still thinks that the great end which is contemplated by all judicatories in the punishments which they inflict is to terrify and deter from crime, sometimes the malefactor himself, as well as others, but more frequently others only, who may witness his punishment. And this is indeed true with regard to human judicatories, which have no such means of punishment within their power as are calculated for the reformation of the culprit, and can therefore only hold him forth as an example for the warning of others; but this is an imperfection which is inevitable to these judicatories as human, and ought not therefore to be transferred to the divine government. It is in consequence of this imperfection incident to human judicatories, by which they are driven to consult for the good of the whole, exclusive of that of the criminal, that they must often inflict upon him severer penalties than his own benefit would require, merely for the sake of the salutary influence of his punishment on the minds of others. That they are thus compelled to sacrifice an individual to the general good is certainly an evidence of imperfection. Just at that point where punishment ceases to be salutary to the person who endures it, however salutary it may be to others as an example—just at that point does it become an evidence of the ignorance and imperfection of those by whom it is inflicted. But how can we suppose

that God, who knows what kinds of punishment are necessary for the benefit of the offender, and who has every mode of punishment at command, would ever punish any one more severely than was necessary for his own profit, merely for the sake of making him a terrible example to others? None upon whom he inflicts punishment, with their good in view, will fail of being benefited by it, unless through their own fault; for he employs those means only which are calculated to produce this effect, and is liable in the choice of means to none of those mistakes and imperfections to which human judicatories are subject. We cannot, therefore, make these human judicatories our standard of judging respecting the divine government. The *judicial authority* of God does not rest on the same basis as that of human rulers; and in the judgments which he inflicts none of the imperfections of human judgments appear. We should avoid many mistakes if, when we speak even of the justice of God, we should represent him less under the image of a judge than of a father, who, as we are taught in the Bible, is "good even in his judgments," Ps. cxix. 39. The benevolence by which God is actuated in his severest inflictions is implied in the very words by which his chastisement is denoted—e. g., *παδεία*, Hebrews, xii. 5—11; and *ἀποτομία*, Rom. xi. 22. The representation of God under the image of a judge is not, however, in itself objectionable, but only on account of its liability to abuse. It is very natural to men, as we see from the present example, to transfer to God the extremely defective ideal which they have derived from human rulers; and it will therefore be wiser for religious teachers to represent God under the image of a father, at least to those who are virtuous, and of a nature to be influenced by kindness and love, and to reserve the image of a severe and righteous judge for rude and intractable men, who are incapable of being influenced by anything but terror.

Note 1.—Persons cannot be said to be punished when they suffer without any fault of their own, but only when they suffer in consequence of their wickedness. The wretchedness which the prodigal son brought upon himself (Luke, xv.) is properly called punishment; while the same wretchedness befalling an innocent person would properly be denominated *calamity*. The Bible teaches us very justly and satisfactorily how such evils and sufferings as befall the virtuous must be understood and improved by them and by others. The wise father, in the education of his children, often finds it necessary to treat even the dutiful with severity, in order to promote their present advantage and real permanent welfare. In the same manner does God often see it necessary, for wise reasons, to exer-

cise severity towards those whom he is educating, and to impose sufferings upon them. He sees that afflictions will tend to promote their holiness, strengthen their faith, and restrain their sinful propensities. *Habent talia vim disciplinæ*, Morus, p. 50. This is the view of the chastisement we receive from God, which is given us by Paul in that excellent passage, Heb. xii. 5—11. He there calls the discipline which we receive, *παδείαν, fatherly correction*, and compares the conduct of God towards men with that of a father. Ver. 6, *Ὁν ἀγαπᾷ Κύριος, παιδεύει*. Ver. 7, *Τίς ἐστὶν υἱός, ὃν οὐ παιδεύει πατήρ*. In ver. 10 the apostle teaches that God punishes *ἐκ τὸ συμφέρον* and proceeds, ver. 11, to say, *παδεία οὐ δοκεῖ χαρὰς εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ καρπὸν εἰρηνικὸν ἀποδίδωσι, κ. τ. λ.* The goodness and justice of God which appear in the allotment of such evils to men, is hence called by some theologians, *justitia pædæutica*, or *pædagogica*. The justice of God, when thus exercised, has the same object with his penal justice—viz., the improvement and moral perfection of men; but it differs from that in its internal nature and character, as appears from what has been said. There is an endless diversity in the characters of men; and in his treatment of them God governs himself according to this difference of their characters, and guides them to happiness through different ways, and by different means; and in doing this he clearly exhibits his wisdom and goodness. This truth is strikingly illustrated in Isa. xxviii. 23—29. As the husbandman cannot treat all his lands and all his fruits in the same manner, so neither can God treat all men alike; but while he seeks for the improvement of all, he promotes it in one by prosperity, in another by adversity.

[*Note 2.*—The *causes* for which God does anything, and also the *ends* which he would attain, may be sought either *in himself* or *without himself*, in the world which he has made; in other words, they are either *subjective* or *objective*. But because he is entirely independent and absolutely perfect, the highest and last grounds of what he does must be sought in his own nature; and to these the objective reasons of his conduct must be subordinate. And so, when we inquire for the final cause of the rewards and punishments which God distributes in the exercise of his retributive justice, we must look for it in God himself; and to this we must subordinate any ends for this exercise which may be derived from the world which God has created. Now the nature of God, in which the last ground of his retributive justice is to be sought, has infinite moral perfection; for this perfect moral excellence residing in his nature God must have supreme regard and absolute love, and consequently he must feel an absolute pleasure in what is morally good, and displea-

sure in what is morally evil. This necessary love to what is morally perfect is, then, the *last ground* of the divine justice. But in order to be consistent, he must *act* according to this love, and exhibit to the view of his moral creatures his approbation of good and disapprobation of evil; and this is the *last end* of the retribution which he awards. And if there were no reformation of the individual offender, no warning of others, or any objective ground for the exercise of retributive justice, there would be sufficient ground for all that God does either to punish or reward, in his own absolute love of moral good and hatred of moral evil. The representations of the Bible would certainly lead us to think that the feelings which prompt him in the punishment of the wicked are, his holy disapprobation of their conduct—his necessary hatred of their moral character. And when we enter into the feelings of the guilty subject of the divine judgments, does he not find reason enough in his own ill-desert for all which God inflicts upon him; and would not all which he endures be sufficiently understood by him, if no advantage to himself or others occurred to his mind? The justice of God is an absolute attribute, and demands itself to be satisfied; and moral evil has a real, intrinsic ill-desert, and ought to be punished. That God has sometimes the reformation of the offender in view in the punishment which he inflicts, and that he seeks the moral perfection of men in the displays of his attributes, is perfectly true; these ends, however, so far from being the only or the highest reasons of retribution, are subordinate to the satisfaction of divine justice.—Tr.]

2. The different kinds of punishment which God inflicts.

(a) *Natural*—i. e., such unhappy consequences as flow from the internal nature of sinful actions; *incommoda necessaria malo, sive male factis, nexa*, as Morus describes them. These, like natural rewards, have their ground in the wise constitution which God himself has given to the natural world. That natural punishments are really inflicted is shewn by daily experience. Sin everywhere draws upon itself remorse, disgrace, bodily disease, &c. And these natural consequences of sin, like the natural consequences of virtue, are greater than is commonly supposed, and often unlimited in their extent, as will be hereafter shewn in connexion with the doctrine of endless future punishment. "Sin punishes itself."

(b) *Positive, arbitrary*—i. e., such as stand in no natural and necessary connexion with the sinful actions of men, or which do not flow from the internal nature of such actions, but are connected with them by the mere will of the legislator, and are additional to the natural consequences of sin. According to the common

theory on this subject, with which the Bible agrees, such positive divine judgments are inflicted by God, on account of the inadequacy of natural judgments alone to effect the moral improvement of men, and to deter them from sin. In order, therefore, to preserve inviolate the authority of his law, he connected positive judgments with the natural consequences of sin, which alone were insufficient for this purpose. In the infliction of these arbitrary sufferings, he is governed by the rules of infinite wisdom and love, and not by blind caprice.

Positive punishments are divided into *present* and *future*. The *present* are those which take place in this life; and in proof of them we may refer to the passages of the Old Testament where they are threatened to the disobedient Israelites—e. g., 2 Sam. xii. 10, 11, 14; Acts, v. 5, 9; 1 Cor. vi. 3—5.

Future positive punishments are those which are threatened in the next world. From many expressions of the New Testament we are undoubtedly led to expect *positive* punishments in the future world. Cf. Art. xv. It must certainly be considered inconsistent for any one to object to positive punishments in another world who expects positive rewards. Such an one has certainly very much the appearance of conforming his belief to his wishes, and of admitting positive rewards because he desires them, and denying positive punishments because he fears them.

It was with reference to the *positive* punishments of sin that the atonement of Christ was principally made; for the *natural* consequences of sin are not wholly removed by virtue of his death. The bodily disorders incurred by the sinner in consequence of his vices do not wholly cease, though they may indeed be abated and alleviated by his becoming a sincere believer in Christ as the Saviour of the world. Those who deny the existence of positive punishments hereafter consider that Christ by his atonement has freed us merely from the *fear* of punishment—a notion which is inconsistent with the declarations of the New Testament, as will be shewn in the Article respecting Christ.

In speaking of the *positive* divine judgments which take place in *this life*, the teacher of religion is liable to do injury, and should therefore wisely consider his words. It is true, doubtless, that positive punishments do take place in the present world; but it is also true that we are unable, in given cases, to determine decisively whether the sufferings which we witness are, or are not, positive judgments from the hand of God. To consider plague, famine, and physical evils of every sort befalling an individual or nation as in every case the consequence of moral evil, is an error to which the multitude is much inclined. They frequently refer in these cases

to the very sins which have occasioned these divine judgments, as they denominate the calamities which befall their fellow men. And this injurious prejudice has been not a little strengthened by the incautious manner in which the teachers of religion have sometimes spoken on this subject. It is perfectly right to consider pestilence in general as a divine judgment, and for the religious teacher, during such visitations from God, to remind men of their sins; but it is not right to pronounce, as it were, a definite judicial sentence upon the guilt of a particular person or country visited in such a manner. Experience and scripture both disapprove of this; for we often see that these calamities cease before the alleged cause of them is removed; and they befall the good and bad equally, and without distinction. As God causes the sun to shine and the rain to descend upon the evil and the good, so he sends tempest, flood, and conflagration, upon one as well as the other. Indeed, the best men often suffer, while the worst prosper; from which the fair conclusion is, that nothing can be determined concerning the moral character of men from the allotment of their external circumstances. Vide No. I. of this section. The sacred writers concur entirely in these views. The friends of Job concluded from his bodily ills that he must have committed great sins; but Job shews (v. 10, 12) that God often visits persons with sufferings which are not occasioned by their sins. Christ says, Luke, xiii. 2, 4, that the Galileans whom Pilate had caused to be executed at Jerusalem, and the eighteen men upon whom a tower had fallen, were not sinners more than others because they had suffered these things. He corrected his disciples when they ascribed the misfortune of the man born blind to the sin of his parents, and taught them that they ought not to conclude that particular misfortunes were the sure consequence of particular crimes, John, ix. 3. Those who advocate the practice to which allusion has been made cannot justly plead in their defence the passages in the Old Testament, where pest, famine, failure of the harvest, destruction by enemies, and various other positive punishments in this life are frequently threatened for certain definite transgressions of the divine commands; for we have now no prophets to come forth among us, as among the Israelites, as the messengers and authorized ambassadors of God. The civil government of the Israelites was theocratic—i. e., God was acknowledged by the Israelites to be their civil ruler; and the leaders of their armies, their earthly kings, their priests and prophets, were considered by them as his authorized servants. Hence all their laws were published in the name of God—i. e., at the divine command, and under the divine authority. And in the same manner the temporal rewards connected

with obedience, and the temporal punishments connected with disobedience, were announced as coming from him. From what has been said, we draw the conclusion, that external blessings or calamities are not to be considered in particular cases as the reward of good actions, or the punishment of bad, except where God has expressly declared that these very blessings, or these very calamities, are allotted to this individual person, on account of the good or bad action specified; as Lev. xxvi., Deut. xxviii., Revelation, ii. 22, 23. Additional remarks concerning natural and positive punishments will be made in the Article on Sin, s. 86, 87.

APPENDIX.

SECT. XXXII.

OF THE DECREES OF GOD.

THE doctrine of the divine decrees depends upon the freedom of the will of God, and upon his wisdom, goodness, and justice. It may therefore properly succeed the discussion of these subjects in the foregoing sections.

I. General Statement, and Scholastic Divisions.

1. *Definition of the decrees of God.* By these we mean, *the will of God that anything should come into existence*, or be accomplished, (Morus, p. 51.) or, the free determinations of God respecting the existence of any object extrinsic to himself.

2. *The nature and attributes of the divine decrees.* These are the same as were ascribed to the divine will, because the decrees of God are only expressions of his will. The decrees of God are, properly speaking, (a) *only one single decree*. They were all made at one and the same time. Before we can come to a determination of the will, it is often necessary for us to institute laborious investigations and inquiries, since we cannot survey all the reasons on both sides of a subject at a single glance. And it is on account of this limitation of our understandings that all our determinations are successive. But no such succession takes place in the mind of God; he knows all things at once. Vide s. 22. And so, properly speaking, the decree to make the world, and every single decree respecting everything which exists, or has been done in it from the beginning, are only *one entire decree*. But we represent to our minds as many different decrees as there are particulars comprehended in this one universal decree. (b) *The divine decrees are free*. Nothing can compel God to decree what is contrary to his will or understanding. His decrees, however, though free, are never *blind* and *groundless*.

Vide s. 26. Cf. Ephes. i. 5; 2 Tim. i. 9. (c) They are *benevolent*, always intended for the good of the creatures of God, Ephes. i., Rom. viii., ix. That they are so follows from the goodness, holiness, and justice of God; s. 28—31 inclusive. (d) *Eternal* and *unalterable*. Vide s. 20, and especially s. 26, ad finem. Cf. Morus, p. 53, s. 15. Whence the Bible often says, God determined such a thing, *πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*, Ephes. i. 4; *ἀπ' ὁρὸς αἰώνων*. *Πρὸ*, in *προγινώσκειν*, *προορίζειν*, &c. τ. λ., denotes the same thing. God existed from eternity; and as he exists without succession of time, all of his decrees must be as eternal as himself, and as immutable as his own nature. Rom. xi. 29, *ἀμεταμέλητα*. Heb. vi. 17, *τὸ ἀμετάθετον τῆς βουλῆς Θεοῦ*. (e) *Unsearchable*, *ἀνεξερεύνητα*, *ἀνεξιχνίαστα*, Romans, i. 33—36; *βάθη Θεοῦ*, 1 Cor. ii. 10; Isaiah, lv. 8. Cf. Morus, p. 46, s. 10, note 4. We see but a small part of the immeasurable whole which God surveys at a glance, and are incapable, therefore, of comprehending, in its whole extent, the immeasurable and eternal plan of God, or of determining *à priori* what he ought to have decreed. The attempt to decide what God has determined to be done by conclusions drawn from particular attributes of his nature, of which we have such imperfect notions in our present state, is attended with the greatest danger of mistake. For us to undertake to say that this and the other thing is good and desirable, and therefore must be, or has been, done by God, is what the Bible calls wishing to *teach God*, 1 Cor. ii. 16. We can learn what God has actually decreed only from seeing what events have actually taken place. From the existence of the world, we conclude that God decreed to create it; from the existence of evil, we conclude that God decreed to permit it, &c. And although we are taught expressly in the Bible that God decreed to send Christ into the world, (1 Cor. ii. 9, seq.) we are also taught to note the *event*, the *effects* of his mission, and from thence to conclude what the will and purpose of God is.

3. *Division* of the divine decrees. They are divided, as far as they relate to moral beings, into *absolute* and *conditional*, like the divine will. Vide s. 25, II. 2.

(a) *Absolute* decrees are not such as are made without reason in the exercise of arbitrary power, but such as are made without reference to the free actions of moral beings, or without being dependent for their accomplishment upon a condition. The decrees of God to create the world, to send Christ to redeem it, to bestow external prosperity, advantages for intellectual improvement, or the knowledge of the gospel, upon one people or individual, and to deny them to another, and all his determinations of this nature, are called *absolute* decrees; because,

though made in view of wise and good reasons, they do not depend for their accomplishment upon the free actions and the true character of moral beings. In the allotment of *temporal* or *earthly* good, riches, honour, health, &c., the rule by which God proceeds is not always the worthiness of men. We do not mean that virtue always and necessarily induces suffering and persecution, (as some have concluded, from a false interpretation of such texts as Matt. v. 10, seq.; 2 Tim. iii. 12, &c.) Pure Christian virtue, on the contrary, often brings along with it great temporal advantages, Rom. xii. 17, seq. We simply mean, that in imparting these external advantages, God is often governed by other principles than regard to the obedience or disobedience of his moral creatures.

(b) *Conditional* decrees are those in making which God has respect to the free actions of moral beings. These conditional decrees are founded upon that fore-knowledge of the free actions of men which we are compelled to ascribe to God. Vide s. 22. God foresaw from eternity how every man would act, and whether he would comply with the conditions under which the designs of God concerning him would take effect, or would reject them; and upon this fore-knowledge he founded his decree. Of this class are the decrees of God respecting the spiritual and eternal welfare of men. They are always founded upon the free conduct of men, and are never absolute, but always conditional. We are not, however, to regard these spiritual gifts as in any sense deserved by the moral agent, when he complies with the prescribed conditions; Luke, xvii. 10. The decree respecting the eternal welfare of men is called, by way of eminence, *predestination*, in the limited sense; for all God's eternal decrees are called *predestination* in the larger sense. This name has been used, in this more limited sense especially, since the time of Augustine; from the fact that the word *prædestinare* was employed by the Vulgate to render the Greek *προορίζειν*, in Rom. viii. 29, 30, which was then referred to the decrees of God respecting the salvation and condemnation of men. The decree of God respecting the eternal blessedness of the pious, was then called *electio*, *decretum electionis*, *predestinatio ad vitam*. The decree respecting the punishment of sinners in the future world was called *reprobatio*, *decretum reprobationis*, *predestinatio ad mortem*. These words too are derived from the New Testament, especially from Rom. viii.; where, however, they are used in a different sense. The election, *ἐκλογή*, there spoken of, is the gracious reception of Jews and heathen into the Christian society; and the rejection is the denial or withdrawal of this and other divine blessings, as will appear from No. II.

II. Scriptural Representation, and the Errors occasioned by False Interpretation.

1. Scriptural representation.

The following are the principal expressions employed in the Bible in relation to the decrees of God. (a) All the words which signify to say, speak, command. The phrase, *God says*, often means, *he wills, he decrees*, Ps. xxxiii. 9. So frequently דבר, בזה, וגו. (b) The words which signify to think, are often used to denote the divine decrees; as חשב, חשבו, דיאלוגיסμοί, Ps. xxxiii. 10, 11; Is. lv. 8. Hence the phrases, *to speak with one's self, to say in one's heart*, often mean, *to consider, determine*. *Saying in his heart*, was the manner in which the Hebrew denoted thinking—an instance of the ancient simplicity of language, corresponding with the phrase of the Otaheitans, *speaking in one's belly*. (c) Κρίμα, שטף, sentence; representing God as a judge or ruler, who publishes edicts and pronounces sentence; Ps. xxxvi. 6, 7; Rom. xi. 33. (d) Ὁδός, דרך, way. The way of God signifies his manner of thinking or acting, his conduct; Ps. cxlv. 17, "Gracious is Jehovah in all his ways"—i. e., decrees; Rom. xi. 33, ὁδοὶ Θεοῦ ἀνεξήγητοι.

(e) The following occur more frequently in the New Testament: Ἐλέημα, εὐδοκία, in Hebrew, רחם, רצון, used particularly to denote God's gracious purpose. Vide s. 25. Πρόθεσις, Ephes. i. 11, where it is synonymous with βουλή θελήματος, 2 Tim. i. 9, seq., and Rom. ix. 11, ἵνα ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ πρόθεσις κατ' ἐκλογὴν μένη—i. e., so that the divine purpose must remain free, must be acknowledged to be according to his own choice. Προγινώσκω. This verb, like the Hebrew ידע, and γινώκειν and εἰδέναι, very frequently signifies to decree, (metonymia causæ pro effectu.) In this sense it is often used by Philo. In Acts, ii. 23, it is used to denote the purpose of God, that Christ should suffer and die. Now since the *verba cognoscendi* frequently signify, among the Hebrews, to love, to wish well, προγινώσκω very often signifies, by way of eminence, the gracious and benevolent purpose of God, which he entertained from eternity for the welfare of men. Thus προγινώσκω in 1 Pet. i. 2, denotes the gracious purpose of God respecting the admission of men to the privileges of the Christian church; Rom. viii. 29, οὓς προέγνω, *his beloved*, those whose welfare he seeks; Rom. xi. 2. Ὁρίζω and προορίζω, commonly rendered in the Vulgate *prædestinare*. Ὁρίζω is to determine, in the general sense; and in this sense it is said, Acts, xi. 29, that the apostles ὥρισαν κ. τ. λ. The divine purpose is therefore called ὥρισην βουλήν, *decretum voluntatis divinæ*, Acts, ii. 23. In the classics, ὁρισμός is purpose, determination. Προορίζω is properly *decernere antequam existat*; because the decrees of God are eternal, as, Acts, iv. 28, the Jews conspired

to do "whatever thy counsel προώρισε γενέσθαι, before determined to be done." The word προορίζω, when used in reference to men, never denotes exclusively the divine purpose respecting their eternal salvation or condemnation, but rather respecting their admission to the Christian church, to partake both of the rights and privileges, and also of the sorrows and sufferings of Christians. So it is used, Ephes. i. 5, Προορίσας ἡμᾶς εἰς υἰοθεσίαν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ—i. e., he purposed to bring us into the Christian church, and thus to make us his children—his beloved friends. That this is the meaning of the apostle appears from verses 11, 12. The same is true of the passage, Romans, ix., which does not treat of the eternal salvation or condemnation of men, but of the temporal benefits, and the external civil and church privileges, which God confers upon particular persons and nations in preference to others. Vide s. 26. The passage, Rom. viii. 28, 29, seq., so often and entirely misunderstood, must be interpreted in a similar manner. Paul had spoken, verses 19, 20, seq., of the sufferings and persecutions which Christians were at that time called to endure. He endeavours to console them in the midst of their distresses, and to shew the blessedness in which their afflictions might result. "We are confident that all things (even afflictions and persecutions) will conspire for the good of those who love God, and are called, in pursuance of the purpose of God, to partake of Christian privileges, (τοὺς κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοὺς οὖσιν.) For he has predestinated (προώρισε) us, whom he thus graciously regarded from eternity (προέγνω), to be conformed to the example of his Son, (viz., as in suffering, so in reward,) whom God has designed to be the forerunner (προτόκογον) of his many brethren, (first in suffering, then in reward.) But those whom he thus destined (to a fellowship in the sufferings of Christ) he adopts as members of the Christian church (τούτους ἐκάλεσε), and alleviates the sorrows which they endure (for the sake of Christ) by granting forgiveness of their sins, and the hope of that future glory, (which Christ their forerunner has received, and to which he will raise them.)" This passage, therefore, does not teach that God elects men to salvation, or dooms them to destruction, without respect to their moral conduct, but that the present sufferings of Christians are alleviated by the external advantages which they enjoy as members of Christian society. Vide No. I.

In the bestowment of spiritual and eternal blessings, it is absolutely essential that God should be governed solely by the moral conduct of men. His goodness, justice, indeed, all his moral perfections, are infringed by the contrary supposition. We are taught also by the express assurances of scripture, standing on almost every

page of the New Testament, and especially of the epistles of Paul, that God will reward and punish every man according to his works, Rom. ii. 6—11; Matt. xvi. 27; 2 Cor. v. 19. The decrees of election and reprobation, then, according to the doctrine of scripture, are not *absolute*, but *conditional*, Mark, xvi. 16.

The terms commonly employed in the schools respecting the decrees of God may be illustrated by the following syllogism:—**MAJOR**: whoever believes in Christ to the end of his life, shall be saved, (this is *προθεσις*, or *ἐκλογή*, the *voluntas Dei antecedens*.) **MINOR**: Paul will believe to the end of his life (this is *πρόγνωσις*, *prævisio*.) **CONCLUSION**: Therefore Paul will be saved, (this is *προσρισμός*, *voluntas Dei consequens, decretum*.) Since, now, the major term is here an universal proposition, but the minor particular, it is easily seen in what sense the grace of God can be scripturally denominated *universal* and *particular*. It is the same with the *decree of reprobation*.

2. Errors occasioned principally by false interpretation.

The opinion has long existed in the church, that the decrees of election and reprobation were *absolute*—i. e., that without respect to their moral character, God selected from the human race a certain number, (many say very few,) and destined them to eternal happiness; and, on the other hand, rejected others (by far the greater part of the human race,—seven perhaps in ten) in the same arbitrary manner, and destined them to eternal condemnation. This error is called *predestination*, and the advocates of it *predestinationists*, or *particularists*. This doctrine, it has been justly remarked, if carried out into all its logical consequences, would destroy the freedom of the human will, and thus undermine the foundations of morality. But it has not been carried out to its legitimate consequences, in theory or practice, by those who have professed it. And many of the soundest moralists and most virtuous men are found, by a happy inconsistency, among the advocates of this doctrine.

The principal sources of this error are the following: (a) False opinions respecting the freedom of the divine will, by which it is represented as a blind caprice, in the exercise of which God pardons or condemns without reason, like a human despot, (vide s. 26,) and in connexion with these, false conceptions of the goodness, justice, and other moral attributes of God, and of their connexion with his natural attributes. (b) The want of discrimination between the decrees of God respecting the allotment of temporal and earthly good, and those respecting the gift of spiritual blessings and eternal life. But more than all, (c) the misinterpretation of Rom. viii. 9, by which these passages are made to relate to eternal salvation and condemnation, instead

of temporal privileges. This interpretation was introduced by Augustine, who, however excellent in other respects, was deficient in his acquaintance with the language of scripture, and therefore exhibits here none of his usual ability. Vide s. 26. (d) A similar misunderstanding of other texts of scripture, especially of the declaration of Christ, Matt. xx. 16, πολλοὶ εἰσι κλητοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκλεκτοί. This has been supposed to mean, that there are many who are nominally and externally Christians, but few only who are chosen to eternal salvation. But the ἐκλεκτοί are here only the more eminent, select saints, (the Hebrew *קְדוֹשִׁים*.) Thus the passage would mean: *among the many who are externally Christians*, (admitted into the Christian church,) *there are only a few whom God counts as his peculiar people*—i. e., few who live conformably to the precepts of Christianity, and are in all respects such as they should be. That this is the true sense of these words appears from the parable, Matt. xxii. 2—13; at the end of which (ver. 14) they are repeated.

Again: the text, Acts, xiii. 48, has been appealed to in proof of this doctrine, from ignorance of the *usus loquendi* of the Bible; καὶ ἐκίστευσαν ὅσοι ᾤσαν τεταγμένοι εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. Those who believed are here opposed to those who (ver. 46) *made themselves unworthy of eternal life*—(viz. by unbelief.) The phrase is synonymous with οἱ ἑαυτοὺς τὰξάτε εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, *those who prepared themselves for eternal life*—the *pious, virtuous*. The Greeks frequently express reciprocal action by passive verbs, especially in the preter. The meaning here becomes sufficiently evident by a comparison of ver. 46.

Brief history of the doctrine of unconditional decrees.

The controversy in which Augustine engaged with the Pelagians led him to maintain the doctrine of absolute decrees. In contending against the errors of his opponents he fell into the opposite extreme, and asserted the doctrine of unconditional decrees concerning salvation and condemnation, and then his doctrine *de gratia particulari et irresistibili*, (s. 132.) In consequence of the high authority of Augustine, this doctrine prevailed extensively in the African and Latin churches during the fifth and sixth centuries. During the former part of this period, particularly, it was urged against the doctrine of the Pelagians by Prosper of Aquitania and Lucidus, presbyter in France. And indeed it was alternately defended and opposed in the western church during the whole of this and the following century.

This doctrine was again maintained in the ninth century by Gottschalk, a monk at Orbais, in France, and a zealous follower of Augustine. It became the subject of vehement discussion, and was at length condemned as heretical by a

council at Chiersy, in the year 849. But this decision was not universally accepted; and the doctrine of predestination still had many advocates, among whom were Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, and his followers, the Dominicans and other Thomists.

This controversy was renewed with great vehemence in the Romish church during the seventeenth century, on occasion of the writings of Jansenius, Bishop at Ypern, in the Netherlands. The Jesuits and the Pope took sides against the doctrine of absolute decrees. But the Dominicans, and other warm admirers of Augustine, agreed with Jansenius, and there are many staunch Jansenists in France at the present day.

This doctrine, which owes its origin to Augustine, was adopted again in the sixteenth century by Calvin and Beza, the Swiss reformers, and by them disseminated through their church. [The symbols of the reformed church, in which the doctrine of Calvin is acknowledged, are, the *Consensus pastorum eccl. Genev.*, (1551 an 1554,)—*Conf. Galicana*, Art. xi., (1559,)—*Conf. Belgica*, Art. xvi.,—*Catechismus Heidelbergensis*, (1562 and 1563.)] At first, this doctrine was at least partially believed even by Luther and Melancthon, but there is no trace of it in the writings of Zuingle.

It was not without controversy, however, that the doctrine of Calvin prevailed in the reformed church. During the seventeenth century it was opposed by Arminius and his followers. But it was at length established as an article of faith in the reformed church by the national synod at Dordrecht, in the years 1618, 1619, and the Arminians were placed beyond the pale of the church. By degrees, however, this severe doctrine has been abandoned even in the reformed church, its hardest features being first softened down through the influence of the doctrine of universal redemption. It was maintained for the longest time in the Netherlands and in Switzerland; though it has but few advocates in the Netherlands at the present day. In England the number of its friends is still considerable. Cf. the history of the doctrine of grace, s. 132.

Note.—In the above statement of the Lutheran view of the doctrine of *divine decrees*, there is of course much which must be objectionable to a Calvinist; far less, however, than in the statement of this subject usually made by Lutheran writers. Our author treats the doctrine of his Calvinistic opponents with a justice and mildness quite unusual with the theologians of his church. In general, there are no epithets too violent for them to heap upon the doctrine of absolute decrees, and no evasions too weak for them to employ to escape the force of the arguments by which it is supported. That the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees should be rejected and ca-

lumnated by men who reject those scriptural truths upon which it depends, might be expected; but that it should be thus treated by those who hold, in common with its advocates, those doctrines of grace from which it inevitably results, is somewhat surprising. After taking the liberty to make a few general remarks upon some particular representations of our author, I shall endeavour to shew, that *the Lutherans are chargeable with obvious inconsistency in opposing the Calvinistic theory of decrees, while they adhere to the standard confession of their church.* With regard to the representations of Dr. Knapp, it may be remarked,

First. That he is not exactly just in describing the theory of absolute decrees as involving the election and reprobation of men *without respect to conditions*. The advocates of this theory insist, equally with others, that men must believe in order to be saved; and the question between them and their opponents is, *In what relation this faith, which is essential to salvation, stands to the purpose of God?*

Secondly. When he describes the *called, chosen, elect*, so often mentioned in the New Testament as those who were made partakers only of the *external privileges* of Christianity, and not those who were heirs of *future happiness*, does he not violate the whole spirit and usage of the New Testament, without yet avoiding the difficulty? If the intimate connexion between the enjoyment of the external privileges of Christianity and securing its spiritual and everlasting blessings is considered, will there not be the same objections to the sovereign appointment of men to one as to the other?

Thirdly. Instead of saying that predestinationists are distinguished for depth of religious sentiment and strictness of moral practice *notwithstanding* their principles, as our author and others generously concede, is it not apparent that they are so *in consequence* of their principles? The perfect *safety* of their theory of election has been often satisfactorily proved by reformed theologians in answer to the objections urged against its moral tendencies. But its *direct* bearing upon the religious life has not been so often exhibited. It is therefore the more worthy of notice, that Tholuck (whose Commentary on the ninth of Romans will sufficiently free him from any suspicion of leaning towards Calvinism) concedes, in his Treatise on Oriental Mysticism, that the doctrine of predestination, so far from producing the despondency and inaction often ascribed to it, on the contrary, moves and excites the inmost soul, by the self-surrender which it demands to the all-prevailing will of God. To the influence of this doctrine he attributes whatever of religious life there exists among those who receive the sensual dogmas of the Koran. Every one, he says, acquainted with eastern lite-

ture, knows that the most strong and vivid religious experiences are connected with and arise from the belief in predestination. And Calvinism, he allows, is incomparably more favourable to the deeper religious life than that doctrine by which the will of God is limited or conditioned by the human will—i. e., the syncretism of the Lutheran church.

Fourthly. The suggestion of Dr. Knapp, that Augustine was first induced to adopt his theory of election by his controversy with Pelagius, contains the implication that this theory owes its origin to polemical excitement, and was adopted by its author in order to extricate himself from some embarrassments, or as the opposite extreme of the theory against which he contended. But this is not only wanting in historical evidence, but is in itself improbable. The *Decretum Absolutum* of Augustine is the direct result of his views of the natural character of man, and is necessary to complete that system of truth which he adopted. To the belief of this doctrine he would naturally be led by the cool deliberation of the closet, and it therefore more probably belonged to those original convictions which impelled him to the controversy with Pelagius, and animated him in prosecuting it, than to any after convictions to which he might have been driven by opposition. Which now, it may be asked, looks most like the offspring of the contrivance and heat of controversy, the theory of Augustine, coming forward with direct affirmations, and belonging essentially to his system, or the opposite theory, consisting mostly of evasions, negations, and limitations? To assert the doctrine of the divine sovereignty and of the all-controlling will of God would seem to be the part of the consistent, philosophical theologian; to deny it, the business of a timorous moderation, of a time-serving policy, or of the native pride and self-sufficiency of man.

The inconsistency chargeable upon the Lutheran theologians who oppose the Calvinistic theory of decrees may be briefly stated thus: According to their theory, God ordains to salvation those of whom he foresees that they will believe; but according to the Augsburg Confession, it is the Holy Spirit *qui EFFICIT FIDEM, QUANDO ET UBI visum est Deo, who produces faith when and where it seems good to God*; both combined, therefore, furnish us the doctrine that God ordains to salvation those of whom he foresees that he who causes faith to exist when and where it seems good to him, will give them the Holy Spirit to produce faith in their hearts, which is the Calvinistic doctrine so often opposed and denounced by the Lutherans. They join together, in their Book of Concord, the *Augsburg Confession*, in which man's moral inability and entire dependence on divine grace are strongly asserted, and their *Declaration*, in which the absolute decrees

of God—an inevitable consequence of these doctrines—is denounced as unscriptural and dangerous. Surely here *Concordia* is *discors*.

This discrepancy could not long remain unnoticed in a country where theological opinions are subjected to so rigid a scrutiny. The Lutheran theologians appear, however, to have imagined, for a time, that they could reconcile the opposing tendencies of their system, and attempted so to modify the doctrine of man's moral inability as to guard against any approach to Calvinism. The best attempt of this nature is exhibited by Storr, in his *Biblical Theology*; but it cannot be thought successful. To many it soon became evident that they were reduced to the alternative of retaining the Augsburg Confession and the doctrine of man's moral inability, and then admitting, as its inevitable consequence, the Calvinistic doctrine of election, or of rejecting the Augsburg Confession, and thus escaping the necessity of Calvinism.

During the recent attempt to unite the Lutheran and reformed churches, their doctrinal differences came of course into new consideration; and Dr. Bretschneider, in his *Aphorisms* published on that occasion, frankly acknowledged, what had not been done before, the inconsistency now charged upon the theologians of his church; and being himself somewhat inclined towards Pelagianism, unhesitatingly chose the second of the two courses above stated, and, in order to avoid Calvinism, willingly surrendered the Augsburg Confession, with the doctrine of man's inability and entire dependence on divine grace. But the Augsburg Confession had long been esteemed the palladium of the Lutheran church; and the doctrine of man's inability and dependence was dearer than almost any other to the heart of Luther, and was too firmly believed by the most distinguished theologians of his church, and had become too thoroughly interwoven with their system of faith, to be thus easily abandoned. The only course remaining for those who wished to be consistent seemed therefore to be, to hold fast to the Augsburg Confession and its Anti-Pelagian doctrines, and to admit the Calvinistic theory of election as their natural consequence. And this course was boldly adopted by Schleiermacher, one of the profoundest theologians of his church, and strenuously recommended by him in the first article of his "Theologische Zeitschrift." He there acknowledges that he had long been unable to sympathize with most of his contemporaries in condemning the theory of Augustine and Calvin as irrational and unscriptural.

This unexpected publication gave a new impulse to the discussion of this doctrine, and some of the most distinguished theologians of Germany have been enlisted as disputants. Whether under the auspices of Schleiermacher this doc-

trine will fare better than under Gottschalk and Jansenius cannot be foretold. Long established prejudice may yet prevail over the love of truth and consistency. But whatever may be the result of this local controversy, the doctrine has nothing to fear, being based on the triple foundation of sound reason, Christian experience, and the word of God.—[Tr.]

ARTICLE IV.

OF THE DOCTRINE OF FATHER, SON, AND HOLY GHOST.

SECTION XXXIII.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

1. It is an established truth, that there are many things in the divine nature which are unlike anything which belongs to us, and of which, therefore, we have no knowledge. For, as has been already shewn, s. 18, II., it is impossible for us to form a distinct notion of any attributes or perfections which we ourselves do not possess, or even to see at all how such attributes can exist. To conclude, therefore, that any particular attribute could not belong to the Divine Being, simply because we might be unable to understand it wholly, or perhaps at all, would be extremely foolish. Vide Introduction, s. 6, ad finem. *If the Bible contains a more particular revelation of God, and if this revelation, in a clear and incontrovertible manner, proposes a doctrine of faith, then must such doctrine, however incomprehensible and inexplicable, be received by us as true.* That the Bible does contain such a revelation has already been maintained in the Introduction, and in the Article on the Holy Scriptures; that the doctrine of the Trinity is taught in this revelation remains now to be proved; and upon the truth of these two propositions the whole subject depends.

2. The doctrine of a Trinity in the godhead includes the three following particulars, (vide Morus, p. 69, s. 13,)—viz., (a) There is only *one* God, *one* divine nature, s. 16; (b) but in this divine nature there is the distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as three, (called *subjects*, *persons*, and other names of similar import in the language of the schools;) and (c) these three have equally, and in common with one another, the nature and perfections of supreme divinity. This is the true, simple doctrine of the Trinity, when stripped of refined and learned distinctions. According to this doctrine there are in the divine nature THREE, inseparably connected with one another, possessing equal glory, but making unitedly only ONE God.

This doctrine thus exhibited is called a *mystery* (in the theological sense), because there is much in the mode and manner of it which is unintelligible. The obscurity and mystery of this subject arise from our inability to answer the question, *In what sense and in what manner do these three so share the divine nature as to make only one God?* But as the learned employed themselves in attempting to answer this question, and endeavoured, by the help of philosophy, to establish certain distinctions, they fell, of course, into explanations more or less opposed, and from this diversity of opinion, into strife and contention. They began to persecute those who dissented from some learned distinctions which they regarded as true, to denounce them as heretics, and to exclude them from salvation. In their zeal for their philosophical theories, they neglected to inculcate the practical consequences of this doctrine, and instead of joyfully partaking of the undeserved benefits which are bestowed by the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, they disputed respecting the manner of the union of three persons in one God.

Jesus requires that all his followers should profess their belief in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, (Matt. xxviii. 19;) and by so doing, he places this doctrine among the first and most essential doctrines of his religion. That it is so is proved from many other declarations both of Jesus and his apostles. The doctrine is, moreover, intimately connected with the whole exhibition of Christian truth. It is not, therefore, a doctrine which any one may set aside at pleasure, as if it were unessential, and wholly disconnected with the system of Christianity. But while Jesus requires us to believe in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, he has nowhere taught us or required us to believe the learned distinctions respecting this doctrine which have been introduced since the fourth century. The undeserved benefits which they had received from the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, were the great subjects to which Jesus pointed his followers in the passage above cited, and in others; that they were now able to understand and worship God in a more perfect manner, to approach him as their father and benefactor in spirit and in truth; that their minds were now enlightened by the instructions given them by the Son of God, who had been sent into the world to be their teacher, and that their souls were redeemed by his death; that in consequence of what Christ had already done, and would yet do, they might be advanced in moral perfection, and made holy—a work specially ascribed to the aids and influence of the Holy Spirit; these are the great truths which Jesus requires his followers to believe from the heart, in being baptized in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. He did not reveal this

doctrine to men to furnish them with matter for speculation and dispute, and did not, therefore, prescribe any formulas by which the one or the other could have been excited. The same is true of this doctrine as of the Lord's supper. Those who partake of this ordinance in the manner which Christ commanded, answer the ends for which it was instituted, and secure their spiritual profit, however much their views may differ with regard to the manner of Christ's presence in the symbols.

Besides, it is certain that no particular distinctions respecting this doctrine were enforced by the church as necessary conditions of communion during the first three centuries. And accordingly we find that Justin the Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and other distinguished men of the catholic party, made use of expressions and representations on this subject which are both discordant with each other, and which differ totally from those which were afterwards established in the fourth century. Then for the first time, at the Nicene Council, under the influence of Athanasius, and in opposition to the Arians, were those learned and philosophical formulas, which have since been retained in the system of the church, established and enforced. That a belief in these formulas should be declared essential to salvation, as is done in the Athanasian creed, cannot but be disapproved. This creed, however, was not composed by Athanasius nor was it even ascribed to him before the seventh century, though it was probably composed in the fifth. The principle that any one who holds different views respecting the Trinity, *salvus esse non poterit*, (to use the language of this symbol,) would lead us to exclude from salvation the great majority even of those Christians who receive the doctrine and language of the Council of Nice; for common Christians, after all the efforts of their teachers, will not unfrequently conceive of *three Gods* in the *three persons* of the Godhead, and thus entertain an opinion which the creed condemns. But if the many pious believers in common life who entertain this theoretical error may yet be saved, then others who believe in Christ from the heart, and obey his precepts, who have a personal experience of the practical effects of this doctrine may also be saved, though they may adopt other particular theories and formulas respecting the Trinity different from that commonly received. These particular formulas and theories, however much they may be regarded and insisted upon, have nothing to do with salvation. And this leads us to remark, that learned hypotheses, refined distinctions, and technical phrases, should never be introduced into popular instruction. They will never be intelligible to a common audience, and will involve the

minds of the common people and of the young in the greatest perplexity and confusion. So judged at one time the Emperor Constantine: οὐ δὲ τοιαύτης ζητήσεως νόμος τινας ἀναγκὴ προστᾶν-τεν, οὐδὲ ταῖς πάντων ἁποαῖς ἀποροῦτως πιστεύειν, Epist. ad Arium, Ap. Socr. i. 7. Would that he himself had afterwards remained true to these principles! [Vide Neander, Allg. Gesch. Christ, Rel., b. i. Abth. 2. s. 616.]

Plan pursued in this Article.

The theologians of former times generally blended their own speculations and those of others on the subject of the Trinity with the statement of the doctrine of the Bible. Within a few years a better plan has been adopted, which is, to exhibit first the simple doctrine of the Bible, and afterwards, in a separate part, the speculations of the learned respecting it. In pursuance of this plan we shall divide the present Article into two chapters, of which the FIRST will contain the *Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity*, and the SECOND, the *History of this Doctrine*, of all the changes it has undergone, and of the distinctions and hypotheses by which the learned in different ages have endeavoured to define and illustrate it.

CHAPTER I.

BIBLICAL DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

SECTION XXXIV.

IS THIS DOCTRINE TAUGHT IN THE OLD TESTAMENT?

It has always been allowed that the doctrine of the Trinity was not fully revealed before the time of Christ, and is clearly taught only in the New Testament. But, at the same time, it was supposed from some passages in the Old Testament that this doctrine was to a greater or less degree known to the Israelites at the time when the New Testament was written, at least that a *plurality* in the godhead was believed by them, although perhaps not exactly a *Trinity*. In proof of this opinion, such passages as Gen. i. 26 were cited by Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen, Eusebius, Theodoret, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil, and other ecclesiastical fathers. Vide Mangey on Philo, De Opif. mundi, p. 17.

This opinion was universal in the protestant church during the sixteenth century, and at the beginning of the seventeenth. The first who questioned it was G. Calixtus, of Helmstadt, who in 1645 published an Essay, *De Trinitate*, and in 1649, another, *De myster. Trinitatis*, an

ex solius V. T. libris possit demonstrari? He was, however, vehemently opposed by Abr. Calovius, and others. And the opinion formerly held by the theologians continued to prevail even into the eighteenth century. But the opinion of Calixtus has since been revived, and has gradually obtained the approbation of most theologians of the present time, although there are still some who declare themselves in favour of the ancient opinion.

The truth on this subject will probably be found in a medium between the extreme to which writers on both sides have frequently gone. (1) It is true, that if the New Testament did not exist we could not derive the doctrine of the Trinity from the Old Testament alone. But (2) it is equally true, that by the manner in which God revealed himself in the Old Testament, the way was prepared for the more full disclosure of his nature that was afterwards made. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are frequently mentioned in the Old Testament, and the Son is represented as one through whom God will bestow blessings upon men, and the Holy Spirit is said to be granted to them for their sanctification. Vide Morus, p. 59, s. 1, note 1, 2. But (3) respecting the intimate connexion of these persons, or respecting other distinctions which belong to the doctrine of the Trinity, there is nothing said in the Old Testament.

Many objections may be made against *each particular text* of the Old Testament, in which an allusion is perceived to a trinity or plurality in God. But these texts are so many in number and so various in kind, that they impress an unprejudiced person, who considers them all in connexion, with the opinion that such a plurality in God is indicated in the Old Testament, though it was not fully developed or clearly defined before the Christian revelation.

These texts may be arranged in the following classes:—

1. Those in which the names of God have the form of the plural, and in which, therefore, a plurality in his nature seems to be indicated. The names אֱלֹהִים, אֲדֹנָי, קְדוּשִׁים, יְהוָה, are cited as examples; but they afford no certain proof, as they may be only the *pluralis majestaticus* of the Oriental languages. Vide s. 17.

2. Texts in which God speaks of himself as many. But the plural in many of these cases can be accounted for from the use of the plural nouns אֱלֹהִים, אֲדֹנָי, יְהוָה. Philo thinks, (De Opif. Mundi, p. 17, ed. Mangey,) that in the passage, Gen. i. 26, *Let us make man*, God addresses the angels. Maimonides thinks the same of the passage, Gen. xi. 7, *Let us go down and confound their language*. Vide Mangey, in loc. It is not uncommon in Hebrew for

kings to speak of themselves in the plural—e. g., 1 Kings, xii. 9; 2 Chron. x. 9; Ezra, iv. 18. In Isaiah, vi. 8, God asks, who will go for us? (לָנוּ)? where the plural form may be explained either as the *pluralis majestaticus*, or as denoting an assembly for consultation. The chiefs of heaven (שָׂרִפִּים) are described as there collected; and God puts to them the question, *whom shall we make our messenger?* as 1 Kings, xxii. 20, seq.

3. Texts in which יְהוָה is distinguished from אֱלֹהִים, and אֲדֹנָי from אֱלֹהִים. *Jehovah rained brimstone and fire from Jehovah*, Gen. xix. 24. *O our God, hear the prayer of thy servant, for the Lord's (Christ's?) sake*, Dan. ix. 17. But these texts, by themselves, do not furnish any decisive proof; for in the simplicity of ancient style the noun is often repeated instead of using the pronoun; and so, *from Jehovah* may mean *from himself*; and for *the Lord's sake* may mean *for thine own sake*—i. e., on account of thy promise. Many other texts may be explained in the same way; as Hosea, i. 7; Zach. x. 12. In this connexion the passage, Ps. xlv. 7, is often cited: *therefore, O God (Messiah?), thy God (the Father) hath anointed thee*. But the name אֲדֹנָי is sometimes given to earthly kings. It does not, therefore, necessarily prove that the person to whom it is here given must be of the divine nature. The passage, Ps. cx. 1, נָא יְהוָה לֵאדֹנָי, "Jehovah said to my Lord," &c. is also cited. But אֲדֹנָי (Messiah) is here distinguished from Jehovah, and is not described as participating in the divine nature, but only in the divine government, as far as he was constituted Messiah by God.

4. Texts in which express mention is made of the *Son of God*, and of the *Holy Spirit*.

(a) Of the *Son of God*. The principal text in this class is Ps. ii. 7, *Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee*, coll. Psalm lxxii. 1; lxxxix. 27. This Psalm was always understood by the Jews, and by the writers of the New Testament, to relate to the Messiah. But he is here represented under the image of a king, to whose government, according to the will of God, all must submit. And it is the dignity of this office of king, or Messiah, of which the Psalmist appears here to speak. The name *Son of God* was not unfrequently given to kings; it is not, therefore, *nomen essentiae*, but *dignitatis messianæ*. The passage would then mean, *Thou art the king (Messiah) of my appointment: this day have I solemnly declared thee such*. That the phrase *to-day* alludes to the resurrection of Christ is proved by a reference to Acts, xiii. 30—34. The writers of the New Testament everywhere teach that Christ was proved to be the Messiah by his resurrection from the dead. Cf. Rom. i. 3, 4. In this Psalm, therefore, the Messiah is rather exhibited

as king, divinely-appointed ruler, and head of the church, than as belonging to the divine nature.

(b) *Of the Holy Spirit.* There are many texts of this class, but none from which, taken by themselves, the *personality* of the Holy Spirit can be proved, as it can easily be from passages in the New Testament. The term *Holy Spirit* may mean, in these texts, (1) The divine nature in general; (2) particular divine attributes, as omnipotence, knowledge, or omniscience; (3) the divine agency, which is its more common meaning. Vide s. 19, II. The principal passage here cited is Isaiah, xlviii. 16, where the whole doctrine of the Trinity is supposed to be taught; וְעַתָּה אֲנִי יְהוָה שְׁלֵחַנִי רִחוּ, *And now Jehovah (the Father) and his Spirit (the Holy Ghost) hath sent me (the Messiah).* רִחוּ has usually been rendered as if it were in the accusative; but it is more properly rendered as a nominative in the Septuagint, the Syriac Version, also by Luther, and the English translators. It means here, as it always does when used by the prophets in this connexion, the *direct, immediate, command* of God. Cf. Acts, xiii. 2, 4. To say, then, *the Lord and his Spirit hath sent me*, is the same as to say, *the Lord hath sent me by a direct, immediate command.*

5. Texts in which *three* persons are expressly mentioned, or in which there is a clear reference to the number *three*. In this class the text, Ps. xxxiii. 6, was formerly placed: *the heavens were made by the word* (Λόγος, *Messiah*) *of Jehovah (the Father); and all the host of them by the spirit of his mouth.* But by the *word of the Lord*, and the *spirit of his mouth*, nothing more is meant than by his *command, will*, as appears from the account of the creation. Cf. verse 9, "He spake and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." The threefold repetition of the name *Jehovah* in the benediction of the high priest, Num. vi. 24, is more remarkable: *Jehovah bless thee, and keep thee; Jehovah be gracious to thee; Jehovah give thee peace.* But the knowledge of the Trinity at that early period cannot be concluded from a mere threefold repetition of the name of Jehovah, unless it is elsewhere exhibited in the writings of the same author. Of the same nature is the threefold repetition of the word *holy* by the seraphs, the invisible servants of God, Isa. vi. 3. To account for this repetition we might suppose there were three heavenly choirs; but the question might then be asked, why these choirs were exactly *three*? It is certainly not impossible that the idea of a trinity in the godhead may be here presupposed, and also in the threefold benediction of the high priest. These choirs are represented in the commencement of the verse as singing one after another, in alternate response, קָרָא הוּא וְאֲנִי. The word קָרָא might have been sung by each choir

separately; and the last words, *the whole earth is full of thy glory*, by the three choirs united.

Thus it appears that no one of the passages cited from the Old Testament in proof of the Trinity is conclusive, when taken by itself; but, as was before stated, when they are all taken together, they convey the impression that at least a plurality in the godhead was obscurely indicated in the Jewish scriptures.

SECTION XXXV.

OF THOSE TEXTS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT IN WHICH FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT ARE MENTIONED IN CONNEXION.

SINCE the Old Testament proves nothing clearly or decidedly upon this subject, we must now turn to the New Testament. The texts from the New Testament which relate to the doctrine in question may be divided into two principal classes: (a) *Those in which Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are mentioned in connexion;* (b) *Those in which these three subjects are mentioned separately, and in which their nature and mutual relation is more particularly described.* In this section we shall treat only of the first class. But the student will need to be on his guard here, lest he should deduce more from these texts, separately considered, than they actually teach. The doctrine of the Trinity in all its extent and in all its modifications is taught in no *single* passages in the New Testament. The writings of the apostles always presuppose the oral instructions which they had given to the Christians whom they addressed, and do not therefore exhibit any regular and formal system of doctrines. Hence, in order to ascertain what the doctrines of the gospel are, we must compare different texts, and form our conclusion from the whole. The first class of texts, taken by itself, proves only that there are the three subjects above named, and that there is a difference between them; that the Father in certain respects differs from the Son, &c.; but it does not prove, by itself, that all the three belong necessarily to the divine nature, and possess equal divine honour. In proof of this, the second class of texts must be adduced.

The following texts are placed in this class:—

1 Matt. xxviii. 18—20. While Jesus continued in the world, he, and his disciples by his direction, had preached the gospel only among the Jews, Matt. x. 5. But now, as he is about to leave the earth, he commissions them to publish his religion everywhere, without any distinction of nation. He had received authority from God to establish a new church, to receive *all* men into it, and to exhibit himself as Lord of all, ver. 18; cf. John, xvii. 2, ἰσχυρία πάντας σαρκός. Wherefore he requires his disciples, ver. 19, to go forth and proselyte all nations,

(μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη.) They were to do this in two ways,—viz., by baptizing (βαπτίζοντες, ver. 19), and by instructing, (διδάσκοντες, ver. 20.) They were required to baptize their converts, εἰς τὸ ὄνομα (ὡς) τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος—i. e., εἰς τὸν Πατέρα, &c. &c. To baptize in the name of a person or thing, means, according to the usus loquendi of the Jews, to bind one by baptism to profess his belief, or give his assent, or yield obedience, to a certain person or thing. The Talmudists say, the Samaritans circumcise their children in the name of Mount Gerizim, and Christians are asked, 1 Cor. i. 13, 15, were ye baptized in the name of Paul? In 1 Cor. x. 3, it is said, πάντες (πατέρες) ἐβαπτίσαντο εἰς Μωσῆν, and in Acts, xix. 4, that John the Baptist ἐβάπτισε εἰς τὸν ἐρχόμενον. This text, taken by itself, would not prove decisively either the personality of the three subjects mentioned, or their equality, or divinity. For (a) the subject into which one is baptized is not necessarily a person, but may be a doctrine, or religion; as, to circumcise in the name of Mount Gerizim. (b) The person in whom one is baptized is not necessarily God, as βαπτίζειν εἰς Μωσῆν, Παῦλον, &c. &c. (c) The connexion of these three subjects does not prove their personality or equality. A subject may swear fealty to his king, to the officer under whose immediate government he is placed, and to the laws of the land. But does this prove that the king, officer, and laws are three persons, and equal to one another? And so, the objector might say, the converts to Christianity might be required to profess by baptism their acknowledgment of the Father, (the author of the great plan of salvation;) of the Son, (who had executed it;) and of the doctrines revealed by God (πνεῦμα ἅγιον), for the knowledge of which they were indebted to both the Father and the Son. But let it be once shewn from other texts that these subjects here mentioned are persons, and that they are equal to one another, and this construction is inadmissible. One thing, however, is evident from this text—viz., that Christ considered the doctrine respecting Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as a fundamental doctrine of his religion, because he requires all his followers to be bound to a profession of it immediately on their being admitted as members of his church, by the initiatory rite of baptism. Vide Morus, p. 59, s. 2.

2. 1 Pet. i. 2. Peter sends his salutations to Christians, and says to them, that they were admitted into the Christian church κατὰ πρόγνωσιν Θεοῦ πατρὸς, (i. e., according to the gracious decree of God,) ἐν ἁγιασμῷ (for εἰς ἁγιασμόν) πνεύματος, εἰς ὑπακοήν καὶ (εἰς) ἰαντισμόν αἵματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, plainly referring to the above-mentioned obligations assumed by Christians at baptism. The sense is, *Ye are become*

Christians according to the eternal decree of God the Father, to the intent that ye should be made holy (morally perfect) through the Holy Spirit; and that ye should obey Jesus Christ, and obtain forgiveness through faith in his blood. But from what is here said of the Holy Spirit, it does not necessarily follow that he is a personal subject; nor from the predicates here ascribed to Christ that he is necessarily divine; and so this passage also, taken by itself, is insufficient.

3. 2 Cor. xiii. 14, *The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit, be with you all.* From the parallelism of the third member of this passage with the two former, we might perhaps infer the personality of the Holy Spirit. But from the mere collocation of the names of these persons, we could not justly infer that they possessed equal authority, or the same nature.

4. John, xiv. 26. Here are three different personal subjects,—viz., ὁ Παράκλητος, Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ὁ πέμψει ὁ Πατήρ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου (Χριστοῦ). But that these three subjects have equal divine honour, and belong to one divine nature, is not sufficiently proved from this passage, and can be argued with certainty only from texts of the second class.

5. Matt. iii. 16, 17, where the baptism of Jesus by John is narrated, has been considered as a locus classicus upon this subject. So the ecclesiastical fathers considered it. Whence the celebrated formula, *I ad Jordanam, et videbis Trinitatem.* This text was called by the ancients Θεοφανεία. Three personal subjects are indeed here mentioned—viz., the voice of the Father, the symbol of the Holy Spirit (περιστερά), and Christ; but nothing is here said respecting their nature; and the phrase, Τὸς Θεοῦ (ver. 17) does not always indicate the divine nature of Christ. This passage then, taken by itself, does not contain the whole doctrine of the Trinity.

But the sense of all these texts can be fully determined by the texts of the second class.

As to the passage 1 John, v. 7, 8;—the words from ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, to ἐν τῇ γῇ, must be allowed, on all critical principles, to be spurious. But even allowing the text to be genuine, it would afford no strong proof of the entire doctrine of the Trinity. Three subjects are indeed enumerated, ὁ Πατήρ, ὁ Λόγος, and τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα; but their nature and essential connexion are not determined; for the expression, οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἐν εἰσι, at the end of ver. 7, does not refer ad unitatem essentiae, and thus signify that they make together one divine being; but ad unitatem voluntatis, and so means, as appears from the context, that they are agreed, unanimous, idem confirmant. This is the meaning at the end of ver. 8, as all are compelled to admit, and it is the

meaning of *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*, whenever it occurs in the writings of John, as John, x. 30; xvii. 11, &c.

Cf. on these verses: Semler, *Historische und kritische Sammlungen über die sogenannten Beweisstellen der Dogmatik*, Erstes Stück; Halle, 1764, 8vo; also his *Vertheidigung und Zusätze*, 2n St. 1768. Michaelis, *Einleit. ins N. T.*, th. ii.; and especially Griesbach, *Dia-tribe in loc. I John*, v. Appendix, N. T. Ed. ii.

SECTION XXXVI.

OF THOSE TEXTS IN WHICH THE FATHER, SON, AND HOLY GHOST ARE SEPARATELY MENTIONED, AND IN WHICH THEIR NATURE AND MUTUAL RELATION ARE TAUGHT.

THESE texts form the second class above mentioned, s. 35; and they shew how the texts of the first class are to be understood. They prove (a) that the Son and Holy Spirit, according to the doctrine of the New Testament, are divine, or belong to the one divine nature; and (b) that the three subjects are personal and equal. In popular instruction it will be found best to exhibit this class of texts before the other. In examining these texts we shall exhibit (1) those which teach the divinity of the Father; (2) of the Son; (3) of the Holy Ghost.

The Deity of the Father.

When the term *Father* is applied to God it often designates the *whole godhead*, or the whole divine nature; as Θεός ὁ Πατήρ, 1 Cor. viii. 4—6; John, xvii. 1—3. He is often called Θεός καὶ Πατήρ—i. e., Θεός ὁ Πατήρ, or Θεός ὅς ἐστι Πατήρ, as Gal. i. 4, (a Hebraism, like the use of *for* the relative *ὅς*.) All the arguments, therefore, which prove the existence of God (vide s. 15—17), prove also the deity of the Father. In the scriptures God is called *Father*,

1. Inasmuch as he is the *creator and preserver*. Deut. xxxii. 6, *Is he not thy Father, who hath made thee and established thee?* 1 Cor. viii. 6, Θεός ὁ Πατήρ ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα, Ephes. iv. 6, ὁ Πατήρ πάντων. The Hebrews call the author, inventor, teacher of anything, the *father* of it; as Gen. iv. 20—22, *Jubal, the father of all who play on the harp, &c.*; Job, xxxviii. 28, *God, the Father of rain.*

2. Inasmuch as he is the *benefactor*, guardian, and guide of men. Psalm lxviii. 5, *The father of the fatherless*. Job says of himself, (xxix. 16,) *I was the father of the poor*. Isaiah, lxiii. 16, "Thou (God) art our father and redeemer." Psalm ciii. 13, "As a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him." It was a great object with Christ to diffuse just apprehensions respecting the universal paternal love of God to men. Cf. Romans, viii. 15, 16, also s. 28, 30, 31. Hence he frequently calls God, *Father, heavenly Father, &c.* The name *children of God* sometimes denotes his *favourites*,

those *beloved by him*; sometimes those who endeavour to resemble him, especially in purity, love, and beneficence; sometimes both those who love and follow him as children a father, and those whom he loves as a father does dutiful children. In this respect, too, God is often called the *Father* of men—i. e., their *example, pattern*, the being whom they imitate. When the name *Father* is applied to God in either of these respects, as creator or as benefactor, the whole godhead is intended.

3. God is frequently called in the New Testament, ὁ Θεός καὶ Πατήρ τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, Romans, xv. 6; 2 Cor. xi. 31; Ephes. i. 3, &c. This expression in many texts indicates,

(a) The relation in which Christ, as the Saviour of men, stands to God; in which relation he is frequently called the *Son of God*, s. 37. God is represented in the Bible as properly the author and institutor (Πατήρ) of Christianity; and also as the father of Christ, in that he sent him into the world, and commissioned him as a man to instruct and to redeem our race. It is clear from John that Christ himself often calls God his father, in reference to this charge and commission which God had given him. John, xvii. 1—3, Πάτερ, —δόξασόν σου τὸν Υἱόν—ἰδωκας αὐτὸν ἐξουσίαν πάσης σαρκὸς ἵνα γινώσκωσι σὲ, τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεόν, καὶ ὃν ἀπέστειλας, Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν. This is quite accordant with that scriptural usage before specified, by which the author of a thing is called its father. And besides, *teachers* were called by the Jews *fathers*, and those taught by them, *children*. 2 Kings, ii. 12; vi. 21. Christ says to his disciples, Matt. xxiii. 9, *Let none call you FATHER* (as teachers are called), *for one is your Father*, (teacher, instructor,) *who is in heaven*.

(b) This phrase, *the Father of Jesus Christ*, in many passages, undoubtedly indicates a certain internal relation existing in the godhead of the deity of Christ to the deity of the Father, the peculiar nature of which relation is nowhere disclosed in the Bible, and probably cannot be clearly understood by men. We know, however, that while Christ always acknowledged that he derived everything from the Father, he made himself equal to him. Vide Morus, p. 63, s. 8. In this sense, Christ uses the phrase in many passages, and among others, in his discourse, John, v. This even the Jews noticed, and accused him of blasphemy, because he called God Πατέρα ἰδίον, and so made himself equal to God, (ver. 18.) Nor does Christ blame them, in his answer, for understanding him in this way; but, on the contrary, goes on to say, ver. 23, *that all should honour the Son even as they honour the Father*. Cf. John, x. 30, seq.; Luke, ii. 49. Theologians therefore say: *Pater dicitur dupliciter; (a) ὑποστατικῶς, personaliter,*

incommunicabilit̄, (de prima persona;) (b) *οὐκ ὁμιλῶν*, *essentialiter*; *sic tribus personis esse commune*. Morus, p. 60, note ad. s. 4.

SECTION XXXVII.

OF THE TEXTS IN WHICH DIVINE NAMES ARE GIVEN TO CHRIST.

THE deity of Christ is proved from three classes of texts. Morus, p. 60, seq. s. 5—9. (a) Texts in which *divine names* are ascribed to him, s. 37. But from most of these texts, in themselves considered, we can derive no very strong argument for the supreme or essential deity of Christ. They rather prove his *divineness* than his *deity*. In order to prove the deity of Christ, we depend upon (b) texts in which *divine attributes and works*, and (c) *divine honour or worship* (cultus divinus) are ascribed to him. Both of these classes will be considered in s. 38, coll. s. 100. From all these texts in conjunction the result is, that Christ is called God on account of his divine attributes and works. Morus, p. 63.

Note 1. Works in defence of the deity of Christ. Among the more ancient writers, Calixtus, Whitby, Spener, Venema, defended this doctrine. Among the more modern, G. F. Seiler has written, and with reference to the present controversies, Ueber die Gottheit Christi; Leipzig, 1775, 8vo. Semler, Ueber die Beweisstellen u. s. w. 1772, 4to; particularly his *historical* notes. "Gottheit Christi, Ist sie wohl aus seinen eignen Reden zu erweisen?" (printed without name of the place, 1790, 8vo.) In the year 1786, the King of England gave, as the subject of a premium-essay, *the proof of the divinity of Christ* (in the sense of the Lutheran church), and appointed the theological faculty at Göttingen to award the prize, (a medal, worth 50 ducats.) This gave occasion to the following work of Semler, Vorbereitung auf die Königl. Grossbrit. Preisfrage von der Gottheit Christi; Halle, 1787, 8vo. From twenty-seven essays that were offered, none were judged worthy of the prize. The faculty, however, published the following essay as the best: Jo. Frid. Flatt, Commentatio, in qua symbolica ecclesiæ nostræ dei deitate Christi sententia probatur et vindicatur; Göttingæ, 1788, 8vo. The following able and intelligent letters, written under fictitious names, owed their origin to this prize: Io. Aspontani ad Rud. Plimmeliū, de deitate Jesu Christi, epistolæ quatuor; Lipsi, 1789, 8vo. Martini, Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte des Dogma von der Gottheit Christi, in den vier ersten Jahrhunderten; Rostock und Leipzig, 1800.

Note 2. Morus, p. 65, s. 9, makes the following just observation: Christ has laid the human

race under infinite obligations, by the special blessings relating to our salvation, which he has bestowed upon us. But these benefits derive an additional value from the exalted character of the person to whom we owe them. And the gratitude which we shall feel towards him, and our willingness to obey his precepts and to believe his doctrine, will therefore probably be in proportion to the idea we form of his character. It is not then, as many would have us suppose, a matter of no consequence to undervalue the character of Christ, or degrade him to the level of a man. The truth of this observation is abundantly confirmed both by scripture and experience; and it should be seriously pondered by every teacher of religion.

The following are the principal texts in which the names of deity are given to Christ;—

1. John, i. 1, 2. Christ is here called *ὁ λόγος*; Morus, p. 71, note. John is the only one of the New-Testament writers who applies this name to Christ. He wrote among the Grecian Jews, and for the Hellenistic Christians, among whom probably this appellation of Christ must at that time have been very common; which is the reason why he does not more fully explain it. It signifies among the Jews and other ancient people, when applied to God, *everything by which God reveals himself to men, and makes known to them his will*. Hence those who made known the divine will to men were called by the Hellenists *λόγοι*, otherwise *ἄγγελοι*, *δοῦλοι Θεοῦ*; as, *Θεὸς χρητὰι λόγοις*, Philo, Migrat. Abrah. Vide Book of Wisdom, xviii. 15, on which cf. Grotius. Now this word was probably applied to the Messiah, by way of eminence, because he was considered as the greatest divine messenger; Rev. xix. 13.

The Hellenists, however, frequently associated very erroneous ideas with this word; and on this account John undertakes here to correct their mistakes respecting it, and gives it a very elevated meaning. He says: *ὁ Λόγος* (*the declarer, revealer of God*) existed *ἐν ἀρχῇ*—viz., *τοῦ κόσμου* (רִאשִׁית, Gen. i. 1—i. e., *ab æterno*.) Did he exist before the creation of the world, he must be *God*; for before the creation nothing but God himself existed. This pre-existence of Christ is also taught in his discourses, John, viii. 58; xvii. 5, 24. *And the Λόγος was with God*—viz., before he revealed himself to men. Καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος, *proposito inversa*, as in John, iv. 24. 'Ο Λόγος is the subject; *the Logos was God*. Crell's conjectural reading, *Θεοῦ ἦν ὁ λόγος*, must be rejected at once, since all the MSS. agree in the common reading, which is undoubtedly correct. Vide s. 100. In this passage the principal proof does not lie in the word *λόγος*, nor even in the word *θεός*, which in a larger sense is often applied to kings and

earthly rulers, but to what is predicated of the *Ἀλόγος*—viz., that he *existed from eternity with God*; that the world was made by him, &c. This text belongs, therefore, to the following general class, as well as to this.

2. John, xx. 28. Here Thomas, at last convinced that Christ was actually risen from the dead, thus addresses him: *ὁ Κύριός μου καὶ ὁ Θεός μου*. The nominative instead of the vocative. *Εὖ σὺ*, or some similar phrase, must be supplied, in order to complete the sense: "Thou art truly he, my Lord and my God." It is not an exclamation of wonder, as some have understood it; for it is preceded by the phrase *ἔλεπεν αὐτῷ*, he said this *to him*; addressed *him* in these words. In the same manner the Romans, after the time of Tiberius, used the expression *Dominus ac Deus noster*, in relation to the emperors, whom they deified. Thomas probably remembered what Jesus had often said respecting his superhuman origin, John, v. 8, 10, 17, seq.; and he now saw it all confirmed by his resurrection from the dead. Christ seems to have approved of the manner in which he was addressed by Thomas.

3. Philip. ii. 6, where it is said of Christ that he is *ἰσᾶ Θεῷ*, *Deo æqualis*; not *ὁμοίος Θεῷ*, *ἄντιθεός*, *θεοεικὸς*, *similis Deo*—terms applied by Homer to kings and heroes. The term *ἴσος Θεῷ*, or the contrary, is never applied to a finite or created being. Hence the Jews, John, v. 18, considered it as blasphemy in Christ to make himself *ἴσον Θεῷ*. Vide s. 38.

4. Rom. ix. 5. Paul is speaking of the privileges of the Jewish nation, and mentions among others the circumstance, that Christ was derived from them, as to his bodily nature, *ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα*. and then adds, *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός, εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*! If this refers to Christ, it is a very strong proof of his divinity. For the phrase *Θεὸς εὐλογητός* is applied only to the supreme God, Romans, i. 25; Mark, xiv. 61. Besides *ὁ ὢν* is used for *ὅς ἐστι*, which usually relates to the immediate antecedent.

But the passage is sometimes differently pointed, a full stop being placed after *σάρκα*, and then this whole proposition is referred to the Father. So Origen, Eusebius, and many of the ecclesiastical fathers; vide Wetstein and Semler. But (a) it must then read, according to the *usus loquendi* of the Greeks: *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων*, without *ὢν* or *ὁ Θεός, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων (ὢν)*; though in answer to this, it might indeed be said that Paul was little versed in the Grecian idiom, and has many ungrammatical constructions. But an ungrammatical construction of *such a nature* is found nowhere else, either in Paul, or the other writers of the New Testament. (b) In all the passages, without exception, in which

these words are used as a *doxology*, *εὐλογητός* (*ברוך*) stands first in the clause; accordingly, if it referred to the Father, it would read *εὐλογητός ὁ Θεός ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων*. This usage is as fixed and invariable in Greek, as in German to say *Gottlob!* instead of *Lobgott!* (c) Since Paul has elsewhere ascribed divine perfection to Christ in the distinctest manner, as will be proved s. 38, there is no reason why the natural meaning of his language in this passage should be perverted. And if this passage were read in an unprejudiced manner, it would undoubtedly be referred by every one to Christ.

5. John, x. 28—30, *ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ Πατήρ ἐν ἑσμέν*. These words are not to be understood to denote so much an equality of nature, as unanimity of feeling and purpose; s. 35, note, ad finem. Still the passage is quite remarkable; because Christ professes to do his work *in common with his Father*; and this is more than any man, prophet, or even angel, is ever said in the Bible to do. These perform their works *through* God, and by his assistance. Indeed, they do nothing themselves, and God does everything. That *being one with God*, therefore, which Jesus here asserts for himself, is something peculiar, and which belongs to him only as he is a being of a higher nature. Cf. John, v. 18, seq.

6. Some of the texts in which Christ is called the *Son of God*. It is evident that this name is given in the New Testament to Christ in more than one relation, and consequently is used in more than one signification; vide s. 36, ad finem. Morus, p. 63, note 2. Three different senses of this name may be distinguished.

(a) In many passages it is synonymous with *χριστός*, *Messiah*, or *king*. In the oriental languages, kings are commonly called the *sons of God*, by way of eminence, (so in Greek *διογενεῖς* and *διοτρεφεῖς*;) and the most distinguished among them his *first-born*, Ps. lxxxix. 27. They were considered as the vicegerents of God upon earth,—as his representatives, bearing his image, and entrusted with his authority, Ps. lxxii. 2. The idea of a *king*, therefore, is frequently implied in the appellation *Son of God*, applied to Christ; which then is synonymous with *μετ᾽ ἐξουσίαν, Χριστός, Χριστὸς Θεοῦ*. This title was very commonly given to the Messiah by the Jews; vide Matt. xvi. 16; Luke, ix. 20; Matt. xxvii. 40; Luke, xxiii. 35; also the Talmud and Rabbins. It was undoubtedly taken originally from Ps. ii. 7, and 2 Sam. vii. 14, both of which texts were referred by the Jews to the Messiah. If this title is understood in this way, it is easy to see how Paul can say, 1 Cor. xv. 28, that hereafter, when the church on earth shall cease, the *Son of God* will lay down his *βασιλείαν*, and as *τίδς* become subject to the Father. In this same sense—namely, to

denote his Messiahship—Jesus also sometimes appropriates this name to himself. He says, Mark, xiii. 32, that *he himself, as Ἰδὸς, knew not the time of the judgment of Jerusalem.* To contend, therefore, that this appellation always denotes the *divine nature* of Christ, would involve us in unnecessary difficulty. But the meaning which we have now given will by no means apply in all the cases in which this appellation occurs. It sometimes denotes,

(b) *The higher nature of Christ*—e. g., Rom. i. 3, 4. Christ is here spoken of in two respects: first, *κατὰ σάρκα, in his inferior nature*, his humanity, and in this he is called *Ἰδὸς Δαυὶδ*: secondly, *κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιασμένης, as to his higher, more perfect nature, τὸ θεῖον*, and in this he is called *Ἰδὸς Θεοῦ*, and solemnly declared to be such by God in his resurrection from the dead. Jesus, moreover, uses this title of himself in this sense, John, v. 17, seq.; and the Jews well understood that by thus using it he made himself equal to God; cf. x. 30, 33. Nor did Christ charge them with misunderstanding him, but, on the contrary, admitted the sense they had put upon his words; cf. ver. 18, 23; and x. 34. Again, the predicates connected with this appellation, John, i. and Heb. i. ii., are such as are never used in respect to any man, or any created spirit. Thus Christ is called *μονογενὴς*. Moreover, *Χριστός* is often distinguished from *Ἰδὸς Θεοῦ*. Thus, Matt. xvi. 16, where Peter answers a question of Jesus, by saying, *thou art the Christ, the Son of God*: cf. John, xx. 31.

(c) He is also called *Son of God*, Luke, i. 35, to designate the immediate power of God in the miraculous production of his human nature. In the same sense, Adam, who was immediately created by God, is called the *Son of God*, Luke, iii. 38.

7. Tit. ii. 13, *We expect the glorious appearance, the ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. Here it is objected, that if *Θεὸς μέγας* related to Christ, the *καὶ* would be omitted. But since *τοῦ* is omitted before *σωτῆρος*, both *μεγάλου Θεοῦ* and *σωτῆρος* must be construed as in apposition with *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, according to a known usage of the Greek language; and so they are construed by many of the ancient writers. Besides, *ἐπιφάνεια* is the word by which the solemn coming of Christ is appropriately designated. The passage therefore, is regarded, even by Henke, as referring to Christ.

These are the most important texts of this class. Other texts are sometimes placed in connexion with these, which are less capable of defence, either on critical or philological grounds. Such are 1 John, v. 20; 1 Tim. iii. 16; Acts, xx. 28:

SECTION XXXVIII.

OF THE TEXTS IN WHICH DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AND WORKS ARE ASCRIBED TO CHRIST; AND IN WHICH DIVINE HONOUR IS REQUIRED FOR HIM.

I. *Texts in which Divine Attributes and Works are ascribed to Christ.*

This is the second class of the division mentioned in the first part of s. 37. Many doubtful texts are often placed in this class, in order to make out the proof, that all the divine attributes are ascribed to Christ in the Bible. But the proof of this is not at all important. For if it be allowed that one single divine attribute is ascribed to Christ in the Bible, the conclusion is inevitable, that he must possess all the rest. The divine attributes cannot be separated or disjoined; where one of them exists, all of them must be found. And the truth of this cannot be disputed. Vide s. 18. The following divine attributes and works are distinctly ascribed to Christ in the scriptures—viz.,

1. *Eternity*. Cf. Morus, p. 60, 61, s. 6. This attribute is ascribed to him in those texts in which he is said to have existed *before the foundation of the world*; for this is the way in which eternity *à parte ante* is always described. Vide s. 20. Here belongs the text, John, i. 1 (s. 37); and also John, xvii. 5, *Glorify me with that glory which I had with thee πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι*. The glory here spoken of could not be that derived from the government of the kingdom of God, or of the church; because neither of them existed before the creation of the world; it can therefore be nothing else than *divine* glory. Here, too, belongs the passage, John, viii. 58, where Christ describes his higher nature, by saying, *Before Abraham was, I AM (εἰμι)*; for by this same verb, in the present tense, does God describe his own unchangeable being. Accordingly the Jews understood him to assert for himself a divine attribute, and therefore charged him with blasphemy, and sought to stone him, (ver. 59.) And so frequently, according to the testimony of John and the other evangelists, Christ spoke of himself, in a manner in which it would have been presumption and blasphemy for a prophet or any created being to speak.

2. *The creation and preservation of the world*. This is ascribed to him, John, i. 1—3, *Πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν, ὃ γέγονεν*. Ver. 10, *Ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο*. Col. i. 15—17, *Πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*, not, *primus inter res creatas*, which would be inconsistent with the context, ver. 16, where the reason is given why he was *πρωτότοκος*; but, *rex, the ruler or governor* (πρωτεύων ἐν πᾶσι, *principatum tenens*, Col. i. 18); in which sense

Christ is also called *πρωτότοκος* in Heb. i. 6, and *ἀρχή* (i. e., *ἄρχων*) *τῆς κτίσεως Θεοῦ*, Rev. iii. 14. *By him were all things in the universe created, (ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς,) the material and spiritual world, (τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ ἀόρατα;) everything which is elevated, great, and powerful, (θρόνοι κυριότητες, ἀρχαί, κ. τ. λ. ;) all things were created by him (δι' αὐτοῦ) and on his account, or for his service (εἰς αὐτόν). He exists from eternity (πρὸ πάντων), and from him everything derives its existence (τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκε).* Philo and Josephus often speak of God, the Creator, in the same way. Heb. i. 2, 3. Christ is here described as *φέρων*, (i. e., *conservans*; cf. *φέρω*, Is. xli. 3; and the phrase *ἐκ τῆς ἐξουσίας* applied to God) *τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ* i. e., by his almighty will or command. That in the clause, *δι' οὗ καὶ τοὺς αἰῶνας ἐποίησεν*, the word *διά* may denote not merely the *instrumental*, but also the *efficient cause*, is evident from many texts—e. g., John, iii. 17; Romans, i. 5; 1 Cor. i. 9; and especially from Heb. ii. 10, where the same word is used in reference to the Father, *δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα*. And that the meaning of Paul was, that the Son himself was the creator of the universe, is placed beyond a doubt from the text, Heb. i. 10, where Ps. cii. 26 (*Thou, Lord, hast founded the earth; the heavens are the work of thy hands,*) is quoted and applied to Christ. Therefore inasmuch as the eternal power and majesty of the Father are declared by the creation, so far as it is his work (Rom. i. 20); the eternal power and majesty of the Son are declared by this same creation, so far as it is *his* work. For further remarks respecting the creation of the world by the Son, vide s. 47.

3. *Omnipotence* is ascribed to Christ, Phil. iii. 21; *omniscience*, Matt. xi. 27. John, vi. 46, *He only, ἔωπαξε τὸν πατέρα*. John, ii. 24, 25. He is also described as the *searcher of hearts, who knows and will bring to light the most hidden things*, 1 Cor. iv. 5. Indeed, it follows of course, that if Christ has created, governs, and preserves all things, he must possess omnipotence and omniscience. Here it is objected, that from other texts it is clear that Christ received both his doctrine and his power from the Father—e. g., Matt. xi. 27, *πάντα μοι παρεδόθη ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς*. John, viii. 26; xii. 49; Matt. xxviii. 18, *all power in heaven and in earth is given me*. John, iii. 35; v. 26; *the Father hath given power to the Son to raise the dead, &c.* But in these passages Christ is spoken of as MESSIAH, or as an ambassador appointed by God. And here it is evident, that he is considered in the New Testament both as God, and as God united with man. Vide s. 100, seq.

Note.—The passage Col. ii. 9, *ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς*, is quoted

to prove that Christ possesses all divine perfections. But the text must be explained by the parallel texts, Col. i. 19, *ἐν αὐτῷ εὐδόκησε πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα κατοικῆσαι*, and Ephes. iii. 19, where the phrase *πλήρωμα Θεοῦ* occurs instead of *πλήρωμα θεότητος*, so that *θεότητος* is abstract for concrete, like *κυριότης* instead of *κύριος*. *Πλήρωμα* means *multitude, collection*; as *πλήρωμα τῶν Ἰδων*, Rom. xi. 25. By the phrase, then, *πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος*, the whole multitude of men living under the divine government are intended, and when of these it is said, that they *ἐν αὐτῷ (Χριστῷ) κατοικεῖ*, it is the same as to say, All men without distinction, whether Jews or Greeks, have citizenship in the Christian church,—all are the people of God. *Σωματικῶς* is equivalent to *ὡς σῶμα*, and must be explained by the parallel texts, Col. i. 18; Ephes. i. 22; iv. 15; according to which the meaning of the phrase is, *they compose the body, or church, of which Christ is the head (κεφαλὴ)*. Næsselt, in his Weihnachts programm. of 1785, gives another explanation. He supposes the allusion is to the perfect divine instruction which is given by Christ, and that in a real and distinct manner (*σωματικῶς*); and not in symbols and images, as in the Mosaic religion.

II. Texts in which Divine Honour is required for Christ.

This is the third class of texts in proof of the divinity of Christ. Christ and his apostles expressly teach that divine honour and worship must be paid to God only. Vide Matt. iv. 10, coll. Deut. vi. 13; Rev. xix. 10. And in this they agree entirely with the prophets of the Old Testament. Vide Isa. xlii. 8; xlviii. 11. Hence it is just to conclude, that when Christ himself and his apostles require that divine worship should be paid to him, they acknowledge that he is God; otherwise they would require what, according to their own principles, would be blasphemy. The following are the principal texts of this class:—

1. John, v. 23, *All should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father; whoso honours not the Son, honours not the Father who hath sent him*. We reason thus:—If the worship due to the Father should be paid to the Son, and if he who withholds from the Son such worship as is due to the Father, is regarded as if he honoured not the Father, it follows that equal honour is due to the Son with the Father. But Christ, according to his own maxims, could have laid no claim to this honour if he were less than the Father, or, which is the same thing, were not God. Now the Son is honoured as the Father, his instructions and precepts are embraced and obeyed as those of the Father; when the same unlimited confidence is placed in him as is placed in the Father; when all our salvation is

expected from him as it is from the Father: and this is what Jesus requires of his disciples.

2. That the apostles and primitive Christians must have understood and explained these and similar expressions of Christ in this manner, appears from their example. For (a) the apostles and first Christians directed their *prayers* to Christ—e. g., in the choice of an apostle, Acts, i. 24: *Σὺ, Κύριε, καρδιουργήσῃς πάντων*, coll. v. 21, where Jesus is called *Κύριος*. The *ὁ Κύριος*, whom Paul invoked, 2 Cor. xii. 8, was Christ; for it was that the power of Christ (*δύναμις Χριστοῦ*) might be manifested in supporting him that he was willing to suffer; cf. Acts, vii. 59. Besides, in the early ages of Christianity, it was well known even among the heathen, that Christians worshipped Christ as a God. Pliny (X. Epist. 97) says, he was assured that in their meetings, *carmen Christo quasi Deo soliti essent dicere secum invicem*. (b) The apostles frequently refer to Christ the texts of the Old Testament which speak of the honour and worship of God—e. g., Heb. i. 6, *Let all the angels of God worship him*, from Psalm xcvi. 7; also Rom. xiv. 11, from Is. xlv. 3.

3. Phil. ii. 10, *At the name of Jesus* (i. e., when they hear the name of Jesus, *ὁ Κύριος*, the Lord over all, ver. 9, 11,) *every knee should bow, of angels, (or the inhabitants of heaven,) of the inhabitants of earth, and the inhabitants of the kingdom of the dead, (καταχθόνια);* in short, all in the universe, without exception. Should it be objected here that these words do not require that *divine* honour should be given to Jesus, but that adoration only which is due to him as *king, Messiah, head of the church*, (since in ver. 9, 11, he is spoken of in the latter character, and not as God,) it might be replied, that in the preceding context he is expressly described as *ἰσα ὁ θεός*. So that Paul here requires that same divine honour to be paid to Christ which he requires elsewhere, and which he himself rendered: All should worship as God *this equal of God* (ver. 6), whenever they heard his name, which is above every other.

4. Here belong also the texts in which the apostles shew that they place their whole reliance on Christ; looked to him for all temporal and spiritual blessings, those relating to time and to eternity; and in which they exhort all Christians to do the same; and this reliance on Christ is expressed by them in the same language in which they speak elsewhere of their confidence in God and his providence, and which is never employed in reference to men or angels; 2 Cor. v. 8—11; 2 Tim. iv. 17, 18. The texts in which the apostles profess to work miracles *ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ*, as his messengers, and by his power, are to be reckoned among the foregoing proofs—e. g., Acts, iii. 6, seq. &c.;

also the *oaths* and *protestations* which the apostles uttered by Christ, since, according to Christian rules, they could swear by God alone—e. g., Rom. ix. 1, *ἐν Χριστῷ*, by Christ! 2 Tim. ii. 7; finally, the texts in which the apostles supplicate grace from Christ, as well as from the Father, for all Christians.

We see, then, from all these texts, that while the Bible always teaches that Christ receives all his endowments from the Father, (vide Morus, p. 63, s. 8,) and that the Father acts through him; and bestows all good through him; it still describes him as literally God, and equal with the Father. And this is sufficient to establish our faith; and further than this we should not attempt to go.

SECTION XXXIX.

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT AND HIS PERSONALITY.

I. Meaning of the term Holy Spirit.

ONE of the principal difficulties in the discussion of this doctrine arises from the various meanings of the words *רוח* and *πνεῦμα*, and of the compounds *רוח קדוש*, *רוח אלהים*, *רוח ἁγίος*, *Πνεῦμα ἁγίον*, *Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ*, &c. These meanings, however, are needlessly multiplied by the subtleties of interpreters and lexicographers. It may also be remarked that the terms *רוח קדוש* and *רוח אלהים*, *Πνεῦμα ἁγίον* and *Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ*, are interchanged as synonymous, since *ἁγίον*, *קדוש*, signify *what is revered, venerable*, and then more specifically *what is divine*. Hence the expression occurring 1 Pet. iv. 14, *τὸ τῆς δόξης*, (i. e., *ἔκδοξον* or *ἁγίον*) καὶ (i. e.) *τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πνεῦμα*.

In order to understand thoroughly the ground of the various significations of this term as used in the Bible, and especially in the New Testament, the reader must consult the general remarks respecting the use of these words, and respecting the derivations of their significations contained in s. 19, II.; col. s. 9, III. IV. In continuation of what is there said, (supposing it now to be understood by the student,) the following remarks, relating particularly to the New Testament, are here added.

רוח קדוש frequently signifies, *the divine nature, or God himself*; but it also denotes the *divine power*, as displayed both in the material and spiritual world; also the *divine understanding and knowledge*, and the *communication* of it to men. But in speaking of the effects of the divine power, there was not in ancient times that nice distinction which is now made between what is mediately and immediately done by God, since his agency is not less real in one case than in the other. This distinction is not therefore found in the holy scriptures; no practical pur-

pose could have been answered by introducing it; and indeed, to have made it would often have been injurious.

Accordingly, throughout the Old Testament, the *רוח קדש*, or *רוח אלהים*, is represented as having an agency, sometimes mediate, sometimes immediate, in everything which is done; and to it everything great and elevated—knowledge, talents, discoveries, arts, great actions, good governments, exemplary virtue and piety, &c., are uniformly ascribed. Vide s. 9, III.

The same mode of expression and representation is adopted in the New Testament, and was common among the first Christians. As the people of God, they were bound to distinguish themselves from other men by their knowledge of the sacred truths of religion; they were bound to live in a virtuous and truly pious manner; to place their confidence in God and in Jesus Christ; with the promise that thus they should enjoy in an eminent degree the blessing of God and the grace of Christ, and be greatly prospered in their endeavours for the promotion of Christianity. Now all this knowledge, holiness, faith, and success in their undertakings was ascribed by them *Πνεύματι ἁγνῷ* or *θεοῦ*. Vide 1 Cor. xii. 3, seq.; from which passage we also learn that the influences and operations of this divine Spirit were different, according to the difference found in individual Christians.

(a) It was the duty of *all* Christians to possess a fundamental knowledge, and a firm and unwavering belief of the principal truths of Christianity; to live in a manner corresponding to this knowledge; to have a faith in God and in Jesus Christ, made active by love. And so this knowledge of the truths of religion, and this correspondent Christian temper and disposition, were ascribed to the Holy Spirit, and were called *Πνεῦμα ἁγνόν*, *Πνεῦμα θεοῦ*, *Χριστοῦ*, or *τίου*. Vide Rom. viii. 9; Gal. v. 16, 22, 23; vi. 8. The gospel itself, or Christianity, was also called by the same name, it being the most perfect, and a *divinely instituted* religion.

(b) But some Christians were distinguished from the rest by eminent abilities, talents, gifts, and capacities; by zeal, activity, &c. These were made teachers and other officers of the church, according to their various gifts and abilities. Now all these various gifts, abilities, and talents, of whatever sort, by which such persons became useful to the church, were ascribed to the Holy Spirit, derived and named from him; for in these various endowments the agency of this divine co-operating power was unusually conspicuous. These extraordinary qualifications are commonly called *miraculous gifts*—the gift of teaching, of tongues, of healing, of working miracles, &c.,—all of which promoted the glory and advancement of Christianity. Vide Matt. iii. 11; 1 Cor. xiv. 12; 1 Thess. v.

19. On this account it is that all who oppose the truth of God, or persecute the prophets who teach it, even those who put hindrances in the way of the influence of religion over themselves or others, are said to *resist the Holy Spirit*, to *afflict*, to *grieve it*, &c. Isa. lxiii. 10; Ephes. iv. 30; Acts, vii. 51.

Since now the sacred writers, like all others, make use of the figure *prosopopeia*, and personify these divine influences—speaking of them as the *Holy Spirit*, as they often do of the *wisdom* and *other attributes* of God—we should be cautious in the selection of texts from which the *personality* of the Holy Spirit is to be proved. We should rest content with those which are most clear and explicit; for nothing is gained by collecting a large number.

Cf. Lang, *Zur Beforderung des richtigen Gebrauchs des Teller'schen Wörterbuchs über das N. T. unter dem Worte Geist*. Schleusner. Diss. de vocabuli *πνεῦμα* in libris N. T. vario usu, Göttingæ, 1791, 4to. Scripta Varii Argumenti, No. IV., *De Spiritu Sancto et Christo paracletis*; Halæ, 1790.

II. Personality of the Holy Spirit.

The Holy Spirit is represented in the New Testament, not only as different from the Father and Son, and not merely as the personification of some attribute of God, or of some effect which he has produced, but as a *literal person*. Vide Semler, *Disp. Spiritum Sanctum recte describi personam*. The proof of this is thus made out from the following texts:—

1. From the texts, John, xiv. 16, 17, 26; xv. 26. The Holy Spirit is here called *παράκλητος*, not *comforter*, *advocate*, nor even merely *teacher*, as Ernesti renders it, but *helper*, *assistant*, *counsellor*, in which sense it is used by Philo, when he says, *God needs no παράκλητος*, (monitor.) Of the *Paracletus* Christ says, *that the Father will send him in his (Christ's) name*, (i. e., in his place,) *to instruct his disciples*. To these three subjects similar personal predicates are here equally applied; and the *Paracletus* is not designated by the abstract word *auxilium*, but by the concrete *auxiliator*; so that we have the Father, who sent him; the Son, in whose place he comes; and the Holy Spirit, who is sent. His office is to carry forward the great work of teaching and saving men, which Christ commenced, and to be to the disciples of Christ what Christ himself was while he continued upon the earth. John, xv. 26, *When the Paracletus shall come, whom I will send to you from the Father, (I mean, the Spirit—i. e., teacher—of truth, who proceeds from the Father), he will instruct you further in my religion*; where it should be remarked, that the phrase *ἐκπορεύεσθαι παρὰ Πατρός* means *to be sent or commissioned by the Father*. Cf. John, xiv. 16, (*δώσει ὑμῖν Παῖρ,*)

and xvi. 28, (ἐξῆλθον παρὰ Πατρός, *missus sum*,) and xvi. in Hebrew. This procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father does not imply, then, as it is used in the Bible, the communication of the divine nature to the Spirit, or his internal connexion with the Father. Vide s. 43.

2. 1 Cor. xii. 4—11, *There are various gifts (χαρίσματα), but there is one and the same Spirit (τὸ αὐτὸ Πνεῦμα), from whom they all proceed.* Here the χαρίσματα are expressly distinguished from the Spirit, who is the author of them. In ver. 5, this same person is distinguished from Christ (ὁ Κύριος), and in ver. 6, from ὁ Θεός. In ver. 11 it is said, *all these (various gifts) worketh one and the selfsame Spirit, who imparteth to every man his own, as he will (καθὼς βούλεται).*

3. Those texts in which such attributes and works are ascribed to the Holy Spirit as can be predicated of no other than a personal subject. In John, xvi. 13, seq., he is said λαλεῖν, ἀκούειν, λαμβάνειν, &c. &c. 1 Cor. ii. 10, *God hath revealed the doctrines of Christianity to us BY HIS SPIRIT, (the παράκλητος before mentioned, who was sent to give us this more perfect instruction.) And this Spirit searches (ἐρευνᾷ) all things, even the most secret divine purposes, (βάζει Θεοῦ, cf. Rom. xi. 33. seq. ;) in his instruction, therefore, we may safely confide. The expressions, the Holy Spirit speaks, sends any one, appoints any one for a particular purpose, and others, which occur so frequently in the Acts and elsewhere, shew that the Holy Spirit was understood by the early Christians to be a personal agent. Acts, xiii. 2, 4; xx. 28; xxi. 11, seq.*

4. The formula of baptism, Matt. xxviii. 19, and other similar texts, such as 2 Cor. xiii. 14, where Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are mentioned in distinction, (s. 35,) may now be used in proof of the personality of the Holy Spirit, since the other texts upon which the meaning of these depends have already been cited. We may now safely conclude that the Holy Spirit mentioned in these texts was understood by the early Christians to be a *person*; although this could not be proved from this class of texts separately considered. Vide s. 35, I.

From all these texts taken together, we may form the following result:—The Holy Spirit is represented in the Bible as a personal subject, and as such is distinguished from the Father and the Son. In relation to the human race he is described as sent and commissioned by the Father and the Son, and as occupying the place which Christ, who preceded him, held. In *this* respect he depends (to speak after the manner of men) upon the Father (John, xiv. 16) and upon the Son, (John, xiv. 16, 26, also xvi. 14, ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήγεται;) and in *this* sense he proceeds from them both, or is sent by them both. This may be expressed more literally as fol-

lows:—The great work of converting, sanctifying, and saving men, which the Father commenced through the Son, will be carried on by the Father and Son, *through the Holy Spirit.*

Note.—The objectors to this doctrine frequently say, that the imaginative orientalists were accustomed to represent many things as personal subjects, and to introduce them as speaking and acting, which, however, they themselves did not consider as persons, and did not intend to have so considered by others. And to this oriental usage they think that Christ and his apostles might here, as in other cases, have conformed. But whenever Christ and his apostles spoke in figurative language, they always shewed, by the explanations which they gave, that they did not intend to be understood literally. But they have given no such explanation of the language which they employ with regard to the Holy Spirit. We therefore fairly conclude that they intended that their language should be understood literally; otherwise they would have led their readers and hearers into error; and the more so, as they well knew that their readers and hearers were accustomed to personifications.

SECTION XL.

OF THE DIVINITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

We shall now offer the texts from which the proof is drawn that the Holy Spirit is God; or that the personal subject, called Πνεῦμα ἅγιον, possesses the same divine perfections which are ascribed to the Father and the Son. Morus, p. 65, 66, s. 10. These texts may be divided into those which are more important, and those which are less convincing, or which, though frequently cited, have no relation to this subject.

I. *Texts in which Divine Attributes, &c., are ascribed to the Holy Spirit.*

On this subject we reason as follows:—If the texts in which the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Father and the Son, and in which he is spoken of as a personal subject, also ascribe to him, as well as to them, divine attributes and perfections, it is just to conclude that he is God in the same sense in which the Father and the Son are so. On account of the various meanings of the word πνεῦμα, we may not be able, nor can it be at all necessary, to offer a great multitude of texts in proof of the divinity of the Holy Spirit. If one divine attribute is in any passage clearly ascribed to him, his divinity is as firmly established as if it were proved from a great variety of texts that all the divine perfections belong to him; for the divine perfections are inseparably connected, and the possession of one of them involves the possession of all the rest. Vide s. 18, 38.

1 Cor. ii. 9—13, Πνεῦμα ἐρευνᾷ τὰ βάθη Θεοῦ, where omniscience is evidently ascribed to the Spirit. Vide s. 39; John, xvi. 13; where he is said to know future events, (futura contingetia,) which are concealed from every created being, and known to God only, (ἐν γόνοισι θεῶν κεῖται, Hom.,) except so far as he reveals this knowledge to men. The Holy Spirit, then, to whom they are known, and who himself reveals them to others, must be God. 1 Cor. xii. 4, 11. *Omnipotence* and *omniscience* necessarily belong to an agent, who, according to his own good pleasure, imparts such various gifts, and does all which is here ascribed to the spirit of God. The revealing of divine truth to the minds of prophets and apostles; their inspiration; the miracles wrought through their instrumentality, and other things often spoken of as the peculiar work of God, are elsewhere ascribed to the Holy Spirit as the efficient agent, and considered as his *proper work*; from which it justly follows, that the Holy Spirit was regarded as God. Cf. John, xiv. 17; 1 Cor. xii.; 1 Pet. i. 21, seq. The improvement of the moral character is described as the work of the Holy Spirit, John, iii. 5, seq., and often elsewhere as the work of God, on account of the difficulties and obstacles with which it is attended, and which are so great as to prove wholly insurmountable by the unassisted efforts of man.

The proof that *divine worship* was paid to the Holy Spirit is not so abundant and satisfactory as that adduced to prove that divine worship was rendered to Christ, s. 38. Still, however, it is sufficient, when taken in connexion with what has already been offered in proof of his divinity. In Rom. ix. 1, Paul *swears by the Holy Spirit*, ἐν Πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, as he does by Christ in the same passage. This must be considered an act of divine worship, since both Mosaic and Christian rules forbid swearing by any but the supreme God, Matt. v. 33—36. *To swear by God*, and *to honour or worship him*, were synonymous terms in the Old Testament. In Matt. xii. 31, to speak against the Holy Spirit is represented by Christ as blasphemy.

We are not destitute, then, of passages which distinctly ascribe divine attributes and works to the Holy Spirit, although these texts are not so many nor so clear as those which relate to the divinity of the Son. Some have taken occasion from this fact to represent the doctrine of the divinity of the Holy Spirit as doubtful or unimportant; but—

(a) In this connexion we would repeat the observation before made, s. 12—viz., that we can conclude nothing respecting the internal importance of a doctrine from the more or less frequent mention of it in the New Testament. The books of the New Testament were written with primary reference to the condition of men

at the time when they were written, and always presuppose a more full oral instruction.

(b) The most important consideration, however, is this: that by the Πνεῦμα ἅγιον, something *divine* (τὸ θεῖον) was always understood by the Jews and Christians of ancient times. So soon, therefore, as the early Christians understood that the Πνεῦμα ἅγιον was a *person*, they immediately regarded him as God—a subject belonging to the godhead. It was not necessary, therefore, in the first Christian instruction, to speak often and expressly of his divine nature and attributes. These were very easily understood from the ideas commonly entertained in ancient times respecting the divine Spirit. Vide Morus, p. 66, Note 5. The case was different with respect to Christ, since the Jews did not commonly suppose that the Messiah was divine, as appears from Matt. xxii. 43—46. They understood his title, *Son of God*, in the general sense of a great king, s. 37.

II. Texts in which the Holy Spirit is called God, &c.

These are sometimes used to prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit, but are either inferior to the former in evidence, or have no bearing upon the subject. The observations just made, No. I. (a) of this section, have not always been duly regarded. Writers have thought too much of *the number* of texts, and have collected indiscriminately many which have only an apparent relation to the subject. Especially they have endeavoured to search out a multitude of texts in which the Holy Spirit is expressly called *God*. But (a) the simple appellation *God*, is not of itself sufficient to prove the *supreme divinity* of the subject to whom it is given, as Christ himself declared, John, x. 34, 35, coll. s. 37. The texts therefore which ascribe divine attributes and works to the Spirit are far more important than texts of this class, and prove all that is essential. (b) It is doubtful in many of these texts, in which the predicate *God* is used, whether the Holy Spirit as a *person* is intended. Many of them, at least, may be explained without necessarily supposing a personal subject, according to the analogy of the texts mentioned, s. 39, I.

The following texts are often quoted:—Acts, v. 3, 4. Peter tells Ananias (ver. 3) that Satan had induced him ψεύσασθαι τὸ Πνεῦμα ἅγιον, and afterwards (ver. 4) οὐκ ἐψεύσω ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ τῷ Θεῷ. The same subject who is called the *Holy Spirit* in one place is called *God* in the other. But from the comparison of other passages, it might be thought that the Πνεῦμα ἅγιον was here to be understood in the *subjective* sense, and denoted the Spirit dwelling in the apostles; the higher knowledge and gifts with which they were endowed; their miraculous powers, as in

ver. 32; and the passage could accordingly be explained thus: *your crime is not to be considered as if you had intended to deceive mere men*, because you knew that God had endowed us with supernatural knowledge. This explanation is confirmed by the very clear text, 1 Thess. iv. 8, *He who despises us, despises not men, but God, τὸν δόντα τὸ Πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ τὸ ἅγιον εἰς ἡμᾶς*. Cf. Ex. xvi., where it is said, ver. 2, that the Israelites rebelled against Moses and Aaron; but Moses tells them, ver. 8, your rebellion is not *against us, but against God*, whose messengers we are. Does this prove that Moses and Aaron belong to the godhead? But when it is proved from other texts that Christ, the apostles, and the early Christians, understood the Πνεῦμα ἅγιον to be a personal subject, belonging to the godhead, (as those concerned in this event undoubtedly did,) then this text and many of the following may be regarded as satisfactory proof of the divinity of this Spirit. But when introduced before these texts, by which their meaning is determined, or out of their relation to them, they prove nothing. The sense of the text in Acts, as determined by the preceding texts, is plainly this: for you to intend to deceive us who are apostles—us, whom you knew to be under the special influence of the Holy Spirit—is to be considered the same as if you had intended to deceive God; for you knew that he from whom this influence proceeds is regarded by us as God. The same may be said with respect to the formula of baptism, Matt. xxviii. 19. It cannot, in itself considered, be used as a proof-text, because the mere collocation of the name Holy Spirit with that of the Father and Son does not prove that he possesses divine nature in common with them. Vide s. 35. But when his divinity has been proved by other texts, then this also may be cited; because from the former we learn how the latter must be understood, and was actually understood in the first ages of the church. The passage, 2 Cor. iii. 17, *Ὁ δὲ Κύριος τὸ Πνεῦμά ἐστι* has sometimes been translated, *the Spirit is Jehovah himself*. But the meaning is, *Christ is the true Spirit of the Old Testament*—i. e., the Old Testament contains essentially the same doctrine which Christ taught—viz., the necessity of the renewal of the heart, and inward piety. Some have endeavoured to prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit from a comparison of different texts; but in doing this they have often resorted to forced and unnatural interpretations. An instance of this may be seen in the comparison of the texts Isa. vii. 8—10 and Acts, xxviii. 26, 27. In the former of these we read, *JEHOVAH said, Go to this people*, &c.; but in the latter, *Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐλάλησε διὰ Ησαίου—λέγων, &c. &c.* Here the same person who in the former text is called πᾶς, in the latter is called Πνεῦμα ἅγιον. But Πνεῦμα ἅγιον

may be used in its more general sense for the *Deity*, and does not here necessarily designate the *person* of the Holy Ghost. Vide s. 39, I., and s. 19, II.

We have now considered some of the most important texts of scripture in which we are taught the doctrine that (1) there is only one God; but that (2) in this one divine nature there are also *three*, described as personal subjects, and called *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*; and that (3) these *three* possess in common the divine nature. Respecting the *manner* in which these three make one God, we are taught nothing in the Bible, since the subject is of such a nature as not to admit of its being explained to us. Vide s. 33. It is not therefore strange that in their attempts to illustrate it theologians should have pursued such different methods; that in endeavouring to explain what is inexplicable, they should have been compelled to call in the aids of human philosophy; and that, for the very reason that the whole subject is beyond their reach, they should have differed so widely from each other in the opinions which they have entertained respecting it. We should here therefore refer to the remarks made upon this subject, s. 33. A general view of the whole will be given at the end of Chapter Second, to which we now proceed.

CHAPTER II.

HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

SECTION XLI.

ARE THERE IN JEWISH OR HEATHEN WRITINGS ANY TRACES OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY WHICH WERE NOT DERIVED FROM CHRISTIAN SOURCES?

I. *Traces of this Doctrine in the Old Testament, the Apocrypha, and the Chaldaic Paraphrases.*

SOME have endeavoured to prove that the Jews had some knowledge of the Trinity, or at least of a plurality of persons in the godhead, from all these sources. But (a) the texts cited from the Old Testament in proof of this point do not by themselves perfectly establish it, as has been shown, s. 34. Neither (b) are the texts cited from the Apocrypha altogether satisfactory. The appellation λόγος Θεοῦ, which occurs frequently in the Book of Wisdom and in Sirach, cannot be clearly proved in any one instance to designate a *person* of the godhead, but signifies either the *divine oracles and revelations*, as Sir. i. 5, or the *divine decrees and will*, as Sir. xliii. 26, ἐν λόγῳ αὐτοῦ σύγγεταται πάντα. Book of Wisdom, xviii. 15, λόγος Θεοῦ παντοδύναμος, coll. ix.

1, xvi. 12. Nor does the appellation *Son of God*, in the Book of Wisdom, ii. 13—20, designate the *Messiah*, but, in a more general sense, a favourite of God, one approved by Heaven, a righteous person. The phrase *Holy Spirit*, used in the same book, (chap. ix. 17, 18,) there means only a *holy temper, virtue, temperance, continence, sanctitas animi*; cf. ix. 4, 10. (c) The terms *חֵסֶד, יִשְׁרָאֵל, יִשְׁרָאֵל* are used very frequently in the Chaldaic paraphrases, and seem, as there employed, to designate a *person*, and have therefore been compared with the appellation *λόγος Θεοῦ*, and considered as indicating the doctrine of the Trinity. This is a very important argument. It is doubtful, however, whether these terms were understood by the Jews contemporary with the paraphrasts as titles of the Messiah, or whether, as many suppose, they were regarded as synonymous with *numen, majestas divina*. The whole subject needs a new investigation. Vide Paulus, *Zum Anf. des. Evang. Johannis*.

[Note.—Whatever may be said of the use of the term *λόγος* in the Apocryphal writings, it cannot be doubted that the term *σοφία*, in the Book of Wisdom, an Ægyptico-Jewish production, is used hypotatically. *Wisdom* is there represented as a being of the purest light, proceeding before the creation from the substance of God, as his perfect image, and the creator and governor of the world. Cf. i. 6; vii. 22—27; viii. 1, 3; ix. 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 18, x. The writer of this book had before him the personification of this divine attribute in the Old Testament, the *חֵסֶד* of Prov. viii. xi.; but his representations very much surpass that in boldness; and this must be ascribed to the influence of that extravagant philosophy, strangely composed of oriental and Platonic ideas, which then prevailed at Alexandria, and which, not content with personifying, distinctly hypostatized the divine attributes. The influence of this philosophy was more strongly exhibited in the hypostases of Philo and the Cabbalists, and afterwards, in the peculiar modifications of some Christian doctrines, adopted by the Alexandrine catechists. These different systems of independent powers, proceeding from the source of all being, formed, as they were, upon these hints in the Old Testament, under the influence of a foreign and corrupting philosophy, bear but little resemblance, indeed, to the Trinity of the New Testament. And notwithstanding all these presentiments of the truth found in uninspired writers before the Christian era, the doctrine of the Trinity must be regarded as altogether an *articulus puerus*.—Tr.]

II. *Traces of this Doctrine in the Writings of Plato, the New Platonists, Philo, the Cabbalists, &c.*

We find clear evidence of a belief in a certain

sort of trinity in all these writers, although they differ in the mode of explaining it, and understand by it something very different from the Trinity of the Bible. This evidence is as follows:—

1. Plato believed in a supreme being existing from eternity, but he also believed in an uncreated, eternal *matter*, the former the source of all good, the latter, of all evil. The origin of the visible world, its relation to God, and his influence upon it, were explained by him from the principles of the system of emanation—a system which the mind naturally adopts when it begins to speculate on subjects of this nature, and which is, accordingly, more ancient and universal than any other system of philosophy. (It is probable that, in conformity with the general principles of this philosophy, the *ideas* of which Plato spoke were material; though this is disputed. Vide Plessing, *Versuche zur Aufklärung der Philosophie des ältesten Alterthums*; Leipzig, 1788, 8vo.) The system of Plato may be thus stated: God first produced the *ideal world*—i. e., his infinite understanding conceived of the existence of the world, and formed, as it were, the plan of the creation. The *real world* was then formed after this *ideal world*, as its model; and this was done by uniting the soul of the world, which proceeded from the Divine Being, with matter, by which the world became an animated, sensitive, rational creature, guided, pervaded, and held together by this rational soul. The three principles of Plato were thus, (a) *the supreme God*, whom he calls *Πατήρ*; (b) *the divine understanding*, which he calls, *νοῦς, δημιουργός, λόγος, σωτήρ, σοφία, &c. &c.*; and (c) *the soul of the world*. He indeed distinguished the two last principles, in some respects, from the supreme God, but still accounted them as belonging by derivation to the divine nature. These views are fully developed in his *Timæus*, and elsewhere. It appears, then, that Plato believed in a Trinity, or three principles in the Divine Being; but whether he actually hypostatized these principles is doubtful, though it is affirmed by the New Platonists.

A somewhat different statement of the Platonic system is given by Oelrich, in his “*Commentatio de doctrina Platonica de Deo*,” &c. According to him, Plato divided all things into two classes—that which is real, unproduced, immutable, capable of being discerned only by the reason, (*νοητός, intelligibilis*;) and opposed to this, that which is produced, mutable, material, and cognizable by the senses, (*αἰσθητός, sensibilis*.) The latter must have a cause of its existence; and this cause is the Creator of the world, who, in imitation of the perfect *ideal* in his understanding, in which all the reality, substance, and *true being* of things was contained,

wrought rude matter into the present sensible world. But since what is animated is more perfect than what is inanimate, and God, as the most perfect being, could not make anything otherwise than perfect, he imparted a soul to this sensible world. But this *soul of the world* is not a self-existing divine principle, since its nature participates in what is material and mutable, as well as in what is real and immutable, and consequently is neither one thing nor the other, but an intermediate being composed of the two. According to this statement, Plato did not conceive of a number of hypostases in the Deity; for the divine understanding (*λόγος*) could not be imagined to be different from God himself, and the soul of the world belonged neither to the being of God, nor was regarded as a self-subsistent principle. Many passages in his writings, however, were so perverted and misapplied by the New Platonists, that they seemed to afford ground for their assertion that he really distinguished a number of hypostases in the Divine Being. Hence the strange and manifold form in which the Platonic doctrine of God was exhibited by Numenius, Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblicus, Proclus, Chalcidius, Macrobius, and other New Platonists, and also by the Christian fathers of the second and third century.

[*Note*.—In favour of the alleged Triad of Plato, cf. *Souverain, Le Platonisme dévoilé*, translated by Löffler into the German, under the title *Versuch über den Platonismus der Kirchenväter*. Ben. Carpzov, *Trinitas Platonis*, &c.; Lipsiæ, 1693. Cudworth, *Systema intellectuale hujus universi*. In opposition to the Triad of Plato, cf. Tiedemann, *Geist der speculativen Philosophie*, 2 bd. s. 118, ff. Tennemann, *System der Platon. Philosophie*, 3 bd. s. 149. *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2 bd. s. 387. Paulus, *Memorabilien, an Essay, Ueber den göttlichen Verstand aus der Platon. Philosophie*.—Tr.]

2. The New Platonists eagerly embraced these ideas of Plato, and during the second and third centuries after the birth of Christ, seemed to labour to outdo one another in explaining, defending, and more fully developing them. We have, for example, a work of Plotinus, *περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχῶν ὑποστάσεων*—(i. e., *Deus supremus, mens, anima mundi*.) These New Platonists, however, not only differ widely from Plato, but often disagree among themselves in their mode of thinking, and in their phraseology.

3. The *learned Jews*, who lived beyond the bounds of Palestine, especially those who resided in Egypt, and in the other Grecian provinces, had imbibed, at an early period, (doubtless a considerable time before the coming of

Christ,) many of the principles of the philosophy prevailing in the regions where they resided, and had connected, and as it were incorporated them with their previous opinions, and with their established religious system. They first received the principles of the Grecian, and especially of the Platonic philosophy, as then taught, into their own belief; and afterwards, as is common with theologians, endeavoured to find them in the ancient sacred books of their own nation; and in order to this, they interpreted many expressions of their sacred books in accordance with their newfangled notions. They were encouraged to do this the more, from the opinion which they entertained, that Plato had derived many of his ideas from Moses and other Hebrew writers. These foreign learned Jews seem also to have been influenced in their speculations by the principles of the *theory of emanation*. This oriental element may have been introduced in different ways into the later Jewish philosophy. The Jews must have become acquainted with this system during their residence in Chaldæa, where it appears to have formerly prevailed; and they probably brought many of its principles with them on their return to Judea; and in this way it may have passed into the system of the later philosophizing Jews. They must also have received a large portion of this orientalism, when they adopted the Platonic, or rather New Platonic philosophy, since the latter is wholly based upon the system of emanation. But, from whatever source derived, this system is found in the oldest writings of the Cabbalists,—those of the second century; and from these writings it is obvious that it was not of recent origin, but had been received by many learned Jews, before and at the Christian era. Vide Joh. Fr. Kleuker, *Ueber die Natur und den Ursprung der Emanationslehre bey den Kabbalisten*; Riga, 1786, 8vo. These principles were indeed wholly unknown to most of the Jews who lived within the bounds of Palestine during the lifetime of Christ, and afterwards. They were satisfied with their Pharisaic-rabbinic theology, and looked for the Messiah as a religious reformer, and a temporal king. This was not the case, however, with the Jews who lived beyond the bounds of Palestine, and who were educated under the influence of the Grecian philosophy; they for the most part abandoned the expectation of a future Messiah, or regarded his kingdom as entirely of a *moral* nature. It is among these learned Jews out of Palestine that the theory of the *λόγος* is found as early as the first century. They regarded the *λόγος* as existing before the creation of the world, and as the instrument through whom God made all things. They entertained also the same notions respecting the

spiritual world and the emanation of spiritual substances, or æons, from the divine nature, &c., as are found among the Platonists of that day. And entertaining these views, derived from the Platonists, they endeavoured to find them in the Old Testament; and, as appears from the example of Philo, carried all their preconceived opinions, by means of allegorical interpretation, into their ancient books. Philo speaks often in the Platonic manner of the *Λόγος*, calling him the *Son of God*, the *FIRST-BORN Son of God*, (in distinction from the *world*, which was the younger son,) *the first servant of God*, *δούτερος Θεός*, &c. τ. λ. The Cabbalists frequently speak in their writings of *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit*; and there are many passages in the books of Philo in which a kind of trinity is taught, and in which his Platonic ideas are clothed in Biblical language. Thus, for example, in his work "*De officio Mundi*," there is mention of a supreme God, and of one *begotten* of him, (elsewhere called *πρωτότοκος, λόγος, υἱός*, &c. τ. λ.,) who was full *τῷ Θεῷ Πνεύματος*. Vide Carpzov, Philoniana, p. 157.

4. When now, at a later period, the Christian doctrine became known to these Grecian Jews, and was embraced by them, they began to connect with it the philosophical notions then prevalent respecting the invisible world, the gradation of spirits, the superior æon, who was of divine origin, &c. They affirmed that the Son of God existed long before the man Jesus, and that in process of time he united himself with this man, in order that he might be better able to benefit men by his instructions, to exert his influence upon spirits, and to weaken the power which evil beings exercised to the injury of our race. They regarded the Holy Spirit as the all-enlivening and ever-active power, which flows forth from God, and is equally efficient in the physical and moral world. These opinions, derived partly from Grecian philosophy, and partly from Jewish and Christian theology, grew gradually in favour with the more learned Christians; they were variously developed and modified by the different parties of the early Christian church; until at length, in the fourth century, one party obtained ascendancy for its own peculiar theory and phraseology, to the exclusion of all the rest.

From the foregoing statements we arrive at the following conclusion:—viz., (a) It cannot be denied that many of the ancient heathen philosophers (e. g., the *Platonists*) believed in a trinity in the divine nature; and that they were led to entertain that belief by the principles of the theory of emanation, which they had first adopted. From this source many learned Jews, who lived beyond the bounds of Palestine, drew their opinions—e. g., the Alexandrine Jews,

Philo, and the Cabbalists. These Grecian Jews did not, however, simply adopt the pure ideas of Plato, which were variously represented even by the New Platonists, but they mixed and incorporated them with their own national opinions and their own religious principles, and thus endeavoured to reconcile Platonism with the language and doctrines of the Bible. That a trinity, *in this sense*, was known and professed by philosophers and Jews who were not Christians, is admitted. But (b) the representations of this subject which are found in the writings of Plato and his followers, whether pagans or Jews, by no means agree with the simple representations of the Trinity contained in the word of God, nor even with those which prevailed among Christians throughout the Roman empire, after the Nicene Council in the fourth century. For, according to the Platonists, the second and third principles belonging to the Deity were widely distinguished from the supreme God; they were produced from him, were subordinate to him, and altogether less than he; though yet, from their derivation, they were regarded as belonging to the Divine Being, and were often, indeed, called *God*. Such, however, is not the representation of the Trinity contained in the Bible, or in the distinctions established at the Nicene Council. But although the Platonic trinity differs thus widely from the scriptural doctrine, and also from the established theory of the church, it is yet possible that the scholastic and technical language in use on this subject was originally borrowed by Christians from the Platonic theology.

[*Note*.—Besides these traces of a trinity in the godhead found among the Platonists, Alexandrine Jews, Cabbalists, &c., we may mention those found among the Indians in their *trimurti* (triad), composed of three spirits, Brahma, Vischnu, and Schiva, produced from the supreme Deity. For a fuller account of this, cf. Fr. v. Schlegel, *Weisheit der Indier*, s. 108; Heidelberg, 1808, 8vo. J. K. F. Schlegel, *Ueber den Geist der Religiosität aller Zeiten und Völker*, 2 th. s. 7, f.; Hanover, 1814, 8vo. Maurice, *Indian Antiquities*; London, 1796. In vols. iv. v. the oriental triads are extensively investigated. The author finds "*the holy Trinity*" in all his travels in the East. The Egyptians also have a trinity, consisting of Knuph, the eternal, all-pervading soul of the world, connected with Phtha (original light) and Neith (Wisdom.) For an account of this, cf. besides the above-named work of J. K. F. Schlegel, 1 th., s. 192, Fr. Kreuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker*, s. 78, f. of Moser's abridgment. On the general subject, cf. Tholuck, *Die speculative Trinitätslehre der neuern Orientalen*; Berlin, 1826, 8vo.—Tr.]

SECTION XLII.

HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY DURING THE SECOND AND THIRD CENTURIES BEFORE THE NICENE COUNCIL.

Notice of some of the works which cast light on this portion of Dogmatic History.

Vol. ii. of the work of Dionysius Petavius, the Jesuit,—“*De Theologicis Dogmatibus*,” Ed. 2, 6 vols.; Antwerpæ, 1700, fol.—contains a collection of passages from the early fathers relating to the doctrine of the Trinity; but should be consulted rather for the passages themselves than for the compiler’s exposition of them. Book ii. of the work of Jo. Forbesius, à Corse, “*Institutiones historico-theologicæ*,” Amstel. 1645. Both of these writers endeavour to prove the agreement of the earliest Christian writers with the common orthodox doctrine as established in the fourth century. But this agreement of the ante and post Nicene writers cannot be proved merely from their having used the same words and phrases, as has often been very plausibly contended; for the earlier writers often used these words and phrases in an entirely different sense from that in which they have been employed since the fourth century. This remark must be kept in mind in forming an estimate of those works which were written with the professed object of proving the entire agreement of the doctrine of the Trinity as held by the earliest Christian fathers and as established in the fourth century at the council of Nice—e. g., G. Bull, *Defensio Fidei Nicenæ*, 2 vols.; Londini, 1703. Burscher, *Scriptorum antiquissimorum Doctrina de Deo Triuno et J. Christo*; Lipsiæ, 1780, 8vo.

The following works are composed with great critical accuracy, and with a careful regard to the peculiarities of the writers of different periods—viz., Dr. Semler, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der christlichen Glaubenslehre*, prefixed to the three parts of Baumgarten’s *Polemik*; also his *Sammlung über die Beweisstellen in der Dogmatik*, th. ii. s. 1; Halle, 1768, 8vo. Souverain, *Platonisme dévoilé*, 1700; translated into German, under the title, *Versuch über den Platonismus der Kirchenväter*, with notes and a preface by Löffler, 1782, 8vo; republished with an additional Essay by Löffler, *Ueber das Entstehen der Dreyeinigkeitslehre unter den Christen*, Züllichau, 1792, 8vo. Cf. the Review of this work in the *Lit. Zeit. Nr. 295—297*, 1793. C. F. Rössler, *Lehrbegriff der christlichen Kirche in den drey ersten Jahrhunderten*; Frankfurt am Main, 1775; also his greater work, *Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, 10 thle; Leipzig, 1776—86, 8vo; in which he gives extracts from the doctrinal writings of the ecclesiastical fathers. The works of Meiners

and Oelrichs on Platonism must be noticed here, though referred to more particularly under another division of this section. The new works of Lange, Muenschler, and Augusti, on dogmatic history, must also be here cited.

[*Note*.—The latest and most distinguished investigators of this difficult portion of dogmatic history are, Neander, Gieseler, and Schleiermacher. The first of these, in that portion of his *Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche*, devoted to the history of doctrines, is thought to have given the best history of this doctrine yet offered to the public. The *Kirchen-Geschichte* of Gieseler is principally valuable for a full and excellent selection of extracts from the fathers. Schleiermacher has entered upon an investigation of the opposition between the *Sabellian* and *Athanasian* theories—a sphere of inquiry which had been nearly overlooked in the zeal and diligence with which every ramification of the more urgent and threatening heresy of Arius had long been examined.

The results to which these writers have come, while they confirm the general view of the history of this doctrine given by Dr. Knapp, differ, however, in several important particulars. Some of these different results the translator had intended to introduce as notes, in their appropriate places, and thus to render this history more complete, and in some parts more correct. But he found this undertaking attended with great inconveniences, and that it would swell this chapter, already very much extended, to an immoderate length. He therefore concluded to publish this history as given by Dr. Knapp, with only an occasional reference to the authors where other views may be found, and with here and there a brief additional statement. It may, however, be hoped that some fruits of the labours of Neander, Gieseler, and Schleiermacher, will be reaped ere long by the American public.—*Tr.*]

I. Doctrine of the Trinity as held by Primitive Christians.

Christians from the earliest times were required, agreeably to the command of Jesus, to profess their belief in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, at the time of their baptism; and these names were often used on other occasions, and were introduced, as appears from the New Testament, as opportunity presented, in all the discourses intended for Christian instruction and edification. It will of course be presumed that the first teachers of Christianity did not merely repeat these names before those to whom they administered the ordinance of baptism; they must also have exhibited the ideas to be connected with these names, and have explained the whole purport of that profession which was required. What this instruction was we cannot learn exactly, since, beside the New Testament, we have

no credible written records of the first century containing information on this point. From the New Testament, however, and from the fragments of the oldest symbols, (collected by Walch in his *Bibliotheca symbolica vetus*; Lemgo, 1770, 8vo,) we may be satisfied thus far, that this instruction was short and simple, and wholly free from subtle and learned distinctions. The early teachers of Christianity were satisfied with instructing the people respecting the *works* of God (*œconomicis operibus*), and in pointing out to them the various and undeserved *benefits* for which they were indebted either to the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit, according to the nature of these benefits; and they abstained in their instructions from refined and scholastic distinctions. This is evident from the writings of the oldest church fathers, Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, and Tertullian. Justin the Martyr, for example, says that Christians bound themselves to believe in the Father, as the supreme God and the Governor of the world; in Jesus, as the Messiah (*Χριστός*) and Saviour (*Σωτήρ*), who had died for them; and in the Holy Spirit, who foretold by the prophets everything relating to Christ, and who counsels and guides those who believe in him. These ancient symbols were gradually enlarged by various additions intended to oppose the various errors which from time to time arose. Such, however, as has been represented, was the simplicity with which this doctrine was at first taught. And even Origen, in his Books *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, states the sum of the doctrines formerly taught to the people to be, the doctrine of the Father, as creator and preserver; of the Son, as the highest ambassador of God, and himself both God and man; and of the Holy Spirit, as holding a place beside the Father and the Son, and entitled to equal honour. As these primitive Christians were not, as a general thing, scientifically educated, were wholly unaccustomed to speculate on religious subjects, and contented with those practical views which they obtained from their teachers, and which they found most conducive to their comfort and edification; so their teachers were contented to present the simple truths of religion without any minute and philosophical distinctions: and this was the right course, and they found the advantage of pursuing it.

II. *Doctrine of the Trinity as held in the Second and Third Centuries.*

Towards the end of the first century, and during the second, many learned men came over both from Judaism and paganism to Christianity. At that period the New Platonic philosophy was becoming more and more prevalent in the Grecian provinces, and especially in Egypt, and indeed had been embraced before

this, in the first century, by many of the learned Grecian Jews. Vide s. 41; and Meiners, *Beitrag zur Geschichte der Denkart der ersten Jahrhunderte nach Christi Geburt*, in einigen Betrachtungen über die neuplatonische Philosophie; Leipzig, 1782, 8vo; and Jo. Jac. Oelrichs, *Comment. de doctrina Platonica de Deo*, &c.; Marburg, 1788, 8vo—an able and fundamental work. These learned Jews and pagans brought over with them into the Christian schools of theology their Platonic ideas and phraseology, and they especially borrowed from the philosophical writings of Philo. And as they found in the religious dialect of the New Testament some expressions which apparently resembled those to which they had been before accustomed in their philosophical dialect, it was no difficult matter for them to annex their preconceived philosophical notions to the language of scripture, and thus to carry their whole philosophical system into the Bible; exactly as Philo had before carried his peculiar system into the Jewish scriptures of the Old Testament. Vide s. 41.

But we find that those learned Christians of the second century confined themselves, in their philosophizing respecting the Trinity, principally to the Logos; and this was very natural, since the name Λόγος is applied even in the New Testament to Christ, and since so much had been said and written respecting him by the Platonists. These philosophizing Christians connected in general the same ideas with the name λόγος, as had been done before by Philo and other Platonists, (vide s. 41;) and differed only in this, that they referred the whole to the person of Christ, and endeavoured to associate their philosophical speculations with Christian truth. Such in general is the fact with respect to the earliest ecclesiastical fathers—e. g., Justin the Martyr, (*Dial. cum Tryph. Iud. c. 61.*) Tatian, Athenagoras, (in his *Apology*), and Tertullian, (*Adv. Praxeas, c. 2, seq.*) the latter of whom in this respect follows the example of the Grecian fathers. On several smaller points these writers indeed differ from one another; but in the following general views, all of which are based upon the Platonic system, they perfectly agree—viz., The Logos existed before the creation of the world; he was begotten, however, by God, and sent forth from him. By this Logos, the New Platonists understood the infinite *understanding* of God, which they conceived to be, as it were, a substance which emanated, with its functions, from God. They supposed that it belonged from eternity to his nature as a *power*, but that, agreeably to the divine will, (*Βουλήματι Θεοῦ*, as Justin expresses it, in the passage above cited,) it began to exist out of the divine nature, and is therefore different from God its creator and father, and yet, as begotten of him, is en-

tirely divine. Hence the Logos is denominated by Athenagoras *πρῶτον γέννημα*, the first-begotten; and Justin, in the passage above cited, says, Θεὸς γεγέννηκεν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν τινα λογικήν, which was sometimes called δόξα Κυρίου, sometimes Τίος, σοφία, ἄγγελος, and sometimes Θεός, Κύριος, and Λόγος. By means of this Logos they supposed that God at first created, and now preserves and governs the universe.

The Holy Spirit was more rarely mentioned by these early fathers, and their views respecting him are far less clearly expressed than concerning the Son. Most of them, however, agreed in considering him a *substance* (the term used by Tertullian) emanating from the Father and the Son, to whom, on this account, divinity must be ascribed. Tertullian says, *Est Spiritus a Patre per Filium*. [Vide Neander, b. i. Abth. 3. s. 1039, ff.]

Respecting these three, the early fathers contended that they were *one*. Athenagoras says, that with these three there was *ἑνωσις ἐν δυνάμει*, but *ἐν τῇ τάξει διαίρεσις*. Origen and Novatian make exactly the same representation in the third century. It is obvious, however, that the *unity* (*ἑνωσις*, *unitas*) of which many of these philosophical fathers speak is nothing more than *unanimity, agreement, correspondence in feelings, consent in will, in power, and in the application of power to particular objects*. They do not mean, by the use of this word, to signify that the Son and Holy Spirit were God, in the full meaning of the word, and in the same sense in which the Father is God. In short, these philosophical Christians asserted rather the *divineness* of the Son and Spirit, and their divine origin, than their equal *deity* with the Father. Justin the Martyr expressly declares that the Son is in God what the understanding (*νοῦς*) is in man, and that the Holy Spirit is that divine power to act and execute which Plato calls *ἀρετή*. With this representation, Theophilus of Antioch, Clemens of Alexandria, and Origen, substantially agree. The name *Father* is used, according to them, in relation to all existing things; the name *Λόγος* to *λογικά*, and *Holy Spirit* to moral perfections. According to Tertullian, the persons of the Trinity are *gradus, formæ, species unius Dei*. Thus it is obvious that these philosophical fathers of the church entertained far different views of the divinity of the Son and Spirit, of which they often speak, than we do at the present time; and this because they were more influenced by their Platonic ideas than by the declarations of the holy scriptures.

But when, in after ages, the learned were no longer familiar with the Platonic ideas by which these early fathers were influenced, they very naturally misunderstood their writings, and, deceived by some resemblance of phraseology, attributed to them that system of belief which

was afterwards established as orthodox. Into this mistake, Bull, Burscher, and many others, have fallen. Various causes conspired to give the opinions on the subject of the Logos, which have now been described, an extensive influence among Christians of a learned and philosophical cast, during the second and third centuries: these opinions were advocated by the most distinguished teachers of that period; and especially they were in entire agreement with the principles of the Emanation and Platonic philosophies, which were then so universally prevalent. It thus becomes evident that Arianism existed in the church long before the time of Arius; and that he was only the means of bringing to a more full development, and to a more consistent and systematic form, a doctrine which had arisen in a much earlier period. Indeed, the belief in the subordination of the Son to the Father, for which Arianism is the later name, flowing as it did directly from Platonic principles, was commonly adopted by most of those fathers of the second and third centuries who assented in general to the philosophy of Plato. And had not Divine Providence interposed in a special manner, there is reason to think it would have been the established doctrine of the church.

But there was another class of learned, philosophizing Christians, who either rejected the principles of the Platonic philosophy, or applied them differently from the orthodox fathers; and these substituted another theory in place of that which had prevailed on the subject of the Trinity, which however, no less than the one which they rejected, was formed rather from their philosophical ideas than from the instructions of the Bible. Among the writers of this class was Praxeas, of the second century, to the confutation of whose errors Tertullian devoted an entire book. Praxeas contended that the Father, Son, and Spirit were not distinguished from each other as individual subjects; but that God was called *Father*, so far as he was the creator and governor of the world; *Son* (*Λόγος*) so far as he had endowed the man Jesus with extraordinary powers, and enabled him to teach and to suffer for the good of the world, &c. In accordance with this view, Theodotus denied any *higher, pre-existing* nature in Christ; and with him Artemon agreed, and in the third century Noetus and Beryllus of Bostra. They agreed in rejecting the existence of the Logos, as a particular subject in God, before the birth of Jesus; and supposed that what was extraordinary in the person of Christ was merely the divine influence of the Father, (called *Son, Logos, &c.*) which dwelt in Jesus, and acted through him. But among these opinions, which arose in opposition to the general doctrine of the orthodox fathers, the theory of Sabellius, who flourished in the third century, was the most

celebrated. Sabellius regarded the terms *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit*, as merely describing different divine *works*, and various modes of divine *revelation*. According to him there is only one divine *person* (μία ὑπόστασις), but a threefold divine *work*, or three *forms* (τρία πρόσωπα), in which God has revealed himself to men. With Sabellius agreed, for the most part, Paul of Samosata, who also flourished in the third century. He rejected the *personal* distinction in the godhead, and in opposition to it, contended that the Son was ὁμοούσιος or οὐνούσιος τῷ Πατρὶ—i. e., *unum idemque cum Patre*. It was in this sense of the word ὁμοούσιος, as involving the denial of a personal distinction in the godhead, that it was condemned by the third council held at Antioch. In opposition to these theories, the disciples of the Alexandrine school contended with great zeal for the ἰδιάν ὑπόστασιν, the *proper personality* of the Logos.

[*Note*.—The seceders from the catholic faith here described were in the early ages commonly denominated *Monarchians*, because they insisted upon the *unity* of God, which they supposed infringed by the common doctrine which placed three eternal persons in the divine nature. *Monarchiam tenemus*, they said often, when comparing themselves with the orthodox fathers. But this general class comprehended many who differed more from each other than they did even from those reputed orthodox, and who indeed had nothing in common but a great zeal for monotheism, and a fear lest the unity of God should be endangered by the hypostases of the Alexandrine fathers. Without any regard, however, to these essential differences, all who, in behalf of the divine unity, in the first centuries, rejected the doctrine of distinct persons in the Deity, are here thrown promiscuously together, as they have commonly been. And Theodotus, Artemon, and Paul of Samosata, are placed by the side of Praxeas, Noetus, Beryllus of Bostra, and Sabellius, between whom and themselves, on every essential point of Christian doctrine, there was a total opposition. They agreed only in denying that the prophetic Logos, whom they admitted as a power or manifestation of the Deity, existed before his incarnation as a distinct person; while with regard to the manner of his being in Christ they differed as widely as possible. Theodotus and his followers supposed this divine energy to be in Christ merely as influence exerted upon him, in the same way as upon the ancient prophets, though in a higher degree. They thus regarded Christ as a man inspired and commissioned by God; and differed but little in opinion respecting him from the ancient Ebionites, or from modern Unitarians. Praxeas, on the contrary, and those of his school, supposed that this divine, though impersonal energy, or God himself, was in

Christ, in a manner altogether new and peculiar, not acting upon, but dwelling in and forming one with him. In Christ, then, they saw a full and complete representation of the Deity, and went beyond even the catholic fathers in the views which they entertained of his divinity; so that, in answer to the objections urged against his doctrines, Praxeas is said to have asked his opponents, *τι καὶ οὐκ ὁδοῦν Χριστόν*; It was on account of this intimate union, and almost identity, for which they contended, between God and Christ, that they were charged by their opponents with teaching that the Father himself suffered in the passion of Christ, and were hence called *θεοπασχῆται*, *patripassiani*, *patripassians*. There is plainly, therefore, occasion for a subdivision among those who agree in rejecting the previous hypostatical existence of the Logos.

In the following table the writers of the three first centuries on the subject of the Trinity are ranged according to their opinions.

CATHOLIC.	MONARCHIANS.
1. Justin the Martyr	(κ) <i>Unitarians</i> .
2. Theophilus of Antioch	1. Theodotus
3. Athenagoras	2. Artemon
4. Irenæus	3. Paul of Samosata.
5. Clemens Alexandrinus	(α) <i>Patripassians</i> .
6. Tertullian	1. Praxeas
7. Origen	2. Noetus
8. Dionysius Alexandrinus	3. Beryllus of Bostra
9. Cyprian	4. Sabellius.
10. Novatian	
11. Dionysius Romanus.	TR.]

III. *Terms employed in the Discussion of this Doctrine during the Second and Third Centuries.*

The theologians of this period, in the learned discussion and the scientific statement of this doctrine, made use of some peculiar and appropriate terms, which they found convenient, as concerted watchwords, to distinguish those of their own party from others who differed from them. Vide Morus, p. 67, 68, s. 12. The more the prevailing theory was controverted, the greater was the number of new terms invented by the different parties, who laboured to state their opinions as clearly and distinctly as possible, and thus to secure their system from contradiction. These new modes of expression were first employed in the Oriental church, and were introduced into it from schools of heathen philosophy; indeed, they can most of them now be found in the writings of Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, and other Platonists of that age; and even those which do not seem to be directly borrowed from this foreign dialect, are yet *analogous* to the terms employed by these Platonic philosophers, and are used in the same sense and spirit which they give to their terms. This newly-invented phraseology was afterwards in-

roduced from the Grecian church into the Latin, by Tertullian, who enlarged it by some terms of his own. He therefore must be regarded as the principal author of that ecclesiastical dialect on the doctrine of the Trinity, (as well as on the other doctrines,) which was first adopted in the African church, and afterwards generally throughout the Latin church, and which has come down to us improved and extended by his successors. Among the terms which were employed in the discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity during the second and third centuries, the following are the most common—viz. :

1. *Τριάς*. This term is among those which were employed by the Platonic philosophers, Plotinus, Proclus, &c., who spoke of many *triads* in the Deity. It was first introduced into the discussion of the Trinity among Christians, as far as we can learn, by Theophilus of Antioch, of the second century; and was afterwards often used by Origen in the third century. It was translated into the Latin by Tertullian, by the word *trinitas*; and the phrase *trinitatis unitas*, answering to the *ἑνωσις* of Athenagoras, occurs in his book, *Adver. Praxeam*, c. 2, 3, &c. [Of this word the English *trinity* is the exact translation.] It is less correctly rendered in German by the word *Dreyeinigkeit* [the usual term for denoting the Trinity among German theologians; less accurate, however, than the word *trinity*, because it expresses agreement of affection and will merely, and therefore seems to lean towards tritheism. It contains the same implication as would be expressed in the English word *trianimity*, if such a word may be supposed.] It was at first rendered into German by the word *Dreyfaltigkeit* [Anglicé, *triplicity*], which, however, was opposed by Luther, as favouring the Sabellian view of the divine nature. Basedow recommends that the word *Dreyeinheit* [*triunity*] be used to denote this doctrine, and to render the Latin *trinitas*. And this word, it must be confessed, would better express the scriptural doctrine and the theory of the church at the present day than the term commonly employed. It is less proper, however, than *Dreyeinigkeit*, to express what was intended in the second and third centuries by the terms *τριάς*, *trinitas*, *trinitatis unitas*, which was not so much the unity and perfect equality of nature as simple agreement of will, which is exactly rendered by the word *Dreyeinigkeit*. The latter word, on the other hand, taken in its common and literal acceptation, does not express the doctrine of the Bible and of the church at the present day, so well as the term *Dreyeinheit* [*triunity*]. If we wished to designate this doctrine by a German word as various and comprehensive in its meaning as the Latin *trinitas*, [English, *trinity*,] the word *Dreyheit* would be the best; but if we wished to express more ex-

actly the doctrine of the Bible, and the present belief of the church, we must prefer the word which Basedow has recommended—viz., *Dreyeinheit* [*triunity*].

2. *Οὐσία ὑπόστασις*. These terms were not sufficiently distinguished from each other by the Greek fathers of the second and third centuries, and were often used by them as entirely synonymous. Tertullian translates *οὐσία* by *substantia*, and affirms *substantiæ unitatem* in the Trinity. By the word *ὑπόστασις* the older Greek fathers understood only a really existing subject, in opposition to a nonentity, or to a merely ideal existence; in which sense they also not unfrequently used the word *οὐσία*. Thus, according to the Platonists, the *Λόγος* existed in God even from eternity, but at first as an impersonal *idea*, and became an *hypostasis* only shortly before the creation of the world, in order that the world might be created by him. The New Platonists employed the word *ὑποστάσις* in reference to the deity in itself, and called their triads *ὑποστάσεις*, or *τα ὑποσταμένα*. Vide Proclus, *Tim.* p. 131, 177. But the meaning of this word has gradually been altered in later times, especially since the fourth century. Vide s. 43, II. 2.

3. *Persona*. This word was first employed by Tertullian, in the passage above cited; and by it he means, *an individual*, (*subjectum intelligens*,) a single being, distinguished from others by certain peculiar qualities, attributes, and relations; and so he calls *Pater, Filius, Spiritus Sanctus, tres personæ*, at the same time that he ascribes to them *unitas substantiæ*, because they belong to the divine nature (*οὐσία*) existing from eternity. He asserts this in opposition to Praxeas, who would allow of no distinction between Father, Son, and Spirit. Among the Greeks, Origen is the first who used the word *ὑπόστασις* in a sense like that which Tertullian connects with *persona*; and he accordingly says, *We believe in three ὑποστάσεις, Πατέρα, Υἱόν, καὶ Πνεῦμα ἅγιον*.

SECTION XLIII.

HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY DURING THE FOURTH CENTURY; AND OF THE DISTINCTIONS ESTABLISHED AT THE NICENE COUNCIL, AND SINCE ADOPTED IN THE ORTHODOX CHURCH.

I. The Trinity, as held in the Fourth Century.

It had already been settled by many councils held during the third century, and in the symbols which they had adopted in opposition to Sabellius and Paul of Samosata, that the Father must be regarded as *really* distinguished from the Son, and the Holy Spirit as distinguished from both. But there had been as yet no controversy among the learned respecting the mu-

tual relation of the three persons of the Trinity, or respecting the question in what the distinction between them properly consists; and these subjects were accordingly left as yet undetermined by the decisions of councils and symbols. Vide s. 42. The learned men of this period, therefore, entertained different opinions on these subjects, and were at liberty to express themselves according to their own convictions. At length, however, one of these opinions prevailed over the rest, and through the influence of those fathers by whom it was advocated, and through the patronage of the imperial court, was adopted by the Nicene Council, and authoritatively prescribed as a rule of faith of universal obligation.

Origen and his followers had maintained against the Sabellians that there were in God *τρεις ὑποστάσεις*, (tres personæ,) but *μὴν οὐσίαν*, (una substantia,) which was common to the three. They had not, however, or at least but few of them, as yet taught, that these three persons were entirely *equal* to one another; but, on the contrary, had allowed, in accordance with their Platonic principles, that the Son, though belonging to the divine nature, was yet subordinate to the Father. But at length, in the beginning of the fourth century, Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, and Athanasius, his successor, attempted to unite the hypotheses of Origen and Sabellius, thinking that the truth lay between the two extremes, and that the subordinate persons of Origen, or the one undistinguished nature of Sabellius, were alike inconsistent with the representations of the Bible. In forming his theory, Athanasius exhibited great sagacity and penetration, and it must be allowed to have a decided superiority over the partial and unscriptural theory of Arius. He stated the personal distinction of the Father and the Son to be, that the former was *without beginning and unbegotten*, (*ἀναρχος, ἀγέννητος*), while the latter was *eternally begotten* (*γεννητός*) by the Father, and equally eternal with the Father and the Spirit.

The Arian controversy began about the year 320. Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, had taught the doctrine *ἐν τριάδι μονάδα εἶναι*. This doctrine was disputed by Arius, a presbyter of Alexandria, who affirmed that it was inconsistent with the personal distinction in the Deity, and therefore favoured the Sabellian theory. As the controversy proceeded, the breach widened, and Arius at last distinctly affirmed, in opposition to the Sabellians, that there were not only three persons in God, but that they were unequal in glory (*δοξαὶς οὐχ ὅμοαι*);—that the Father alone was the supreme God (*ἀγέννητος*), and God in a higher sense than the Son;—that the Son derived his divinity from the Father before the creation of the world, and that he owed his existence to the divine will (*ἐκλήματι Θεοῦ πρὸ*

χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων πρὸϋδής);—and that the Holy Spirit was likewise divine in a sense inferior to that in which the Father is so. These doctrines were not in reality different from those entertained by the early Christian fathers, who had come under the influence of the New Platonic Philosophy. They were, however, carried out by Arius to all their legitimate consequences, and stated by him in a more distinct form than had been done by any who preceded him. [For a more particular statement of the system of Arius, from his own writings, vide Hahn, *Lehrbuch des christl. Glaubens*, s. 242; Gieseler, b. i. s. 334. Cf. Neander, *Allg. Gesch.* b. ii. Abth. 2, s. 770.]

It was not long, however, before different parties arose among the followers of Arius, who adopted different modes of expression. Some maintained that the Son is in all respects unlike the Father, (*κατὰ πάντα ἀνόμοιος*.) [These are called by different names, descriptive of their doctrine—viz., *ἀνόμοιοι*, *Anomoians*, also *Ἑτεροουσῖοι*; and also after their leaders, Aëtius, Bishop at Alexandria, 362; Eunomius, Bishop at Cyzicus, 392; Acacius, Eudoxius, &c. This party prevailed at a council held at Sirmium, 357, and their confession of faith is contained in the *Formula Synodi Sirmiensis*.—Tr.] Others contended that the Son, though not of the *same*, was yet of a *similar* nature with the Father, (*ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρί*.) [These were called *ὁμοουσιῶνται*, *Ἡμιόμοι*, *Semi-Arians*, also *Eusebians*, from Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia, who endeavoured to reconcile the adherents of Arius and Athanasius. At first, this party was outnumbered by the stricter Arians in the council above mentioned, held at Sirmium, 357. But under their leaders, Basilus, Bishop of Ancyra, and Georgius, Bishop of Laodicea, they united the year following in a synod at Ancyra, where they rejected alike the Arian and Nicene formulas, and anathematized alike those that held that the Son is *ἀνόμοιον κατ' οὐσίαν τῷ πατρί*, or that he is *ὁμοούσιον ἢ παντοῦσιον τῷ πατρί*.—Tr.] All the Arians, of whatever party, agreed in rejecting the term *ὁμοούσιος*, because, in their view, it set aside the personal distinction in the Deity, and made the Son *unum idemque cum Patre*. For the same reason, the orthodox of the third century had condemned it in Paul of Samosata. Vide s. 42.

But in opposing the Arians, some of the teachers of this period fell into the opposite extreme, and professed a scheme substantially the same with that of Sabellius. Of this class were Marcellus, Bishop of Ancyra, and Photinus, Bishop of Sirmium. [The former of these was a zealous advocate of the Nicene formula, and was probably betrayed by his zeal for the *ὁμοούσιος*, unconsciously, into the error of Sabellius. Though condemned by the Arians and

Semi-Arians in a council held at Constantinople, (336,) he was approved by the Council held at Sardica, and was favourably regarded by Athanasius, and generally in the Western church. Vide Neander, b. ii. Abth. 3, s. 841. Photinus, on the other hand, boldly and deliberately advocated Sabellianism, and was condemned not only by the Eusebians, in the second Council at Antioch, (343,) but also by the Western church in the Council at Milan, (346.) The opposition of the Arians and Semi-Arians against these men, in the council at Sirmiam, very much conduced to the union of all anti-Athanasians.—Tr.]

In opposition to all these, and various other theories, Athanasius and his adherents contended with great zeal. Their great object was to find the true medium between Arianism and Sabellianism, and to establish certain formulas in opposition to both. And in this they succeeded; and at a general council at Nice, in the year 325, a symbol was adopted, which was designed to be thenceforward the only standard of orthodoxy. [The Nicene symbol is as follows:—"Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεόν, Πατέρα παντοκράτορα, πάντων ὁράτων τε καὶ ἀδράτων ποιητήν. Καὶ εἰς ἕνα Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς, μονογενῆ, τὸν τέστιν, ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς, Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρί, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, τὰ τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα, καὶ σαρκωθέντα, καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, παθόντα καὶ ἀνυστάμενα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ, ἀναστάντα εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς, καὶ ἐρχόμενον κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς. Καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα. Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας, ὅτι ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο, ἢ ἔξ ἐτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας φάσκοντας εἶναι, ἢ πτωστόν, τρεπτόν, ἢ ἀλλοιωτὸν τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀναθεματίζει ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία."'] This symbol was confirmed at the council held at Constantinople in the year 381, under Theodosius the Great, and so enlarged as to meet certain heresies which had in the meantime arisen. [A sect called *πνευματομάχοι*, *Pneumatomachians*, who agreed generally in opinion with the Semi-Arians, maintained that the Holy Spirit has not the same relation to the Father which the Son has, but derives his existence directly from the Son. Those of this sect were afterwards called *Macedonians*, in honour of Macedonius, who was deposed from office by the stricter Arians on account of his adherence to this doctrine. In opposition to this doctrine it was that the following addition was made to the Nicene formula respecting the Holy Spirit:—"Πιστεύομεν εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα, (τὸ Κύριον, τὸ ζωοποιόν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον, τὸ

καλῶσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν.) Respecting the clause *τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον*, a serious difference afterwards arose, which ended at length, in the eleventh century, in the entire division of the Eastern and Western churches which still subsists. Vide No. III. I. (c) *Third*, of this section.—Tr.]

The distinctions established at the Councils of Nice and Constantinople were often re-enacted at various councils during the succeeding ages. To the Arians, however, and to many who were not Arians, they still appeared to be not only unfounded but injurious. They insisted that *tritheism* was the inevitable consequence of the admission of these distinctions, though Athanasius strongly protested against this conclusion. Some were actually accused of tritheism during the sixth century, though they probably were chargeable with no other fault than an unguarded use of language. [The principal writers who fell under suspicion of tritheism were John Ascosnages, a learned Syrian, and teacher of philosophy at Constantinople, A. D. 565; and his disciple, John Philoponus, a celebrated grammarian of Alexandria, A. D. 641. Among the schoolmen, Roscellinus, Gilbert de la Porree, Peter Abellard, and Joachim of Flora, were condemned on account of tritheism.—Tr.]

Notwithstanding all opposition, however, the distinctions adopted in the Council at Nice remained in force; and so carefully were they guarded, that during the whole period between the fourth and the sixteenth centuries but few were found bold enough to dissent, or to broach any novelties, and those few found scarcely any adherents. Even the schoolmen, who were so much addicted to speculate and refine on other subjects, remained faithful, as a body, to the distinctions once established on the subject of the Trinity.

II. Terms employed in the Discussion of this Doctrine since the Nicene Council.

1. *Οὐσία, substantia*. This term, like all the others in common use in the discussion of this doctrine, is in itself very ambiguous, and was employed in various senses even by the ecclesiastical fathers of this period. It was used to signify (a) *whatever really exists*, in opposition to what has no existence, or exists merely in imagination. Vide s. 42. (b) *Whatever exists for itself has personal self-subsistence*, in short, a *person*. Hence some, in opposition to Sabellius, spoke of *τρεῖς οὐσῖαι ἐν Θεῷ*. (c) *The entire sum of the attributes which belong to a thing, its nature*. In this sense it was employed when it was said that three persons belonged to the *οὐσία Θεοῦ*. Hence the phrase *ὁμοούσιος, consubstantialis*.

2. *Ψύχασις* and *πρόσωπον*. The former

of these words gave occasion to much controversy on account of its ambiguity, some contending for *μὴν ὑπόστασιν*, others for *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*. Before the Nicene Council, as we have seen, s. 42, *ὑπόστασις* and *οὐσία* were employed by the ecclesiastical fathers as synonymous; even in the Nicene symbol they appear as interchangeable words, (*ὑπόστασις ἢ οὐσία*;) and Hieronymus, still later, contended for *unam hypostasin* (i. e., *οὐσίαν*) in God. But, as we before said, Origen had previously contended that there were *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις* and *μία οὐσία* in God, making a distinction between these words. In this he was followed by many writers; and at length this distinction which he had introduced was established by ecclesiastical authority in opposition to the Arians; although many still continued, according to the ancient custom, to use *ὑπόστασις* and *οὐσία* one for the other. In order to obviate the perplexity thus occasioned, and to put an end to the strife about words, many writers in the Greek church began, shortly after the Nicene Council, to use the word *πρόσωπον* instead of *ὑπόστασις*. The former of these is an exact translation of the *persona*, which had been before introduced into the Latin church by Tertullian. But neither was this word free from ambiguity; and it was objected to by many, because it seemed to favour the theory of Sabellius, who was willing to admit that in the divine nature there were three *πρόσωπα*, meaning by the word different *aspects* or *forms* in which God revealed himself to men. The orthodox, however, employed this term in the sense in which it had been used by Tertullian, and afterwards by Augustine and others. Vide s. 42. The sense they intended to convey by it was, that the three subjects spoken of were truly distinguished from each other, and acted each for himself, *eos esse à se invicem sic distinctos, ut singulis sua intelligentia et sua actio tribuenda sit*, Morus, p. 67, s. 12. And that this is a truth taught in the Bible must be evident to all who impartially examine its instructions. It was with a particular reference to the Sabellian theory that this word was adopted by the fathers. In opposition to this theory they also sometimes said, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were *ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*—i. e., different subjects, though not *ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο*—i. e., of different nature, as the Arians affirmed.

3. *Ὁμοούσιος*, *consubstantialis*, Morus, p. 69, s. 13, No. 2—one of the most difficult and controverted of all the terms employed on this doctrine. According to the oldest Greek usage it signifies, *what belongs to the same species*, or *has the same nature, being, properties, with another thing*. Thus Aristotle says, *πάντα τὰ ἄσπερ ὁμοούσια*, and Plato says, respecting souls, that they are *ὁμοούσιαι* *ἑξῆς*. Thus, too, Chrysostom says, Adam was *ὁμοούσιος* with Eve, and re-

specting Jupiter and Neptune, Homer says, *ἀμφότεροιςιν ὁμὸν γένος*, *both were of one race, born of one father*, Il. xiii. 354, seq. This term had been used by the Sabellians and Paul of Samosata, in the third century, to signify *an entire identity of nature*; and when they said the Son was *ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρί*, they meant that he was *unum idemque*, so that no personal distinction existed between them. Hence this term was rejected by the orthodox of that period. Vide s. 42. But when, in the fourth century, at the Nicene Council, the Arians too rejected it, supposing it to mean, what they denied, that the *nature* of the Son was the same with that of the Father; the orthodox then adopted it, expressly guarding, however, against the Sabellian misinterpretation. They explained themselves thus:—The Son was not *created* (*κτισθείς, ποιηθείς*), but *eternally generated* (*γεννηθείς*) from the nature of the Father, (*οὐσία Πατρός*), and is therefore in all respects equal to him, and no more different, as to nature, from God than a human son is from his father, and so cannot be separated from the Father. In this way was the term *ὁμοούσιος* defined by the orthodox fathers, so as to guard alike against the Arians and Sabellians. What the relation designated by this term is they never *positively* explained; nor could they do so, since we are unable to form any ideas respecting the *internal* connexion in the godhead. All that they meant to teach by the use of this word was, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit had the divine nature and divine perfections so in common that one did not possess more and another less; without asserting, however, that there were three Gods; in short, that in the godhead there were *tres distincti, unitate essentiae conjuncti*. This is the doctrine contained in the creeds of the Lutheran church. It admits of a simple and intelligible explanation, and in the manner now pointed out may be kept clear from refinement and subtlety. Vide Morus, p. 69, 70, s. 13, extr. n. 2. Moreover, it is a doctrine which is taught in the Bible, as we have seen in chapter first of this article.

III. *The characteristics by which these persons may be distinguished from one another.*

If these three *supposita* are really distinguished from one another, there must be some signs by which this distinction can be recognised; and these signs must be of such a nature as to indicate a real *personal* distinction. In short, we must be able by these signs to distinguish these subjects, not merely as different names or attributes of God, or as different modes by which he has revealed himself to men, but as really distinct *persons*. Now there are two classes of signs (*characteres personales, sive hypostatici, γνωρίσματα ἰδιώματα σχετικά*) by which theolo-

gians undertake to distinguish these persons from one another.

1. *Internal, characteres interni.* These are distinctive signs which arise from the *internal relation* of the three persons in the godhead to each other, and which indicate the mode of the divine existence, (*peculiaris subsistendi modus, τρόπος ὑστάσεως.*) They are also called *proprietales personales*. To discover and explain what is this internal relation which exists in the godhead is indeed a difficult task, since we have no definite notions respecting the internal nature of the Divine Being. But rather than pass the subject in silence, theologians have laid down the following distinctions, which they derive from the names Father, Son, and Spirit, and from some other Biblical phraseology.

(a) The Father *generates* the Son, and *emits* the Holy Spirit, *generat Filium, spirat Spiritum Sanctum*; and possesses, therefore, as his personal attributes, *generatio activa* and *spiratio activa*. By these representations nothing more is intended than that the divine nature was communicated from eternity to the Son and Holy Spirit, and that there is a certain internal, necessary, and eternal relation between the Father, Son, and Spirit, which, however, we are not able fully to explain. This personal characteristic of the Father was called by the early writers *ἀγεννησία, ἀναρχία, paternitas*. Ἰδιον τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀγεννησία, said Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. 31. "*Patris est GENERARE, non GENERARI.*" Accordingly, the Father was said to be *ἀναρχος ἀγέννητος, ἀπενστος, αὐτόθεος, πηγὴ, αἰτία, fons, radix, principium divinitatis*.

(b) The Son is *generated* by the Father; *Filius est GENERARI, non GENERARE*; ἰδιον τοῦ Τίτου ἡ γέννησις, according to Gregory, in the passage above cited. So that the Son possesses as his personal attributes, *γεννησία, filialio generatio passiva*, and also, as he is supposed to emit the Spirit in conjunction with the Father, *spiratio activa*; with regard to the latter characteristic, however, there was dispute between the Eastern and Western church, of which we shall shortly speak.

(c) The Holy Spirit neither generates nor is generated, but *proceeds* from the Father and Son; *Spiritus Sancti est, nec generare nec generari, sed PROCEDERE*; ἰδιον τοῦ Πνεύματος ἡ ἐκπεμψις, said Gregory, as above. What he calls *ἐκπεμψις* is called by other Greek writers, *πνοή, προβολή*, and by Basilus, *πρόδος ἐκ Θεοῦ*.

Respecting these attempts to determine exactly in what the internal distinction between the persons in the godhead consists, we have to remark,

First, that they were wholly unknown to the oldest writers, both of the Greek and Latin church, and were first made by the catholic party of the fourth century, when they wished to draw

the line of distinction between themselves and the Arians on the one hand, and the Sabellians on the other, as finely as possible, as we have already seen in No. 1.

Secondly. In stating these internal personal characteristics of the three persons in the godhead, theologians have indeed selected terms which occur in the Bible, (such as *beget, proceed &c.*) and would seem to have drawn their whole phraseology on this subject directly from thence. But even if we should allow that these terms are always used in the Bible to denote the internal relation existing between these divine persons, we should not be at all advanced by them in our knowledge of what this relation is, since we are wholly unable to detect that secret meaning which lies concealed beneath them, and which God has not seen fit to reveal. We cannot concede, however, that all these terms are used in the Bible to denote the communication of the divine nature and the internal relation existing between the persons of the Trinity; certainly not, that they are *always* so used. The term *beget*, for example, denotes in many passages, not the communication of the divine nature to the Son of God, but his appointment to the kingly office, or the Messiahship. Thus the passage, *Psa. ii. 7, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee*, though often cited in the New Testament, is never brought to prove the divine nature of the Son of God, but is always supposed to refer to the confirmation of his Messiahship by his resurrection from the dead. The same might be said of many other passages in which similar phraseology is used. Vide s. 34, No. 4; s. 37, ad finem; and Morus, p. 64, n. 2. The name *Son of God* is indeed, in some passages, given to Christ, in designation of his higher nature, his equality with the Father, and his *internal relation* to him; though even then it does not enable us to understand what this relation is, which we have reason to think lies beyond the reach of our knowledge. All the idea which we are justified in deriving from this name is, that Christ as truly participates in the divine nature as the Father, ἵσα Θεῷ Πατρί, just as, among men, the son as truly participates in human nature as the father, ἵσα Πατρί ἀνθρώπῳ. Again, the *proceeding of the Holy Spirit from the Father*, which is spoken of, *John xv. 26*, denotes merely his being *sent* and *commissioned*, and by no means his divine nature and internal relation to the Father and the Son. Vide s. 39, II. 1; and Morus, p. 67, note.

Thirdly. With regard to the *Holy Spirit* more particularly, we may remark, that during the first three centuries of the Christian era there was nothing decided by ecclesiastical authority respecting his nature, the characteristics of his person, or his relation to the Father and the Son. The learned men of this period, therefore, being

left unshackled by authority, indulged themselves freely in philosophizing upon this subject, and adopted very different theories; as we find in the writings of Justin the Martyr, Origen, and others. Cf. s. 42. Nor was anything more definite with regard to his nature and his relation to the other persons of the Trinity than what has already been stated, established by the council at Nice, or even by that at Constantinople. To believe in the Holy Spirit, τὸ ὂν Πατὴρ καὶ Τῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον, and ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, was all that was required in the symbol there adopted. It was not long, however, before dissension arose with regard to the latter phrase between the Greek and Latin church. The Greek fathers adhered for the most part to this formula, without going into any more minute distinctions; so Basiliius, Gregory of Nazianzen, Cyril of Alexandria, and others; though Epiphanius added to the formula, ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, the explanatory clause, ἐκ τοῦ Τίτου λάμβανον, according to John, xvi. 15; and John of Damascus, in the eighth century, represented that the Spirit did not proceed from the Son, but from the Father *through* the Son—a representation which had before been made by Novatian, (*Spiritus Sanctum a Patre per Filium procedere*), and which undoubtedly was derived from John, xv. 26, *I will send you the Comforter from the Father*. With this modification the formula adopted by the Council at Constantinople, and appended to the Nicene symbol, was retained in the Greek church. But there were many, especially in the Latin church, who maintained that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Father *only*, but *also from the Son*. They appealed to John, xvi. 13, and to the texts where the Holy Spirit is called the *Spirit of Christ*—e. g., Rom. viii. 9, seq. To this doctrine the Greeks were for the most part opposed, because they did not find that the Spirit was ever expressly said in the New Testament to proceed from the Son. It prevailed, however, more and more in the Latin church; and when, in the fifth and sixth centuries, the Arians, who then prevailed very much in Spain, urged it as an argument against the equality of Christ with the Father, that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father *only*, and not from the Son, the catholic churches of that region began to hold more decidedly that the Holy Spirit proceeded from both, (*ab utroque*), and to insert the adjunct *Filioque* after *Patre* in the *Symbolum Nicæno-Constantinopolitanum*. In this the churches of Spain were followed, first by those of France, and at a later period by nearly all the Western churches. But as the Eastern church still adhered substantially to the more ancient formula, it accused the Western church of falsifying the Nicene symbol; and thus at different periods, and especially in the seventh and ninth centuries, violent con-

troversies arose between them. The true causes of these unhappy dissensions were, however, very different from those which were alleged; and we have reason to suspect that they were less animated by zeal for the truth than by the mutual jealousies of the Roman and Byzantine bishops. But to whatever cause they are to be ascribed, these disputes terminated in the eleventh century in that entire separation of the Eastern and Western churches which continues to the present time. Cf. Morus, p. 67, s. 11, note. Walch, *Historia Controversiæ Græcorum Latinorumque de processione Spiritus Sancti*; Jenæ, 1751, 8vo. Ziegler, *Geschichtsentwicklung des Dogma vom heiligen Geist*, th. i. Num. 2 of his "Theologische Abhandlungen," where he gives an historical account of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit from the time of Justin the Martyr. Cf. especially s. 204, ff. of this essay. [Respecting the controversy in the Eastern and Western church concerning the Holy Spirit, cf. also Neander, b. ii. Abth. 2, s. 891; and Hahn, *Lehrbuch*, &c., s. 217, s. 57.]

Note.—Since these ecclesiastical terms *de characteribus personalibus internis* have now become common, they cannot be entirely omitted in the religious instruction of the people. Let the doctrine, therefore, (according to the advice of Morus, p. 64, No. 2, and p. 67, Note extr.) be first expressed plainly and scripturally thus: The Son is equal to the Father, and has the same nature with him; but has this from eternity *through* the Father. It may then be remarked, that this doctrine is briefly expressed by the words, *the Son is generated by the Father*. Respecting the Holy Spirit, let it be said, That he is equal to the Father and Son, and possesses the same nature with them; and it may then be added, that this is commonly expressed by the words, *he proceeds from the Father and from the Son*.

2. *External, characteres externi*. Morus, p. 68. Note 3. These are characteristics of the persons of the Trinity arising from the *works* of the Deity relating to objects extrinsic to itself, and called *opera externa, sive, ad extra*. They are twofold:

(a) *Opera Dei æconomica*, those institutions which God has founded for the salvation of the human race. They are the following:—*The Father* sent the Son to redeem men, John, iii. 16, 17. He also gives or sends the Holy Spirit, John, xiv. 26. *The Son* is sent from the Father to accomplish the work of redemption, and sends the Holy Spirit from the Father, John, xv. 26. *The Holy Spirit* formed the human nature of Christ, Luke, i. 35, and anointed it, (unxit, Acts, x. 38,) i. e., endowed it with gifts; and is sent into the hearts of men, and carries them forward towards moral perfection.

(b) *Opera Dei attributiva*, such divine works

as are common to the three persons, and are sometimes predicated of them all; but which still are frequently ascribed (*attributive*) to one of the three. Theologians, therefore, have the rule, *Opera ad extra (attributiva), tribus personis sunt communia*. To the Father is ascribed the decree to create the world, the actual creation, and the preservation of it. To the Son also, the creation, preservation, and government of the world is ascribed; also the raising of the dead and sitting in judgment. To the Holy Spirit is ascribed the immediate revelation of the divine will to the prophets, the continuation of the great work of salvation commenced by Christ, and the communication and application to men of the means of grace. [Cf. Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 238.]

SECTION XLIV.

HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY SINCE THE TIME OF THE REFORMATION.

If we consider how obscure and full of difficulties the doctrine of the Trinity must have been, as commonly taught after the Nicene Council, we shall not wonder, that when, in the sixteenth century, the spirit of inquiry and speculation revived in the West, many attempts should have been made to illustrate and explain the prevailing theory, to rectify its mistakes, or wholly to abandon it for another more rational and scriptural. Many of the writers, whose intention it was to explain and vindicate the ancient theory adopted at the Council of Nice, unconsciously deviated from it, and thus placed themselves in the ranks of the heretics. None, however, of the very numerous attempts which have been made since the sixteenth century to illustrate this doctrine, and vindicate it against the objections of reason, can lay claim to entire originality. The germ, at least, of many modern hypotheses may be found in the writings which belong to the period between the second and fourth centuries; and after all the inquiries then made, and the theories then published, it is not probable that much remains to be said. Nearly all, therefore, of those who have written on this subject since the Reformation, belong to some one of the general classes which have been before mentioned; though it needs to be remarked, that those who bear a common name often belong to very different classes. This was the case with those who spread from Italy in such numbers in the sixteenth century, under the general name of *Unitarians*.

1. Some have attempted to illustrate and explain this doctrine by philosophy; and not a few have gone so far as to think that they could prove the Trinity *à priori*, and that reason alone furnishes sufficient arguments for its truth; though others of this class have looked to reason

for nothing more than an *illustration* of this fact with regard to the divine existence, for the knowledge of which they believed man indebted to revelation alone. In the latter class we may place Philip Melancthon, who, in his "*Locutiones Theologice*," explained the Trinity in the following somewhat Platonic manner:—God, from his infinite understanding, produces *thought*, which is the image of himself. Our minds, too, produce thoughts, which are the images of things; but we are not able to impart *personal* existence to our thoughts; to his thought, however, God can do this; and this his thought bears the impress of the Father, is his likeness and resemblance, and is hence called by John, *λόγος*. This illustration of the Trinity was received without offence or suspicion, until the heresy which lurks beneath it was detected and exposed by Flacius. In connexion with this illustration, we may mention those drawn from nature. Many such are found in the writings of the fathers. Take, for example, that of Augustine, drawn from the human *soul*, which, he says, is *one* substance, with *three* principal powers, *memory*, *understanding*, and *will*; respecting which it may be remarked, that it is hard to see why many other powers might not have been named as well as these. Vide Semler, *Inst. ad doctrinam Christianam*, 305. Or take, as another example, that illustration of the Trinity given at an earlier period by Lactantius, who compares it with *light*, which unites in itself *fire*, *splendour*, and *heat*. In all illustrations of this nature the fault is, that the mere powers and qualities of things which have no personal existence are used to represent the subsistence of a trinity in unity. Hence such illustrations are more favourable to the theory of Sabellius than to the doctrine of the Trinity drawn from the Bible, and established at the Council at Nice. The latest attempt to explain the Trinity in this manner may be found in the September number of the "*Berliner Monatschrift*," for the year 1790, s. 280, where there is an article entitled, "*Neues Gleichniss von der Dreyeinigkeit*," written by Schwab, counsellor, and professor at Stuttgart. *Space*, he says, cannot be seen, felt, or recognised by any of our senses, and yet must be regarded, he thinks, as something *substantial*. It is, indeed, extended, and still *one*. This one substance has, however, three distinct *dimensions*, which are not arbitrarily assumed, and which cannot be considered merely as *parts* or *accidents* of space, but which belong essentially to it—viz., *length*, *breadth*, and *thickness*. Some chemists and theosophists suppose that there is, throughout the whole kingdom of nature, and even in material bodies, a threefold elementary principle, (as to the nature of which, however, they are not agreed,) and they refer to this as an illustration of the Trinity.

But, as we have said, there were others who supposed that the Trinity could not only be illustrated by reason, but mathematically proved *à priori*. Among these were Bartholomew Keckermann, who wrote a "Systema Theologicum," Peter Poiret, and Daries, who published an Essay, "in qua pluralitas personarum in Deitate e solis rationis principiis, methodo Mathematicorum, demonstratur;" Leovardix, 1735, 8vo. The attempt of this kind which deserves most attention is that made by Reusch, a celebrated theologian and philosopher of Jena, in his "Introductio in theologiam revelatam,"—an attempt which was regarded by the late Dr. Gruner as entirely successful, and was adopted by him substantially in his "Institutiones theol. dogmat.," l. i. c. 5. This demonstration is very much as follows:—In the divine understanding there are three acts: (a) God comprehends in his understanding the ideas of all things which can be conceived, and so far as he does this he is called *Father*; (b) he connects these ideas as means to an end, and devises all possible schemes or connexions of things in the possible world, and so far he is called *Son*; (c) from all these possible schemes, he selects, by his infinite wisdom, that which is best, and so far is called *Holy Spirit*. These acts of the divine understanding, in each of which there must have been a special exercise of the divine will, must be supposed distinct from each other; and yet, being in God, they cannot have been successive; and, finally, they must be regarded as personal, or as *actus hypostatice*, and be designated by particular personal names. But how this last consequence follows, it is hard to see; and where is the text from which it can be made to appear that any one of the inspired writers connected any such ideas with the names Father, Son, and Spirit? Another metaphysical demonstration has been proposed by Dr. Cludius, in his inaugural disputation, *Philosophica expositio et defensio dogmatis orthodoxi de Trinitate*; Gottin-gæ, 1788.

2. There have also been some in modern times who have expressed themselves so boldly on the subject of the Trinity that they have seemed to approximate towards *tritheism*, like those whom we have already mentioned in the sixth century. Vide s. 43, I. ad finem. To pass by those who have merely been unguarded in the manner in which they have defended and interpreted the Athanasian theory, we may mention in this class, Matthew Gribaldus, a Jurist of Padua, who flourished in the sixteenth century, and was for some time professor at Tübingen. He maintained that the divine nature consisted of three equally eternal *spirits*, between whom, however, he admitted a distinction in respect to rank and perfections. [Henry Nicolai, William Sherlock, and Pierre Faydit, belong to this class.]

3. Other modern writers have inclined to adopt the *Sabellian* theory as the ground of their views on the Trinity. Among these is Michael Serveto, or Servetus, a native of Spain in the sixteenth century, who published his views in seven books, "De trinitatis erroribus," and in his Dialogues, "De Trinitate." He taught that there is *one God*, who, however, has made known his will to men in two *personales representationes*—i. e., personal, or personified modes of revelation, called *Λόγος* and *Πνεῦμα ἅγιον*. For these opinions he was brought to the stake by Calvin, at Geneva, 1553. Vide Mosheim, *Leben Servet's*; Helmstadt, 1748, 8vo, republished with additions at the same place, 1750. The representation of the Trinity which Grotius gives in his "*Silvæ Sacre*" leans towards Sabellianism, and agrees substantially with the theory advanced by Stephen Nye, an Englishman, in his "Doctrine of the Trinity;" London, 1701. God, he said, is a being who knew and loved himself from eternity; and his *understanding* is the Son, and his *affection* the Holy Spirit. [For a more full statement of this supposed demonstration of the Trinity, vide Lessing, *Das Christenthum und die Vernunft*; Berlin, 1784, 8vo. Mich. Sailer, *Theorie des weisen*; Spottes, 1781, 8vo. Marheinecke, *Grundlehren der christ. Dogmatik*, s. 129, 370, seq.; Berlin, 1819. Leibnitz, *Defensio logica Trinitatis*.]

In this class we must place the hypothesis of Le Clerc, who supposes that the terms Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, designate the different modifications of the divine understanding, and the plans which God forms. God is called the Father, so far as his understanding comprehends all things and surveys them at once; Son and Holy Spirit, so far as he produces and executes a particular thought. Of the same nature is the view of the Trinity which Dr. Löffler has appended to his translation of *Souverain*. In God, he says, according to the New Testament, there is but *one subject*; the Logos and Spirit are his attributes, powers, relations, or modes of operation, and the term, *Son of God*, so far as it denotes a personal subject, is applicable only to the man Jesus. Among the Arminians, and even among the Puritans of England, there have always been many who have inclined towards Sabellianism. [This is the error into which Weigel and Jacob Boehmen fell, and which has always proved more seductive than any other to mystics and pietists, and persons who have mingled feeling and imagination with philosophical investigation. In this divergency from the established creed of the church, by far a greater proportion of the modern theologians and philosophers of Germany are found than in the Arian heresy, which was formerly so much more prevalent. They have so explained the Trinity as to lose the idea of three divine *persons*

in the godhead, for which they have substituted either three distinct *powers* or *attributes*, (as Meier, Seiler, Cludius, and Töllner,) or a three-fold *agency* in God—three eternal actions distinct from each other, as S. G. Schlegel, Kant, Tieftrunk, Daub, Schelling, De Wette, and Fessler. Among these Sabellian hypotheses, the one which is less devious from scriptural truth, and which is defended with the most sober argument, is that of Schleiermacher, who supposes that the established doctrine of the Trinity is a proposition which connects what we are taught in the scripture as to the three-fold mode of the divine existence—viz., the being of God in himself, absolutely considered; his being in Christ (the Son,) and his being in the Christian church (the Spirit.) To this view Neander appears inclined, from his general remarks prefixed to his history of this doctrine, and also Tholuck, from various passages in his Commentary on John. For a more full statement of these modern Sabellian hypotheses, cf. Hahn, s. 57, Anm. 3, a.; and s. 58, Anm. 2, f.; Bretschneider, Handbuch, b. i. s. 63, 82.—[Tr.]

4. The *Arian* theory (which, however, we have shewn, s. 43, to be in every important respect older than Arius) has also found advocates among protestant theologians, especially those of the eighteenth century. Some, especially in England, embraced and zealously defended the entire system of the high Arians of former times—e. g., Whiston, Harwood, and even Wetstein. But the system which has met with the most approbation is that more refined subordinationism taught by Sam. Clark, in his “Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity;” London, 1712; which was translated into German, and published with a preface by Semler, Leipzig, 1774. Vide Morus, p. 69, s. 15, note 1. It had not a few advocates among the English, especially of the presbyterian order, and among the Armenian theologians of Holland, as well as among protestants elsewhere. The names of Whitby, Benson, and (Priestley?) are found on the list of its defenders in England. This theory is as follows:—God is the author of all things. With him existed *from the beginning* (so indefinite is the statement of Clark) the Logos and the Spirit, both as *personal* subjects. What their real internal nature and connexion is cannot indeed be known, but so much the scripture reveals, that the Father alone is self-existent *αὐτοῦς* and the source and author of all the works and agency of the Son and Holy Spirit. *How* the Son received his being before the creation of the world cannot be determined; but he has in fact received, communicated to him from the Father, all the communicable divine perfections. He is not to be

regarded as himself the creator of the world, but was employed by the Father as his organ in this work. Though subordinate to the Father, he yet claims from us divine honour. The Holy Spirit derives his origin from the Father, is dependent upon the Father and the Son, and subordinate to them; he yet has a nature superior to that of angels, and is intermediate, as it were, between them and the Son. The subordination of persons taught in this theory, though subtle, is yet so evident that its advocates are justly called *subordinationists*. This mode of representation is by no means new, and, as we have shewn, s. 42, 43, was common in the second and third centuries, long before Arius appeared. It resulted naturally from the application of the principles of the Platonic philosophy to the declarations of the Bible. The hypothesis of Paul Maty, a Netherlander, in some respects resembles this. According to him there are three persons in the godhead, distinct from each other. The first is the entire Deity, who created and governs all things, and is called the Father. This God, before the creation of the world, produced two finite beings, with whom he entered into a most intimate connexion, in such a way that he with them composes three persons, somewhat in the same manner as the divine nature in Christ is connected with the human. So that the union between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be called a *personal* union. According to this theory, the only union which exists between the persons of the Trinity is an *unio moralis*, and the whole representation is very similar to that which was adopted by the Council at Antioch, 343. But it wants the support of scripture, and fails, as much as any other theory, of shewing any *ground* or *necessity* for this union of persons. There is nothing in reality either illustrated or explained by it.

Note.—The real source of the Arian hypothesis is the New Platonic philosophy, to which it can be traced much more directly than to the holy scriptures. One strong objection to this theory is, that it presents to view a *plurality* of unequal gods, thus encourages the worship of higher spirits, and so leads on to the most multiform superstition. In this point, as well as in others, the doctrine of the *numerical unity* of the divine nature has greatly the advantage over Arianism.

5. Still another class of modern sectarians remains to be mentioned—the *Socinians*, sometimes called *Photinians*, because they agree in the main with Photinus, who flourished in the fourth century, and whose scheme was noticed, s. 43. The founders of this sect were Lælius Socinus and his nephew Faustus Socinus, both of whom flourished in the sixteenth century. They maintained that the Nicene theory leads

to *tritheism*, and on account of the uncommon purity in which they supposed themselves to hold the doctrine of the divine unity, called themselves *Unitarians*. They brought over considerable numbers to their doctrine in Poland and Transylvania, whom they formed into separate societies; and since their death their system has prevailed to some extent both in England and Germany. The Socinian theory is briefly as follows:—The *Father* is the only true God. Christ is the son of Mary, and a man like ourselves, though produced by a miraculous divine influence. When, therefore, he is called God, it cannot be in the same sense in which the Father is so called. He was endowed by God with very unusual gifts and qualifications, and after his ascension to heaven was promoted above all other created beings, and exalted to divine honour. The Holy Ghost is not a *person*, but merely an attribute of God, or a mode of divine operation. On the question, *whether divine worship should be paid to Christ*, they were not themselves agreed; and although most of them answered in the affirmative, it was not without dissent from others of their number. With regard to this theory, it may be remarked that it stands in direct opposition to the most express declarations of the writers of the New Testament, and especially of John and Paul, much of whose writings cannot be reconciled with it without great violence. Nor is it at all more capable of being reconciled with sound philosophy, which rejects at once the idea of a *deified man*—a *deus factitius*.

6. A new theory on the Trinity was proposed by Dr. Ursperger, in a number of essays, the views of which were condensed by himself into a work entitled, “*Kurzgefasstes System seines Vortrags von Gottes Dreyeinigkeit*,” published at Augsburg, where he was then pastor, 1777, 8vo. His theory bears a general resemblance to that of Marcellus of Ancyra, and, like that, was condemned by many as favouring Sabellianism. In this, however, they were manifestly unjust; since his object was to unite the three principal ancient theories—the Arian, Sabellian, and Nicene, making the latter the foundation of his system. He endeavoured to effect this combination by making a distinction between *trinitas essentialis*, the internal threefold distinction necessarily belonging to the divine nature; and *trinitas œconomica*, the three persons revealed to us in the work of redemption. But this theory derives no support from the scriptures. Vide Revision der deutsch. Lit. 1te St. for the year 1776. [Cf. Bretschneider, Handbuch, b. i. s. 474.]

Concluding Remarks.

From all that has now been said, the conclu-

sion is obvious, *that while we are taught by the scriptures to believe in three equal subjects in the godhead, who are described as persons, we are still unable, after all that has been done by theologians and interpreters, to determine IN WHAT MANNER OR IN WHAT SENSE these three have the divine nature so in common that there is only ONE God.* Vide s. 33. It must therefore be unwise for the religious teacher to enlarge in his public instructions upon those points where the scriptures are silent; and he will do well to confine himself to what is clearly taught in the Bible, and has a practical influence upon the feelings and conduct; for this doctrine was not given us to employ our understanding in speculating upon it, but to encourage our hearts by the disclosures which it makes of the Divine Being, to incite us to a grateful remembrance of the benefits which the Father, Son, and Spirit bestow upon us, and to lead us to avail ourselves of these benefits. Instead, then, of perplexing his hearers with learned speculations, let the minister of the gospel content himself with teaching the doctrine of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as represented in the holy scriptures, describing them as three distinct subjects, designating the distinction between them by the word *person*, shewing that to three, and to one as much as another, divinity and equal divine perfections belong, while still there is only *one* God; and especially insisting upon the benefits which these persons confer upon men, the *opera ad extra* which we mentioned in the last section.

As Christians, we should repose our confidence in the FATHER, as the author and giver of all good, and especially as the author of salvation. He bestows this good and these blessings upon us (*a*) through the *Son*, to whom we are indebted for making known the way of salvation for the remission of sins, on condition of faith in his sufferings and death, and for eternal blessedness; and (*b*) through the *Holy Spirit*, who continues the great work of enlightening and saving men, which Christ began, and who, in the use of appointed means, carries us forward from one stage to another of moral improvement. If such is the light in which we regard this doctrine, (and such is the light in which it is presented in the scriptures,) we then yield the Father, Son, and Spirit the *religious worship* required, and receive the favours which they bestow as *divine* favours, for which we are indebted to none but God himself. Whatever more than this it may be necessary for others to know with regard to this doctrine, the Christian, as such, needs to know nothing more; he can dispense with the learned subtleties with which many are chiefly employed. He does not wish to know this truth, merely for its own sake, but

for that higher end for which all religious knowledge should be sought—viz., that he may conform in feeling and practice to the truth which is known. When this is the case with Chris-

tians, and not till then, the great doctrines of religion will exert their proper influence upon the heart and the life. Vide Morus, p. 70, s. 14; and Griesbach, Praktische Dogmatik, s. 62.

PART II.—THE WORKS OF GOD.

ARTICLE V.

OF THE CREATION OF THE WORLD.

SECTION XLV.

OF THE MEANING OF THE WORD "WORLD," AND OF SYNONYMOUS WORDS.



HE attentive study and contemplation of the visible world leads us to the knowledge of the Divine Being and of his glorious attributes. Paul well says, Rom. i. 20, that the attributes of God, which are in themselves invisible, are brought within the sight and cognizance of man since the world has been created. The Bible accordingly earnestly recommends this source of divine knowledge, (vide Ps. viii. 1; xix. 1—6, coll. s. 15;) and it should therefore be ranked among the first and most essential parts of religious instruction. The practical import of this doctrine is exhibited by Morus, p. 74, s. 4, 5. The first of these works of God is the *creation of the world*; and to the consideration of this we shall now proceed.

Meaning of the word "World," and of other Synonymous Words.

World, in the strict, philosophical sense, means *everything extrinsic to God*—the animate and inanimate, rational and irrational creation. Rude and uncultivated nations do not commonly have any idea of a *world*; certainly they do not concern themselves with the question how it originated, or perhaps believe that only particular parts of it were created. The Caffres have no idea of a *creation*; they believe that the world always existed, and will always continue as it is. Vide Le Vaillant, *Reise ins Innere Afrika's*, s. 365, translated by Forster, in his "*Magazin von merkwürdigen neuen Reisebeschreibungen*," th. ii. But when the first early inquirers into nature attained to the principle that everything which exists must have a beginning, they unconsciously fell into the belief that *chance* or *necessity* was the cause of all things. Vide Mei-

ners, *Historia doctrinæ de vero Deo*, p. i. It was only by slow degrees that they proceeded to those higher inquiries which are indicated in s. 46. Their gradual progress in the knowledge of this subject is strikingly exhibited in the terms which at different periods they employed to designate the general notion they had of the world; on these terms, therefore, we shall offer a few remarks.

1. When men first began to reflect upon the objects which surrounded them, they naturally divided the whole universe into two great portions—viz., *the earth*, upon which they dwelt, and *the heavens*, which they saw above them. Accordingly, we find that in most of the ancient languages the general notion of the universe is expressed by the simple and original phrase, *the heavens and earth*. So we find it frequently among the Hebrews. Gen. i. 1; ii. 1; Psalm cxv. 15. The nations who inhabited the sea-coasts, and beheld the boundless expanse of the ocean, frequently divided the universe into three portions—*heaven, earth, and sea*. So too the Hebrews, Ps. cxlvi. 6; Acts, xvii. 24. This was the most ancient mode of describing the universe even among the Greeks. Homer conceived of the universe as divided into these three portions—heaven, earth, and sea. Odys. i. 52—54, coll. II. xv. 189, seq. This ancient phraseology is the ground of Aristotle's definition of the world, *Κόσμος ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις περιεχομένων φύσεων*, *De Mundo*, c. 1.

2. But in process of time other terms were introduced into the various languages, by which this idea was expressed more briefly and distinctly. These terms were derived from various sources; most of them from certain obvious attributes, whether perfections or imperfections, of the world. The following may be here stated as those best known;—

(a) The Hebrews, Chaldeans, and Syrians called the world עולם, עולמים, to which correspond the αἰών, αἰῶνες, of the Grecian Jews. This term was derived from the *duration* and age of the world. Cf. s. 20, III. No passage, however, occurs in the books written *before the Babylonian exile*, in which these words are clearly used in the sense now ascribed to them. In the earlier books they stand simply for the ideas

of *continuance, duration, age*. The word *הָעוֹלָם*, which occurs in Ps. xlix. 2, is of similar origin, being derived from *הָלַךְ*; although in this passage it rather means the *earth* than the world. Vide Anmerk zu Ps. xvii. 14. The word *הָאָרֶץ*, on the contrary, which occurs, Isaiah, xxxviii. 11, in the sense of *world, or earth*, is of exactly an opposite origin, the *mutability and perishableness* of the world being the foundation of this appellation, although some consider the reading incorrect, and wish to substitute *הָעוֹלָם*. Corresponding with the former appellation of the world, taken from its long duration, is the German word *Welt*, or, as it is always written in the old books, *Werelt*, and in the Danish *Weret*, which is derived from the word *währen, to continue, endure*; though, according to others, it is abbreviated from *Werld*, and so derived from *werlen, to revolve, turn round*, the earth being considered as an oval surface. On the latter supposition this term would resemble the Latin *orbis terrarum*, and the English *world*.

(b) From the beautiful and wonderful order and arrangement of all parts of the world, the Greeks called it *ὁ κόσμος*, and the Latins, *mundus*, which is a mere translation of the Greek *κόσμος*. This term, however, does not occur in Homer; nor indeed is the notion of *world* ever expressed by a *single* word either in Homer or Moses. The word *κόσμος* was employed by the oldest Grecian writers, to denote merely the *starry firmament*, from its beauty and splendour. And in a similar limitation the word *mundus* was frequently used by Lucretius and other Latin poets, and even by Seneca. Afterwards the Sophists—i. e., the learned, or the philosophers, began to apply this word to the whole universe, as was the case with Socrates as cited by Xenophon. When, therefore, Xenophon employs the term in this sense, he is careful to say, *ὁ ὑπὸ τῶν σοφίστων καλούμενος κόσμος*. After his time it gradually passed in this sense into the language of common life. Pythagoras is usually esteemed the first who employed the term *κόσμος* to denote the whole universe. Cf. Ser. var. arg. p. 532, seq. This word was afterwards used in various other significations which occur in the writings of the Grecian Jews, and in the New Testament. Among these is the sense of the *earth, οἰκουμένη, ἡ γῆ*; and also of *particular provinces of it*—a meaning which belongs to the words just mentioned, and to the Latin *orbis terrarum*. *Κόσμος* was also used in the sense of the *world of men, the whole human race*, and then, the *wicked as a whole, the heathen*. By Christian writers it was sometimes used to denote the *Jewish world*. Finally, *κόσμος* was used to denote *visible, perishable, earthly things* and possessions, (*res terrenæ, externæ, ad corpus pertinentes*), in opposition to things *invisible, heavenly, and divine*.

(c) Metaphorical appellations of the world, like those of the Greeks and Latins, occur also among the Jews. The Hebrews called the stars *the host, צְבָא, host of heaven, host of God*, Judges, v. 20. But afterwards they called *all created things the host of God*, which they represented as standing in his service and accomplishing his will, Ps. ciii. 21, coll. ver. 20, 22; also Gen. ii. 1. *The heavens and the earth, and all the host of them, וְכָל צְבָאָה*. Hence the supreme God is called *יהוה צְבָאוֹת, Lord of hosts*—i. e., *of the world*. Cf. s. 17. This term resembles the *κόσμος* of the Greeks, in that it was originally applied to the heavens only, and afterwards so extended in its signification as to embrace all created objects.

(d) After the belief in spirits and demons became common among the Israelites, the phrase *τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ ἀόρατα* was employed to designate the sum of created objects, and occurs in this sense, Col. i. 16.

The Greek term, *τὸ πᾶν (universum)*, is the appropriate philosophical appellation of the world, and does not occur in the New Testament, except indeed in the plural, *τὰ πάντα*.

SECTION XLVI.

WHAT WE MEAN WHEN WE SPEAK OF THE CREATION OF THE WORLD; THE PROOF OF A CREATION; THE MATERIAL FROM WHICH IT WAS MADE; WITH A SKETCH OF THE VARIOUS OPINIONS ENTERTAINED ON THIS SUBJECT.

I. Definition and Proof of the Creation of the World.

By creation we understand *that act of God by which he gave existence to the world, or to things exterior to himself; or, as it is commonly expressed, by which he made the world out of nothing*; which last definition will be considered at length in No. II. The proof of the position that the world derives its existence from God, is made out from reason, by the very same arguments by which we prove from nature that there is a God; respecting which, vide s. 15. For from the very reason that the world could not produce itself, we conclude that there must be a God who produced it. Vide ubi supra. We proceed, therefore, to the more important inquiry respecting—

II. The Material from which the World was formed, and the Various Opinions entertained upon this subject.

1. Philosophers have always allowed the *existence* of a first material, since otherwise they would be compelled to admit a *progressio causarum in infinitum*, which is not supposable. But,

2. The ancients found great difficulty in explaining the *origin* of this first material. The

Grecian philosophers and other ancient writers insisted upon the principle, *ex nihilo nihil fit*; and could not admit, therefore, that it was even possible for God to create the world out of nothing. Accordingly, they believed almost universally in two eternal, original principles—viz., *God*, and *self-existent matter*, neither of which is the ground of the other. The former they supposed to be a rational and thinking principle, and the author of all good; the other, irrational and unintelligent, and the author of all evil.

As to the question, how the world arose from this pre-existing matter, the opinions of the ancients were very various. Plato taught, that *God, of his own will*, united himself with matter, and produced the world from it; so that he could say that the *world* was not eternal and uncreated, although matter might be so. Aristotle, the peripatetic, and Zeno, the stoic, taught that this union of God with the world was *necessary*; and accordingly they affirmed the eternity of the world, (Cic. Qu. Acad. iv. 38,) although they differed from one another in explaining the manner of this connexion. Epicurus separated God entirely from the world, and taught that matter consists of innumerable small atoms, which from eternity had floated about, like dust on the water or in the air, until at last they assumed the form of the present world. This ancient opinion of the eternity of matter found an advocate in modern times in Bayle, who was of opinion that it resulted necessarily from the principle, which cannot be disputed, *ex nihilo nihil fit*. But as we have before shewn, s. 15, II., the doctrine, that matter is *eternal* and *necessary*, is the foundation of a theoretical atheism.

If we follow the principles of philosophy in its present improved state, or rather, if we follow the Bible, to which alone our modern philosophy is indebted for its improvement, we shall be unable to admit the validity of the maxim *ex nihilo nihil fit*, in opposition to the doctrine of creation from nothing. This maxim is indeed incontrovertibly true when applied to the *causa materialis*; for there must be in every case a ground—a *prima materia*—from which whatever exists proceeds. But it is not true if understood of the *causa efficiens*, to which omnipotence is ascribed. Consequently, if our theory respecting God and his attributes is well established, this principle applied to him as the efficient cause must be regarded as false; for if God is omnipotent, he can of course from nothing produce something, or bring into existence what did not exist before. If he could not do this, he would not be omnipotent. Moreover, if it is true that matter is not *necessary*, (vide s. 15,) it cannot exist *of itself*, but must derive its existence from God, or depend upon God, who at first created it out of nothing.

The greatest philosophers of antiquity appear

therefore to have stopped short of the truth, and to have been inconsistent, when they worshipped God as the creator of the world, indeed, but not of *matter*. They admitted merely a *creatio mediata, ex præexistente materia*, and not *immediata*—i. e., they did not believe in the production of matter itself from nothing. God, with them, was merely the *builder*, and not the *creator*, of the world.

The ancient Greeks, as we perceive, reasoned upon this subject from principles entirely different from those which we at present adopt; and not one of them ever advanced to the distinct conception of a *creation from nothing*. It is no valid objection, however, against the position that God made matter from nothing, that we cannot conceive how what is *possible* should become *real*, through the mere will of God; for this is a matter of which we have never had any experience; and yet experience assures us of the reality of many events, the manner of whose occurrence is incomprehensible to the human understanding. How much less, then, are we capable of judging respecting things of which we have had and can have no experience!

The truth, that everything which exists was created by God from nothing, is the uniform doctrine of the Bible—of the old Jewish prophets, and of the Christian teachers. In respect to this important doctrine of religion they were far in advance of the other cultivated nations of antiquity, though confessedly behind them in general intellectual improvement. This sublime truth, which appears to us so simple, since we have been taught it, was unknown to the ancient philosophers, long after it had been taught by the writers of the neglected Jewish scriptures; and indeed it is from these that our modern philosophers have derived, however unwillingly, all their better views on this subject. To the sacred writers we owe the doctrine that God gave existence to what was not. They do not, indeed, dwell so much on the theoretical ground of this truth as notice its practical consequences; they were, however, the first who established the position itself. Philosophers have only reinvestigated the doctrine which they established, and developed the reasons of the truth which they taught.

But it may be asked—Is then the doctrine *de creatione ex nihilo* really so important? is it not rather a doctrine interesting only to speculative philosophers? To these questions we must answer, that this doctrine is, on the contrary, one of great practical importance, which is the reason why the holy scriptures so frequently and urgently inculcate it. For (a) if matter was created by God from nothing, it follows that he must fully understand it in all its parts; he must have wisely assigned to everything its definite position in space, and have pre-

served it as he originally created it. But in case he were not the creator, but only the former of the world, according to the opinion of the ancients, it would then be necessary for him to acquaint himself with this matter, which he himself had not produced, and which was foreign to his own nature. But we may confidently affirm, that he never would have become acquainted with matter if he had not himself made it, (as even Malebranche concludes;) because he derives all his knowledge from himself alone, and nothing exterior to himself can either add to his information, or in any way exert an influence upon him. (b) A mere builder may leave his building, when it is once completed, and concern himself no further about it, except perhaps in certain extraordinary cases. And considering that almost all of the philosophers and religious teachers of the heathen world proceeded upon the notion that God was the former only, or builder of the world, and not its creator, it is not strange that their ideas of Providence were no more pure and consonant to the divine nature. They generally believed, either that God concerned himself not at all with the world, or, at least, that his providence did not extend to small and minute affairs. When once Phaeton had misguided the chariot of the sun, Jupiter indeed found it necessary to see whether the firmament had been shattered; but except in such extraordinary cases, he remained unconcerned with the affairs of the world, and everything here below was supposed to be left to go on, like a clock, when it has been once wound up. Thus it appears, that the belief that the world was created from nothing has an important influence on the doctrine concerning providence, and so is of great practical consequence. This belief alone excites in us ideas of providence which do honour to God, and are consonant with his character. If God is the creator of the world, we may be sure that he not only understands and provides for *the whole*, but that his knowledge and providence extend to every particular part of the universe, though ever so small. The schoolmen, with entire truth, called the preservation of the world a *continued creation*. And the Bible frequently argues from the fact that God created all things in the universe, that he must be perfectly acquainted with them, and that they depend for their preservation solely upon his will. Vide Psa. xciv. 8—11; cxxxix. Cf. Kastner, Ueber die Lehre der Schöpfung aus Nichts, und deren praktische Wichtigkeit; Göttingen, 1770, 4to. Heydenreich, Progr. Num ratio humana sua vi, et sponte contingere possit notionem creationis ex nihilo? Lips. 1790. He shews that this is the only reasonable opinion respecting the origin of the world. [Respecting the practical importance of this doctrine, cf. also, Neander, Allgem. Gesch. der

christ. Rel., b. i. abth. 3, s. 974. Also Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 271.]

Note.—The phrase itself, *to create from nothing*, does not occur in the canonical books of the Bible, although the idea is scriptural. The phrase is taken from 2 Macc. vii. 28; in the Vulgate, *ex nihilo fecit Deus cælum et terram*, in the Greek, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων. The phrase τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα, which occurs, Heb. xi. 3, is of the same import. Morus (p. 72) and some others have rejected the phrase, *creation from nothing*, because it seems to imply that *nothing* is the material from which the world was made. But this subtlety is unnecessary, since the same language is used in other cases, and is never misunderstood. When we say, for example, *there is NOTHING in the chest*, *there is NOBODY there*, we do not mean to imply that there is in the first case a material substance, and, in the second, a person existing in the places intended.

III. The Nature of the First Material.

The idea of *chaos* resulted very naturally from the opinion of the ancient Greeks that matter is eternal and uncreated, and that God merely arranged and combined the materials which he, as the great architect, found furnished for his use. The word *χαός* is derived by some from *χάω*, *hio*, *vacuus sum*; by others from *χέω*, *fundo*, because they imagine chaos to be something movable and fluid. The corresponding Latin word is *silva*, which denotes *what is confused, unarranged*, and then, *unorganized material* from which anything is made; as, *silva rerum, sententiarum*, Cicero; *silva medicinæ*, Pliny. The Greek word which is used by Plato and other philosophers is, *ἄλλ*, which signifies both *silva* and *materia*. The ancients imagined that these *primordia*—the unorganized elements of things—were of the nature of a thin air, or a subtle ether, fluid and movable, without order or connexion, *rudis indigestaque moles*. Vide Ovid, Met. i. 7, seq. But the whole conception of chaos is rather poetical than philosophical—the progeny of fancy, and not of reason. The philosopher can see no satisfactory reason for believing that disorder must have preceded the present system. The poet, however, fancies a state before the world was formed, like that which would appear if all the objects of the present world were torn to pieces, dissolved, and thrown together; and this state he calls *chaos*, and supposes that there the elements of things conflicted with one another, until the Deity at length interposed to end the strife. The Greeks now supposed that the universe proceeded from this state, as from a fluid and fermenting mass; the Hebrews, on the contrary, represented the origin of the world under the image of a *building*, of the materials of which, as well as of the structure itself, God was the author. Cf. the

(Kosmogonie?), in his "Memorabilien," No. III. Stück 4; Leipzig, 1793, 8vo. Some have thought they perceived a description of chaos in the מוֹרָא of the Mosaic account of the creation, Gen. i. 2. But Moses says this *merely of the earth*. After God had created the universe, (the heavens and the earth,) the *earth* was still waste, empty, and unfinished. There is nothing in the Mosaic account to justify the idea of the Grecian chaos, in which everything in the universe lay together in a promiscuous and disorderly mass, of which God was no more the creator than the architect is of the pile of stones from which he forms his edifice.

The history of the opinions of ancient and modern philosophers respecting the nature of the first material of the universe belongs appropriately to the history of philosophy. The following remarks must suffice for this place.

We cannot form any distinct notion of the elements, and of the primitive, essential, and constituent parts of the bodies which now exist, since our senses are not adapted to take cognizance of them. That such elements actually exist, however, there is no doubt; and that each of these particles has properties which distinguish it from every other—its peculiar use, size, shape, &c.—is equally clear; for otherwise there could be no distinction, variety, or alteration in the world. Pythagoras proceeded on this ground, when he taught that the *μονάς* was the origin and ground of all things. For as numbers consist of their units, as constituent parts, so he supposed the world was composed of many such units or *monades*. This thought led Leibnitz to his theory of *monades*. According to this theory, these monades are what God originally produced from nothing; and all the variety of things, the world itself, has arisen from their original difference, and their various combinations. This theory, therefore, clearly involves the doctrine of a *creation from nothing*. But what is the nature, and what are the qualities of these first productions of creative power, we cannot know, because our senses do not reach so far. And when the atomic system, or monadology, is extended to inquiries like these, it becomes, as Kant has well shewn, merely hypothetical, and without any practical interest. The science which has for its object the *powers* and *forces* which act in the world—*dynamics*, as it is called—is more important to us than the science which relates merely to the minute atoms or particles of which bodies are composed, whether they are called *monades* or any other name.

In this whole subject we must guard against the supposition of any successive acts in God; as if he had first created the materials, and then

step by step, like a human artist. Vide s. 20, respecting the immutability of God. In God, thought and execution are one and the same act. *He speaks, and it is done*, Ps. xxxiii. 9. He says, *Let there be light, and there is light*, Gen. i. 3. Nor is any alteration produced in God by the creation of the world. He designed from eternity that the world should exist at a certain time. Morus expresses this differently, p. 72, s. 2. Cf. on this particular point, and on the general subject, Ziegler, Kritik über den Artikel von der Schöpfung, nach unserer gewöhnlichen Dogmatik, in Henke's "Magazin für Religionsphilosophie," b. ii. st. 1, Abhandl. 1.

SECTION XLVII.

THE DOCTRINE AND LANGUAGE OF THE BIBLICAL WRITERS RESPECTING THE CREATION IN GENERAL, AND HOW THEY ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD.

I. *Respecting the Eternity of Matter.*

THE holy scriptures constantly describe God as the author and creator of the world; not merely of the form which it now has, as the ancient philosophers supposed, but of the materials themselves from which it is formed. With this fundamental principle Moses begins his geogony, Gen. i. 1. We find this mentioned as the principal characteristic of the true God, throughout the Bible; Is. xlii. 5; Ps. cxv. 3, seq.; Acts, xvii. 24; and the other passages cited s. 14, ad finem, and Morus, p. 72, s. 2, note 1. It may be considered as an established point, that *the eternity of the world* is nowhere affirmed in the Bible. Vide Ps. xc. 2; cii. 26, coll. s. 20.

But notwithstanding this, there have always been philosophers and theologians, even among Christians, who have advocated the eternity of the world, or at least of matter. The Platonists among the first Christians very naturally followed Plato, who believed in the eternity of matter, though not of the world. Vide s. 46. Thus Justin the Martyr affirmed, that God formed the world from an eternal, misshapen, unorganized material, Apol. i. 39; though in other parts of his writings he appears to derive matter originally from God as its author, and thus to differ from Plato.

The schoolmen, who followed Aristotle, and wished to defend his opinion respecting the eternity of the world (s. 46), taught that we might say, *God had CREATED the world from eternity*—a statement in which its dependence upon God would be vindicated at the same time that its eternity was maintained. This opinion was expressed by Boëthius as early as the fifth and beginning of the sixth century. Others, however, only wished that the *possibility* of this sup-

position should be granted. The schoolmen made this distinction:—*Deus est ÆTERNUS; mundus est AB ÆTERNO*, sc. *productus à Deo*. For God, they said, had the power to act from eternity, and we can see no reason why he should not have exerted this power.

Some protestant theologians of modern times have also asserted the possibility of the eternity of the world. Some have thought it to be a contradiction to speak of an eternal God who is not an eternal creator. Even Wolf, in his metaphysics, affirmed that it could not be shewn from philosophy that the world and the human race have had a beginning. But even if the world had been produced from eternity by God, it would not therefore be eternal in the same sense as God is. It would only have existed through infinite time, while God is anterior to, and independent of time. It would perhaps be better to say, that eternity (*à parte ante*) is a necessary attribute of God, but not of the world: the world is eternal because God *willed* its existence from the first; and not from an *internal necessity* of its existence, as there is of the existence of God. The followers of Wolf, Ribbow, and others, held the same opinion. Others contend, that this opinion does violence to the laws of the human understanding. If the word *eternity* is understood in the proper sense, in which it excludes time (s. 20), it is hard to see how it can be said, with propriety, that the world was *created* by God from *eternity*. For as soon as we suppose that the world was created, we necessarily admit that it had a beginning; and if it had a beginning, it exists in time; and time excludes eternity. We may imagine, if we please, an *eternal* series of *created* things; but such a series can have no *real* existence; for a series consisting of things which have a beginning cannot be without a beginning.

But the reason why we never obtain satisfaction, after all our philosophizing, upon this subject, and why we find so many difficulties attending any supposition we may make respecting the eternity of the world, is this, *that the whole subject far transcends our limited capacities*. The forms of time and space, which are inherent in our mental constitution, so limit our minds that we cannot conceive of anything as existing without them. Vide s. 20, I. Time takes its origin from the succession of one thing after another. It is a notion of finite beings, who can think of only one thing at a time, in whom, therefore, one idea must succeed another; and is not a quality of external objects. Vide Io. Ernesti Schubert, Diss. de impossibilitate mundi æterni; Jenæ, 1741. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. When Augustine was asked the question what God had done before the creation of the world? he replied, *Nescio, quod nescio*.

The simple doctrine of the Bible is, that God had an eternal purpose to make the world; it does not teach us that he did create it from eternity; but rather the contrary. Vide the texts cited in Morus, p. 72, s. 2, Note 1.

II. Respecting Creation from Nothing.

1. The importance of the doctrine of creation from nothing, its philosophical proof, its scriptural ground, &c., have been already exhibited, s. 46. It only remains to cite the most important texts relating to this subject. But before proceeding to do this, it is important to repeat the remark, that the Bible makes no mention of a *chaos*, in the sense of the Grecian fabulists and philosophers. Moses, in his first book, and the other sacred writers, always exhibit the simple, great idea, that God by his mere will brought into existence the world, which did not before exist—i. e., in other words, that he created it from nothing; that he willed that what was not should be, and it was; Morus, p. 72. So Paul says, Heb. xi. 3, *By faith in God* (i. e., his declaration, assurance in the scriptures) *we are certain that the world (αἰώνας) was created (κατηρτίσθαι, ἦν), by the decree or will (ῥήματι) of God; so that what we see (φαινόμενα) and believe (ᾠόμενα, what appears or exists,) was made out of nothing, (τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα.)* The phrase τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα is here synonymous with τὰ οὐκ ὄντα, which occurs in 2 Macc. vii. 28, *God made heaven and earth, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*. Here too the text, Rom. iv. 17, is cited: *Abraham trusted in God τοῦ ζωοποιούντος τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ παλοῦντος (creantis) τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα*. The phraseology in this text is, indeed, derived from that used to describe the creation from nothing; but it is here figuratively applied to the numerous posterity of Abraham, which did not yet exist, and of which there was no probability; but which was afterwards brought into being. The word *καλῶν* here answers to the word *καρ*, Isa. xli. 4; xlv. 7, and signifies *create, producere*. So Philo says, τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐκάλεσεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι. Vide Carpzov on Heb. xi. 3. The doctrine that God made the world from nothing, is also implied, where it is said that he created the world by his *word*, his *decree*, or by the *breath which proceeded out of his mouth*. Vide Ps. xxxiii. 6, 9. Gen. i. "He spake, and it was done," &c. Cf. s. 34, No. 5. It is said in Rev. iv. 11, *οὐ ἐκτίσας πάντα, καὶ διὰ τὸ θέλημα* (ὕψι, Daniel, viii. 4; xi. 3, 16) σου εἰσέ, "Thou hast made all things, and they depend for existence upon thy will."

2. Nothing can be determined from the Bible respecting the particular manner in which God, by his mere will, created the world from nothing; and we are unable even to form any conception of the subject, as we have nothing ana-

logous to which we can compare it. The New Testament usually ascribes the work of creation to the *Father*; and God is called *Father*, (Πατήρ πάντων,) so far as he is creator and preserver of all things. Theologians say, *Creatio est opus Dei ad extra, quod Patri adscribitur appropriativè sive terminativè*, Morus, p. 72, note 1.

But creation is also ascribed to the Son, or to the Λόγος (vide s. 38, I. 2); as John, i. 3, Πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ (Λογού, ver. 1, 2) ἐγένετο, κ. τ. λ.; and again, in ver. 10, ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο. It is the object of this passage to describe the relation of the Logos to the world and created things. The particle δία with the genitive frequently, indeed, denotes merely the *causa instrumentalis*; (so Luke, i. 70;) but it also denotes the *causa efficiens*; as Rom. i. 5, and 1 Cor. i. 9, (Θεός, δι' οὗ ἐκλήθητε,) and Hebrews, ii. 10, (Θεός δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα.) That it is used in this sense here may be shewn from the analogy of other passages—e. g., Col. i. 15—17, and Heb. ii., where it is expressly said that everything in the universe was created by the Son. Cf. the texts cited in s. 38. But some theologians have endeavoured to explain all these passages as figurative, and as exhibiting a mere personification of the divine understanding, and of its plan executed in the creation; somewhat as Wisdom is said in Prov. viii. to have assisted God in the creation, and to have been the instrument by which he made the world. Vide s. 37, and s. 41, II. This interpretation is embraced by those who favour the Sabellian theory; but certainly it is not scriptural. The most just, scriptural, and at the same time simple view, is, perhaps the following. Since the New Testament makes the Son of God equal (ἴσα) with the Father, it designs to teach in all texts of this kind that he stands in the very same relation to the world, and to all created objects, as the Father does, and that whatever is said of the Father is true also of the Son. Hence theologians have the canon, *Opera Dei ad extra* (attributiva) *sunt tribus personis communia*; intending thereby to intimate their equality with one another. Vide s. 43, ad finem. Those who are inclined to Arianism have often referred, in behalf of their hypothesis, to Heb. i. 2, where it is said, "God appointed his Son Lord (κληρονόμον) over all, δι' οὗ καὶ τοὺς αἰῶνας ἐποίησεν: the meaning of which they suppose to be summed up, and expressed in ver. 3, "He (the Son) upholds all things (φέρων τὰ πάντα) by his power, (δυνάμει δυνάμεως.)" The phrase, the Father created the world *through the Son*, occurs only this once in the New Testament, for which reason Dr. Griesbach advises to alter the reading, and to substitute *διότι καὶ* for *δι' οὗ καὶ*, Progr. De mundo a Deo Patre condito per Filium; Jenæ, 1781. But no sufficient reason can be given for

this alteration; and, as theologians have justly remarked, it does not follow from this phraseology that the Son is less than the Father, as the Arians and Subordinationists (e. g., Dr. Clark) have concluded. For the person through whom I accomplish anything, so far from being necessarily inferior to myself, may be equal or even greater. I may, for example, secure a favour to any one from the king, through the influence of the *minister*. Some of the old theologians attempted to prove from Gen. i. 2, that a share in creation was expressly ascribed to the Holy Spirit, considered as a person. But it is at least doubtful whether in this text the person of the Holy Spirit is spoken of. Ps. xxxiii. 6 has no relation to this subject. Vide s. 50, I.

3. The following are the principal words and phrases used in the Bible in respect to the creation of the world, and of the earth.

(a) בָּרָא, *to create, produce*, Gen. i. 1, et passim. This word, however, by itself, does not signify to create *from nothing*. It frequently denotes the formation of a thing from a pre-existing material, and answers to *πρῶξεν*. So in Gen. i. 27, it is used in relation to the formation of man from the earth; and hence to denote his being born and begotten; so Ps. civ. 30. It often signifies, too, *parare, condere, facere, reddere*; so Is. xliii. 7; Num. xvi. 30, seq. Cf. s. 48, I.

(b) All the words which signify *to make, to prepare, to form*; as עָשָׂה, (hence עֲשֵׂה, *a work, created thing*, ποίημα, ἔργον,) יָצַק, *to form*; כָּן, *καταρτίξεν, to prepare, to arrange*, Ps. viii. 4; xxxviii. 18. The corresponding verb and the derivate substantive have the same meaning in Arabic.

(c) All the words which relate to *building*, to the erecting of the superstructure, or the laying of the foundation. יָסַד, *ᾤκοδόμησεν, to found, to establish*, is applied, particularly in poetic language, to the creation of the earth; Ps. cii. 26. Hence the Hellenistic phrase *καταβολὴ κόσμου*, John, xvii. 24, coll. ver. 5, and Eph. i. 4. The Hebrews considered the earth as being in the centre of the universe, and represented the heavens as a tent spread over it, according to their natural appearance; and to these popular notions the sacred writers everywhere conform; and so because the earth is firm, and undeviating in its course, they represented it as established upon pillars; Ps. civ. 5. בָּנָה, *to build*, &c.; but it also signifies *to propagate the race, to acquire posterity*, Gen. xvi. 2; hence בָּנָה, *son*, (the builder of the family.)

(d) The words which signify *to say, speak, call*, (call forth,) *command*; as, אָמַר, קָרָא, respecting which, cf. No. I. These are the words more commonly employed to designate creation *from nothing*.

SECTION XLVIII.

THE WORK OF CREATION TWOFOLD; DIFFERENT CLASSES OF CREATURES; OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THEM; END OF GOD IN THE CREATION OF THE WORLD; THE BEST WORLD.

I. The Work of Creation twofold.

CREATION is divided into *prima* or *immediata*, and *secunda* or *mediata*. The *immediate* creation is that which took place when God first gave existence to all this variety of things, when before there was nothing. The *mediate* creation is that which is seen since the original creation was completed, in the production of plants, the generation of animate creatures, and the whole natural propagation of the various kinds of beings. God works, since the creation is completed, not immediately, but generally, by means of the powers of nature which he himself has bestowed and regulated. It is not uncommon to speak of God's having *left the world to the powers of nature*. But such phraseology should be carefully avoided in religious instruction. It seems to remove God to a distance from us, and very naturally suggests the idea that he has given up the world, and concerns himself no more about it. More injury is done by such expressions, especially in an age that forgets God, than is ever supposed. Instead of such language it would be better, therefore, to say, *God works by means of nature, or, by means of the powers which he has bestowed upon nature, or with which he has furnished his creatures*. Even Moses says expressly, Gen. i. 22, 28, that God gave his creatures the ability to preserve and propagate their own kind. Still, however, all creatures, both animate and inanimate, which are thus mediately produced, are called, with perfect truth, *creatures of God*, considering that God first established and upholds this natural constitution by means of which they come into being. Vide Job, x. 8; xxxiii. 4; Ps. cxxxix. 13—16. The word בָּרָא and the derivative noun are used in both of these senses; in the first, that of immediate creation, Gen. i. 1, 27; ii. 2, seq.; Is. xlv. 18; Ps. cxlviii. 5; in the second, that of mediate creation, Psalm civ. 30, "They (men) are created"—i. e., *born*. Hence בָּרָא and יָצַר are interchanged as synonymous: as, עָם יִבְרָא, *populus creandus*, Psalm cxii. 19; and עַם יִצְרָא, *populus nascendus*, Psalm xxii. 32. Hence to *create*, signifies metaphorically, in the scriptures, *to renew, to found, to be the author of anything*; Is. xlviii. 7; Ps. li. 12. The same is true of *στίβειν* and *στίσειν*, Eph. ii. 10, 15; iii. 9; and also of the Latin *creare*; as, "*Romulus creator urbis*." "*Terra creavit genus humanum*," Lucretius. *CREARE regem, magistratum, &c.*

Every good, therefore, which we derive from any of the creatures of God, is truly a gift and

favour of God himself, who gave to his creatures all their various powers with the intention of making them useful to others. Cf. Hos. ii. 21, seq.; Matt. vi. 25, seq.; Acts, xvii. 25, seq. Consequently we are under obligation to be thankful to God himself for these advantages, which we derive from his creatures. Vide Psalm civ. 1, seq., and other texts of the New Testament.

II. Different Classes of Creatures.

The kingdom of God is so vast, and comprehends such an innumerable *host*, (to use a scriptural term,) that we are able to survey but a very small portion of it at once, and are wholly inadequate suitably to estimate the perfection, beauty, and harmony of the whole. What, then, we cannot survey at once, we must examine in separate portions, and by this partition we may relieve the weakness of our understanding; and this course is both reasonable in itself and according to the example of scripture.

The ancient Hebrews divided the universe into *heaven, earth, and sea*, (s. 45,) which are properly styled the *provinces* (מְקוֹמֹת) of the kingdom of God by the author of Psalm ciii.; and this is the division according to which the ancient Hebrew prophets always proceed in the classification of the works of God. Vide Psalm civ., cxlviii. The former of these Psalms is an admirable ode on the creation and the wise constitution of the world. The various objects in heaven, on the earth, and in the waters, are there mentioned in their natural order; their dependence on God is shewn, and their uses, and the ends for which they were made, is described. The sublime descriptions in Job, xxxvi. and xli., may be cited in this connexion. Cf. Ps. cxlv. cxlvii.

The Bible always gives the preference to animate creatures (*creatures who have breath*; in whom is the *breath of life*, as Moses says) over the inanimate creation. It justly considers them as the more noble, exalted, and perfect work of God; and it assigns to man a pre-eminence among the creatures which belong to the earth. Vide Gen. i. 26, seq., and Ps. viii., which treat of the dignity of man, and of his superiority to the other creatures of the earth, especially ver. 4—9. This passage may be considered as a comment upon Gen. i. 26, seq. There it is said that God made man in his own image, and placed him over the rest of the creation. This pre-eminence consists in the rational and moral nature, and the freedom of will which man alone possesses among all the creatures by which he is surrounded.

Respecting the division of creatures into *visible* (corporeal) and *invisible*, (immaterial, spiritual,) which occurs, Col. i. 16, vide s. 45, ad finem. *Angels and the human soul* belong

to the second class; but the *whole* man belongs alike to the corporeal and spiritual kingdom.

III. *The Knowledge of the Works of God.*

The ancients had a very imperfect acquaintance with natural science. They remained contented for the most part with the first impressions which were made upon their senses, without being able to penetrate into the internal nature of the objects around them. We cannot, therefore, expect to find any very thorough and accurate acquaintance with natural science in the writings of a nation in so early a stage of improvement as the ancient Hebrews were. They were wholly incapable of a high degree of the knowledge of nature. And although some have thought they discovered it in the geogony of Moses, they have done so only by ascribing their own thoughts to his words, and embodying their own information in his account. The ancient hearers and readers of this history had no taste for all this, and would not have understood it.

The more cultivated nations of antiquity, especially the Greeks, and their disciples the Romans, advanced indeed much beyond the Hebrews in natural science. But they too were destitute of the requisite instruments and helps, and often trusted more to reasoning *à priori* than to experiment; and consequently their knowledge of nature, as a whole, bears no comparison with ours, though in particular departments they did much, considering the age in which they lived; as appears from the works of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Hippocrates, Galen, Pliny, Seneca, and others. More considerable advances, however, have been made by Europeans in modern times, especially since the fifteenth century, by means of the telescope, microscope, and other newly invented philosophical instruments, by which the secrets of nature have been disclosed.

We have made these observations upon the study of nature in this place, not only because this study, and the general prevalence of correct natural science, contribute greatly to intellectual improvement, and in many respects to the ennobling of man, but especially because they stand in intimate connexion with religion. On these accounts it must appear to be the duty of every man of education, and especially of the religious teacher, to acquaint himself with natural science, and also to give instruction to the common people and the young in those parts of it which they are capable of learning—always employing it, however, for religious purposes. This knowledge can and should be used—

1. As a very easy and practical means of attaining to the knowledge of the existence and attributes of God, and as well adapted to pro-

mote a disposition and conduct corresponding to such knowledge, vide s. 15, I., where some physico-theological works are mentioned; also, Morus, p. 74, s. 4, 5.

2. As a preventive of superstition, and a remedy for its evil consequences. The superstitious are those who believe things to be *real*, of whose *reality* they have no evidence, and who expect things will come to pass without the least reason for so doing. This is their peculiar infirmity; and the only suitable remedy is, for them to learn to judge correctly respecting the *reality* of things; to observe closely and examine properly the evidence of what they believe, and then to believe only so far as their observation and evidence will warrant. The superstitious easily believe that an event accomplished by natural means is accomplished by direct supernatural agency, and thus allow themselves to be deceived by tricks and artifices. These false views cannot be proved to them to be groundless in any way so clearly and effectually as by giving them a thorough knowledge of nature; since by this we can shew them that an event which they had regarded as supernatural was entirely in the usual course. This will have more influence than all the laws which could be enacted against superstitious practices, magic, and fortune-telling, and more than all the punishments which could be inflicted upon magicians and fortune-tellers. The best laws and regulations of this kind are of little use, if the first source of such superstitious notions cannot be discovered and removed by proper instruction. This is the reason why even the wise regulations of Moses upon this subject were ineffectual among the Israelites.

Natural science ought, therefore, by no means to be neglected in the instruction of the common people and of the young; since it contributes so much to mental and moral improvement, to genuine religion, and to the whole happiness of man. Cicero has an excellent remark upon this subject: *Omniū rerum naturā cognitā levamur superstitione, — non conturbamur ignoratione rerum, è quā ipsā horribiles sæpe existunt formidines; denique etiam morati melius erimus*, De Fin. i. 19. Bayle's work on comets should be read, as a thorough antidote to superstition. Cf. Wiegleb, *Natürliche Magie*, continued by Rosenthal, which explains by natural causes many things considered by the common people as supernatural.

In giving this instruction in natural science which has now been recommended, the religious teacher must carefully avoid all learned speculations and hypotheses, and introduce only that which can be made intelligible to the least improved understanding. He must not come forward in the character of a naturalist, for the purpose of merely instructing his people in

natural science. This is not his calling. He must give this instruction only as a means of inspiring his people with reverence for God, of promoting their piety towards him and confidence in him, and of making them more happy and contented in their condition. He should exhibit it in connexion with the positive truths of Christianity, and in such a way that it will have no tendency to produce doubts and scepticism with regard to our holy religion. Cf. *Flatt's Magazin, Ueber den Inhalt öffentlicher Religionsvorträge an erwachsene Christen*, St. i. Num. 7, and St. v. Num. 3.

IV. End of God in the Creation.

The scriptures declare expressly, that everything which God has made is good—i. e., accomplishes exactly the purpose for which he made it. Moses represents God as testifying his pleasure in all that he had done, when the creation was completed, Gen. i. 31. The truth of the principle, that God has given to all his creatures the highest possible degree of perfection, is evident both from his wisdom and his goodness. Vide s. 24, 28. Either our former theory respecting these attributes is untrue, (*quod non potest esse*), or this principle is true. Acting under the guidance of infinite wisdom, and under the impulse of infinite goodness, God could not but choose *what is best*.

Upon this principle rests the doctrine of the *best world*, or *optimism*, which is found even in Plato, the stoics, and other ancient writers. According to Seneca, (Ep. 65,) Plato said, *Deus mundum fecit quam optimum potuit*. In modern times, this doctrine has found a decided advocate in Leibnitz, in his *Theodicée*, th. i. cap. 8. Wolf, in his *Metaphysik*, and others after him, have more fully developed it. If we *presuppose* that God could have conceived of many worlds as possible, the present world, which he preferred to the others, and to which therefore he gave existence, must be the best. If not, then God might prefer the worse and less perfect to the best and most perfect; which would bespeak an imperfection both of intelligence and will. When God created the world, he foresaw, most clearly and infallibly, all his creatures—their nature, actions, and their connexion with the whole system. He must also be supposed to have had the best end in view in the creation of the world, and to have been able to apply the best means for the attainment of it; s. 24, 23. Moreover, his power is so unlimited that nothing could prevent him from giving the world a different constitution from that which it now has; or, which is same thing, from creating a different world from that which now exists. Now since he has created the present world, it follows that no other world is so well adapted to the attainment of the divine

purposes as this. We are, indeed, unacquainted with his designs, or with the final cause of the creation of the world. God, doubtless, had many ends in view, which we do not know, and of which we do not even think. Vide *Morus*, p. 75, s. 6. So far, however, as we consider the designs of God in respect to his creatures, (and in this respect alone can we consider them,) it was his object to give them individually that degree of perfection and of well-being of which they might be susceptible. This what is meant in the Bible, when it is said, *He created everything for his own glory*, (rather, *glorification*,) in reference to us rational beings, who are to learn his majesty and his glorious perfections from the works of his hand. This is enough for us to know in order to make a wise use of the world. The theological doctrine, that God had his own glory as his highest object in the creation of the world, when thus explained, is just and scriptural. Cf. s. 24, I; s. 18, I. Note.

Now if optimism be thus defined, and if the supposition that many worlds were possible is admitted, it is a true doctrine. When, however, Leibnitz and Wolf maintained that the best world could not exist without imperfection, evil, and sin, (which will be farther considered in the articles on Providence and the Apostasy,) the theologians of that age were unable to reconcile it with their common theories and modes of expression, and supposed that by this doctrine God was made the author of sin. This was the case with Buddeus, Lange, Weismann, and others. Vide Baumeister, *Historia doctrinæ recentius controversæ de mundo optimo*; Gortlit. 1741.

The philosophy of Kant sets aside the theory of optimism as incapable of proof, and resting upon arbitrary notions of the moral attributes of God. Kant's objections against this doctrine, or rather, against the abuse of it, may be found in his *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*; Berlin, 1790, 8vo; and in Rehberg, *Verhältniss der Metaphysik zur Religion*, Abschn. 5, 6. [Cf. Hahn, s. 60, Anmerk. 4, 5. Bretschneider, b. i. s. 584.]

SECTION XLIX.

OF THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF THE CREATION, ITS OBJECT, AND THE VARIOUS HYPOTHESES ADOPTED TO EXPLAIN IT.

I. Object of this Narration, and whence it was derived.

THESE points must be determined before we can attain a position from which we can survey the whole subject in all its bearings. Moses wrote primarily for his *own nation*, the Israelites. And the surest way to determine what

end he had in view in writing this narrative, is to consider the circumstances and wants of the Jews at the time he wrote; and these are best learned from his own books.

1. One principal object which Moses had in view in this account, was to shew *that the God whom the Israelites worshipped was the being from whom all things derived their existence*, and that, consequently, their national God was the God and Lord of the whole universe, and not a being of so limited a nature as the national deities at that time were usually imagined. The Israelites had a very strong propensity to the polytheism then prevalent. Even many among them, who worshipped Jehovah as their national God, still considered the heathen idols as deities having rule over other nations and countries. And so they frequently regarded *Jehovah* as the God of their own nation only, and their own land; and not of the whole earth, or world. Vide s. 16. And as they had seen image-worship in Egypt, they frequently worshipped their own God under various forms—e. g. that of a golden calf, Ex. xxxii. This tendency among the Jews gave rise to those severe laws which Moses enacted against image and idol worship, Ex. xx. 4; Deut. iv. 15—17. Many of the Israelites worshipped the stars. Vide the texts above cited.

Now this history of the creation clearly shews that the God whom the Israelites worshipped is the Creator and Lord of the whole universe; that the firmament and the stars, as well as the earth and its inhabitants, are his work, and his alone; that there are not many gods, but *one* only, the author of all things; that these things were created by God for the good, advantage, and service of man, and not to be worshipped by him, and that, on the contrary, he himself is appointed by God to be the lord and ruler of the earth, and of all the inferior creatures that inhabit it.

Such a history was the more necessary, from the fact that almost all the ancient books of legislation and religion began with cosmogonies. This was the case with the books of the Phenicians, Greeks, &c. The same might therefore have been expected from Moses by his countrymen, especially as many of the cosmogonies of other nations were false, and needed to be corrected.

2. Moses intended, also, by this account, to confirm, impress, and solemnize many of his positive institutions and laws. Thus what he says, in the account of the work of the fourth day, (ver. 14,) respecting the use of the sun and moon in the reckoning of time, was designed to recommend the custom which he had instituted among the Israelites of reckoning time, and observing feasts and public solemnities, according to moons and lunar years. And thus, especially

in the account which he gives of the *seventh day* (ii. 2, 3), on which God rested when his labours were done, he has an obvious reference to the institution of the Sabbath. This becomes still more evident on a comparison of these verses with Ex. xx. 8—11; for it is there expressly said respecting the Mosaic institution of the Sabbath, “that no labour should be done in it, *because* God laboured only six days, as it were, and rested on the seventh day; wherefore God consecrated (בִּקְרָא) the seventh day, and appointed it for a festival (יְקָרְשָׁה).” In what way, now, could this solemn festival of the Jewish nation have received a higher sanction and interest, than from such a consideration as this? The Sabbath was thus consecrated as a solemn festival in remembrance of the creation, and in it the Jews were required to rest from their labour in honour of God, their creator and the creator of the world, and to employ this rest in religious meditation, and in celebrating his perfections. Hence the Hebrew psalms intended for the Sabbath day were hymns of praise to God for his greatness, as manifested in his works—e. g., Ps. xcii. 1, seq. This reference of Moses to the institution of the Sabbath in what he says of the consecration of the seventh day in his history of the creation, is so evident, that it was perceived by many of the ecclesiastical fathers—e. g., Philoponus, in the sixth century, in his *Hexæmer*, l. i. c. 3.

Eichhorn, in his “*Urgeschichte*,” has endeavoured, very ingeniously, to carry out this idea respecting the object for which Moses wrote. Vide *Repertor. für bibl. Lit.* th. iv. s. 129—172; Leipzig, 1779; and, Eichhorn’s *Urgeschichte*, herausgegeben mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen, von Dr. Joh. Phil. Gabler, 1 th. Altorf und Nuremberg, 1790, 8vo, and 1te Abth. des 2n th., at the same place, 1791. Cf. Gabler, *Neuer Versuch über die Mosaische Schöpfungsgeschichte aus der höhern Kritik*; Altorf, 1795, 8vo; and, Vater, in his “*Commentar zu dem Pentateuch*,” th. iii. Eichhorn, however, maintains that Moses *fabricated* this whole history of the creation, for the mere purpose of establishing some truth, or of sanctioning some of his religious institutions. But this opinion cannot be proved, and only involves us in new difficulties. There is no reason to regard this history as a fabrication of Moses himself, because he is not known in any other case to have invented fables to recommend his most important laws and institutions. Others are of opinion, that he found this history previously existing, and applied it to the confirmation of his institutions. That such was the case cannot, however, be proved, as he himself is silent upon the subject. Such *might* have been the case; and the supposition detracts nothing from the author of the book of Genesis. This opinion

was maintained long since by Astruc in his "Conjectures sur les memoires originaux dont il paroît que Moïse s'est servi pour composer le livre de la Genèse," (Bruxelles, 1753, 8vo,) and by Jerusalem, in his "Briefe ueber die Mosaische Schrift und Philosophie," (Braunsch. 1762, 8vo;) who endeavoured to shew, that Moïse, in his first book, made use of ancient narratives orally transmitted, and of written memorials, derived in part from the antediluvian world. The design, then, of Moïse, (as the following chapters of his first book shew,) was to preserve in Genesis such venerable remnants of antiquity as had been handed down from the patriarchal age. Now if it is apparent, as even Eichhorn allows, that Moïse made use of such fragments in the composition of the second and third chapters, it is hard to see why he should be supposed to have fabricated the whole narrative in the first chapter. Besides, it is common for the ancient traditions and religious memorials of a nation to begin with cosmogonies. And it is therefore probable, that an ancient account of the creation had been transmitted, which Moïse either inserted as he found it, or remodelled to suit his own purpose. All this, however, is mere hypothesis and ingenious conjecture.

The number *seven* has been a sacred number in all the East from the earliest times. Here, say some, is the ground of the representation that the creation lasted to the seventh day. But how can this be proved? With as much reason one might reverse the statement, and say, this account of the creation, which was widely circulated in the ages before and after the deluge, was the reason why the number seven was adopted as the sacred number. And no one is able to disprove this. Such hypotheses never lead to a certain result.

As respects the Sabbath, it was not first instituted by Moïse, but was an ancient usage, as Michaelis has shewn in his "Mosaisches Recht," and others after him, with much reason. Moïse, however, found it necessary to enact new laws for the observance of this ancient institution. Eichhorn, indeed, considers this opinion unfounded, though without sufficient reason. For we find this day hallowed as a day of rest among the Israelites, even before the legislation of Moïse commenced. Vide Ex. xvi. 23. The Sabbath is there called a day of holy rest in honour of Jehovah. Cf. J. W. Rau, Progr. de fictione Mosaica, falso adserta; Erlang. 1779. Beck, De fontibus sententiarum de creatione; Lipsæ, 1782, 4to. Paulus, Abhandlung ueber die Anlage und den Zweck des ersten und zweyten Fragments der ältesten Mosaischen Menschen-geschichte, in his Neu. Reper. für bibl. und morgenländ. Lit. th. ii. Num. 5; Jena, 1790, 8vo. He considers the first chapter of Genesis

as an ancient Sabbath-hymn, which owes its whole form and structure to the division of time into six days for labour, and a day of rest.

II. Consequences from these General Remarks.

If the remarks made in No. I. are true, the following rules and principles must be adopted in the interpretation of the history of the creation:—

1. Moïse did not write as a naturalist or philosopher, intending to make his account the basis of a scientific physiology. Vide Morus, p. 73, s. 3, Num. 2. He did not design to shew, as a naturalist would have done, the manner in which particular things were created. The opinion was formerly very prevalent, especially among the Jews, that the Bible was a general repository of every kind of knowledge, as well as of the doctrines of faith and morality, or at least that it contained the first germ of all the sciences; and as improvements were gradually made in natural science, they were supposed to be contained in the Bible, and from the general and comprehensive nature of scriptural language, often with great appearance of truth. But in this attempt the true object of the Bible was overlooked; which was the reason, also, that allegorical interpretation found so much approbation formerly.

The writings of Homer met with the same fate among the Greeks which those of Moïse have experienced among the Jews and Christians. Everybody forced his own system upon these writings, and found it confirmed by them, without ever thinking that learned sciences did not exist at so early an age of the world, and that they are unsuitable to the common people of any age. They could not have been possessed by the writers to whom they are attributed, nor could they have been understood by their contemporaries.

The whole representation which Moïse has given of the creation of the world is as simple as possible, and such as doubtless was perfectly intelligible to those who lived in that infant age of the world, and is still so to men in common life. The more familiar one becomes with the views and wants of men at large—the more he is able to place himself in their condition, the more justly will he be able to explain this passage, and the more fully will he enter into the spirit of its author. In the Bible, God speaks with men after the manner of men, and not in a language which is beyond the comprehension of most of them, as the learned would fain make it to be. Well, indeed, is it for the great mass of mankind that the learned were not consulted respecting the manner in which the Bible should be written!

When the study of nature became more prevalent in the seventeenth century, it was very

common among Christian interpreters, who at that time adopted the principle before stated, either to derive their systems of physiology from the writings of Moses, or to force them upon him. 'The first fault was committed, though with the best intentions, by the otherwise very deserving Joh. Amos Comenius, in his "Synopsis physices ad lumen divinum reformatæ." He had many followers. The latter fault was first committed by some adherents of the Cartesian philosophy. They believed that they found many of the peculiar doctrines of Des Cartes very clearly exhibited in the writings of Moses. Des Cartes himself appeared to be of this opinion. Vide, e. g., Joh. Amerpoel (Cartesius Mosaizans), Beaufort, Rambert, and others.

The same was done in the eighteenth century, and in still more modern times. There have always been some who have believed that they found the various philosophical systems of Newton, Wolf, Buffon, and Bergmann in the writings of Moses, or at least that they could reconcile these philosophers with him. But Moses will as little confirm the theories of one philosopher as he will contradict those of another. All the attempts made by different philosophers to answer objections to their own theory drawn from the Mosaic geogony, or to draw arguments from it to confute the theories of others, are labour thrown away. Cf. Silberschlag, *Geogonie, oder, Erklärung der Mosaïschen Erdschaffung nach physikalischen und mathematischen Grundsätzen*, 3 thle; Berlin, 1780—83, a work which contains much of the sort above mentioned. Cf. the "Neue Theorie der Erde," by the same author, containing many very good scientific observations, but also many rash and untenable positions. Vide also, De Lüc., *Lettres physiques et morales sur l'histoire de la terre et de l'homme*, à la Haye, 6 tom. 1779, 8vo. Dr. Rosenmüller, *Antiquiss. telluris Historia*; Ulmæ, 1776, 8vo, is very useful as a collection of materials for a history of opinions, &c.

2. In this description of the creation regard is shewn to the comprehension of common men, especially of men in that early age; and it is not improbable, as remarked before, that it may have been composed by Moses from ancient written records.

The general subject of this passage is indicated in ver. 1. This is then enlarged upon in the following verses, not to gratify the curiosity of scientific men, but to meet the wants of those who lived in the age in which it was written, and of common men in all ages. This amplification is entirely simple and popular; and when the work of creation is here represented as a *six-days' work*, it is to be considered as a *picture*, in which God appears as a human workman, who accomplishes what he undertakes only by piece-meal, and on each successive day lays out and

performs a separate portion of his business. By such a representation the notion of the creation is made easy to every mind; and common people, seeing it so distinctly portrayed, can form some clear conceptions concerning it, and read or hear the account of it with interest.

Many modern writers (e. g., Paulus) are of opinion that Moses, or the author of this history whoever he may be, designed this description merely as a philosopheme respecting the manner in which the creation might have taken place, not intending that it should be understood as a literal fact. And it cannot be denied that we find many difficulties in the whole narration considered as literally true. These difficulties, however, do not justify us in affirming that Moses did not design to represent these events as actually taking place. On the contrary, it clearly appears from many other texts in his writings that he did intend to relate these events as literal facts. He himself elsewhere alludes to the creation, as Morus justly remarks, (p. 73, s. 3, n. 2,) as to *res in facto posita*; as Ex. xx. 11; xxxi. 17.

This Mosaic history of the creation teaches us the three following truths: (a) that the world began to exist, and that God was its author, (Gen. i. 1); and that the world therefore is not eternal, and God is wholly distinct from the world. (b) That the constitution, connexion, and final destination of all existing things are from God alone, ver. 2, seq. (c) That the universe, and especially our earth, was not brought *at once* by the hand of its Creator into the form and state in which we now see it; but yet within a moderately short time.

Herder's "Aelteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts" contains many very valuable remarks which may assist one in placing this history in its proper light. His statements, however, are frequently obscure and enigmatical, and built in a great measure upon hypothesis. Vide a review of this work in the "Allgem. deutschen Bibl.," thle. 25, 30. But the "Urgeschichte" of Eichhorn is the most important work on this subject. It was first published in the "Repert. für bibl. Liter." th. 4; Leipzig, 1779; and edited with notes, by Gabler; Altorf, 1790. These are also a number of essays on this subject by Dr. Paulus and others, in his *Repertorium, Memorabilien, and Theological Journal*. Cf. Ilgen, *Urkunde des Jerusalem'schen Tempelarchivs*, and Vater, *Commentar über den Pentateuch*.

3. From this history of the creation it follows, that our globe, and the race of men that now dwells upon it, is about six thousand years old. I say, *about* six thousand years. For Moses does not give us an exact chronology, and time cannot be reckoned with certainty from the genealogies of the patriarchs, because only the

most remarkable men and their families are mentioned, while less distinguished names and generations are omitted. This is the common custom in oriental genealogies; and is the case in the first of Matthew. Besides, there is a great difference between our present Hebrew text and the Cod. Sam. and the LXX., in respect to the number of years; although the readings of our texts, on the whole, are far better supported than the others.

The human race is much older than this, according to the belief of some other nations—e. g., the Chinese and Indian. The whole subject, indeed, presents many difficulties; it is, however, strange, that Voltaire and other enemies of the Bible should have embraced in such a credulous and partial manner the monstrous and unfounded calculations of the Chinese and Indians in preference to the evidence which may be derived from Moses. Some have endeavoured to confirm the truth of the Mosaic account of the later origin of the human race from the more recent origin of the arts and sciences among men than would be consistent with the theories before mentioned, and from many other considerations; which, however, in themselves, are not satisfactory.

One important question in relation to this subject remains to be investigated: Does Moses speak in the first chapter of the *first* creation of the globe, or only of a *new* creation, a *remodeling* of it, and planting it with a new race? Cf. Morus, p. 73, n. 6. Many modern naturalists affirm that the earth must have existed much earlier than the time of which Moses speaks, perhaps a thousand years; and that during this earliest period it must have undergone astonishing revolutions, to which, however, no history can of course extend, as they took place before the existence of the present race of men. They think these tremendous revolutions are proved by the sea-animals which are found, sometimes singly and sometimes in whole layers, upon the highest mountains and in the deepest clefts of the earth, far distant from the present bed of the ocean; by the remnants of plants and beasts found in climates entirely different from those in which they are native—e. g., the bones of the elephant found in Liberia, &c.; by the petrifications which are found deep in the interior of the earth, &c. All these appearances are considered by some as proof that great alterations have taken place in the earth which lie far beyond the reach of our history. Vide Büffon and Justi, *Geschichte des Erdbodens aus seinen innerlichen und äusserlichen Beschaffenheiten hergeleitet und erwiesen*; Berlin, 1771, 8vo; Bergmann, *Physikalische Beschreibung der Erdkugel*; Greifswald, 1769. Other great naturalists, however, even Linneus, Haller, De Lüc, and Silberschlag, do not think these facts

are incontrovertible proof of what many have so confidently deduced from them.

Many modern interpreters and theologians have supposed, in order to reconcile more easily the account of Moses with the assertions and hypotheses of modern naturalists, that Moses speaks of the creation of the whole universe in the first verse only; and that from ver. 2 onwards he turns exclusively to the earth, and then describes, not its first creation, but only a re-formation and new constitution of it. They suppose, accordingly, that in the first verse he intends to say simply, God created the whole universe, without determining *when*, and that in the following verses he has particular reference to the earth, and describes its present formation, without determining whether it took place at the very time when God created the universe or a thousand years afterwards, when the earth may have been already once or many times inhabited by different races of beings. They have endeavoured once to establish this hypothesis even by other texts of scripture, as Ps. civ. 6—9, which indeed is an amplification of the Mosaic account of the creation, but which gives no information respecting the *time* or the *duration* of this revolution, and none respecting a race of creatures previously existing upon the earth. The passage, 2 Pet. iii. 6, is cited with still less propriety in support of this hypothesis. The *ὁ τότε κόσμος* refers undoubtedly to the men who lived before the flood; as appears from chap. ii. 5.

The following remarks may enable us to decide with regard to this hypothesis:

It is true that, from ver. 2 onwards, Moses confines himself principally to our globe, though still, in ver. 14—19, he describes the creation of the heavenly bodies; which description, according to this hypothesis, must be considered as merely *optical*, intended to convey the idea that these bodies then for the first time became visible from the newly-formed earth. But it cannot be proved that Moses intended from ver. 2 to describe only a new formation of the earth.

1. He always distinctly connects the creation of the earth with that of the rest of the universe, and he uses expressions so entirely similar respecting the two that open violence must be done to his words before they can be understood to refer at one time to a re-formation of the earth, and at another to its original creation, according to this modern hypothesis—e. g., Gen. ii. 1, “Thus the heavens and the earth were completed, *and all the host of them*”—i. e., all creatures. Ex. xx. 11, “In six days, God made *heaven and earth and sea*, and all which therein is.”

2. Those who consider this history of the creation as a mere human production, as is very common at the present day, cannot consistently admit that Moses intended to describe only a

remodelling of the earth. For this notion is too little in the spirit of the ancient world, and too nicely adjusted to our present physiological and astronomical knowledge, to have occurred to an uninspired historian. The ancients always supposed the earth to be the centre of the universe, and the author of this history, living at that early period, and left to himself, could hardly have conjectured that it had previously undergone any such revolutions and changes as are spoken of. Cf. s. 48, II. An uninspired author, writing in ancient times, could scarcely have conceived that the earth should have been created later than the other heavenly bodies, since they were supposed to exist principally for the sake of the earth. Thus, on the supposition that this record is a mere human production, and that Moses, without any divine influence, inserted it in the book of Genesis, we may draw an argument *κατ' ἀνθρώπου* against the truth of the above explanation.

We must therefore rest in the belief that it was the real opinion of Moses that God created and finished the whole material world, the whole visible universe, together; and, indeed, in that order and connexion which he describes in the first chapter of Genesis.

The hypotheses of modern naturalists respecting the *material* of our globe can neither be confirmed nor refuted from the writings of Moses. Which of all those that have been suggested is true? that of Whiston, who supposes the earth to be formed from a comet; that of Leibnitz, who makes it a *sun burnt out*; that of Buffon, according to whom all the heavenly bodies are fragments broken off from the body of the sun by the concussion of a comet; or that of Wideburg, who supposes the earth to have been originally a *spot on the sun*; must be determined on other grounds than the testimony of Moses. Vide Silberschlag's "Geogonie" for an account of these and other systems. He justly rejects the opinion that Moses speaks in this passage only of a *revolution* or remodelling of the earth.

All these learned speculations and inquiries respecting the *material* of the earth &c. lie beyond the object and sphere of Moses. And any of these hypotheses of the naturalists may be adopted or rejected, the Mosaic geogony notwithstanding. Nor can the authority of Moses be brought to decide the question, whether the whole globe, or only the higher regions of Asia, received at first their full and complete formation and present structure. Herder and Doederlein suppose the latter; but the author of this record appears rather to favour the former. He speaks in general terms of the earth—that is, so far as it was known to him. Still nothing can be determined upon this subject from his authority.

Note.—The question has been asked, *At what*

time in the year was the world created? The Jews commonly answer, according to the Chaldaic paraphrasts and the cabalists, that the world was created in *autumn*. They found their opinion principally upon the supposed fact, that the patriarchs in the most ancient times commenced their year in autumn; but of this there is no definite proof. Others say, in the *spring*; with which opinion many of the fathers and most modern Christian writers agree. Scaliger, in the first edition of his work, "*De emendat. temp.*," advocated the latter opinion; but in the second edition, the former. In favour of this opinion, Gen. i. 11 is cited, "Let the earth bring forth grass and herb;" which suits better with spring than harvest. Exod. xii. 2 is also cited, where it is said that the month Nisan (April) shall be the first in the year of the Jews, &c. According to Solinus and Macrobius, the Egyptians gave out the *summer* as the first season of the year. The whole inquiry is fruitless and idle; for the season can only be relatively determined in respect to the situation of the country in which our first parents lived. For the time of the seasons is not everywhere the same; when it is summer in one place, it is winter in another.

SECTION L.

EXPLANATION OF THE MOSAIC HISTORY OF THE CREATION.

I. General Account of the Creation of the World.

שֵׁשֶׁת יָמִים—i. e., the first of all the events in the world, that with which the history of all things commenced, was the creation of the universe (heaven and earth, s. 45) by God. Philo says, *Τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν, ἵσον ἔστι τῷ πρώτῳ ἐποίησε τὸν οὐρανόν*, De Opif. Mundi, p. 16, Pf. And so Cicero says, "*A PRINCIPIO omnia facta a diis et constituta sunt*," De Officiis, i. 4, coll. De Natura Deorum, i. 12. Before this, *God* alone existed; and he gave existence to everything which is exterior to himself. In the same way we must explain *ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος*, John, i. 1. "*Ἐξ ἀρχῆς*," (ab initio mundi,) Hesiod, Theog. v. 45.

After prefixing this general statement, Moses now (ver. 2) proceeds to describe the creation of the earth; vide s. 49. "The earth was *waste* (חֲרָב) is applied by the Hebrews and Arabians to deserts and wasted towns) and *empty*, (חֲדָשׁ, *void, unoccupied*, like a chamber without furniture; so in Arabic.) Both terms occur in Isaiah, xxxiv. 11. The earth is thus represented as a rude, formless mass, which, together with the rest of the material world, is now framed by the artificer in the space of six days, and which gradually receives its full perfection. The whole description is after the manner of

men, and is adapted to common apprehension. The same may be said of the description of the creation of man in the second chapter; he was made gradually, and was formed like any other work of art.

“And darkness was upon the deep waters.” *אֲדָמָה* is rendered by Luther, *die Tiefe, the deep*; *ἀβύσσος* by the LXX; but is also *deep waters, profundum, profundum pelagus*; so frequently in the scriptures, *the sea*—e. g., Gen. xlix. 25; Psa. cvi. 9. The meaning here is, the earth, which was then overflowed with water, was in darkness. Moses and the ancient Hebrew prophets always describe the original condition of the earth in this way. It was all an open sea, dark and dreadful. The water gradually subsided; the higher regions first became visible, and then the low lands; and they were covered with light, as is described below. A fuller delineation, and a poetic comment on this passage, is contained in Psa. civ. 5—9. Moses calls the mountains, *the eldest sons of the earth*—those which the earth first produced, Psa. xc. 2, because the mountains first rose from the water, and became visible. Similar opinions respecting the original condition and primitive form of the earth are found among other nations—e. g., the Egyptians (Diod. Sicul. i. 7) and the Phenicians, (Eusebius, Præp. Evan. i. 10, taken from Sanchuniathon.) They supposed that in the beginning all was confused, gloomy, and dark. So the Orphean Hymns represent. And this supposition is in itself very natural; for darkness commonly precedes light; disorder, order; and emptiness, fulness. The overflowing of water is still the occasion of the most wide-spread desolation, and even of great alterations on the surface of the earth. According to Homer, *Ὠκεανός* was the eldest progenitor of all the gods; and from him everything proceeded, Il. xiv. 201, 246; xv. 187, seq. Many modern naturalists suppose that the bottom of the sea was pressed up by subterranean fire, and that in this way the mountains and firm land arose above the waters. On this supposition the sea-products found upon mountains are explained. Vide Silberschlag’s “*Geogonie*.” Moses does not contradict this opinion; but neither, on the other hand, have we reason to believe that he intended to teach it. He only relates the fact that the dry land appeared, without determining *how* this was brought about, whether from the subsidence of the waters, from the action of internal fire, or some other cause.

רוח אלהים מרחפת על־פני תהום. What is here called *רוח אלהים* is elsewhere called *אֵלֶּהּ*, Gen. ii. 7; Psa. civ. 30; *the spirit, the breath of God*, which vivifies everything—i. e., the efficient, all-animating, all-creative power of God. On the word *רוח*, vide s. 9, and s. 19, II. *רוח*

is variously explained. The LXX. and other Greek interpreters render it *ἐπεφύετο*, *moved over the waters*. The Chaldaic, Samaritan, and both the Arabic versions, render it *blew over the waters*. Others render it, *to make warm, calefacere*, (to vivify;) because it is applied to the hatching of eggs by warmth, Deut. xxxii. 11. Michaelis translates it from the Syriac, *to descend, let one’s self down, se demittere*. In whatever way it is translated, the main idea remains the same—the *effect and motion* produced by the almighty power of God.

II. The Six-days’ Work; ver. 3, seq.

1. Introductory remarks upon the question, What is here meant by *days*? and respecting some difficulties which occur in relation to the whole description, and the manner of obviating them.

It appears from the preceding sections, that God may be supposed either to have created at once the whole system of things, as it now exists, or to have first produced the *material* from which all things were formed, with the power to develop itself gradually, and that he may have caused this further development to proceed by means of these natural powers, himself exerting a direct influence only where they were insufficient. The latter is the scriptural idea. The object of exhibiting the creation as a six-days’ work has been shewn to be, to render the subject perspicuous and intelligible to men; to depict before their eyes the manner in which each thing in succession was accomplished, and the whole gradually finished under divine influence and direction.

By *days* Moses appears to have meant common days of twenty-four hours. For (a) their limits are always determined by morning and evening, which being understood literally, the day must be literal also. (b) In all other texts where Moses alludes to the account of the creation, *literal* days are always clearly presupposed—e. g., Exod. xx. 11, where the institution of the Sabbath in described; and chap. xxxi. 17. But interpreters find various difficulties in this supposition. How, they ask, could so much be done in one day, without heaping together too many miracles? or, how could Moses speak of days, in ver. 5, 8, 13, before the sun as yet existed, which, according to ver. 16, seq., was not until the fourth day? and many more questions of the same kind. To avoid these difficulties various other hypotheses are invented. Some say the three first days were periods of indefinite length, but the three last, ordinary days of twenty-four hours; so Michaelis. Others understand by *יָמִים*, through the whole description, periods of indefinite length; or they prolong each day into a mon-

strous duration. According to Des Cartes, each day was a *thousand years*; six thousand years, therefore, were occupied in forming the earth! According to Whiston, each day is *one year* only. But such conjectures, as everybody sees, are arbitrary and groundless.

If we would form a clear and distinct notion of this whole description of the creation, we must conceive of six separate *pictures*, in which this great work is represented in each successive stage of its progress towards completion. And as the performance of the painter, though it must have natural truth as its foundation, must not be considered or judged of as a delineation of mathematical or scientific accuracy, so neither must this pictorial representation of the creation be regarded as literally and exactly true.

First picture; ver. 3—5. The earth, before dark and invisible, is enlightened, that the spectator may be able to see it, and that the builder may be able to mould and fashion the materials upon which he is to work. This light is of periodical succession, causing day and night, because the whole is divided into days' works. Whence this light proceeds is a question which cannot properly be proposed here; it is sufficient to say that there must have been light enough to enable the spectator in some measure to discern the objects as they were formed. We cannot conclude, that because the light of day at present proceeds from the sun, there could have been no light before the sun existed. Indeed, there are other luminous bodies besides our sun, which shine with unborrowed light. The sun itself was not created until the fourth day. At present it is sufficient that it is alternately clear and obscure, and that there is light both for the artificer and the spectator. Probably, however, it was only a glimmering and obscure light, like the morning or evening twilight.

Second picture; ver. 6—8. Though light has dawned upon the earth, an ocean still encircles the globe, and cloud and vapour float over the waters. The *upper* water is now separated from the *under*; so that, as the Egyptians say, *heaven and earth may no more be commingled and united in one mass*, (Diod. Sic. 1, 7.) as they were on the first day. This is the second day's work.

Third picture; ver. 9—13. After this great division, the other great movements can now proceed without hindrance. The builder first applies his hand to the inferior portion. He causes the dry land to rise from the *lower* waters, and separates it from the *ocean*, and from the smaller collections and currents of water, which now flow into the lower regions of the earth. This land is next furnished with plants of every

kind. The naturalist may indeed object, that it is incredible that plants should spring from the earth before the appearance of the sun; but it does not follow that, because such is the uniform course since the universe and the earth are finished, therefore such must have been the case in this incipient state. Besides, it seems that the plants were only *created* on the third day, and grew and increased immediately on the appearance of the sun on the following day. On this third day the earth was sowed and planted for the first time by Him who created the seeds and plants. And as we frequently sow and plant *to-day* because we expect that *to-morrow* and on the succeeding days there will be weather favourable to the growth and germination of the seeds; so may God have now sowed and planted the earth, in prospect of the sun which on the morrow he should place in the heavens.

Fourth picture; ver. 14—19. The superior portion is now to be fashioned—the *upper* waters, or the atmosphere. Here now the observer discovers the *sun*, *moon*, and *stars* apparently floating in a high and immeasurable distance above the clouds. These henceforth enlighten the earth and shed their influence upon it. The *little moon* is represented as, next to the sun, the *greatest* light, because it appears so to us. A painter would justly be accused of a fault, if he should otherwise represent it. He must represent it as it appears to the eye.

Fifth picture; ver. 20—23. The upper and lower waters are peopled with inhabitants—birds, fishes, and other creatures of the sea. The supposition sometimes made, that Moses describes the birds as formed from the waters, is without foundation.

Sixth picture; ver. 24—31. The inhabitants of the *dry land* are now produced, after everything is properly prepared for them, and provision made for their sustenance—all the beasts of the field, quadrupeds, and reptiles; and, lastly, man himself, the lord of this lower creation. He is not introduced into his dwelling before it is entirely ready. The house is first built, and then the occupant enters. Vide the Article on the creation of man.

At the end of the sixth day the builder once more reviews his whole work—"He considered everything which he had made, and behold! it was very good." The same formula of approbation occurs at the end of the several days' works, with only two exceptions—viz., (a) It is entirely wanting at the end of the second day's work, (ver. 8.) In some MSS. of the Septuagint, the formula is here introduced, but it is wanting in others. Zachariã conjectures (Bibl. th. ii. s. 34, f.) that the words, "And the evening and the morning were the second day," which now stand at the end of ver. 8, should be

first introduced at the end of ver. 10, before the words, "and God saw that it was good;" making what is now the beginning of the third day's work a part of the second. But this transposition is unnecessary. The use of this formula of approbation appears not to be regulated by the division of days, but by the completion of the larger portions of the creation. All the changes which the water was to undergo were not finished at the end of the second day—they continue even into the third; and this appears to be the reason why the formula of approbation is omitted at the end of the second day. (b) This formula stands in the middle of the description of the work of the sixth day, immediately after the mention of the creation of the beasts in ver. 26. Michaelis and Eichhorn well observe here, that it answers the purpose of a pause, before the transition is made from the inferior creation, here completed, to the production of *man*, the noblest creature of the earth.

2. Explanation of some obscure terms which occur in the description of the six days' work.

Ver. 3. For the meaning of the term *to speak*, as used here and in the rest of the history of the creation, vide s. 47, II. 1.

Ver. 6. רָקִיעַ is translated by Luther, *Veste*, because the Vulgate has *firmamentum*, which is a translation of the στερέωμα of the LXX. רָקִיעַ, the root of this word, signifies, *to stamp* (with the feet), Ezek. vi. 11; xxv. 6; and hence, *to spread out, to expand, to hammer out, to tread out, (calcando expandere.)* Moses and the other sacred writers always use this term to denote the heavens—*das Gewölbe, fornix, camera—the welkin, the expanse over our heads; elsewhere, the tent of the heavens.* The origin of the term, and of the idea from which it is derived, can be best learned from Ezekiel's vision, i. 22, 23, 26; x.

1. רָקִיעַ there denotes the *floor* of the throne of God in heaven. God, the Ruler and Judge, was imagined by the Jews as sitting upon a throne in heaven. Other nations had the same conception. According to Homer, the gods sat with Jupiter, χρυσέῳ ἐν δαπνίδῳ, (upon a golden floor;) II. iv. 2. The upper sanctuary and the throne of God, then, is above the expanse of the heavens. This expanse is the floor upon which he places his feet, and over which he rides in his chariot of thunder. Vide the texts cited from Ezekiel. Hence the whole earth, which has this רָקִיעַ for a covering, is frequently called the *footstool of God*. By רָקִיעַ is meant (a) the *atmosphere*, which bears the rainy and stormy clouds; also (b) whatever is still above them—all that the eye can see over us in the heavens. In the immeasurable distance of the blue sky, high above the region of the clouds, float the sun, moon, and stars, *as it appears to the eye*. For this reason they are placed in the firma-

ment, ver. 15, 17. When it is said, ver. 8, "God called the רָקִיעַ *heaven*," it is as much as to say, what we call *heaven* is God's footstool; what we behold high over our heads is under his feet. So in Homer it is said, "Men call it so; the gods call it differently." The Deity sees everything in a different light from what we do, and therefore *names* everything differently, to speak after the manner of men.

Ver. 11, 12. רֶשֶׁת is the generic name for everything which grows out of the earth—the green plant. עֵץ is the specific name for trees and arboreous plants. עֵשֶׂב stands for the *herb* and lesser plants. נָזַע is used in Hebrew in reference both to *sowing* and *planting*, like the Latin *serere*, and denotes therefore here every kind of propagation.

Ver. 14. The usefulness of the heavenly bodies to the earth and to men is here stated. The word אֵשֶׁת, *sign*, signifies a mark for the division of time. The sun and stars are intended to determine the *times*, (מִצְרִיִּים,) the days, and the years. מִצְרִיִּים are not so much the four revolving seasons of the year, as *months*. For (a) they are connected with years and days. (b) In Ps. civ. 19, the מִצְרִיִּים are said to be determined by the moon, because they are defined by her motion:—"He created the moon for the computation of time."

Ver. 20. שָׂרָץ, *webende Thiere*, (moving creatures,) Luther, שָׂרָץ signifies, *to swarm*. It denotes, literally, the lively, rapid motion of beasts who are collected in great multitudes. Hence it is used in reference to fishes, birds, and other animals—e. g., Exod. i. 7. Here it is applied to sea animals. Cf. Ps. civ. 25. עֲלֵי־הַיָּם, not *supra caelum*, but *to heaven, towards heaven, heavenwards*; as the flight of birds appears to the eye.

Ver. 21. תַּנִּינִים, *Wallfische* (whales), Luther, because the LXX. have χήνη, and the Vulgate *ceti*. But these words signify all great fishes, *pisces cetacei*. The Hebrew word is used for all the beasts of the sea of the greater kind, as Psalm civ. 26; for the *crocodile*, Ezek. xxix. 3; xxxii. 2; also for *great serpents*. רָשָׁע is the name for all creatures which move upon the belly; hence, *the worm*. It is applied, however, sometimes to creatures that swim, and even to quadrupeds who do not go upright, like man.

Ver. 22. בְּרֵךְ denotes here, as frequently, the propagation of the species, or the bestowment of the power to propagate the race; as ver. 28; Gen. xxiv. 60; Ps. cxxviii. 3, 4.

Ver. 24. A division of land-animals; (a) בְּהֵמָה, the larger kind of tame, domestic animals, when opposed to חַיָּה. (b) חַיָּה, the smaller kind of tame animals. (c) חַיָּה טָמֵא, the wild beast.

ARTICLE VI.

OF THE CREATION AND ORIGINAL CONDITION
OF MAN.

SECTION LI.

OF THE NATURE OF MAN, ESPECIALLY OF THE
SOUL OF MAN, AND OF HIS DESTINATION.

WITH this subject it will be most convenient to commence this Article. After this, we shall consider the *Mosaic account* of the creation of man; then, his *happy original condition*, not only as described by the Bible and by Christian writers, but also by those who have not enjoyed the light of revelation; and lastly, the *preservation and propagation* of the human race.

I. The Nature of Man.

1. *Of how many parts does man consist?* The holy scriptures, and even those of the Old Testament, constantly teach that man consists of two parts, *body and soul*—e. g., Eccl. xii. 7, “The *dust* returns again to the earth, of which it is a part; the *spirit* returns to God, who gave it;” Matt. x. 28, “Fear not those who kill the *body*, but cannot kill the *soul*,” &c. Nor can we suppress the conviction that there is within us a nature different from the body, and superior to it—an enlivening and quickening principle, through which we possess the power of feeling, thinking, willing, and acting. But notwithstanding this conviction, there have always been different opinions with regard to the constituent parts of human nature. Some have maintained that either the soul or the body is the only essential part of man; while others have maintained that he consists of three essential parts, *body, soul, and spirit*. This opinion had its origin in the cabalistic and Platonic philosophy. The cabalists divided the human soul into נפש (life, *anima vegetiva*), ניה (the sensitive soul, *anima sensitiva*), and מוח, (the rational soul, *anima rationalis*.) By this division, however, they did not mean to teach that there are three different *substances*, but three different *powers* of one substance. Plato, too, as appears from the history of philosophy, ascribed to man a twofold or threefold soul, but neither did he pretend that *man* consists of three parts. Some modern philosophers, who have lived since the time of the schoolmen, have also adopted the opinion of the cabalists, and divide the soul into three parts; while others defend the opinion that the soul is *twofold*, and divide the whole man into three parts. But they express themselves so obscurely and ambiguously that it is often doubtful whether by these divisions they understand different substances, or only various powers of one and

the same substance. The Christian theologians and philosophers who believe that man consists of three essential parts differing from each other, sometimes appeal to scripture in behalf of their opinion. They quote the texts, Luke, i. 46, 47: “My *soul* magnifies the Lord; my *spirit* rejoices in God,” &c. Is. xxvi. 9, and especially 1 Thess. v. 23, “That your *spirit* and *soul* and *body* may be preserved blameless to the coming of Christ;” also Heb. iv. 12. The first who asserted this opinion in modern times was Theophrastus Paracelsus, who was followed by Jacob Boehmen, Weigel, and other theosophists; also by Andr. Rüdiger in his *Physica Divina*. Luther likewise adopted this division, though it is very clear that he did not consider *spirit* and *soul* as different substances, but only as different attributes and operations of the same spiritual essence. Respecting the texts of scripture above cited, it may be remarked, (a) That in most of those cited, πνεῦμα and ψυχή are synonymous; as in Isaiah and Luke; also in Heb. iv. 12, where they may be rendered either *life* or *soul*, as the passage refers to death, or the separation of the soul or life from the body. (b) The passage in the epistle to the Thessalonians may be explained in two ways. As Paul evidently here writes in strong excitement, he may have heaped these words together, though they do not differ in meaning, in order to give his admonition more effect. So Augustine supposed, (De Anima, iv. 21.) But the probability is, that he meant to distinguish πνεῦμα and ψυχή; not meaning, however, by any means, to imply that man consists of three essential parts; but only to distinguish πνεῦμα and ψυχή as two different powers of one substance. This the Hebrews and Grecian Jews frequently did. By πνεῦμα and ניה, they often meant, the *superior faculties of the soul, the reason*; and by ψυχή and מוח the *sensual part*, which we possess in common with the brutes—the *desires, Sinnlichkeit*; Ps. cxxxi. 2, seq. Josephus says, Arch. i. 1., Ἐπλάσεν ὁ Θεὸς ἀνθρώπον, ᾠδὴν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς λαβὼν, καὶ πνεῦμα ἐνέχευ αὐτὸν καὶ ψυχὴν. Philo and the New-Testament writers frequently use ψυχή and ψυχικός in this sense. Vide Jude, ver. 19.

[Note.—The theory according to which man is divided into two parts is called *dichotomy*; that by which he is divided into three parts, *trichotomy*. The latter of these, so rare at the present day, was the prevailing theory with the early fathers. Vide Tatian, Orat. ad Græcos, p. 151, seq.; Irenæus, Adv. Hæres. v. 6, 7, 9; Origen, περὶ ἀρχῶν, iii. 4; Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. c. 1. It was indeed opposed by Tertullian, and other writers of the Western church; but it was still believed by many distinguished Christian teachers. Trichotomy is chargeable not only upon Paracelsus, Boehmen, Weigel, and other

theosophists, but also upon Spener, and other so-called Pietists of the seventeenth century. It seems to have been generally believed by those of a more deep and spiritual religion, and is at present the doctrine of the more evangelical part of the Lutheran church. Hahn gives the following scheme of the nature of man:—

(ὁ ἕως ἀνθρώπου)	(ὁ ἕως ἀνθρώπου)	(ὁ ἕως ἀνθρώπου)
1.	2.	3.
SPIRIT, (Geist, Πνεῦμα)	SOUL, (ψυχή)	BODY, (σῶμα)
Peculiar to man, with	Common both to man and brute, with the	
(a) Reason	(a) Under-	same properties
(b) Will	standing	as other matter,
(c) Conscience	(b) Desire	(b) Desire and the exter-
	(c) Feeling	nal senses,
as principal attributes.		

Those who make this division must hold, accordingly, that man has not only, in a higher degree, that same understanding, feeling, and desiring soul which is seen in brute creatures; but that he possesses also a nature different *in kind* from theirs, and by which he is raised above them to the rank of a moral being.—[Tr.]

2. The notion of *soul* is expressed in all the ancient languages by terms which originally signify *wind, air, breath*. And from this fact we can learn what were the notions originally entertained respecting the soul. However obscure and indefinite they might have been in some respects, the soul was always conceived to be that invisible power or being from which the body derives its life and activity; and this may be sufficient for practical purposes. Now a man lives and moves only so long as he *breathes*. *Breath* is that mark of life which is most obvious to the senses. Hence such terms as literally signify *breath*, were naturally employed to denote the *life* and the *soul* of man. Thus the Hebrew words רוח and נִשְׁמָה, and the Greek words, ψυχή and πνεῦμα, stand for the *soul*. Cf. s. 9, and especially s. 19, II. The word נִשְׁמָה, from נָשַׁם, signifies primarily, *spiraculum, anhelitus*; next *vita*, as Ps. xlix. 9, 16; then *ánimus*, as Ps. xvi. 10; also what takes place in the soul, *feelings, desires, &c.* The same is true of the Latin word *spiritus*, and of the words *animus* and *anima*, both of which originally signify *aura, flatus, halitus*, and seem to be the same word as the Greek ἀνεμος.

3. The question respecting the *internal nature* and the *quality* of the human soul, is one of those difficult and obscure questions which can never be satisfactorily answered in this life. It cannot certainly be decided by anything in the Bible. The soul is there merely contrasted with the *body* (σῶμα). The latter, we are informed, will return to the earth from which God created it, while the former will return to God,

who gave it,—i. e., produced it in a different way from the body, Eccles. xii. 7. This is said in plain allusion to the account, Gen. i., respecting which vide s. 52. So much is perfectly evident that the Bible always distinguishes between soul and body as different substances, and ascribes to each peculiar properties and operations; and this is in full accordance with the manner in which this subject was understood and represented in all the ancient world.

We should mistake very much, however, if we should suppose that the ancient Israelites, merely because they distinguished widely between soul and body, possessed those strict, metaphysical ideas of the *spirituality* or *immateriality* of the soul, which are prevalent in the modern schools of philosophy. Such ideas are by far too refined and transcendent to belong to that age; as also are the pure metaphysical ideas of the spirituality of God which now prevail. The whole ancient world, Jews and Greeks, (as likewise the savage nations of the present day,) supposed everything which moved to be animated by a *spirit*, and this spirit to be a substance, different indeed from grosser matter, but still somewhat corporeal—a subtle, material essence, like the *wind, air, or breath*. This is proved by the ancient languages. Vide No. 2, and the remarks on the spirituality of God, s. 19, II. See the remarks on this subject in the Progr. “Orig. opinionum de immortalitate animi apud nationes barbaras,” in Scripta Varii argumenti, No. iii.

From what has been said, it is evident,

(a) That the Bible does in no way support, and indeed that it directly contradicts, that gross materialism which denies all substantiality to the soul, considering it a mere accident of matter or of the body. Such an opinion respecting the soul was advocated among the Jews by the Sadducees, (Acts, xxiii. 8,) and among the Greek philosophers originally by Dicaearchus, who entirely denied the existence of the soul as a substance distinct from the body; Cicero, Tusc. i. 10. This same doctrine has been advocated, as is well known, in modern times, by Hobbes, Toland, De la Mettrie, the author of the “Systeme de la Nature,” and others. Indeed, an attempt was made, unsuccessfully it need not be said, to reconcile this gross materialism with the holy scriptures, by William Coward, an English physician, in his “Thoughts on the Soul,” London, 1704. Priestley, too, made a vain attempt to prove from the Bible his ideas respecting the soul, which lead so decidedly to materialism. But from what has been said, it is equally evident,

(b) That the Bible does not support the modern, fine-spun, metaphysical theories respecting the perfect spirituality and immateriality of

the soul. The notion of the ancient world respecting *spirit* was by no means the same with that of our modern metaphysicians. And if the question of the perfect immateriality of the soul had been left to them, and theologians had stopped where the Bible does, and omitted these inquiries, the object of which lies far beyond their sphere, they would have done wisely. This doctrine respecting the *immateriality* of the soul, in the strict philosophical sense of the term, is of far less consequence to religion than is commonly supposed. The reason why so much importance has been supposed to attach to this doctrine is, that it was considered as essential to the metaphysical proof of the *immortality* of the soul. But since the immateriality of the soul, in the strictest sense, can never be made fully and obviously certain, whatever philosophical arguments may be urged in its favour, the proof of *immortality* should not be built upon it. Nor were the fine-spun theories of immaterialism ever resorted to by theologians to prove the immortality of the soul, or ascribed by them to the Bible, until Hobbes, Toland, De la Mettrie, and other materialists, had so perverted the doctrine of materialism as to deduce from it the destructibility of the soul, or its annihilation at the death of the body. But, in truth, the immortality of the soul does neither depend for proof upon its immateriality, nor can be certainly deduced from it. It is possible for one to doubt whether the strict immateriality of the soul can be proved, and yet to be convinced of its immortality. The strongest advocates of immateriality must allow that God *might* annihilate a spirit, however simple its nature may be. Why, then, on the other hand, *might* he not make a substance not entirely simple immortal? The immortality of the soul will be examined in Book II. s. 149; its origin will be investigated in this Article, s. 57.

II. The Destination of Man.

The question, *What is the destination of man?* is equivalent to the inquiry, *What am I, as a man? What have I as a man to do and expect?* Or, more definitely: *Whither lead those tendencies by which, without my own choice, I feel myself impelled? What have I to do, in conformity with those more deep and essential powers and capacities of my nature which cannot be overlooked or effaced? and, When I have acted in conformity with them, what am I to expect?*

A feeling of *morality*—the sentiment of an indelible distinction between right and wrong—lies deep in the soul of every man. There is a principle implanted in our very nature, by which we approve that disposition which corresponds to *right*, and disapprove that which is opposed to it. This regard for a moral law is deeply inwrought into the heart. Nor is there any-

thing more fundamental in our constitution than this; and we may presume that the good to which this our moral nature points us is the very highest good; and it consists in *moral perfection*, and that well-being which is connected with, and dependent upon, holiness. *Increasing holiness*, then, and *the happiness connected with it*, are the destination of man. Without moral excellence no one can be happy; and to seek for happiness without it is mean and base. This is the doctrine of the scriptures both of the Old and New Testament—e. g., Lev. xi. 44; xix. 2; 1 Thess. iv. 3, 7; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Heb. xii. 10, 14, seq. In the creation of the world, God must have designed to impart to every creature that degree of perfection and of well-being of which it should be susceptible. For the attainment of this great end he employs the most suitable means. This results inevitably from his *wisdom*; vide s. 24, I. Now, since man is by far the noblest of all the living creatures who inhabit the earth, and possesses the most superior powers, especially of an intellectual kind, he must have been created by God for a more exalted end, and with a higher destination, than that of other creatures. In consequence of the greater perfections with which he is endowed, he is capable of a higher degree of happiness, for the attainment of which he is incited to strive by the obligations arising from his moral nature.

1. The destination of man *in this life* embraces the following particulars:—

(a) Man possesses the right and the power to make use of the other creatures of the earth for his own advantage. He is *dominus in res creatas*, Gen. i. 26, seq.; Psa. viii. This right he possesses by virtue of the rational and moral nature which God has given him.

(b) As lord of the other creatures, man accomplishes the design of God, or his own destination, when, together with his concern for his own welfare, he promotes in every possible way the comfort and welfare of all his fellow-creatures, and especially the happiness of his fellow-men, with whom, according to the design of God, he stands in the closest and most intimate relation. Cf. Acts, xvii. 26. To this he is also obliged by the divine law, which, whether externally revealed, or written on his heart, requires him to love his neighbour as himself.

(c) God must have designed, in endowing man with such noble capacities and powers, that he should cultivate and exercise them *all*, and employ them for his own advantage and that of his fellow-creatures. The more diligently and actively, then, we employ the powers with which we are gifted by God for the good of ourselves and others,—the more we seek to develop, cultivate, and by constant exercise to strengthen our moral, and indeed our whole nature, the more conformably shall we live to the

end for which we were made. Diligence, labour, and activity, are indispensably requisite to the fulfilment of our destination. Even the life of paradise is not described by Moses as idle and inactive. Man was there to be employed in "tilling the ground," Gen. ii. 5, 15. The improvement of all our powers and capacities is the end of our rational nature; and all the care and effort which we may now bestow upon the improvement of our powers will prepare us richly for whatever we are to be or to do hereafter. To cultivate and improve our whole nature is the duty daily allotted us by God.

(d) But man should be especially attentive to the improvement of his higher nature—his spirit. Man alone, of all the creatures on the earth, possesses the distinguishing excellence of a rational soul, and of *freedom of will*. This is all which gives his existence an absolute worth; this is that true inborn *nobility* which essentially raises him above the rank of all his fellow-creatures upon the earth. By the proper use of his reason, and of all the higher powers of his spirit, man becomes capable of a happiness of which no other creature on the earth is capable. This higher happiness is founded upon the knowledge of truth and moral good, and especially upon religion, or the knowledge and reverential love of God, of which man alone is capable, and which is the most powerful means of promoting holiness. Vide Introduction, s. 2. seq. Now it is a law of reason, and so the design and will of God, who has given us our reason, that the moral powers and faculties of our nature should be developed and strengthened by exercise. Consequently, to exercise these powers—to do justly, and shew mercy, in all the circumstances in which we are placed—is the way for us to discharge our present duty, and to testify our love to God. And every instance in which we neglect to improve the opportunities afforded us of exercising and improving our moral powers is a failure in duty, which is always attended with hurtful consequences.

The book of Ecclesiastes contains many excellent rules for the accomplishment of our destination upon the earth, most of them in the form of proverbs; as ii. 24; iii. 12, seq.; v. 17; ix. 9. They may be briefly expressed as follows:—Man is happy, and lives according to the end for which he was made, "when he wisely enjoys the present; when in the right way he seeks for peacefulness of soul, cheerfulness, and serenity of mind; when he fulfils his social duties; when he loves and serves God, and is active and diligent in the employment of his powers; remembering that he does not exist merely for himself and for the sake of selfish enjoyment, but for the sake of benefiting others, as far as he is able."

2. The destination of man *beyond the grave*.

That man was not made for the present life alone is a doctrine which, although by no means unknown before the time of Christ, had not as yet been clearly and distinctly revealed. But Christ and his apostles inculcated this encouraging and consoling truth with great earnestness, and made it the basis of all their exhortations. Vide 2 Cor. iv. 18; Phil. iii. 20; Col. iii. 1—4. It may be adopted as a first principle, that the right enjoyment and the proper use of the present life is the best preparation for happiness in the life to come; and, on the other hand, constant and earnest effort to prepare for happiness in the *future world* is the best way to be happy *here*. Cf. 1 John, iii. 2, seq. In order that we may be prepared for future happiness, and capable of enjoying it, we must be *holy*. "Without holiness no man can see the Lord," Heb. xii. 14. And the greater the advances we make in holiness, knowledge, and the practice of known truth in the present life, the greater will be our happiness in the life to come. There is, and must be, a close and unalterable connexion between our holiness here and our happiness hereafter.

Note.—From these observations, which we think just and scriptural, we conclude that man is placed in the present life, principally, indeed, to prepare for the next, but not *solely* for this purpose. And he, it must be allowed, fails of fulfilling the whole *end of his being*, who forgets the present in the hope of the future, or who labours in such a way to prepare for the life to come as to render himself inactive and useless in this. Future blessedness is only the continuation and perfection of that which begins here. And we must now begin to be active, holy, and happy, that we may continue to be so in a more perfect manner hereafter. The present is the time to sow; the harvest will come in the future world. He therefore who does not sow here cannot expect to reap beyond the grave. It is a part of the end of our being to be happy even in the present life, however inferior may be the happiness we can obtain here to that which we hope for in heaven. Our life upon the earth is an *end* as well as a *means*. And if we earnestly seek to do the will of God, the present life, even in itself considered, is not worthless, though its value is infinitely raised by the certainty of a future life. In regard to the proper use of the time now allotted us, we have a pattern in the example of those pious men who are recommended in the Bible for our imitation; and especially in the example of Jesus, which, even in this respect, is the most perfect of all. These hints on the destination of man are carried out in Spalding's "*Bestimmung des Menschen*;" Leipzig, 1794; and in the Essay of Töllner, "*Ist das gegenwärtige Leben nur eine Prüfungszeit?*" in his "*Theologischen Untersuchungen*," th. i. s. 402, f. Cicero, in his Book,

“De finibus bonorum et malorum,” states the theories of the various schools among the Greeks respecting the *summum bonum*, or the *finis bonorum*. Seneca calls the destination of a thing, or of a man, *finis naturæ suæ, suum cujusque (rei sive hominis) bonum*. To attain or fulfil one’s destiny, he calls, *ad finem naturæ suæ pervenire*, sive, *attingere finem naturæ suæ*, Ep. 76.

SECTION LII.

OF THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN RACE.

I. General Remarks.

Most nations have some ancient traditions respecting the origin of the human race, which, however, differ widely from each other. Many of the heathen nations believed that their forefathers, or the human race, sprung originally either from the earth, rocks, trees, eggs, teeth, or other inanimate things, or that they were produced by wild beasts. Vide the passages cited in Meiners’ “Geschichte der Menschheit,” s. 245. There were comparatively few of the ancient heathen nations who supposed that the human race, or particular nations, were derived from gods, heroes, or giants; and even these differed very much from one another in their accounts; some supposing that the first men were brought forth in the way of natural generation by these superior beings; and others, that they were only formed by the gods from some inanimate material, *earth, stones, &c.*, and then endowed with life.

In the first and second chapters of Genesis, Moses has preserved the ancient traditions of the Hebrew nation with respect to the origin of man. These traditions are substantially the same with those of other oriental nations, and they are uniformly followed by the other sacred writers. As here recorded by Moses, they breathe the very spirit of the ancient world, although they exhibit more truth, completeness, and connexion, than are found in the traditions and fables of other nations respecting the origin of our race.

According to the Mosaic account, the whole human race is derived from *one stock*, as Paul expresses it, *ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος πᾶν ἔθνος ἀνθρώπων*, Acts, xvii. 26. The first man, Adam, was formed from the earth, Gen. ii. and iii.; Eccles. xii. 7; 1 Cor. xv. 47; *ὁ πρῶτος ἀνθρώπος ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκός*. Eve was formed afterwards, and from Adam, Genesis, ii. 18, seq.; 1 Cor. xi. 8, *γυνὴ ἐξ ἀνδρός*. Some modern investigators of nature have supposed that the distinction found between the races of men cannot be accounted for on the supposition that they all have proceeded from one stock. They have conjectured, accordingly, that *many different pairs of men* were originally

made. That climate, manner of life, means of subsistence, &c., could have produced all the variety which is perceived among the different races of men is what they will not allow. But others affirm that all the arguments adduced in support of this hypothesis are unsatisfactory; and contend, with strong reasons, for a contrary opinion. Among these is Forster. Cf. his “Bemerkungen auf seinen Reise um die Welt,” s. 226—254; Berlin, 1783. Also Kant, Ueber die verschiedenen Racen der Menschen; Königsberg, 1775, 4to; Blumenbach, De generis humani varietate nativa; Göttingæ, 1776, 8vo. Other nations beside the Hebrews have believed that the human race descended from one original pair. Nor is it necessary to suppose that they derived their belief on this point from the account of Moses. The supposition that the whole human race has descended from one pair might naturally arise from various circumstances—from the gradual peopling of countries round about—from the old family tradition, that formerly the number of the human race was comparatively small—and from the observation of the large and rapid increase of single families. Besides, these other nations might have derived much of what they believed respecting the origin of man by direct oral tradition from the earliest times.

[Note.—The question so much discussed among anthropologists respecting the different races of men, and their descent from one original pair, is of very considerable interest both to the theologian and the philanthropist. It has an essential bearing upon the doctrines of inherited corruption, and of the atonement. But its most important bearing is upon our duty to a very numerous race, who have long been excluded from the rights and privileges of fraternity in the human family. Lactantius has well said, (Div. Inst. v. 10,) *Si ab uno homine, quem Deus finxit, omnes orimur, certe CONSANGUINEI SUMUS; et ideo maximum scelus putandum est, odisse hominem VEL NOCENTEM*. And this practical influence of the Christian doctrine of the consanguinity of all nations may be seen in the extensive abolition of negro slavery by Christian nations.

It deserves to be noticed that this scriptural doctrine, which is so connected with the highest interests of humanity, has been successfully vindicated on the ground of physiology against the ingenious and plausible attacks of those who make equal opposition to the Christian scriptures and to African freedom. In addition to the works recommended by our author, we may mention that of H. F. Link, “Die Urwelt und das Alterthum;” Berlin, 1821. There is one physiological argument, which, it would seem, must be conclusive against the supposition that the negro belongs wholly to a different kind from

the white—viz., the offspring of the mixture of different *genera* cannot propagate their own species. We know this is not the case with regard to the children which are born from the mingling of the white and negro races. The essential characteristic marks of the human kind are the rational and moral powers with which man is endowed; and those in whom we can find the least traces of these are to be regarded by us as brethren, bearing with us something of the image of God, however low the degree in which they may possess these powers, and however widely they may differ from us in the incidental circumstances of colour, feature, and temperament.—Tr.]

We must here notice the opinion that men existed before Adam, who is spoken of in the Mosaic account. The belief in Præadamites has been embraced for various reasons; partly to escape some supposed natural difficulties of the kind just mentioned, partly in support of various theological and historical hypotheses, and sometimes for both reasons united. Most of those who have entertained this opinion, however different their views respecting the Præadamites themselves, have appealed to Moses and other sacred writers for support, or at least have endeavoured to shew that they believed in nothing inconsistent with the scriptural account. But they evidently do the greatest violence to the passages which they cite. The plain, scriptural representation is that which we have given. This hypothesis was first raised to notice by Isaac Peyrere, who in 1655 published his book styled "*Præadamitz*." He pretended to find his Præadamites in Rom. v. 12—14. The heathen, according to him, are the Præadamites, being, as he supposed, created on the same day with the beasts, and those whose creation is mentioned in the first chapter of Genesis. Adam, the father of the Jews, was not created until a century later, and is the one who is mentioned in the second chapter. Cf. the works cited by Morus, p. 95, s. 1, note 1. Since the time of Peyrere, this hypothesis has been exhibited more connectedly; and has been asserted independently of the authority of Moses; or, in other words, it has been asserted that the human race is older than Moses represents it. Vide Irwing, "*Versuche über den Ursprung der Erkenntniss der Wahrheit und der Wissenschaften*;" Berlin, 1781, 8vo. Cf. Brun, "*Vergleichung der griechischen und römischen Nachrichten von dem ältesten Zustande der Menschen mit den hebräischen*," in Gabler's "*Theologischen Journal*," b. v. st. 1, s. 50. u. f.

II. The Mosaic Account.

There are two accounts of the creation of man recorded by Moses. The first is very brief, given in general terms, in connexion with the

history of the creation of the world, on the sixth day of which man was formed, Gen. i. 26—30. The second account is more full, and stands by itself, Gen. ii. 4, seq. In this second account, the creation of the world and the state of the earth before man was placed upon it, are again cursorily mentioned, while in ver. 7 the creation of man himself is more fully detailed. It is not improbable that in the composition of these first chapters of Genesis, Moses may have had before him some written records handed down from the patriarchal age, and he may perhaps have inserted them, word for word, in his own history. Vide s. 49, I. According to this supposition, we have here inserted one of these original records, extending from Gen. ii. 4 to iii. 24, and forming a complete whole, which is separated from what precedes by the appropriate title, "This is the history of the heavens and the earth," ver. 4. What favours the supposition that Moses drew from written records in composing the first part of Genesis, and that he even preserved them in the very language in which they were written, is the fact, that in each of these distinct fragments the Supreme Being is uniformly designated by a different title,—in one, by the name אֱלֹהִים, in another, by the name יְהוָה, and in a third, by the combined name יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים. This was first observed by Astruc and Michaelis, and is often made use of by Eichhorn in his "*Urgeschichte*." Cf. s. 49, and the works of Herder, Eichhorn, Gabler, Paulus, Ilgen, Vater, and others. But Eichhorn and Ilgen have spoken with far too much confidence respecting the sources from which Moses drew. The subject is not so well understood as to allow of so much confidence. Vide Köppen, *Die Bibel ein Werk der göttlichen Weisheit*, th. ii. s. 456, 2te Ausg. These accounts must now be separately considered. Vide Morus, p. 96, s. 4.

1. *Observations on the first account, Genesis, i. 26—30.*

Here, and in other parts of the history of the creation, God is said to *speak*. This is a representation by which the exertion of the divine will, or the determination of God, is intelligibly expressed, and corresponds with the whole pictorial nature of the account. Cf. Genesis, vi. 5; xi. 6, 7. After the production of so many creatures of the earth, God at length created man, the noblest and most excellent of them all—the lord of the lower creation.

אָדָם, in the first chapter, is not a *proper*, but a *collective* noun—*man*. We might suppose, from this passage, if the account in the second chapter were not more explicit, that the first human pair were created at the same time. The words, בְּצַלְמִי בְרָמֹתִי, should not be distinguished as they have sometimes been. The two words thus collocated signify, *an exact or a very similar*

image; as chap. v. 1, 3. The primary signification of *צל* is, a *shadow*, as Psalm xxxix. 7; then, a *shadowy image*, a *likeness*. In what this divine likeness consists,—whether simply in the dominion over the rest of the creation, mentioned immediately after, or in the possession of higher faculties, will be investigated, s. 53. The *dominion* of man over animals here spoken of denotes merely his right to use and employ them for his own advantage. The phrase, *God blessed them*, (ver. 28), is to be understood as above, in ver. 22; he gave them *fruitfulness, the power to propagate their species*. The fruits of the tree and of the field, and not the *flesh of animals*, constituted the original food of man as well as of beast. Vide ver. 29, 30, where it is said that God gave to them the produce of the earth for food. Cf. ii. 16. Many reasons may be given for this. Had it not been so, there would have been ground to apprehend that man might have destroyed whole species of animals, while they were yet few in number, &c. Vide Michaelis, in loc. The fact that man at first fed upon fruits and herbs is confirmed by the traditions of other ancient nations. They uniformly represent the practice of taking the life and shedding the blood of living creatures as a cruel and frightful practice, which could not have existed in paradise, or in the golden age of the youthful world, when universal friendship and happy concord reigned among the creatures of God. Hence, in the prophetic descriptions of that happy age which should again return to the world, it is expressly said that one beast shall not destroy another; “the lion shall eat straw like the ox,” Isa. xi. 7, coll. ver. 6—9. The same trait recurs in the description which the Greeks give of the Saturnian age. Vide Plutarch, *περί σαρκοφαγίας*. Ovid, too, describes the *vetus aurea ætas* as happy *felibus arboreis et herbis*; *neq. poluit ora cruore*, Met. xv. 96, seq. Vide Clerici Comment. in Genesin. We find, therefore, no intimation that beasts were slain until after man had forfeited paradise, Genesis, iii. 21. Shortly after, they appear to have been offered by men in sacrifice to God, Gen. iv. 4. Noah was the first who received a distinct command to use flesh as well as vegetables for his sustenance, Gen. ix. 3. And it is in general true, that rude nations eat for a long time only herbs and fruits, and come slowly into the use of animals for food, even after they have been in the habit of slaying them, and using their skins for clothing. This can be easily accounted for, when we consider that animal food, as then prepared, before fire and salt came into common use, must have been extremely coarse and disgusting. We gather from Homer, that the use of salt on flesh could not have been very common in his day, since he always gives it the epithet *divine*, and describes

it as a gift of the gods. The Caribbeans at the present day eat flesh without salt.

2. *Observations on the second account, Genesis, ii. 4—24.*

(a) After the mention, in ver. 5, 6, of the means of subsistence which God had provided for man from the vegetable kingdom, the writer passes now, in ver. 7, to the creation of man himself. “God formed man from the dust of the earth,” *קָיָם מִפְּרוֹתָאָרְצָה*—a very natural idea, readily suggested by analogy, and in itself probable. The decay of man, and the mouldering of his body to dust and earth, gave rise to the phrase, *to become dust and earth*. And so dust and earth were naturally regarded as the elements of the human body; and to describe death they said, *קָיָם שׁוֹב עָר*, *to return to the dust*, from which we were taken; Psalm civ. 29; Genesis, iii. 19; Job. x. 9; Eccles. xii. 7. Cf. Joh. xxxiii. 6. The body of the first man, which God had formed from the earth, was entirely finished before it was endowed with life. Here again the description is rendered natural and probable from the analogy of the human body when first deprived of life. The form and structure remain complete after life has departed; and the body moulders slowly into dust and clay. Thus, on the other hand, the body first was formed under the plastic hand of the Artist; and the breath of life was not imbreathed until it was finished. In these two respects there is a great resemblance between this account and the Grecian fable of Prometheus, who first formed a man from earth and water, and afterwards endowed it with life through the co-operation of the Deity. Vide Ovid, Met. i. 82.

The *אָדָם* is here not only the common appellation for *man*, but also the proper distinguishing name of the *first man*. The first man is called, by way of eminence, *the man*. The word is not derived from *אָדָם*, *red*, (supposed by some to refer to the red colour of the countenance, or to the *red earth*, from which man was formed, as the Rabbins and Josephus (Antiq. i. 1) suggest.) It is rather derived from *אֲדָמָה*, *the earth*, and so describes man as *earthborn*, *γῆγενής*. Plato says, in his *Politicus*, *Ἐκ γῆς γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ποιεῖται πάντες*.

“And he breathed into his nostrils the breath of life,” *וַיִּנְשָׁם בְּאָזְנוֹ נֶשֶׁם חַיִּים*. *God vivified the previously lifeless body of man*. Breath is the most obvious and certain indication of life, and breathing is performed principally through the nose; and hence this whole figurative representation. When God gives life to his creatures he is said *to breathe out his breath*, or *to breathe it into them*. When he causes them to die, he is said *to take away their breath*; as Ps. civ. 29, 30.

Nothing is expressly said in this passage respecting the rational soul, its indivisibility, and immortality. That only which is obvious, and

perceptible by the external senses, is here described; as it is in general the object of Moses in this passage to describe the origin of the world only as far as it falls under the cognizance of the senses. Cf. the remarks on *וַיֵּרָא*, s. 51, I. *וַיֵּרָא* is, a living creature, or being.

(b) In ver. 9, and ver. 16, 17, the writer speaks of the means of subsistence appointed for man, from the vegetable kingdom, (Vide No. I.,) and particularly the tree of life, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil, or of the distinction of good and evil; which were found in the midst of the garden, (*בְּתוֹךְ הַגָּן*). They are mentioned here to prepare the way for what follows in the third chapter. Trees of life denote with the Hebrews such trees as possess a healing, life-giving power, *arbores salutare*, whether the virtue belongs to the fruit, leaf, bark, or root; as Prov. iii. 18. We say, *official* herbs or trees. The design of the tree of life was, to perpetuate human life, Gen. iii. 22. While man continued in paradise, his body was endued with immortality, which, however, was not effected in an immediate and miraculous way, but by a natural means, divinely appointed—viz., the fruit of a tree, in partaking of which human life might be prolonged. Hence the tree of life is described as planted in heaven, the abode of immortality, Rev. xxii. 2; ii. 7. The Greeks, too, speak of food of which no mortal can taste, and which the immortals alone enjoy. Homer, *Odys.* v. 197, 199; II. xix. 38, 39.

The description which Moses gives of the tree of life would naturally lead to the conclusion that the other tree which stood opposite was a hurtful, poisonous tree, destructive of life; and this is confirmed from ver. 17, "The day thou eatest of it thou shalt die." Cf. chap. iii. This account too, as well as those which have preceded it, is very probable and natural. There are injurious plants and poisonous trees by which we are made sick and destroyed; there are also useful trees, which impart health and prolong life. Such trees there were in the age of paradise, conferring perpetual health and immortality; and also a single poisonous tree, placed in the garden for the trial of man. Cf. Gen. iii. 3. But why is it called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil? Because by means of this tree man was to learn prudence, to be made cautious and circumspect; and because it was intended to put his wisdom to the test. Cf. *Morus*, p. 97, s. 6. If he did not eat of the tree it would be well for him, and he would act wisely and circumspectly; if he ate of the fruit of the tree, it would be to his hurt; and by the evil he would suffer he would become wise, and learn in future to be more circumspect; he would then know from his experience the unhappy consequences resulting from transgression of

the divine command. Cf. Gen. iii. 22. The phrase, *to know*, or *to distinguish good and evil*, (or, as Horace expresses it, *curvo posse dignoscere rectum*, Ep. ii. 2, 44,) always signifies in the ancient languages *to be or become wise, to acquire judgment*. So frequently in Homer—e. g., *Odys.* xviii. 227, 228; xx. 309, 310. Cf. Book ii. s. 75.

(c) In ver. 19, 20, we have the following points—viz.,

(a) Adam lived at first among the beasts; and they were, so to speak, brought before him by God. They were more nearly related to him than any other part of the material creation by which he was surrounded. He had more in common with them than with inanimate things. In paradise the beasts were not timid and wild, but lived with man in familiarity and confidence. Cf. Isaiah, xi. 6—9. Nor is this representation of the original state of man confined to the Jews; it is found among other nations, and is moreover confirmed to our present observation. We find even now, that in regions entirely uninhabited by man, and where his persecutions have never been felt by beasts and birds, they are tame and unsuspicious, though elsewhere known as wild and timid. Cook describes the tropical birds which he saw in the uninhabited islands of the South Sea—the *man of war*, and other birds which are commonly very shy—as so tame that they could be caught by the hand. When the traveller passes through the wilds of South America, which are seldom trodden by human footsteps, he is not shunned by the most timid birds, and can catch even partridges as he passes along by a mere noose fastened upon the end of a stick. Cf. the work, "*Zur Kunde fremder Länder und Völker*," b. ii. s. 152, extracted from the "*Lettres Edifiantes*."

(b) As man was conversant with the animals about him, and was soon able to distinguish them one from another, he gave them names, which appear to have been the sounds by which he called them around him, and sometimes in imitation of the sounds which they themselves made. In this way it is easy to account for the transition of man from his original speechlessness to the first use of language. We notice the same process in children. Plato observes, very justly, in his *Politicus*, "that in the Satyrnian age men were very familiar with animals, and even conversed with them, (as appears in Gen. iii., and as is seen in children;) and that in this intercourse they learned much wisdom; and by giving attention to their nature and habitudes saw much which they could turn to their own advantage." Hence the great influence which the fables of *Æsop* had in ancient times, and the deep impression which they still make upon children.

(γ) But although every animal had its mate, man did not find among them all a companion for himself. His innate propensity to the social and conjugal state was thus more strongly excited; ver. 18, 20, ad finem. "Man only," it is said, "had not as yet נָקְבִי." נָקְבִי signifies, properly, *an assistant, companion*; as Ezekiel, xii. 14. is rendered by Luther, *die um ihn wäire*; in English version, *meet for him*; Sept. κατ' αὐτὸν and ὁμοίος αὐτῷ.

(d) Creation of the wife of Adam, ver. 21—24.

This passage has greatly perplexed commentators, who have undertaken to reconcile it with the notions of modern times, with which it does not at all agree. Eichhorn (p. 182, 183 of the work above cited) explains it in this way—"Adam and his wife were created at the same time, but at first lived apart. The conjugal impulse of Adam was excited; he fell into a sleep, and *dreamed* that he was divided into halves. When he awoke, Eve stood before him." The same explanation in substance is given by Zachariä, in his Bib. Theol. th. ii. s. 120. But what unprejudiced reader can see any foundation for all this in the Mosaic account? Moses evidently teaches that Eve was created after Adam, and taken by God from Adam; and Paul says, "Adam was first formed, and then Eve," 1 Tim. ii. 13. For this part of the Mosaic narrative, as well as for the former parts, there is some analogy, which, however, must be more evident to the orientalists than to us, since the subserviency of the woman to the man is more acknowledged in the East than in the West. The orientalists believe the woman to be indeed of *his own nature*, but still secondary and subject to him; though this place by no means teaches her subjection as a slave, as afterwards, when the age of paradise was over, Gen. iii. 16—a supposition inconsistent with the idea of the golden age. Now, because the woman is of the same nature as man, she is described as taken from him. Hence the deep love he feels for her, and the intimate union between man and wife. Hence, too, (viz., from the fact that she was taken from him,) the superiority of the man over the woman. That this explanation is entirely in the spirit of the Bible is clear from the argument which Paul deduces from this place—"For the man is not of the woman; but the woman of the man. Neither was the man created for the woman; but the woman for the man," 1 Cor. xi. 8, 9. This truth, then, that husband and wife stand in the closest connexion with each other, while still the wife is necessarily dependent upon her husband, could not be made more intelligible and impressive than by the account here given, which represents the woman as created after man, taken from him, and made out of his *side*. נָקְבִי in this

place does not signify *rib*, but *side, half*, as commonly in Hebrew and Arabic—e. g., Exod. xxvi. 26, 27, 35, seq. Sept. πλευρά—"The place was closed up with flesh"—i. e., the body was healed and made whole. As pain was not known in paradise, it was necessary that Adam should be put into a deep sleep (ver. 21) while all this took place—in such a way, however, as to allow him an obscure consciousness of what was done, (ver. 23.) It is frequently the case, when something befalls us in sleep which makes a deep impression on the senses, that, without waking at the time, we have a sort of perception, which we obscurely recollect when afterwards awake. עַתָּה זֶה, *this time*. "Now I see at last a being like myself, one of my own species," referring to ver. 20, ad finem. Adam now gives to his companion a name, as he had formerly done to the beasts—viz., נָקְבִי (like the *vira* of the ancient Latins,) because she was formed from man, (שָׁמָּה.) When afterwards she had borne a child, he called her name נָקְבִי, because she then became *the mother of the human race*, (נָקְבִי בְּרִיָּה;) Gen. iii. 20. In ver. 24, it is not Adam who speaks; for he knew nothing as yet about father and mother. The historian here deduces a practical inference from what had been said. In Matt. xix. 5, where ἡ γράφη is to be supplied before ἔλκε, this passage is cited: "The relation between husband and wife is the most intimate which can exist, and, according to the design of God, indissoluble. It is more irrefragable than the relation between parents and children; whence (so Christ concludes) to separate from one's wife is a crime of worse desert than to renounce father and mother." The particular truths and inferences to be drawn from the whole Mosaic narrative are well exhibited by Morus, p. 96—98, s. 4—8. Cf. Matt. xix.; 1 Cor. xi. When it is said *they shall be one flesh*, it means, they shall be regarded as *one body, one person*.

Note.—The first abode of men is commonly called *paradise*, παραδείσος, (cf. Morus, p. 96, s. 4, n. 1,) because the LXX. thus translate the Hebrew גֶּן, which is used in ver. 8 of this narrative, and in other parts of the Bible, and are followed in this by the Latin versions. The word is of Persian origin, (in the Hebrew form גֶּן־עֵדֶן,) and signifies, in Eccl. ii. 5, and in other texts where it occurs, not any small garden, but a large portion of land, a *park*, furnished with trees, and wild beasts, and water, for the purposes of hunting and fishing; as Xenophon describes it, Œcon. iv. 13. The name of *paradise* was afterwards given to the abode of the blessed; but the original abode of man was called by this name, by way of eminence, after the example of the LXX., by Sirach, Josephus, Philo, and other Grecian Jews.

The description of the garden is given, Gen. ii. 8—15. *Eden* was not the name of paradise itself, but paradise was a spot in the extensive territory of Eden. Vide ver. 8, coll. ver. 10. If the situation of the territory of Eden is to be determined by the names of the four rivers mentioned in the Mosaic account, and if by these rivers we are to understand those to which the same names were anciently given, and some of which retain them to the present day, we may fix upon the region where Armenia, Ghilan, Dailem, and Chorasán now lie. There are no means, however, by which we can determine the particular spot in this region where the garden of delights was situated. Eden then comprehended all the countries which extend from Euphrates (פֶּרַס) and Tigris (הֶקֶל) to Aras or Araxes, (אֶרַס), which rises in Armenia and flows into the Caspian Sea,) and Oxus (אֶקְסוֹס), on the east of the Caspian.

The fables and traditions of the Asiatic nations agree very generally in placing the first habitation of men, and the cradle of the human race, in the neighbourhood of Caucasus and the Caspian sea, and the valleys which extend sideways from Caucasus, though they differ very much in assigning more definitely the particular spot where man first dwelt. Vide Zimmerman, *Geographische Geschichte des Menschen*, band iii. s. 250, and Meiners, *Geschichte der Menschheit*, s. 7. Some learned men, however, relying upon other Asiatic traditions, not in the least supported by the Bible, suppose that the earth was first peopled from Southern Asia; and so they fix upon other rivers more favourable to their hypotheses than those before mentioned, to water their territory of Eden, although they nearly all allow the river Euphrates to be one intended. Buttman sided with these in his "Aeltesten Erdkunde des Morgenländers;" Berlin, 1803, 8vo. In this work he represents, as is common at the present time, the whole narrative of Moses as fabulous. He endeavours to render it probable that the whole territory extending from the Persian Gulf eastwards to the Peninsula of Malacca, was the region intended by Eden; that the Ganges was one of the four rivers, and that these original habitations were afterwards placed by the Hebrews more in their own vicinity. Among the older works on this subject, cf. Reland, *De situ paradisi*, in his "Diss. Miscell." t. i. Bochart, *Geog. Sacra*, and Michaelis, *Spiceleg.* t. ii. In the seventeenth century, Olaus Rudbeck, a Swede, wrote a book called "*Atlantica*," in which he placed paradise in Sweden. In the nineteenth century, Dr. Hasse, in his "Entdeckung im Felde der ältesten Erd- und Menschengeschichte," endeavoured to prove that Eden was the north of Europe, and that paradise was Prussia.

SECTION LIII.

OF THE IMAGE OF GOD IN WHICH MAN WAS CREATED.

I. *History of opinions respecting the Image of God.*

No one doubts that the *image of God* denotes in general a *likeness of God*, (s. 52.) But the opinions of theologians have always been different respecting the particular points of resemblance which Moses intended to express by this phrase. And this is not strange, since Moses does not explain what he means by it, and it is used in very different significations in the Bible; which is a fact that has not been sufficiently noticed. The common opinion is, that this phrase denotes certain excellences which man originally possessed, but which he lost, in part at least, by the fall. The principal texts which are cited in behalf of this opinion are, Gen. i. 26, coll. ii. 15, seq.; and from the New Testament, Col. iii. 10, coll. Ephes. iv. 24, where a *renewal* after the image of God is mentioned; which is understood to mean a *restoration* of this image, implying that man must have lost it; also 2 Cor. xi. 3. Against this common opinion it may be objected, that the image of God is described in many passages as existing after the fall, and as still discoverable in men; as Gen. ix. 6, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for *in the image of God* made he man;" also James, iii. 9, "With the tongue we curse men, who are *made after the similitude of God*;" also 1 Cor. xi. 6, 7, ἀνὴρ—εἰκὼν—Θεοῦ ὑπαρχων. Here also belongs the passage often cited in behalf of the opposite opinion, Gen. v. 1—3, where it is said, that God created man in his own image; and that Adam begot a son in his own likeness, and after his image; from which it must appear, that Seth, being made in the likeness of Adam, must have had the same image of God, whatever it was, which Adam possessed. This phrase, then, evidently, is not always used in the same sense in the Bible. And the fault of interpreters and theologians has been, that they have overlooked the different meanings in which this phrase is used, and have selected one only, which they have endeavoured to elicit from all the texts in which the phrase occurs.

As to the question, in what consists that excellence of man, denoted by the phrase, *the image of God*, we find,

1. Even the oldest Christian writers, *the ecclesiastical fathers*, were very much divided. This is acknowledged by Gregory of Nyssa, in an Essay devoted to this subject. Theodoret confesses, that he is not able to determine exactly in what this image consisted, Quæst. xx.

in Genesin. Epiphanius thinks that the thing cannot be determined, Hæres. 30. Tertullian placed it in the innate powers and faculties of the human soul, especially in the freedom of choice between good and evil, Adv. Marc. ii. 5, 6. Philo placed it in the *νοῦς*, the rational soul, and associated with this phrase his Platonic notions respecting the original *ideas* in the divine mind (*λόγος*), of which the visible man is a copy, De Opif. Mundi. The human race, according to him, is indeed degenerate, but yet has traces of its relationship with the Father of all; for *πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν φειώται Θεῷ λόγῳ, τῆς μακαρίας φύσεως ἐκμαγεῖον, ἡ ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα γηγονώς*. Origen, (Περὶ ἀρχῶν, iii. 6,) Gregory of Nyssa, and Leo the Great, were of the same general opinion on this subject as Tertullian. According to these ecclesiastical fathers, this image of God consists principally in the rectitude and freedom of the will, and in the due subordination of the inferior powers of the soul to the superior. The immortality of the body is also included by Leo and many others. Epiphanius blames Origen for teaching, that Adam lost the image of God, which, he says, the Bible does not affirm. He knows and believes, "*quod in cunctis hominibus imago Dei permaneat*," Ep. ad Joannem, in Opp. Hieronymi, t. i. Most of the Grecian and Latin fathers distinguish between *imago* and *similitudo Dei*. By the *image* of God, they say, is meant the original constitution (*Anlage*)—the innate powers and faculties (*potentia naturalis*, Scholast.) of the human soul. By the *similitudo* of God, is meant, that actual resemblance to him which is acquired by the exercise of these powers. I shall not dwell upon the subtleties of the schoolmen, which are still prevalent to some degree in the Romish church. Vide Petavius. [For an account of these, vide also Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 76.]

2. Nor are modern theologians at all more unanimous. The most important opinions entertained on this subject in modern times admit of the following classification—viz.,

(a) Some find this image in the *rational soul*; like Philo, who, as before remarked, supposed it to consist, not in bodily advantages, but in the *νοῦς*, the higher reason alone, De Opif. Mundi, p. 15, 45; and like many of the fathers. To be sure, this higher rational and moral nature of man lies at the foundation of all his other excellences, and indeed is essential to their very existence. But, according to the representation of the Bible, this rational soul is not so much itself this image of God, as the *foundation* or source of those excellences in which it does more properly consist.

(b) Others find it in the *dominion* of man over all the creatures of the earth; because this dominion is mentioned in immediate connexion

with the image of God in Gen. i. 26. So think Socinus and his followers, and also many Armenians. According to both of these theories, the image of God must be allowed still to exist in man. This will be farther considered hereafter.

(c) Others find it in the *moral perfections of our nature which we have lost by the fall*. These writers refer to the texts in the epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians, and in accordance with these explain the passages in Genesis relating to this subject. This is the most common theory. In the language of the Apol. Conf. Augs., the image of God consists in *certior notitia Dei et probitas*. Theologians define it, *justitia originalis sive sanctitas*, original uprightness or holiness.

(d) Those who find difficulties with all these opinions, endeavour to relieve the subject by dividing the image of God into a *physical* and a *moral* image; or into an *essential* and an *incidental* image. The latter, they suppose, is now lost, or exists in a less degree; the former is still possessed by man.

II. Biblical uses of the phrase, "The Image of God."

1. We cannot expect to find any strict or definite notion attached to this phrase in the ancient Mosaic account. The general idea of *divinity*, *greatness*, *precedence*, is all that Moses intends to express when he uses it; *insignis dignitas ac præstantia hominis*. Morus, p. 103, s. 18. Any one who possesses excellence and dignity superior to other men, is said, in this widest sense, *to bear the image of God*, as 1 Cor. xi. 7; Ps. lxxxii. 6. Moses, however, places it principally and prominently in that part of this superiority which is most obvious to the senses—viz., the superiority of man over irrational creatures, and his dominion over the earth. By this limitation, however, the other excellences of our nature are not excluded; but, on the contrary, those powers and faculties from which this more obvious superiority results must be included in the idea of Moses. But while Moses, in the use of this phrase, had in his eye that superior excellence of man by which he is *lord of the earth*, he does not teach anywhere that man lost this entirely by the fall; but, on the contrary, implies that he afterwards possessed it. Vide No. I. *Princes and judges* are called by Moses *gods*, and *sons of God*, on account of the superiority and dominion which they possess. Vide s. 17. For the same reason man is *king* and *god* of this lower creation, which honours him as the image of God. David probably used the phrase in this wider sense in Ps. viii. 6—9, where he explains and paraphrases Gen. i. 26, seq. Cf. 1 Cor. xi. 6, 7; James, iii. 9. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and even Augustine, explained the words of Moses in this way.

2. The later Jews appear to have used this phrase in different senses, as we learn from the Book of Wisdom and Sirach. They included in its meaning,

(a) *The immortality of the body*, ἀφθαρσία. "Οὗτοι ὁ Θεὸς ἐκτίσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπ' ἀφθαρσία, καὶ εἰκόνα τῆς ἰδίας ἰδιότητος ἐποίησεν αὐτόν. Φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον· πειράζουσι δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος ὄντες, Book of Wisdom, ii. 23, 24. In this respect, therefore, according to this writer, we have lost the image of God. Vide ver. 24, where he considers death as the consequence of sin, and attributes it to the devil. This immortality was regarded by the whole ancient world as something divine and godlike, and is made by Homer the principal mark and characteristic of his deities. Gods and ἀθάνατοι are always synonymous in his writings.

(b) *Dominion over the earth*, Book of Wisdom, ix. 2, 3; Sirach, xvii. 3, 4. The dominion of man over the inferior creation is regarded, even by Philo, as a remnant of his original perfection and power, De Opif. Mundi, p. 100, ed. Pf. Sirach, in the passage cited, seems to include in this image, together with dominion over the earth, reason, speech, and the other perfections mentioned in ver. 5, seq. In this respect we still retain the image of God.

(c) *The moral state*, Book of Wisdom, ix. 3, where mention is made of the ὁσιότης καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ εὐδύτης ψυχῆς in which the first men lived upon the earth and ruled over it. These moral excellences we do not any longer possess; certainly not in the same degree as formerly.

3. The same significations of the phrase, *image of God*, which were noticed No. 2, were common among the Jews at the time of Christ, and were accordingly adopted by the apostles. They use this phrase,

(a) In reference to the general exaltation, dignity, and dominion of man:—e. g., 1 Cor. xi. 7; James, iii. 9. (b) In reference to the moral perfections of man, exactly as it is used by the author of the Book of Wisdom—e. g., Col. iii. 10, coll. Ephes. iv. 23, 24. Both of these epistles were written at the same time; they are entirely similar in phraseology, and perfectly parallel in these passages. Christians, especially converts from heathenism, are here exhorted to renounce altogether their former sinful propensities, and the wicked life which they had previously led, (παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος;) and to put on the *new man*—i. e., to be wholly renovated, to embrace new principles, and to lead a new life correspondent to their principles. Now this *new man* is said to be ἀνακαινούμενος, *renewed*—i. e., new created, or remodelled by God, Ephes. iv. 23; and hence the phrase, *the renewal or restoration of the divine image*. Εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν should be construed with πύσαντος

αὐτόν, *to the knowledge of God*—i. e., this disposition is produced in you to enable you to attain to the knowledge of God and of his will—a living and saving knowledge. Κτίζειν, *to create anew, transform*—i. e., entirely to change and improve; continuing the figure derived from the *new man*. Κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ—i. e., according to Ephes. iv. 24, κατὰ Θεόν, after the *pattern or likeness of God*—i. e., that you should become again like unto God. Paul here makes this likeness of God to consist in a moral resemblance—that holiness and uprightness, to the attainment of which Christ teaches us the means, and gives us the power. This is clear from what precedes, and also from Ephes. iv. 24, where Paul says that this reformed character, bearing the divine likeness, consists ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ (piety), καὶ ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθείας—(i. e., ἀληθινή,) *honest, sincere integrity*. The same words are employed in the passage cited from the Book of Wisdom. John, in his epistles, frequently urges the duty of striving to become like to God, (filii Dei,) although he does not use the phrase, *image of God*. Plato says, that likeness (ὁμοίωσις) to God is, "δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γένεσθαι." Cicero makes our likeness to God both a physical and moral resemblance. God, he says, animated the human body, "ut essent qui terram tuerentur, quique cælestium ordinem contemplantes imitarentur cum vitæ modo et constantia."

III. Concluding Remarks.

We draw the following general conclusion from these historical and exegetical observations—viz., the phrase, *the image of God*, is very comprehensive, and used in the Bible in more than one sense; and many unnecessary disputes would have been avoided, if it had not been adopted in systematic theology as the title of a particular article. One may say, without at all denying a primitive state of innocence, that *the image of God* in which man was created did not consist in this state, and that it still continues after the fall. If we believe the scriptures, we shall believe in the primitive innocence of man; but there is no necessity for us to call it *the image of God*. It would be far better to abandon the phrase, *image of God*, in speaking scientifically on the original perfections of man, and to adopt in its place the more comprehensive title, *the state of innocence*. The latter phrase is derived from 2 Cor. xi. 3, where Paul says, he fears that, as Eve was beguiled by the serpent, Christians may be beguiled (by false teachers) from the ἀπλότητος τῆς εἰς Χριστόν—i. e., *simplicity, sincerity, purity*; here, *pure love to Christ*, true and sincere dependence upon him, like what innocent children feel towards their parents and benefactors.

Again; we compare men with God in respect

to all the excellences which we observe in them, and which we conceive that he also possesses, only in a higher and more perfect degree. We may say of men, therefore, that, in respect to all these excellences, they *bear the image of God*, or are like him. Now we still possess, as we are taught in the scriptures, many of these nobler powers with which our nature was endued, though in a far less degree than God; such are reason, dominion over the earth, &c. Other of these excellences, according to the constant doctrine of the Bible, we have lost by the fall, or possess at present in a far less degree than our first parents before the fall. Among the latter are (a) that degree of bodily strength and health which laid the foundation for the immortality of the body; and (b) more especially *moral* perfections. Thus we see that the Bible will support us in saying, both that we still possess the image of God, and that we possess it no longer, according as we use this phrase in a *wider* or *narrower* sense. So far as the posterity of Adam still possesses reason and power over irrational creatures, they still possess the image of God, *Deo sunt similes*. So far as they have ceased to be righteous and holy as man was in his state of innocence, and so far as their bodies are now become mortal, they have lost the image of God. But so far as they regain this original moral rectitude, and a happy immortality, they again become like God, and his image is renewed in their souls. This whole subject is discussed by Morus, p. 105, s. 23, in a manner worthy of imitation, especially in the practical turn which he has given it.

Note.—Theologians have invented various divisions and technical phrases, in order to determine more accurately the nature and kind of those excellences and perfections which were bestowed by God upon man at the creation. But these divisions have given rise to many erroneous views of this subject. The following distinctions deserve to be particularly noticed:—

1. These original endowments of man are not to be understood as excellences which he possessed in actual exercise (*habitus*, Scholast. *habitus infusi*;) but only as capacities and faculties for those excellences which, by practice and exercise, he may come to possess. The human soul resembles in this respect an unwritten leaf, (the *tabula rasa* of Aristotle,) upon which everything can be written for which it has a natural fitness and susceptibility. Vide Introduction, s. 4.

2. They are *naturales*; united with human nature, and wrought into it by God; and opposed (a) to *perfectiones essentielles*, because man can be conceived to exist without them, and would remain *man* though destitute of them; and (b) to *perfectiones superadditi per gratiam*.

This last point was affirmed in opposition to many theologians of the Romish church, who placed these excellences in a *high degree* of wisdom, justice, and holiness, imparted by God to men on creation in a *supernatural manner*, and in addition to the original endowments of his nature. They regarded the *similitudo cum Deo* as opposed to the *status purorum naturalium*, in which man was without the knowledge or love of God; and therefore as a *donum supernaturale*, which could be lost without altering the essential nature of man.

3. *Perfectiones propagabiles*. It was the intention of God that these perfections should be transmitted to the posterity of our first parents, so long as the conditions prescribed by God should be fulfilled.

SECTION LIV.

OF THE PRIMITIVE STATE OF MAN; HIS MENTAL AND MORAL PERFECTIONS.

THE excellences which man possessed in his original condition are generally divided into two classes; (a) *Internal*, such as belong to the essential constitution of human nature, as established by God himself, including all his original perfections both of *soul* and *body*; s. 54, 55. (b) *External*, such advantages as man possessed from the relation to the rest of the creation in which he was placed by God; his dominion over the other creatures of the earth, his title to use them for his own advantage, &c.—*imago Dei sensu latiori*; s. 56. We shall first treat of the *INTERNAL* excellences of man; in this section, of the original perfections of his *soul*; in the following, of those of his *body*. The excellences which originally belonged to the soul of man will now be considered in reference to its two principal powers—understanding and will.

I. *Original Excellences of the Human Understanding.*

Reason and the intellectual powers are the noblest gifts which we have received from God, without which we could not be moral beings. We cannot suppose, then, that these powers should have remained idle and unemployed during the happy state of innocence in which our first parents lived. Paul, therefore, with entire truth, makes *ἐπίγνωσις* one of the things in which our likeness to God consisted; Col. iii. 10, cf. s. 53; since holiness and blamelessness, the other things mentioned as constituting it, could not exist, without some knowledge of good and evil. This knowledge, however, was not itself directly imparted to man at his creation, but only the *power of obtaining knowledge*. Vide s. 53, ad finem.

In what the knowledge of our first parents consisted neither Moses nor any other sacred writer has particularly informed us. Their state with respect to knowledge is doubtless justly described as a *state of infancy*; in the sense, however, in which we speak of the infancy of *nations*; for Moses does not represent Adam as in all respects resembling a new-born child. As to *actual knowledge*, he was, indeed, at the moment when God created him, exactly in the condition of a new-born child, and quite as destitute of innate ideas. But in another respect he was very unlike a new-born child; in this, namely, that he was able to *exercise his reason immediately*, which a child is not. God created man, according to the Mosaic account, not only endued with reason, but able to exercise it on his first entrance into the world. And if he had immediately the full use of his intellectual powers, he must very soon have acquired from the objects by which he was surrounded a great variety of ideas, and a large stock of knowledge; and he would advance in knowledge the more rapidly and easily, as his mind was not as yet swayed by those inordinate bodily appetites, nor darkened by those prejudices, nor confirmed in those bad habits, by which all others who have attained to maturity are so effectually hindered in the acquisition of knowledge.

The means by which God called the intellectual powers of man into exercise, and brought them to a full development, were, according to Moses, of two kinds.

(a) *Indirect*,—the external objects by which man was surrounded. *Animate* creatures, being more nearly related to him than the inanimate creation, were the first objects which attracted his attention and excited his curiosity. That this was so we may conclude, both from what we observe every day among children, and from the express declaration of Moses. The living creatures with which man was conversant first employed his thoughts; and in giving them names, he first exercised the faculty of speech. Cf. s. 52, II. It was not until afterwards, and only in an inferior degree, that the *inanimate* creation also administered to his instruction by the various objects which it presented to his attention.

(b) *Direct*,—the revelations made immediately to man. The Mosaic history throughout represents God as familiarly and directly conversant with our first parents; and as *speaking* with them; Gen. ii. 16, 17; i. 29, 30. And the history of the fall (chap. iii.) presupposes in our first parents an acquaintance with some direct divine instruction, and with positive divine precepts; and this corresponds entirely with the notions which even heathen nations have always

had of the original condition of man. In the early and infant age of the world, the Deity, they supposed, walked familiarly among men, and revealed himself to them directly, by words, dreams, visions, and in other ways.

The knowledge of our first parents, so far as it was derived from natural sources, must have been confined to the objects by which they were immediately surrounded; and even with regard to these, they knew only as much as was necessary for them in the circumstances in which they were placed. In comparison with the knowledge which we possess at present, it must have been very small, as their wants were comparatively very few. The Mosaic history does not afford the remotest support to the fabulous stories which we find in the rabbins, ecclesiastical fathers, and other writers, who have followed the later Jewish teachers, respecting the extensive physiological, scientific, and literary knowledge of Adam. These Jewish fables are connected with the notion that the language which Adam spoke was Hebrew, which is supposed by the Jews to be a holy language, inspired by God—a pretension which has been ably refuted by Schultens. The Jews think they can discover proof of the thorough knowledge of nature which Adam possessed, in the Hebrew names which they suppose him to have given to the various animals, and from the etymologies of these names.

We should not expect to find thorough knowledge or extensive learning in our first parents, for the following reasons:—viz., (a) With their few wants they could derive no advantage from such knowledge, and could make no use of it. (b) As to religion, the knowledge which they needed both of its theoretical and practical truths could be comprised in a few simple and intelligible points. Of any higher or more extended knowledge of this subject they were at first wholly incapable. (c) It will not be denied that the language of our first parents must have been simple and scanty. Vide s. 55. But it is well known from experience, that without *words*, and indeed without a great copiousness and richness of language, neither distinct and definite ideas, nor, in general, accurate knowledge, can exist. (d) When men first begin to collect in society, even supposing them endued with the most noble faculties and intellectual powers, they cannot be instructed by philosophy, like learned and cultivated people. They must first be instructed by what is sensible; and have everything rendered as obvious to the senses as possible; exactly as it is represented, Gen. ii. 19, 20. If the representation there made were different, and such as many modern scholars would have us believe, it would be highly improbable, and the whole narrative would become suspicious. This

very simplicity gives it the stamp of internal truth. (e) Our first parents are represented in chap. iii. as in fact credulous and easily beguiled. And how can this be reconciled with the supposition that they possessed that deep and extensive knowledge and those great perfections sometimes ascribed to them? The knowledge of Adam, then, cannot be compared with that of any advanced and mature race of men. The same standard of judging cannot be employed in the two cases. It may be readily conceded, however, that the *powers* and *faculties* of our first parents, as long as the *σάφξ* and *πνεῦμα*, sense and reason, remained in proper balance, were greater than those of their posterity, in whom the case is otherwise. Vide Dr. Junge, "Volekommenheiten der ersten Menschen," Stück 1, of his philosophical and theological Essays; Nürnberg, 1779, 8vo.

II. Original Excellences of the Human Will.

They consist chiefly in the order and regularity of our bodily desires. Our first parents in their state of innocence were blameless and sinless. They had sincere love for God and regard for his commandments, and did everything which was agreeable to him with the greatest readiness, out of pure love, as virtuous children do the will of an earthly parent. In short, if their piety was *childlike* in respect to the knowledge upon which it was founded, it was also so in respect to its purity and simplicity. And this disposition is that which will be revived in those in whom the image of God is renewed. Hence Christ recommends us so earnestly to become *like children*. Our first parents obeyed from grateful love; and it is the object of Christianity, in designing to renew the image of God, to bring us to render obedience to God and Christ from motives of grateful love. But this rectitude of our first parents consisted only in the subjection of their bodily appetites to the law of reason. Both scripture and experience teach us that our depravity and moral degeneracy arise principally from the dominion of sense (*σάφξ*) over reason (*πνεῦμα*.) Such was not the case with man in his state of innocence; he then suffered his appetites to be controlled by rational considerations; he fixed his choice only upon what was good, and his desires being virtuous, his actions were the same. Hence this original rectitude of man is called *sinlessness* (*ἀναμαρτησία*.) The representation now given of the original rectitude of man depends principally upon the passages, Col. iii. and Ephes. iv. Vide s. 53. In these passages, *righteousness* (uprightness) and *holiness* (moral perfection) are ascribed by Paul to the will of man as first created, and as renewed. This rectitude of the will is called by theologians *imaginem Dei stricte sic dictam*, also

justitiam originalem, the last of which is used in the Apol. Augsb. Confession. Vide Morus, p. 105, Not. ad. s. 23. Of the same import is the phrase *εὐθύτης ψυχῆς*, which occurs, Book of Wisdom, ix. 3 (s. 53); and also *δοῦότης* and *ἀπλότης*, 2 Cor. xi. 3. *Εὐθύς* corresponds with the Hebrew *יָשָׁר*, *honest, upright, virtuous*; and is used with particular reference to the text Eccles. vii. 29, "God made man upright; but he sought out many inventions (wrong ways)." The meaning is: man had a natural capacity for virtue, but he abandoned nature, and declined to evil, notwithstanding his noble capacities.

The opinions which many form of the perfections of the will of our first parents, and of the virtues of their character, are frequently very extravagant. This is a fault which should be guarded against. Man was created with the amplest CAPACITY for moral excellency; but it cannot be said that he had attained to the actual possession of this excellence in a very high degree. High and confirmed virtue can only be attained by a long course of moral action; and at that early period opportunities for this action must have been very rare. God, however, did not require more from man than he had given to him. But the understanding of man in his primitive state, though indeed sufficient for the situation in which he was placed, was still very small, and his actual knowledge very limited; but the more feeble and imperfect these are, the more imperfect, necessarily, must be that virtue which depends upon them. There is a great difference between the innocence of childhood, and the virtue which is grounded upon the more perfect and mature knowledge and experience of a ripener and more advanced age. If our first parents had possessed so preponderating a bias to good as many have supposed, it is hard to see how they could have been so easily seduced. We behold them yielding to temptations which would have in vain assailed many of those among their descendants, in whom, according to the language of scripture, the image of God is renewed.

They, however, were not destitute of a knowledge of their duty sufficient for their situation; for so much God had provided, Genesis, iii. 2, 3. Accordingly, their neglect of duty and their transgression of the divine command could be *imputed* to them. We should avoid, therefore, the other mistake of representing them as entirely ignorant. Vide Morus, s. 8, 22. If they had been faithful in the use of the knowledge which they possessed, they would have attained to a greater measure of it, and to a more fixed habit of goodness, as is the case among those in whom the image of God is renewed. Cf. Matt. xiii. 12, and the texts cited from the epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians.

SECTION LV.

OF THE PRIMITIVE STATE OF MAN; HIS BODILY EXCELLENCES, AND SPEECH.

I. *Original Excellences of the Human Body.*

1. THE superiority of our first parents over their posterity in this respect cannot be accurately and particularly determined from the Mosaic account. So much, however, is clear from this account, that the body of man was then perfectly healthy, strong, and vigorous, and that it would have enjoyed a never-failing youth if man had continued in that happy condition in which he was first placed. And this account agrees perfectly with the representations which we find among other nations of the animal cheerfulness, the bodily health and strength of man in the golden age, and even down into the heroic age. Homer frequently speaks of the strong bodily powers of the men of an earlier period, in comparison with the feebleness of those who lived in his own age. The blooming health and bodily vigour of our first parents contributed to the health and strength of the soul; its powers were not disordered or weakened by sickness; the passions and appetites, which so often destroy both body and soul, were as yet moderate and regular. On this subject, as well as with regard to the original mental and moral excellences of man, the fancy of the later Jews was very active; and they invented innumerable fables, with which their writings are filled, respecting the beauty, the gigantic size and strength, of the first man.

The immortality of the body is expressly mentioned in the Mosaic account, as one of the peculiar distinguishing advantages which our first parents enjoyed, Gen. ii. 17, but which we have lost by the fall, Gen. iii. 3, 19. The same is also everywhere taught by the later Jewish writers, who always regarded the immortality of the body as a part of the image of God. Vide Book of Wisdom, ii. 23, seq., (s. 53, II. 2.) So also the first Christian teachers—e. g., Romans, v. 12; vi. 23; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22; where the same views are given as in the texts cited from the Book of Wisdom. This doctrine of the immortality of the body does not imply that man in his nature was so unalterable that he absolutely could not die. An *impossibilitas moriendi*, or *immortalitas absoluta*, is not pretended; but only the *absentia necessitatis naturalis moriendi*, or *immortalitas hypothetica*, the condition proposed being obedience to the command of God, and the enjoyment of the tree of life being permitted to them only so long as they should fulfil this condition. Morus, p. 98, s. 9, note. Nor is this immortality represented even by Moses as a necessary consequence resulting from the incorruptible nature of the human body,

but as a favour promised to man by God, and depending upon the constantly-repeated use of the *tree of life*, Gen. ii. 9, coll. iii. 22, 24. Cf. s. 52, II. Something similar to this is found in the Grecian mythology, which represents the gods as partaking of *nectar* and *ambrosia*, in order to preserve and invigorate their bodies; while mortal men were not allowed to participate of this heavenly food, even when they ate with the gods. Hom. Od. v. 197, 199.

The question is frequently asked, *whether man would have always remained upon the earth if he had not fallen?* The Mosaic history furnishes no reply to this question; but the answer commonly given by theologians is, that man would not always have remained here below, but that, by some unknown transformation, without death, or the separation of the soul from the body, he would have been raised to a higher happiness *in heaven*. To this opinion Morus assents. It is grounded principally upon the New-Testament doctrine, that those men who should still be alive at the day of judgment would not die, but *be changed*—i. e., their grosser bodies would pass, without the painful sensation of death, into those more refined and perfect bodies which all will possess in the abodes of the blessed, 1 Cor. xv. 51, seq. This representation is supposed to furnish some evidence with regard to the original destination of the human body; and this is rendered more probable by what Paul says, ver. 47, “*ἀνθρώπος ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός (εστί).*” But we cannot attain to certainty upon this subject, because the holy scriptures leave it undecided.

2. It was not intended, however, by the Creator, that our first parents, while living in their state of innocence, should leave their bodily powers unemployed and unexercised. Morus, s. 4. The life which they were to lead was not one of indolent ease and animal enjoyment, although such is the notion almost universally entertained respecting the life in the golden age. Our first parents, on the contrary, were required to labour, and in that way still further to develop and perfect their bodily and intellectual powers. Vide s. 51, II. The very idea, however, of this happy age, excludes the notion of pain and hardship, the frequent attendants of labour. Vide Genesis, ii. 5; iii. 17—19. *Agriculture* is mentioned, in the passages before cited, as the first employment appointed for man. The taming, or rather domestication and employment of animals is mentioned in Gen. i. 28. By describing agriculture as the first employment of man, Moses obviates the false opinion that our first parents were originally in a *savage* state. A degree of cultivation which *savages* do not possess is implied in agricultural employments; and they lead faster than any other to progressive improvement.

II. *Original Language of Man.*

Speech is the great characteristic excellence of man, without which he would hardly be able to employ his rational powers, or to exist in social connexion with his fellow-men. Of this distinguishing faculty of man Moses makes express mention, Gen. ii. 19; cf. s. 52, II. There have always been very various opinions respecting the origin of human language. For the opinions of the ancient Greeks, vide Puffendorf, *Jus naturæ et gentium*, l. iv. c. 1, s. 3, and Müller, *Positiones, historico-philosoph. de origine sermonis*; Argentorati, 1777. This subject has been often discussed in modern times, and has caused much controversy both among philosophers and theologians; and as it is usually made a topic of discussion in modern systematic theology, and can be more naturally introduced into this department than any other, we shall treat of it briefly in this place. Writers on this subject are divided into two principal classes—viz.,

1. Some have maintained that an articulate language, consisting of arbitrary sounds, was imparted to man at his creation, and that he was able immediately to speak it; and moreover, that this original language was very copious and in the highest degree perfect. Man, they assert, not only did not, as a matter of fact, invent the language which he spake, but never could have done it; and so they suppose that speech was originally as special and miraculous an endowment as the gift of tongues to the apostles. The principal advocate of this opinion in modern times is Joh. Pet. Süssmilch, who has attempted, with no common sagacity, to prove that the origin of language is not to be traced to man, but directly to God. Vide his *Essay on this subject*, published at Berlin, 1766, 8vo. But,

(a) The nature of language itself, and the most ancient history of it, furnish conclusive evidence that man not only *can* invent, but has actually invented, articulated language, consisting of arbitrary sounds. All languages in their incipient state are indescribably simple, consisting of very few and short words and phrases, which are so insufficient for the communication of thought, that looks and gestures are called in to their aid. Such we observe to be the case still with children, who have more thoughts and feelings than words in which to express them. The same is true of savages, and generally of all who have but few words. Now, if God had communicated language in some such miraculous manner as is supposed to our first parents, it is hard to see why he should have suffered this language to be afterwards lost, and how it should have come to pass that all the nations springing from Adam should have begun back with the very elements of speech, and proceeding from these, have formed so many and

such different languages. According to this supposition, then, a great miracle would have been wrought in behalf of our first parents, from which none of their posterity had reaped the least advantage. This is not according to the manner of God in his other works.

(b) The supposition that the original language of man was copious and finished, overlooks the fact that language cannot be such where objects and ideas are still scanty and imperfect. Ideas arise from the perception of objects; and the number, clearness, and distinctness of our ideas is in proportion to the number of objects which we behold, either simply or in connexion with others. But language contains the signs and symbols by which we express our ideas of things, and communicate them to others. How, then, could there be a perfect language in that simplicity of human life in which there were but few objects to be seen or compared? The advocates of this supposition are driven to the absurdity of saying that man could have spoken of things which he had never seen or thought of. It was remarked by Samuel Werenfels, very truly, that if one should look through the most comprehensive and complete dictionary, he would find but few words which could have belonged to the language of Adam.

(c) Again; of what use could a rich and cultivated language have been to our first parents? And if of none, how can the supposition that such a language was miraculously given them be reconciled with divine wisdom, which does not work miracles except for some important object? Now it is perfectly obvious that to them, in their peaceful and simple life, when they had but few wants, and those easily satisfied, such a language would have been of no utility. They had as yet no ideas of innumerable things which became afterwards known as improvement advanced; and for such things, of course, they had no words in their language. The language of our first parents, in its incipient state, could not naturally have been more copious or perfect than the language of nations generally while they are still in their infancy and possess but few ideas, and of course have, and need to have, but few words to express them.

(d) We justly conclude, from what we see of the wisdom of God in all his other works, that he did not endow man, on his creation, with any advantage which he himself could attain in the diligent use of the powers and faculties of his nature. So we conclude that man has no *innate* ideas, because he can easily obtain the ideas he possesses by the use of his intellectual powers. And with still more reason may we conclude, on the same ground, that man has no *imagines innatas*, sive *signa innata idearum de rebus*. The Bible makes no mention of any such; on the contrary, it teaches that one way in which

our first parents learned language was from their intercourse with irrational creatures, in giving names to which they first exercised the faculty of speech.

2. The second class affirm that God did not bestow language itself upon man at his creation, but gave him powers and faculties which would enable him to form a language for himself, and gradually to refine and enrich it as his circumstances might require. Those who hold this opinion may have as sincere admiration for the wisdom of God and gratitude for his goodness as the advocates of the other theory. Among the ancients, Epicurus, (vide Lucretius,) and among the fathers, Tertullian and Gregory of Nyssa, assented to this opinion; and it was considered even by Quenstädt as entirely unobjectionable.

These writers, however, differ among themselves respecting the *manner* in which man proceeded in the development and improvement of his faculties of speech. The strangest conjecture on this point is that of Maupertius, that language was formed by a session of learned societies, assembled for the purpose! The theory which derives the most support from history is, that the *roots*, the primitive radical words of articulate and conventional language, were originally made in imitation of the sounds which we hear from the different objects in the natural world, and that these original sounds, in imitation of which language is first formed, become less and less discernible in these languages in proportion as they are improved and enlarged, and the radical words are subjected to various alterations and inflexions. Vide Herder, Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache, (a prize Essay;) Berlin, 1772; 2nd ed. 1778; 3rd, 1789. Cf. the works of Tetens and Tiedemann on this subject; also Jerusalem, Betrachtungen, th. ii. s. 134, f.

These views respecting the origin of language are entirely consistent with the very natural representation which Moses gives, Gen. ii. 19, 20, of the *naming of the animals*. Vide s. 52, II. These were the first objects to which man directed his attention, and to these he gave names, sometimes derived from his calls to them, and sometimes from voices and sounds which they themselves made. In this way, then, man was first led to exercise his powers of speech; and it was perfectly natural for him to begin to speak by giving names to animals, as they are more interesting to him, and more nearly related to him, than the inanimate creation.

Now, when our first parents were to be instructed in moral objects, which could not be recognised by their senses, it must necessarily be done by images drawn from nature, and especially from animals, and so their names and the names of their actions were figuratively applied, in the poverty of the then existing lan-

guage, to designate moral objects. In conformity with these views, we must interpret what God says, Genesis, iii., iv., which would have been unintelligible to our first parents if it had been expressed in such language and phraseology as is now common among us; but which, being expressed in a figurative manner, was level to their comprehension. This is the way in which missionaries are now compelled to proceed, when they have to do with men who have no ideas on religious and spiritual subjects, and of course no words answering to them in their language. Instruction intended for children, also, must be conveyed in the same figurative language and style; and they are always found to be most interested in allegories and fables, like those of Æsop. Those who object to this mode of instruction only prove, then, their own ignorance. Instruction imparted to uncultivated men must of necessity be given in a figurative manner, because they not only speak, but even *think*, in figures. From abstract expressions they derive but faint conceptions. The case is entirely different among cultivated men.

SECTION LVI.

OF THE PRIMITIVE STATE OF MAN; HIS EXTERNAL ADVANTAGES; AND THE NOTION OF A GOLDEN AGE.

I. *Original External Advantages of Man.*

THIS is the second class of the distinguishing advantages of our first parents, as divided in the beginning of s. 54. They have their ground in the external relation of man to the other creatures of the earth; but they presuppose in him the possession of those internal excellences described s. 54, 55. These advantages are comprehended under the general description, *the dominion of man over the earth*, or over the creatures of the earth, Morus, p. 104, s. 21; and this is taken from Gen. i. 26, seq. coll. Gen. ix. 2. This dominion implies nothing more than that man possesses (a) the right and title to make all the creatures of the earth contribute to his own advantage, to the supply of his wants, and to the convenience of his life; and (b) that he possesses both the power and skill to compel them to that subservience to which their nature is adapted. Cf. s. 52, II. It is said by Plato, in a passage in *Timæus* respecting the creation of men, as translated by Cicero, "*Tales creantur, ut Deorum immortalium quasi gentiles esse debeant, divini generis appellantur*," (cf. Acts, xvii. 28, from Aratus, τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἑκείν,) *teneantque omnium animantium principatum*." God has placed man, as lord, at the head of the animate creation; made him his image upon the earth—a subordinate god—a representative of the Deity. And the irra-

tional creatures, whose knowledge cannot extend beyond what they can recognise by their senses, can conceive of nothing superior to man. Of God and of spiritual things they know nothing, and so can have no duties to perform to him. Their business is, to submit to *man*, as their lord and ruler; and God has given to man the means to compel them to this obedience, for which they were made. With many animals, even since the fall, this subjection to man seems to be natural and easy; they are inclined to his service of their own accord, or are readily prevailed upon by favours or chastisements to engage in it.

This dominion which was conferred upon man over the animate and the inanimate creation he still retains, at least in a good measure. It is represented as still the prerogative of man in Psalm viii. 6—9, the whole of which passage is a paraphrase of Genesis, i. 26, seq. (On the question, whether this dominion is only a part, or the whole of what is intended, when it is said that man was made in the *image of God*, cf. s. 53, I. II.) Theologians, however, frequently assert, that since the fall man does not possess this dominion over the inferior creation *in its full extent*; and it does not follow from the words of Moses, considered by themselves, that he *ever* did. Moses, however, and other sacred writers, clearly teach, that such wild, intractable, and cruel beasts, as are now found upon the earth, were unknown to man in his original condition, where they were all tame and subject to his will. This is clear, too, from the figurative description which the prophets give of the return of that happy age—e. g., Isa. xi. 6; lxv. 25. The same opinions respecting that happy age of innocence in the youth of the world are found among the Greeks, Romans, (cf. Virg. Ecl. iv.), and almost all nations.

From the relation which man holds to irrational creatures, as their master and ruler, he owes them several important duties; the consideration of which belongs, however, rather to the department of morals than of theology.

II. *The Notion of a Golden Age.*

1. The notion of a *golden age of the world* is almost universal; and, although somewhat modified by the peculiar opinions and customs of each people, it is yet found diffused through all ages and nations, as far as history extends, and is everywhere substantially the same. All nations believe that the original state of the earth and of the human race was far more happy and cheerful, and in every respect better, than the present; and that either at once or more gradually the world degenerated. The notions which the Grecians, and the nations which adopted their mythology, the Romans and others, entertained respecting the different ages,—the golden,

silver, &c.,—are generally known. Cf. Hesiod, *Epy. xai ημ.* verses 109—201. Ovid, *Met. I.* 89—162. Virgil, *Ecl. iv.*, and the selections from Plato and Diodorus in Euseb. *Præp. Evan.* i. 7; xii. 13. [Cf. Lucretius, *De rerum nat. ii.* 332, seq. Tibullus, i. 3, 35, seq. Seneca, *Hipp. v.* 524.] The same opinions substantially are found among rude and savage nations—the inhabitants of Kamschatka, Tartary, the Indians in North and South America, the South-Sea Islands, &c.

2. What is the source of these ideas, which are so universally diffused?

(a) It was formerly supposed very generally that all these mythological fables were only traditional relics and fragments of a direct divine revelation. The Mosaic history was regarded as the only source from which these various and wide-spread ideas were derived; and to shew how they were handed down from one age to another, and transmitted from the Hebrews to the Greeks, Romans, and others, has been very often attempted. But the arguments employed in support of this opinion have been generally far-fetched, and unsupported by history; as, indeed, all arguments must be which are adduced in support of the opinion, that the scriptures are the *only* source from which the ideas of the Greeks, Romans, and others, respecting the original state of man, are derived, and that these ideas have been only corrupted in being transmitted by the intermixture of fable. This opinion was advocated by Huetius, in his "*Demonstratio Evangelica*, where he endeavoured to shew that the scripture history was at the foundation of the whole Grecian mythology. But his theory is inconsistent with facts, as is very generally acknowledged at the present day. Much, indeed, of the scriptural account respecting the original condition of man may have been preserved and diffused among the nations of the earth. But it cannot be historically proved that our sacred history is the *only* ground of these ideas of a golden period, in which all nations agree. These universal ideas on this subject may have arisen partly from other sources. Men are everywhere alike in all the essential parts of human nature. And hence there prevails among them a certain universal analogy in respect to language, manners, modes of thought and opinion; and from this analogy their agreement on many points may be explained, without supposing them to have learned or borrowed from one another. Vide Introduction, s. 9, No. 6.

(b) One cause of this notion of a *golden age* so widely diffused among heathen nations is the disposition, which may be seen in all men, to *think THE PAST better and more happy than THE PRESENT*. This disposition has its origin in a certain urgent feeling of our *natures*, of which

we shall in a moment say more. We shall here speak only of the disposition itself, as it is seen among men. And in accordance with it, the higher one ascends into antiquity the more happy and charming does the world become to his view; the nearer he approaches the times in which he lives, the more imperfect and dismal does everything appear. It was the same with men in respect to their views of the past a thousand years ago. And had the world actually degenerated, physically and morally, a thousand years ago as much as the old men, *laudatores temporis acti*, doubtless then thought and said, and had each successive generation of men since proved, according to the expression of Horace, *progenies vitiosior*, then the world by this time would have become a mere waste, and the whole human race would have long since perished! This prevalent belief that the world from the first had been constantly deteriorating was now clothed in an historical form, and taught as actual truth; and the fables thus invented respecting the early state of man, though they differ in some particulars, are yet everywhere essentially the same.

The manner in which the ideas of a golden age may have originated, and have been gradually developed into those mythological descriptions which are found in all nations, may be shewn by the following remarks, founded upon experience:—When we have arrived at mature years, and especially when we are in the decline of life, the period of our youth appears to us far better than the present. We were then more free from anxiety than ever after; our susceptibility of pleasurable emotions had not then been blunted; our heart was open to the enjoyments of life. And when we look around, and everything seems to us to have degenerated since we were young, it is not unnatural to conclude that the same has been true in every age; that at a very early period, in the infancy of the world, it was full of peace and happiness, and from that time to the present has been gradually growing worse and worse. And we are strengthened in this conclusion by hearing our parents and grandparents speak in the same way respecting the times which they have lived through. Thus at length we come to the conviction that old times were better than the present, and that the farther back we go, the more delightful, happy, and perfect we shall find the state of the world. We then proceed to fill up this general outline which we have formed of a happy age. And this we do by carefully removing from that golden period all the ills and imperfections of our present state, the physical sufferings which we now endure, and also the evils arising from our social connexion, and from the progress of refinement. Then we suppose there was no need of clothing, there was no rough and uncom-

fortable weather, there were no harmful beasts, and men were not as yet unjust and cruel. Such is the picture of the primitive state of the earth and of the human race, in which the ancient fables of almost all nations agree. It deserves, however, to be remarked, that Moses dissents from nearly all the heathen mythologists who have described the original state of man as one of indolence and perfect rest, and, on the contrary, makes it a state of activity and labour.

These mythological descriptions have, no doubt, an historical basis, but whatever of truth there is in them has been enhanced and beautified by the imagination in its attempt to bring up the golden age to its own ideal of perfection. For, in reality, that happy state of man of which so many dream, and which is depicted in heathen mythologies, is nothing more than the state of *barbarism* with its best side turned to the beholder, beautified by the imagination, and placed in that same magic and enchanting light with which we have seen the *entire absence of cultivation* covered over by the genius of Rousseau. Vide his “*Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes.*” If the worst side of this state should be exhibited, instead of pleasing it would shock and disgust all who have ever enjoyed the blessings of civilization and refinement.”

In this way we can account for the origin of these universal ideas respecting the original state of man, without supposing that they were altogether derived from the Mosaic record.

(c) These remarks respecting the manner in which the opinions and ideas of men respecting a golden age first originated and are gradually developed are so obvious, and have so much internal truth, that they occur of themselves to every observer of the world and of mankind. But for this very reason, that the universal ideas respecting the primitive state of man can be so easily accounted for, without supposing an historical foundation for them, the Mosaic history of this original state has, like the rest, been regarded by many as fabulous. But those who have taken this view of the Mosaic history have overlooked other very important aspects of the subject, and have but a very partial acquaintance with it. Should they look at this subject on all sides they would see the necessity of admitting some real truth as the basis of these wide-spread conceptions, and that the claims of the Mosaic account to our credence are greatly superior to those of heathen mythologies. This will be evident from the following considerations:—

(a) The general disposition of all nations to regard the original condition of mankind as eminently happy, proves, beyond dispute, that they have felt a certain pressing necessity to

believe that God, who is supremely wise and good, would have created the human race in a better condition than that in which it is now found. This feeling is universal among men. Most of the ancient philosophers acknowledged it, nor have modern philosophers been able entirely to suppress it. Vide the writings of Kant. But to mere philosophers there has always been a riddle here, which they have endeavoured, but have never been able, satisfactorily to solve. This riddle, so inexplicable to them, has been perfectly solved by the Bible, in the account which it gives of the fall of man from a state of innocence and happiness.

(3) That something must have taken place to corrupt the human race must seem at least *probable*, from the mere necessity of believing that it was once better than now. But if a book, accredited as a divine revelation, gives historical information respecting both the original happy condition and the commencement of the degeneracy of our race, we are no longer left in uncertainty with regard to the fact.

(7) The Mosaic history of the state of innocence, although it agrees in some respects with the fables of the heathen respecting the golden age, in other respects differs widely from them. The extravagant, and plainly false and fabulous representations which are found in the writings of Hesiod, Ovid, and Plato, who describe the happy state as one of ease and indolence, do not occur in the writings of Moses. This circumstance alone would lead us to conclude that his record is of wholly different origin from theirs, and that it is not a mere fiction, but founded on historical facts. Moreover, it is more ancient than any other account which we have of the first age of the world.

SECTION LVII.

OF THE PROPAGATION OF THE HUMAN RACE.

THE Mosaic history informs us, with a simplicity which is characteristic of the age in which it was written, that God designed that the human race should be propagated, and should extend itself over the earth; and that he gave to man, as well as to other living creatures, the power to propagate his own species. Gen. i. 28, coll. v. 22. But as man consists of two essential parts, *body* and *soul*, the origin of both these in the posterity of Adam must be considered.

I. Origin of the Human Body.

The Hebrews generally describe the human *body* as derived directly from parents, as appears from the phrases, *to come from the loins of the father*, *to be in his loins*, &c. Gen. xlvi. 26; Heb. vii. 5, 10, seq. Sometimes, however, they speak of it, as *taken out of the earth, from the*

earth, or dust; and so as *returning to the earth, to the dust*, &c. Vide s. 52, II. 2. The passage, Ps. cxxxix. 15, 16, may perhaps be most easily explained in this way. The human body is there represented as being in a *dark pit* before its birth, and as formed in the *depths of the earth*, from *lime* and *earth*. The phrase עֲרֵב עֲרֵבָה, is in other places entirely synonymous with שָׁמַיִם. Both Greeks and Hebrews represented the state of man before his birth as similar to that in which he will be after his death, and comprised both conditions under the words לֵבַיִם and אֲדָמָה. Moses describes man as *coming from the earth*, and as *returning to it*. And so, according to the notions of the Hebrews, man is *in the earth*, as well before his birth as after his death; and comes forth into the material world from that same vast, subterranean, invisible kingdom, to which he again returns. Job. i. 21; x. 9; xxxiii. 6. Eccl. xii. 7. Book of Wisdom, xv. 8.

II. The Origin of the Human Soul.

Respecting the manner of the propagation of the soul among the posterity of Adam, the sacred writers say nothing. The text, Eccl. xii. 7, gives us, indeed, clearly to understand that the soul comes from God in a different manner from the body (vide s. 51, I.); but what this manner is, it does not inform us. The texts, Is. xlii. 5, and Job, xii. 10, which are frequently cited in this connexion, merely teach, that God gave to man *breath* and *life*, and so do not relate to this subject. Nor can anything respecting the manner of the propagation of the soul be determined from the appellation, *Father of spirits*, which was commonly given to God among the Jews, and which occurs, Heb. xii. 9. Vide Wetstein, in loc. This appellation implies nothing more than that, as man is the father of an offspring of the same nature with himself, so God, who is a Spirit, produces spirits. It is doubtless founded upon the description of God, Num. xvi. 22, as "the God of the spirits of all flesh." The whole inquiry, therefore, with regard to the origin of human souls, is exclusively philosophical; and scriptural authority can be adduced neither for nor against any theory which we may choose to adopt. But notwithstanding the philosophical nature of this subject, it cannot be wholly passed by in systematic theology, considering the influence which it has upon the statement of the doctrine of original sin. It is on account of its connexion with this single doctrine (for it is not immediately connected with any other) that it has been so much agitated by theologians, especially since the time of Augustine. They have usually adopted that theory respecting the origin of the soul which was most favourable to the views which they entertained respecting the native character of man. And hence the followers of Augustine and of Pelagius, the advocates and

opponents of the doctrine of native depravity, are uniformly ranged on opposite sides of the question concerning the origin of the soul.

There have been three principal hypotheses on this subject, which will now be stated.

1. The hypothesis of the *pre-existence of souls*. Those who support this hypothesis, called *Præ-existiani*, affirm that God, at the beginning of the world, created the souls of all men, which, however, are not united with the body before man is begotten or born into the world. This was the opinion of Pythagoras, Plato, and his followers, and of the cabalists among the Jews. Among these, however, there is a difference of opinion, some believing that the soul was originally destined for the body, and unites with it of its own accord; others, with Plato, that it pertained originally to the divine nature, and is incarcerated in the body as a punishment for the sins which it committed in its heavenly state. This hypothesis found advocates in the ancient Christian church. Some Christians adopted the entire system of the Platonists, and held that the soul was a part of the divine nature, &c. Priscillianus and his followers either held these views, or were accused of holding them by Augustine, *De Hæres.* c. 70. All who professed to believe the pre-existence of the soul cannot be proved to have believed that it was a part of the divine nature. This is true of Origen, who agreed with the Platonists in saying, that souls sinned before they were united with a body, in which they were imprisoned as a punishment for their sins. Vide Huetius, in his "*Origenianæ*," l. ii. c. 2, quest. 6. The pre-existence of the soul was early taught by Justin the Martyr, *Dial. cum Tryphone Jud.* This has been the common opinion of Christian mystics of ancient and modern times. They usually adhere to the Platonic theory, and regard the soul as a part of the divine nature, from which it proceeds, and to which it will again return. This doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul is, however, almost entirely abandoned, because it is supposed irreconcilable with the doctrine of original sin. And, if the mystics be excepted, it has been left almost without an advocate ever since the time of Augustine.

2. The hypothesis of the *creation of the soul*. The advocates of this theory, called *Creatiani*, believe that the soul is immediately created by God whenever the body is begotten. A passage in Aristotle, *De Gener.* ii. 3, was supposed to contain this doctrine, at least, it was so understood by the schoolmen; and in truth, Aristotle appears not to be far removed from the opinion ascribed to him. Cyril of Alexandria, and Theodoret among the fathers in the Grecian church, were of this opinion; and Ambrose, Hilarius, and Hieronymus, in the Latin church. The schoolmen almost universally professed this doc-

trine, and generally the followers of Pelagius, with whom the schoolmen for the most part agreed in their views with regard to the native character of man. For these views derived a very plausible vindication from the hypothesis that the soul was immediately created by God when it was connected with the body. The argument was this:—If God created the souls of men, he must have made them either pure and holy, or impure and sinful. The latter supposition is inconsistent with the holiness of God, and consequently, the doctrine of the native depravity of the heart must be rejected. To affirm that God made the heart depraved, would be to avow the blasphemous doctrine, that God is the author of sin. The theory of the *Creatiani* was at first favoured by Augustine; but he rejected it as soon as he saw how it was employed by the Pelagians. It has continued, however, to the present time, to be the common doctrine of the theologians of the Romish church, who in this follow after the schoolmen, like them, making little of native depravity, and much of the freedom of man in spiritual things. Among the protestant teachers, Melancthon was inclined to the hypothesis of the *Creatiani*; although, after the time of Luther, another hypothesis, which will shortly be noticed, was received with most approbation by protestants. Still many distinguished Lutheran teachers of the seventeenth century followed Melancthon in his views concerning this doctrine—e. g., G. Calixtus. In the reformed church, the hypothesis which we are now considering has had far more advocates than any other, though even they have not agreed in the manner of exhibiting it. Luther would have this subject left without being determined, and many of his contemporaries were of the same opinion.

3. The hypothesis of the *propagation of the soul*. According to this theory, the souls of children, as well as their bodies, are propagated from their parents. These two suppositions may be made:—Either the souls of children exist in their parents as *real beings*, (*entia*),—like the seed in plants, and so have been propagated from Adam through successive generations, which is the opinion of Leibnitz, in his "*Theodicæ*," p. i. s. 91,—or they exist in their parents merely *potentially*, and come from them *per propaginem*, or *traducem*. Hence those who hold this opinion are called *Traduciani*. This opinion agrees with what Epicurus says of human seed, that it is "*σώματος τὸ καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπόσπασμα*." This hypothesis formerly prevailed in the ancient *western* church. According to Hieronymus, both Tertullian and Apollinaris were advocates of this opinion, and even "*maxima pars Occidentalium*." Vide Epist. ad Marcellin. Tertullian entered very minutely into the discussion of this subject in his work

"De anima," c. 25, seq., where he often uses the word *tradux*; but he is very obscure in what he has said. This is the hypothesis to which the opponents of the Pelagians have been most generally inclined, (vide No. 2,) though many who were rigorously orthodox would have nothing definitely settled upon this subject. Even Augustine, who in some passages favoured the *Creatiani*, affirmed in his book "*De origine animæ*," *nullum (sententiam) temere affirmare oportebit*. Since the reformation this theory has been more approved than any other, not only by philosophers and naturalists, but also by the Lutheran church. Luther himself appeared much inclined towards it, although he did not declare himself distinctly in its favour. But in the "*Formula Concordiæ*" it was distinctly taught that the soul, as well as the body, was propagated by parents in ordinary generation. The reason why this theory is so much preferred by theologians is, that it affords the easiest solution of the doctrine of native depravity. If in the souls of our first progenitors the souls of all their posterity existed potentially, and the souls of the former were polluted and sinful, those of the latter must be so too. This hypothesis is not, however, free from objections; and it is very difficult to reconcile it with some philosophical opinions which are universally received. We cannot, for example, easily conceive how generation and propagation can take place without *extension*; but we cannot predicate extension of the soul without making it a material substance. Tertullian and other of the fathers affirm, indeed, that the soul of man, and that *spirit* in general, is not perfectly pure and simple, but of a refined material nature, of which, consequently, *extension* may be predicated. Vide s. 19, ad finem, and s. 51, I. ad finem. And with these opinions the theory of the propagation of the soul agrees perfectly well, certainly far better, than with the opinions which we entertain respecting the nature of spirit; although even with these opinions we cannot be sure that a spiritual generation and propagation is impossible; for we do not understand the true nature of spirit, and cannot therefore determine with certainty what is or is not possible respecting it. There are some psychological phenomena which seem to favour the theory now under consideration; and hence it has always been the favourite theory of psychologists and physicians. The natural disposition of children not unfrequently resembles that of their parents; and the mental excellences and imperfections of parents are inherited nearly as often by their children as any bodily attributes. Again; the powers of the soul, like those of the body, are at first weak, and attain their full development and perfection only by slow degrees. Many more phenomena of the same sort might

be mentioned. But after all that may be said, we must remain in uncertainty with regard to the origin of the human soul. Important objections can be urged against these arguments, and any others that might be offered. And if the metaphysical theory of the entire simplicity of the human soul be admitted, the whole subject remains involved in total darkness.

ARTICLE VII.

OF THE DOCTRINE RESPECTING ANGELS.

SECTION LVIII.

OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING ANGELS, AND SOME INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL REMARKS.

I. The Importance of this Doctrine.

1. Its *practical* importance. By one class of theologians the practical importance of this doctrine has been very much exaggerated; while others, who are mostly modern writers, have denied it all practical utility, and have gone so far as to insist that it should be entirely omitted in common religious instruction. To these views we can by no means assent, if we make the Bible the source of our knowledge and the foundation of our belief in religious truth. Nor should we allow ourselves to entertain exaggerated views of this subject, the tendency of which must be injurious. In the manner in which this doctrine is now generally held among Christians, we see the effect of the levity and irreverence with which the doctrines of the Bible have often been treated in late years by theological writers. The contempt with which the belief in angels is often spoken of among common Christians is not to be wondered at, when we consider how it has been treated by the teachers of religion in our schools, universities, and pulpits. Those who are preparing to be teachers of religion should take warning from the evils which they see produced by the light and irreverent manner in which the doctrines of the Bible have been lately exhibited. Vide Reinhard's excellent sermon, "*Wie sich Christen bey so mannichfachen Meinungen über die Geisterwelt zu erhalten haben*," published in the collection for the year 1795.

Angels belong to that invisible world of which we, who are composed of body and spirit, can form only very obscure and imperfect notions. Their existence, and their influence on the material world and human affairs, are not within the cognizance of our senses, and can be known to us only by revelation. They are not men-

tioned by Moses in his cosmogony, (though he appears from many passages to have believed in them;) because he confines himself in that account strictly to the visible world. And so he mentions only the *breath of life* in man, although he believed beyond dispute that he possessed also a reasonable soul.

2. Its *theoretical importance*. To the theologian, the interpreter, and the student of the history of the human mind, this doctrine is of great interest and importance. For (a) angels are very frequently introduced in the sacred books of the Jews and Christians. They are represented as standing in various relations to men, and as actively employed in our affairs. To deny, therefore, the existence and agency of good and bad angels, is plainly contrary to the holy scriptures. The opinion of the Sadducees, that "there is neither angel nor spirit," (Acts, xxiii. 8,) is always rejected as false and unscriptural by the writers of the New Testament. Notwithstanding, then, the disagreeableness of the doctrine concerning angels to the taste of the age, it must be exhibited by the religious teacher, whose invariable duty it is to conform his instructions to the word of God. (b) Many texts of the Bible which relate to this doctrine, by being misunderstood, have led the great multitude into opinions respecting the power and agency of angels, which are inconsistent with the character of God, and of an immoral tendency, by enabling men to shift the guilt of their actions from themselves to others. And these mistaken and hurtful opinions have been fostered by the incautious and indefinite manner in which the teachers of religion have sometimes spoken.

3. Some important doctrines are exhibited in the Bible as standing in close connexion with the doctrines respecting angels; and for this reason, if for no other, an accurate knowledge of it, and of the manner in which it is taught in the scriptures, is indispensable. The doctrine respecting sin, and the origin of it; the temptation of our first parents; the providence of God; the state of men hereafter, when they will be brought into still closer connexion with spirits; these and other subjects are nearly related to the doctrine under consideration.

4. A critical investigation of this subject, in which the declarations of the holy scriptures should be made the chief object of attention, would tend to free men from many superstitions which are in the highest degree injurious. In this view, this doctrine deserves the special attention of the teacher of religion. For the mistakes which have prevailed with regard to the agency of angels, and especially of bad angels, have been a most fruitful source of superstitions destructive of the happiness, virtue, and piety of mankind. To correct these supersti-

tious mistakes, and at the same time to teach with wisdom and judgment what we are taught in the Bible with regard to the agency of angels, is the duty of the Christian minister.

II. *Introductory Historical Remarks.*

The idea that there are certain spirits intermediate between God and the human soul, and employed as the instruments of Divine Providence, is very widely diffused among men, and has often attracted the attention and elicited the inquiries even of philosophers. The opinions of the Hebrews upon this subject are the principal object of our present attention; still, as the opinions both of Jews and Christians may be illustrated by those of other nations, we shall bestow some attention upon the latter. From the writings of Moses we are justified in concluding that the early ancestors of the Israelites—the patriarchs, received by revelation some more full and particular knowledge respecting angels, which they transmitted to their descendants. But the conceptions which they formed on this subject—the images under which they represented angels to their own minds, as well as the *expressions* which they employed to designate their ideas—were influenced by the circumstance of time and place in which they found themselves, and by their whole external condition. To such circumstances the providence of God evermore conforms. God treats and governs men *more humano*, and adapts the revelations which he makes to their comprehension and mode of thinking. Hence the variety in the manner in which the divine revelations are made. To illustrate the *terms* employed in the Bible on this subject, and some of the figurative representations which it uses, is the object of the following remarks.

Jehovah was worshipped by the ancestors of the Israelites as a household god. They naturally conceived of him at that early age as resembling themselves. Vide s. 18. Whenever he acted, he conformed to the manner in which men act. He was not visibly present, but he knew all things, interested himself in the affairs of men, and employed himself actively among them. In pursuance of his purposes he also employed his *servants*, who according to the analogy above stated, were conceived of as household servants, belonging to the father of a family, and engaged in the execution of his commands. They frequently acted in his name, as his ambassadors, and had committed to them the oversight, care, and guardianship of men. This notion of them is discerned in all the ancient names by which they were called—viz., מַלְאָךְ יְהוָה, (messenger, ambassador,) מַשְׁרָףֵי יְהוָה, Ps. ciii. 20, 21; Ps. civ. 4. They are commonly *invisible*, as God is; although, like him, when occasion requires, they can appear to men. Hence they

were regarded as *spirits*, though not at that early period, in the strict and purely metaphysical sense of this term. Vide s. 19, II.

Such conceptions as these respecting spiritual agents being very familiar and deeply interesting to those at that age, would very naturally occur to them in their dreams. Now dreams were regarded by the whole ancient world as of divine origin, and as the vehicles of the divine communications to men. By seeing angels in their dreams, the belief of men in their existence was therefore still more strengthened. So in Homer, (*Iliad*, xxiii. 103, seq.,) Achilles was first convinced of the real existence of the souls of the departed in the under world by the apparition of the spirit of his friend Patroclus in a dream. And it was perhaps in compliance with the prevailing belief that dreams were sent by God to instruct mankind, that he actually made use of them as one vehicle of his revelations to Abraham, Jacob, and the other patriarchs. Vide Gen. xxviii. 12, &c.

When the notion of angels had once become definite, and the belief of their existence confirmed, their agency in human affairs was very naturally and easily determined. Everything which took place in such a way that the relation between cause and effect was not seen—everything which could not be assigned to a natural cause, was ascribed to the immediate agency of God, and of these his invisible servants. When God afforded assistance, especially in an unusual, unexpected, and unlooked-for manner, he was supposed to do it through the instrumentality of angels; and in general, when anything took place under the divine agency or permission, the mediate causes of which were concealed, angels were regarded as the agents. In short, they were regarded as spirits engaged in the service of God, and employed as the instruments of his providence. And this is an opinion which the sacred writers do not merely record as having been held by others, and which they leave to depend upon its own merits, but which they themselves adopt as their own, and sanction with their own authority. Vide Gen. xvi. 7—12; 2 Kings, xix. 35 (the destruction in the Assyrian camp); Psalm xxxiv. 7; xci. 11, 12; Luke, xvi. 22; i. 13, 28; Heb. i. 14.

But various objects in the material world, and even inanimate things, were also sometimes called the *angels of God*, because they were employed by him in the execution of his purposes. This appellation will appear more natural, if we consider that inanimate things, in which there appeared to be motion and a kind of self-actuating power, were regarded by the ancient world as really possessing life and animation. Thus perhaps we may account for it that the appellation *angel* is so often figuratively applied to things of the material world by the Hebrews,

especially in their poetic writings. Vide Ps. lxxviii. 49; civ. 4 (wind and lightning), coll. Ps. cxlviii. 8, (cf. Morus, p. 89, Not. ad. s. 6;) 1 Chronicles, xxi. 14—16; Acts, xii. 23.

The dwelling-place or principal residence of the angels was always represented as with God *in heaven*, the abode of the blessed. Hence in the scriptural division of the creatures of God into those in heaven and those on earth, angels are always enumerated with the stars, as belonging to the former class. So Ps. cxlviii. 1—6, coll. ver. 7—13.

2. When the Hebrews became acquainted with more powerful rulers than the heads of their families, and began to abandon their early patriarchal mode of life, they looked upon God in a different manner from what they had done before, and thought of him under the image of a mighty oriental monarch, and compared his dwelling and his providence with the palace, court, and government of a powerful earthly ruler. The terms which they now used, and the figures which they employed, were all borrowed from this comparison. It is natural for men to compare God with the most elevated and powerful beings whom they see on the earth, and to pay to him those external services of reverence and homage which are paid to royal personages. Hence the name *אלהים*, and other royal predicates, were now given to God. He was represented as the universal Lord and Judge, seated upon a throne, surrounded by hosts of angels and servants, ready to execute his commands, and standing before him in different offices, divisions, and ranks, distinguished among themselves, like other beings, in dignity and employment. This conception of the angels as standing in different ranks and offices is at the foundation of many of the figurative representations in the Bible; which representations, however, though figurative, are intended to teach the truth that there are differences of rank and dignity among the angels, and that some have nearer access to God than others. Vide 1 Kings, xxii. 19; Isa. vi. 2; Dan. vii. 10; Luke, i. 19; Matt. xviii. 10. The same alteration took place in the external rites of divine service, which now became more complex and magnificent; and doubtless much of the increased splendour of the Jewish ritual may be traced to the influence of this comparison of God with an earthly king. In the matter of external service, God conformed, as far as he could do so without injury to the truth, to their conceptions and feelings. An earthly prince bears some resemblance to God, and the servants of Divine Providence to the servants and agents of a prince. A useful work on this subject is Paulsen's "*Regierung der Morgenländer*;" Altona, 1755, 4to.

3. The servants of princes are accustomed to

give account to their superiors of the state of the provinces over which they have charge, and of the good or ill conduct of those placed under their government, and are then employed by their superiors, in return, to dispense rewards and punishments. Now from the resemblance above noticed between a king and his servants and God and his angels, whatever was said in respect to the former was very naturally transferred to the latter. And so God is described as sending forth his messengers, bearing good or evil, prosperity or adversity, reward or punishment, to men, according to their deserts. Vide Ps. lxxviii. 49. Hence we may explain the fact that sickness and other calamities inflicted by God are ascribed in the scriptures to the angels, through whom, as his ministers, he inflicts them. Vide Ps. lxxviii. 49; xxxiv. 8; 2 Kings, vi. 16, 17. The angel of God is represented as the author of the pestilence in David's time; 2 Sam. xxiv. 16; coll. Exod. xii. 13, 23.

It should be remarked here that in what is now extant of the writings of the Hebrews before the Babylonian captivity, the title *evil angels* does not properly denote beings who are *morally bad* in their own nature; but, on the contrary, spirits whose nature is good, and who on this very account are employed by God, and who, in whatever they perform, act under his will and direction. The reason of this title is to be found, therefore, not in themselves, but in the nature of the work in which they are employed; and the very same angel is called evil or good, according as he has it in commisoion to dispense prosperity or adversity, rewards or punishments. So in Homer, when the deity inflicts misfortune, he is called *κακὸς δαίμων*, Odys. x. 64, coll. Il. xi. 61, xx. 87. Some have, indeed, attempted to shew that the Satan mentioned in Job, i. and ii., was an evil spirit in his own nature; but this is uncertain. He is not represented as being himself wicked and opposed to the designs of God, but rather as a complainant or accuser. The whole representation contained in these chapters seems to be taken from a human court and transferred to heaven. Vide Michaelis, in loc.

It is not until the time of the exile, or shortly after it, that we find distinct traces of the doctrine that there are angels who were once good, but who revolted from God, and are now become wicked themselves, and the authors of evil in the world. The probability is, therefore, that this doctrine was first developed among the Jews during their residence at Chaldea and shortly afterwards. The same thing is true of many other doctrines of the Bible which were not revealed at first, but were gradually made known by means of the prophets at later periods. We cannot, however, certainly prove that this doctrine was wholly unknown to the Jews pre-

viously to the captivity. It is enough for us to know that after this time the Jewish prophets, as acknowledged messengers and ambassadors of God, themselves authorized it, and taught it in their addresses and writings; and that it is accordingly now to be received by us as a doctrine of the ancient Jewish revelation. In bringing the doctrine concerning angels to a fuller development, the following circumstances were made use of by Divine Providence.

The Persians, and perhaps also the Chaldeans, (though this is more doubtful,) held the doctrine of *dualism*, which afterwards prevailed so widely in the East. This doctrine is, that there are two coeternal and independent beings, from the one of whom all good, and from the other, all evil proceeds. Now the doctrine of the Hebrews respecting good and bad angels, though it appears at first sight to resemble this, is essentially different, and cannot therefore have been derived from it. But when the Hebrews were brought under the dominion of the Persians it became necessary, in order to prevent them from falling into the wide-spread doctrine of their masters, that they should be instructed more minutely than they had previously been, or needed to be, with regard to good and bad angels. And so the later prophets brought to light the agency of good and bad angels in many events of the early Jewish history, with which angels had never been known to have had any connexion. The *fall of man*—e. g., had not been ascribed by Moses to the agency of an evil spirit; but this event was afterwards ascribed to the influence of Satan, and of this Christ himself approves in John, viii. Again; the numbering of the people by David is described in 2 Sam. xxiv. 1, as a crime to which he was given up by God, in anger against him; but this same thing is afterwards ascribed in 1 Chron. xxi. 1, to the direct influence of Satan. In the same way many events were afterwards ascribed to *good* angels, whose agency in them had not before been known. Thus the giving of the law was not ascribed by Moses to the ministry of angels; and this fact is first intimated in Psalm lxviii. 17, and afterwards more clearly taught in the New Testament.

Some periods of Jewish history were more remarkable than others for the appearance and agency of angels. The patriarchal age is described in the books written before the captivity as most distinguished for the visible appearance of angels among men, both with and without dreams and visions. During the age of Moses and Joshua, although angels are mentioned, they do not seem to have appeared. The communications of God to men were at that time made mostly through the oracles of the prophets. Angels again appear during the period of the Judges. But after the time of Samuel

they do not again appear in the history of the Jews before the Babylonian exile; at which time, and shortly afterwards, they are once more introduced. Shortly before the birth of John the Baptist, angels were again very frequently seen, and many communications were made through their instrumentality. But the age of Christ and the apostles is distinguished above all others for the frequent appearance and interposition of angels, and especially for the agency of evil spirits upon the minds and bodies of men. In view of the whole we may say, with regard to the appearance of angels, what Paul said, Heb. i. 1, with regard to revelations in general, that they were *πολυμερῶς καὶ πολλοτρόπως*.

4. Other nations, ancient and modern, have entertained opinions respecting some intermediate spirits, and their influence on the world and on man, somewhat resembling those of the Israelites, though not necessarily derived from them. Such were the opinions of the Egyptians, according to the testimony of Diodorus Siculus, and also of the Greeks. The latter, however, do not appear in the *early* stages of their history to have had the idea of intermediate spirits or angels. The *δαίμονες* of Homer are only *θεοί* under a different name, though, indeed, the offices assigned to them and to many of the gods by the Greeks are not more elevated than those assigned by the Hebrews and other nations to their angels or intermediate spirits. The Grecian *philosophers*, however, for the most part, believed that besides God and the human soul, and intermediate between them, there were other spiritual existences. They proceeded on the supposition, confirmed by so many experiments and observations, that there is in nature a general connexion or chain (*σειρά*), by which all creatures are most intimately united together; that each class of beings borders upon and runs into others; so that there is no break in the descending scale from the highest to the lowest. When, therefore, they considered the immense interval between God and their own souls, they naturally concluded that it must be occupied by intermediate beings, subordinate to God, but superior to man; and that these beings must themselves exist in various degrees of perfection. Such appear to have been the opinions of Pythagoras. According to the "*Carmina Aurea*," and Diogenes Laert. viii. segm. 23, he believed that besides the Supreme Being there were four orders of intelligences—viz., *gods, demons, heroes, and men*. To the first three he ascribed about the same offices as were ascribed by the Hebrews to their angels; so that his theory really seems somewhat to resemble the Biblical doctrine. Considerably different from these are the views of Plato. Some have indeed thought that they could see in the Phædrus of Plato, in

his book "*De legibus*," and in some other writings of his, the traces of a distinction between good and bad demons. But this distinction, as Ficinus justly remarks, was first made by the followers of Plato, and especially by the Jews and Christians, who philosophized according to the principles of the new Platonic school, and was then ascribed by them to their great master. The learned Jews of the first and second centuries of the Christian era, being conversant with the Grecian, and especially with the Platonic philosophy, adopted the doctrines of these different schools, and connected them with the doctrines of the Jewish religion; and many Christian teachers proceeded in the same way, and connected the principles of the Platonic school, with regard to the doctrine of angels among others, with what they were taught from the Bible, and indeed endeavoured to interpret the Bible in accordance with these Platonic principles. Aristotle likewise admitted certain intelligences as intermediate beings between God and men, and his theory on this subject was adopted by the schoolmen. The stoics, too, allowed of some intermediate spirits. Epicurus, on the contrary, denied the existence of angels altogether; and in this he was consistent with himself, since he denied the providence of God, whose instruments these intermediate beings were supposed to be by other philosophers. Among the Jews, the Sadducees denied the existence of angels. Vide Acts, xxiii. 8. They seem to have regarded the passages of the Old Testament in which angels are spoken of as figurative, and the whole account of them as mythological. [The existence of angels has been wholly denied in modern times by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Edelmänn.]

Note.—We have no great abundance of useful works on the general history of the doctrine of angels. Most of them take too confined and narrow a view of the subject. They merely record the opinions of Jews and Christians, without shewing in what manner these opinions were developed and modified. Among these works are the following: Dr. Joach. Oporin, *Erläuterte Lehre von den Engeln*; Hamburg, 1735, 8vo. Jac. Ode, *De Angelis, Trajecti ad Rhenum*, 1739, 4to, (a book in which everything relative to this subject is brought together, but without judgment or discrimination.) Jo. Fr. Cotta, *Diss. ii. historiam succinctam doctrinæ de angelis exhibentes*; Tubingæ, 1765—67, 4to. Also, Petavius, *Theol. Dogm. tom. iii.*, and Cudworth, *Syst. Intellectuale, c. 5*, with the notes of Mosheim. There are some treatises of very unequal value in Eichhorn's "*Bibliothek der bib. Lit.*" and in Henke's "*Magazin für Exeg. Kirchengesch. u. s. w.*" The treatise of Ewald, entitled "*Die Bibellehre von guten und bösen Engeln*," published in his "*Christlichen*

Monatschrift," for the year 1800, s. 326, f. and 395, f., deserves to be recommended to the perusal of the Christian teacher.

SECTION LIX.

OF THE APPELLATIONS OF ANGELS; THEIR NATURE; PROOFS OF THEIR EXISTENCE; THEIR CREATION AND ORIGINAL STATE; AND THE CLASSES INTO WHICH THEY ARE DIVIDED.

I. Appellations of Angels.

THE most common appellation given them is, מַלְאָכִים. The correspondent term in Hellenistic Greek is ἄγγελος, messenger, servant, envoy, ambassador. This name is sometimes given to men who are engaged in any offices in the employ of others. *Est nomen MUNERIS, non naturæ*, as is justly remarked by Morus, p. 86. Vide Num. xx. 14, 16; Josh. vi. 17; James, ii. 25. Hence ἄγγελοι ἐκκληρίας, in the Apocalypse, and ἄφθνη ἄγγέλους, (the disciples of Christ, the apostles,) in 1 Tim. iii. 16. The analogy upon which these names are founded has already been exhibited, s. 58, II. 1.

Another name given to angels, besides these and others which are derived from their office and employment, is, בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים, children of God; Job, xxxviii. 7, "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth—when the morning stars sang together, and the sons of God shouted for joy?" Here, indeed, it may be objected, that sons of God may be a poetic expression synonymous with morning stars, with which it is parallel in the construction. But no such objection lies against the passage, Job, i. 6, where a solemn assembly of the sons of God is described. And since even earthly kings were sometimes called sons of God, there can be no doubt that the Hebrew idiom would permit the application of this name to angels, the inhabitants of heaven. Hence they were called by the Jews familia Dei celestis. Cf. Ephes. iii. 15, and Heb. xii. 22, 23, where the souls of the pious dead are included in this heavenly family.

Still another title, which, in the opinion of many, is given to angels, is מְרִצִּים. That this title may be given them is certain; since it is given even to rulers, judges, and all those who act as the viceregerents of God upon the earth. But the argument to prove that this title is actually given to angels is mostly founded on the fact that the LXX. render the word מְרִצִּים, by ἄγγελοι, in some texts of the Old Testament, where, however, the context does not make this rendering absolutely necessary. The texts cited are Ps. viii. 6, and xcvii. 7, in both of which the original מְרִצִּים is rendered by the LXX. ἄγγελοι—a rendering which is approved and retained by Paul, Heb. i. 6, and ii. 7. I am at present inclined to believe that even the original writer

intended to denote angels by this title in both places, and especially in Psalm viii.

II. The Nature of Angels.

The only conception which we form of angels is, that they are spirits of a higher nature and nobler endowments than men possess. They are described by Morus (p. 94, s. 14) as spiritus deo inferiores, hominibus superiores. In making our estimate of them, we must compare them with the human soul as the measure. The human soul possesses understanding and free will, or, a rational and moral nature. Hence we conclude, *vid eminentiæ*, that other spirits—angels and God himself—must possess the same; angels, in a far higher degree than men, and God, in the highest possible perfection. With respect to the nature of angels, we are informed in the Bible (a) that they far excel us in powers and perfections, Matt. xxii. 30, seq.; 2 Pet. ii. 11. (b) They are expressly called spirits (πνεύματα;) Heb. i. 14, πνεύματα λειτουργικά. And the attributes which belong to spirits—understanding and will, are frequently ascribed to them—e. g., Luke, xv. 10; James, ii. 19.

Note.—The question, whether angels have a body, (more refined, indeed, than the human body,) is left undecided in the Bible. And the texts by which it has been supposed to be answered (Ps. civ. 4, and others) have no relation to this question. Still it is not improbable, from the prevailing opinions of the ancient world, that the sacred writers believed that angels sometimes assumed a body in which they became visible to men. Vide Morus, p. 88, n. 2, supra. The arguments *à priori* which are frequently adduced in behalf of this opinion are unsatisfactory. Thus it is said, that as spirits angels could not act upon the material world without assuming a body. But if God, as a Spirit, may act on matter without a body, why may not other spirits do the same? We cannot in any case determine, *à priori*, what can or cannot be done by spiritual beings. This question is therefore generally dismissed by modern theologians with the remark, that the body of angels, if they have one, must be very unlike the human body.

The Christian fathers of the Platonic school ascribed to all spirits, the supreme God alone excepted, a subtle body, so subtle as to be invisible to us, and imperceptible by any of our senses. So Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and Augustine. They appear to have entertained about the same notion of the bodies of angels as the Greeks had of the bodies of their gods. Vide Homer, Il. v. 339—342. Justin the Martyr, (Dial. cum Tryph. Jud. c. 57,) and some others, believed that angels partook of heavenly nourishment, as the gods of the Greeks partook of nectar and ambrosia; that, like them, they

could at choice become visible or invisible to men, &c. The latter opinion is quite ancient, as appears from the account of Balaam in Num. xxii. 22—34, and from the representation of Homer, in the *Odys.* xvi. 160, seq., where Minerva is visible to Ulysses, and not to Telemachus—

Οὐ γάρ πω πάντεσσι θεοὶ φαίνονται ἑναργεῖς.

The ass, however, in the one case, and the dogs in the other, perceived the apparition, and were frightened. So again in the *Iliad*, i. 198, Achilles beheld Minerva, who stood before him, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐτις ὄρατο.

At the second Nicene Council, in the year 787, it was established as a doctrine of the catholic church, that angels have a thin body of fire or air. Afterwards, however, Peter of Lombardy, (*Sent.* l. ii. dist. 8,) and many other schoolmen, maintained the opposite opinion, and held that angels had no body of their own, (*corpus proprium*,) but could assume one in order to become visible. So Gassendus represents that they assume *corpora extraordinaria*, when they design to act upon the material world. This opinion of the schoolmen respecting angels was founded upon the philosophy of their great master, Aristotle, who makes his intelligences entirely *incorporeal*. Vide s. 58, ad finem.

III. *Proofs of the Existence of Angels.*

1. Some theologians and philosophers have undertaken to prove the existence of angels by arguments *à priori*. Their most plausible argument is that derived from the unbroken gradation and chain in which all beings are seen to exist—an argument which was employed by many even of the ancient heathen philosophers. Vide s. 58, II. 4. But although the *possibility* of the existence of angels cannot be disproved by any valid arguments *à priori*, so neither can the *reality* of their existence be proved satisfactorily by arguments of this nature. All that such arguments can do is, to render *probable* that which must depend for proof on different evidence; but to deny the existence of angels on the ground of arguments *à priori*, is extremely absurd. Cf. Morus, p. 86, s. 3. These proofs are stated, after the method of Wolf, by Reinbeck, in his “*Betrachtungen über die Augs. Conf.*” th. i. s. 298; and also by Ewald, in a treatise on this subject.

2. The sacred writers affirmed the existence of angels so clearly that it is hardly credible that any one should seriously doubt their opinions on this subject. He might as well doubt whether Homer, who speaks of the gods on every page, really believed in them. Jesus and the apostles rejected the doctrine of the Sadducees, that there are no angels, as a gross error,

Acts, xxiii. 8. The Pharisees believed in the existence of angels, and contributed by their influence to render this doctrine almost universally prevalent among the Jews. In this particular, Jesus and the apostles agreed fully with the Pharisees, as appears from innumerable texts in the New Testament. In Matt. xxii. 30, Christ expressly and designedly professes his belief in the existence of angels, in the presence of the Sadducees; also in Matt. viii. 28—34. Paul, too, as is very clear from his writings, believed in the real existence of angels, and retained and sanctioned, as a Christian and an apostle, many opinions on this subject which he had learned in the schools of the Pharisees. Thus, for example, both he and Stephen (Acts, vii. 53) held, in common with the Pharisees, that the Mosaic law was given through the ministry of angels, Gal. iii. 19; Heb. ii. 2. And he labours through the whole of the first two chapters of the epistle to the Hebrews to prove that Jesus Christ was superior to the angels, and a messenger of God of a more exalted character than they. His meaning cannot be, as some have strangely supposed, that Christ was superior to beings whom he supposed to exist merely in the fancy of the Jews. He has so interwoven the theory of the Pharisees with his own instructions on this subject, as plainly to shew that while he did not countenance those fabulous representations, with which he must certainly have been acquainted, in their schools, he yet regarded their doctrine as essentially true.

IV. *The Creation of Angels; their Perfections, and Number.*

1. The Bible teaches us nothing definitely respecting the origin of angels. But when it represents *all* things as coming from God, it must clearly be understood to imply that angels also derive their existence from him. Paul says expressly, Col. i. 16, “God made all things, visible and invisible.” Their creation is not, indeed, mentioned by Moses in his account of the creation. And as he undertakes to describe the creation of only the *visible* world, their creation did not come within the compass of his plan. Vide s. 49.

The question has been asked, *On which day of the creation were the angels made?* and at least an historical view of the opinions entertained on this subject must here be exhibited. (a) Some have held, that the angels were created before the visible world, and that this is the reason why Moses does not mention them. Of this opinion were Origen, Chrysostom, Hieronymus, John of Damascus, and others, among the ancients; and among the moderns, Heilmann, Michaelis, and others. (b) Others held that angels were created after man, because the

Creator proceeded in his work from the lower to the higher; and so, as his last upon the earth, created man. So Gennadius, in the fifth century. But this opinion was opposed by Augustine. It has been advocated in modern times by Schubert of Helmstädt. (c) Others still maintain that angels were created on the first of the six days, when, as they suppose, the human soul and other simple and incorporeal beings were made, and were stationed as spectators, or employed as assistants, of the remaining work. So Theodoret of Mopsvestia, Augustine, Peter of Lombardy, and others; and in modern times, Calovius, who appealed to Job, xxxviii. 7, (vide No. I.) Seiler, and others. Some hold that they were created on the fourth day, because the sun, moon, and stars were then created, in connexion with which angelic spirits are always enumerated.

2. The *perfections* with which angels were endued can be ascertained only from the analogy of those of the human soul. Vide No II. and Morus, p. 88, s. 9. Their *intellectual powers* must be greater than our own; they must possess more strength of thought and clearness of conception. Their *moral powers*, the perfections of their will, must also be greater than ours. For them, therefore, to persevere in holiness, must accordingly be easier than for men; and hence the guilt incurred by them in their fall is represented as far greater than that incurred by men in their apostasy. We are unable, however, to determine the exact measure of angelic powers and excellences. From the fact that men have a state of probation (*status gratiæ*) allowed them, in which their virtue may be exercised and confirmed, and from which they pass to a state of perfection, enjoyment, and reward, (*status gloriæ*), we conclude, that the case is the same with regard to angels. The New Testament says nothing expressly respecting the perfections of angels, except that they possess greater strength and power than men; 2 Pet. ii. 11, *ισχυὶ καὶ δυνάμει μέζονες*. Hence the phrase *ἄγγελοι δυνάμειως*, 2 Thess. i. 7. Hence also the word *ἄγγελος* is used adjectively, like *Θεός*, to denote the excellence of a thing; 2 Sam. xiv. 17, 20, *the wisdom of angels*; Ps. lxxviii. 25, *the food of angels*; Acts, vi. 15, *the face of angels*.

3. The *number* of the angels is by some represented as very great; and they justify this representation by arguments *à priori*. God has made, they say, a great number of creatures of all the different kinds, even in the material world; and it is therefore just to suppose that in the more exalted sphere of spirit the creatures of his power are still more numerous. And, indeed, the Bible always describes God as surrounded by a great multitude of heavenly servants. Vide Dan. vii. 10; Ps. lxxviii. 17; Jude,

ver. 14; Matt. xxvi. 53. Cf. s. 58, and Morus, p. 89, note.

V. Division of Angels.

Angels are divided into *good* and *evil* in reference to their moral condition. There is no distinct mention of *apostate* angels in the Bible before the Babylonian captivity; though from this silence it does not follow that the idea of them was wholly unknown to the ancient Hebrews. Vide s. 58, II. 3. This idea, however, even if it had before existed, was more distinctly revealed and developed at the time of the exile, and afterwards. It was sanctioned by Christ and the apostles, and constituted a part of their faith, as really as it did of the faith of the Jews who were contemporary with them. The name, *evil* or *bad angels*, was taken from Ps. lxxviii. 49, the only passage in which it occurs in the Bible; though even in this passage it does not denote disobedient angels, evil in a *moral* respect; for in this sense the phrase *evil angels* is never used in the Bible; nor, on the contrary, is the phrase *good angels* ever used to denote those who are *morally* good, though indeed they are sometimes called *holy* in this sense. But although this term is not derived from the sacred writers, but from the schoolmen, it should unquestionably be retained, since the meaning it conveys is wholly accordant with the doctrine of the Bible. The term *angel* is applied in the Bible to evil spirits only in reference to their former state, when they were still the servants of God. Vide 2 Pet. ii. 4. Since they have apostatized, they can no more, strictly speaking, be denominated his *angels*—i. e., *servants, messengers*. On the contrary, they are called in the Bible, *ἄγγελοι τοῦ διαβόλου*, or *τοῦ Σατανᾶ*, Matt. xxv. 41, Rev. xii. 9. The phrase, *bad* or *unclean spirits* (not *angels*), occurs frequently in the New Testament, especially in the writings of Luke. Paul, too, uses the phrase *πνευματικὰ τῆς πορνείας*, Eph. vi. 12. Whenever the term *οἱ ἄγγελοι* occurs in the New Testament without qualification, *good* spirits or *holy* angels are always intended; as Matt. iv. 11, where it is opposed to *διάβολος*. We proceed now to consider these two classes more particularly.

CHAPTER I.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY ANGELS.

SECTION LX.

OF THE PRESENT STATE AND EMPLOYMENT OF HOLY ANGELS.

I. Their Present State.

1. ANGELS are properly regarded, according to the general remarks, s. 59, IV. 2, as beings possessing great *intellectual excellence*—intelli-

gence, knowledge, and experience. Hence, whatever is great and excellent is in the Bible compared with them; great wisdom is called the wisdom of angels; excellent food, the food of angels; beautiful appearance, the appearance of angels. Their advice is accordingly said to be asked for by God; they are summoned into council before him, and compose, as it were, his senate or divan. Cf. Job. i. and ii. This does not imply that God needed their council; but rather, that he wished to instruct and employ them.

We should beware, however, of exaggerated conceptions of their knowledge, and should never ascribe to them anything like divine intelligence and wisdom. We should not suppose, for example, that they are acquainted with the thoughts of men, or that they have a knowledge which borders on omniscience. The Bible, while it describes their great superiority over us, still represents their knowledge as very limited and defective in comparison with the knowledge of God, and as capable of great increase. In Job. iv. 18, God is said to charge his angels with folly. In Mark. xiii. 32, the angels of God are said not to know the hour of the destruction of Jerusalem. 1 Pet. i. 12, εἰς ὃ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄγγελοι παρακύβαι.

2. They are also described as possessing great *moral perfection*, which is called their *holiness*. Thus they are sometimes called ἄγιοι, in opposition to ἀκάθαρτοι, also ἐκλεκτοί, *Deo probati, elect*, 1 Tim. v. 21. Hence they take their greatest pleasure in witnessing and promoting integrity and virtue. In Luke. xv. 10, they are said to rejoice over the repentance of sinners. It is in general true, that the more advanced in holiness one is himself, the more pleasure he takes in that of others, the more interested is he in the diffusion of morality and piety, and the more distressed at the prevalence of vice. And if this is the case with man, how much more with spirits of a higher order! We see here, why the plan of redemption engages the interest of the whole spiritual world, and fills angels with delight and wonder when they contemplate it, as is represented in the New Testament; 1 Pet. i. xii.; Eph. iii. 10. The angels are described as very actively engaged before and at the birth of Christ, Luke. i. They sung praises to God on this occasion, and announced his advent to men, Luke. ii. With equal activity and interest they attended him during his life, ministered to his wants, witnessed his passion and resurrection, and were interested in whatever concerned him. The union of so many natural and moral excellences in the angels is the reason why great *wisdom* is also ascribed to them.

3. From what has now been said, we may determine what, in a general view, is their condition. It is always described as one of the

greatest happiness; for of this, their holiness, which is the essential condition of happiness in moral beings, renders them eminently susceptible. Vide s. 51, II. They are said in the Bible to stand in the most intimate connexion with God, and to behold his countenance continually. Matt. xviii. 10. When the sacred writers would describe the blessedness of which we shall hereafter be partakers, they do it by saying, that we shall then be like the angels of God; ἰσάγγελοι, Luke. xx. 36. It is sometimes said, that the angels are now so confirmed in goodness that they *cannot* sin. We cannot suppose, however, that there is any absolute impossibility of their sinning; for this would be inconsistent with their freedom. It is true, indeed, that they never will intentionally and deliberately commit sin, or *wish* to do so. Still to sin must be *possible* to them, and to all finite beings, in short, to all but God himself.

Note.—The schoolmen, like the Rabbins before them, proposed many questions on this subject which were wholly unanswerable; and many, too, which were extremely frivolous, which may also be justly said of the answers which they gave. Vide Morus, p. 88, n. 5. Among these questions were the following:—Whether an angel could be in more than one place at the same time? Whether more than one angel could be in the same place at the same time? Whether they spake the Hebrew language, or what language was meant by the γλῶσσαι ἁγγέλων, spoken of 1 Cor. xiii. 1?

II. The Employments of Holy Angels.

They are represented in the Bible as the servants of Divine Providence, and as chiefly employed in promoting the good of men. The text, Heb. i. 14, teaches explicitly that they are all spirits, engaged in the service of God, and employed by him for the good of those whom he will save. In Matt. xxvi. 53, we read that God could have sent more than twelve legions of angels to the service of Christ. Cf. Matt. xviii. 10; and also Ps. xxxiv. 7, and xci. 11, where it is said that they encamp about the righteous, and bear them up in their hands, both of which are proverbial phrases. These are the general representations contained in the Bible respecting the employments of angels; and beyond these the teacher of religion should not attempt to go in the instructions which he gives. There are two cautions which it may be well for him to suggest in connexion with this subject.

(a) We are unable, in any particular cases of providential protection or deliverance which may occur at the present time, to determine whether the ministration of angels has been employed, or how far their intervention has extended. It is sufficient for us to know that we are watched over and provided for by the providence

of God, and that his angels are employed in our behalf; and it is of no importance to us to be informed of the particular cases in which their agency is exerted. If we may believe that God is not confined to the established course of nature, that he may sometimes turn aside and afford us special and extraordinary assistance, protection, deliverance, and instruction, through the instrumentality of his angels, as we are clearly taught to believe in the Bible, this surely must be sufficient to comfort and encourage us during the dangers and difficulties of life, even if may not know *when* and *how* these services are performed.

(b) We are not to conclude that because extraordinary appearances and interpositions of angels are recorded in the holy scriptures as having taken place in former times, similar occurrences are to be expected at the present day. The events described in such passages as Matt. i. 24; ii. 13; Luke, i. 11, 26; ii. 9; xxii. 43; Acts, xxvii. 23; should be exhibited by the religious teacher, as real occurrences, indeed, but as peculiar to that day. This is far better than to attempt to explain away the obvious meaning of these passages, as has often been done, to the great injury of the interests of truth.

Moreover, the Bible does not teach that angels are present with men at all times and under all circumstances, and that they are conversant uninterruptedly with our affairs. On the contrary, they are generally represented as present and active only in extraordinary cases, in unexpected events, the occurrence of which cannot easily be explained without supposing their agency. Vide Isaiah, xxxvii. 36; Acts, xii. 7. Cf. s. 58, and Morus, p. 89. Hence we find them employed at the *giving of the law, the last judgment*, and other great events of this nature, as even the Jews supposed. Vide Matt. xiii. 39, 41; xvi. 27; xxv. 31; 2 Thess. i. 7. They are frequently exhibited, especially in the prophetic writings, in a symbolical and parabolical manner; and much which is there said concerning them must be understood as merely figurative representations—e. g., Isa. vi. 1, seq.; Dan. x. 13; Zac. iii. 1; Luke, xvi. 22. But at the ground of all these figurative and parabolical representations lies the truth, *that angels are actively employed for the good of men*. The source of the imagery contained in these passages has already been pointed out in s. 58. We cannot, however, leave this subject without considering more fully the opinions which have been entertained respecting two particular offices or works ascribed to angels.

1. One of these offices is that of *guardian angels*. The general notion of them is, that they are appointed to superintend particular countries and provinces of the earth, and also to watch over individual men, and administer their con-

cerns. We find no clear evidence that this doctrine was held by the Jews before the Babylonian exile; and many suppose that they adopted it for the first time in Chaldea. The origin of this opinion at that time is accounted for on the supposition that angels were compared with the viceroys who ruled over the provinces of the vast oriental kingdoms. We find, indeed, the doctrine that angels were *guardian spirits*, in a general sense, developed in the earlier books of the Old Testament; but not so clearly the opinion that each particular man and country had an angel as an appropriate and permanent guardian. The guardian spirit (שֹׁמֵר אֱלֹהִים) mentioned Job, xxxiii. 23, as promoting the virtue of man, and interceding for him when he lies desperately sick, does not seem to be one among many of the same kind, but altogether extraordinary. He is supposed by some to be a *man*. Vide Dathe and Schultens, in loc. Those, however, who are spoken of in Dan. x. 13, 20, are unquestionably guardian angels over particular countries and people. Daniel, in a vision, beholds Michael, the guardian angel of the Jews, contending with the guardian angel of the Persian empire. In whatever way this passage may be interpreted, it discloses the idea that angels were intrusted with the charge of particular countries and people. This idea was so familiar to the Seventy, and so important in their view, that they introduced it surreptitiously even into their version of the Pentateuch, and thus contributed to its wider diffusion—e. g., they rendered the passage, Deut. xxxii. 8, 9, κατὰ ἀρετὴν ἀγγέλων Θεοῦ. And תְּחִלָּתֵנוּ, תְּחִלָּתֵנוּ, Gen. vi. 2, is rendered by Philo and Josephus ἀγγέλων Θεοῦ. Cf. Gen. xi. 1, 2, 5, 9. They supposed that evil spirits reigned over heathen countries—an opinion respecting which we shall say more hereafter. The Rabbins held, that there are seventy people and as many languages, over which seventy angels preside. Vide the paraphrase of Jonathan on Gen. xi. and Deut. xxxii. This idea was the source of many other representations. Every star, element, plant, and especially every man, was now supposed to have an appropriate angel for a guardian.

We find some traces of the latter opinion—viz., that every *man* had his own guardian angel, even in the New Testament. In Acts, xii. 15, when they could not believe that it was Peter himself who appeared, they said, ὁ ἀγγελος αὐτοῦ ἐστίν. But Luke merely narrates the words of another, without assenting to the opinion expressed. Vide Wetstein, in loc. Some suppose that in Matt. xviii. 10, Christ himself utters and sanctions the opinion in question: "Their (μικρῶν) angels behold the face of my Father." But neither does this passage authorize the opinion that each particular man has his appropriate guardian angel. *Their angels may*

mean, those who guard and preserve them whenever and wherever occasion might require; according to Heb. i. 14; John, i. 51. It does not necessarily imply that there is a particular angel appointed to guard each individual man and to be his constant attendant. The word *μικροί*, which primarily signifies *children*, means also *those who have the disposition of children*, and are therefore liable to be despised and abused. Vide ver. 14 and Matt. xi. 11. The meaning of the whole passage may be thus expressed:—As we are very careful not to offend the favourites of those who stand high in favour with earthly kings, we should be still more careful not to offend the favourites of Divine Providence—the humble pious—who are intrusted to the special care of those who stand high in the favour of God, (who behold his face.)

The Jews believed, moreover, that angels administered the affairs of men before God, brought their supplications and complaints to him, &c. Many of these opinions afterwards prevailed in the Christian church, and are found in the writings of the earlier Christian teachers. Much is said respecting the care of angels over particular kingdoms of the earth by Clement of Alexandria, (Strom. b. 7,) Origen, (Contra Cels. b. 4 and 8; also b. 5, 10, 26, 30, 31; Homilia 11 in Numeros; and in Gen. homil. 9,) and Eusebius, (Demonstr. Evang. iv. 7, seq.) The latter speaks of the care of angels over seas, fruits, &c. The angel of fire is spoken of, in conformity with the opinions of the Jews, in Rev. xiv. 18; the angel of water, Rev. xvi. 5; John, v. 4. Similar passages respecting the guardian angels of particular countries and people occur in the writings of the Platonists, Jamblicus, Julian, and others. Vide the work of Ode, before cited, s. 779, ff. Much is said respecting the guardian angels of particular men, by Hermas, Pastor, b. ii., and Origen, who says, among other things, (Adv. Celsum, i. 8,) that the angels bring the prayers of men to God, according to the opinion of the Jews. So say Eusebius, Basiliius, Hieronymus, Augustine, Chrysostom, and most of the schoolmen; and among protestant theologians, Baier, Er. Schmidt, Gerhard, and others. This idea of guardian spirits was likewise widely diffused among the ancient Greeks and Romans. It is found in the writings of Hesiod, though not in Homer. It was received, and philosophically discussed by Socrates, and by Plato in various of his works. Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblicus, and Proclus, taught it in the manner peculiar to the new Platonists. It was likewise taught in a similar manner at Alexandria and the other schools of Christian philosophy, where the maxims of the new Platonists were adopted. Thus this opinion was rapidly and widely diffused.

2. The assistance of angels at the giving of

the law. They are said to have been present on this solemn occasion, and to have been employed as the instruments through whom the law was given. Moses says nothing which either proves or disproves this opinion. But we find, in Ps. lxxviii. 17, that Jehovah was on Sinai with thousands of angels. We find also in the Septuagint version of Deut. xxxiii. 2, that God appeared at the giving of the law *ὁπ μὴρίαν—ἐκ δεξιῶν αὐτοῦ ἄγγελοι μετ' αὐτοῦ*. This opinion was universally received both among Jews and Christians at the time of the apostles, and sometimes occurs in the New Testament. Heb. ii. 2, *δὲ ἄγγέλων καλῶν λόγος*, (i. e., νόμος.) Acts, vii. 53; Gal. iii. 19, *διαταγὰς δὲ ἄγγέλων*. Now, because God employed angels as his servants at the giving of the law, and published it through them, and, as the Jews supposed, governed the world, and especially the Jewish church, by them, Paul says, Heb. ii. 5, that the former world was subject to angels, but the times of the New Testament to Christ alone. The same opinion respecting the giving of the law by angels is found in Josephus, Antiq. xv. 5. The Israelites, he says, received the law *δὲ ἄγγέλων παρὰ Θεοῦ*. It is also found in the writings of the later Rabbins. Vide Wetstein on Gal. iii. 19. Cf. s. 58.

Note.—The manner in which this whole subject should be treated in practical discourse is well exhibited by Morus, p. 87, s. 3. The great principle which should be first of all inculcated is, *that Divine Providence aids those dependent on its care in various ways, and frequently in a way wholly unknown and inexplicable to us*. This should be shewn by examples. Among other means, angels are employed, as we are taught in the Bible, for the good and safety of man. And since this is so, it is alike our duty and privilege to live quietly and peacefully, with trust in that Providence which employs so many means, both of an ordinary and extraordinary nature, for the good of those who comply with the conditions. prescribed in the gospel. We need not be distressed even in view of death; but may go with a cheerful heart from this world into the next, knowing that we are attended by the angels of God, and shall be borne by them into the bosom of Abraham. Vide Luke, xvi. 22.

SECTION LXI.

OF THE CLASSES OF GOOD ANGELS; THEIR NAMES; AND THE WORSHIP RENDERED THEM.

I. *Classes of Good Angels.*

ANGELS are described as existing in a society composed of members of unequal dignity, power, and excellence; as having chiefs and

rulers, and, in short, as exhibiting all those differences of rank and order which appear in human society, and among the courtiers and ministers of earthly kings. It is hardly conceivable that a great society should exist without higher orders, and those of a lower and subordinate grade. Hence the Biblical representations that angels are divided into various classes (*ordines*), over which chiefs are placed, and to which appropriate employments are assigned.

The conception is not clearly expressed in the books written before the Babylonian captivity, (vide s. 58;) but it is developed in the books written during the exile and afterwards, especially in the writings of Daniel and Zechariah. In Zech. i. 11, an angel of the higher order, one *who stands before God*, appears in contrast with angels of an inferior class, whom he employs as his messengers and agents. Cf. iii. 7. In Dan. x. 13, the appellations מַלְאָכִים, and in xii. 1, מַלְאָכֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ, are given to Michael. The Grecian Jews rendered this appellation by the term ἀρχάγγελος, which occurs in the New Testament, Jude, ver. 9, and 1 Thess. iv. 16, where we are taught that Christ will appear to judge the world ἐν φωνῇ ἀρχαγγέλου. This term denotes, as the very analogy of language teaches, a chief of the angels, one superior to the other angels; like ἀρχιερεύς, ἀρχιστράτηγος, ἀρχισυνάγωγος. The opinion, therefore, that there are various orders of angels was not peculiar to the Jews; but was held by Christians at the time of the apostles, and sanctioned by the apostles themselves.

These distinct divisions in which angels are arranged according to their rank in the writings of the Jews of later times, were, however, either almost or wholly unknown to the Jews contemporary with the apostles; in proof of which it may be mentioned, among other things, that Philo, who has much to say respecting angels, takes no notice of any such divisions. The appellations, ἀρχαί, ἐξουσίαι, δυνάμεις, θρόνοι, κυριότητες, are indeed applied in Ephes. i. 21, Col. i. 16, and other parallel texts, as they often are in the writings of the Jews to the angels; but not to them exclusively, and with the intention of denoting their particular classes; but to them in common with all beings possessed of might and power, those *visible* as well as *invisible*, on *earth* as well as in *heaven*. The same is true of 1 Peter, iii. 22. A general division of angels into chiefs and subjects is indicated in Rev. xii. 7, ὁ Μιχαὴλ καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι αὐτοῦ, *those that belonged to his train, and were subject to him*. But these general classes were greatly subdivided by the later Jews. The fathers, too, under the influence of their Platonic ideas, went far beyond the instructions of the Bible in classifying the angels. An example of this may be seen in the

work, *De Hierarchia Cœlesti*, which appeared about the fifth century, and was falsely ascribed to Dionysius Areopagita—a work full of the most extravagant fictions and conceits. This work was in high repute with Peter of Lombardy, Thomas Aquinas, and other schoolmen, who adopted its division of the angels into nine classes.

The Cherubim (כְּרֻבִים) and Seraphim (שֶׁרָפִים) mentioned in the Old Testament have been considered by some as forming classes of angels. Vide Morus, p. 87, s. 4. But (*a*) *Cherubim* are not, properly speaking, *angels*, but originally hieroglyphical figures in the form of beasts; like the sphynx of the Egyptians, the bird-griffin, &c. They are represented as bearing God when he rides over the heavens, in order to shoot his lightnings, and hence are always mentioned when tempests are described, Psalm xcix. 1; Genesis, iii. 24. They thus came to be used as symbols of the divine majesty and power, and as such were placed over the ark of the covenant, as pillars of the throne, and engraven on the walls of the temple. They were variously composed of forms of men and beasts, (ξῶα πολύμορφα.) Vide Ezek. i. 5, seq.; Michaelis, *De Cherubis*, equis tonantibus Hebræorum, Commentar. Soc. Scient. Gottingæ, t. i. p. 157, seq. The *four beasts* (τέσσαρα ξῶα) in the Apocalypse (which in their form resemble the Cherubim) are represented indeed as endowed with speech and reason, and as serving before the throne of God; and yet as distinct from the angels. Vide Rev. iv. 6, seq.; v. 8—14; vi. 1, seq.; vii., xiv., xix. (*b*) The *Seraphim* appear only in the prophetic vision, (Isaiah, vi. 2, 6,) and there, judging from the analogy of other passages, would seem indeed to be angels who surround the throne of God; not, however, a particular class or order of angels; but in general, *the nobles and princes* of heaven; the name being derived from the Arabic شرف, *to be noble, excellent*. Cf. Job. i. and ii.

II. Names of Good Angels.

Wherever there are many of the same kind it becomes necessary to make use of appropriate names to distinguish one individual from another; and so it was with regard to the angels. Particular names are given to some of them in the Bible, by which we are able to distinguish between them, and by which also, as some Jews and Christians have supposed, they are actually denominated in heaven. We find no names given to particular angels in the books of the Old Testament written before the Babylonian exile; they occur for the first time in the books written during the captivity and afterwards; in Daniel, and the Jewish and Christian apocryphal writings. These names are, *Michael, Gabriel,*

Raphael, Uriel, Jeremiel, Sealthiel, &c. The first two only, Michael and Gabriel, are found in our canonical books. Vide Dan. viii.—xii.; Luke, i. 19, 26; Jude, ver. 9; Rev. xii. 7.

III. *Worship of Good Angels*

It is well known to be a doctrine which still belongs to the creed of the Roman, and, to some extent, of the Grecian church, that angels, and indeed the souls of the pious dead, should be worshipped and invoked. The *teachers* of these churches, however, always protest decidedly against paying *divine worship* to angels, and contend that a merely *civil* homage should be rendered them, and that they should be supplicated to intercede for us with God. This, in itself considered, is not *sinful*, as has been sometimes unjustly asserted. It is not improper for me to request even a pious man now living to intercede with God for me, any more than it is improper for one to request a favourite at court to intercede for him with the king. The practice of invoking the aid and intercession of angels proceeds on the supposition that they are intimately acquainted with the affairs of men, and hear the prayers offered up to them. But this supposition is unfounded; for angels are neither omniscient nor omnipresent. Vide s. 60, II. To invoke their aid, therefore, before we know that they will hear our prayer, is as absurd as it would be for a subject at a great distance from court, and in the retirement of his own house, to supplicate the aid and assistance of the prince or minister, believing that his request would be regarded. Hence it must appear that supplication to angels and saints is not so sinful as it is irrational. To these considerations we may add the following:—

1. The Bible furnishes us with no example of the invocation of an absent angel. On the contrary, even a present angel is represented in Rev. xix. 10; xxii. 9, as seriously displeased with John, who fell down before him, because he was his brother, and, like him, employed in the service of God, (σύνδουλος.) Again; Paul teaches (Heb. ii. 5) that the Christian dispensation is not placed under the control of angels. We are instructed by the example of Jesus and the apostles to address our prayers directly to God and to Christ, and that we do not need the intercession and mediation of other beings. Respecting the passage, Job, xxxiii. 23, seq., vide s. 60, II.

2. The propriety of this practice must likewise be rendered very suspicious by the fact, which experience has abundantly established, that wherever the invocation of saints and angels is allowed, the great mass of mankind, notwithstanding all the protestations of their teachers, do actually render them, not merely civil homage, but *divine worship*, and regard them very

much as the heathen do their gods. This has been seen ever since the worship of saints and images was introduced in the fifth and sixth centuries.

The following remarks will shew how the worship of angels came to be authorized and established in the church. It was an ancient Jewish opinion that angels were intermediate persons between God and men, that they conducted our affairs with God, and carried our desires and prayers before him. This opinion is found in the apocryphal writings, Tob. xii. 12—15; also in the book of Enoch, and is alluded to, Rev. viii. 3, 4. We do not find, however, that the Jews at the time of Christ and the apostles ever worshipped the angels or invoked their aid. Some indeed thought (and so Peirce and Michaelis) that they found an allusion to the worship of angels in Col. ii. 18, 19, where Paul warns his readers against the ταπεινοφροσύνη, and the δρησεία ἀγγέλων of some seditious persons of Jewish feelings. But ταπεινοφροσύνη and δρησεία ἀγγέλων here signify *humility and worship, like that of angels*, to which these persons pretended; like σοφία ἀγγέλων. Vide s. 59, iv. 2, ad finem. It is synonymous with ἐξελοδρησεία, ver. 23. What the Jews believed with regard to their angels, the Grecians, and especially the Platonists, believed with regard to their *demons*—viz., that they conducted the affairs of men with God, and laid our prayers and offerings before him. Hence this idea became more and more prevalent among the Grecian Jews and Christian teachers. It occurs in the writings of the fathers of the second and third centuries—e. g., in Origen, (Contra Celsum, viii. 36,) who says, in cap. 57 of the same work, that angels deserve honour and thanks from men. The Valentinians and other Gnostics *are said* by the ancients to have gone further, and to have rendered a kind of divine worship to the angels. But this was always very much disapproved by the catholic fathers, until the fifth and sixth centuries; as we see from the writings of Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus, Origen, Eusebius, Augustine, and Theodoret, and by the acts of the Council at Laodicea, about the year 360, Can. 35. But when at length the worship of images and saints came in vogue in the fifth and sixth centuries, we find that not only the great mass of the people rendered religious homage to saints and angels as to deities, but that even many Christian teachers expressed themselves in such an incautious manner as to justify this practice. Not a single respectable theologian, however, has ever directly defended it, nor is it now defended in the Romish church. The Trent Catechism contains the doctrine, *Angelos pro iis provinciis preces fundere quibus prestant;* and the Romish church teaches, that it is proper to pray to angels

for holiness, and to seek their intercession *in articulo mortis*. Vide Jo. Himmeliuss, *De Natura Veræ ac Religiosæ Invocationis, Contra Barthold.*; Nihusium, 1624. Protestant theologians—e. g., Brochmand and Baumgarten—have allowed that angels may give good counsel, awaken pious thoughts, and produce pleasurable emotions.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE FALLEN ANGELS, OR EVIL SPIRITS.

SECTION LXII.

OF THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL SPIRITS; AND THEIR APOSTASY.

In addition to the works of Ode, Cotta, and others, mentioned s. 58, note, the student should consult the following, in reference to the history of this doctrine. J. G. Mayer, *Historia Diaboli*, &c., Ed. 2; Tubinger, 1780, 8vo—a work in which the existence, condition, power, agency, &c., of evil spirits are considered, and in which the common doctrine is defended; and, on the other side, the work “*Versuch einer biblischen Dämonologie, oder Untersuchung der Lehre vom Teufel und seiner Macht*,” with a preface and appendix by Semler; Halle, 1776, 8vo; in which the agency of the devil is denied. Cf. the work of Ewald, above cited. Other works relating to some particular points in this doctrine will be noticed, s. 65. [A complete view of the literature of this doctrine is contained in Hahn, *Lehrbuch*, s. 67.]

I. *The Existence of Evil Spirits.*

It is undoubtedly true, as has been often contended, that the more savage and ignorant men are, the more slavish is their fear of such invisible beings, whether gods, angels, or of some other name, as are supposed to be evil and malignant; and also that the belief in the existence and influence of such beings commonly decreases as science and civilization advance. Some of the ancient nations believed in only *one* evil spirit, while others conceived of many such, under the government of one head. These were regarded as the authors of every description of evil, natural and moral, and to them were attributed all the diseases and calamities with which men are visited. The doctrine of the Jews respecting evil spirits, which has a general resemblance to that of other nations, though in many points it is entirely different, was not fully developed, as has been already remarked (s. 58, II. 3), until the time of the captivity.

The existence of any such evil spirits as are

exhibited in the Jewish and Christian scriptures has been either doubted or wholly denied by some philosophers in every age. The principal objections urged by them against the existence of evil spirits are the following:—

1. The idea of a spirit, by nature wise and intelligent, and yet opposed to God, seems, they think, to involve a contradiction. But if this objection were valid with regard to angels, it must also hold true with regard to men; and it would be impossible to find a man highly intelligent and sagacious, and yet wicked. [This is the principal objection upon which Schleiermacher rests his rejection of the common doctrine respecting evil angels. If Satan were acquainted with God, and knew his power, he could not hope to succeed in opposing him; with all the high intelligence ascribed to him he must see the folly and ruin of wickedness, and repent, otherwise his understanding and his will would remain in fixed opposition; whereas the functions belonging to any real existence must be harmonious. Hence the conclusion is, that the idea of Satan, as a being possessed of high intelligence and yet opposed to God, contains logical contradictions, and cannot therefore be received. But if the existence of a depraved will be not inconsistent with the highest degree of intelligence with which we are acquainted in human beings, how can we tell that it may not be consistent with a far higher, and indeed the very highest, degree of finite intelligence? Besides, in a moral apostasy, though the defection of the will must precede the error of the understanding, yet the error of the understanding is sure to follow; and the higher intelligence which angels by nature possess may have become perverted by their fall, as is the case with men.—Tr.]

2. There is no trace of a belief in the existence of evil spirits, even among the Jews, until the time of the Babylonian captivity. [But if, as has been shewn in a previous section, there was no necessity for the revelation of this doctrine before that time, and then it became necessary, the fact of its being previously unknown cannot, surely, be an argument against its truth when revealed. It is enough that it was at any time taught by inspired prophets.—Tr.]

3. Connected with the foregoing objection, and perhaps implied in it, is another, which needs to be more fully stated. It is said, that the Biblical doctrine of a Satan is derived from the system of *dualism* so prevalent in the East, and is liable to the objections to which that system is exposed. This objection is urged by Henke, Eckermann, and others of the same school. But in answer to this it may be said, that even supposing the Biblical doctrine respecting Satan to agree with oriental dualism, it does not follow that the former is untrue.

If it is taught by inspired writers, it certainly does not become less true by having been taught by Zoroaster, and believed by the Persians, any more than the doctrines of God and divine providence are to be discarded because universally believed. But there are, it must be remembered, very obvious differences between the demonology of the sacred writers and of the Eastern philosophers. According to the latter, the two principles of good and evil are co-eternal and in every respect equal; and it is from this representation that all the evils connected with oriental dualism result; and it is in this very point that it differs from the Biblical doctrine. According to this, Satan himself, and all his legions, are creatures of God, dependent upon him, and trembling before him. Thus, although possessed of vast power, they are still under the entire control of the Ruler of the universe; and so our trust in him remains unshaken.—[Tr.]

4. Belief in evil spirits is confined, it is said, to rude and uncultivated men, and disappears as science and civilization advance, and ought therefore, in these enlightened times, to be wholly discarded. But it should be remembered that learned men in enlightened periods sometimes fall into errors, as well as ignorant men in barbarous ages, and that an opinion is not true merely because believed by the one, nor false because believed by the other.

Those who deny the existence of evil spirits are called *Ademonists*. Many of these, who are hardly prepared flatly to oppose the authority of the inspired writers and to set aside their instructions, undertake the useless labour of explaining away the doctrine of the devil from the Bible, and in doing this resort to the most forced and unauthorized modes of interpretation. Vide Morus, p. 93, s. 13.

[The modes of interpretation here alluded to were practised long since by the Rationalists of the seventeenth century—the Cartesians, Spinoza, and his friends. A good specimen of the manner in which these fathers of modern Rationalism disposed of the instructions of the Bible upon the subject of evil spirits is given by Stosch, in his “Concordia rationis et fidei,” p. 8, s. 17: “Quæ de angelis et dæmonibus tam in s. scriptura quam historia humana traduntur, sunt partim somnia, partim visiones et apparitiones, partim phantasmata, partim morbi, partim figmenta et illusiones.” But the most plausible of all the systems of Ademonism is that by which Satan is made to denote, not a real existence, but some mode of moral evil. This system is well expressed by Ammon when he says, “Acquiescamus non tam in *existentia* et *factis*, quam *notione* Satanæ,” Sum. Theol. Christ. p. 105. The particular form of moral evil denoted by the word *Satan* is very various according to different authors, each of whom

modifies it to suit his own philosophical system. Thus, according to one, it is that disposition which pursues evil for its own sake, and not for any advantages with which it may be connected—*peritancia in damnum proprium vel alienum agendi, absque illecebris carnis, vel mundi, sive gloriæ vanæ*. In the school of Kant, Satan is the *IDEA* of what is absolutely displeasing in the sight of God, and so is the direct opposite of the Son of God, who, according to Kant, is the *IDEA* of what is absolutely well-pleasing with God. Thus in each different system does Satan, at the option of the framer, assume a different form, and act a different part.—[Tr.]

Our modern theologians have often chosen a middle course, and endeavoured to unite the opinions of those who totally deny the existence of demons, and of those who contend strongly for their existence and agency; but, as is usual with those who endeavour to please opposite parties, they have given satisfaction to neither. In order to prevent the appearance of rejecting the authority of the holy scriptures, they admit the existence of evil spirits, while, in order to avoid the difficulties to which the common doctrine is liable, and to conform to the prevailing notions of the day, they deny that the devil can exert any power on men, at least at the *present time*, (a very necessary limitation for them to make;) that to us, therefore, it is all the same as if he did not exist; and that when Christ and the apostles spoke of the agency of the devil, they merely accommodated themselves to the popular superstitions of the Jews, while they themselves neither believed in demoniacal influence, nor even, as some will go so far as to say, in the existence of a devil. (Of this number, the most distinguished perhaps is Wegscheider, who thus gives his views in his “Institutiones,” s. 106: “Verisimile est magistram illud divinum rectius quidem de demonologia Judæorum cogitantem, at formulis quibusdam usum symbolicis, regnum divinum regno diabolico oppositum adumbrantibus, quæ apud Judæos tunc temporis pervulgatæ erant, a discipulis suis non satis intellectum fuisse, et ipsam providentiam divinam posteritati doctrinam istam emendandam tradi voluisse.” Cf. De Wette, Bib. Dogm. s. 241.—[Tr.]

But these views are liable to very weighty objections; for,

(a) Since it was a great object with Jesus to free mankind from hurtful prejudices, and especially, during his earthly ministry, to eradicate the errors which prevailed among the Jews, we may be very certain that he would not have spared their belief in the existence and agency of the devil, if he had regarded it as false. It is said, indeed, that it was necessary for him to indulge those prejudices of the Jews which he could not at once eradicate, and that when

he spoke of the influences of Satan it was merely in condescension to those deep-rooted Jewish prejudices. But an examination of his words, in the connexion in which they stand, will convince us that this was not the case. Christ does not merely forbear to contradict this prevailing doctrine, or merely allude to it incidentally, but he frequently brings it directly forward, and expressly teaches the existence of the devil and his agency upon men. Thus, for example, in John, viii. 38, 44, he speaks of the devil, without having the least inducement on the part of his hearers for so doing, and this in the very same discourse in which he demands from them implicit faith in everything which he says, on his simple word, and in which he declares his utter abhorrence of all falsehood and deception. Vide ver. 38—47. And he frequently mentions this doctrine in his discourses, when he could have had no motive for doing so from a desire of pleasing his hearers, and siding with their prejudices. Vide Matt. xii. 22—31, 43—45; xiii. 39. Had not Christ himself believed this doctrine he would have introduced it as seldom as possible into his discourses, and would have thrown out hints here and there, by which the more discerning would have discovered that he himself entertained different opinions on the subject. It could not certainly have been through fear of any consequences injurious to himself attending the denial of this doctrine, that he was induced to indulge and authorize it; since the Sadducees had before renounced it without experiencing persecution; and since Christ was never known in other cases to give way to any false or dangerous opinions, how much soever the Pharisees and the Jewish people might have been attached to them. Thus, for example, he fearlessly opposed their doctrine respecting *traditions*, though this was far more important in their view than the doctrine respecting angels.

(b) Christ himself informs us, that during his life on earth he privately taught his disciples many things which were not to be published by them till after his ascension, (Matt. x. 26, 27;) and that much which he could not teach them, because they were unable to bear it, would be communicated to them by the Paracletus, John, xvi. 12, 13. But we do not find that among these more familiar instructions the disciples were taught that there is no devil, or that he is not the author of evil, or that he is destitute of all power. On the contrary, Christ expressly and particularly sanctions a belief in evil spirits, in presence of his disciples, (Matthew, xiii. 39, seq.; Luke, xxii. 31;) and even mentions the fact that *the prince of this world is judged*, (not that there is no Satan,) as one of those things of which the Holy Ghost would convince the world through their instru-

mentality. After the ascension of Jesus, the apostles made use of the same expressions and representations with regard to evil spirits which he himself had employed; as, 1 John, iii. 8; 1 Pet. v. 8; and often in the Acts. With what freedom and fearlessness does Paul often attack the prevailing prejudices and superstitions of the Jews and Greeks! But so far is he from either opposing this doctrine, or merely passing it by unnoticed, that he expresses his own belief in all the essentials of the Jewish demonology; Ephes. ii. 1, 2, seq.; vi. 11, seq. et passim. The apostles, indeed, held this doctrine in a manner somewhat different from that in which it was held by the Jews, and discarded many of their gross and fabulous representations; but yet, as it must appear from what has been said, they themselves really believed it. Our modern philosophers are at liberty to follow their own convictions upon this subject, and to reason upon their own principles; but they are not at liberty to ascribe their hypothesis to Christ and the apostles, nor to impose upon the common people this boasted wisdom, which they will never relish, and by which they will be rather confounded than enlightened.

Our belief of this doctrine must rest ultimately on our conviction of the *divine mission of Christ* in its most full and proper sense. If we receive him as a divinely-commissioned teacher, we must abide by his decision on this subject as well as on all others, whatever difficulty we may find in the way. Otherwise, we are driven to the alternative of saying either that Christ did himself believe and teach the existence of evil spirits, though they do not exist,—in which case he is not an infallible teacher,—or, that Christ did not himself believe, but yet taught the existence of evil spirits, in which case his moral character is impeached. The same is true in regard to the apostles.

[Note 1.—In confirmation of the remark of the author, that our belief of this doctrine must depend ultimately on *the testimony of Christ*, it may be said that the attempts which have been made to prove the existence of evil spirits by arguments *à priori*, have proved as unsuccessful as the attempts to disprove it by arguments of the same nature. The most noted attempt of this kind is, perhaps, that made by Heinroth, in the last chapter of his late work, “*Ueber die Wahrheit*.” He there endeavours to demonstrate the existence of evil spirits from the apostasy of man, which he thinks can be accounted for only on the supposition that he was tempted by a being who had previously fallen. Man was made pure and holy, and could therefore find no inducement to disobedience from anything in his own nature. The inducement to sin must therefore have come to him from without; and as he acts only in view of seeming

good, he must have been made to believe that transgression would conduce to his advantage; in short, he must have been *deceived*. But he could not have been deceived by God, nor anything in the world in which he was placed, which is a work and revelation of God; and if deceived at all, therefore, it must have been by an older apostate, a *spirit of evil*, a *father of lies*; and only on the admission of such a spirit can the incontrovertible fact of the fall of our race be in any way accounted for. But, in the first place, this temptation does by no means account for that moral act in which the essence of the apostasy consisted. A change in man's moral character must have already taken place, before transgression could have been made alluring. Without this previous defection of his will from God, and the consequent disorder of his powers and darkness of his mind, he could have seen no attraction in what was forbidden, and could have looked upon the inducements to it, as Christ did, only with abhorrence, and certainly never would have preferred them to the infinitely stronger inducements which the government of God holds out to the obedient; and even if, without this change, he had yielded to the influence of some delusion from without to which he had been subjected, he would have been chargeable with *mistake* only, and not have been guilty of *sin*. And, in the second place, the agency of a tempter, though employed as a matter of fact in the apostasy of man, is not absolutely necessary to account for it. If the fall of Adam cannot be accounted for except by the influence of temptation, neither can that of Satan; and the tempter himself must have been before tempted and deceived. But if Satan—a spiritual existence, and stationed near the throne of God—could have apostatized without having been drawn away by an older apostate, certainly this may be supposed of Adam, in whom, both from his nature and his circumstances, apostasy must have been more probable. The argument of Heinroth is liable, therefore, to the twofold objection, that the agency of a tempter does not fully account for the apostasy of Adam, and that it is not necessary to account for it, since the tempter himself fell without any such agency, though possessed of a nature and placed in circumstances far more favourable to obedience.—Tr.]

Note 2.—Since demons and their influence are mentioned so frequently in the New Testament, the doctrine which relates to them ought not to be omitted in popular instruction. If it is passed by, the common people will fall into very erroneous and superstitious notions with regard to evil spirits. The truth ought therefore to be exhibited with wise caution, in such a way as to obviate both unbelief and superstition, to rectify false views, and yet so as to

leave the authority of the Bible unfringed, and the whole sense of scripture unperverted. The following is the simple scriptural view of this subject which the religious teacher should exhibit:—(a) Christ, by his death and the gracious dispensation which he administers, has taken away from the devil the power of injuring his true followers; those, therefore, who are sincerely pious towards God, and believers in Christ, and followers of his instructions, have nothing to fear. (b) The existence of demons and their influence may, however, furnish us with motives to piety and virtue, and serve to deter us from vice and corruption. If we are pious, we are citizens of the *kingdom of God*; if *wicked*, citizens of the *kingdom of Satan*—representations by which the states of moral goodness and badness are figuratively described. Vide Morus, p. 90, s. 8, seq. [Cf. Bretschneider, Handbuch, b. i. s. 723.]

II. Apostasy of Evil Spirits.

All the angels, according to the Jews and the writers of the New Testament, were placed originally in a state of innocence and holiness; some of them afterwards sinned, apostatized from God, and were consequently punished. Respecting the time at which this apostasy took place, or in what the sin of the fallen angels consisted, we are not clearly informed in the scriptures; hence very different opinions have been entertained on these subjects.

1. Some suppose that the first sin of the apostate angels was the temptation which they offered to the progenitors of the human race. This opinion has been advocated in modern times by Cocceius, Vitringa, Heilmann, Schmid of Wittenberg, and others. The devil is not indeed expressly mentioned in the narrative in Gen. iii.; but after the Israelites were made better acquainted with the nature and influence of evil spirits (s. 58), they always supposed that they were intended in this passage, and that death and sin had come into the world by Satan. So the Book of Wisdom, ii. 24, and the New Testament everywhere. They accordingly regarded the devil as the tempter; but it does not appear that they regarded the temptation as his *first* offence, that by which he first rebelled against God. On the contrary, they seem to presuppose that he was previously wicked. The passage, John, viii. 44, cannot therefore be employed, as Heilmann has employed it, in support of this opinion. The sense of this passage may be thus given:—"You resemble the devil in your dispositions and conduct, (*ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστέ*;) he was a murderer from the beginning, (*ἀνδραποκτόνος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, alluding to the murder of Abel by Cain, Gen. iii.; 1 John, iii. 12, and other events,) and remained not in the truth, (the knowledge and worship of God,

or moral rectitude, or both united;) the love of truth and integrity is not in him; it is his pleasure to speak and propagate falsehood and error, (τὸ ψεῦδος, Rev. xxi. 27; xxii. 15;) for he is the author (πατήρ) and patron of falsehood and error, (unbelief, superstition, and immorality, of which he is always represented as the founder.)" This passage certainly does not teach that this was the first instance in which Satan revolted from God.

2. Others place the chief offence of the evil spirits in *pride*, which was shewn, according to some, in one way, according to others, in another. So Athanasius, Hieronymus, Augustine, and others, particularly the Latin fathers, who were followed by many of the schoolmen, and in modern times by Luther, Buddeus, Mosheim, Cotta, and others. They refer to the passage 1 Tim. iii. 6, (which, however, admits of another interpretation,) and also to the proud expressions which are ascribed to the seducer of men in the holy scriptures, Gen. iii. 5; Matt. iv. 9. This view is partially correct; but the first sin of the fallen angels may be ascertained still more definitely.

3. We are led to believe by the writings of the apostles that in many particulars they agreed with the Jewish teachers of their own day respecting the first transgression of fallen spirits. We may accordingly consider the Jewish opinions, in these particulars, as sanctioned by the assent of the apostles. Now the Jews held, especially after the Babylonian captivity, that God entrusted to angels, as overseers or governors, particular provinces of the earth, and also the heavenly bodies (cf. s. 60, II.), while their more proper home and abode was *heaven*. The Jews further held that some of these angels were discontented with their lot, and entered into a rebellious concert among themselves. They proudly aspired to higher posts than those assigned them, revolted from God, and deserted heaven; and then, for their punishment, were thrust by God into Tartarus, like the giants or Titans, who, according to the Grecian mythology, were cast as rebels out of heaven. Tartarus is now their proper abode, as heaven was formerly; and from thence they exert, under the Divine permission, an influence upon the world. They seduced our first parents, and brought sin and death into the world; they reign over heathen nations, whom they led into idolatry; they also rule wicked men—i. e., exert a controlling influence over them; but, together with those over whom they have ruled, they will be punished in Tartarus after the day of judgment. With this account the Jews mingled many fabulous and unscriptural representations, which were adopted even by many of the Christian fathers; but the general account above given is very clearly authorized even in the

New Testament, especially in the passages 2 Pet. ii. 4, and Jude, ver. 6, 7. The first passage teaches, that we cannot expect that God will leave transgression unpunished; "for he spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell (ταρταρώσας), where he keeps them in reserve for future punishment, (εἰς κρίσιν.)" Still clearer is the parallel text, Jude, ver. 6, where we are taught that God keeps enchained (ὑπὸ ζόφον) in Tartarus, reserved for the judgment of the great day, the angels τοὺς μὴ τηρήσαντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ ἀποσιπνύσας τὸ ἴδιον οἰκήριον. 'Αρχή does not here signify, *their original state*, but the *dominion* entrusted to them as governors. Τηρεῖν is *tueri, conservare, to retain*, and the latter clause is not a description of their punishment, but of their crime. Thus Jude and Peter, though they by no means take part in all the Jewish notions with regard to the apostasy of the fallen angels, clearly authorize the general doctrine of the Jewish teachers, as given above.

Note.—The question has been asked, how it can appear probable, or even possible, that such perfect beings as angels are represented to be, with all their intelligence and knowledge, could have fallen in this manner, and so foolishly have rebelled against God, with whom they must have been acquainted? It might be asked, with equal plausibility, how it is possible that men can act so frequently as they do against the clearest knowledge and strongest convictions of duty? We often find men, endowed with the greatest talents, and possessing the clearest discernment, who are yet grossly vicious, and act in a manner unaccountably foolish and unadvised. Eminent intellectual endowments are not unfrequently attended by eminent virtues, and then are eminently useful; but they are also frequently accompanied by vices, and then are to the last degree hurtful. But were it not that experience justifies this remark, it would be easy to demonstrate, *à priori*, that high intelligence and moral depravity could not possibly go together. Demonstrations *à priori* on such subjects are therefore wholly inadmissible.

SECTION LXIII.

OF THE NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF EVIL SPIRITS; THEIR PRESENT AND FUTURE CONDITION; THEIR NUMBER, CLASSES, AND NAMES.

I. *Their Nature and Attributes.*

THE essential constitution of human nature is not altered by the depravity of the heart. Man continues to possess the inborn excellences and perfections of his nature, however depraved he may be as to his moral condition. The case is the same with evil spirits, as they are represented in the Bible. In common, then, with good angels, they are still *spiritual* beings, and even

in their present state possess the excellences and perfections which are peculiar to spiritual existences—great intellectual powers, internal energy and activity. Vide s. 59, II. And if good angels are invested with a body, or can assume one as occasion requires, the same must be supposed with respect to evil spirits. Vide *ubi supra*. But their *moral state*, their will and affections, are described as very depraved and evil. They therefore employ their intellectual powers in behalf of evil and not of good; they act in opposition to the divine purposes, and are the enemies of truth and righteousness, John, viii. 44. The σοφία ἀνωθεν κατερχομένη is contrasted with σοφία δαιμονιώδης, James, iii. 15; and men are warned of the μεθόδεαι τοῦ διαβόλου, Eph. vi. 11; ii. 2. 1 Pet. v. 8. Matt. xiii. 39.

II. Their Present and Future State.

Their condition is described as extremely *unhappy*. Vide Matt. xxv. 41. Even the natural consequences of sin—the power and dominion of the passions, the remembrance of their former happy condition, the frustration of their wishes and plans, remorse of conscience, &c., would be enough to render them miserable. But these are not all which they endure; since *positive* punishments, as we are taught in the scriptures, are inflicted on them, and will be more especially after the day of judgment. We are not able to determine accurately, from the language of the Bible, which is for the most part figurative, in what these punishments consist. The principal texts relating to this point, besides that already cited in Matt. xxv. 41, 46, are 2 Pet. ii. 4, and Jude, ver. 6. Τάρταρον, or, as the Greeks otherwise write it, καταρταρόν, signifies, *in Tartarum dejicere, (e celo.)* Tartarus, in the Grecian mythology, is the place of punishment and condemnation. Hesiod, in his Theogony, and Plato, in his Gorgias, represent it as the prison of the Titans. But at a later period it came to signify the general place of suffering. It is that part of ᾗδης where the wicked were confined, and is represented as dark, and deep under the earth. The place of punishment was more commonly described by the Jews as גֶּהֶנֶם, γέεννα, and *eternal fire*. But as their notion of γέεννα corresponded perfectly with the Grecian idea of Tartarus, they adopted the latter term into their own dialect, as in many other cases. In this place condemned men and spirits are confined; and hence the latter are said to suffer such judgments and dreadful torment as will constitute the punishment of wicked men after this life. Such is the representation, Matt. xxv. 41, 46, “Depart into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.” The phrase, σιρραῖς ζόφου παρέδωκε (he bound them in dismal Tartarus with chains), describes their

misery as *unavoidable and remediless*. Great wretchedness is often described by the Hebrews under the image of captives bound in a dark prison. The evil spirits are not as yet, however, chained for ever in Tartarus—i. e., they are not now confined to this single place of misery. They sometimes, under divine permission, roam beyond their prison, and exert their influence upon men. Vide Revelation, and Luke, viii. 31, &c. But a more strict confinement and a higher degree of punishment are impending over them, as over wicked men, and will fall upon them at the last day: εἰς κρίσιν τηρούνται, cf. ver. 9, and Jude, ver. 6, εἰς κρίσιν μεγάλης ἡμέρας. Cf. Matt. xxv. 41. The question of the demon, Matt. viii. 29, ἡἷδες ὧδε πρὸ καίρου βασανίσαι ἡμᾶς, alludes to this impending punishment. Cf. 2 Pet. ii. 4. Hence the evil spirits are described as *fearing* God, and trembling before him as their Judge; James, ii. 19, δαίμόνια φρίσσουσιν.

Note.—Will evil spirits repent, obtain forgiveness, and be restored to happiness? These are questions, which have often been asked in modern times, and to which various answers have been given. Origen was the first among Christian teachers who distinctly avowed the opinion that evil spirits would repent, and be restored to happiness. Vide Augustine, Con. Jul. v. 47, and vi. 10. This opinion has been adopted in modern times by theologians of the most different parties; by Eberhard, in his “Apologie des Sokrates,” th. i., by Lavater, in his “Aussicht in die Ewigkeit,” th. iii., [Bretschneider, in his Handbuch, b. i. s. 691.] and others.

If we had nothing but reason to guide us in our inquiries on this subject, we should probably argue thus:—(a) If wicked men truly repent, reform, and comply with the other conditions prescribed, God will forgive them, and remove the punishment of their sins. But considering that these spirits are in the highest degree depraved, that their vicious propensities, so long cherished, must have taken deep root, and that the habit of sin must have become confirmed, we must conclude, from all human analogy, that their repentance and reformation must be extremely difficult, though we might not be able to pronounce it absolutely *impossible*. (b) But should they from the heart repent of their sins, and were it possible for them to fulfil the other conditions prescribed, it is probable that God, who is perfect goodness, and who is ready to forgive men on certain conditions, and who desires the salvation and happiness of all his creatures, would also forgive them, and restore them to his favour; or at least, he might perhaps remove the positive punishments inflicted on them, should they comply with the conditions prescribed; if indeed we can suppose their situation such that conditions could be offered them—

a point which we are unable to determine. But (c) since every good action has its natural and permanent good consequences, and every evil action its natural and permanent evil consequences, it is certain that the happiness of such repentant angels must always be less in amount than the happiness of those who never sinned, and have persevered in obedience. The former must always take a lower stand, in point of happiness and character, than the latter; and in this sense we may affirm, even on principles of reason, that their punishment will be *eternal*.

But if we inquire what Christ and the apostles teach on this subject, *we can find nothing to justify the hope that the fallen angels will be restored*. Their punishments are described as *δεσμοὶ αἰδίοι*, Jude, ver. 6; as *πῦρ αἰώνιον, κόλασις αἰώνιος*, Matt. xxv. 41, 46. These expressions do not, indeed, necessarily denote *positive* punishments, although it cannot be shewn that natural punishments are here exclusively intended. There is some plausibility in the argument that the words *αἰώνιος* and *αἰδός*, like the Hebrew *עלם*, do not denote *eternity*, in the strict philosophical sense, but only a *long and indeterminate duration*. Vide s. 20, III. But while this remark is doubtless true in itself, yet in the passage cited, Matt. xxv. 46, *κόλασις αἰώνιος* and *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* are contrasted, and if in the latter case *αἰώνιος* is allowed to denote *absolute eternity*, what right have we to use it in the former case, in a less strict sense? From these words, therefore, no argument can be drawn in behalf of the cessation of the punishments of fallen spirits; nor can it be shewn that these punishments are merely natural. The argument for restoration is therefore left by the scriptures very doubtful. The consideration of the question will be resumed, s. 157, 158. [However hesitating and undecided the theologians of the Lutheran church may be with regard to the endless punishment of the fallen angels, the doctrinal standards of their church express no doubts; and the Augsburg Confession (Art. xvii.) expressly condemns those, "*qui sentiunt, hominibus damnatis ac DIABOLIS finem penarum futurum esse*." Neander suggests, that the doctrine of the final and perfect restoration of all things (*ἀποκατάστασις πάντων*), which is ascribed to Origen as its author, was the result of the principles of the Alexandrine *Gnosis*, and was abandoned by him at a later period of his life. Allg. Kirchengesch. b. i. abth. 3, s. 1098.—Tr.]

III. Number and Classes of Evil Spirits.

The New Testament gives us no definite information with respect to the number of evil spirits; but they were supposed by the Jews to be very many (Luke, viii. 30), and indeed are often mentioned in the New Testament in the

plural. We are likewise informed that evil spirits compose a *kingdom*, and exist in a social relation; and hence the phrase *ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Σατανᾶ*, Matt. xii. 26. This representation must be understood in the same way as that in reference to good angels. Vide s. 61, II. They have a leader, prince, or commander, (*ὁ ἄρχων τῶν δαιμονίων*, Matt. xii. 24,) represented often as a fallen *archangel*, and called *Beelzebub* (vide No. iv.), also, by way of eminence, *διάβολος*, *Σατανᾶς*, κ. τ. λ. In Rev. xii. 7, 9, in opposition to the good angels who fought on the side of Michael, the angels of Satan are called *ὁ ἄγγελος αὐτοῦ*. The names *devil* and *Satan* are not used in the Bible in the plural, and are applied only to the *ἄρχων τῶν δαιμονίων*. It is not therefore according to scriptural usage to speak of *devils* in the plural.

IV. Names of Evil Spirits.

Respecting the title *evil angel*, vide s. 59, V. [Cf. Bretschneider, Handbuch, b. i. s. 627; Hahn, Glaubenslehre, s. 294, Anm.]

1. General appellations of evil spirits as a body.

(a) *Πνεύματα ἀκάθαρτα*—i. e., morally impure and evil; Luke, xi. 24, et passim. Synonymous with this is (b) *πνεύματα πονηρά*, Luke, vii. 21; Ephes. vi. 12, *τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας*. (c) *Δαίμονες* or *δαίμονια*. The etymology of this word is quite uncertain. In Homer and all the most ancient Grecian writers it means neither more nor less than *gods*, (*θεοί*.) And although, in process of time, it acquired various additional meanings, it always retained this. It is accordingly used by the LXX. to denote the heathen gods (*θεοὶ*), and also in 1 Cor. x. 20, 21, and Rev. ix. 20, where *δαίμονια* and *εἰδωλα* are connected. It was very commonly used in this sense by the Attic writers; and so, when Paul was at Athens, (Acts, xvii. 18,) some believed that he wished to introduce *ξένα δαίμονια*, *foreign deities*. But the name *δαίμονες* was afterwards given by the Greeks to those invisible beings whom they supposed, in connexion with their deities, to exert an agency in the world. Hence *δαίμονες*, is the name given by Pythagoras, Plato, and others, to the *human soul*, even when connected with the body, but especially when separated from it. The intermediate spirits between God and our race—deified men, and heroes, were also called *demons*. And lastly, the *internal spring, impulse, the foreboding or presentiment of the mind*, which appeared so inexplicable to Socrates, and which he therefore personified and deified, was called by him his *δαίμονιον*. Whenever this invisible agent was the cause of good to men, it was called *ἀγαθοδαίμων* or *εὐδαίμων*; and when the cause of evil, *κακοδαίμων*. At the time of Christ and the apostles, *δαίμων* was a common appellation given by the Grecian Jews to *evil*

spirits; those morally so, and indeed by the Apocryphal writers also. Vide Tob. iii. 8, *πονηρὸν δαιμόνιον*. In the evangelists, the phrases *πνεύματα ἀκαθάρτα* and *πονηρά* are interchanged, times without number, with *δαίμονες* and *πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου*. In Matt. xii. 24, *δαίμονες* are distinctly mentioned as belonging to the kingdom of the devil. The woman who is described in Luke, xiii. 11, as *πνεῦμα ἔχουσα ἀσθενείας*, is said (ver. 16) to be one *ἣν ἔδραμεν ὁ Σατανᾶς*. Vide s. 64, I. 2. The opinion of Farmer, therefore, in his "Essay on Demoniacs," that other spirits—gods, departed souls, &c., and not devils—were intended in the New Testament by this appellation is unfounded. In James, ii. 19, *δαίμονια* has clearly the signification above given. But how came *δαίμονες* to have this peculiar signification among the Grecian Jews? The LXX. usually rendered the Hebrew words which signify *idols* by the word *δαίμονες*, and the Greeks called their gods by this name. Now the Jews connected with this name their idea that *evil spirits* ruled in the heathen world, and caused themselves to be worshipped as gods, under the names of *Jupiter*, *Mercury*, &c., and had seduced the heathen into this idolatry. Hence *δαίμονες* and *evil spirits* came to be regarded by them as synonymous terms.

2. But one of the evil spirits is represented as their *prince*, *leader*, *commander*. Vide No. iii., and Morus, p. 91, s. 10. He is called by various names. (a) *Satan*, שָׂטָן, *Σατανᾶς*, literally, *enemy*, *fiend*, *accuser*, Ps. cix. 6; Job, ii. (s. 58); Matt. xvi. 23; and hence, by way of eminence, *princeps dæmonum*, because he is represented as the greatest enemy of man, and of the kingdom of truth and holiness. Synonymous with this title are the names *ὁ ἐχθρός* and *ὁ ἀντίδικος*. (b) *Ὁ πονηρός*, *malignus*, *noxious*, *the foe of man*. This name is frequently given him by John; as 1 John, ii. 13, 14. (c) *Διάβολος* is the most common Grecian name of the devil; and from this word our *devil* and the German *Teufel* are derived. It signifies *fiend*, *destroyer of peace*, *calumniator*. The LXX. rendered the Hebrew שָׂטָן by *διάβολος*, Job, i. 6; Ps. cix. 6. This name was sometimes applied to *men*, 1 Tim. iii. 11; Tit. ii. 3. (d) *Βελίαρ* or *Βελιάρ*, 2 Cor. vi. 15, from *βηλ*, compounded of *βῆλ*, *not*, and *βῆλ*, *high*—i. e., *low*, *abject*. It has different senses. In the Old Testament it sometimes signified *the under world*, *the kingdom of the dead*, Psalm xviii. 5; and sometimes *unworthy men*, *abject principles*, Deut. xiii. 13. After the Babylonian exile it was frequently used as the name of the devil, and occurs once in this sense in the New Testament, 2 Cor. vi. 15, "What concord hath Christ with Belial?"—i. e., How can the worship of Christ consist with the worship of the devil (idolatry)?

(e) *Βεελζεβούβ*, or *Βεελζεβούλ*, who is expressly called *ἄρχων τῶν δαιμονίων*, Matt. xii. 24. This was an appellation very common among the Jews at the time of Christ. In 2 Kings, i. 2, Beelzebub appears as a god of the Philistines. The name when written with final β, is derived from *בזבז*. It most probably means, *God of the flies*, *Fly-Baal*, *Deus averruncus muscarum*, whose office it was to protect his worshippers from the flies, which were among the greatest plagues of Egypt and Philistia. [It corresponds with the Greek *Ζεὺς ἀπόμυιος*.] According to the later Jews, it means *dominus criminacionis*, *accuser*, *complainant*, and is synonymous with *διάβολος* and *Σατανᾶς*, from the Syriac ܕܒܒ, which signifies *criminari*. The other form, *Βεελζεβούλ*, is derived from *בזבז*, and is either an intentional alteration of the word into an epithet of disgrace, and so signifies *deus stercoris* (Mistgott), from *בזבז*, *stercus*; or signifies, *deus*, or *prefectus sepulchri*, (as *בזבז* signifies in Chaldaic and Syriac,) *dominus inferni*, or *inferorum*, *ὁ κράτος ἔχων τοῦ θανάτου*, Heb. ii. 14. It was at first, then, the name of the *angel of death*, and afterwards of the devil, when he was supposed to be the same person. (f) *Ὁ δράκων ὁ μέγας*, and *ὁ ὄφις ὁ ἀρχαῖος*, Rev. xii. 9, 13. This appellation might have been given to him from his general character for cunning and deceit, (*ὁ πλανῶν τὴν οἰκουμένην*.) But the word *ἀρχαῖος* evidently alludes to Gen. iii., since the agency of the devil in the occurrence there described was doubtless believed by the Jews at the time of Christ.

3. The Jews gave particular names to *evil* as well as to good spirits. Among these is *Ἀσμοδαῖος*, *Asmodi*, mentioned in the book of Tobias, iii. 8, also *Samaël*, *Azazel*, &c. But none of these proper names of evil spirits occur in the New Testament, unless the name of the *angel of destruction*, *Ἀβαδδὼν*—i. q., *Ἀπολλύων*,—ὁ ἄγγελος τῆς ἀβύσσου, Rev. ix. 11, be considered as such.

SECTION LXIV.

OF THE EMPLOYMENTS AND THE EFFECTS OF EVIL SPIRITS.

I. Objections to the common theory.

THE power of Satan and his influence upon men were formerly stated in a very exaggerated manner, and represented as excessively great and fearful; and this view was the more plausible, as it seemed to be supported by many passages in the New Testament. But this mistake would have been avoided if the true spirit of the Bible had been more justly apprehended, and the true meaning of its language better understood. Vide No. ii. According to the common theory, evil spirits were supposed to be actively

employed at their own pleasure all over the earth, to have immediate influence on the souls of men; to inspire wicked thoughts, doubts, and anxieties; to intrude themselves into all societies and mysteries; and to rule in the air, and over the whole material world. Such are the opinions which formerly prevailed to a great extent, and which are often found in the older ecclesiastical writers. They were long preserved, and transmitted from one age to another with more or less of exaggeration. And many theologians of the protestant church, even in the sixteenth century, held opinions on this subject which were more conformed to the prevailing superstitious ideas of that age than to reason or scripture. Luther and Melancthon were inclined to the belief that good and evil spirits were at all times present in the world, and stood in a very intimate relation to men. In the symbols of the Lutheran church, however, the connexion of superior spirits with the world is not very minutely determined, and the doctrine of demons is exhibited in the general Biblical phraseology. Thus, in the Augsburg Confession many texts of scripture are cited, but no definite meaning is affixed to them. Many of the ideas formerly prevalent on this subject are either wholly without foundation, or are carried beyond the bounds of truth. For,

1. It is contradictory to the ideas of the power, wisdom, holiness, and goodness of God which we derive from the Bible and from reason, to ascribe to the devil such vast and almost infinite power. Nor can we see any rational way of accounting for it that God should permit so great and injurious an influence to be exerted in the world.

2. The opinion maintained by some that evil spirits can produce wicked thoughts in the minds of men by an immediate influence is incapable of proof. The evil influences exerted on the human mind have by some been supposed to be as immediate and efficient as the divine influences; and as God infuses good thoughts, as he inspired prophets and apostles, so does Satan, it is supposed, directly infuse evil thoughts into the minds of the wicked, and into the minds of the good also, when he is permitted so to do by God. That these inspirations of the devil can be distinguished by any certain signs from thoughts and desires which arise in the mind from other sources is not pretended; this opinion, therefore, cannot be established by *experience*, and certainly it cannot be derived from scripture; at least, the opinion that evil spirits do *always* or *commonly* exert an immediate influence of this kind cannot be proved from the Bible.

3. This theory, when carried to the length to which it has sometimes been carried, is inconsistent with human *freedom*. If the agency of Satan was of the nature often believed, man

would not be the agent of the wicked actions he seems to perform, but merely the instrument of the irresistible influence of Satan; and thus an excuse for sin would be furnished.

4. In many texts in the New Testament in which the common origin of particular sins is described, Satan is not mentioned, but their existence is accounted for in another way, agreeable alike to reason and experience. Cf. especially James, i. 13—15, "Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God. Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed, when he gives indulgence to rising desires, which is *internal sin*. When lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin, (it breaks forth in sinful words and works, which is *external sin*;) and sin, when it is brought into the world, bringeth forth death, (its uniform consequence is *misery*)." Cf. Matthew, xv. 19; Gal. v. 16—21; Rom. vii. 5, 8, seq.

From these texts, however, we cannot conclude, as some have done, that the Bible *excludes* the agency of Satan in the sins of men. This would be an extreme equally contrary to the scriptures with the other, for the Bible expressly teaches (a) that Satan is hostile to man, and is active in promoting wickedness, Eph. ii. 2, vi. 11, seq., &c. Morus, p. 92, 93, n. i. (b) That he contributes something to the sins which prevail among men—e. g., 1 Cor. vii. 5, where Satan is distinguished from ἀρκαία, *incontinence*, to which he is said to tempt men; from which it is clear, as Morus justly observes, that *Satan* is not used in the scriptures to denote merely an *abstract idea*, and moral evil. Vide ubi supra, n. 2. (c) That he opposes goodness; Luke, viii. 12; John, viii. 44; and is therefore the enemy of Christianity and morality. Vide ubi supra, n. 3. This is what the Bible teaches; still it does not deny that the ignorance of man, his sinful passions, and other causes, have a tendency to lead him to sin; nor does it undertake to determine the manner in which Satan does what is ascribed to him; nor does it justify us in deciding in *particular cases* whether Satan has had any agency in the crimes committed, or *what* and *how much* it may have been. So thought Origen (περὶ ἀρχῶν, iii.) and many of the ecclesiastical fathers, who endeavoured to rectify the unscriptural notions respecting the power of the devil which were entertained by many of their contemporaries.

The extravagant opinions which formerly prevailed on this subject were the means of much injury, as appears from experience. (a) They led the common people to what was, in effect, a belief in two gods—a good and an evil deity; and also to entertain false conceptions of the attributes of the true God, which could not have been without a practical influence on the life. (β) They often furnished a real hindrance to

moral improvement; for instead of seeking for the origin of sin in themselves, and endeavouring to stop its sources,—instead of becoming acquainted with, and avoiding the external occasions of sin,—they laid the whole blame of it upon Satan, and when they had made him guilty, held themselves sufficiently justified and exculpated. (γ) They gave rise to many other false opinions and superstitious practices, similar to some already existing among the Jews. Origen, Eusebius, and Augustine, represent demons as fluttering about in the air, from the misunderstanding of Eph. ii. 2. Vide No. ii. Eusebius speaks of them as present at pagan sacrifices, regaling themselves with the sweet savour, according to an opinion which prevailed both among the Jews and Greeks respecting their gods. Sometimes they are represented as speaking in the heathen oracles, and plotting evil against men at prayer; to secure themselves against which, the ancient saints, as appears from the fabulous histories of their lives, were accustomed to make use of the sign of the cross. They were supposed to keep themselves in deserts, swamps, and subterranean caves, Is. xxxiv. 13, 14; Matt. iv. 1; Luke, xi. 24; 1 Sam. xviii.; and also to dwell in men before their baptism, even in the children of Christian parents, and not merely in the heathen, as was at first supposed; and this gave origin to the rite of exorcism. Vide Döderlein, Disp. de redemptione a potestate diaboli; Altorf, 1774, 4to; also in his “Opuscula Theologica;” Jenæ, 1789, 8vo. Töllner, Theol. Untersuchungen, th. i. st. 2, “Die Lehre von den Versuchungen des Teufels ist nicht praktisch.” Runge, Man muss auch dem Teufel nicht zu viel aufbürden; Bremen, 1776, 8vo.

In opposing these false and superstitious notions, many, however, fell into an opposite fault, and wholly denied the power and influence of evil spirits, and explained the passages of the Bible relating to this subject in an arbitrary manner, in order to make them agree with their own previously established theories. It was with the texts relating to this doctrine that the Rationalists began, about the middle of the eighteenth century, to indulge themselves in that arbitrary mode of interpretation which they have since applied to such other doctrines of the Bible as they have wished to reject.

II. Remarks on some texts relating to this subject.

The general notion which formerly prevailed among the Jews respecting evil spirits, and which has been adopted and authorized by the writers of the New Testament, is, *that they are the authors and promoters of evil among men*, John, viii. 44. The following general doctrines are at the basis of the Biblical representations of this subject.

1. God is indeed the governor of all mankind; but he is especially the kind father, benefactor, and protector of those who truly reverence his authority, obey his precepts, and in their conduct endeavour to imitate him. Of these his *kingdom* is composed; they are *citizens* of it, *children of God*; by which appellation is meant, that they are those who honour, love, and obey him, as dutiful children do their father; and whom, therefore, he loves in return, as a good father does his dutiful children. Now as the Israelites were in ancient times selected by God as the means of diffusing the true knowledge of himself and pure morals, and for the accomplishment of other great designs, they are called, in an eminent sense, *his people*, *his children*, and he, their king and father. These titles are properly transferred by the writers of the New Testament to Christians, who take the place of the Israelites, and succeed them in all their rights. Christians now constitute the kingdom of God; they are his *house*, his *family*; he is their father and counsellor; and he employs in their behalf the good angels, who are the invisible instruments of his providence. After the same manner, the great mass of mankind—the *κόσμος*, (as the heathen world is called, from the multitude of which it is composed,) and the *σκότος*, (as it is also called, from the ignorance and moral corruption that prevails over it)—has also its invisible head. It is governed by the spirits who are at enmity with God, and by their prince the devil. To whomsoever men yield obedience, his children they are, and to his kingdom they belong, John, viii. 44. And thus all those who follow their sinful passions and desires, who are the servants of sin, and resist the will of God, are said to *obey* the devil, or to stand under his dominion, because they act according to his will, and imitate him. And so the heathen, who have no true knowledge of God, and whose moral character is debased, are said to belong to his kingdom. The supremacy here spoken of is, then, of a *moral* nature, founded upon resemblance in conduct, moral character, and opinion.

2. There is another doctrine intimately connected with this. As Satan opposes the designs of God, and does only evil, he is represented as the seducer of our first parents, and so the author of sin among men, and of all its evil consequences. Vide Book of Wisdom, ii. 24. He is generally described as the great enemy of man, ὁ ἐχθρὸς, ἀνθρώπου. Vide Morus, p. 92, sec. 11. According to this view, the events narrated in Gen. iii. were referred to Satan by the Jews, in which they were followed by the New-Testament writers, John, viii. 44; 1 John, iii. 8; Rev. xii. 9. Since the time of the first apostasy, men are born with a strong and predominant bias and propensity to sin, Rom. vii.

23, coll. v. 12, 19. This now, and everything regarded as a consequence of the apostasy to which Satan tempted our first parents, is considered as belonging to his kingdom, and is ascribed to his influence, even in those cases in which he himself may not have been immediately engaged. Thus all errors, especially those in religion, all wickedness, deceitfulness, and whatever else is offensive to God, are ascribed to him, even when he himself has not been personally or immediately active in promoting them; and this, because he is the first cause of all this evil which has followed; just as, on the contrary, all the good which is opposed to this evil is ascribed to God, even in those cases where he has not immediately produced it, only because it is according to his will, and results from the wise institutes which he has founded. And so everything connected with moral evil, as cause or as consequence, and all wicked men, (*ὁ πόθος, ὁ σκότος,*) belong to the kingdom of Satan, (vide Morus, p. 91, Num. 1;) while, on the contrary, all the pious, and all moral goodness, with its causes and consequences, belong to the kingdom of light—the kingdom of God, or of Jesus Christ. Vide the texts referred to, *ubi supra*. From what has now been said, light is cast upon the following Biblical representations and expressions:—”

(a) The prevalence of immorality and the diffusion of false religious observances are striking proofs of the great corruption of human nature; they are accordingly ascribed in a peculiar sense to the influence of evil spirits, who are hence called *the gods or rulers of this world*. Eph. ii. 2, *ἄρχων τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ αἵματος, prince of the power of darkness*, (*ἄρ, tenebræ*, Homer, Od. ix. 144; Virgil, *ætre sepsit*)—i. e., of the heathen world, darkened by ignorance and error. Cf. Eph. vi. 12, *οἱ κοσμοκράτορες τοῦ σκότους τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου*. To the former passage the apostle subjoins the declaration that evil spirits were *ἐνεργούντες ἐν υἱοῖς τῆς ἀπειθείας*, and in ver. 3 mentions *αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῆς σαρκός*, the desires which spring from our bodily nature, and which lead to immorality. Satan is called in the same sense *ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου*, who blinds the understanding of the unbelieving, 2 Cor. iv. 4; also *ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου*, John, xii. 31; xvi. 11; and paganism, irreligion, and immorality, are called *ἐξουσία τοῦ Σατανᾶ*, Acts, xxvi. 18; while the Christian church, the object of which is to make men pious, and to prepare them to become citizens of the society of the blessed above, is called *βασιλεία τοῦ Υἱοῦ Θεοῦ*, Col. i. 13.

(b) Christ came into the world in order to remove the misery and disorder arising from the seduction of our first parents by the devil, and to shew us the way to true holiness and happiness. 1 John, iii. 8, *ἐφανέρωθη—ἵνα λύσῃ τὰ*

ἔργα τοῦ διαβόλου, and according to Col. ii. 15, Christ prevailed and triumphed over Satan. The works of the devil are sin, and everything by which sin and unbelief are occasioned. Where sin, and misery as its consequence, prevail, there Satan rules. John says, in the passage above cited, *ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστίν*. Thus he rules over unbelieving Jews and Christians, as well as over the heathen, John, viii. 44.

(c) All the hindrances to the spread of Christianity, and to the prevalence of that piety and holiness which Christianity is intended to promote—all the temptations and persecutions which Christians are called to endure;—in short, the whole system of efforts opposed to Christianity, are regarded as the *works of Satan*, and the enemies of Christianity as his instruments. Morus, p. 91, s. 9, note. Hence, when Judas formed the infernal purpose (as we should say) of betraying Christ, it is said, *the devil entered into him*—i. e., took possession of him, John, xiii. 2, 27, coll. Acts, v. 3. By the *wiles of the devil*, Eph. vi. 11, seq., the persecutions which Christians were called to endure, and the efforts made to turn them aside from the truth, are principally intended. Cf. 1. Pet. v. 8, 9, where *παθήματα* are expressly mentioned. The enemies of Christians are the instruments by which he brings suffering upon them, in order to injure them and lead them to apostasy and unbelief. He has a hand also in the schisms, controversies, and heresies which arise among Christians themselves, 2 Cor. ii. 11; xi. 14, 15, *δῆκονοι Σατανᾶ*. Unbelief in particular individuals is also ascribed to him, Luke, xxii. 31, as are all gross vices and crimes.

(d) Death, and every other evil which may be regarded as the punishment of sin, is also ascribed to the devil, and is said to have come into the world through him; Book of Wisdom, ii. 4; John, viii. 44; Heb. ii. 14. In the last passage he is described as the one *who has power over death*, *τὸ πρῶτος ἐχὼν τοῦ θανάτου*, which is taken from the image of the *angel of death*, Asmodi, or Samael. And as sickness may also be regarded as the punishment of sin, they too are often represented as the works of the devil. We are prevented, however, from considering Satan as the sole and independent cause of the death of men, by those texts in which the power over life and death, and the whole disposal of the destinies of man, is ascribed to God alone. The representation, therefore, that Satan is the author of death and misery, is to be understood figuratively; for he is such to *individuals* only as he was the first cause of that apostasy of man which brought death and misery upon our race. Still we are taught in the Bible, that for the same wise reasons which lead him to permit other evils, for the attainment of certain good

ends, not otherwise attainable, God allows more power to evil spirits, in particular cases and at certain times, than they commonly possess.

(c) But evil spirits, according to the doctrine of the Bible, cannot, with all their efforts, do us harm, unless we resemble them in our disposition, and are ourselves devoted to sin; 1 John, v. 18; iii. 8; John, viii. 44. Christ has robbed evil spirits of their power, has conquered them—i. e., has rendered them harmless to those who believe in him; and this he has done, partly by delivering us from the punishment of sin, and partly by freeing us from its power and dominion,—the one, by his sufferings and death, the other, by his instructions and example. All those, therefore, who, in compliance with his precepts, and in conformity with his example, keep themselves from sin, or are pardoned for sins already committed, are secured against the temptations and wiles of evil spirits, 1 John, v. 18. Prayer, faith in Christ, the wholesome use of his precepts, watchfulness, in short, the means prescribed in the Bible for security against vice and sin,—these, and only these, are the means appointed for security against evil spirits; Eph. vi. 11—18; 1 Peter, v. 8, seq.; James, i. 14; iv. 7. Morus, p. 93, n. 6. The excuse, therefore, that *one has been tempted of the devil*, and is on that account exculpated, is always unfounded, even in those cases, if such occur, in which it is capable of proof that the inducement to sin was really offered by the devil; for he could not, according to the doctrine of the Bible, have found this opportunity unless the nature of our hearts had been depraved, 1 Cor. vii. 5. In those cases only in which men indulge the sinful desires of their own hearts (James, i. 14) are they liable to temptations either from the devil or any other quarter; they themselves, in such cases, are always in fault.

APPENDIX.

POWER OF SATAN OVER THE HUMAN BODY AND THE MATERIAL WORLD.

SECTION LXV.

OF THE BODILY POSSESSIONS RECORDED IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

I. Meaning of the term "Possession."

ORIGINALLY it was doubtless supposed to denote a *real indwelling* in the human body. An agent, in order to exert an influence on the human body, must, it was thought, be near to it, and substantially dwell in it, as the soul dwells in the body. Such was at first the general, indeterminate notion. But it was afterwards re-

fined upon, and the belief in a literal, substantial indwelling of the devil was abandoned; and the term *possession* was understood to indicate merely the powerful *influence* which Satan sometimes exerted in controlling and abusing the bodies of men said to be possessed. In the New Testament we do indeed sometimes meet with a phrase like the following, Σατανᾶς ἐῖς ἡλθεν εἰς τινα (Ἰουδαν), John, xiii. 27; but by this phrase nothing more than an *obsessio spiritualis*, an *influence upon the mind*, is intended; and the common expressions are, ἔχει δαίμονιον, δαίμονιζεσθαι, &c. &c. The term *possession* is not used in the New Testament, although Josephus speaks of πονηρὰ πνεύματα καὶ δαίμονια ἐγκαθεζόμενα (insidentia), Ant. vi. 11; and of πνεύματα ἐνδύμενα, (induentes se, sive, ingredients,) Bell. Jud. vii. 6. The words to *possess*, and *possession*, are exact translations of the Latin words *possidere*, *obsidere*, *possessio*, *obsessio*, which were first used in relation to this subject by the Latin fathers and schoolmen. *Obsidere* is synonymous with *occupare*, *implere*, and is so employed by Cicero, where he says, *corporibus omnis obsidetur locus*. It was then spoken figuratively of the orator, who possesses himself of his hearers, and gains them over to his own views, *obsidet ac tenet auditorem*, Cicero, De Orat. 62. *Possidere* is also sometimes used for *tenere*, *in potestate sua habere*. So Pliny, Hist. Nat. xxx. 1, says, with regard to magic, *possideri eā hominum sensus vinculis*, the senses of men were controlled by magic as by chains, were held absolutely under its power; and in the same place, *Gallias possedit magia*, because it was very prevalent and deeply rooted in Gaul. Hence when one was afflicted with an obstinate and fixed disease, he was said *possessionem esse*; so Aurelian, a physician in Africa, near the close of the second century, says of one who was afflicted with epilepsy, *passione possessionem esse*. This phraseology was now applied particularly to those diseases which were ascribed to the immediate agency of demons. The Biblical terms which have the nearest resemblance to this phraseology are those which are found in Luke, xiii. 16, where Satan is said to have bound (ἐδῆσε) a sick woman; and in Acts, x. 38, where some are described as καταδυναστεύεσθαι ἐν τῷ διαβόλῳ.

II. History of this Doctrine.

1. *Among the Greeks.* The belief of this doctrine is found among many heathen nations both of ancient and modern times. The general origin of this idea is to be sought in the fact that uncultivated men are in the habit of ascribing everything, the immediate cause of which they do not perceive, (especially if the thing is in any degree extraordinary,) to the direct influence of the Deity, or of some other spiritual

agent more powerful than man. Whatever of this kind is good or desirable they regard as an effect proceeding immediately from good spirits; and the opposite, from evil spirits. Cf. s. 58, II. Thus it came to pass that evil spirits were considered often as the authors of all kinds of sickness, and especially of those diseases which were attended with unusual and inexplicable phenomena. For the cure of such diseases, which were supposed to be miraculously inflicted by a malignant deity, or by demons, and therefore to be beyond the reach of human art, resort was had to miraculous remedies. The diseases which have commonly been regarded by different nations as of this miraculous nature are, *melancholy*, *madness*; also such *nervous* diseases as are attended with the more frightful appearances—*cramp*, *epilepsy*, *lunacy*, &c. These general opinions prevailed among the Greeks, as appears from the writings of some of their oldest physicians—e. g., Hippocrates, who lived 400 years before Christ, and wrote *περὶ τῆς ἰέρης, νόσου*, also Galen, and Aretæus of Cappadocia, who is quoted by Wetstein, Nov. Test. tom. i. p. 282, seq. Hence it was common among the Greeks to use the phrases *δαίμονῶν, κακοδαίμονων, and δαιμόνιον ἔχειν*, as synonymous with *μαίνεσθαι*. This is seen in the writings of Xenophon, Aristophanes, and others; and also in the New Testament, as John, vii. 20; x. 20, 21. In the earliest ages, the Greeks ascribed such diseases as those above mentioned to some malignant deity. Thus it is said even in Homer, *Odyssey*, v. 396—

ἔχρας στυγερὸς δαίμων.

But when, at a later period, the doctrine of intermediate spirits was received among the Greeks, and these spirits were called *δαίμονες*, (demigods, heroes, and the souls of the departed;) they were now considered as the authors of these evils; and this not by the people only, but by many of the philosophers, who adopted these ideas into their systems, and formed theories respecting them, as was the case with the New Pythagoreans and the New Platonists, especially in Egypt, both before and after the birth of Christ. But Hippocrates, Galen, and some other Greek physicians, who supposed they could explain these diseases in part from natural causes, rejected this prevailing opinion as superstitious; and in this many of the philosophers agreed with them. Origen remarks, in his Commentary on Matt. xvii., that the physicians in his day did not believe in possessions. They, however, retained the expressions which were in common use among the people on this subject; such as *δαμονίζεσθαι, δαίμων εἰσέρχεται, ἐξέρχεται, ἐβάλλεται, δεῖαι νόσου*.

2. Among the Jews.

(a) There is no mention made of possessions

in any part of the Old Testament, either in the older books, or in those composed after the Babylonian exile. It is indeed often said that particular diseases, or deaths, were inflicted by God, or by his angels, even by evil angels (messengers of evil) sent by him. Vide s. 58. But this does not at all correspond with the idea of demoniacal possessions entertained at a later period by the Jews. There is one passage, however, 1 Sam. xvi. 14—23, where an evil spirit is said to come upon Saul, which has sometimes been appealed to on this subject. But the evil spirit here mentioned was not one whose *moral* character was evil; and in this respect, therefore, the case of Saul is distinguished from the cases of bodily possession in the New Testament. The evil spirit here mentioned is *an evil spirit from Jehovah*, in opposition to the good spirit which came from Jehovah upon David, ver. 13, and previously upon Saul himself, 1 Sam. x. 10. This good spirit inspired him with a high and kingly disposition, and with resolution for great and good deeds; but the other spirit was to him the messenger of evil, and harassed him with anxiety and melancholy, which ended in total madness. Nor is there any mention of bodily possessions in the Grecian apocryphal books which were written before the coming of Christ; in short, no trace of this opinion can be found among the Jews before the Christian era.

(b) But the age of Christ and his apostles is altogether remarkable in this respect. There were then in Judæa and Galilee many sick persons, whose diseases were considered by the great body of the Jews (the Sadducees, perhaps; only excepted) as the effects of the agency of evil spirits. It is worthy of notice that this is not found to be the case at all in the age preceding that of Christ, nor, at least in the same degree, in those which followed it. We see from the New Testament that Jesus, and after him the apostles, healed many of these diseases; nor do we anywhere find that Jesus assigned other causes for these diseases than those to which they were supposed to be owing by the contemporary Jews; nor that on this subject more than on others the apostles and evangelists undertook to go farther than their Master. We see also, from the New Testament, that the Pharisees interested themselves in this subject, and at least attempted the cure of some of these diseases. Cf. Matt. xii. 27. The truth of these facts—viz., that there were at that time sick persons of this description in Palestine and its vicinity—that they were there almost universally regarded as possessed of evil spirits, and that many, especially from among the Pharisees, appeared as exorcists, is confirmed by the testimony of Josephus, Ant. viii. 2. A few only of the Jews, who pretended to be more liberal and

enlightened than the rest, either wholly rejected the belief of possessions, and indeed of the existence of evil spirits, (as was done by the Sadducees in Palestine,) or adopted the opinion of the later Greeks, according to which demons were regarded, not as evil angels, but as a sort of intermediate spirits—the souls of the deceased, &c., as was done by some of the more learned Jews, who wished to conform to the philosophy of the age. Of this class was Josephus, who says, *Bel. Jud. vii. 6, τὰ καλοῦμενα δαιμόνια—πονηρῶν ἐστὶ ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα.*

(c) The Jews of later times, after the second century, believed very generally, not only that there had been possessions formerly, but that instances of the same kind sometimes occurred even in their own day. The latter opinion was, however, denied by Maimonides and some other Rabbins; while others, with the Sadducees, rejected the whole doctrine of evil spirits, and declared themselves decidedly for *adæmonism*. Vide Wetstein, *ubi supra*.

3. Among Christians since the second century.

(a) The early Christian teachers since the second century are united in the opinion that the so called demoniacs of the New Testament were truly possessed by the devil, because Christ expressly declared them to be so. This was the opinion of Origen himself. They moreover believed that there might be, and actually were, demoniacs in their own day; although we have not sufficient evidence to convince us that those whom they regarded as possessed were so in truth. But as this was believed by the Christians of that day, *exorcists* soon appeared among them, who adjured the demons in the name of Jesus to depart, and who were afterwards in many places established as regular officers of the church, and placed in the same rank with the clergy. Among these Christian teachers of the second and third centuries there were many New Platonists, who contributed much to the diffusion of the belief that possessions continued beyond the first ages of the church, and who, in full accordance with the philosophic theory which they had adopted, understood by the demons supposed to occupy the body, not evil spirits, but *ψυχαι ἀποθανόντων*—the opinion of Josephus, as stated above, No. 1. Such is the doctrine expressed by Justin the Martyr, *Apoll. ii.* This latter opinion, however, was not universal, and gradually disappeared, as the influence of the New Platonic philosophy ceased; though a belief in the continuance of real possessions still prevailed both in the Eastern and Western church, and in the latter was retained even by the schoolmen. At no time, however, was the belief that evil spirits have power to possess the bodies of men, even since the age

of Christ, more prevalent in the Western church than from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century. Hence we find that this belief was received even by Luther and Melancthon, and other theologians of both the protestant churches, and was transmitted by their disciples to those who came after them.

(b) But about the middle of the seventeenth century some doubts arose with regard to demoniacal possessions, and in general with respect to the whole notion that the power of evil spirits, especially over the material world, still continued. These doubts were engendered at first by the prevalence of the principles of the Cartesian philosophy. The first public attack was made upon this doctrine in England, about the year 1676, and was shortly followed up in France. But a new epoch in the history of this doctrine was made by Balthasar Becker, a Cartesian philosopher, and a preacher at Amsterdam, who in 1690 published at Leuwarden a quarto volume, entitled, *The Enchanted World*, afterwards translated into German by Schwager, and published at Leipsic, 1781–82, with a preface and notes by Semler. This work attracted great notice, and the author of it was severely persecuted. He did not deny the existence of evil spirits, but only their influence upon men, and, of course, all demoniacal possessions, even those mentioned in the New Testament. His opinions met with great approbation at the beginning of the eighteenth century in England and the Netherlands, and were adopted and advocated by Wetstein, Le Clerc, and many other Arminian theologians; but in Germany and Holland these opinions were uniformly rejected by the protestant theologians during the first half of the eighteenth century; nor did even Thomasius agree with Becker on this subject. Semler was the first among the protestant theologians of Germany who adopted, with some modifications, the opinions of Becker, and supposed that the demoniacs of the New Testament were people afflicted with common and natural diseases. He first published an essay, *De dæmoniis quorum in Nov. Test. fit mentio*; Halle, 1760; and afterwards his larger work, *Untersuchung der dämonischen Leute*; Halle, 1762; which were followed by still other writings on the same subject. This opinion at first excited great attention, and had to encounter strong opposition, but it gradually gained ground, until it has now become almost the prevailing opinion among the learned theologians of the protestant church. Some, however, even of modern times, have declared their opinion that the question is not altogether settled, and that there remains something to be said upon the other side. In the English church the opinion of Semler has found many advocates, among

whom Hugo Farmer, the author of an *Essay on Demoniacs*, is distinguished. In the Romish church, the old doctrine that the so called demoniacs of the New Testament were really possessed of devils, and that these possessions were not confined to that particular age, remained the common and professed belief during the greatest part of the eighteenth century. But during the last few years, many of the theologians, even of this church, have come over to the opinions prevailing among protestants. The interest on this subject was revived in the protestant and catholic churches in Germany by the practices of the celebrated conjurers, Schröpfer and Gessner, who appeared in the latter half of the eighteenth century. As the difference of opinion was very great, (some protestant theologians—e. g., Crusius and Lavater, maintaining not only that there might possibly be possessions and conjurations at the present day, but that such were sometimes actually known,) many works were written on both sides of the question. The result of this discussion in the minds of the more unprejudiced and moderate was, that although God, for particular reasons, and for the sake of certain ends, might formerly have permitted demoniacal possessions, there is no proof that there are any such at the present day; and there are no infallible signs by which these alleged possessions can be certainly distinguished at the present day from diseases merely natural.

III. *Remarks on the Possessions recorded in the New Testament.*

1. The common opinion at the present time is, that all these disorders are to be explained by merely natural causes; and that when Jesus and the apostles attributed them to the influence of evil spirits, they spoke in accommodation to the prevailing error of their contemporaries. The ancients, it is said, from their want of pathological science, referred many diseases which were purely natural to demoniacal influence; and this was the case with regard to the diseases mentioned in the New Testament. Christ and his apostles did not appear in the character of theoretic physicians, and were not required by their calling to give instruction concerning the true causes of human diseases. Such is the reasoning often employed at the present day; and in this way do some attempt to escape from difficulties, and to free Christ from the charge of entertaining the superstitious opinions of his countrymen; but, as we shall see hereafter, they thus involve themselves in greater difficulties than they attempt to escape. The question respecting the reality of the possessions recorded in the New Testament is at least open to discussion, and cannot be decided in that authori-

tative and peremptory tone which has of late sometimes been assumed. 'That demoniacal possessions are impossible cannot be proved; nor can it be shewn from the fact of there being none at the present time that there *never* were any. A disease—e. g., epilepsy—which may be owing at one time to a natural cause, may at another be produced by the agency of an evil spirit; nor can the opposite of this be proved. It is also possible that Divine Providence may have suffered in a former period, for the attainment of particular ends, what it no longer permits now that those ends are obtained. Vide No. 3.

2. There are, indeed, difficulties attending the doctrine of demoniacal possessions, and many things about it are dark and inexplicable; but, great as these difficulties may be, those which follow from rejecting this doctrine are still greater. They who deny the reality of demoniacal possessions will find it difficult either to maintain the authority of Christ as a *teacher*, especially as a divine teacher, and the highest ambassador from God to man, (which he always affirmed himself to be,) or even to vindicate his *moral character*. This subject is commonly treated at the present day in altogether too partial a manner; and I regard it as the duty of the Christian theologian, arising especially from the wants of the age in which we live, boldly to resist all such partial views in matters of religion, not concerned as to the judgment which may be formed of him by the multitude, if he can but succeed in gaining the minds of the more candid and enlightened, which he may depend will, sooner or later, be found on the side of truth. In reference to this subject, two things are perfectly undeniable—viz., (a) that Jesus himself spoke of these diseases as effects produced by evil spirits, and never gave the remotest occasion to suppose that he believed they were anything else, not even in his more confidential discourses with his disciples, nor in those cases in which he would have found it necessary to contradict the prevailing opinion, if it had been different from his own, Matthew, viii. 28—32; xvii. 19—21; Luke, x. 17—21; Matt. xii. 28, 29.

This being the case with Christ, it will not be thought strange, (b) that his apostles and other disciples should always have been of the same mind; and that the evangelists did regard these sick persons as true demoniacs is obvious at first sight. Cf. Matt. viii. 28, seq. If Christ and the apostles had regarded this opinion as erroneous they would not have hesitated to declare it so, even if their doing this had been attended with danger from the Jews; for where truth was concerned, they were not accustomed to be governed by regard to consequences. They could not, however, have had any reason to apprehend serious disadvantages from denying the

reality of demoniacal possessions; for this was done by the entire sect of the Sadducees, among whom most of the rulers and great men in Palestine were found, and who, although they went so far as to deny even the existence of good and evil spirits, were left to the undisturbed enjoyment of their belief. That accommodating policy which some have ascribed to Christ and the apostles can hardly be reconciled with the principles of that pure morality which they themselves taught, and according to which, in other cases similar to those now under consideration, they themselves unhesitatingly and invariably acted.

The whole dispute may be summed up in the following points—viz., (a) Those who consider Christ as merely a *human* teacher, and yet one who acted on the highest moral principles, must allow that he at least sincerely believed what he so often asserted; and in no other way can his moral character be vindicated. Such persons might still doubt, notwithstanding the declaration of Christ, whether this doctrine is true, since they might suppose that he, like other human teachers, might err from the imperfection of his knowledge, and thus be the means of leading others astray, or of confirming them in their errors. (b) But those who regard Christ as an *infallible divine* teacher, in the full and proper sense of the word, and as he is declared to be in the New Testament, must assent to his decision on this, as on every other subject, and they must have the courage to profess this, however many difficulties they may find in the way, and although philosophers and illuminati should array themselves in opposition, and scoffers should treat them with ridicule and contempt. (c) In order to avoid the pressure under which they feel themselves placed by the above-mentioned alternative, many will say, that while they would not deny that Jesus was an upright man, and a teacher worthy of esteem, they cannot yet receive him as a divine teacher, in such a sense as to require them to believe a doctrine like this *on his mere authority*. But if they will be consistent, they will bring themselves in this way into great straits. For Jesus declared himself, on every occasion, and in the most decisive manner, to be an *infallible divine teacher*, whose words were true, and must be believed on his mere authority. Now if Christ was not such a teacher as he declared himself to be, the following dilemma arises; either Christ did not think himself such, although he expressly affirmed it, and then he forfeited his character for integrity; or he only imagined himself to be such, and then, though a good man, he must have been a weak and deluded enthusiast, and thus he forfeited the character which the New Testament gave him, and which

he claimed for himself, of a sure and venerable teacher, upon whose guidance and instruction men might safely rely. Everything, therefore, depends upon *the belief of the divine mission and authority of Christ*; and from this point, therefore, which many would be glad to evade, the discussion must proceed.

3. The following are the views and principles respecting demoniacal possessions, and the design with which they were permitted, which are found, without intermixture of philosophy, ancient or modern, in the New Testament, and which therefore should be laid before his hearers by the religious teacher, as far as they are capable of being understood. (a) Satan and other evil spirits feel a hatred to men, which is manifested in various ways. Vide loc. cit. s. 64, II. (b) It was important that this hostility should be rendered very clear and obvious to men, and especially at the time of Christ, when a new era commenced, which needed to be strongly distinguished, at its very introduction, from every other. For this reason, power was granted to evil spirits to possess the bodies of men, or to affect them with dreadful diseases—a power which they had not possessed before, and of which they have since been deprived. Vide Matt. xii. 28; Luke, xiii. 16, coll. v. 11, and x. 17—20; John, xvi. 11; Acts, x. 38, seq. (c) But, on the other hand, power was granted to Jesus and his apostles to shew, in a manner equally clear and striking, by the cure of the diseases which demons inflicted, that the object of the coming of Christ was to destroy the power of evil spirits, to render their hostility to our race harmless, and to free all those who wished to be freed from the evils ascribed to demoniacal agency. Cf. loc. supra cit. and John, xvi. 11; 1 John, iii. 8, and those cited s. 64. The permission of these possessions, therefore, secured an important moral end, which could not be as well secured in any other way, at that particular age of the world. (d) In no other way could the great object for which Christ came into the world, and to which he so often alludes, be so strongly represented, or so deeply impressed, as by these facts falling under the cognizance of the senses. The mere teaching of this religion, unaccompanied by any such facts, would have produced on hearers like his a feeble impression, compared with that made by those wonderful works which proved both the teacher and his doctrine to be divine. *Facts* produce always a greater effect upon men than abstract instruction; and hence God so frequently employs them, as we see both from the Bible and from experience, in the instruction which he gives to men, at least makes use of them to render the instruction he has otherwise imparted more impressive and certain.

SECTION LXVI.

OF MAGIC AND SPECTRES.

I. *Of Magic.*

1. WE shall here present some historical observations on the subject of magic, and then some conclusions drawn from them; for nothing more is necessary for the refutation of magic than that it be exposed to the light of history. The *existence* of spiritual agents, either friendly or hostile to our race, is here presupposed; and magic is founded on the belief of their influence, and secret and invisible power. Wherever this secret, invisible power of superior spirits is granted to men, there is a foundation for magic, whatever may be the nature of the spirits by whom it is granted, whether they are gods, or angels, or demons, or of some other denomination. The many erroneous conceptions of ignorant and uncultivated men with respect to the influence of these spirits, and the custom of ascribing to their agency everything which cannot be easily explained on natural principles,—these, with other things, furnish a sufficient ground for the propensity to magic which is seen among so many persons, and in so many nations. This superstition has indeed appeared in different forms among different people; but as they all proceed from the same general ideas, they bear a strong resemblance to each other in all their diversities, and agree in the means which they prescribe to propitiate or appease these superior spirits, or to avert the threatened evil. *Magic*, in its largest sense, is the art of performing something which surpasses the natural powers of men, by the aid of superior spirits. And the less general cultivation one has, the less knowledge he possesses of the powers of nature and their effects, the more inclined will he be to magic, and to all kinds of superstition which relate to the natural world. The question has sometimes been asked, In what nation was magic first practised? and, Who was its first inventor or teacher? And in answer to these questions, the Chaldeans and Persians have been mentioned. *Sine dubio*, says Pliny (xxx. 1), *orta in Perside à Zoroastre, ut inter auctores constat*. But this inquiry is useless, since magic is practised by all savage nations, and they would be led to it naturally by the superstitious ideas above mentioned, and need not be supposed therefore to have derived it from other sources. Vide Tiedemann, *De Magia*; Marburg, 1787.

When rude and uncultivated man wishes in any way to better his condition, or to accomplish what appears to him difficult or impossible, he resorts to magic, or the aid of spirits. (a) Those who wished to be rich, or prosperous, to live comfortably, to regain their own health, or to

procure health for others, were accustomed to resort to supernatural assistance, to magic medicines, cures effected by incantation, alchymy, philtres, &c. The more mysterious, dark, and enigmatical the means prescribed by this art, the more welcome were they, and the more efficacious were they believed to be. Even the effects produced by the natural virtues of herbs, medicines, &c., were ascribed by some to the influence of spirits; hence Pliny says (xxx. 1), *Natum primum (magiam) e medicina nemo dubitat, ac specie salutari irrepsisse velut altiore sanctioremque medicinam*. (b) Those who wished secretly to injure others, or to be revenged upon them, were wont to employ various herbs, roots, or formulas of speech, for the purpose of bewitching or enchanting the objects of their dislike; and, on the other hand, resorted to amulets, charms, &c., when they wished to repel the injury to themselves from like practices in others. Real injury has been done in magical practices by the use of actual poisons, though the operation even of these is ascribed by many to spirits. Hence, *veneficium* (φαρμακεία) signifies both the *mingling of poison and sorcery*. So Pliny (xxx. 2), *Habet (magia) quasdam veritatis umbras; sed in his veneficæ artes pollutæ, non magicæ*. (d) Those who wished to acquire the knowledge of things unknown to them, (e. g., who their enemies were, who stood in the way of their success, who had stolen their property, &c.,) or who wished to learn their future destiny, supposed that by consulting spirits they could best obtain the desired information. Pliny, in the passage above cited, says, “*Nullo (homine) non avido futura de se sciendi, atque de cælo verissime peti credente.*” Hence divination, dreams, and apparitions, have always been among the instruments of which the magician has availed himself.

Among men entertaining the superstitious opinions here described, the supposed confidant of superior spirits would naturally command respect and influence. These magicians (for so those were called who were supposed to possess familiar spirits) were sometimes impostors, sometimes themselves deluded, sometimes both at once. The various practices to which they resorted in ancient and modern times may be easily explained from what has already been said. The most common are the following—*viz.*, *fascination by evil glances*, by words, prayers, incantations, (*carmina*, formulas which were sung,) Eccl. x. 11; Ps. lviii. 5, 6; Hom. Odys. de Circe; Virgil, Ecl. viii. 69, seq.; Æn. iv. 487, seq. *Necromancy*, the art of obtaining the secrets of the future by conjuring up the dead; Homer, Odys. xi.,—a very common practice in the East, and among the Hebrews, who were addicted to idolatry. A male practitioner of this art among the Hebrews was

called אִיִּם, and a female, (for it was practised by females), בְּלֵילֵי אִיִּם, *a woman who has a spirit of necromancy*; in the plural, אִיִּמוֹת, *sorceresses*. Lev. xx. 27; Is. xxix. 4. Of this class was the *witch of Endor*, whom Saul consulted, 1 Samuel, xxviii. Cf. Is. viii. 19. *Enchantment by magic herbs, ointments, medicines, and different means of exciting the feelings and passions.*

But the belief in the connexion between wicked men and evil spirits or malignant deities, and the injury to others which wizards of this description could do with the assistance afforded them, has been more frightful in its consequences than any other. The magical practices of such men were called by the Arabians *the black art*, in distinction from what was done by those who had connexion with good spirits, which was called by them *white magic*, (*magia alba*.) This form of magic existed also among the Hebrews, who were addicted to idolatry; for the Canaanites, and other heathen nations with whom they were connected, believed in *black deities*, אֱלֹהֵי דִי—i. e., *harmful gods, the authors of mischief*, not morally wicked, like the devils of the Jews after the captivity.

So we find חָשַׁף, (from the Arab. كَسَفَ, *obscuravit*, *eclipsi affecit Deus solem*, and synonymous

with خَسَفَ, *caliginavit oculos*), *magic, black art*; and מַכְשֵׁף, *a magician, practitioner of the black art*. Nah. iii. 4; Deut. xviii. 10. Great mischief has been done by the professors of the *black art*, who, under pretence of magical practices, have not unfrequently committed murder, or administered poison. Hence in many of the ancient languages, the *practice of magic* and the *mingling of poison* were denoted by the same word; in Greek, by φαρμακεία, in Latin, by *veneficium*, *venefica*; hence, too, the operations of poison and of magic are confounded by savage people—e. g., by the African negroes. Vide Oldendorp's History of the Mission to the Caribbean Islands, where the terrible consequences of the belief in magic among barbarous men are described. The practice of black magic was therefore forbidden by many of the ancient legislators, and especially by Moses, Ex. xxii., Lev. xx., Deut. xviii. The latter forbade the practice of it by the Jews, partly from its intimate connexion with idolatry, and partly from the injury done by magicians, as real murderers and poisoners. Magic, however, remained in vogue among the Jews. Before the exile, they supposed the supernatural power of magicians was derived from the heathen idols; but after the exile, when they wholly renounced idolatry, they supposed that black magic was performed by the aid of evil angels. No traces of this opinion, however, are to be met with shortly after the exile; but the Jews at the time of Christ

believed both in the connexion of men with good spirits and in their fellowship and alliance with devils; and of this the Pharisees accused even Jesus, Matt. xii. 24.

2. The source of *modern scientific magic* which has prevailed so extensively even among the civilized nations of Asia and Europe, must be sought in the principles of the New Platonic philosophy, which first flourished in Egypt. The enthusiastic adherents of this philosophy during the second and third centuries brought the ancient religion of the Greeks and the superstitious opinions which prevailed among them into a scientific form, and gave them a learned aspect. Vide Meiner, Betrachtungen über die neuplatonische Philosophie; Leipzig, 1782, 8vo. Eberhard, Ueber den Ursprung der wissenschaftlichen Magie, in Num. 7 of his "Neuen vermischten Schriften;" Halle, 1788. They gave out their own notions as purely Platonic, and in order to secure them a more favourable reception, invested them with the Platonic ideas respecting demons, purification of souls, union with the Deity, &c. They divided magic into two parts:—(a) Θεουργία, θεωρητικὴ τέχνη, *magia alba*—i. e., the art of gaining over good deities or good demons, and of procuring their assistance and cooperation by means of appointed ceremonies, fasts, sacrifices, &c. This art was also called θεαγωγία, (θεαγωγία?) the art of enlisting the gods on one's side; θεωρία, κ. τ. λ. (b) Γοητεία (from γόης, *incantator, præstigiator*), *præstigiæ, magia atra, witchcraft*, the art of securing the assistance of evil spirits. This division was made by Jamblicus, Proclus, Porphyry, and other New Platonists.

When now the principles of the New Platonic philosophy became prevalent among Christian people, theurgy and witchcraft were adopted among other doctrines, though in a form somewhat modified, and intermingled with Jewish and Christian ideas. Vide Lactantius, Instit. Div. ii. 14, 16. The spread of these opinions was also promoted by the enthusiastic writings which were published in the fifth century under the assumed name of Dionysius Areopagita. It was the almost universal opinion of the ecclesiastical fathers that oracles, auguries, and the whole system of heathen divination, were to be ascribed to the devil, and were a product of this their so called γοητεία. Vide Lactantius, l. l. Van Dale, De Oraculis vet. ethnicorum; Amsterdamæ, 1700. Among the Jews, some adopted the opinions above described, others adhered to their cabalistic dreams, and pretended to work wonders with words and phrases taken from the Bible, with the name of God or angels, &c.; all which ran into the theurgy just noticed. Among the Saracens, also, theurgy was very much practised; and especially in the twelfth century, they employed

themselves very zealously in searching for the *philosopher's stone* by the practices of white magic; and transmitted their results to the Christians both of Asia and Europe. It may be said in general of Jewish and Christian teachers, that while they condemned *heathen* theurgy, they did not do this on account of its being a superstitious practice, but because of the homage rendered by it to strange gods; for the gods and demons of the heathen were regarded by Jews and Christians as devils or fallen angels. But while they condemned theurgy as involving this homage, they retained the art itself, unaltered except in its name. During the middle ages, magic was indeed in many places exchanged for astrology, in consequence of the introduction of the physics of Aristotle; still magic was not wholly exterminated, nor were the different kinds of it (*θεουργία* and *γοητεία*) ever in more repute in the west than during the sixteenth and a part of the seventeenth centuries, shortly before and after the Reformation. The heads of theologians, civilians, and common people, were filled with the notion that there were in reality alliances between wicked men and wicked spirits, and not unfrequently, even in the protestant church, have persons been condemned as wizards and witches. By degrees, however, the notions of some of the learned, especially of the Cartesian school, became more clear on this subject; and in England and the Netherlands some ventured openly to avow their own opinions, and publicly to express their belief in the unreasonableness of the popular superstitions. Among these writers, Becker was foremost. He was followed in England by Webster and others, and in protestant Germany by Christ. Thomasius, in his work "*Theses de crimine magiæ*;" Halæ, 1701; and in other works, in which he further developed the principles expressed in his *Theses*. His opinions excited at first great opposition, which, however, did not last long, so ashamed did the princes, theologians, and common people of the protestant church become of this superstition; the trials of the witches were abandoned, and provision was made for the better instruction of the people and the enlightening of the public mind. But, after all, there is still in protestant countries a deep-rooted belief in magic, which is likely yet to continue. How many people of all classes, even in the midst of enlightened Germany, were deceived and led away by the conjurer Schröpfer, and afterwards by Cagliostro! And by how many secret societies has the belief in magic been industriously propagated among the high and the low! Besides the works of Becker, Thomasius, Semler, Tiedemann, Meiner, and Eberhard, which have been already cited, cf. Hauber, *Bibliotheca Magica*, 3 tom.; Lemgov. 1735—41, 8vo, where the

hurtfulness of these magical practices is shewn from authority and history. Hennings, *Das Grab des Aberglaubens*, 4 Samml.; Frankfurt, 1777, 8vo. Vide Noesselt's "*Bücherkenntniss*."

Note 1.—The act of producing unusual and striking effects by means of the known powers of nature, is called *magia naturalis*, because these effects, however marvellous and magical they may appear to the ignorant, are yet really produced by natural means. Such, for example, were many of the effects produced by the magicians of Egypt; Ex. vii. Vide Wiegleb, *Natürliche Magie*; Berlin, 1779, 8vo; continued afterwards by Rosenthal.

Note 2.—The philosophy of many secret orders, both in ancient and modern times, relies upon magic for the attainment of its object. It is built on the cabalistic theory, that man in his original perfection was a very different being from man in his present state; that he possessed even more natural powers than he now does; in short, that he was in the image of *Adam Kadmon*, the original god-man, the first and purest effluence of all the divine powers and attributes; that he was immortal, the friend of superior spirits, lord of the invisible world, and master of secret sciences and arts. To restore human nature to this its original perfection was the object of philosophy; and the mysterious means by which this end could be accomplished, (the philosopher's stone,) were supposed to have been communicated to Adam by superior spirits, and transmitted by tradition, hieroglyphics, and various secret writings, through Seth, Enoch, Noah, Moses, Solomon, Hermes Trismegistus, Zoroaster, Orpheus, and others of the initiated. This order was accessible to men of all religions, and among its members we find the Arabians Adfar and Avienna, Artesius, Raymund, Lullus, Nic. Flamel, and Basil. Valentine. This mystery was brought from the East into Europe by Christ. Rosenkreutz, who lived in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It was called the *philosopher's stone*, though it comprehended more than mere *alchemy*, or the art of ennobling metals, and the secret of preserving life a thousand years. This mystery had for its higher object the entire elevation of man, bodily and spiritually; and this object it sought to effect by means of magic, or a mysterious connexion with good spirits. In comparison with this object, the mere making of gold was regarded as a very petty achievement by these adepts, and was so insignificant in their view, as many of them assure us, that rather than employ themselves about it they would always remain poor.

II. Of Spectres.

A belief in spectres was formerly, and is still, almost universal, and this, because it results

immediately from certain feelings and ideas which are widely diffused among men. Spectres are called by the Greeks, εἰδῶλα, *apparitions, visions, forms which can be seen, shadow-shapes*; also φάσματα (from φαῖνω) and φαντάσματα (from φαντάζω,) *phantoms, phantasms*. Vide Mark, vi. 49. They are called by the Latins *spectra*, (from the obsolete *specio, cerno*;) also *monstra*.

What are spectres? According to the conceptions of the Greeks, Latins, Hebrews, Orientalists, and indeed of most nations, they are *the souls of the departed, returned again to the earth, and rendered visible to men*. The nations now mentioned, and others less cultivated than these, supposed, indeed, that departed souls (the ghosts or manes of the dead) immediately after death wandered down to Hades (ᾍδης), (vide Homer, and Isaiah, xiv. ;) and that they had definite places appointed them there, secluded from the upper world, to which they were not allowed to return in ordinary cases. Vide 2 Sam. xii. 23; Job, vii. 9, 10; Luke, xvi. 22, 23; Isa. xxxviii. 10, seq. But as the living sometimes saw the deceased in their dreams, and as an excited imagination often depicted before their waking eyes the image of some departed friend, so that they seemed to themselves to see and to hear him, they naturally fell into the belief that the shades sometimes ascend from Hades, and become visible to men, or in some other way (perhaps by knocking) give signals of their presence. In conformity with these conceptions, the rich man in Hades is said in the parable to pray that *one of the dead might be sent to his father's house*, Luke, xvi. 27, 30. These ghosts in Hades were represented as beings possessing fine, ærial bodies, in which, though they were far less gross and palpable than the flesh and bones of our earthly bodies, they yet sometimes rendered themselves visible to men. Vide s. 59, II., s. 150. Traces of this opinion are found among the Jews, and also among the Latins and Greeks; thus Homer speaks of βροτῶν εἰδῶλα χαμόντων, and says of them,

Οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ σάρκας τὲ καὶ ὁστέα ἵνες ἔχουσιν.

Cf. Luke, xxiv. 39, πνεῦμα σάρκα καὶ ὁστέα οὐκ ἔχει. Vide texts from various writers cited by Wetstein in his Com. on Luke, xxiv. 37. From these prevailing conceptions, the passages, Luke, xxiv. 37, and Mark, vi. 49, 50, may be explained, and upon the existence of such superstitions the delusions of the ancient necromancers were founded—e. g., of the witch of Endor, 1 Samuel, xxviii. 7, seq. It was with these notions in his mind that Thomas took the appearance of Jesus to be the apparition of a departed spirit in a shadowy body, (εἰδῶλον,) and was unwilling to believe that he had appeared to the other disciples in the true body

which he had upon the earth, John, xx. 25. John relates (chap. xxi.) that Jesus ate with his disciples after his resurrection, in order, it would seem, to discountenance the idea that he appeared only with the airy body of a spectre. The common opinion on this subject was adopted by Plato in his Phædon, and was afterwards further developed and remodelled to suit themselves by the new Platonists. Vide Scripta Varii argumenti, Num. iii., Progr. super origine opinionis de immortalitate animorum; Hallæ, 1790. It was also adopted by many of the early Christian teachers; it is found in the writings of the Greek and Latin fathers; and was turned to good account by the Romanists in their doctrine of purgatory.

It would naturally occur to the minds of Jews and Christians that the devil, and the demons in subjection to him, might have some hand in these apparitions. Some accordingly maintained that it was the devil who, for various sinister purposes, occasioned the return and appearance of departed spirits; while others asserted that spectres were only illusions practised on us by Satan, that the ghosts of the departed never appeared, and that there were no other than *devilish spectres*. Of this opinion were many of the philosophers and theologians of the protestant church, in opposition to those of the Romish. Nor have there been wanting those who have attempted to explain ghostly appearances from physical causes. Cardanus and Jul. Cæs. Bannini contended that spectres were exhalations from the wasting corpse, which, becoming condensed during the more damp and silent air of the night, assumed at length the external form of the deceased. Of the philosophers who divided man into three parts—*body, soul, and spirit*, (s. 51, I.,) some have supposed that it is the *spirit* only which after death appears as a spectre. This was the opinion of Paracelsus, in the sixteenth century, and in this he was followed by many theosophists and astrologers. He called this spectral spirit *astral*, because he supposed that it was composed of the two upper elements, *air and fire*, and was therefore longer in dissolving after death than the material body, and could float about in the atmosphere. He was followed in this by Jacob Boehmen, and also by Rob. Fludd, and others of the ancient Rosicrucians.

But these philosophers would have been better employed in inquiring, in the first place, whether the stories of ghostly appearances which they undertook to explain were real and well-established facts. This inquiry, however, they rarely made, and usually took for granted the truth of what they had heard on this subject. But if we examine impartially the various ghost-stories which are told, we shall be brought to the conclusion that spectres are not, for the

cause them, and all which is done by them, to promote his own designs. Hence the providence of God is justly denominated by the schoolmen *the second creation*. Vide s. 46. But, defined as to its external effect, and as far as it is visible to the eyes of men, providence may be said to be *the government and preservation of all things*; or *the constant care and oversight of God for all his works*; and this definition, which is the one that Morus gives, is the most easy and intelligible. Cf. Morus, p. 76, s. 1, 2.

Note 2.—The doctrine of divine providence is of the very first importance, and contributes greatly to the peace and happiness of human life. Were it not that God maintained a constant and watchful care over his works, all piety would immediately cease. A god who did not concern himself in the affairs of the world, and especially in the actions of men, would be to us as good as none at all. In that case, should men live in a virtuous and pious manner, they would have no approbation to expect from him; should they be guilty of crimes, they would have no punishment to fear; were they persecuted, they could think of God only as the idle witness of their wrongs; were they in circumstances of suffering and sorrow, they could find no consolation, if God were unmindful of them. But if, on the other hand, I am entitled to believe, that even in times of the greatest adversity God careth for me as a

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PROVIDENCE, defined as to its inherent nature, is *the power which God exerts without interruption in and upon all the works of his hands.* The relation in which all things stand to God, and the influences which he exerts upon them, are always represented in the Bible as depending upon the *creation.* As the *creator* of all things, God possesses the power and the right to use them according to his own pleasure; and to

father, and will overrule all events for my greatest good, I may then be composed and unshaken, and may rise above depression and despair.

II. History of Opinions respecting this Doctrine.

1. Rude and uncultivated nations have at first no idea of the world as a whole; they do not once think of its origin, of its internal connexion, or of the government which is exercised over it. Vide sec. 45, Nos. 1, 2. And when by degrees they have attained to the thought that everything which exists must have a cause, they unconsciously adopt the notion, that *chance* or *necessity* is the cause of all things; and with this vague and indefinite notion remain for a long time satisfied. Vide Meiners, *Historia doctrinæ de Deo vero*, p. 1. Respecting the relation which exists between God and the world; respecting his power, and the influence which he exerts upon the works of his hands, the conceptions of people in the first stages of improvement were of course very confined and imperfect. Vide s. 46, II. They represented the Deity to their minds as resembling themselves as closely as possible; they compared him to earthly princes and rulers, possessing, like them, though in a higher degree, power and influence; they considered him therefore as a being whose protection was to be sought, and whose anger was to be dreaded; but at the same time they ascribed to him many human weaknesses and imperfections. Of many of his attributes they appear to have had very elevated and worthy conceptions; and especially of his power, as is evident from the representation of Homer, Ζεὺς δύναται πάντα and yet even of this attribute their views were in some respects defective. For as an earthly monarch, though possessed of the greatest power, and of the best will, is sometimes prevented from acting in the manner which he approves and desires, by the occurrence of some unforeseen events, or by the control of necessity; even so, they supposed, was God himself, though possessed of a vastly superior power, and acting in a sphere of vastly greater extent, yet equally liable to be hindered by contingent events, and equally subject to that irresistible *necessity* (*fatum, μοῖρα*), by which gods and men were alike controlled. And not only in the respect above mentioned was God supposed to resemble human rulers, but also in matters of mere *propriety*; and as it was reputed inconsistent with the dignity of a ruler to concern himself in all the petty affairs of his subjects, so it was supposed, a minute inspection and particular care over all his works would be inconsistent with the majesty of God. Such were the popular notions respecting the deities which prevailed among the ancient Greeks, and which are expressed in Homer, Hesiod, Pindar. and other early Grecian poets.

On the one hand, their conceptions of the providence of God, and his government over the world, were very just and elevated; they considered all events as depending upon his will;

ἀλλ' ἦτοι μὲν τὰτα θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται,

Il. xx. 435, and represented him as the witness and judge of the conduct of men;

Ζεὺς σφείας τίσαιδ' ἵκετ' ἡσίοιο, ὅστις καὶ ἄλλους ἀνδρῶν ποῦς ἐφορᾷ, καὶ τίνεται, ὅστις ἀμαρτῆ,

Od. xiii. 213. But, on the other hand, these conceptions were mingled with others, which appear to us extremely unworthy, and inconsistent with the divine character.

Among the ancient nations, the Chaldeans were distinguished by their belief in the doctrine of *fate*, which they associated with their astrology; hence the name *fatum Chaldaicum*, or *astrologicum*; though this doctrine was by no means confined to them. Among the Greeks, the philosophers made the popular notions respecting the Deity the basis of their philosophical reasonings. From the belief which was almost universally entertained of two original and eternal principles—*God* and *matter*, neither of which was the author of the other (vide s. 46, II.), their views respecting the agency of God in the material world, and of his power over it, and consequently respecting his *providence*, must have been extremely defective and erroneous. The first among the Grecian philosophers who advocated the doctrine of *fate*, from whose control not even the Deity was excepted, was Heraclitus. It was afterwards defended by Parmenides, Democritus, and others; and even by Aristotle, if the testimony of Cicero (*De Fato*, c. 17) is to be received, which is somewhat doubtful. But as this doctrine involved inadequate conceptions of divine providence, and infringed upon the freedom of God and of other rational beings, it was remodelled by Plato, and so explained by him as to be more easily reconciled with other established truths; though he does not always adhere to his own principles. The stoics are known as strict *fatalists*, though the precise sense in which they held this doctrine is a subject of dispute among the learned. Lipsius maintained that the fate of the stoics was nothing more than the so called *rational fate*—i. e., the order established by God, in the exercise of his freedom and wisdom, according to which certain events must necessarily take place. In the stoical fate, however, there was always involved a *physical necessity*, although they represented it as a predetermination which did not exclude the freedom of the will, and which, while it secured the *certainly* of particular events, did not make them *necessary*. This is indeed contradictory; but it did not appear so to them. Vide Tiedemann, *System der*

stoischen Philosophie, th. ii. s. 129—142; Leipzig, 1776, 8vo. According to the doctrine of Epicurus, the Deity was wholly removed from the world. In his system, as it is represented by Diogenes, Laertius, and Seneca, the notion of *providence* is absolutely denied. He supposed that the peace of the blessed gods would be interrupted by the labours and cares incident to the government of the world.

2. This doctrine of an inevitable necessity being found inconsistent with the scriptural representations of the providence of God, and being also liable to the greatest objections on philosophical grounds, has been justly abandoned and rejected by Christian philosophers and theologians. But in determining the *manner* in which God governs the world, they have shewn a great discrepancy in their opinions, and on account of the bearing of this question on that concerning the origin and causes of sin, have made it the subject of great controversy. They may be ranked, according to the systems which they have adopted, in three classes, each of which has its representatives even among the ancient schoolmen.

(a) *The Occasionalists*, who adopted the system of *occasional causes* (*systema causarum occasionalium*), *occasionalism*. They maintained that God is the *immediate* cause of the actions of his creatures, and that they only furnish him an *occasion* for what he does, and accordingly are only passive instruments by which he absolutely and irresistibly accomplishes his own designs. According to this system, what are elsewhere called *second causes* are only *occasiones agendi*. They are also called *Prædeterminantes*, because they supposed a *prædeterminatio*, or *præmotio physica*. Of this class were many of the schoolmen, particularly the Thomists and Dominicans, among whom Gabriel Biel distinguished himself as an advocate of this theory, in the fifteenth century. The same notion respecting the manner of God's agency in the world was adopted in the seventeenth century, by many of the disciples of Des Cartes; and indeed his principles necessarily involved it. Among theologians, the disciples of Cocceius, and some Arminians, were the advocates of this system. Its most zealous and acute defenders, however, were Malebranche and Bayle, though the latter dissented in many particulars from the former. The names of Twiss, Maccov, and Turretin, deserve to be mentioned in this class. In the Romish church, the Dominicans still continue the advocates of this theory. With regard to this theory it must be said, that it is hard to see its consistency with the freedom of the human will; nor, indeed, is its inconsistency denied by Bayle. Man is thus subjected to necessity; his good and bad actions are not imputable to him, but to God, who acts through

him, as a mere instrument. But the law of necessity, when applied to moral beings, or within the world of spirits, is extended beyond its proper sphere, which is the material world. This theory, therefore, which involves a necessity of acting, is utterly inapplicable to moral beings, whose highest law of acting is *freedom*. [Respecting the system of occasional causes, the student may consult Hahn, *Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens*, s. 73, s. 316, 320; Bretschneider, *Handbuch der Dogmatik*, b. i. s. 93, s. 610. Tennemann, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philos.* s. 373, 378.—Tr.]

(b) Perceiving that this theory was untenable, and injurious in its influence on morality, some adopted one exactly opposite, and maintained that the creatures of God acted immediately in and through themselves, in the exercise of the powers with which they had been once endowed by the Creator, and independently of his assistance. They compared the movements and alterations which appear in the creation to those of a machine, (e. g., of a clock,) which, being once made and wound up, goes for a time of itself, without the further assistance of the artist, and when he is no longer present. This theory is called the system of *mechanism*, and was proposed by Durandus, in the fourteenth century, and by other schoolmen. Its first advocate was Scotus, and it has been adopted by many of the modern mechanical philosophers, and even by Richard Baxter. Some have made use of Bonnet's *System of development*, in order to confirm and complete this theory. But this theory, as well as the one to which it is opposed, is liable to great objections. It exhibits God in a light which is inconsistent with his perfections. It represents him as an artist who leaves his work, when he has completed it, or idly beholds its operations. Nor does this theory, less than the former, impinge upon the doctrine of freedom and accountability. If it is consistently carried through, it removes many of the most important motives which ethics or religion can furnish; for practical uses, therefore, it is wholly unfit. Vide Jerusalem, *Betrachtungen*, th. i. s. 114. Also the writings of Kant, which contain many profound discussions on this subject. [Cf. De la Mettrie, *L'Homme machine*, 1748, 4to. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, p. 243, Amer. Edition.—Tr.]

(c) In consequence of the difficulties and obvious errors attending the theories above mentioned, many of the schoolmen were led to adopt a scheme which is intermediate between these opposite extremes. They maintained that God has indeed endowed his creatures with active powers; but that still his own concurrent aid (*concursum*) is essential to their exercise; since without it neither the thing itself which is supposed to act, nor its power of action, could for a

moment subsist; so that, in all the actions of his creatures, there is a joint, concurrent agency of God. By this theory, most of the difficulties attending this subject are obviated; it is also found to be the most accordant with the representations of the Bible, and to commend itself more than any other to sound reason. It has therefore been justly adopted, though with various modifications, by most of the modern philosophers and theologians. In the sequel of this Article it will be more fully developed. [Cf. Bretschneider, *Handbuch*, b. i. s. 92, s. 605.]

But after all that has been thought and written upon this subject, it still remains encompassed with difficulties; and this, for the reason that it is impossible for men to form any distinct conceptions respecting the proper, internal manner of the divine agency. In order to represent it to our minds, we must liken it to the manner in which men act; and thus our whole knowledge of the subject is, from the necessity of the case, symbolical, and greatly deficient. From this historical sketch, however, and especially from No. 1, one thing is clear—viz., that the simple theory respecting the providence of God, which is now almost universally received as true, owes its origin neither to heathen mythology or philosophy, but to the Bible, where it was exhibited before it ever entered the mind of any philosopher. Vide Staüdlin, *Materialien zu einer Geschichte der Lehre von Gottes Fürsorge*, in his "Magazin für Religionsgeschichte," b. iii. st. 1, s. 234, ff; Hanover, 1804, 8vo.

SECTION LXVII.

OF THE PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE; AND OF THE DIVISIONS UNDER WHICH IT HAS BEEN TREATED.

I. Proof of this Doctrine.

1. PROOF from *reason*. This proof depends upon the truth of the position that the world is not self-existent, but was created by God; and this proposition is proved by the same arguments by which the divine existence is proved. Vide s. 15, 46. Presuming that this position may now be considered as fully established, we derive proof of the providence of God from two sources—viz., from *his own nature*, and from *that of his works*.

(a) From the nature and attributes of God. That God is not only able, but willing to take care of all his creatures, is demonstrable from the idea of the most perfect being; cf. s. 15. That he is able to do this, appears from his *omniscience*, by which he knows the circumstances and wants of all his creatures; from his *wisdom*, by which he understands in what manner and by what means the world may be sustained

and governed; and from his *omnipotence*, by which he can accomplish everything which he desires. That he is willing to do this, follows alike from his *wisdom* and his *goodness*. Vide s. 24, 28. If it is the design of God to advance his creatures to that degree of perfection and well-being of which they are susceptible, it must also be his will to watch over them, and to exercise towards them his providential care, to sustain them, and to promote their welfare by means which his wisdom approves as best. And his willing to do this is his actually doing it; for to suppose God to will anything, the attainment of which depends upon his absolute power, which yet he does not execute, would be to ascribe to him weakness and imperfection. This metaphysical proof, however, when stated in its full extent, is not sufficiently intelligible to be used in popular instruction.

(b) From the nature of *created things*. For it is obvious that the creatures of God are no more able to perpetuate their being than they were to contribute at first to their own existence. To sustain and perpetuate existence requires no less power than to create. Besides, the wise, orderly, and harmonious movement of all created things, in conformity with the plan on which they were adjusted, and for the promotion of the ends for which they were made, which is everywhere visible in the universe, sufficiently evinces the care and government of an all-wise and almighty being. Cf. s. 69. To this it is objected that God *might* have so made the world that it would preserve itself, and stand in no need of the providence of its author; but from this objection the system of mechanism (noticed s. 67, II. b) immediately results; and this system, as was remarked, excludes moral freedom, and subjects everything to the law of necessity. Cf. s. 26.

[Note.—Besides these proofs of the providence of God, the theologians of the school of Kant have proposed another, similar to that of the divine existence, Art. ii. s. 15, II. It is briefly this: we cannot recognise the law of duty written upon our hearts as a divine command, unless we believe that there is a moral government which will, in the end, make the happiness which, as sensitive beings, we naturally desire, proportionate to the *morality* of our actions; we cannot derive the strength which is necessary to a course of undeviating virtue amidst the temptations to which we are exposed, from anything but a faith in a holy governor of the world, and disposer of the destinies of men. And hence—viz., from the necessity of believing in providence in order to virtuous moral action—they argue the truth of this doctrine, and call it a postulate of our practical reason. There is still another proof which deserves a distinct mention—viz., that which may be de-

rived from the great historic events which have taken place in the world,—the giving and transmission of a divine revelation—the founding of religious institutes, as the Mosaic and the Christian—the raising up of prophets, apostles, and defenders of the faith—the ordering of particular events, such as the Reformation—the more remarkable deliverances noticed in the lives of those devoted to the good of the world, &c.—all of which indicate the wise and benevolent care of God over the human family, and together constitute what may be called the *historic* proof of the providence of God. This proof is exhibited in an interesting manner in the scripture biography of Hess, in Niemeyer's Characteristics of the Bible, and works of a similar kind.—Tr.]

2. From the *holy scriptures*. Cf. Morus, p. 76, seq. s. 3. Many of the texts which might be cited will be omitted here, and introduced in their more appropriate places in the sections which follow. Of the texts which treat of the general subject of providence more at large, and which exhibit many of the truths connected with this doctrine, the following are the most important:—Ps. viii. xix. xc. (s. 20, III.) xci. civ. (vide Article on the Creation,) and cxxxix. (s. 22, I.); in the New Testament, Matt. vi. 25—32; x. 29—31; Acts, xvii. 24—28.

In the texts above cited we are taught the following truths:—(a) The preservation of the existence of all things depends on God alone. (b) God is the ruler and proprietor of the universe, his title in it being founded in his having created it. (c) The state and circumstances of all created things are determined by God; he needs nothing; but his creatures receive from him the supply of all their wants. (d) Nothing is so insignificant as to be unworthy of his notice; his providence extends even to the smallest objects. (e) Through his watchful care all his creatures, in their several kinds, enjoy as much good as from their nature they are susceptible of. (f) But his providence is most conspicuous in reference to the human race, both as a whole and as composed of individual men. He preserves their lives, provides them with food, clothing, and everything which they need. Their actions and their destinies are under his guidance and at his disposal; and their race is preserved from generation to generation through his care. The whole is comprised in the words of Paul, Acts, xvii. 28, *ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν*.

These scriptural representations have many practical uses. They furnish us with the means of forming just notions of God, and with motives to induce us to reverence and serve him, Acts, xvii. 27. These considerations are calculated to inspire our minds with confidence in God, and to teach us to regard him as a kind

and benevolent father. Cf. the texts cited from Matthew, and Is. xl., ad finem. Indeed, the whole object and tendency of this doctrine, as exhibited in the sacred writings, is to excite and cherish pious dispositions in our minds. It leads us to think, with regard to every passing event, that *God knows it*; to feel that it is exactly as he willed it, and in it to see his agency. If we were duly influenced by what we are taught in the Bible of the providence of God, we should do all our works under a sense of his presence, *ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and our constant maxim would be *οὐδὲν ἀνεῖν Θεοῦ*. Vide Matt. x. 29, &c. Morus, p. 76, s. 3, p. 78, Note. Such exalted and worthy conceptions of the providence of God as these, which occur everywhere in the Bible, and which must accord with the judgment and the feelings of every one who is not wholly perverted, may be sought in vain in the writings of the ancient philosophers, who were unacquainted with the Bible. And it is to the Bible alone that modern philosophers are indebted for the more correct principles which they inculcate upon this subject.

Note.—The work of providence and preservation is usually ascribed in the Bible to the *Father*, as is also the work of creation; and it is principally as the *creator* and *preserver* of the world that he is called *Father*. Vide s. 36. There are, however, some texts in the New Testament, in which both the creation and preservation of the world are ascribed to the Son—e. g., Heb. i. 3, *φέρων πάντα ὅγκματι δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ*, and Col. i. 17, *τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνίστηκε*, both of which have already been examined in the article respecting the creation, s. 47, II. 2.

II. Scholastic Divisions.

1. The providence of God is divided, in relation to its *objects*, into *general* (*generalis*), so far as it extends to all existing things; *special* (*specialis*), so far as it relates to moral beings—to men and human affairs; and *particular* (*specialissima*), so far as it extends to the moral beings, who fulfil the ends of their existence—the pious and virtuous. Vide Morus, p. 78, s. 4. Strictly speaking, however, God cannot be said to care more or less for one class of his creatures than for another. His providence, in itself considered, is *the same* for all; but all have not an equal capacity to receive the proofs and benevolent expressions of his care: an irrational creature is not susceptible of the same kind and degree of perfection and welfare as a rational being; nor a vicious, as a virtuous man. Hence it *seems* to us as if God had more care for the animate than for the inanimate creation; for men, than for beasts; for the pious, than for the wicked; though the real ground of the difference in their condition lies in their own greater or less capacity for the divine favour.

Now the universe, so far as we know, consists of the three classes—inanimate things, creatures endowed with life and activity but possessing no rational and moral powers, and moral beings. The latter are by far the most exalted and noble, the nearest related, so to speak, to their author, and those in whom his designs mostly terminate. They are not placed, like the lower orders of being, under the law of necessity, and treated like machines; which would be inconsistent with the free nature which has been given them. The highest aim which God can be supposed to have had in view in the creation and government of the world, is a *moral* end; and to subserve this end, to which all others are subordinate, he governs not only the moral kingdom, but the whole material and animal creation.

2. The particular *manner* in which God preserves and governs the world can no more be understood by us than the manner in which he first created it. Vide s. 46. But in order to obtain some definite conceptions of this subject, we compare the operations of God to those of men; though in doing this there is danger of ascribing to God the imperfections which belong only to man. Now when men exercise care over anything, there are two things which may be considered—the *care itself*, as exercised by them, and the *effect* or *result* of it.

(a) The *care itself*, (*actio interna*.) Since a man, when he exercises care over others, must have the *knowledge* of what they need, and understand the *means* by which their wants can be supplied; must then come to a *determination* to make use of the means approved as proper; and lastly, must carry his determination into *effect*; so it was supposed to be with God, in the care which he exercises over the world; and this gave rise to the scholastic division of the providence of God into three acts—viz., *πρόγνωσις* (*præscientia*), the *knowledge* of God of the wants of his creatures, and of the best means of supplying them; *πρόθεσις* (*decretum*), his *determination* to make use of these means; and *διάκρισις* (*executio*, *administratio*), his actual *fulfilment* of his determination. But here it must be remembered that this can be said only anthropopathically of God, since in his mind there is no succession of acts.

(b) The *effect* of this care, (*actio externa*.) In order to render the manner of this external agency of God in his providence in some degree intelligible, the schoolmen have assumed *three* external acts of providence—viz., *preservation* (*conservatio*), *cooperation* (*concursus*), and *government* (*gubernatio*); and under these three heads the doctrine of divine providence is usually treated. (a) *Preservation* (*conservatio*) is that mighty and efficient agency of God by which created things continue to exist, by which

the identity of their being is preserved; *efficientia Dei, quæ ipsæ substantiæ pergunt esse*. It extends to things already existing, and in this is distinguished from the act of *creation*; though, in reality, the preservation of the world is only a continuation of the act of creation, and is therefore sometimes properly called, *creatio continuata*. (β) *Cooperation* (*concursus*) is that act of God by which he preserves the *powers* originally imparted to created things, *quæ vires substantiarum durant*. The term *concursus*, as used by the schoolmen, is synonymous with *auxilium*; but it is a very inconvenient term, and leads naturally to the inquiry, whether God *assists* men and *cooperates* with them in their *wicked* actions? This division has been wholly omitted by some modern theologians (e. g., by Doederlein), on the ground that the preservation of the existence of a thing without the preservation of its *powers* cannot be conceived, and that this division is therefore necessarily involved in the preceding; which is indeed true, as to fact, though the preservation of the simple substance of a thing, and the preservation of its powers of acting, may be made the subjects of distinct consideration by the mind. (γ) *Government* (*gubernatio*, *providentia strictè sic dicta*) is that act of God by which he so orders all the changes which take place in the world, and so guides all the actions of his creatures, as to promote the highest possible good of the whole, and of every part. According to the usual method of theological writers we shall proceed to treat of this doctrine under the three foregoing heads; in such a way, however, that what is said respecting the first two divisions (*preservation* and *cooperation*) will be connected together. Respecting the division of providence into *ordinata* and *miraculosa*, vide s. 72, II.

Note.—Notice of some of the principal works on the providence of God. The ancient heathen philosophers said much on this subject which was just and practically useful, though mingled with much that was erroneous. Cf. Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, the writings of Plato, and other disciples of Socrates. Cf. also the writings of Marcus Aurelius, and of other stoics. The work of Cicero, *De Natur. Deor.*; and of Seneca, *De Providentia*, deserve particular mention. Some of the early ecclesiastical fathers devoted whole works to this subject. Chrysostom wrote a book on providence. Gregory of Nazianzen treated of it in his discourses, particularly the sixteenth. Theodoret wrote "*Sermones de Providentia*." Salvianus Massiliensis, a Latin father of the fifth century, wrote a work entitled "*De gubernatione Dei*." In modern times, the theory of this subject has been ably discussed in the writings of Kant, and other works on the philosophy of religion.

Works of a more practical and popular cast are the following:—Jacobi, *Betrachtungen über die weisen Absichten Gottes*; Hanover, 1765—66, 8vo; Jerusalem, *Betrachtungen über die wichtigsten Wahrheiten der Religion*; Sander, *Ueber die Vorsehung*; Leipzig, 1780—81, 8vo; also the work “Für Anbeter Gottes, 1780, by the same author; Zollikofer, *Betrachtungen über das Uebel in der Welt*; Leipzig, 1777, 8vo; and many of the Sermons of this author; Jacob, *Von der Religion*; Köppen, *Die Bibel, ein Werk der göttlichen Weisheit*, in which excellent work there are many fine and useful remarks on this subject.

SECTION LXIX.

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE EXISTENCE AND OF THE POWERS OF CREATED BEINGS AND THINGS.

I. *Preservation of Creatures in General.*

THE great end which God has in view in his providence over the world is the welfare of his creatures. On him does their existence and well-being every moment depend. The *powers* which they possess from the beginning of their existence, and the *laws* by which these powers are exercised, have their only ground in the divine will. This will of God is the efficient cause of the existence of his creatures, and of all the powers which they possess; and not only so, but of the *continuance* of these creatures, with their powers and laws. These laws, in conformity with which the powers of created things develop themselves, are commonly called the *laws of nature*. These propositions need to be farther illustrated and established.

1. The proof that God preserves the existence and the powers of all created things is drawn from the following sources:—

(a) From the *contingency* of the world. The world does not *necessarily* exist; it has not the ground of its existence in itself; but it is contingent, and depends upon the will of God. Vide s. 15, 46. It must therefore continue to exist through the same power which first gave it being. The purpose of God to create the world could not have been confined to the first instant of its creation, but must have comprised its whole *future* being and permanent existence. Now this purpose of God is unalterable, and cannot be hindered or turned aside by the intervention of any object; but must endure while the creation continues. The *continuance*, therefore, of the creation, through every moment of its existence, is so intimately connected with the purpose of God respecting its first existence, that it can hardly be separated from it, even in thought. Cf. the theory of the divine decrees, s. 32.

(b) From *experience* and *history*. That God preserves the works which he has created may be rendered very obvious from a survey of the world and a review of its past history. Cf. especially the work of Sander above mentioned, and the works on teleology noticed s. 15, 1, 2, ad finem. If we look no further than the physical world, and confine our attention to its wise adaptation to the ends which it is made to answer, we shall be driven to the conviction that it is not the work of chance or blind accident, but that, on the contrary, it is constituted by an intelligence which, though invisible, guides and governs all things with infinite wisdom. The following are examples of innumerable teleological observations which might be made. No single species of animals has perished, notwithstanding all that has been done to destroy them, and all the dangers to which they have been exposed from floods, earthquakes, &c.; nor has any species undergone essential alterations. The nature and qualities of the horse, the lion, the crocodile, &c., are still the same as they were described to be by Moses, Homer, Aristotle, and other ancient writers. Between the *individuals* also of the different species, the same relations and proportions which have always been observed still exist. Wild and dangerous animals multiply less rapidly than tame and domestic ones. The short-lived animals, and particularly insects, propagate their kind in great numbers; those that live longer produce fewer young. Were the ephemeral insects no more prolific than the lion and the elephant, their race would be soon extinct; and were the progeny of the lion and elephant as numerous as that of the insect tribes, the earth would soon be insufficient to support, or even contain them, and other species of animals would be driven out and destroyed before them. In the material world there is a constant ebb and flow; on the one hand, decay, death, and destruction; on the other, life, and ever-renewed activity and motion; in short, throughout the world there are conflicting powers, by which the things that belong to it are at one time wasted and destroyed, at another revived and animated; but yet, after all, everything exists in the most just proportion and perfect order; and every apparent dissonance is resolved at last into an uninterrupted harmony. Every sensitive being stands in such a relation to the rest of the world that it finds what is necessary for its support and welfare. And any one who will consider all this with attention, will be led to the conclusion that it results from the constitution of a Being who is supremely intelligent, and who guides all things in such a way as to promote his own purposes. What is so suitably arranged, so wisely and accurately adapted to its ends, and so perfectly adjusted to all its rela-

tions, cannot possibly be the work of blind chance. Against such a supposition the reason of man instantly revolts.

[*Note*.—The validity of this proof from experience is denied by Staüdlin, (Lehrb. s. 273,) and also by Bretschneider, for the following reasons:—(1) Our experience is too young and too limited to enable us to derive an argument from it with certainty. (2) From experience it cannot be shewn that everything has been the same from the beginning of the creation as it now is. (3) The argument from experience is rendered uncertain by the fact that several species of animals—e. g., the mammoth—are wholly extinct, and other facts of a similar nature. They therefore rest the proof of the preservation of the world by the agency of God, solely upon the metaphysical and scriptural arguments.—*Tr.*]

(c) From the express declarations of the *holy scriptures*, which coincide with what we are taught by experience and history, and which indeed, by their example, lead us to make the observations and to draw the conclusions just stated. Among the most explicit of these declarations are those contained in Psalm civ. 8—16, 27, 28, and particularly ver. 29. "Thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth." Here also the words of Christ, which are so useful as examples of proper instruction, should be particularly mentioned, Matt. vi. 26, seq.; x. 29. According to these representations, not a hair falls from the head of man, not a bird falls to the ground, not a flower withers in the field, without the notice and will of God. Hence we, who were made for such higher purposes, should confidently trust in God, and renounce all painful solicitude and despondency, all doubt and despair. For if God takes care of the less, how much more will he of the greater! of us, therefore, whose destination is so much more exalted than that of his other creatures. Our life, our activity, our whole existence, proceeds from him; and as a father, he constantly cares for us, Acts, xvii. 28.

2. In considering the *powers* which God imparts to his creatures, and the continuance of which he secures, two things need especially to be noticed—viz., their *degree* and their *use*.

(a) The *degree* (modus) of these powers. And this again is either *essential*—i. e., necessarily requisite to the very existence of the thing, so that, in defect of it, it would cease to be what it is, or *contingent, accidental*, inasmuch as the proportion of powers in different individuals belonging to the same kind, may be, and actually is, different. These contingent powers and capacities are either *innate* or *acquired*, and increased and strengthened by discipline and ex-

ercise. For example: it is essential to the existence of a man that he possess reason, memory, and imagination; these are *vires essentielles*; but one man surpasses another in these powers, and this is what is contingent. One man has a natural and innate talent for poetry, music, painting, or some other art or employment; another acquires skill in these things by effort and diligence. Now in this difference of degree in these powers, and in the wise proportion and allotment of them to animate and inanimate, rational and irrational creatures, the wise providence of God is clearly exhibited.

(b) The *use* of these powers is granted to the creatures of God for their own advantage and the good of the whole. This is very obvious in the case of the natural instincts imparted to animals. Vide Reimarns, Von den Trieben, besonders den Kunsttrieben der Thiere—an excellent work. In this respect man is far inferior to the lower orders of creatures. But in place of instinct he has reason and free will, by which he is determined to action. Vide s. 26. I. And in this his great advantage over other creatures consists; by this, his moral nature, he resembles God, and is more nearly related to him than other creatures who inhabit the earth. And God has enabled man so to use his powers that the freedom of the human will shall not be at all infringed.

From what has now been said it appears (a) that God is the first cause of all the powers which his creatures possess. (b) That God may be said in a certain sense to cooperate (concurrere) with the free actions of men, since he grants them the powers necessary to action, even to free action, and continually preserves the powers which he has given; and moreover is able to overrule their evil actions so as to make them promote the greatest good. But (c) since this language is liable to misapprehension, and might be understood in such a sense as would be inconsistent with the freedom of the will, and would represent God as the author and promoter of sin, it is better to make an accurate distinction between the *powers* themselves granted to moral beings, and the *exercise* of these powers in free actions. The powers of action come from God; but he has left the use and exercise of these powers to moral beings. This is involved in the very idea of moral being, which would cease to be *moral* if it were subjected to the control of necessity, and not suffered to choose and to do what it saw to be best, according to the laws of freedom. Vide s. 26, I. God is not, therefore, the efficient cause of the free actions of moral beings. This distinction is thus expressed by the schoolmen: *Deum concurrere ad materiale actionis liberæ*—i. e., God gives to men the powers of action, and preserves these powers every moment, but not *ad formale*

actionis liberæ—i. e., he is not the efficient cause of the free actions themselves. Thus, for example, when a man opens his mouth to lie, or to forswear, God grants him the power at that very moment to open his mouth and to speak (*concurrit ad materiale actionis*;) but the use of this power (*formale actionis*) is left to the man himself, and he might open his mouth to speak the truth, and to glorify God. The action, therefore, whatever it is, is his own, and for it he himself is accountable; which could not be the case if the action proceeded from another.

Note.—In contemplating the preservation of the existence and of the powers of all created beings, we find great occasion to recognise and admire the divine wisdom and goodness, and also a powerful motive to seek for true holiness. This is the application which the sacred writers made of this doctrine; and hence the ample instruction on this subject which they give us is so eminently calculated to produce a good practical effect. Cf. s. 24 and s. 28, II. Also Cicero, *De Natur. Deor.* ii. 39, seq., and 47.

II. Preservation of Men.

1. Men are the only creatures of God upon the earth who possess a moral nature, or who have reason and freedom of will; and as possessing these, they are capable of a far higher degree of perfection and happiness than the lower orders of creation. Hence the care of God for them is more apparent, and seems to be more active and efficient, than for his other creatures. Matthew, vi. 26, οὐχ ἄμειν μᾶλλον διαφέρετε αὐτῶν; Acts, xvii. 26, 28, γένος Θεοῦ ἐσμεν. Of this watchful care of God for the preservation of men we have abundant proof in the history of our race. Vide Süssmilch, *Goettliche Ordnung in den Veränderungen des menschlichen Geschlechts*; Berlin, 1788, 8vo. But more particularly—

2. The life and all the powers of each individual of the human race depend upon God. Morus, p. 77, n. 3.

(a) *Our life depends upon God.*

(a) As to its *origin*; for although our parents, as the instruments of God, are the means by which we come into the world; yet God is truly our creator, and the author of our existence. We are taught everywhere in the holy scriptures that God formed us, &c.; Job, x. 8, 11, 12; Acts, xvii. 25, 27; Ps. cxxxix. 13—16; and also that he secures the continuance of the life which he imparts, orders all its changes, determines the time, place, circumstances, and, in short, everything respecting it, Psalm xc., xci., cxxxix.; Acts, xvii. 24; Matthew, vi., x. The Hebrews represented this truth in a very plain and striking manner, by supposing God to keep a *book of fate* and *book of life*, in which every man is enrolled, and has, as it were, his own portion assigned him, Ps. cxxxix. 16. Hence

to be *blotted out from the book of life* is the same as *to die*, Exod. xxxii. 32; Ps. lxxix. 28. The meaning of the representation is this:—God determines the beginning and the end of our lives; he is perfectly acquainted with our whole destiny; everything in our whole existence depends upon him, and is under his control and government.

(β) As to its *termination*. However contingent the time of our death may appear, it is still at the disposal of God; Job, xiv. 5, "Thou hast appointed his bounds which he cannot pass." Ps. xc. 3, "Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, Return, ye children of men;" Psalm xxxi. 15; xxxix. 4, 5. These texts, however, and others of a similar nature, have been often erroneously supposed to imply an unconditional decree of God respecting the life and death of every man. Against this erroneous opinion of an unconditional decree of God, determining irrevocably the bounds of the life of man, the Christian teacher should carefully guard his hearers, since it is not unfrequently entertained even by those who are cultivated and enlightened, as well as by those who are ignorant. It may encourage the most rash and foolhardy undertakings; and where it is thoroughly believed and consistently carried out into action, it must lead to the neglect of the proper means of recovery from sickness, and of the necessary precautions against approaching danger. For if the fixed period of my life is now arrived, may one say who is of this opinion, these remedies can be of no service to me; if it is not yet come, they are wholly unnecessary. This error has been for a long time widely diffused over the East; and Mahommed himself was a strict fatalist and predestinarian. He believed that every event in the life and the very hour of the death of every man was settled by an unalterable predetermination. This doctrine has received the name of *fatum Turcicum* among modern European Christians, because among all the Mahomedans by whom it is professed, the Turks are those with whom the Europeans are most acquainted, and in whom they have seen the evil influence of this doctrine most clearly displayed. It would be more properly denominated *fatum Muhammedicum*. The opinion that the bound of human life is unalterably determined was also adopted by those ancient philosophers who believed in the doctrine of fate. Vide s. 67. Hence the stoical dilemma of which mention is made by Cicero, in his treatise, "*De Fato*;" *Si fatum tibi est, ex hoc morbo convalescere, sive medicum adhibueris, sive non, convalesces*; [and the saying, *Nisi fatale ægro mori, facile evadet: cui fatale mori, vel pediculi morsu conficeretur.*] On this principle suicide might be justified, or at least palliated, as has been actually done. God does indeed, in every case, foresee and

know how long a man will live, and the result will perfectly agree with this foreknowledge, since the omniscient God cannot be mistaken in what he knows. But to stop here would be to take only a partial view of some of the divine attributes, which would lead into error. God has indeed formed a purpose respecting the length of the life of every man; but for the very reason that he is *omniscient*, he has formed this purpose only on consideration of natural and moral causes; his providence therefore does not make it in itself unconditionally necessary that any man should die at such a particular time. The purpose of God is a conditional one, founded upon a knowledge of all the circumstances into which the individual who is the object of it would come, and also upon the knowledge of all his free actions. Vide s. 32, I. ad finem. God foresees how the body of every man will be constituted; in what situation it will be placed; of what character his moral actions will be, and what consequences will flow from them, &c. And from his foreknowledge of all these circumstances respecting him, God forms his purpose, fixing the termination of his life. The *bodily constitution* which a man brings with him into the world, and which is afterwards affected by so many circumstances, perfectly known to God, and under his control, is one of the conditions upon which the purpose of God respecting the end of human life is founded; and this period, so far as it depends upon our bodily constitution, cannot be passed over. When the clock runs down, it stops; when the flower blossoms, it fades; and man cannot give himself a new body, nor can God, except by miracle. This period of life, depending upon the natural constitution of the body, and upon other natural circumstances, is called the *natural* bound of human life; and this cannot be prolonged by man himself. Now if a man dies earlier than he would naturally have done, whether from his own fault or that of others, or from some outward accident, (the cause, however, of whatever kind, being known to God, and under his providence and control,) his death is said to be *unnatural*, *extraordinary*, or sometimes *consequens*, in opposition to the other, which is called *antecedens*. The cases here supposed are described in the Bible by the phrases, *to fulfil one's days*, (מִלְּמָוֶלֶת,) or *not to fulfil them*, Isa. lxx. 20. And in this way are we to understand those passages in which God is said *to lengthen out*, or *to abridge*, the life of man. The meaning of these terms is, that God so directs the course of nature that a particular man lives longer than he would naturally have lived, or than he was expected to live. Hence it appears that man can do nothing himself to prolong his life beyond the natural limits of human existence; but that he may do much to shorten it. To return now to the sto-

ical dilemma. When a man is sick, he must call for a physician, and make use of prescribed remedies, because he cannot be certain that the end of his life has now come. The purpose of God respecting his life or his death is in this case, as we must conceive it, merely conditional. If he uses the proper means, he will recover; if not, he will die; and God, as he is omniscient, knows which of these courses he will pursue, and therefore whether he will die or live. A vehement controversy arose on this subject, in the seventeenth century, between the reformed philosophers and some theologians of the Netherlands, on occasion of the work of Beverovicius, *Quæstiones Epistolice de vitæ termino fatali*; Dortrecht, 1634, 8vo; and enlarged, Leiden, 1636, 4to.

(b) *Our powers* depend upon God. These powers are very various; but they may be classed under two general divisions, the powers of *soul* and of *body*—*spiritual* and *corporeal* powers. Now as man did not give himself these powers, so neither can he retain possession of them by his own strength or skill. Hence they are justly described in the Bible as the gift of God. Worldly respectability, mental endowments, sound judgment, memory, learning—all are given by God; and that one man surpasses another in these respects is owing to his will and his wise government, Exod. iv. 11; James, i. 17; 1 Cor. iv. 7. Those happy combinations of circumstances by which we are sometimes enabled to accomplish with ease the enterprises with regard to which we and others were ready to despair, are to be ascribed to God, although we are often disposed to consider them as the effect of chance. We owe the success of all our undertakings, not to our own wisdom and skill, but solely to the wise and benevolent providence of God. To lead men to feel this, is a great object with the sacred writers, who everywhere recommend to them the exercise of these pious and humble dispositions by which they may be strengthened in their faith in God, and preserved against pride and selfish blindness. Hence they always ascribe the powers of man, and his success in exercising them, directly to God, as the first cause; in such a way, however, that second causes, which also depend upon him, are not excluded. Morus, p. 77, n. 1, 2. In this connexion, reference should be made to Ps. cxxvii., where we are taught that our most strenuous efforts will be in vain, unless God grants us success.

Note.—Such meditations respecting the preservation of our existence, powers, and the healthful and successful employment of them, are very instructive and practical. They are calculated to fill our minds with peace and joy, and to excite hearty gratitude to God. Christ makes use of these considerations to shew us

that we should not be distrustful of God, and should not trouble ourselves with anxious cares. Since God takes so much care of the various orders of being, of beasts, and even of inanimate things, how much more will he care for us, to whom he has given a destination by far more noble than theirs! Matt. vi. 25, seq. He especially warns us against anxious cares as to our bodily support, since they withdraw us from more important concerns, and render us disqualified for religion, and divine instruction. Luke, viii. 14, αἱ μέριμναι τοῦ βίου συμπνίγονται τὸν λόγον, the cares of life prevent the efficacy of divine truth upon our hearts.

SECTION LXX.

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

I. *Statement of this Doctrine.*

FROM what has already been said, it appears that God is perfectly acquainted with all the *efficient causes* which exist, both those which are free in their agency and those that are otherwise; that he knows every *act* of these causes, and all the *effects* which they produce, and that he guides and controls them all at his pleasure, and makes them subservient to his own designs. And it is in this his guiding and controlling all the changes and all the actions of his creatures, so as to promote the highest good of the whole, and of each part, that the *government of God* consists. The good of the whole involves that of all the parts of which it is made up, and one cannot be secured exclusively of the other. The sum of the good of all the individuals under the government of God constitutes the good of the whole. Hence the propriety of making the good of each part an object of the government of God.

In order to form a correct judgment respecting the good secured in the world under the government of God—a subject on which mistakes are very common, the following principles should be kept in mind.

1. The degree of perfection and happiness attainable by different beings varies according to their different relations. All beings are not susceptible of an equal degree of good. The beast, for example, seeks for nothing further than the satisfaction of his hunger and thirst, and the gratification of his other natural appetites. But moral beings require more than this for their happiness; they have a higher destination, and are capable of a higher good. And even among men themselves, the external good of which they are capable is different according to the original constitution, the abilities, and even the age, of different individuals. The good which would be adapted to a child is not such as would satisfy the desires of a man.

2. Such is the constitution which God has given to the world, that the happiness of one is often subordinate and must be sacrificed to the happiness of another. This is clearly taught by *experience*; though doubtless philosophers would prove, if the testimony of experience were not so explicit, that this could not be so. We find, however, that many animals serve for the nourishment of others, by whom they are constantly devoured. And how many of them are there which daily suffer from the free actions of men! For us, with all our short-sightedness, to call in question the wisdom and justice of what God thus ordains, or permits, and to suppose that it could or should have been otherwise, is unwarrantable presumption. It is enough for us to know that such is the divine plan, which we are unable fully to comprehend, but which, for the very reason that God chose it, is the wisest, best, and most adapted to its ends. So we are taught by the holy scriptures, and further than this, with all our speculative philosophy, we cannot go. Vide s. 48, ad finem, and s. 71, II.

3. Happiness is frequently connected with certain conditions, on the fulfilment of which our enjoyment of it depends. For example: the enjoyment of good health depends in a great measure upon temperance. If any one fails to comply with these established conditions, the loss of the good which he had hoped for is to be ascribed to himself, and not to God.

These considerations are overlooked by the great body of mankind; and hence it is, that when affairs do not take the turn which they wish, they complain and murmur respecting the divine government. The mistakes most frequent on the subject of divine providence are the following—viz., (a) Men are apt to consider their whole happiness as placed in the enjoyment of a certain kind of advantages, perhaps that very kind of which they are deprived; perhaps, too, advantages which possess no intrinsic value, which are transient and uncertain, and which, if obtained, could not make the possessor truly happy. The poor often desire, most of all things, that they may be rich; and the sick, that they may enjoy good health. But how undesirable is it often, both for their temporal and eternal welfare, that their wishes should be gratified! (b) Men are prone to forget that the good of the whole is to be consulted for, and that individuals must often sacrifice to the general welfare some private advantages, for which, however, they are to receive an equivalent in other ways, as they may confidently expect, from the goodness of God, and as experience even in the present world has often proved. (c) Men are prone to regard disproportionately the *present* pain and unhappiness which they experience, and to forget that under

their sufferings and deprivations there may be concealed the germ of a greater temporal and eternal good. (d) Men are disposed to charge God unjustly with denying them, or depriving them of certain advantages, the loss of which is wholly their own fault. How many of the sick and the destitute complain of God as the author of their sufferings, while their own consciences must assure them that they alone are to blame!

II. Proof of this Doctrine.

1. From the *natural constitution of the world*, (argumentum physicum,) it is impossible for the human mind to conceive how the admirable order and harmony which appear in the universe, where all things are so intimately connected, run into, and depend upon one another, like the links of a chain, should exist without the superintendence and control of an infinitely wise and almighty Being. Consider here the influence of the atmosphere upon the growth of plants, upon the life, health, and support of animate beings. Reflect, too, that one country has a surplus of certain useful productions, of which another country is wholly destitute. The former cannot use its surplus productions, the latter is compelled to seek elsewhere what its own soil does not produce, and to obtain it where it can be found in the greatest abundance. This gives rise to trade, activity, enterprise; and these bring in wealth, &c.

2. From *experience*, (argumentum historicum,) This may be either *personal* or *general*, and so is called by Morus *duplicem providentiæ scholam*, p. 83, s. 8. This proof, when rightly exhibited, is very obvious and intelligible, even to the unlearned. In the events which take place around us, let the attention be directed to the *causes* by which they are effected—to the time, place, and other circumstances in which these *causes* acted. By their slow and often unnoticed combination, effects are produced at which every one is astonished. The smallest occurrences often lead to the greatest revolutions; wicked actions are made the means of good, and result in the advantage of those whom they were designed to injure, so that many can say, with Joseph, (Gen. i. 20,) “Ye thought evil against me, but God meant it for good.” Men who are to be the means of eminent good to the world, or to perform some distinguished service, must be called forth upon the stage of action at exactly the most proper time, in exactly the most suitable place, and at precisely the most favourable juncture of other circumstances. When history is studied with these considerations kept in mind, (and in the study of history they should never be omitted, as they are now, alas! too frequently, by those who

teach this branch to the young,) what to the ignorant and thoughtless might appear to be chance or accident, exhibits clear marks of a guiding Providence. And this is the high position, from which those who have the scriptures in their hand can survey all the events recorded in the history of the world. We may refer to the history of Joseph, to the ancient history of the Jews, that of the diffusion of Christianity, of the Reformation, and the more important events of our own times, as remarkable examples. Vide Schroeeckh, *Disp. historia providentiæ divinam, quando et quam clare loquatur*; Vitebergæ, 1776. J. G. Müller, *Briefe über das Studium der Wissenschaften, besonders der Geschichte*; Zürich, 1798, 8vo—a work full of valuable remarks drawn from experience, which deserve to be considered, especially by the teachers of religion, and to be carefully applied by them to practice. But we ought by no means to confine our attention to the great events which are recorded in the history of the world. To one who is an attentive observer of all the changes through which he himself passes, his own life will furnish abundant materials for the most interesting and useful observations respecting the providence of God. And such observations are uncommonly useful in popular instruction. They tend to awaken and cherish religious dispositions. If men suppose that God exercises no care over them, they have no ground or motive to love and worship him. But since *holiness* is the true end for which we, as moral beings, were made, and since our capacity for happiness is in exact proportion to our holiness, we ought to pay particular attention to those dealings of Divine Providence with us by which this great end is promoted. To every man whose moral character is in any considerable degree improved and advanced, whatever he has experienced himself, or noticed in others, tending to the promotion of holiness, possesses an inexpressible interest; and any who are destitute of feeling on this point, and can ridicule the spiritual experiences of pious Christians, and what they communicate of their experiences to others, either by writing or by oral relation, give mournful proof that they themselves are as yet unreformed, and are turning aside from the true end of their being. One who is taught in his youth to refer everything in his own life to God, and to search for the traces of divine providence in what befalls himself, will learn to look at the lives of others and at the history of nations in the same manner and with the same interest, and will of course be dissatisfied when he sees that, in opposition to the example of the sacred writers, God is wholly left out of the account by so many historians. But, on the contrary, he who himself lives in the world without God,

may be content with a history in which the hand of God is unnoticed, and indeed will be displeased with any other.

3. From the *Bible*. Morus, p. 79—81, s. 6. That God is the creator, proprietor, and governor of the world, that all things, even the smallest, depend upon him, and that with infinite wisdom he overrules all for the highest good, are principles everywhere assumed in the *Bible*. The texts which relate to providence, in the more general view of it, were cited s. 68, l. 2. The texts which relate more particularly to the divine government may be divided into the following classes:—(a) Those in which the guidance and direction of all events, both small and great, are expressly ascribed to God, Matt. vi. 31; Acts, xvii. 25, 26; 1 Chronicles, xxix. (al. xxx.) 12. (b) Those in which particular changes and occurrences, past, present, and to come, are referred to God as the author; Isa. xliii. 12; Acts, iv. 28; Psal. xc.; Prov. xvi. 1, 33, "The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord." (c) Those which contain divine promises and threatenings, and which would be without meaning on any supposition but that God is the governor of the world and the disposer of the destinies of men; Exodus, xx. 12; Psal. xc., xci., &c. (d) Those in which God is entreated to avert calamities, to put an end to distress, to bestow blessings, &c.; or those in which the granting of such requests is promised, Psalm xxii. 5; cxviii.; Matt. xxvi. 39; 1 Thess. iii. 10, 11. In order that this may be correctly understood, it should be compared with what was before said respecting the will and the purposes of God, s. 20, 32.

Note.—It has been already frequently remarked, that according to a mode of thinking and speaking common among the ancients, many things were represented as resulting *immediately* from the agency of God, though they were in reality effected through the instrumentality of second causes, which perhaps were merely not mentioned, perhaps were overlooked, or possibly, at that early period of the world, not even known. Vide s. 58, II. The mode of representation here referred to, and expressions and narrations founded upon it, occur frequently in the *Bible*, in Homer, and the ancient writers. Thus, for example, when we should say, *it thunders, it rains, there is an earthquake*, the ancients said, *God thunders, &c.*, Psal. xxix.; civ. 32. Gen. xi. 7, 8; xix. 24, "God rained upon Sodom and Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven." Many events, therefore, which would seem, from the manner in which they are spoken of, to be the results of the immediate agency of God, and to be accomplished in an extraordinary way, were really effected by natural causes. However, since these natural causes depend upon the government of God, this

mode of speaking is in itself correct. And it is because we, in the present age, have so little of the religious feeling of the ancient world that we misunderstand their more pious and religious mode of expressing themselves, and even feel it to be offensive. The teacher of religion should, however, closely follow the example of the sacred writers in this respect, and ever imitate and preserve this more religious phraseology which they employ, and, like them, refer everything to God. And if, in order to prevent superstition, he should think it necessary to say that such an event took place *naturally*, he must be careful that he be not understood to mean that it took place *without God*, and that he does not thus become the means of causing his hearers to forget God, and to live at a distance from him. He ought, on the contrary, in such cases, to shew that although a particular event may have been *natural*, it was not the less owing to the agency of God; that nature is only an instrument in the hands of God; and that nothing therefore takes place which is not according to his will and purpose.

SECTION LXXI.

THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD IN RELATION TO THE FREEDOM OF MAN, AND TO THE EVIL EXISTING IN THE WORLD.

I. In Relation to the Freedom of Man.

On the one hand, the freedom of the human will is unimpaired by the government of God; and, on the other, the government of God is unobstructed and undisturbed by the free actions of men. The freedom of man must at all events be maintained, for morality and accountability depend upon it. If he is not free to choose and to act, he cannot be accountable for his actions; for they are not within his own power. We have already established the position (s. 22, I.), that God *foresees* those actions which result from the freedom of man, and the consequences of them, as well as those which are necessary, or less contingent; but that the former do not cease to be free because they are foreknown. This principle must be assumed as true in reasoning on this subject. We are not to expect, therefore, that the government of God over moral beings will be shewn by his *compelling* them to perform good or bad actions. That men are free in what they do is everywhere assumed in the *Bible*, and must be presupposed in every system of morals. Vide Luke, viii. 5—15; xiii. 6—9; James, i. 13—15.

Still, however, the free actions of moral beings are under the most minute inspection and the most perfect control of God. For these actions are dependent (a) upon the *powers* which man possesses, and for these powers he is indebted

to God alone. Vide s. 69. (b) Upon the *laws* of his physical and moral nature—i. e., the laws (in one case, of motion, and in the other, of thought) according to which he exercises his peculiar powers; and these laws are given and established by God. Vide ubi supra. (c) Upon *external circumstances*—upon things *without* the man himself; and these things, as all others, are under the control of God. Man, then, as a moral being, is free to will, to resolve, and to act according to his resolutions. God furnishes him with occasions of acting in the external objects around him; he also gives him his powers of action, and preserves to him their exercise; but then permits him, though under his own guidance and supervision, to exert his powers according to his own will, and to perform his actions freely. Vide s. 69, I. ad finem. How this can be, we shall find it difficult to understand, however sagacious and fine-spun our philosophical theories may be; but that thus it is, that notwithstanding the providence of God we remain free in our actions, must be firmly maintained if we would not degrade ourselves below the standard of moral beings, if we would not falsify the dictates of that moral feeling so deeply implanted by the Creator himself in our hearts, and if we would not consequently overturn the first and most important doctrines of morality. Every man's own consciousness, the clear dictates of his moral nature, convince him that he is free, beyond the necessity, or even the possibility, of a further demonstration. Cf. the writings of the modern philosophers of the different schools—Eberhard, *Ueber die Freyheit*; and Jacob's clear and perspicuous treatise on the same subject, according to the principles of the Critical philosophy, contained in Kiesewetter's work, "*Ueber den ersten Grundsatz der Moralphilosophie*;" Leipzig und Halle, 1788, 8vo. On account of the deficiencies and difficulties attending metaphysical demonstrations of freedom, and the perplexed and endless speculations by which both sides of this question have been argued, Kant rejected them all as insufficient, and as leading into error; and would have us depend more upon *experience*, and believe and hold fast the doctrine of human freedom, because it is so indispensable in morals that without it morality cannot be conceived to exist. [This view of Kant, implying that freedom, while it is a postulate of our *practical* reason, (i. e., necessary to be assumed in order to moral action,) is yet inconsistent with our *theoretical* reason, (i. e., incapable of demonstration, and contrary to the conclusions to which the reflecting mind arrives,) is now very generally rejected. We cannot admit a twofold and contradictory reason, nor can we adopt a principle for practice to which our speculative reason is statedly opposed. It is justly remarked by Bockshammer,

in his brief but comprehensive treatise on the Will, that even *practical* freedom cannot be adequately maintained, if, while we must *deem* ourselves free, we are yet left to suspect, by the decisions of our speculative reason, that in reality we act from some concealed necessity, under the laws of which our inmost being is placed. Vide Bockshammer, *Ueber die Freyheit des mensch. Willens*, s. 5, f.; Stuttgart, 1821.—Tr.] The more full investigation of the whole subject belongs rather to the department of moral science than here.

The exhibition of this subject in popular instruction should be kept as free as possible from all philosophical subtleties; and it would be well if the teachers of religion, from regard to their own peace and comfort, as well as that of their hearers, would abide by the following simple principles, which accord alike with scripture and experience. (a) God, with a view to the real welfare of man, gives him the means and opportunities necessary to withhold him from the choice of evil, and to lead him to what is right. (b) For many of our free actions, he furnishes us with inducement and encouragement in the external circumstances in which he has placed us; and he so orders these circumstances as to promote what we ourselves undertake, and to give it a happy issue. He makes use of these circumstances also as a warning to us and others to abstain from such actions as we find attended with unhappy consequences. These encouragements and warnings may serve as examples to shew the consistency between the divine government and human freedom; for we are still at liberty, and have it still within our power, to do that to which we are encouraged, and to abstain from that from which we are warned; and in both cases we remain the authors of our own free actions. (c) God rewards men for their good actions, and punishes them for those that are bad; which he could not do, were men not free in performing them. Vide s. 31. (d) God frequently prevents wicked actions, which men had intended and resolved to perform. The brethren of Joseph, for example, were not able to execute their designs against his life, Gen. xxxix. God, however, does not always do this; but, on the contrary, sometimes permits the wicked actions of men, since otherwise he would destroy their freedom. But then these wicked actions are overruled by him to be the means of good, Gen. l. 20; Acts, ii. 36. If in any case, however, they are wholly irreconcilable with the wise and benevolent plan of his government, or, which is the same thing, cannot be made to contribute to the general good which he seeks to promote, he then directly prevents them. What actions and events belong to this class it is impossible for us to say, and can be known only to the omni-

scient God. (c) The result and issue of all actions, good and bad, depend solely upon God. Vide s. 70. Many a scheme, which appeared in itself to be a masterpiece of human wisdom and prudence, has failed of success, while the most foolish and inconsiderate undertakings have been prospered. Vide Eccles. ix. 11; Prov. xvi. 1, seq.; James, iv. 13—15. This would be seen by us much more frequently if we were not accustomed to look rather at the result than at the intention and plan. If the result is favourable, we judge favourably of the design itself; and the reverse. Hence it is that we find praise and blame so unjustly awarded in history. When we think to benefit ourselves or others by a particular course of action, we often injure both ourselves and others; and the reverse. Hence it is said, that while the freedom of men and other moral beings is not destroyed by the divine government, it is yet *confined* and *limited*. Cf. Morus, p. 81, s. 3, 6, Notes. [Also Bretschneider, Dogmatik, b. i. s. 644, s. 98, 6.]

II. In Relation to Evil.

I. The many evils which exist in the world, and the calamities which befall the human race, have from the earliest times been regarded as a standing objection against the providence of God. How they can consist with his wisdom and goodness, and consequently with his providence, is a question which men at all times have found it difficult to answer. These evils are either physical or moral; and the permission of either of them has appeared to be subversive of divine providence. The existence of evil was brought forward as an argument against providence by Epicurus. Vide Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, l. v.; Cicero, De Nat. Deorum; Lactantius, De ira Dei, c. 13. The stoics, on the other hand, undertook to answer this objection. Vide Seneca, De Beneficiis, iv. 4, seq. This objection appeared so strong to Bayle, that, in the article on Manicheism, in his Dictionary, he pronounces it unanswerable. But Leibnitz, in his "Theodicée," endeavoured to resolve the doubts of Bayle, and to establish a correct philosophical theory respecting the existence of evil.* An argument has sometimes been drawn against providence from the complaints of the sacred writers respecting the evil existing in the world, and the unhappy fate of man, especially those which occur in the book of Ecclesiastes.

But the object of the author of this book is not so much to arraign the providence of God, as to shew, from the instability of fortune, and the uncertainty of human schemes, that we should learn *true wisdom*, and that since providence affords us a sufficiency of good things, we should study the art, so rarely understood, of making a wise use of them, by which alone we can be contented and happy, Eccles. iii. vii. ix.

In reply to these objections, it may be said, that if the providence of God can be proved from other arguments, the existence of evil can afford no reason to doubt or deny it. On the contrary, we must conclude, that since God permits and suffers evil in the world, it must be according to his wisdom, and be perfectly consistent with his providence, although we may not be able to understand how it can be so, and why he did not constitute a different order. Vide Seneca, De providentia, sive quare bonis viris mala accidunt, cum sit providentia. The will and the power of God may be regarded either as exerted *unconditionally*, unconfined by any established order, or as exerted in conformity with a certain established order of things. In the exercise of his absolute, unconditional power, God *could* remove evil out of the way; but he *will* not always do this, because it is against the order which from his wisdom he found it necessary to establish. He indeed foresaw the existence of evil, and permits it, (cf. Ps. lxxxi. 12, 13; Acts, xiv. 16; Rom. i. 24;) but so far as it is evil, he can never have pleasure in it, or himself promote or favour it; James, i. 13—17. He has admitted it into his general plan, because he can make it, in its connexion with other things, the means of a good, which, without it, either could not be effected at all, or at least not so well, as by its being permitted. What Christ said, Matt. xiii. 29, is very true, that if the tares were pulled up the wheat would be pulled up with them; and that to prevent this, the tares and the wheat must be suffered to grow together. We are acquainted with only a small part of what is embraced in the universe of God; and even this small part is understood by us very imperfectly; and as to the true internal relation of things—the ends for which they exist, and the consequences by which they are followed, our knowledge is extremely defective; we are therefore unable to form a right judgment respecting the relation of evil to good, and of the amount of evil to the amount of good.

Seneca says, Contro. iv. 27, "*Necessitas magnum humanæ felicitatis patrocinium*"—*Necessity is a great consolation in the sufferings of men*. If by necessity he meant that blind, inevitable fate to which the gods themselves are subject, then is it a poor consolation indeed; for what comfort would it be to a malefactor,

[* Voltaire also opposed the doctrine of providence in a poem on the destruction of Lisbon; and when this doctrine was ably defended by Rousseau, in his Letter on Optimism, he replied by a philosophical romance entitled "Candide," in which he presents an appalling picture of the disorders of the world, from which he takes occasion to deride the notion of an overruling providence.—Tr.]

when carried towards the place of execution, to be continually informed that he must die, and there is no escaping it. But if necessity may be understood to mean the order of things which God saw it necessary to constitute, then the maxim above stated is perfectly true; it is accordant with the Christian spirit, and full of consolation, although this necessity may involve many things which are unintelligible and disagreeable to us. For if God, who is infinitely wise and benevolent, has constituted this order, it must be good, and adapted to the end which he has in view, however otherwise it may appear to us.

Again; men who are dissatisfied with their lot often complain that certain blessings are denied them, without inquiring whether they themselves are susceptible of these blessings, and without remembering the many blessings which they already enjoy. Besides, the opinions of men respecting happiness are so various, and sometimes so foolish, that it would seem impossible that their wishes should all be gratified. Things sometimes desired as the greatest blessings would be, if possessed, the greatest injury to both soul and body; and the goodness of Providence is shewn in withholding them. Cf. Zollikofer, *Betrachtungen über das Uebel in der Welt*. Jacobi, *Ueber die Weisen Absichten Gottes*. De Marée, *Gottesvertheidigung über die Zulassung des Bösen*.

2. Another argument against providence is, that the ungodly often prosper in the world, while the righteous suffer affliction. This is thought to be indirectly inconsistent with the wisdom and goodness of God, and therefore to disprove a superintending providence. The minds of reflecting persons have from the earliest times been disturbed by this doubt; and the advocates of providence have endeavoured in various ways to solve it. It is frequently mentioned in the Old Testament, and receives various answers, according to the different aspects which the subject assumes—e. g., Psalm xxxvii. xxxix. xlix., and especially lxxiii.; Job, xvi. et passim. Many also among the Grecian philosophers were very much perplexed on this subject; and Diogenes the Cynic declared, "that the prosperity of the wicked disproved the power and wisdom of the gods;" Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* iii. 34. Others, however, and particularly the stoics, undertook to answer this objection; and Seneca, in his book "*De Providentia*," investigates the question how the righteous can suffer, if there is a divine providence? According to the opinion of Bayle this objection cannot be met by any satisfactory answer. But,

(a) This objection results in a great measure from ignorance, and from the low and false estimate put upon the real advantages which the godly enjoy, and the true happiness which flows

from the possession of them. Most of those who urge the objection, that the righteous suffer adversity, while the wicked prosper in the world, place happiness in *external things*, in the possession of wealth, or in sensual indulgences; and of course regard the poor man, who is little thought of by the world, as unhappy. But in this they mistake, overlooking the essential distinction between *true* and only *apparent* good. True advantages, such as health of body, knowledge of the truth, holiness of heart, and others, both of a physical and moral nature, make men happy by their own proper tendency. These are the true spiritual goods, the *treasures in heaven*, of which Christ speaks; by the possession of which alone the soul is prepared for the true happiness of moral beings. But besides these, there are other things, such as riches, the enjoyments of sense, power, and honour, which may become advantages by a wise and rational use of them, but which otherwise are injurious, and the occasions of unhappiness to men. They are, however, regarded by many, even when unwisely and improperly used, as real blessings, because they excite sensations agreeable to the carnal mind. But to those who form a right judgment respecting them, they are, when improperly used, only *apparent blessings*, because the pleasure which they produce is transient, and turns at last to pain. The writer of Psalm xlix. very justly decides, therefore, that the life of the profligate is only *outwardly* and in *appearance* happy, and is often, in reality, only splendid and showy misery, to envy which would be extremely foolish. In Psalm lxxiii., Asaph points to the end of the wicked, and shews that their prosperity, being unsubstantial, is suddenly and in a moment lost. We cannot certainly regard that as a good in reference to another, or account him as happy for the possession of anything which he himself does not truly enjoy. But it is not unfrequently the case that the things most esteemed by the world, so far from making the possessor happy, are the occasion of disquietude and misery. And so it is often said in common life, that the fortune of the rich and powerful is only *shining misery*; that they are not to be envied; that we would not exchange places with them, &c.

(b) When this is considered, and the state of the virtuous and the vicious is then compared, that of the former, though replete with external sufferings, must be pronounced to be more happy than that of the latter. For although the good man may have no worldly honour, no earthly riches, no superfluity of pleasures, he has true, spiritual, good treasures in heaven, which moth and rust do not corrupt, and which are secure from thieves, (Matt. vi. 19, 20;) and although he were bowed down under external afflictions, he would yet maintain his integrity

of heart, and the reward which the favour of God secures—the greatest of all the blessings which men can enjoy. Vide Matt. xvi. 25. He has cheerfulness and tranquillity of soul; while those who seek their good in external things are constantly disquieted by passions, cares, and disappointments. But this blessedness which the virtuous man enjoys makes but little show in the world, and is hence so often undervalued by worldly men. They find it impossible to see or believe that there can be any happiness in things for which they have so little taste. This train of thought is much dwelt upon by the stoical philosophers, and by the sacred writers.

(c) It is a mistake, however, to suppose that the virtuous always endure more external sufferings than the wicked; for the righteous are frequently prosperous, even in their worldly affairs; while the wicked are unsuccessful in all their undertakings. But these cases are less noticed, because they seem to follow in the natural course of things.

(d) Even good men often bring upon themselves the sufferings which they endure by their own fault; they do not in all cases act according to the law of duty and the rules of prudence; and in such cases they cannot justly ask to be excepted from the common lot of faulty and injudicious men, and must expect to endure the unhappy consequences of their errors and follies. Christ says, Luke, xvi. 8, "The children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light"—i. e., those whose affections are fixed upon the world, the worldly-minded, are often more wise with regard to the things of time than those whose affections are fixed upon heaven are with regard to their heavenly treasures. The former have more care for their welfare in the present life than the latter for their blessedness in the world to come. Should pious and good men exhibit the same zeal and prudence which worldly men exhibit in managing their worldly affairs, how much would they accomplish for their own advantage and that of others! But since they do not always come up to this standard, they must suffer the evil consequences of their delinquency.

(e) Nothing is more common than for us to err in our estimate of the moral state and character of other men. All are not pious and virtuous who appear to be such, and are esteemed such by their fellow men. And it is equally true that all who are accounted ungodly are not the gross criminals and offenders they are sometimes supposed to be. Vide Luke, xviii. 10, seq. The character of many a man is made out, by those who look upon him with hatred or envy, to be much worse than it really is. One man commits some flagrant, out-breaking crime, which brings him into disgrace, and

draws upon him the contempt of the world; but he may be, at the same time, of a better disposition, and less culpable in the sight of God than many a reputed saint, who covers over his real shame with the hypocritical pretence of virtue. Vide John viii. 3, 7, 10, 11. And since this is the case, and it is always difficult, and sometimes impossible for us, who cannot search the heart, to determine the true moral character of men, and of their actions, we ought to be extremely cautious in deciding, whether the good or evil which befalls them is deserved or not. In most cases, our judgments on this subject are certainly very erroneous.

(f) The afflictions which good men endure are beneficial to them and to others, and are promotive of their highest welfare. They often prevent a greater evil which was threatening them; exercise and strengthen their piety, virtue, and confidence in God; increase their zeal in the pursuit of holiness, and consequently their true happiness; and thus verify the declaration of Paul, Rom. viii. 28, "That all things work together for the good of those who are friends of God." Cf. Rom. v. 3; James, i. 2; Matt. v. 10; Heb. xii. 5—13, especially, ver. 11, which appears to be copied directly from the heart of an afflicted saint. "No chastening for the present seemeth joyous, but grievous; nevertheless, afterward it yieldeth the peaceable fruits of righteousness to them who are exercised thereby." Hence the sufferings of good men are sometimes called *πειρασμοί*, because by means of them their characters are proved and their faith is tried and strengthened.

(g) But there is one other consideration, which may remove all our doubts, and make us contented when we see the innocent oppressed and suffering, and the wicked, who forget God, in a prosperous condition—viz., that the present life is only the first, imperfect stage of our existence—a state of probation, in which we are to prepare for another and more perfect state. This consoling doctrine respecting the future life and retribution beyond the grave, is one of the chief doctrines of Christianity, from which everything proceeds, and to which everything is referred; and the writers of the New Testament constantly make use of it, and seek to comfort the pious by the truth that divine justice will not be fully exhibited until the future state shall commence, and that then the righteous shall be richly recompensed, by the exceeding greatness of their future reward, for all the evil they have suffered. Vide Rom. viii. 17; 1 Peter, iv. 12—14; 2 Cor. iv. 17, 18, and the parable of Lazarus, Luke, xvi., especially ver. 25. But of those who act here upon the earth from improper motives, even if they perform actions which in themselves are good and praiseworthy, Christ says, *they have their reward*—i. e., they

may indeed obtain temporal advantages, but God will not reward them with the treasures of the future world, Matt. vi. 2, 5, 16.

SECTION LXXII.

OF THE NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

I. It is Universal.

It extends to every creature and to every event in the universe—to the small and insignificant, as well as to the great and important. The Bible everywhere teaches, that the purpose of God extends not merely to the whole, and to the connexion of all its parts, but to each and every part, their relations and their alterations. His knowledge must accordingly comprehend the smallest and most apparently insignificant circumstances. This follows even from the scriptural idea of creation. Vide s. 46. Cf. Ps. cxliii. 5, 6, "He dwelleth on high, and humbleth himself to behold the things in heaven and in the earth." Ps. cxxxviii. 6, "Though the Lord be high, yet hath he respect unto the lowly." Ps. xxxvi. 6; cxlviii. Matt. x. 29, 30, "Not a sparrow falls to the ground without his notice; he numbers the hairs of our heads."

The doctrine, that the providence of God extends even to the *minutest things*, (*providentia circa minima*), leads us, when it is properly considered, to entertain a very exalted idea of God and his attributes, in that he thinks and cares for every creature which he has made during every moment of its existence, and in every situation in which it is placed. But because the manner in which the providence of God can extend to all individuals is incomprehensible by the human understanding, and because men are prone to compare God with themselves, this doctrine has been often either wholly misunderstood or directly denied. Since it is supposed inconsistent with the dignity of princes and the great of the earth to concern themselves with small affairs, the case is thought to be the same with God; and his honour, it is imagined, is asserted, by denying that he cares for what is small and insignificant. This doctrine was accordingly either doubted or denied by most even of the Grecian philosophers; and indeed it could not appear to them with that degree of clearness in which it appears to us, considering that their ideas respecting matter and the creation of the world, and the relations in which matter and the world stand to God, were so imperfect, and so wholly unlike those which we have derived from the Bible. Vide s. 45, 46. Aristotle maintained that the providence of God extends to heavenly things, but not to things on the earth (according to Diogenes and Plutarch.) The stoics, on the contrary, believed in a providence

extending to individual things, in a sense, however, somewhat different from that common with us. Vide Seneca, *De Providentia*, and Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 65, 66; also Plato, *De Rep.* x., where this doctrine is ably defended. The views entertained by some even of the Christian fathers on this subject were extremely erroneous. Such are those expressed by Hieronymus, in his *Commentary on Hab.*, where he says, "The divine majesty cannot stoop so low as to interest itself to know how many vermin are each moment produced on the earth, and how many perish; how many flies, fleas, and gnats there are; how many fishes the sea contains;" &c. His opinions, however, were opposed by Gregory of Nazianzen, *Orat.* xvi., and by Chrysostom, in his book "*De Providentia*;" and very rational and scriptural opinions on this subject were expressed by many other of the ecclesiastical fathers. In modern times, the Socinians have been accused of denying that providence extends to small things; at least such was said to be the opinion expressed in the writings of some of the leaders of this sect; but from the obscurity of their language, the truth of the accusation remains doubtful. Many of the modern sceptics and free-thinkers in England, the Netherlands, France, and Germany, have either doubted and denied the providence of God altogether, or at least *providentia circa minima*. So Bayle, De la Mettrie, Voltaire, the author of the *Système de la Nature*, and Frederic II., in the works of the philosopher of *Sans souci*, Letter Seventh.

The doctrine that the providence of God is *universal*, and extends to every individual creature, may be confirmed and illustrated by the following observations:—

1. The division of the creatures of God into classes and kinds answers no other purpose than to assist the feebleness of the human understanding, which cannot at once survey all things in their true connexion. We are therefore compelled to begin with particulars, and then proceed to what is general; to begin with what is more easy, and proceed to what is more difficult, in order to render the connexion of the whole in some measure comprehensible to our minds. But God knows all things immediately and at once; there is no succession in his knowledge. Vide s. 22, II. This his knowledge can occasion him, therefore, no trouble or expense of time, in which, as is the case with us, more important concerns must be neglected or deferred. Employment about small things is made an objection to men, because they are prone to regard trifles as important, (which can never be said of God,) and because, on account of them, they are prone to neglect what is of more value. This danger has been transferred very inconsiderately to God. But as nothing

is too great for him, so nothing is too small. He cannot therefore be *distracted*, as Frederic II. supposed, by being employed about small concerns.

2. The divine purpose must necessarily extend to particular things; since otherwise his knowledge must be as imperfect and fragmentary as our own. From the theory of the omniscience and the decrees of God stated in s. 22, 32, and there proved to be according to scripture and reason, it appears, that when God thinks of men he does not think of them *in general*, but in *particular*—of all men individually, and in all the various circumstances and conditions in which they exist every moment. In this way does he think of the whole world, and of all its separate parts, from eternity; and similar to this is his decree respecting the universe, and all its parts. No alteration, therefore, can be made in the smallest portion of the world, which he did not consider and embrace in his eternal decree.

3. That a human ruler cannot devote equal attention to all the objects which are under his inspection, and that he is compelled to set some of them aside as comparatively unimportant, and to give himself little or no concern about them, is the consequence of human imperfection. The greater the powers of his mind are, the more will he be able to occupy himself with particular objects, and those of minor consequence; and the more he does this, the more just and impartial an estimate will he be able to form of the whole, and consequently the more wisely and prosperously will he be able to administer his government. Hence Plato justly remarked, that a perfect ruler must have an *equal* care for all his subjects, and all the offices of state, and allow none of them to pass unregarded, lest the whole should suffer injury from his neglect of a part. Vide Cicero, *De Officiis*, i. 25. It is this restless activity, which seizes upon everything, even things which would appear insignificant to men of common minds, and turns them to its own account, which is so universally admired and applauded in Cæsar, Frederic II., and other distinguished rulers of ancient and modern times. If this is true with regard to human rulers, how much more so with regard to God in administering his government; since he is not wanting either in the knowledge, power, or will, requisite to the most particular providence. If God did not exercise a watchful care over particular persons and things, how would he be able to secure the good of the whole, which is composed of so many parts, all intimately connected? The whole is only the aggregate of many small portions; and the smallest is as inseparably connected with the largest, as the links are in a chain, or the wheels in a clock. The greatest revolutions which have taken place in the

world—wars, &c., have often proceeded from the smallest causes; from a small spark, great conflagrations, which have occasioned a widespread misery and destruction. In these cases, what is small is inseparably connected with what is great. The providence of God, therefore, either extends to all things, even to those which we denominate small, or there is no divine providence. From this alternative there is no escape.

4. Men are accustomed to regard many things as small, insignificant, useless, and even injurious, because they are unable to see their use and importance in the connexion of things. This is therefore a proof of the weakness of the human understanding, and of the great imperfection of human knowledge. But as God *created* all these things, and continually prolongs their existence, he must regard them as useful and necessary, and adapted to promote his ends, in their connexion with the whole. How then can it be inconsistent with his dignity to watch over them, and to preserve them! If it was not dishonourable for God to give them existence, it cannot be dishonourable for him to preserve to them the existence he has given. And indeed his wisdom, power, and goodness, are at least as evident, and often more so, in his least, as in his greatest works. Cf. Plato, *De Repub.* x.

II. *It is Benevolent, Wise, Unsearchable.*

This follows incontrovertibly from what has already been said, and is perfectly accordant with the instructions of the Bible. Vide Ps. lxxiii. 16, civ. 24; Job, xxxvi. xxxvii., and especially xxxviii.; Eccl. iii. 11, viii. 17, xi. 5; Rom. x. 33, 34; in which passages the wisdom and unsearchableness of God are particularly noticed. This benevolent and wise government of God is administered in such a way as to promote the highest, which is a *moral* good, among all moral beings, in order to prepare them to partake of that true and abiding happiness which can be attained only by holiness; since it is principally for moral beings, who are more nearly related to God than any other, that he has created, preserves, and governs all things.

We must here attend to the question, *In what relation the miracles so often mentioned in the holy scriptures stand to the government of God?* We must here presuppose what has already been said respecting miracles, s. 7, III.; and proceed therefore directly to consider the philosopho-theological theory respecting miracles, and to shew in what manner the objections urged against it may be answered.

1. The changes in the world *ordinarily* take place under the divine government, according to the laws or the course of nature, since they are

effected through the powers which God has given to his creatures, though not without his concurrence, but, on the contrary, under his constant guidance and inspection. Now if anything takes place which cannot be explained by these laws, or which transcends them, it is *extraordinary*, and is regarded as an immediate production of God, (in distinction from what takes place according to the course of nature, which is said to be a *mediate* production of God,) and is commonly called a *miracle*. Since now both of these effects are to be ascribed to the providence of God, it is divided into *ordinary* and *extraordinary*; and because these extraordinary effects are produced both on the body and on the mind, miracles are divided into those which take place in the *material world*, and in the *spiritual world*.

Note.—Many things produced by the mediate agency of God are ascribed to his immediate agency, from ignorance of the second causes by which his agency is exerted. Hence ignorant and inexperienced men are accustomed to see more miracles, and to believe in them more readily, than learned men, who are better able to observe the natural causes by which these effects are produced. And this it is which renders learned and scientific men often incredulous and sceptical upon the subject of miracles. But they are apt to presume too much on their own knowledge, and to think they can explain many things which they really do not understand. It is also a great fault, though a very common one, to draw a general principle from what often occurs, and to apply it to all cases. Because many pretended miracles have been proved false, Hume declares that all miracles, those of the Bible not excepted, are such, and thus rejects the most credible testimony.

2. The *possibility* of such extraordinary effects produced by God is proved in the following manner—viz., (a) They are *naturally* possible—i. e., God has power to produce such effects. He is indeed himself the author of the laws of nature, but he is not bound by them—i. e., he is not so bound by them that he must necessarily act in every case in accordance with them; he can alter them, suspend them, or depart from them; which, indeed, follows as a just consequence from his omnipotence. (b) They are also *morally* possible—i. e., they are not inconsistent with the divine wisdom, provided they tend to promote some important end, which could not, or at least could not so well, be secured in any other way; nor can it be shewn, *à priori*, that such cases may not occur. Miracles cannot, then, be shewn to be either morally or physically impossible, and to attempt to do this is, as Kant, Fichte, and other modern philosophers have allowed, most unpardonable pre-

sumption. Cf. the similar reasoning of the stoics, in Cicero, *De divin.* i. 52, seq.

3. The proof of the *reality* of miracles depends upon credible testimony. We, as Christians, regard the testimony of the holy scriptures as credible, the historical truth of the events related in them being supposed already established, for which cf. s. 7, III. The miracles mentioned in the scriptures are all of such a nature as to prove the divinity of the truths and doctrines which are taught in them, to seal the divine mission of the teacher, in short, to promote various important ends, especially those of a moral kind. At the time when these miracles were performed, when men would believe nothing without signs and wonders, they were doubtless of special service, but their utility is by no means confined to those particular times, but they must answer the same great ends with all who are convinced of their historical truth. For if miracles are true, God proved by them his unlimited dominion over the powers of nature; and to a being who proves this we are bound to yield assent and render obedience.

4. Tindal, Hume, Morgan, Voltaire, and others, who contend against miracles, bring forward the *à priori* objection that miracles would presuppose an imperfection in the original plan of God. It would be, they say, very unphilosophical to represent God as a workman who had not properly planned or executed his work, and who is obliged, when the wheels of the machinery stop, or the house is ready to fall, himself to interpose, and regulate and rectify what is wrong. Such ideas, they think, would suit well with that early state of society in which Jupiter was supposed to examine the vault of heaven, to see if it were rent, but are entirely unsuited to our enlightened and philosophical age. To this it may be answered,

(a) That miracles, like everything else in the world, formed a part of the original plan of God, and were embraced in his eternal purpose respecting the world and all its changes. Vide s. 32. In this purpose, it must have been determined that in the course of ordinary events, in particular places, and at certain times, miracles should take place; for God must have foreseen that some of his plans would either wholly fail, or could not be so well accomplished by the ordinary course of events, as by his special interference. This answer was given by Leibnitz and Wolf.

(b) The contradiction which the human understanding appears to find in miracles is owing to the fact that men, from the very constitution of their minds, connect together the causes and effects of the material world by the idea of *necessity*, and cannot do otherwise. But in the view of God, who sees all things as they really are,

there are no necessary effects, even in the material world; but his will is in all things free, and upon his will alone therefore does it depend to produce any effect which may be conducive to his designs. A miracle now is a new effect aside from the usual chain of events, which cannot therefore, like ordinary effects, be connected with what has preceded and with what follows by the law of a *sufficient reason*, and which we are therefore led irresistibly to ascribe to a power which has unlimited control over the material world, and thus arises the idea of a *miracle*. But still there is no real change in things themselves, and as soon as the miracle ceases they proceed as they did before, and are still connected together by the rules of the maxim of a *sufficient reason*. Thus we see that miracles are possible, but we are unable to comprehend how they can be performed; just as we are unable to understand how God could create a world from nothing.

5. From these principles it also follows that no miracles are wrought, in cases in which the designs of God can be fully and in their whole extent attained by natural means. And hence we may conclude, that miracles are of unfrequent occurrence, and that their reality must be attested by witnesses who cannot be justly suspected either of intentional fraud, or of enthusiasm, credulity, or any unintentional self-deception, before we can be justified in believing them. It cannot be said that God is more glorified by miracles than by the common course of nature. On the other hand, he is equally glorified, to say the least, by the common course of nature, as by miracles. In miracles his bare omnipotence becomes more conspicuous, but in the course of nature, his infinite wisdom and power are alike evidenced. The opinion here opposed arises from the puerile notion, that it must be more difficult and laborious for God to perform a miracle than to produce, in the ordinary way, the natural changes which take place in the world, and that the former therefore is more to his glory. But to God nothing is difficult, and nothing causes him labour. The production of the natural world, the constitution of its laws, and the regulation of its changes, require, in themselves considered, as great an exertion of power as the working of miracles.

6. But although the remarks here made are true, they by no means justify those interpreters who endeavour to explain by natural principles events expressly said in the scriptures to be miraculous, performed for the attainment of important moral ends not otherwise attainable. For such an interpretation is inconsistent with the authority of the Bible, and indeed, is a direct impeachment of its truth, and goes to prove that the sacred writers, or those who performed the pretended miracles, were either impostors,

or themselves deluded fanatics. The doctrine of Christ and the apostles is only so far established, as they appeal to miracles. For they gave themselves out as *extraordinary and immediate ambassadors of God*. But this claim could not be proved merely by the internal excellence of the doctrines which they taught, and they could expect to be credited only when their extraordinary claims were supported by extraordinary facts. And it is on account of this intimate connexion between the truth of their miracles and their character as extraordinary teachers, that many who are unwilling to concede the latter are disposed to dispute the former. If the proof from miracles be once allowed, it follows directly that those who performed them were extraordinary and immediate messengers from God. Vide s. 7, and Introduction, s. 7, 8.

7. The question is asked, Whether miracles occur at the present time, and whether we, in accordance with the promises of the New Testament, may expect to perform miraculous cures, and hope to possess the gifts of inspiration, divination, &c.? This has been believed by pretended thaumaturgists, prophets, and enthusiasts of every kind, ancient and modern. And many also, who cannot be accused of enthusiasm, have assented to this opinion. Grotius, for example, believed that Christian missionaries might hope to perform miracles, and Lavater supposed, that any Christian who could firmly believe that God would work miracles through him, would be able to do what he believed. But if history and experience are consulted, we shall soon know what to think of the pretended wonder-workers since the times of the apostles, and be able to put them down either as impostors or as deluded fanatics. But does not the New Testament afford reason to hope that miraculous powers may be continued in the Christian church? No! For (a) these miraculous gifts were by no means promised by Christ to all his followers, at all times, but only to the apostles and first teachers of Christianity, to be used by them in proclaiming Christian truth, and in establishing the Christian church, Mark, xvi. 17, 18, coll. ver. 15, 16, 20; John, xiv. 12, coll. ver. 11, 13, 14. (b) In Eph. iv. 13, seq., Paul teaches what is well worthy of notice, that these gifts were intended only for the first age of the church, and would cease when the church had become thoroughly established, when more clear knowledge of the truth had been diffused, and the controversies between Jewish and heathen Christians were ended. The same truth is taught in 1 Cor. xiii. 8; the gift of tongues, &c., it is there said, will hereafter cease, (with some reference to the present world, though principally to the world to come, where these gifts will be wholly useless,) but faith, hope, and charity will abide (and that in the present world as well as in the

future) as long as the church shall continue. (c) Add to these the consideration, that it cannot be proved that the power of conferring these gifts was granted to any besides the apostles, (cf. Acts, viii. 14—17,) and that after the death of the apostles and their immediate successors in the Christian church, these gifts would therefore cease, as a matter of course.

On this subject, cf. Toellner, *Vermischte Aufsätze*, th. ii. Abhandl. 2, *Warum Gott nicht übernatürlich thut*, was natürlich geschehen kann. Ammon, *De notione miraculi*; Göttingæ, 1795, 4to. Also the work entitled, *Betrachtungen über den Endzweck der Wunderwerke, und die Kraft des Wunderglaubens in unsern Tagen*; Berlin, 1777, 8vo; and the works occasioned by the opinion of Lavater and others; Middleton's *Essay on Miraculous Gifts after the Death of the Apostles*; F. T. Rühl, *Werth der Behauptungen Jesu, und seiner Apostel*; Leipzig, 1791, 8vo; Köppen, *Die Bibel ein Werk der göttlichen Weisheit*. One of the latest works in opposition to miracles is entitled, *De miraculis enchiridion*, a philosopho Theologis exhibitum; Zwickau, 1805, 8vo,—a prejudiced and partial work. Vide the Review in the *Jen. Lit. Zeit.* for 1806, No. 168.

Note.—In respect to its practical influence, the doctrine of the providence of God is one of the first importance. In addition to the particulars enumerated s. 67, I., *Note 2*, the religious teacher, in his practical instructions, should insist upon the following points, which are made prominent in the holy scriptures, where we may see an example of the proper mode of exhibiting them.

(a) He should shew, that we ought never to stop with the second causes through which our blessings come to us, or by which the effects which we witness are accomplished, but should always go back to God as the first cause, and sincerely love and honour him, as the author of every good gift. Vide James, i. 17; iv. 13, 15. Instead of dwelling upon the second causes by which events are brought about, and wholly overlooking the agency of God, (the common method of modern historians,) the sacred historians refer everything to God, and hence they so frequently clash with the views and feelings of those who look upon the world from a different and lower point of view. Vide s. 70, II. 2.

(b) If we would enjoy the blessings, whether temporal or spiritual, which are designed for us, and promised to us by God, we must, on our part, fulfil the conditions to the performance of which he has annexed this enjoyment. Cf. s. 71, II. Morus, p. 83, s. 8.

(c) Natural evils and calamities are under the

control of an all-wise and benevolent Being, and are intended to lead us to repent of our sins, and lead holy lives, or to confirm and strengthen us in holiness, and in every way to contribute to our advantage. Cf. s. 71, II. 2.

(d) We should feel especially indebted to God for any holiness or moral rectitude which we may perceive in ourselves. By cherishing the feeling that whatever is good in us is the gift of God, we shall be kept from that selfish blindness and pride which would spring from the thought that we ourselves were the authors of it. God gave us our moral nature, and to him we owe all the powers which we possess, and all the means, in the use of which we attain to holiness. Our faults and crimes, on the contrary, we must charge wholly to ourselves, and never to God. Cf. James, i. 13—15; 1 Cor. iv. 7; 2 Cor. ix. 11; Phil. ii. 13.

(e) God employs all his creatures as instruments for the promotion of his own purposes, and hence they are called (e. g., Ps. ciii.) his servants, his messengers, who do his will. But to none of the creatures who inhabit his footstool, has God assigned so large a sphere of action, and none does he so much employ in the accomplishment of his most important purposes, as man, and man is what he is through the moral nature which God has given him, and which he constantly preserves in exercise. In this his moral nature man resembles God, and can continually become more and more like him, yea, in this he is related to him, and *partakes of the divine nature*. Every man, in every station and calling in life, is employed by God as an instrument for the attainment of important ends. The more faithfully a man performs all the duties of his station, however inferior it may be, and especially the more he labours after true holiness, the more will his life be conformed to the divine will, and answer the ends for which he is employed. And one who fails to discharge these duties, and is unprofitable in the service of God, proves that he mistakes his own true worth and dignity. It is therefore our highest duty to exert ourselves, to the utmost of our powers, to do good in all the relations in which we stand under the government of God, and especially to promote holiness in ourselves and others. Cf. s. 69, ad finem, and s. 70, II. 2. Morus, p. 78, s. 4.

As Christians, however, we should exercise these feelings, and yield this obedience, not to God only, but also to Jesus Christ, the Son of God. He counsels and guides all who believe in him; they ought therefore to imitate and follow him. It is the peculiarity of the Christian system to require of us that we should do everything *ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ*.

BOOK II.

DOCTRINE OF MAN.

ON THE PLAN, ORDER, AND SUCCESSION OF TOPICS IN THE SECOND BOOK.

THIS Book is properly denominated, *theological Anthropology*, because it contains the doctrine respecting man, and his relation to God. In respect to the order and succession in which the various topics belonging to this doctrine are treated, there is a great diversity in the systems of theology, both ancient and modern. The particular order in which doctrines are treated is, indeed, of no great importance, provided only that those doctrines are placed first which constitute the basis of those which follow, or which contribute essentially to the illustration of them. To place the doctrine respecting Christ—e. g. respecting his person, the redemption effected through him, &c.—at the very introduction of the system, (as some have done,) is certainly very preposterous, since a great deal in these doctrines cannot be placed in the proper light until the scriptural doctrines of the depravity of man, of sin, and the punishment of sin, have been previously illustrated. The plan adopted by Morus, of placing the latter doctrines first, has therefore greatly the advantage over the other. Still, on any method which may be adopted, there will always be found difficulties and imperfections. Some have made a merit of deviating from the method generally pursued in systems of theology, of inventing a method wholly new, and especially of giving new titles to the various divisions of the subject. But no new land is won for the science itself by means of these innovations; and, on the contrary, the study of it is rendered very perplexed to beginners, and they are compelled, whenever they take a new system in hand, to begin as it were anew, and to learn a new language.

We adopt the following order—viz., (a) Man may be considered in his *former* or *original* condition—the state of *innocence*, and of this an account has already been given in Book I. s. 53—57. Further, man may be considered (b) in his *present* state—that in which he is, since the state of innocence has ceased. In this connexion belong the doctrines respecting *sin*, its origin, the various kinds of sin, and its consequences; Art. ix. s. 73—87, inclusive. Finally, man may be considered (c) in that better state to which he is restored. Here the whole doctrine respecting the redemption of the human race belongs. (1) *De gratia Dei salutari*,—the gracious institutes which God has established to promote the holiness and happiness of men,—especially those established in and through Christ,—the different states of Christ,—his person, his work, and the salutary consequences of it to the human race; Art. x. s. 88—120, inclusive. (2) On the conditions (repentance and faith) on which we can obtain the blessedness promised to Christians by God; Art. xi. s. 121—128, inclusive. (3) On the manner in which God aids those who believe in Christ, and enables them to fulfil the prescribed conditions, or, respecting divine influences and the means of grace; Art. xii. s. 129—133, inclusive. (4) On the Christian community, or the *church*; Art. xiii. s. 134—136. (5) On Baptism and the Lord's Supper, or the *sacraments*; Art. xiv. s. 137—146. (6) On the passage of man to another world, and his state in it,—of death, the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, the day of judgment, the end of the world, and future happiness and misery; Art. xv. s. 147—160.

BOOK II.

DOCTRINE OF MAN.

PART I.—STATE INTO WHICH MAN IS BROUGHT BY THE FALL.


ARTICLE IX.

OF SIN, AND THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN.

SECTION LXXIII.

WHAT IS MEANT BY SIN; THE DIFFERENT WORDS
USED IN THE BIBLE TO DENOTE SIN, AND THE
MEANING OF THEM.

I. Definition of Sin.



SIN, understood objectively, and taken in its wider sense, is, *any deviation from the law of God, or, what is not right, according to the divine law; what is opposed to the law.* In the language of jurists, a deviation from the law is called a *crime*, (Germ. *Verbrechen*, *crimen*;) in theology, and when the concerns of religion are made the topics of discourse—that is, when men are considered in their relation to God, it is called *sin*; and it is an advantage which the German language [and also the English] possesses, that it is able to designate this particular form of transgression by an appropriate word. Sin, therefore, properly speaking, is a deviation from the *divine law*, or, according to the scripture phraseology, *what is not κατὰ τὸ δέγμα τοῦ Θεοῦ*. This word is always used with reference to God, as *Legislator*; and because the Bible, in entire conformity with experience, regards all men in their present condition as transgressors of the divine law, it calls them *sinner*s, Rom. iii. 9, 23, 24.

But would we define *subjectively* that act by which one becomes a sinner, or punishable, we might say, *sin is a free act, which is opposed to*

the divine law, or which deviates from it. Here it must be remarked,

(a) That in order for an action to be *imputed* to any one as sinful, it must be a *free* action; for whenever a man acts by compulsion, and it does not depend upon himself either to perform or omit the action, it cannot be imputed to him as sin; the consideration of which will be resumed in s. 81.

(b) Properly speaking, it is the law which makes sin what it is. All morality proceeds from the law; and where there is no divine law, there is no sin. This is taught by Paul, Rom. iv. 15, οὐ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, οὐδὲ παράβασις (ἔστί). Were there no law given, the actions now denominated *sins* (e. g., licentiousness, theft, murder,) while they must still be regarded as foolish and injurious, and be called *evils*, (Germ. *Uebel*;) could no longer be denominated *sins*. Wild beasts often despoil and destroy other beasts and human beings. This is an evil, and has injurious consequences, even for the beasts themselves; they are ensnared, and hunted down. But what they do is not *sin*, because they have no law given them; and no reasonable man would call such things in brutes *sins*, or seriously affirm that a beast had *sinned*. Nor is even the word *crime* applied to their outrages, because they are exempt alike from human and divine laws.

By *law* is meant, *the precept of a ruler, accompanied with comminations*; and by a ruler is meant one who has the right to prescribe rules of acting to others, and to connect these rules with threatenings. *Commands* and *laws* are two different things. In every law there is a command, but every command is not a law. A command must be *rightful* in order to be a law; the preceptor must be entitled to give commands, and those to whom they are given must be bound to obey; and on these conditions only

does a command become a law. Hence the demand of the robber to give him our property, with the threat which he annexes, that he will murder us if we refuse, is no law. The laws of God are made known to us partly through nature, and partly by immediate revelation through the holy scriptures. The latter are designed to renew, impress, confirm, illustrate, and enlarge or complete the law of nature. God has thus, both by the works of nature and by the doctrines contained in the holy scriptures, given us information respecting his designs, as his will respecting men and a rule for them, to which they should continually have regard, and according to which they should regulate their conduct. Morus, p. 106, n. 3, 4.

II. Scriptural Terms for Sin.

1. The most common word for sin is the Hebrew \sin , generally rendered by the Grecian Jews $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$. Both of these words are used in various senses.

(a) The Hebrew \sin signifies literally *to deviate from one's way, to slip aside*—a meaning which it has among the Arabians. Hence *to fail of one's end, to see his design frustrated*, Job, v. 24; Proverbs, x. 2. In the same way are the words $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ and $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$ employed by the Greeks in reference to those whose expectation is disappointed, who lose, or are deprived of something, who miss their aim, and come short. Thus, e. g., Xenophon speaks of those $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\lambda\eta\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, whose counsel was frustrated; and even in Homer we find the phrase $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \theta\omega\alpha\pi\tau\eta\varsigma$, *to be deprived of sight*. In the Iliad (xxiv. 68) he says, with regard to Hector, that he never suffered the gods to want for offerings worthy of their acceptance—

οὐτὲ φίλων ἡμάρτανε δῶρων.

Hence (b) these words are used figuratively, and are transferred to the soul, and denote the faults and defects of the understanding and of the will, and also of the actions; of the latter more frequently, though sometimes of the former—e. g., John, viii. 46, $\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\chi\chi\epsilon\iota\upsilon\ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$, *erroris convincere*, and John, xvi. 8, 9, where $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$ signifies, *delusion, blindness of the understanding*. More commonly, however, it is used with reference to the will and the actions, and denotes every deviation from the divine law in willing and acting. Ἡ $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$, therefore, often signifies, sometimes every transgression of a grave character, and sometimes, in general, *impiety, profanitas, irreligion*. Thus the heathen were denominated by the Jews, $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\omega\lambda\omicron\iota$, \sin , in opposition to themselves, the *gens sancta*. In Heb. x. 26, $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ signifies to apostatize from the Christian faith. In Romans, vii. 9, Paul uses $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$ to denote the propen-

sity to sin (Germ. *Hang zur Sünde*) which is everywhere observed in man, and which is natural to him. [Cf. Usteri, *Entwicklung des Paulinischen Lehrbegriffs*, Zweiter und Dritter Theil.—Tr.]

(c) This, and all the words which signify *sin*, are often used by the Hebrews and Hellenists to denote the *punishment of sin*—e. g., Isaiah, liii.; 2 Kings, vii. 9, seq.

(d) They also signify a *sin-offering*—e. g., Ps. xl. 7; 2 Cor. v. 21, $\thetaυσία\ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$.

2. Besides this word, there are many others by which the idea of *sin* is expressed by the Hebrews and Greeks. Among these are,

(a) In Hebrew, ∞ , *guilt (reatus)*, *sin*, Psalm lix. 5; frequently rendered in the Septuagint $\alpha\delta\iota\chi\eta\mu\alpha$, or $\alpha\delta\iota\chi\iota\alpha$. ∞ , strictly, *apostasy from the true God, or rebellion against him*. [The word ∞ , from ∞ , has the same signification.—Tr.] Forsaking the worship of Jehovah for that of idols, and every deliberate transgression of the divine law, were justly regarded as rebellion against God, and so called by this name, 2 Kings, viii. 10; Jer. iii. 13. ∞ is therefore a stronger word than \sin . ∞ is used to denote the *injustice of judges*, when they lose sight of what is *just* (∞), and decide unjustly and partially, Job, ix. 24; Ezek. vii. 11; hence applied to any *misdeed or wickedness*, by which the desert of punishment is incurred, Psal. v. 5. Hence ∞ signifies, *one guilty, (reus, damnatus), sensu forensi*. ∞ is rendered in the Septuagint by the words $\alpha\delta\iota\chi\iota\alpha$, $\alpha\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha$, $\chi.\ \tau.\ \lambda.$ ∞ , *guilt, guiltiness*. ∞ , or ∞ , *error, mistake, transgression*, Psal. xix. 13. Sept. $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omega\mu\alpha$. Classical Greek, $\pi\lambda\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta$.

(b) In the New Testament, the words which denote sin are mostly taken from the Septuagint, where they are used interchangeably the one for the other. Among these are $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\kappa\omicron\eta$, Hebrews, ii. 2;— $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\beta\alpha\varsigma$, Romans, iv. 15;— $\alpha\delta\iota\chi\iota\alpha$ and $\alpha\delta\iota\chi\eta\mu\alpha$, (like $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$ and $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\eta\mu\alpha$) Romans, i. 18; vi. 13;— $\theta\phi\epsilon\iota\lambda\eta\mu\alpha$, Matt. vi. 12. (The Hebrews often represent sins under the image of *debts*, which must either be remitted or paid.) $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omega\mu\alpha$, Matt. vi. 14, also used to signify apostasy from religion, Rom. xi. 12; $\alpha\gamma\gamma\acute{\iota}\omega\mu\alpha$, *a sin committed through ignorance, erratum*, Heb. ix. 7. (So Aquila renders ∞ , Lev. xxvi. 39, by $\alpha\gamma\gamma\acute{\iota}\omega\mu\alpha$ so also $\pi\lambda\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta$. Ἄνομια, *illegality, transgression of the law, or sin*, Matt. vii. 23. It is also sometimes used in the sense of *irreligion, heathenism*, since νόμος often signifies the religion revealed by God. Hence the heathen are called $\alpha\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\iota$, Rom. ii. 12; vi. 19. Cf. $\alpha\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha$, $\alpha\sigma\epsilon\beta\acute{\iota}\varsigma$. In the text, 1 John, iii. 4, ἡ $\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\upsilon\ \eta\ \alpha\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\iota$, it is not the intention of the writer to give a logical definition of *sin*, but rather to oppose those deceivers who maintained that a sinful life was allowable. The meaning of the text is as follows: "Whoever leads a

sinful life, act in opposition to the precepts of the divine law; for every sin is against the divine law, (which commands us to live holy and without sin. Vide ver. 3.)”

In the discussion here following of the doctrine respecting sin, this order will be observed—viz., (1) *The origin of sin among men, or the sin of our first parents, and the moral corruption of human nature*, derived, according to the scriptures, from them, will be first considered, s. 74—80. (2) *The origin and nature of the particular sinful actions of men*, which have their ground in that moral depravity, together with the different kinds and divisions of these actions, s. 81—85. (3) *The punishment of sin*, as learned from reason and revelation, s. 86, 87.

SECTION LXXIV.

WHAT DOES REASON, WITHOUT THE USE OF THE BIBLE, TEACH US RESPECTING THE SINFUL STATE OF MAN, AND THE ORIGIN OF IT? AND HOW FAR DO THE RESULTS OF REASON ON THIS SUBJECT AGREE WITH THE BIBLE?

I. *Opinions of Heathen Philosophers.*

The fact that human nature is imperfect, and has a morally defective constitution, shewing itself in the earliest youth, was observed and conceded by most of the ancient heathen philosophers; and the fact is so obvious, and so conformed to experience, that it could hardly have been otherwise. It was formerly observed, as it is now, that man has more inclination to immorality and sin than to innocence, holiness, and moral purity. A perpetual conflict was seen to exist in man, from his youth up, between reason and sense—a contest in which man oftener sided with the latter than with the former, and thus made himself unhappy. It was seen that man, even when enjoying the best moral instruction, and when possessed of a full conviction of the justice of the requisitions of the moral law, still often acted immorally; and this, even when perfectly convinced that in so doing he did wrong; and that he was thus in a state extremely wretched. Vide Morus, p. 109, s. 3. Now, if it was with man as it should be, he would suffer his will to be at once determined by what his understanding perceived to be true and good, and would regulate his conduct accordingly. That this is not so, experience sufficiently teaches. It is false, therefore, to assert that everything depends upon instruction, and that if the mind were only enlightened with regard to duty, the will would soon follow. So it should be, but so it is not; and it is the greatest of all moral problems, how to render the will obedient to the dictates of the understanding.

These things having been observed in ancient times, the writings of the pagan philosophers are

full of complaints over the moral corruption of man. Socrates is said by Plato (*De Repub.*) to have complained that all nations, even the most cultivated, and those advanced farthest in intelligence and knowledge, were yet so depraved that no human discovery or art sufficed to remove the disorder. The writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, are full of expressions of the same kind. Aristotle called this evil *συγγενές*, *Ethic.* ad Nicom. iii. 15. Plato says in his *Meno*, that children by nature (*φύσει*) are not good; for in that case, says he, ironically, it would only be necessary to shut them up, in order to keep them good. He saw that it was a mistake to suppose that man is made wicked merely by education, or that he becomes so merely by the imitation of bad examples. Cicero says, in his *Tusculan Questions* (iii. 1), *Simulac editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate, et in summa opinionum perversitate, versamur: ut pæne cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur.* De Amicit. (c. 24.), *Multis signis natura declarat quid velit: obsurdescimus tamen nescio quomodo; nec ea quæ ab ea monemur, audimus*—our will does not follow what our understanding approves as right and good. In this connexion we may cite the common declaration, *Nitimur in velutem semper, cupimusque negata*; and that of Ovid, (*Metam.* vii. 18, seq.)

Si possem, sanior essem.

Sed trahit invitum nova vis; aliudque cupido,
Mens aliud suadet. Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor.

[Very remarkable are the words of Seneca, in his work *De Clementia*, l. i. c. 6:—“Quotus quisque ex quæstoribus est, qui non ea ipsa lege teneatur, qua quærit? Quotus quisque accusator, vacat culpa? Et nescio, an nemo ad dandam veniam difficilior sit, quam qui illam petere sæpius meruit. Peccavimus omnes, alii gravia, alii leviora; alii ex destinato, alii forte impuls, aut aliena nequitia ablati; alii in bonis consiliis parum fortiter stetimus, et innocentiam invite ac renitentes perdidimus. Nec delinquimus tantum, sed usque ad extremum ævi delinquemus.” Compare with this what he says in his *Treatise De Ira*, (ii. 8.), “Omnia sceleribus ac vitiis plena sunt. Plus committitur quam quod possit coercionem sanari. Certatur ingenti quodam nequitie certamine. Major quotidie peccandi cupiditas, minor verecundia est. Nec furtiva jam scelera sunt; præter oculos eunt; adeoque in publicum missa nequitia est, et in omnium pectoribus evaluit, ut innocentia non rara, sed nulla sit.” Cf. also the declaration of Sopater, *σύμφυτον ἀνθρώποις τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν*. For numerous other passages of similar import, the student may consult Tholuck, *Lehre von der Sünde*, s. 48, 49; 72, 73; and the works commended by Hahn, *Lehrbuch*, s. 359. For the opinions of

the later Jews, vide Eisenmenger, *Entdecktes Judenthum*, theil. ii. s. 80, f.—Tr.]

All this is in perfect accordance with the declarations of the sacred writers, and especially with that of Paul, Rom. vii. 15, "For that which I do, I allow not; for what I would, that I do not; but what I hate, that do I." It is also in accordance with the experience of every individual. And yet there have been philosophers, especially in modern times, who have denied the truth of such representations, and have attempted to demonstrate the contrary, and who have sought to found new systems of education upon their peculiar views respecting the character of man.

As to the real *causes* of this depravity, which was so universally seen and acknowledged, the opinions were very various.

(1) Men in the earliest times, and among the rude heathen nations, being left to themselves, either neglected all reflection upon this subject, or invented various philosophemes or narrations, in order to facilitate to themselves the understanding of the origin and diffusion of this evil. In all of them, however, it was assumed that the human race was originally better than afterwards, and that either by slow degrees, or suddenly and at once, it became corrupt. As soon as men begin to reflect upon God and themselves, they exhibit almost universally the feeling, that it is necessary to suppose that mankind was originally in a better condition; nor can this feeling be obliterated by any subtle reasoning. Cf. s. 56.

(2) The ancient Grecian philosophers adopted in part the fables and narratives which they found already existing; but they also undertook to investigate the first origin of evil more particularly. In doing this, they soon came to the result, (which indeed had been already observed by the authors of those narratives,) that the defective constitution of man consisted in the undue power of *sense* (*Sinnlichkeit*), and that this had its seat in the body. Paul distinguishes in man the *νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν* (i. e., ἐν σαρκί, ver. 18), and the *νόμος τοῦ νοός*. The former, he says, ἀντιστρατεύεται νόμῳ νοός, καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζει με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, Rom. vii. 23. We have thus a *dictamen sensuum*, and a *dictamen rationis*. So Araspas in Xenophon distinguishes in every man an ἀγαθὸν and a πονηρὰ ψυχὴ, Cyrop. vi. 21; and Plato makes mention of the λογιστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς and of the ἀλογιστικόν οἱ ἐπιθυμητικόν. These Grecian philosophers proceeded on the supposition, that there are two equally eternal and original principles, *God and matter*. The former they supposed to be the *rational*, thinking principle, and the origin of all good, physical and moral; the latter, the *irrational* principle, and the cause of all evil. Vide s. 46, II. To the former principle they supposed the

rational soul of man belongs, and his body to the second; and as his body consists of matter, so his soul is a part of the divine nature, and a pure effluence from the same.

They were too prone, under the influence of these views, to overlook the advantages which the human soul derives from its connexion with the body—advantages which could not otherwise exist, and to regard the body too much as a prison, in which the soul is impaled. So taught the Persians, and most of the oriental philosophers, [vide Neander's account of the Gnostic Systems;] so Pythagoras and Plato, especially in *Timæus*; so Aristotle, the stoics, and their followers. In conformity with these views, Socrates and Plato always gave the advice, *χωρίζειν ὡς μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν*. They believed, however, that after death the soul would be reunited with God, after having undergone various degrees of cleansing and purification from the matter cleaving to it; respecting which, vide s. 150, II. [This purification was the intent of the transmigration of souls (metempsychosis)—a doctrine held in all the religions of the East, and in that also of ancient Egypt. The soul, it was supposed, would be purified by the sufferings endured in wandering through uncongenial matter, and be at length prepared to merge into the pure fountain from which it originally emanated. For some valuable remarks on this, and other religious ideas and observances in the East, vide Schlegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte*.—Tr.]

(3) The account which the holy scriptures give of the origin of sin is as follows:—"God made man, not only as to his soul, but his body also; and both pure and without sin; by a daring transgression, however, the nature of man is changed, and from being pure and immortal, has become defective and mortal. This, however, is overruled by God, for our good, by means of Jesus Christ, the Restorer of the human race."

[*Note*.—The traditions of many of the Oriental nations correspond remarkably with the narrative in Genesis, and confirm its truth. This is the case, especially, with the doctrine of Zoroaster, which so strikingly agrees with that of Moses as to indicate a common source in the historic fact of an original temptation and fall. According to Zoroaster, the first human pair were offered heaven on condition of virtue, and of refraining from homage to the *Deus*—the demons of the Persian mythology. For some time they complied with these conditions; but at length Ahriman (Satan) caused the thought to be infused into their minds by a Dew, that he was the creator of the world. They believed this lie, and so became, like Ahriman, evil and unhappy. On one occasion they went out upon a hunting excursion, and found a wild goat, and

tasted its milk, which was sweet to their taste, and reviving, but injurious to their body. The Dew then offered them fruit, which they ate, and in consequence were still more injured, and stripped of their remaining blessings. Vide Kleuker, *Zend-Avesta*, 3 thl. s. 84, ff. Cf. Schlegel, *Philos. der Geschichte*, b. i.—[Tr.]

II. *Results of independent Reason and Observation.*

If, in investigating the origin and causes of this evil, we disregard all authority, even that of the holy scriptures, and proceed solely from those considerations to which experience conducts us, we arrive at the following results, which are not indeed entirely satisfactory, but which yet somewhat illustrate this subject, and therefore may be useful to those to whom the instruction of the young is committed.

It may be remarked in general, that the philosopher, as such, can assign no other ground than that man is a limited being, and consequently can err. The nature of this limitation and liability to sin is now to be more closely examined. Man has a twofold nature, one part of which is *rational* and *moral*, (*νοῦς*;) by means of which he can act with reference to ends, and possesses understanding and free-will; the other part of which is *sensuous*, (*sinnlich*;) and consists of desires and appetites, (*ψυχή*.) By the former, he belongs to the world of spirit; by the latter, to that of sense. He is therefore to be regarded as a being compounded of reason and sense, (Germ. *vernunftig-sinnliches Wesen*.) In this way, man is distinguished from the brute, which has indeed sense, but no rational or moral nature. This in man should be the *ruling power*, the other subject to this; and then only is man *free* when he acts independently of the impulses of his lower nature, and obeys the voice of the moral law, uttered so imperatively within him. But in man in his present state we notice a continual conflict between these two natures—a conflict which cannot be explained away by any subtleties. This conflict rests upon the distinction between these two dissimilar natures in man, and is the immediate result of their connexion in human beings, according to their present constitution.

Beyond this, the essential nature of man, the mere philosopher cannot go, in his inquiries after the causes of sin; and the fact of a particular corruption of our nature, or of the invisible agency of evil spirits, cannot be resorted to by him to account for the existing evil. In short, the mere philosopher who is unacquainted with what the scriptures have taught on this subject, or who will make no use of their instructions, cannot proceed from *facts*, because these are either unknown to him, or doubtful and uncertain. Hence the truth of what many of the old theologians have said, that the fact of a better

state of human nature depends for its proof upon the holy scriptures; and that neither that state, nor the fall which succeeded it, can be demonstrated from mere reason. But we are now exhibiting those results only to which unassisted reason would arrive.

In noticing the defects and imperfections which result from the connexion of these two natures in man, the many advantages which also spring from it ought not to be overlooked. It should be remembered that man could never have been what he is, if this constitution were different. Many possesses various faculties, which have their ground in this constitution, which may indeed, and actually do, mislead him into many faults and errors, but which are in themselves good, and, when rightly cultivated and employed, bring him great advantage. Such are *self-love*, so deeply implanted in the human breast, (hence the instinct for self-preservation and for personal improvement,) *the love of honour*, *the tendency to imitate*, and others, which are in themselves good, and only need to be kept under the control of reason, and properly directed to the ends for which they were given.

After these remarks, we come now to inquire after the more immediate causes, from which the prevailing power of sense, and the inability of reason to control it, are to be explained. We design in this place to give only the result of human observation and experience, which will be very inadequate to the full explanation of this subject. We shall afterwards exhibit the doctrine of the scriptures, and inquire how far it agrees with these results. These causes are to be found partly in the strength of the feelings belonging to human nature, partly in the manner in which the powers of the human soul develop themselves, and partly in the external circumstances in which this development proceeds.

(1) The feelings of man are much stronger than those ideas of his mind which have their foundation in his reason; and the mere philosopher, who receives no light from revelation, cannot tell that this has not always been the fact with man. For he cannot conclude with any certainty, from his mere reason, that human nature was originally in a better state than that in which he now finds it; he must take man as he finds him, and on the supposition, which he has no means of refuting, that he was always the same. In general, the end of this constitution of our nature would seem to be, to guard against insensibility and inactivity. For the mere motives of reason would act far too feebly and slowly; and except for this influence of the feelings, many actions which are useful and necessary for our own good and that of others would remain undone. And so it is found, that men of a cold and phlegmatic temperament,

who have but little feeling and excitability, though they may have good heads and benevolent hearts, are generally indolent, irresolute, and inactive, and accomplish very little. It is often the case, indeed, that a man suffers himself to be carried away by his feelings, and resolves and acts without regard to consequences. The advantages of this constitution must, however, be greater than the disadvantages, because it is so established by God. But on this subject much may be said, without leading to any satisfactory conclusion. This visible *inordinateness* of one portion of our nature can hardly be made to harmonize with our conceptions of the divine attributes. But beyond this the philosopher as such cannot go.

(2) In the earlier years of our life, before we can rightly use our reason, we have no other rule for desiring or avoiding anything than our feelings. And on this account, that they have no maturity of reason, children and minors cannot be left to themselves, but need to be guided and governed by others. We thus become accustomed from our youth up to desire those things which excite agreeable sensations in us, and to shun those things which have an opposite effect. Now the kind of agreeable sensations with which man is earliest acquainted is that which arises from the gratification of his animal desires. For in the earliest years of his life, man, having not yet attained the full use of his rational faculties, has no taste for the more pure and spiritual joys, which are above sense, and which are attendant only on the knowledge of the truth, and holiness of heart and life. When now, after a long time, and by slow degrees, man has attained to the full use and the maturity of his rational faculties, he has for a long time been habituated, even from his youth, to will and act according to his feelings and the impulses of sense, without duly consulting reason, and carefully weighing everything by his understanding. This long practice has produced in him a habit, and it is now hard for him to break this habit, and to acquire, in place of it, the habit of rational consideration before action. *Quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem testa diu.* Very true, therefore, is the remark of Tacitus (*Vita Agricol. c. iii.*), "that human weakness is of such a nature, that the remedies do not act as efficiently as the disease."

From these remarks we draw the following important inference: that we should endeavour, as early as possible, to awaken, cherish, and develop the *moral sense* in the youthful heart. And there is no way for us to do this so successfully as by means of *religion*. Vide Introduction, s. 2. It is therefore one of the most perverse and injurious maxims to say that young children should not have religion taught them.

The evil effects resulting from this maxim have been deeply felt in our age.

(3) The first knowledge of man is derived from his senses; at first, he can acquire information in no other way than from sensible objects. The senses must, in all cases, serve as the vehicle of knowledge; and they are often misemployed. Since now, from the nature of the case, man must, from his earliest youth, be so familiar with visible and sensible objects, it is not strange that he should be too little affected by the instructions given him respecting objects not cognizable by the senses, and especially respecting God, the Invisible; and that he should be so indifferent to the motives to love him, and from love to obey him. The remark, 1 John, iv. 20, "he that loveth not his brother, whom he hath seen, how can he love God, whom he hath not seen," is therefore psychologically true. If we see a man who has no true love to his neighbour whom he hath seen, we may safely conclude that he has no love for the invisible God. Hence we may explain the natural coldness of the carnal mind to God, and everything which belongs to the moral and spiritual world; and hence too we may derive the duty of opposing this at the very earliest periods of life; for the longer a man lives, the more fixed and habitual does it become, and the harder to be removed.

(4) Man brings with him into the world various powers and faculties; but, according to the plan of God, these can be developed and brought to a good end only by instruction and a wise education. Man does not come into the world with any inborn *habits* of action, or with anything which answers to the instincts of brutes, the place of which must be supplied by instruction. But this instruction in religion, morality, and other useful things, which is so necessary to the proper development of our powers, is enjoyed by very few, and some are wholly destitute of it. And the instruction given on these subjects is often defective, and calculated to mislead. It allows men to be satisfied with a merely formal worship, in which the heart remains cold and unimproved; it is generally above the capacities of the young, and by taxing the memory more than affecting the heart, it often produces aversion and disgust. The whole moral education, especially in the so called higher circles of life, is often extremely deficient; so that frequently the rude children of nature, left to grow up by themselves, are in a better condition than those who have been reared in the midst of refinement and cultivation. At least, they are not so perverted and corrupted, although they may be wanting in some of the artificial accomplishments which the latter possess.

Evil example, too, has an indescribable effect

upon children and youth, and brings them to an earlier acquaintance with vice than with virtue. It should be remarked that the outbreaks of many perverse inclinations and dispositions which are perceived in children are the signs and the consequences of some endowments of human nature in themselves good. The exhibitions of these dispositions are important hints to the teacher and guardian of the young; and if he is wise and skilful, may receive such a direction from him as will turn them to good account in the ultimate character of those entrusted to his charge. For example, selfwill and obstinacy indicate firmness of character; forwardness and inquisitiveness indicate a curious and active mind.

(5) The social life of man, the gradual increase of cultivation, refinement, and luxury, and the propensity to seek for the pleasures of sense, while they are in some respects advantageous, are the cause of great evil and injury. Cf. Rousseau, *Sur l'inégalité des hommes*. The wants of men are greatly multiplied, their sensual appetites are greatly excited by the constant presentation of new objects, and their true peace and contentment (*αὐταρχία*) are prevented. They thus become continually more passionate and insatiable, and more withdrawn from invisible and spiritual objects.

Civilized man has, indeed, more means in his power to resist the evils arising from the social state; but these means are too little regarded and employed. Luxury makes men selfish, proud, and hard-hearted, and paves the way to other vices; and when *self*, which is so pampered by luxury, once gets firm possession of the heart, morality and virtue are for ever banished. The observation of the evils which arise from the connexion of men in social life, and from the progress of cultivation, suggested to many even of the ancient heathen world the thought that men were formerly in a better condition than at a later period. Vide s. 56. But Philosophy, uninstructed by Revelation, can never prove, *à priori*, that a change has taken place in human nature, and that it is now different from what it was. At least, the philosopher can never attain to perfect certainty on this subject, and will find many things enigmatical and inexplicable.

Cf. on this subject the works from the different schools. Jerusalem, *Betrachtungen über die Wahrheiten der Religion*, b. ii. th. ii. s. 731, f.; Junge, *Philosophische und Theologische Aufsätze*, th. ii. s. 297, 367; Steinbart, *System der Glückseligkeitslehre*, cap. iii. s. 46, f.; Eberhard, *Apologie des Socrates*; Töllner, *Theologische Untersuchungen*, b. i. st. 2, s. 112, f. As, however, in some of these works, especially in Steinbart, the depravity of man is very inadequately represented, and the present

state of man is placed in far too advantageous and favourable a light, in contradiction both to the Bible and to experience, we refer with pleasure to the views of Michaelis on this subject, expressed in his book, "*Von der Sünde*," s. 48—54, and in his "*Moral*," th. i. s. 105—130; also to Kant, "*Ueber das radicale Uebel*," first essay in his "*Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der blossen Vernunft*;" and to Morus, "*Theol. Moral*," and Reinhard's "*Dogmatik*" and "*Moral*."

[Cf. on this subject Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, b. ii. s. 17, s. 120, *Ursprung der Sünde*; also Tholuck, *Lehre von der Sünde*. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, p. 154—178, especially 158; Neander, *Allg. Kirchengeschichte*, b. i., Abth. ii. s. 640; Hahn, s. 342, s. 77.—Tr.]

III. Could God have prevented Sin?

The question here arises, *How can God be justified as the author of this constitution?* Could he not have guarded against moral evil in the world? Might he not have constituted human nature less weak, and less inclined to err and sin? It is not strange, considering how imperfect is our knowledge of the eternal plan and of the universal government of God, that reflecting minds should have always been disturbed by doubts on this subject, and that they should have devised various means of relieving their doubts, and of vindicating God, and that, after all, they should have been unable, by mere philosophy, to attain to satisfaction. A great portion of the ancient philosophers endeavoured to relieve themselves of this difficulty by supposing two eternal principles. Vide No. I.

In philosophizing on this subject we make the following general remarks:—

(1) It is an established point that to God all evil, both physical and moral, as such, must be displeasing; and that he seeks to prevent it, wherever it may be done. But since there is much imperfection, evil, and sin, actually existing in the world, we must conclude that God has effected and will effect more good by the permission of sin than could be effected if he had not permitted it. He must have seen that he would have prevented the good, if he had not permitted the evil. Vide s. 48, *ad finem*; and s. 71, I. To shew this was the object of Leibnitz in his "*Theodicee*."

(2) We must proceed on the same principles in judging of moral evil and corruption, especially among men. Hateful to God as this moral evil must have been, and punishable as it is in itself, God yet must have seen that by means of this constitution of human nature a greater amount of good would be accomplished for the human race as a whole, and for the world, than if he had made man more perfect, had secured him against every opportunity to sin, or had

hindered his transgression by the *immediate exercise of his power*. The latter could not take place, as God had given to man a moral nature, which is placed under the *law of freedom* alone, and to which compulsion and necessity, which prevail in the material world, where everything proceeds by mechanical laws, cannot be applied. But as in every other case, so in this, God knows how to overrule evil in such a way that higher good shall result from it. Throughout the world there is a constant successive development, and a struggle after an advancement and improvement of condition; and so it is with man. Vide Rom. viii. 20—23. Sin itself may serve for the promotion of good, and may contribute to the perfection of man. Through his liability to err, he may indeed pursue a retrograde course with regard to virtue and moral perfection; but without this liability he could not make advancement; and his virtue would cease to have any worth, and would no longer deserve the name if there were no possibility of wrong. Neither morality nor happiness can be conceived to exist without freedom. So much may be said on this subject in the way of philosophy; it is, however, far from being satisfactory.

SECTION LXXV.

MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF THE SIN OF OUR FIRST PARENTS.

THE moral depravity of the human race is derived everywhere in the New Testament from the disobedience of our first parents. This universal corruption is denominated by theologians, *peccatum originatum*, or *originale*, or *originis*; the first transgression, *peccatum originans*. More frequently, however, is this transgression denominated *lapsus*, *fall*, according to the Hebrew usage, where the *verba cadendi* signify to *err*, to *sin*, also to *become unhappy*; as Prov. xxiv. 16, 17; Rev. ii. 5, *ἐπίπτειν*. In the same way is *labi* used in Latin instead of *peccare*, *errare*; and *cadere*, *excidere*, to be *miserable*, to *lose a thing*. Moses in his narrative first gives an account of the divine precept, that Adam and Eve should not eat of the *tree of knowledge*, &c., Genesis, ii. 15—17; (vide s. 52, II. 2;) and then follows the account of the transgression itself, Gen. iii. 1, seq. We must therefore refer back to what has been already remarked, in general, respecting the creation of the world and of man; s. 49, I.; and s. 52, II. We now proceed to explain this account.

I. Different ways in which this passage has been explained.

The interpreters of this passage were formerly divided into two general classes. Some have

regarded it as an *allegory*, and interpreted it metaphorically, admitting no real serpent, tree, &c. Others consider it as a *literal narrative* of events which actually occurred in the manner here recorded. To these two classes a third has been added in modern times, who hold that it is merely a *didactic fable*. With respect to the history of these various interpretations, cf. Pfaff and Buddeus, in their systems of theology; also Ode, De Angelis, p. 498; M. J. O. Thiess, Variarum de cap. iii. Geneseos recte explicando specimen I.; Lubeca, 1788, 8vo. [Cf. Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 345, f. s. 78. Bretschneider, Dogmatik, b. ii. s. 58, s. 125—Tr.]

(1) *The Allegorical interpretations*. These are very various, and prove by their variety that no certain results can be attained by allegorical interpretation. All the explanations of this kind are forced and artificial. To suppose an allegory in this passage, which is preceded and followed by plain and simple history, is altogether unnatural, and foreign to the spirit of these ancient monuments. Nor is any hint or key to such an interpretation given us by the writer. This mode of interpreting this passage was resorted to merely for the sake of avoiding certain difficulties, some of which seem to arise from the great simplicity of this narrative, (for to the learned interpreter this simplicity constitutes an objection,) and others, from the great dissimilarity in the manner of thought and expression of this narrative from that which is found in this cultivated and refined age. The interpreters of this passage thought it necessary, therefore, to make the writer say something of higher import, and more philosophical, than is contained in the simple words; and proceeded with regard to Moses very much as the later Grecian interpreters did with regard to Homer.

The first attempts at allegorical interpretation are found among the Grecian Jews, and principally in Philo, De Opificio Mundi, p. 104, seq. ed. Pfeif. He was followed by Origen in this general principle of interpretation, though the latter gave a different turn to the narrative; and Origen was again followed by Ambrose, in his book, "De Paradiso," I. Some of their followers understand all the circumstances here mentioned allegorically; others, only some of them—e. g., the serpent, and allow the rest to stand as history. It is said by some, that the whole is intended to teach, by allegory, how unhappy man becomes by the indulgence of violent passions, and the evil consequences resulting from the prevalence of sense over reason. To this view of the subject Morus is inclined, p. 99, n. 2. He supposes that by the *serpent* are intended, in general, the external inducements to evil by which we are surprised and overborne; but that the very things which

constituted the original temptation are unknown to us.

(2) *Literal interpretations.* A large proportion of the church fathers, (e. g., Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian, Augustine, and Theodoret,) and also most of the older theologians even in the protestant church, were united in the opinion that this passage should not be explained as an allegory, although they differed among themselves in the interpretation of particular expressions. They agreed, however, for the most part, in considering the *serpent* as something else than a mere *natural* serpent, as it was regarded by Josephus and other Jewish interpreters. Some affirmed that the serpent was simply the *devil*—an opinion justly controverted by Vitringa, on account of the great difficulties by which it is encompassed. Others, and the greater part of the older Jewish and Christian interpreters, supposed that the serpent here spoken of was the instrument which was employed by the evil spirit to seduce mankind. So it is explained by Augustine, who was followed in this by Luther and Calvin; and this, from their time, was the prevailing opinion of protestant theologians, until the middle of the eighteenth century. There is, indeed, nothing said in the original text respecting an evil spirit; but as the serpent is here introduced as acting and speaking after the manner of an intelligent, though evil-disposed being, it was thought fair to conclude that an evil being actually spoke through the serpent; and so has it been understood even among modern critics—e. g., by Michaelis and Zachariæ.

This exposition respecting the serpent is indeed ancient; but still we can find no distinct traces of it in the books of the Old Testament written before the Babylonian exile; and we are therefore alike unable to prove or disprove that before that period this passage was so understood. To suppose that the serpent in this passage was the instrument of an invisible being is certainly entirely in the spirit of the most ancient people, who imagined that evil and good spirits were everywhere active in all the evil and good done in the world. After the Babylonian exile, however, we find it expressly said by the Jewish teachers, that in the temptation an evil being was invisibly active through the serpent. This point may therefore be one of those (of which we find many relating to the doctrine of spirits) which belong to the later disclosures of the prophets. Vide s. 58. In the Apocryphal books before Christ we find it said that the devil deceived mankind, and brought sin and death into the world—e. g., Book of Wisdom, i. 13, 14; and especially ii. 23, 24, (φθονὸν διαβόλου, κ. τ. λ.) This is conceded on all hands.

It is asserted, however, by many learned men, that this idea does not occur in the New Testament, and they appeal to 2 Cor. xi. 3, where it is said that the *serpent* deceived Eve, and no mention is made of the devil; and also to Rom. v. 18, where Paul makes no allusion to the devil, although he is treating of the origin of evil. In answer to this it may be said, (a) that considering how prevalent this explanation was at the time of Christ, and that neither he nor his apostles contradicted it, nor said anything inconsistent with it, the probability is, that they also assented to it. Morus seems to admit this, although in so doing he cannot be altogether consistent with himself. But (b) it deserves also to be considered that there are many allusions and references in the New Testament, in which this interpretation is presupposed, and from which it appears that Christ and his apostles assented to it, and authorized it—e. g., John, viii. 44, ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς; 1 John, iii. 8, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὁ διάβολος ἀμαρτάνει; also the titles in Revelation, δράκων μέγας, ὁ ὄφις ὁ ἀρχαῖος, Rev. xii. 9, seq. From these texts we can see how the text 2 Cor. xi. 3 is to be understood. The New-Testament writers therefore assumed it as a fact, that in some way, not further determined, the devil was concerned in the temptation of man. It is not, however, expressly said in any one passage that the devil spoke through the serpent.

The principal advocates of the interpretation formerly adopted by theologians, and in opposition to the allegorists and to the class of interpreters to be hereafter mentioned, were, among the more ancient, Aug. Pfeiffer, *Dubia vexata*, cap. 6; among the more modern, Joh. Balth. Lüderwald, *Die allegorische Erklärung der drey ersten Capitel Mosis*, u. s. w. in ihrem Ungrund vorgestellt; Helmstädt, 1781, 8vo; also Karl Traugott Eifer, *Untersuchung der Frage, Könnte nicht die Mosaische Erzählung vom Fall buchstäblich wahr, und durch den Fall ein erbliches Verderben auf die Menschen gekommen seyn?* Halle, 1781; especially Storr, *De Protevangelio*; Tübingæ, 1789, (in his *Opuscula*, tom. ii. num. 7,) and Köppen, *Die Bibel* u. s. w. th. ii. [To this class the great body of American theologians belongs.]

(3) To the third class belong those interpreters who consider this narration as a *mythus*, or a truth invested in a poetic form. According to this idea, this passage has been interpreted in modern times by Eichhorn, in his "Urgeschichte;" in such a way, however, that he allows some things in the account to be historical and others allegorical. Such, in some respects, is also the interpretation of Rosenmüller, (*Repertor. th. i. s. 160.*) who supposes that the narrative in Genesis was taken from a *hieroglyphic picture*—i. e., transferred from pictorial

representation to alphabetic signs. These interpreters have endeavoured to unite the historical and the mythical or allegorical interpretations. But this is inadmissible. If the mythical interpretation is adopted, the whole narrative, in all its parts, must be considered as a *mythus*, like what other nations had, in order to represent to themselves, each in its own way, in a distinct and vivid manner, the first sin of man, and its consequences. So Eichhorn, Paulus, Gabler, and many others. One of two things must be admitted; either this narrative throughout must be considered as a veritable history of events which took place just as here related, (and this agrees with the New Testament,) or it is wholly a didactic or moral fiction. In both cases the interpreter must proceed in the interpretation of the particular portions of this account from the same principles. It is undoubtedly the fact, that Moses, or the writer from whom he took this account, (vide s. 49,) understood these expressions just as they stand, according to their literal meaning; and that these other ideas which are attached to this narrative were ascribed to it at a later period, in order to adapt it more to the tastes and feelings of cultivated and speculative minds.

In confirmation of the internal truth and consistency of this narrative let the following things be considered; and they are equally deserving of notice, whether this passage be literally or historically understood. *Conversation* with animals is something, which to man, in his natural condition, and before the refinements of social life, is perfectly common, and by no means strange and incredible. How often is it the case with children, (even with those, too, who are somewhat grown up,) that they address inanimate things, and still more frequently living creatures, imagining what they would answer, and then replying to them in turn! They will often, too, relate to others the conversations they have had with the animals around them. Hence the fables of Æsop were more agreeable and impressive, and less strange and startling, even to mature minds, in the ancient world than now. Hence, too, the supposition which once prevailed even in the heathen world, that in the golden age beasts actually spake. Again; the author understood the *speaking of God*, here mentioned, as real, *articulate speech*, perhaps with a voice of thunder. For the idea was very prevalent in the ancient world that the Deity was, as it were, personally present, and appeared to the men of early times in the most free and familiar intercourse; somewhat as the gods were supposed by the Greeks to have associated with men in the heroic ages. Vide s. 54, I.

This whole representation, however, whether it be fact or moral fiction, is entirely conformed

to the nature of the human soul, and describes in a manner perfectly true, the history of the temptation and sin of man, as it is witnessed every day, through the impression which sensible objects make upon him. Here then, by the example of our first parents, two things are shewn: the way in which sin commonly arises, and the way in which it actually first entered the world. In this, however, there is a difference, that in the case of our first parents they had come to maturity without having yet sinned. The first sin committed upon earth was one of momentous consequences for themselves and their posterity. In looking at this transaction, we are again impressed with the idea that the *state of innocence* in which our first parents were placed was a state of immaturity, of childhood, and infantine simplicity; and that they then had no very extended knowledge or experience. They were deceived in nearly the same way as an innocent and inexperienced child is now deceived. In this point of view this narrative has been very justly apprehended, even by Morus, p. 99, n. 1.

[*Note.*—There is an interesting essay on the Mosaic account of the Fall in the Appendix to Tholuck's "Lehre von der Sünde." While he contends for the historic fact of the fall, he at the same time regards the representation here given of this fact as figurative, and finds insuperable objections in the way of the literal, and very plausible arguments in favour of the moral interpretation. He gives the following as the moral import of the passage: "Man, who, in accordance with his destination, enjoyed a holy innocence, in which he knew no other will than that of God, abandoned this state, became selfish (autonomic), and would no longer acknowledge the divine law of life as the highest;" s. 266, of the work above mentioned. The views of the German theologians on this subject are very various; and though often fanciful, sometimes deeply interesting and profound. It will be sufficient to refer to some of the more important of these, which the ardent student of theology, who wishes to overstep the limit of merely traditional ideas, may consult at his leisure. Cf. Schleiermacher, *Christ. Glaub.* b. ii. s. 59. Schlegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, b. i. s. 42, 43. Herder, *Geist der Ebra. Poesie*, b. i. s. 155. To these we may add the speculations, ingenious and exciting, even when unfounded and fanciful, of Coleridge. See his "Aids to Reflection," notes, p. 324, 325; also p. 176, 177.—Tr.]

II. Particular Expressions and Representations.

(1) *Respecting the divine law, the transgression of it, and the temptation*, Genesis, ii. 17, coll. ver. 9, and chap. iii. 1—6. For an account of the name, *tree of the knowledge of good and*

evil, vide s. 52, II. The question is here asked, *What design had God in view in giving this precept?* According to the opinion of many theologians, this command was given by God merely for the sake of putting the virtue of Adam and Eve to the test, there being no injurious quality in the tree itself which should lead him to forbid it; and so they suppose that the punishment of death threatened and inflicted by God had no natural connexion with the eating of the forbidden fruit, but depended merely upon the divine will. This is supposed by Ernesti, *Vindiciæ arbitrii divini*, in his "Opusc. Theol." p. 231; and among the ancients, by Theophilus, *Ad Autolyc.* l. ii. c. 35. But against this supposition there are many reasons, both of an internal and external nature, which have been well exhibited by Michaelis, *Von der Sünde*, s. 559. The fact that this forbidden tree is set over against the *tree of life*, would lead us to think that it was in itself a *poisonous* tree, and in its own nature destructive to man. And to this opinion even Morus assents, p. 102, s. 16. The writer here designs to shew by what natural means the life of man was to have been prolonged, according to the divine appointment, in the state of innocence; and this means is the *tree of life*, or life-giving tree; and afterwards, by what means death came into the world—namely, by a poisonous tree. It is against the latter, which bore an alluring, beautiful fruit, that God warns inexperienced man, as a father cautions his child not to taste of a pleasant poison which may lie in his way. Since man entered his new abode as a stranger, it was natural that he should receive all necessary instructions and cautions from the being who prepared it for him, and introduced him to it. Tasting of the fruit of this tree introduced disorder into the human body, which, from that time forward, was subject to disease and death. In this way is God justified, as every one can see, from the charge of being the author of human misery; just as a father is acquitted from blame in the misfortune of his children if he had before cautioned them against the poison. In this way, too, every one can understand why God should require obedience from man. The father requires obedience of his children, because he knows better than they do what is best for them. For the same reason should we unconditionally obey God. Nor is the explanation now given, by which the forbidden fruit is considered in its own nature poisonous, a new explanation; it is mentioned by Chrysostom, although he rejects it.

The propriety and consistency of the account of the temptation by means of the *serpent* may be illustrated by the following remarks. The serpent was used by almost all the ancient nations as the symbol of prudence, adroitness, and

cunning. Vide Matt. x. 16; 2 Cor. xi. 3. Eve sees a serpent upon this forbidden tree, and probably eating of its fruits, which to a serpent might not be harmful. And it is very natural that this should be first observed by the woman, that her interest and curiosity should have been arrested by the sight, and that, with her greater susceptibility to temptation, her desires should have been first kindled, and she first seduced from obedience. Paul mentions it as worthy of notice, that the woman first sinned, 1 Tim. ii. 14, coll. Sir. xxv. 32, ἀπὸ γυναικὸς ἀρχὴ ἀμαρτίας. We may compare with this part of the narrative the Grecian mythus of Pandora. As to what follows, we very naturally understand that Eve reflected upon what she had seen, and expressed her *thoughts in words*:—"The serpent is a very lively and knowing animal, and yet it eats of the fruit which is forbidden us. This fruit cannot, therefore, be so hurtful, and the prohibition may not have been meant in earnest," &c.—the same fallacies with which men still deceive themselves when the objects of sense entice and draw them away. The fact which she observed, that the serpent ate the fruit of the forbidden tree without harm, excited the thought which in ver. 4, 5 are represented as the words of the serpent, that it was worth while to eat of this fruit. It did not seem to occasion death; and, on the other hand, appeared rather to impart health, vigour, and intelligence, as was proved from the example of the serpent, which remained after eating it well and wise. "Consider me," the serpent might have seemed to her to say, "how brisk, sound, and cunning I am," &c. Now, as she knows of no being who surpasses man in wisdom, excepting God only, she supposes, in her simplicity, that if she became wiser than she then was, she should be *like God*. Meanwhile, the desire after that which was forbidden became continually more irresistible. She took of the fruit and ate. The man, who, as is common, was weak and pliable enough to yield to the solicitation of his wife, received the fruit from her and ate with her.

All this may have been as now stated, even on the supposition, so conformed to the spirit of the ancient world, and fully authorized in the New Testament, that the evil spirit had an agency in this transaction. This supposition can occasion no alteration in the verbal explanation of this record. Satan can be allowed to be no otherwise concerned in this affair than as instigator and contriver; somewhat after the manner of a malicious and crafty man, who might secretly injure another, by tempting him, either by words or in any other way, to taste of a poisonous article. Those to whom the real speaking of the serpent seems strange and incredible, may understand it as above.

Now it was in this transgression of the divine

law, which made strict abstinence from the forbidden tree binding upon them, that their *sin* is placed; and it is this which the apostle calls *παράνομι*, Rom. v. 19. The rising desires which our first parents felt to eat the fruit were founded in their nature, and were not imputed to them as sin. Nor is the springing up of involuntary desire in the heart of man ever considered in scripture as *sin*; but merely the entertaining, cherishing, and accomplishing of this desire. Vide James, i. 14. The sin of our first parents, then, properly consisted in this—that they were not implicitly obedient to God, as Paul remarks in the passage just cited. This disobedience to God is the greatest wrong, and draws after itself inevitably the most injurious consequences, whether it is shewn in greater or smaller instances. Cf. 1 Sam. xv. 23. They did what God had forbidden, under the impression which men are accustomed to have in such cases, that it was something trifling, and of little import. From this first act, there now arose in their minds alienation from God, distrust of him, the desire of independence of him, &c. They began to say, “that God had not allowed them to be like himself,” &c.—thoughts from which they should have shrunk with abhorrence, and banished instantly from their hearts.

(2) The *consequences* of this transgression are narrated, ver. 7, seq. The author does not give such a representation as would lead us to think that all piety, virtue, and religion, ceased with man immediately upon his first transgression. For we see in the sequel, that the knowledge and worship of God were perpetuated in the family of Adam. We perceive too, that our first parents felt repentance and shame after the fall, and these feelings are sufficient proof that morality and rectitude were not wholly obliterated by the fall. Some theologians maintain that by the fall man lost the *image of God*, but this is denied by others. And both may be true, according as the image of God is understood in a wider or more narrow sense. The whole dispute is more respecting words than things. Vide s. 53, ad finem, and s. 54. The author places the consequences of this transgression in the following particulars—viz.,

(a) In the disturbed balance of the powers and inclinations of man, and in the preponderance which the impulses of sense now obtained over reason. For this balance and harmony of powers was that which constituted, according to the account of Moses, the principal advantage of the state of innocence. That this was the consequence of the first transgression is clearly taught by Moses in the expression, “*and they knew that they were naked*,” which may be euphemistically expressed as follows: “They felt the motions of sense uncommonly strong, which they were no longer able to control as heretofore, but by

which they were now governed, whence the feeling of shame arose in their minds;” as is still the case with innocent youth, when it first begins to have such desires. It is possible that this may be considered as also the effect of the harmful fruit which had been eaten by them, by which their nerves were strongly excited; for there are many poisonous plants by which violent excitement is imparted to the nerves, and by which great disorder is produced both in soul and body—spasmodic affections, stupefaction, and delirium; such are belladonna, opium, thorn-apple, and hemlock. This supposition will at least serve to render the subject more intelligible, and to explain how this effect may have been propagated from Adam to his posterity, although it is by no means necessary to understand this effect as a physical one; and at all events this should not be brought into popular instruction, as it is merely conjectural.*

* The views here expressed respecting the nature of the forbidden fruit, and the consequences of eating it upon our first parents, are the basis of our author's ideas respecting the natural character of man; they ought therefore to be carefully examined here, where they are first introduced. It is easy to see how Dr. Knapp's love of plainness and simplicity of interpretation, and his aversion to the metaphysical and speculative spirit of his times, should have inclined him to sentiments like those which he has here expressed respecting the narrative in Genesis. Indeed, they may be said to result fairly from adopting and carrying through the principle of literal interpretation in application to this passage. To the same conclusion substantially were Michaelis and Reinhard brought before him, by reasoning on the same principles. But we ought to hesitate before adopting principles which strip this opening page of human history of its chief moral and religious interest, and substitute transactions so unimportant and even trivial. To teach that the forbidden tree was one of physical poison; that on this account mainly, and not for the purpose of testing their obedience, our first parents were warned against it; that by seeing a serpent feed on it with impunity, they falsely concluded they might do so; that having thus by mistake been led to taste of it, their nerves were excited, their passions inflamed, and reason weakened; and, lastly, that the propagation of this physical disorder is the cause of the universal predominance of sense over reason, in short, of human depravity; these are propositions so strange that we must wonder how they could have been soberly propounded by writers of such eminence.

To minds of a particular cast, which had been disgusted with the assumptions of philosophy, and wearied with travelling through its thorny mazes, so simple and easy a solution of the mysteries of our present condition might naturally furnish repose. But a just and unperturbed critical taste must be offended with an interpretation so flatly and frigidly *ad literam* as that which is here suggested.

If this narrative is to retain the least doctrinal interest, it must be regarded as exhibiting the *trial of man as to obedience to the divine will*, and the unhappy issue of this trial. And if this meaning be extracted from this history, it is not of so much con-

(b) The consequences of the first transgression are seen in still other evils. Physical evils are usually regarded as the consequences of antecedent moral faults, and experience shews this to be correct, though mistakes are easily made in applying this principle to particular cases. When man was more perfect, and lived in a state of innocence, he bore none of those loads which he is now called to sustain; he was under no necessity of tilling the ground with weariness; he lived free from care, needed no clothing, &c. Vide s. 56. All this now ceased; and the evils which began to appear were regarded as the consequences of the fall, and as punishments inflicted by the Deity. Hence it is related, ver. 8, that God sat in solemn judgment upon our first parents, and pronounced their sentence. And this was done in a *thunder storm*, which took place *לילה*—i. e., at eventide, when the cool evening wind began to blow at sunset, as it does in the east. This term is used in opposition to *מזרח* *היום*, *meridies*, Gen. xviii. 1. Man *hid* himself; the natural effect of the consciousness of having acted wrong; and then comes the trial. All this is perfectly natural, and like what we see every day in the case of crime and of an evil conscience. Men, as here, fear the presence of God, and wish to conceal themselves from him, although they well know that this is impossible. It is hard for them to acknowledge their sins, repent of them, and confess them. They seek vain excuses, and throw off the guilt from themselves to others; Eve upon the serpent, and Adam upon Eve. And indeed, in these words—the woman which *THOU* GAVEST me, Adam seems to throw the guilt upon God, as

sequence whether it be by an allegorical or literal interpretation. But to make this the history of the imprudent conduct of Adam and Eve in eating of a fruit of whose fatal qualities they had been forewarned, and thus poisoning themselves, is to empty it of its high interest as the account of the birth of *sin*, and to reduce it to a common-place story, unworthy of its place at the head of the history of man. It was well said by Theophilus of Antioch, long ago, "that it was not the tree, but the *disobedience*, which had death in itself," Contra Autyl. Luther, too, who in general followed the literal interpretation, says, with regard to this passage, "Adam indeed stuck his teeth into the apple; but he set them, too, upon a thorn, which was, the law of God and disobedience against him; and this was the proper cause of his misery." Com. on Gen. ii. 5.

Some of the remoter consequences of Knapp's view of the transgression of our first parents and its influence on their posterity are not less singular than the first appearance of his interpretation. If the result of the fall to Adam was a physical disorder which we inherit from him, then it would seem that, in order that man might be restored, a physical cure ought first to be effected, and the first step towards his recovery should be a medical prescription. But of this more hereafter.—T.R.]

much as to say, "hadst not thou given her to me, this evil had not been done."

But the most distinct punishment for the transgression of the divine law was this—that they must die; Gen. ii. 17, coll. iii. 19. In the former of these texts the phrase is *מוֹת תָּמוּת* (best rendered by Symmachus, *ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*); in the latter, *thou shalt return to the earth from whence thou wast taken*. In the latter passage, therefore, it can be only *mortality* which is spoken of; and the theological distinction of *spiritual*, *bodily*, and *eternal* death has no connexion with this passage. Some theologians assert even that it does not relate to *bodily* death at all, but only to spiritual and eternal. So Calovius, Seb. Schmidt, Fecht, &c. This mortality now was the consequence of the harmful fruit they had eaten, just as their immortality was described as what would be the consequence of eating of the tree of life. And as men were henceforward to be deprived of immortality, they were no more permitted to eat of the tree of life, and were therefore removed by God from the garden, ver. 22, 24. In the same way that their removal from the garden is represented as an act of God, are we to understand the direction that they should be clothed with the skins of beasts, ("God made them coats of skins," as it is said, ver. 21)—viz., as an instruction which they received directly and immediately from God; for it was a common opinion throughout the ancient world, that God had directly communicated to men the knowledge of many useful inventions.

In the words, ver. 22, "Adam has become like one of us, knowing good and evil," there is something ironical, and they refer to ver. 5, as much as to say, "we see now how it is, man wished to become wise and like to God, but in breaking the commandment of God he acted like a fool." Others render these words, "*he was like one of us*, but now is so no more."

With respect to the curse pronounced upon the serpent, ver. 14, many difficulties are found. How can the serpent, which, even supposing it the instrument of the devil, was an innocent cause of the temptation, have been punished? This certainly does not seem to agree with our present ideas of punishment, and what constitutes capacity for it. But if we notice the conduct of children, and of rude and uncultivated men, we shall find a solution. God deals with men *more humano*, and condescends in his conduct to their limited and infantine comprehensions. When children are injured by an animal, or even by an inanimate thing, they often proceed in the same way as they would with one like themselves. The sense of the injury which they have experienced, and the displeasure which they naturally feel, leads them to wish for recompence; and they feel a kind of satis-

faction when the cause of the injury done them, even if it be a lifeless object, is in their view repaid. To these conceptions does God here condescend, and designs to impress upon the minds of our first parents, by this vivid representation, the idea that the tempter in this transaction would not go unrewarded, and that every tempter must expect to receive from him unavoidable and severe punishment. This is the doctrine which is taught them in this, so to speak, *sensible* manner. The punishment inflicted upon the invisible agent concerned in this temptation could not be made obvious to them; it must therefore be made to fall upon the instrument. Enough for them that they could derive from the punishment of the serpent this doctrine, which, in the state in which they then were, could have been in no other way made so obvious and impressive. Hence the fear and dread of the serpent which is felt by man and beast. It is the image of baseness, and cleaves to the ground. *To eat dust*, is a figurative expression, denoting to be levelled with the ground, *laid in the dust*, Is. xlix. 23. So, *to eat ashes*, Ps. cii. 10, and the phrase *humum ore memordit*, used by Virgil with respect to one struck dead to the earth. Cf. Hom. Odys. xxii. 269.

(3) Ver. 15, *I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.* עֶרְוָה in the first case denotes the *posterity of the serpent—the serpent race*; in the second case, either collectively, the posterity of Eve, γεννητοὶ γυναικῶν, Matt. xi. 11; or *one of this posterity*, a descendant or son of Eve; for in this latter sense may עֶרְוָה in the singular be taken, according to the Hebrew idiom—e. g., Gen. iv. 25. Taken in this sense it is referred to the Messiah, the second Adam, who even by the later Jews was denominated עֶרְוָה, the descendant sometimes of Adam and sometimes of Abraham. Vide Gal. v. 16, and Wetstein ad. h. l. These words admit of a threefold construction, neither of which is inconsistent with, or entirely excludes the others, and either of which contains instruction for those to whom these words were first addressed, and to their posterity.

(a) If these words are referred to the serpent here *visible*, the sense is, “It is my will that enmity should exist between thee and the woman, between thy breed and her descendants—i. e., there shall be a constant hatred between the human and the serpent race. Men shall aim at thy head, and thou at their heel—i. e., they shall seek thy life, and thou shalt seek to injure them by thy poisonous bite whenever thou canst.” Cf. Zachariā, Bibl. Theol., th. ii. s. 318, and Repert. iv. 250, f.

(b) Everything which took place here was designed to give *moral* instruction to our first parents. In this way it was intended to teach

them respecting the external *occasions* and *excitements* to sin; and by means of the serpent, this lesson was made plain and obvious to their senses. Hence we have in these words the following maxim: “Thou and thy posterity (i. e., all men) will have from henceforward a constant warfare against sin to maintain. The victory of man over the tempter and his seductions will be difficult and uncertain; they will be in constant contention with each other, and men will not come off uninjured, nor will they remain hereafter unseduced, and must always feel the injurious consequences of transgression.”

(c) If עֶרְוָה in the second case denotes a single individual among the descendants of Adam, it refers to the Messiah, who has destroyed the power of the tempter and of sin, and who has also made it possible for all his followers to overcome them. Vide 1 John, iii. 8. Our first parents could not indeed have understood these words as a distinct prophecy respecting the Messiah, for they were not able at that time to comprehend the idea of a Messiah in all its extent; nor is this text ever cited in the New Testament as a prophecy respecting Christ. From these words, however, they could easily deduce the idea, that in this contest the human race might and would come off finally victorious. The head of the serpent would be bruised for its entire destruction, and the only revenge it could take would be, to bite the heel; it could injure less than it would itself be injured. Hence it was here, as Paul says respecting the patriarchs, Heb. xi. 13, they received the promise from God, but saw that which was promised πρόβλεπον. Respecting the manner in which this promise should be fulfilled, and the person through whom it should be performed, more full revelations were gradually given at a later period. So that even although our first parents might not have been able to refer this עֶרְוָה to one particular descendant of Adam, they might yet find in these words a consoling promise of God. And for this reason we may justly call this passage, as it has been called by some of the church fathers, *protevangeliū*, because it contains the first joyful promise ever given to our race. Vide Storr, De Protevangeliō; Tübingæ, 1781. [Hengstenberg, Christologie. Smith, Scripture Testimony to the Messiah, vol. i.—Tr.]

Note.—In explaining the history of the fall to the people, the teacher should dwell mostly upon the internal truth and the practical instruction contained in it. In conformity with the remark at the latter part of No. I. of this section, he must shew, from the example of the progenitors of our race, not only how sin first entered into the world, but also how it is still accustomed to arise. In doing this he can appeal to James, i. 13—15, and then illustrate the truth by examples, such as daily occur. In this way

he may rescue this history from the contempt sometimes thrown upon it, and teach those entrusted to his care to regard it not as a fable, but seriously to reflect upon it in such a manner as may be profitable to them. He must treat it entirely as *fact* or *history*, in the same manner as it is treated both in the Old and New Testament. Let him by no means initiate his hearers into all the hypotheses and controversies of the learned on this subject, since they are unable to form a judgment respecting them, and will be rather confounded than enlightened by hearing them recited. And since in the New Testament the devil is represented as having an agency in this transaction, he must also be so represented by the Christian teacher, who, however, must not attempt to determine the manner in which this agency was exerted, as on this point the scripture says nothing.

[On the general subject of this section cf. the authors before referred to, Tholuck, *Lehre von der Sünde*, Appendix, s. 264; Schleirmacher, *Glaubenslehre*, b. ii. s. 59; Hahn, *Lehrbuch*, s. 345, s. 78; Bretschneider, *Handbuch*, b. ii. s. 58, s. 125; Herder, *Geist der Ebrai. Poesie*, b. i. s. 136, ff.—Tr.]

SECTION LXXVI.

OF THE IMPUTATION OF THE SIN OF OUR FIRST PARENTS.

It is taught in theology, that the transgression of the progenitors of mankind had a twofold influence upon their posterity—viz., a *physical* influence in the propagation of sinful desires and moral imperfection, and also a *moral* influence, which is commonly considered as properly *imputationem peccati Adamitici*. These two do not necessarily belong together, although *imputatio* and *peccatum originale* have been often connected together by theologians. They may, however, be distinguished; and one may easily affirm moral corruption while he denies imputation, and the reverse. We shall therefore first treat of imputation, and then show how, according to the scriptures, the two are united.

Now, whatever diversity there may exist in the opinions of theologians respecting imputation when they come to express their own views definitely, they will yet, for the most part, agree that the phrase, *God imputes the sin of our progenitors to their posterity*, means, that *for the sin committed by our progenitors God punishes their descendants*. The term to *impute* is used in different senses. (a) It is said of a *creditor*, who charges something to his debtor as debt; like *שָׂה*, and *λογίζομαι* and *ἐλλογέω*—e. g., Phil. ver. 18. (b) It is transferred to human judgment, when any one is punished, or declared deserving of punishment. *Crime* is regarded as a *debt*, which must be cancelled partly by

actual restitution and partly by punishment. (c) This now is applied to God, who imputes sin when he pronounces men guilty, and treats them accordingly—i. e., when he actually punishes the sin of men, (*וְיָשַׁר, לֹאֲשֵׁנָה אִמְרָתוֹ*, Ps. xxxii. 2.) The one punished is called *וְיָשַׁר*, in opposition to one to whom *וְיָשַׁר*, who is *rewarded*, Ps. cvi. 31; Rom. iv. 3.

In order to learn what is taught in the theological schools on this subject, we must pursue the historic method, or we shall grope in the dark.

1. Opinions of the Jews.

The imputation of Adam's sin is not called in the Mosaic narrative, or anywhere in the Old Testament, by the name of *imputation*, although the doctrine of imputation is contained in it, as we shall soon see. But in the writings of the Talmudists, and of the Rabbins, and still earlier in the Chaldaic paraphrases on the Old Testament, we find it asserted, in so many words, that the posterity of Adam were punished with bodily death on account of his first sin, although they themselves had never sinned. Cf. the Chaldaic paraphrase on Ruth, iv. 22, "Because Eve ate of the forbidden fruit, all the inhabitants of the earth are subject to death." In this way they accounted to themselves for the death of the greatest saints, who, as they supposed, had never themselves sinned. They taught, also, that in the person of Adam the whole multitude or mass of his posterity had sinned. Vide the Commentators on Rom. v., especially Weistien and Koppe. As early as the time of the apostles, this doctrine was widely prevalent among the Jews. It is clearly taught by Paul, in Rom. v. 12, 14, and is there placed by him in intimate connexion with the more peculiar Christian doctrines. In this passage he has employed exactly the same expressions which we find among the Rabbins.

How was this doctrine developed and brought to such clearness among the Jews? They proceeded from the scriptural maxim, that man was created immortal, and that the death of Adam was a consequence of his transgression. And since all the posterity of Adam die, although all have not themselves sinned (e. g., children), they concluded that these too must endure this evil on account of Adam's transgression. Cf. Book of Wisdom, ii. 23, 24. Sirach, xxv. 32, ἀπὸ γυναικὸς ἀρχὴ ἁμαρτίας, καὶ δι' αὐτὴν ἀποθνήσκουмен πάντες. Farther than this, which is evidently founded in the scriptures, they did not go. In order to illustrate this doctrine and render it plain, they probably resorted to some analogies; such, for example, as the fact, that children must often suffer for the crimes of their parents, in which they had no share; and that, according to the law of Moses, the iniquity of

parents was visited upon the children of the third and fourth generation. In what way they probably conceived of imputation, and formed their conclusions about it, may be seen from the remarkable passage, Heb. vii. 9, 10. The patriarch Levi (who, according to the Mosaic law, receives the tithes) paid tithes to Melchisedec in the person of Abraham—i. e., it is to be considered the same as if the Levites paid tithes to Melchisedec when Abraham paid them, for *Levi was in the loins of his father Abraham* when he met Melchisedec—i. e., he already existed in Abraham, although he was not yet born. What Abraham did is to be considered as if it had been done by his descendant; for had he lived at that time he would have done the same that Abraham then did.

II. Opinions of the New-Testament Writers.

This doctrine is most clearly taught in Rom. v. 12—14, a passage which is very variously explained. It is also briefly exhibited in 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. Vide Töllner, Theol. Untersuchungen, Theil i. st. 2, s. 56. Modern philosophers and theologians have found many things here inconsistent with their philosophical systems. And some of them have laboured so hard and long upon this passage that they have at length extorted a sense from it, in which nothing of imputation could any longer be discerned; and this is the case with Döderlein in his "Dogmatik." They did not consider, however, that Paul here makes use of the same words and phrases which were then common among the Jews on the subject of imputation, and that he could not therefore have been otherwise understood by his contemporary readers; and that Paul has also reasoned in the same way on another subject, Heb. vii. 9, 10. Cf. No. I.

Paul shews, in substance, that all men are regarded and punished by God as sinners, and that the ground of this lies in the act of one man; as, on the contrary, deliverance from punishment depends also upon one man, Jesus Christ. If the words of Paul are not perverted, it must be allowed, that in Rom. v. 12—14, he thus reasons: "The cause of the universal mortality of the human race lies in Adam's transgression. He sinned, and so became mortal. Other men are regarded and treated by God as punishable, because they are the posterity of Adam, the first transgressor, and consequently they too are mortal. Should it now be objected, that the men who lived from Adam to Moses might themselves have personally *sinned*, and so have been punished with death on their own account, it might be answered, that those who lived before the time of Moses had no express and positive law which threatened the punishment of sin, like those who lived after Moses. The positive law of Moses was not as yet given;

they could not, consequently, be punished on account of their own transgressions, as no law was as yet given to them; ver. 14. Still they must die, like Adam, who transgressed a positive law. Hence their mortality must have another cause, and this is to be sought in the imputation of Adam's transgression. And in the same way, the ground of the justification of man lies not in himself, but in Christ, the second Adam."

Such is the argument of Paul in this passage. But respecting *eternal death*, or the torments of hell, he here says nothing, and is far from implying that on account of a sin committed by another man long before their birth, God punishes men with eternal hell torments. On the contrary, he here speaks of *bodily death* merely, as the consequence of the sin of Adam. And herein the learned Jews agreed with him. And in the passage 1 Cor. xv. 21, seq., Paul shews that the resurrection to a blessed immortality will be the best and highest proof of our entire restoration through Jesus Christ, even as bodily death is the first and most striking proof of our degeneracy through Adam. [On this passage, cf. Tholuck, Comm. üb. Rom. v.; Usteri, Entw. d. paulin. Lehrbegriffs; Edwards, Original Sin, chap. iv. p. 352; Stuart's Commentary on Rom. v. and Excursus.—Tr.]

III. Hypotheses of Theologians.

The greatest difficulties with respect to this doctrine have arisen from the fact that many have treated what is said by Paul in the fifth of Romans—a passage wholly popular, and anything but formally exact and didactic—in a learned and philosophical manner, and have defined terms used by him in a loose and popular way, by logical and scholastic distinctions. We do not find anywhere among the ancients, in their popular discourses, an exact and philosophically precise use of terms with respect to the *consequences* and the *punishment* of sin. They frequently use the word *punishment* in a wider sense, in which it is here and elsewhere employed by Paul. He and the Jewish teachers, with whom in this particular he agrees, use *punishment* (κατάκριμα,) *imputation of sin*, &c., in the same sense in which it is said respecting children, for example, that they are *punished* on account of the crimes of their ancestors, that the crimes of their ancestors are *imputed* to them, &c.; although they, in their own persons, had no share in the guilt, and could not, therefore, in the strictest philosophical and juridical sense, be considered as the subjects of *imputation* and *punishment*. The family of a traitor, whose name is disgraced, and whose goods are confiscated, are thus said to be *punished* on his account. Respecting Louis XVI., who was so unfortunate, and suffered so much in consequence

of the errors of his predecessors Louis XIV. and XV., it would be commonly said, without hesitation, that he endured *punishment* on their account, and had to *atone for* or *expiate* their crimes. Here, what is merely the *consequence* of the sin of another, is called, from some analogy between them, the *punishment* of one who has no personal guilt in the matter. Just such is the case here. Mortality was to Adam the *punishment* of his sin, strictly speaking. His posterity are also mortal, since a mortal cannot beget those who are immortal. With them, therefore, mortality is the natural *consequence* of Adam's sin, but not their *punishment*, in the proper juridico-philosophical sense of the word, because they themselves had no share in the first transgression. *Imputation*, therefore, of the sin of Adam, in the strict sense of the word *imputation*, does not exist with regard to us, his posterity, since we only suffer the baleful *consequences* of the sin of the first man, of which we ourselves were not, however, *guilty*, and for which we cannot therefore be punished. Speaking, however, in a loose and popular way, we may call what we endure, *punishment* and *imputation*.

By this observation, many difficulties in other passages of scripture are obviated. So when Moses says, "the iniquity of the father shall be visited upon his posterity from generation to generation," (cf. Ezek. xviii. 4, 20, coll. Jer. xxxi. 29, 30,) he is to be understood as speaking in a popular way of the consequences which should befall the posterity of the wicked without any fault of their own. When, on the other hand, it is said, "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father," it is to be understood as a maxim of justice, and to be taken in the literal sense. Paul himself says, in other passages, that man will be punished solely on his own account. Rom. ii. 6, i. 18, seq.; Gal. vi. 5; 2 Cor. v. 10. In these he speaks *sensu proprio et forensi*. He also teaches expressly, that reward and punishment do not depend upon natural birth and derivation, Rom. ix. 11; and Jesus rejects the opinion suggested by his disciples, that the misfortune of the one born blind was to be regarded as the imputation of the guilt of his parents, John, ix. 2, 3.

But why is language used in such a manner with regard to this subject in the scriptures? The principal reason why the word *punishment* is used in this connexion lies in the fact that there is, in all the mortal descendants of Adam, a preponderance of carnal appetites and passions, and that they are invariably seduced by these into *actual* sin, and so become *punishable*. There is not one upon earth who remains uncorrupted, and consequently all are rendered liable to punishment. Vide Rom. v. 12; Ephes. ii. 3. God would not treat all men

as sinners did they not in this respect resemble Adam.

We find, accordingly, that the passage in Rom. v. was never understood in the ancient Grecian church, down to the fourth-century, to teach *imputation*, in a strictly philosophical and judicial sense; certainly Origen and the writers immediately succeeding him, exhibit nothing of this opinion. They regard *bodily death* as a *consequence* of the sin of Adam, and not as a *punishment*, in the strict and proper sense of this term. Thus Chrysostom says, upon Rom. v. 12, Ἐκείνου πέσοντος (Ἀδάμ), καὶ οἱ μὴ φάγοντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου, γεγόνασιν ἐξ ἐκείνου θνητοί. And Cyril (Adv. Anthropom. c. 8) says, οἱ γεγόνοτες ἐξ αὐτοῦ (Ἀδάμ), ὡς ἀπὸ φθαρτοῦ, φθαρτοὶ γεγόναμεν.

The *Latin* church, on the other hand, was the proper seat of the strict doctrine of imputation. There they began to interpret the words of Paul, as if he were a scholastic and logical writer. One cause of their misapprehending so entirely the spirit of this passage was, that the word *imputare* (a word in common use among civilians and in judicial affairs) had been employed in the Latin versions in rendering ver. 13 of Rom. v.; and that ἐφ' ᾧ (ver. 12) had been translated *in quo*, and could refer, as they supposed, to nobody but Adam. This opinion was then associated with some peculiar philosophical ideas then prevalent in the West, and from the whole a doctrine *de imputatione* was formed, in a sense wholly unknown to the Hebrews, to the New Testament, and to the Grecian church. We may hence see the reason of the fact, that the Grecian teachers—e. g., those in Palestine—took sides with Pelagius against the teachers of the African church.

The following are the principal theories which have been adopted in the Western church, to illustrate the *mode* of imputation, and to vindicate its *justice*.

(1) The oldest hypothesis is that which affirmed that all the posterity of Adam were, in the most literal sense, already *in him*, and sinned in him—in his person; and that Adam's sin is therefore justly imputed by God to all his posterity. This hypothesis has its ground in the opinion that the souls of children have existed, either in reality, or at least potentially, in their parents, and this as far back as Adam; and that in this way the souls of all his posterity participated in the actions done in his person, although they themselves were never after conscious of such action. Vide s. 57, II. 3. This was the doctrine of the *Traduciani*, which Tertullian also professed. And it was upon this ground principally that the strict doctrine of imputation was maintained in the Latin church; even Ambrosius placed his defence of it upon this basis. But this doctrine was argued with the greatest

zeal by Augustine, in opposition to Pelagius, and after his time was generally received in the Western church; although Augustine himself was often doubtful in respect to Traducianism. What Paul had taught in a loose, popular way, respecting the imputation of Adam's sin, was now taken by Augustine and his followers in a strict, philosophical, and legal sense. Ambrosius says, *Omnes in primo homine (ἐφ' ὃ) peccavimus, et culpæ successio ab uno in omnes transfusa est.* Augustine says, *In Adam omnes peccarunt, in lumbis Adami erat genus humanum.* Also, *Infantes ab eo trahunt peccati reatum, mortisque supplicium.* For a full collection of texts on this controversy, vide Vossius, *Historia Pelagiana*. [Vide Hahn, *Lehrbuch*, s. 80, Anmerk. 1, 2.—Tr.] In form, these declarations have an apparent resemblance to the doctrine of Paul; but the resemblance is only apparent. Augustine understands in a strictly philosophical sense what, as we have seen above, was said by Paul in a popular manner.

In opposition to Augustine, Pelagius taught that Adam hurt himself alone, and not his posterity, by his transgression, and that it would be unjust for God to impute his guilt to his innocent descendants—a doctrine evidently opposed to that of Paul.

As the theory of Augustine rests upon a baseless hypothesis, it does not need a formal refutation. It was the prevailing theory among the schoolmen, and even throughout the sixteenth century, and until about the middle of the seventeenth, when it was contested by the French reformed theologians, Joshua Placcæus, and Moses Amyræus, who, however, were violently opposed. In England, too, it was contested by Thomas Burnet. The advocates of this theory endeavoured to defend it by means of the theory of *spermatic animalculæ*, which arose about the middle of the eighteenth century. When, by means of the magnifying glass, these spermatic animalculæ were observed, the thought occurred that they were the cause of impregnation. And some then affirmed that the souls of all men were in Adam, had their seat in these invisible animalculæ, participated in everything which he did, and consequently sinned with him. While, therefore, the Biblical theologians of the protestant church have justly held fast the doctrine of imputation, they have abandoned the theory of Augustine, because this does not accord either with reason or with scripture, and because it furnishes no adequate vindication for God in this procedure. In place of this theory, our theologians have substituted others, either invented by themselves or adopted from different authorities.

(2) Many have inferred the justice of imputation from the supposition that Adam was not only the *natural* or *seminal*, but also the *moral* head of the human race, or even its *representative*

and *federal* head. They suppose, accordingly, that the sin of Adam is imputed to us, on the same principle on which the doings of the head of a family, or of the plenipotentiary of a state, are imputed to his family or state, although they had no personal agency in his doings. In the same way, they suppose Christ took the place of all men, and that what he did is *imputed* to them. According to this theory, God entered into a *league* or *covenant* with Adam, and so Adam represented and took the place of the whole human race. This theory was invented by some schoolmen, and has been adopted by many in the Romish and protestant church since the sixteenth century, and was defended even in the eighteenth century by some Lutheran theologians, as Pfaff of Tübingen, some of the followers of Wolf, (e. g., Carpzov, in his "*Comm. de Imputatione facti proprii et alieni*,") and Baumgarten, in his *Dogmatik*, and disputation, "*de imputatione peccati Adamitici*." But it was more particularly favoured by the reformed theologians, especially by the disciples of Cocceius, at the end of the seventeenth and commencement of the eighteenth century—e. g., by Witsius, in his "*Œconomia fœderum*." They appeal to Hosea, vi. 7, "They transgressed the covenant, like Adam"—i. e., broke the divine *laws*. But where is it said that Adam was their federal head, and that his transgression is imputed to them? On this text Morus justly observes, "*est mera comparatio Judæorum peccantium cum Adamo peccante.*" Other texts are also cited in behalf of this opinion.

But, for various reasons, this theory cannot be correct. And, (a) The descendants of Adam never empowered him to be their representative, and to act in their name. (b) It cannot be shewn from the Bible that Adam was informed that the fate of all his posterity was involved in his own. (c) If the transgression of Adam is imputed, by right of covenant, to all his posterity, then, in justice, all their transgressions should be again imputed to him as the guilty cause of all their misery and sin. What a mass of guilt, then, would come upon Adam! But of all this, nothing is said in the scriptures. (d) The imputation of the righteousness of Christ cannot be alleged in support of this theory. For this is imputed to men only by their own will and consent. This hypothesis has been opposed, with good reason, by John Taylor, in his work on original sin, which will be hereafter noticed.

(3) Others endeavour to deduce the doctrine of imputation from the *scientia media* of God, or from his foreknowledge of what is conditionally possible. The sin of Adam, they say, is imputed to us, because God foresaw that each one of us would have committed it if he had been in Adam's stead, or placed in his circumstances. Even Augustine says, that the sin of

Adam is imputed to us *propter consensionem*, or *consensum præsumptum*. This theory has been advanced, in modern times, by Reusch, in his *Introductio in Theologiam revelatam*, and in Brunquell's work, "Die gute Sache Gottes, bey Zurechnung des Falls;" Jena, 1749. But it is a new sort of justice, which would allow us to be punished for sins which we never committed, or never designed to commit, but only might possibly have committed under certain circumstances. Think a moment, how many sins we all should have committed if God had suffered us to come into circumstances of severe temptation. An innocent man might, by this rule, be punished as a murderer, because, had he lived at Paris on St. Bartholomew's Night in 1572, he might, from mistaken zeal, have killed a heretic.

(4) Since none of these hypotheses satisfactorily explain the matter, the greater part of the moderate and Biblical theologians of the protestant church are content with saying, what is manifestly the doctrine of the Bible, that the imputation of Adam's sin consists in the prevailing *mortality* of the human race, and that this is not to be regarded as *imputation* in the strict judicial sense, but rather as the consequence of Adam's transgression, perhaps, as is thought by some, the *physical* consequence of eating the forbidden fruit, which may certainly be inferred from Gen. iii. The strict doctrine of *immediate* imputation was by no means universal among the protestant theologians of the sixteenth century, and, as is justly remarked by Pfaff, Weismann, Burnet, and others, was to many of them unknown even in name. The common theory, *de capite morali sive federali* is not to be found in the symbols.

For the purposes of popular instruction let therefore the following Biblical statement suffice: "Adam, on account of his transgression of the divine law, was punished with death, and from thenceforward became mortal; and being himself mortal, he could beget only mortal descendants. Vide 1 Cor. xv. 48—50, coll. Gen. i. 3. Hence we and all men are mortal; and the ground of this mortality lies in our progenitors, and this mortality is a consequence of their transgression." In conformity with these views, let the teacher explain the passage in Rom. v., and abstain from all subtleties and learned hypotheses.

Note.—Works on Imputation and Original Sin. (1) In opposition to imputation *sensu strictiori*, and also the doctrine concerning original sin. Of these there have been many among the English theologians of the eighteenth century. Vide especially Dan. Whitby, *De imputatione divina peccati Adamitici*; Londini, 1711; translated into German, with notes, by Semler, 1775; John Taylor, *Scriptural Doc-*

trine of Original Sin, in three parts, also translated into German. At a later period these doctrines were investigated by the protestant divines and philosophers of Germany, and partly opposed—e. g., by Töllner, *Theol. Untersuchungen*, st. ii. üb. Rom. v.; Eberhard, *Apologie des Socrates*, th. i. and ii.; Steinbart, *System der Glückseligkeitslehre*; Jerusalem, *Betrachtungen*, th. ii.

2. In defence of these doctrines, and in opposition to the works above mentioned. Joh. Andr. Cramer, *Exercitationes de peccato originali adversus Jo. Taylor*; Kopenhagen, 1766-67. Sixt, *Prüfung des Systems*, u. s. w. st. i. (in opposition to Steinbart.) The work entitled, "Freymüthige Prüfung des Steinbart'shen Christenthums" (1792), contains also many excellent and just observations. Seiler, *Von der Erbsünde, oder dem natürlichen Verderben*—a work directed in general against the ancient and modern objections to this doctrine, especially those of Eberhard and Steinbart; J. D. Michaelis, *Gedanken über die Lehre der Schrift von der Sünde und Genugthuung*, Göttingen u. Bremen, 1779, 8vo, one of the most important works in relation to this subject. He lay the doctrine of the Bible at the foundation, and then endeavours to shew its agreement with reason and experience, and to vindicate it against objections. This work contains many very excellent and ingenious observations. There are also valuable remarks on this subject in Storr's work, "Zweck des Todes Jesu," and in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. Cf. Kant, *Vom radikalen Bösen*. In illustration of the history of this doctrine, cf. Walch, *Historia doctrinæ de peccato originis*; Jenæ, 1738; Semler, *Geschichte der Glaubenslehre*, prefixed to Baumgarten's "Polemik."

[The work of President Edwards "On Original Sin" deserves mention among the most celebrated works of European theologians on this subject. Among the later and more thorough German writers on the subject of imputation are, Schleiermacher, Usteri, Tholuck, Nitzsch. The former of these has vindicated some of the highest points of Calvinism by the most profound reasoning. The others follow more or less the general system which he has developed.—Tr.]

SECTION LXXVII.

IN WHAT THE NATURAL DEPRAVITY OF MAN CONSISTS; ITS APPELLATIONS IN THE BIBLE; WHERE IT HAS ITS PRINCIPAL SEAT IN MAN; AND HOW ITS EXISTENCE MAY BE PROVED FROM THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

I. In what Natural Depravity consists.

THE descriptions given of it by theologians are very different as to the words employed.

Melancthon describes the *peccatum originis* as an inclination or disposition to all evil, which, however, does not always manifest itself in the same way, or in the same degree, and which does not appear at once, but gradually, and in all men. Others describe it as that disposition of the soul by which evil desires have an existence in it, or rather, spring up whenever occasion offers, &c. But they all agree, at last, that the essence of natural depravity is the disturbed balance of the powers or inclinations of man, or the preponderance of the carnal desires over reason. It lies in the fact, that the lower nature of man, made by God to obey, is not submissive to the reason, as the power which should give law, and govern. The following definition may therefore be given of the moral depravity of man, in conformity both with experience and with scripture: *it is that tendency to sinful passions or unlawful propensities which is perceived in man whenever objects of desire are placed before him and laws are laid upon him*, Rom. vii. This want of harmony between the two natures being but too clearly perceived, and being justly regarded as an evil fraught with ruinous consequences to man, it was early maintained among the Hebrews and other nations, that it could not have existed in the original state of man. We see everywhere that men have felt it necessary to adopt this supposition. It is, moreover, in accordance with the Bible. Vide s. 75, II. 2. We have already considered (vide s. 74) how far unaided reason can go in clearing up this subject; we now come to examine what we are taught respecting it by the scriptures.

Theologians remark here, by way of caution, that we must carefully distinguish between the *essential* and *accidental* deficiencies and imperfections of our nature. *Essential* imperfections would always have been seen in man, owing to the limitation of his nature, even although he had not fallen. But these imperfections would have implied no fault and no depravity. Depravity in any one presupposes a better state, from which he has deteriorated. Hence our *essential* imperfections cannot properly be considered as belonging to our natural depravity—e. g., man cannot be accounted depraved in consequence of the ignorance in which he is born, and the false judgments which spring merely from that ignorance, nor for the pleasure which he takes in objects of sense, when simply considered; but only for the other class of imperfections, those that are *contingent*. Among these may be placed the violence of the passions, their obvious preponderance over reason, and the hindrances we meet with from this source to the knowledge of the truth, and to our progress in holiness. This is shewn by the example of Eve. She was, even before her fall,

in many respects ignorant and inexperienced; she judged incorrectly respecting God; she felt too the motions of sense; but as yet she was uncorrupted. But after she fell she was the subject of those other accidental imperfections which now constitute human depravity.

II. How Depravity is named in the Bible, and where it is located in Man.

(1) The word $\phi\sigma\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$ is used in scripture to designate the entire corrupt constitution of man in a moral respect. According to common usage it denotes a constitution and state *which is not as it should be*. Vide 2 Pet. ii. 19; Ephes. iv. 22; 1 Tim. vi. 5.

(2) This depravity ($\phi\sigma\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$) of man exerts a powerful influence upon his soul, his understanding, and will. Vide Rom. vi. 14—23; Ephes. ii. 3. The *body* is, however, plainly the principal seat of the carnal appetites and desires, and hence the origin of this depravity is to be sought chiefly in the body. Vide Rom. vii. 5, 23; vi. 12, seq. And all the ancient heathen philosophers, who considered the preponderance of this lower animal nature as the source of human depravity, made the body the principal seat of this evil, and in doing so were supported by observations familiar to all.

(a) The ancient Grecian philosophers, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, the stoics, (vide s. 74, I.), considered matter, and the human body as consisting of matter, to be the seat and source of evil. With these writers, the Hellenistic Jews agreed. Vide Book of Wisdom, ix. 15, "The decaying body burdens the soul, and the earthy tabernacle presses down the thinking spirit." Of the same mind were most of the early Christian fathers—e. g., Justin the Martyr, Origen, (although some passages in his works appear to contradict this,) Hilarius, and Augustine himself. This doctrine was carried to a great length and very much abused by some heretics who sprang up in the Christian church, particularly in the East. They regarded matter as in itself an evil existence, not deriving its being from God, nor depending upon him. So the Gnostics and the Manicheans.

(b) The doctrine that the body of man is the chief seat of human weaknesses and imperfections, and also the germ of moral evil, was widely diffused among the eastern nations in the remotest antiquity, and was adopted by the writers of the Old Testament, as may be clearly seen from their use of the word בָּשָׂר , ($\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{x}$.) This word signifies originally the human body, then, *men themselves*, but always with the implied idea that they are frail, imperfect, and mortal, or, in a moral respect, that they are inclined to err and sin. Vide Gen. vi. 12; viii. 22; Isaiah, xl. 6, coll. Matt. xxvi. 41; John,

iii. 6. On the other hand the word *πνεῦμα* denotes what is spiritual, moral, divine, perfect, holy, &c.

(c) This doctrine, the first traces of which we find in the earlier Jewish books, was gradually developed, and was at last exhibited in the New Testament with the greatest clearness. Paul places *σάρξ* in opposition to *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα*, and depicts the controversy between the two, and the hindrances which the *σάρξ* opposes to the *πνεῦμα* in the knowledge of the truth, and holiness of walk. Vide Rom. vii. 18, 23. With him *φρονεῖν* and *περιπατεῖν κατὰ σάρκα* mean to indulge sinful desires, Rom. viii. 1, 5; and *δέλημα*, *φρόνημα*, *νοῦς σαρκός*, signify, the corrupt, depraved disposition of human nature—the propensity to sin, Gal. vi. 13; Ephes. ii. 3. Cf. *ἐπιθυμίαι σαρκικαί*, bodily, sensual desires, 1 Peter, ii. 11; also *ὁ σαρκικός* (*ἄνθρωπος*.) In Rom. vi. 6, 16, Paul says that the Christian should deprive the *σῶμα ἁμαρτίας* of its power, and not suffer himself to be subject *ἐπιθυμίαις σώματος*; and in Rom. vii. 18—25, still more plainly; he knew, he says, that in him (or rather in his body, *ἐν σαρκί*) the seat of moral good was not to be found, (*οὐκ οἶκεῖ ἀγαθόν*.) He was not, indeed, wanting in good will to live righteously, but in power to perform his will. He often *could* not accomplish the good which he heartily approved from his inmost moral feelings; and, on the contrary, he often did the evil which he disallowed. And thus he knew that *sin*—i. e., a disposition to sin, sinful depravity—dwelt in him. His spirit (*νοῦς*, *ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*) approved the divine law, and acknowledged it good and useful; but in his members (*ἐν μέλεσιν*—i. e., *ἐν σώματι*) there was another law, the law of sin, (*dictamen sensuum*), which was opposed to the law of God, and which ruled over him. Hence he exclaims, “O miserable man that I am, who shall deliver me from this mortal body, (*σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*.)” And at last he thanks God that through Christ he has granted him this deliverance, and that he was no more under the necessity of yielding obedience to his depraved appetites, although they still continued, and often resumed their power.

The word *ψυχικός*, *ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος* is also often used in the scriptures, denoting that one does not follow his reason, but is wholly under the influence of his bodily appetites and desires, and will give heed only to what he learns through his senses, and so despises the instruction which God has given respecting spiritual things. Thus Jude, ver. 19; for *ψῆ* and *ψυχή* often signify the impulses, desires, and propensities of our lower nature; and 1 Cor. ii. 14, where *ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος* is one who scorns divine instruction, and chooses rather sense, darkness, and delusion; one who has no organ for what is above sense, and no taste for divine instruc-

tion,—the same with *σαρκικός*, 1 Cor. iii. 1. The *inordinate* desires, those which are not as they should be, are often called in scripture, by way of eminence, *ἐπιθυμία*, *ἐπιθυμίαι σαρκός*, 1 John, ii. 16,—commonly rendered in the Vulgate *concupiscentia*; hence this word is adopted in ecclesiastical Latinity. Vide Morus, p. 107, n. 3, 4.

(d) From the passages now cited, and from the known sense in which the words above mentioned were anciently used, it is plain that those writers who make the *soul* the chief seat and original source of corruption very much mistake. Into this error Buddeus has fallen, as appears from his dissertation, “De anima sede peccati originalis principale;” Jenæ, 1725; and in this error he is followed by Seiler. It is equally certain, however, that this originally bodily disorder has a powerful influence upon the soul, on account of the intimate connexion between these two essential parts of man. It acts (a) upon the *understanding*, since by means of it the objects of knowledge are placed before the mind in an entirely false light, so that the understanding holds that which is false for true, what is evil for good, and the reverse. (β) Upon the *will* and the *actions*, so that what has been thus falsely represented by the senses to the understanding as good and right, is now desired and accomplished. The evil consequences of this are, that man prefers apparent to real good, that he allows himself to be more governed by his senses than by his understanding, and often does that which he himself disapproves, and so chooses and acts against his own principles and his better views. Vide Rom. vii. 8, 19, 23; Gal. v. 17, “The desire of the flesh is often opposed to the desire of the spirit, so that man is often unable to accomplish his good purposes.” The soul, as Paul teaches, is so far weak as the animal propensities (*παθήματα σαρκός*) are strong; and so feeble that it is the slave of these propensities; and although it may have a better conviction, is not able to carry it into effect, but is so carried away that it must do what itself disapproves. And this is the benefit of Christ (*χάρισμα*), that he saves us from the power of sin, as well as from its punishment.

Note 1.—Care must be taken here that the doctrine of the injury which we sustain from the body and the inordinate appetites of which it is the seat, be not carried too far, as it has been by Less, and other modern theologians. This extreme in the doctrine very naturally leads to dangerous perversions; and we might expect that it would lead many to resort to *suicide*, in order to free themselves from the burdensome prison of the body. And indeed suicide was justified on this ground by the stoics, and other ancient philosophers. On this subject it is important to bear in mind the great advantages

which, as we are taught in the scriptures, we possess from the connexion of the rational soul with the body in our present state. Vide s. 74. The false idea of the ancient Pythagoreans and Platonists that the body is a prison where the soul is incarcerated for its punishment, was held also by many of the mystics and Platonists among the old Jews and Christians; but it has no foundation in the scriptures. The sacred writers never require us, as Grecian philosophers and Christian mystics often do, to *eradicate* our bodily appetites and desires, (which, if it were possible, would destroy the very nature of man,) but only to control them and subject them to reason. Christian morals therefore insists, not that man should leave off particular sins, or suppress particular outbreaks of unlawful desire, but that a new turn should be given to all the natural desires; and this is the proper tendency of Christian morals. It designs to bring man from the love of the world to the love of God; from an improper self-love to the love of others; from a love to sensible and perishing things to a love of spiritual and eternal good. Such are the instructions which Christ everywhere gives. Vide John, iii. 3—21. It is a false assertion that the inculcation of the doctrine of the natural propensity to evil has a tendency to discourage men from the pursuit of good; when properly exhibited, this doctrine has exactly the opposite effect, and excites to the vigorous employment of our powers. The great point in this doctrine is, that the man who would fulfil his destination must depart from evil, and, not content with merely cultivating and developing his powers, must experience a radical reformation.

[Note 2.—Does the depravity of our nature consist in the inordinateness of our BODILY desires?

From the views exhibited in this section it appears that our author adopts the affirmative of this question. He sees in man a conflict between reason and those lower principles which have their seat in the body, and thinks of no ulterior or more radical evil. To such a conception of human depravity he is necessarily brought by his theory respecting the consequences of the fall, making them to consist chiefly in the disarrangement of our bodily constitution. In behalf of these views he appeals, as the reader has perceived, to the universal doctrine of pagan philosophy on this subject, to the familiar observation of the actual inordinateness of the bodily appetites and their preponderance over reason, but principally to the scriptural phraseology employed to designate the native character of man, and which, taken in its first etymological sense, seems to indicate that the *body* is the ultimate cause and principal seat of human depravity.

This part of our author's system is of such

radical importance, and so materially affects the views we must entertain of the other doctrines of Christianity, and especially of the atonement, that it ought not to pass without examination.

As to the first argument above mentioned, it will be readily conceded that this view of our natural character and state harmonizes well with pagan philosophy. It has a general resemblance even to the Indian and Persian religious systems, as exhibited by the Schlegels and other modern writers on the East. But it corresponds more exactly with the Platonic system, which fully recognises the conflict between the rational principle, (the λογικόν,) and the irrational, animal principle, (the ἄλογον.) And while it resembles these systems, it must be said also that it is liable to the same objection which has often been urged against them—viz., that in some way, by supposing either an eternal intelligent principle of evil, or a blind destiny, or some defective bodily organization, or by some other external necessity, they account for the origin and prevalence of evil, instead of charging it upon the perverted use of the moral powers of men. But to all such conceptions of our moral condition Christianity stands opposed, especially in the doctrine of the atonement, which, by its proffer of forgiveness, presupposes, not misfortune merely, but *guilt*, on the part of man, and which, in its whole bearing, aims at a spiritual and not a physical evil. It is in this way that Christianity furnishes a new point of view for observing the character of man, and discloses the essential nature and deeper root of evil.

The fact alleged in the second argument—viz., that there is a visible preponderance of sense or of bodily appetites over reason, is also readily conceded; but can we conclude from this fact that this disorder is to be attributed to the body, and the affections having their seat in it? Would not the just balance between the higher and lower principles of our nature be equally disturbed by, altering the weight in either scale? If in the original constitution of our nature, the lower principles of the animal life on one side were balanced on the other by the higher principles of our intellectual life, *not by themselves, but in connexion with a communicated divine life*, of which they are the organ, (as we shall attempt to shew,) then the mere loss or withdrawal of this divine life would be followed of course by a loss of this original equipoise, and the undue predominance of the lower principles. Thus it can be conceived that the inordinateness of the bodily appetites, in which human depravity might seem at first view to consist, so far from constituting its real essence, may be only the necessary result of an ulterior cause, the defect of the higher principles. Indeed, considering the nature of these higher principles, and their rightful supremacy,

how can their being drawn away and enslaved by principles so inferior and subordinate be accounted for, except from some defect in the spiritual part, to say nothing of positively evil inclinations seated there?

The argument derived from the use of the scriptural terms *ῥῆμα* and *σάρξ*, and their synonyms, is very plausible; and when Paul calls the *νόμος τῆς σαρκός* also a *νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι*, the question might seem to be decided. But if this is difficult on one side, it is not less so on the other, that *pride, envy*, and other feelings, the most remote from the influence of the body, are derived by Paul from *σάρξ*, as its immediate fruits. Cf. Gal. v. 19—22; Col. ii. 18. Other reasons against the meaning assigned by our author to these scriptural terms will appear in the sequel of this note.

The following development of the scriptural doctrine respecting the natural state of man is offered for consideration, in the belief that it is Augustinian and Edwardsean on the particular points in which these systems differ from the Pelagian and Arminian anthropologies.

In the first place; that principle, state, or disposition of human nature, whatever it may be, by which it is designated as corrupt or evil, is more usually denominated *σάρξ*, one who is in this state, *σαρκικός*; the living and acting in it are described by the formulæ, *περιπατεῖν ἐν σαρκί, κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν, φρονεῖν, κ. τ. λ.* The same state is also described, though less commonly, by other terms nearly synonymous with these.

Secondly. The most important clue to the meaning of the term *σάρξ*, upon which so much depends, and which is so difficult of interpretation, is the fact that it is placed in constant and direct contrast to the term *πνεῦμα*,—so much so, that it seems necessarily to imply a state exactly opposite to that denoted by the latter term. The opposition between these two principles is pointed out in the following passages—viz., Rom. vii. 25; viii. 1, seq.; 1 Cor. iii. 4; Gal. v. 19, seq. Hence it is obvious, that in order to attain distinct and specific conceptions of the meaning of *σάρξ*, we must fully understand the import of the term *πνεῦμα*, with which it is contrasted. If *πνεῦμα* denotes merely the intelligent, rational principle, (the *λογικόν*), then may *σάρξ* designate merely the irrational, bodily appetites and desires, (the *ἄλογον*.) But if *πνεῦμα* have a higher import, then to suppose *σάρξ* to be still limited, as before, to the designation of merely bodily appetites, would be to lose sight of the direct and invariable opposition in which these terms are placed.

Thirdly. It would be a very superficial view of the import of *πνεῦμα*, and contrary to the whole scriptural usage, to understand by it the mere intelligence or reason of man; on the contrary it denotes this reason, considered as the or-

gan of the higher divine life imparted to man, and which is itself more properly the *πνεῦμα*, and upon which the SPIRIT, as a natural faculty with which man is endowed, depends absolutely for its exercise. This, it seems to us, is the generic idea of the term *πνεῦμα*, although sometimes it denotes more prominently the faculty of the mind, and at others, the divine life itself of which the mind is the recipient; just as *θάνατος* is used to denote either the natural or the spiritual part of the whole penalty of the law, of which it is the generic name, according as the one or the other of these is more prominently in the mind of the writer. And so the *πνευματικός* is one who not merely possesses reason and governs his animal appetites by it, but one who partakes of this higher, divine life, who stands in living communion with God, receives the supernatural gifts of his grace, by which the natural principles of reason are strengthened and enabled to maintain the proper mastery over the lower principles of sense. Accordingly, *σάρξ* must indicate that state of man in which he is destitute of this higher life, either having lost it, or never attained to the possession of it,—in which the principles of humanity, both the higher and lower, are left to themselves; in short, the state in which man is without the Spirit of God—a state which, from this its privative character, might be appropriately denominated *unregeneracy*, or *ungodliness*. And the *σαρκικός* is one who not merely has inordinate bodily appetites, and obeys the *dictamen sensuum*, but one who does not receive and enjoy the presence of the Spirit of God. And so Calvin, in his Comm. on John, iii. 6, explains *σάρξ* to mean the whole natural man, considered as without the new birth, or the divine life; and well remarks, "*Insulsè theologastri ad partem quam vocant sensum restringunt.*"

Fourthly. The correctness of the account here given of the import of *σάρξ* is strikingly confirmed by the manner in which its synonyms are used throughout the New Testament. Thus *ψυχικός* is used (e. g., 1 Cor. ii. 14 and Jude, ver. 19) to designate one who has not the Spirit, and receives not the things of the Spirit. And in Eph. iv. 22, the *πάλαιος ἄνθρωπος*, corrupt according to the deceitful lusts, is opposed to the *being renewed*. And so everywhere the destitution of the supernatural grace of God and of his life-giving Spirit is the prominent idea in these and similar terms.

Fifthly. But thus far we attain only a negative conception on this subject. What positive idea, then, shall we form of the state of man destitute of the Divine Spirit, and estranged from God? An answer to this question will bring us upon the highest dividing points between the Augustinian and Pelagian anthropologies; for it was not in the doctrines which

came most into discussion during the Pelagian controversies that the first and essential differences between these systems lay; but in points further back, adopted unconsciously by these diverging tendencies, according to their different nature, and of which the doctrines in discussion were only the more remote results.

According to Pelagius, man was originally, and is still, endowed by God with all the powers and faculties requisite to the ends of his being, and it depends only upon himself, in the exercise of his free will, to practise all good and fulfil his destination. In his system there is therefore no necessity for any supernatural influences of grace, and scarcely any place for them; certainly a destitution of them does not necessarily imply the corruption of nature, since without them man is adequate to holiness. But according to Augustine it is far otherwise; and man stands in an absolute and constant dependence upon God, as the only source of truth and good; the faculties of reason and will with which the Creator has endowed us are by no means complete in themselves and self-sufficient to the purposes for which they were given, but only organs to receive and reveal the higher life communicated from God, to whom they are related as the eye to the sun; and this, not merely through the contingency of the fall, but originally and essentially; so that the loss of this imparted divine life must be followed by the powerlessness of the higher principles of our nature, the predominance of the lower, and so the corruption of the whole man. We have thus a contrast between a state of *grace* and of *nature*, between the *spiritual* and *natural* man,—the former participating in divine life through fellowship with God, and consequently superior to the baser and lower principles; the latter, estranged from this life, and so fallen into entire disorder, inability to good, and moral corruption. Such is the positive idea of *σάρξ*, and this is the being in the *flesh*, or being *carnal*, so often spoken of in the New Testament.

The views of Edwards, which are exhibited so lucidly and even beautifully in his work on "Original Sin," (p. 330, and especially p. 427, seq. Worces. ed.,) correspond entirely with those of Augustine. "The case with man was plainly this:—When God made man at first he implanted in him two kinds of principles. There was an *inferior* kind, which may be called *natural*, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions which belong to the *nature of man*, in which his love to his own liberty, honour, and pleasure were exercised: these, when alone, and left to themselves, are what the scriptures sometimes call *flesh*. Besides these, there were *superior* principles, that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love.

These principles may, in some sense, be called *supernatural*, being (however concreated or con-nate, yet) such as are above those principles that are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from, and inseparably connected with, *mere human nature*; and being such as immediately depend on man's union and communion with God, or divine communications and influences of God's Spirit. These superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart; the other, to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all things were in excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in their proper and perfect state." Again he says: "The withholding of special divine influence to impart and maintain the good principles, leaving the common natural principles to themselves, without the government of superior divine principles, will certainly be followed with the corruption, yea, the total corruption of the heart. As light ceases in a room when the candle is withdrawn, so man is left in a state of darkness, woful corruption and ruin, nothing but flesh without spirit, when the Holy Ghost, that heavenly inhabitant, forsakes the house. The inferior principles, given only to serve, being alone, and left to themselves, *of course* become reigning principles; the immediate consequence of which is, a turning of all things upside down. It were easy to shew, if here were room for it, how every depraved disposition would naturally arise from this *privative* original." (Abridged.)

But we may attain to still more definite conceptions respecting the positive nature of the *flesh*, by considering it in opposition to the highest principle and spring of the spiritual state. This latter is ascertained by all just reasoning about the nature of holiness, and by the first precept of the divine law, to be *supreme love to God*. Hence *selfishness* is to be regarded as constituting the central point of the natural unregenerate life.

It will now be obvious how, in the catalogue of the works of the *flesh*, there should stand such feelings as have no conceivable connexion with the body, and cannot possibly be derived from its influence.

But it may be asked, why, then, if it is not intended to exhibit the influence of the body, should the term *σάρξ* and its synonyms be employed to designate the natural unregenerate state of man? To this question various answers might be given. One reason is offered by Edwards, p. 321 of the work cited above. But the reason suggested by Tholuck corresponds best with the view which has been given of the privative nature of the flesh. As the body is dead without the enlivening soul, so the spirit of man is powerless and dead without the

higher life derived from the Spirit of God. And thus the mortal part of our animal nature is taken for the designation of our intellectual and moral being, as far as it is dead, powerless, and corrupt, from its being destitute of its higher spiritual life in God.

This view of human depravity, in opposition to that which makes it consist in the inordinateness of bodily appetites, derives its principal interest and importance from its bearing on the other doctrines of religion, and especially on the doctrine of atonement. As was hinted in a previous note, if the depravity of man results from any physical disarrangement, then the remedy, in order to meet the exact point of the disease, and to reach its real source, ought to be applied to the physical, instead of the moral, nature of man. It is only on the supposition that selfishness is the root of evil, and the central principle of our natural life, and that man is dependent for holiness and happiness upon an imparted life, higher than that of reason, that the provisions of the atonement have any significance.—TR.]

III. *How Native Depravity may be proved from the Bible.*

(1) In doing this, we should not employ, without selection, all those texts which speak of the moral depravity of man in general, or of that of particular men or nations; for in many of these passages the sins and vices actually committed by men are the subjects of discourse, and not the disposition to sin inherent in mankind. It was the intention of the sacred writers, in some of the examples which they have given us of heinous transgressors, to shew to what sin leads, by what terrible consequences it is followed, in order to deter men from committing it, and not to teach that all men are the same, or have actually sunk to the same depth of villainy, although by reason of their inherent depravity they *might* all sink to the same depth. Among texts of this nature we may mention Psalm xiv. 3, seq., where the declaration, *there is none that doeth good, &c.*, relates to the godless persons mentioned ver. 1. And so Paul, Rom. iii. 10, proves from this passage that there were formerly among the Israelites very wicked men. And Job (chap. xiv. 4) alludes principally to those actual transgressions by which men are brought into that state in which none can be guiltless in the sight of God. In Rom. iii. 9, seq., the apostle shews that the Jewish nation had no advantage over others in point of holiness or moral purity, and that there had always been in it corrupt and vicious men. Nor can the text, Ps. li. 7, be cited in behalf of this doctrine. The mention of natural depravity does not harmonize with the context, and the phrase *to be born in or with sin* (i. e., to bring sin into

the world with one) relates, as is evident from John, ix. 34, not to native depravity, which all have, but to the fact that he had not sinned for the first time in the particular crime of which he had then been guilty, but from his youth up had been a great sinner; for such is frequently the meaning of the term *נָּפֶשׁ*. Cf. Job, xxxi. 18; Ps. lviii. 4. It may also be said here that David does not make an *universal* affirmation, but only speaks of himself, designing to describe himself as a great sinner.

(2) The proof that the doctrine of natural depravity and its propagation is founded in the holy scriptures, is rather to be made out from the comparison of many texts taken together, or viewed in their connexion. The doctrine itself is undoubtedly scriptural, although the Biblical writers did not always express themselves respecting it with equal clearness and distinctness, and did not adopt all the consequences which have been since drawn from it by many from its connexion with other doctrines. The Bible speaks, as Musæus and Morus justly observe, far more frequently in the *concrete* than in the *abstract*, respecting the sinful corruption of man; and in this respect it should be imitated by preachers in their popular instruction. Men will readily concede the general proposition, *esse perditam naturam humanam*; but they are unwilling that this proposition should be applied to *themselves*; while yet the effect of the personal self-application of this doctrine is most salutary to every individual. The scriptures teach us how to bring this doctrine home to every heart.

The course of thought on this subject which the Hebrews followed, and which was gradually developed and transmitted to Christians, is as follows:—God created everything, and consequently the *material* from which the sensible world has originated, and from which he formed the human body. All this was good and perfect in its kind—i. e., adapted to the attainment of its end or destination; Gen. i. The body of man was sustained by the *tree of life*, and happy and peaceful was his condition in the state of innocence. This Mosaic narrative is at the foundation of the whole. Men ate of the forbidden tree of poison; its taste brought sickness and death upon them, weakened their body, and destroyed its harmony. Violent passions now arose within them, and the just balance of the human powers and inclinations was destroyed, and sense obtained predominance over reason. Vide s. 75. All this is indeed spoken in Gen. ii. and iii. only respecting Adam and Eve, and nothing is there expressly said of the propagation of this evil. But their posterity died after the same manner, and experienced the same predominance of sense and inclination to sin, from their youth up. Respecting the race of

man sprung from Adam before the flood, the scripture saith, Gen. vi. 5, *Their wickedness was great, and every imagination of the thoughts of their heart* (כל־יצר מחשבת לבם), all the thoughts, desires, resolves, arising within them, and carried out into action;—צַר, *nature, constitution*, Ps. ciii. 14, [rather, *frame, whatever is made by an artificer*, and so here the whole *doing or operation of the heart*,]) *was daily nothing but evil*. Nor did any change take place in those who lived after the flood; but men were found to be the same, as before, and so God repeated the same declaration respecting them, Gen. viii. 22. And the constant experience of later times confirmed the same truth. It was therefore justly concluded that this evil is transmitted from generation to generation, and is the common hereditary disease of the human race; especially as this evil was seen to exist very early in all men, even from their youth (צָרָה), and so could not have arisen merely from defect in education or the influence of bad example. All the imperfections, therefore, which were understood by the Jews under the terms בָּשָׂר וְדָם (viz., mortality, the predominance of sense, the bias to sin, &c.) were universally regarded by them as the melancholy consequences of the fall of the first man. Vide No. I. 3. In this, therefore, lay the germ of all the evil and moral corruption among men. It is obviously to these fundamental ideas that all the prophets refer back, when they speak of the sin and corruption so prevalent among men. And it is the same with the later Jewish writers after the Babylonian exile until the time of Christ—e. g., the writers of the Apocrypha. And so we find many traces of this in the old Jewish translations of the Hebrew scriptures; in the Chaldaic Paraphrases, and in the Septuagint Version—e. g., in Job, xiv. 4, where it is said, *none is pure*, the Septuagint adds, *even although he should live but for a single day upon the earth*.

On the same general views do Christ and the apostles proceed; and Paul especially teaches this doctrine plainly and expressly, and improves it in order to set forth more conspicuously the high worth of Christianity, as that system in which more efficacious and sure remedies against this evil were provided than the Jewish or any other religion ever possessed. In this way does he humble the pride of man, and describe the disorder of the soul in that celebrated passage before cited, Rom. vii. 14, seq. He calls this innate evil, ver. 17, ἡ οἰκονομία ἐν ἡμῶν ἀμαρτία, ver. 23, ἕτερος νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν μου, ver. 25, νόμος ἀμαρτίας.

In the text Eph. ii. 3, the term φύσις is variously explained. The explanation of Morus, that it denotes the state of one who follows his sensual desires, as all men are naturally prone to do, is just, on account of the antithesis in ver.

5, 10. Φύσις properly signifies (a) *origin, birth*, from φύω, *nascor*; so in Gal. ii. 15, φύσει Ἰουδαῖος, *Jews by birth, native Jews*; and so too in the classics. (b) It is also used both by the Jews and classics to denote the original, inborn, and peculiar properties, attributes, nature of a thing or person, the *naturalis indoles* or *affectio*; as Rom. xi. 21, 24, where the sense is, “even we who are born Jews, are, as to our nature—i. e., that natural disposition which we have exhibited from our youth up—equally deserving of punishment with other men,—i. e., native heathen; for all, Jews and Gentiles alike, are born with a dangerous predominance of sense, and deserving of the punishment of all the sons of Adam—viz., death.”

After these texts, the passage, John, iii. 6, is easily explained: *what is born of the flesh is flesh*—i. e., from men who are weak, erring, and sinful, men of the same character are born. No one attains, therefore, by his mere birth, (e. g., as a Jew,) to any peculiar privileges from God; these he attains only by being *born again*, by becoming a *regenerate* man, morally changed. On principles like these do the sacred writers always proceed when they teach that all men, without exception, are sinners; John, iii. 6; Rom. iii. 9, 19.

SECTION LXXVIII.

OF THE NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF THIS CORRUPTION; ITS PROPAGATION; ITS PUNISHABLENESS; ALSO OF THE ORIGIN OF SINFUL DESIRES AMONG MEN, AND THEIR PUNISHABLENESS.

I. Nature of Human Depravity.

(1) It is *universal*. This implies, (a) that no man is wholly exempt from it, however different may be the degrees and modifications in which it may exist. The universality of human depravity is proved, partly from the experience of all men and ages (vide s. 74), partly from the testimony of the holy scriptures. Many texts, indeed, treat of the sinful actions and moral corruption of men of mature life; but we are taught by the Bible to look for the first ground even of these in that human depravity or bias to sin without which sin itself would never have prevailed so universally; s. 77, III. ad finem.

The texts commonly referred to on this subject are, Job, xiv. 4, (who can find a pure man? none is unspotted,) Rom. iii. 23, where Paul says, in order to humble the pride of the Jews, that they were no better than the heathen, and were, as well as they, ὑπερβοντες τῆς δόξης Θεοῦ; also Rom. v. 12—21; Eph. ii. 3; John, iii. 6. No sooner does man begin to exercise his reason, and to distinguish between good and evil, than this bias to sin shews itself in him. While

he must acknowledge the law as good and obligatory, he feels within himself a resistance to it—an inclination to do that which is opposed to it, and forbidden by it. Indeed, he is borne away with such power by his lower appetites and passions, that he often does that which he himself knows to be injurious, and neglects that which he knows to be salutary. Rom. vii. 8; Eph. ii. 3; Gal. v. 17. Thus it is with all men; and each individual must confess that the Bible truly describes his own history and experience. Hence this evil is universal.

The universality of this corruption implies, (b) that it can never be entirely eradicated, even with the most sincere endeavours of the pious; that although, through divine assistance, an end may be put to the dominion of sin, and its out-breakings may be prevented, yet the root and germ of evil will remain, and cease only with death, or the laying aside of the body, in which this sinful corruption has its principal seat. Vide Rom. vi. 12; vii. 17, 24; Gal. v. 16, 17; 1 John, i. 8. Every one, therefore, who has been freed from the dominion of sin, has still to contend against this propensity to sin, lest he should again fall under its dominion. Rom. viii. 13; vi. 12, seq. These remnants of depravity which are found even in the best men, make their holiness and virtue very imperfect; and the feeling that they are sinners continually humbles them before God. The truly pious man will never therefore glory in his holiness, or be proud of his virtue, because he well knows that it is imperfect. This is evident from every page of the scriptures.

(2) It is *natural* and *innate*, (*naturalis et congenita sive insita vitiositas sive depravatio*.) The term *natural* is taken from Eph. ii. 3, *φύσει τέχνα ὁργής*. Vide s. 77, III. 1. Tertullian seems to be the first among the church fathers who used the term *naturalis*. Vide s. 79, No. 4. The use of this term, if it be rightly explained, is unobjectionable. If *natural* be understood in the sense of essential, it conveys a false idea, and is the same as to say, that this depravity is an essential part of man, that man could not exist as man without it. Matt. Flacius of Jena, in the sixteenth century, contended, in his controversies with Victor Strigelius about *Synergism*, that *peccatum originale esse non accidens, sed ipsam substantiam hominis*. But he asserted this merely from ignorance of scholastic phraseology. He meant only to maintain the *entire* corruption of man, and his incapacity to all good. And although the authors of the *Formula of Concord* (Art. I.) nominally oppose Flacianism, they maintain the same doctrine in other words: *peccatum originale cum natura et substantia hominis intime conjunctum esse et commixtum*.

The term *natural* is rather used in this doc-

trine in opposition to what is *acquired*, or first produced and occasioned by external circumstances and causes. It denotes that for which there is a foundation in man himself, although it may be an *accident*, and may not belong essentially to his nature. In the same sense we say, for example, that such a man possesses *natural* sagacity, that a disease is *natural* to another, that he is by *nature* a poet, &c., because the qualities here spoken of are not the result of diligence, practice, or any external circumstances. In the same way this depravity is called *natural*, because it has its ground in man, and is not in the first place acquired; or, still more plainly, because it does not first come to man from without, through instruction or the mere imitation of bad examples.

As the term *natural*, however, is ambiguous, and liable to misconception, some prefer the designation *innate*, (*congenitum* or *insitum*)—a term which, as well as the other, is scriptural. The word *congenitus* is used by the elder Pliny in the sense of *innate*, and as opposed *acquisito sive aliunde illato*, and is in substance the same as *natural*. So Cicero (Orat. pro domo, c. 5,) places *nativum malum* in opposition to that which is *aliunde allato*. And it is with justice that a quality, which has its origin at the same time with man, which is found in him from his earliest youth, and can be wholly eradicated by no effort, is denominated *natural*, (נָטוּר, applied to the good, Job, xxxi. 18; to the wicked, Ps. lviii. 4, denoting anything which is deep-rooted, and shews itself *early* in men.) In this sense we speak at the present day of innate or hereditary faults, virtues, excellences, both in men and beasts—e. g., of cunning, pride, magnanimity, &c. So Kant speaks of *RADIKALE Böse*; and Sospiter, according to the testimony of Stobæus, wrote in one of his letters, *ἐννοεῖ δὲ, ὡς σύμφυτον τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν ἀνθρώποις*.

(3) It is *hereditary*. That this evil is transmitted from parents to children follows partly from its universality, and partly from its entire sameness in all men. As it was in the parents, so it is in the children, although it shews itself in different degrees, according to the difference in the organization, the temperament, and the external circumstances and relations in which they live. In the same way we judge that certain faults, talents, and virtues, are *inherited* by children, when we see a resemblance between them and their parents in these respects. The doctrine that this depravity is propagated among men from parents to children, and on this very account is universal, is clearly taught in the holy scriptures, as Rom. v. 12, seq.; John, iii. 6, and other texts. Vide s. 77, III. 2.

Note.—Human depravity does not, however, consist in *definite* inclinations directed to *particular objects*, but rather in a general disposition

to inordinate and violent passions, which shews itself now with regard to one object, and again with regard to another, according to the difference of organization, of temperament, and of external circumstances; but in all cases, whatever may be the object of the passion, in such a way that reason and conscience avail but little against passion, or far less than they should.

II. *The manner in which Natural Depravity is propagated.*

(1) From what has been already said, it is plain that a *physical* propagation of human depravity is affirmed in the scriptures, and it is in this that what theologians call *original sin* (Erbsünde) principally consists. This may be proved from the following principles, which are undeniably taught in the Bible: (a) that human nature was unquestionably more perfect and better formerly than it is at present; (b) that our progenitors were corrupted, and as it were poisoned, by the fall; (c) that the principal seat of this depravity is to be found in the body, s. 77, II. Children derive their bodies from their parents, and so back to the first human pair. The attributes which belonged to the bodies of our first parents after the fall, their excellences as well as imperfections, belong also to their posterity, and so are inherited by children from their parents. Parents could not beget children better or more perfect than they themselves were. Vide 1 Cor. xv. 48, 49. After the fall they had *σάρκα*, or *σώμα ἀμαρτίας* and *θανάτου*, and consequently their posterity, begotten and born after the fall, possessed the same. John, iii. 6, τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ σαρκὸς σὰρξ (σαρκικός) ἐστίν.

This is illustrated from the analogy of certain diseases of mind and body, which are often propagated through whole generations. It is a matter of experience, that some qualities, intellectual and corporeal, are propagated from parents to their offspring, although it is not the case with all. The propagation of moral depravity is not, therefore, contrary to what is known from experience, but rather in perfect consistency with it, and this is enough.

Closely connected with this is the New-Testament doctrine, that the man Jesus Christ was not produced in the common course of nature, like other men, but in an extraordinary manner, by the immediate agency of God. Luke, i. 34; Matt. i. 16—20, 25. It was necessary for him to be without sin or depravity, (Heb. iv. 15,) *vitiositatis expers*, and like the first man in his state of innocence, in order to restore the happiness which was squandered by him; hence he is called ὁ δεύτερος ἀνθρώπος, ὁ ἑσχατος Ἀδάμ, 1 Cor. xv. 45, 47; also, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, the great Son of Adam, or of man.

It was on this account that, in the twelfth

century, some teachers in France, and Anselmus of Canterbury, in England, maintained the *unspotted conception* of the mother of Jesus. To this opinion Scotus acceded, and after him his adherents, the entire body of the Franciscans, and, at a later period, the Jesuits. But they were opposed by Thomas Aquinas and his followers, and by all the Dominicans. On this point there was a violent dispute in the Romish church from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and the popes decided nothing respecting it. This doctrine is wholly unsupported by the holy scriptures.

When all which has now been said is taken in connexion, it plainly appears that the doctrine of the physical propagation of depravity fully agrees with the other scriptural ideas. Any one, therefore, who receives these representations respecting the original and more perfect state of man, respecting the sin and fall of Adam, &c., as true, and founded in the scriptures, proceeds inconsistently when he denies the consequences which flow from them, as many modern theologians do.

In the times of the church fathers, during the third and fourth centuries, this doctrine of the physical propagation of human corruption was often vindicated and illustrated by the doctrine respecting the propagation of the soul *per traducem*; (vide s. 57, II., and s. 79, No. 2;) but of this there is nothing said in the Bible. The manner in which this disposition is propagated can be explained neither *psychologically* nor *anatomically*. The psychologist does not know the soul as it is *in itself*, but only a part of its exercises. In like manner the interior of our corporeal structure is a mystery impenetrable by our senses. Into the inmost secrets of nature, whether corporeal or spiritual, no created spirit can pry. We cannot therefore either understand or describe this disposition, which is so injurious to morality, or its propagation, as they are in themselves, but only according to the appearances and effects which they exhibit in the gradual development of man.

Note.—The universality of depravity (*ἀμαρτία*) and of death (*θάνατος*) depends, according to the Bible, upon the derivation of all men from *one progenitor* or *father*. Hence sin and death are always derived from *Adam*, Rom. v. 14; 1 Cor. xv. 22; and not from *Eve*, although she, according to Paul himself, (1 Tim. ii. 14,) first sinned. If *Eve* only had sinned, she would have removed her depravity from the world when she died; and sin would not through her have come into the world in such a way that sin, and death through sin, should pass upon all men. Hence Jesus, when it was necessary that he, as a man, should be without sin, was born of a human *mother*, but not begotten by a human *father*. Vide Num. I.

(2) There is also a *moral* propagation of this depravity. In this are included,

(a) *The imputation* of the sin of Adam, of which we have treated, both doctrinally and historically, in s. 76. By this is understood the universal mortality of man as a consequence of the sin of our progenitors.

(b) The propagation of depravity through the *imitation of bad examples*. The bias to evil which lies in the human heart is in no way more excited and strengthened than by *bad examples*, which very soon obtain approbation and are imitated, whether the individual may have seen them himself, or have heard of them from others, or have read respecting them in books. The influence exerted by this cause upon man in the formation of his character is so indescribably great, that many ancient writers regarded it as the only cause of the propagation of human depravity, and either wholly denied or, at least in a great measure, doubted the doctrine of its physical propagation. They hence supposed that this evil could be either wholly removed, or at least much diminished, by means of a good education, and that the propensity to imitation could receive such a direction that the good only should be imitated, while the evil should be shunned. So thought Pelagius, (vide s. 79, No. 3,) and at a later period the Socinians and many Arminians. This opinion has found advocates also among some modern protestant theologians—e. g., Steinbart, System, s. 105, f.; Eberhard, Apologie, ii. 339, f.; Jerusalem, Betrachtungen, th. ii. b. ii. s. 683, f.

That example and education contribute much to the moral improvement or corruption of man cannot be doubted; but it is equally true, and conformed to experience, that example and education are far from being the only and sufficient cause of the prevailing wickedness, and that with the best education man becomes bad much easier than good, with all the pains taken to make him so. Of this the cause lies in the undue predominance of the animal appetites. This accounts for it, that the bias to evil is so much stronger and more active than the bias to good. Were it otherwise, it would be unnecessary to contend so strenuously against evil, and to employ so many means to incite man to goodness and to secure him against vice. And among all the thousands who have lived upon the earth, there would have been found some examples of persons who had passed through their whole life free from sin.

As man, therefore, has within himself a natural adaptation to much which is good, he has also a natural disposition and bias to much which is evil, (*malum radicale*), which soon strikes root, spreads round, and chokes the good. It is absolutely inexplicable how the preponderance of sense over reason, so visible in all men, could be

derived from mere imitation. Were this the case, this preponderance ought to cease as soon as man, in the full exercise of his understanding, were taught better. The will, we should expect, would then obey the dictates of reason. It is not found, however, to be so in fact. The dominion of sense still continues, as the experience of every one proves. The ground of this must therefore lie deeper; and both experience and reason confirm the account which scripture gives of it. Vide s. 77.

III. *The Imputation or Punishableness of Natural Depravity.*

This is the *reatus* or *culpa vitiositatis*, and was asserted by Augustine and his followers. Vide Morus, p. 120, s. 7, coll. s. 79, No. 2. They contended that all men, even before they had committed any sinful actions, and barely on account of this native depravity, were deserving of temporal and eternal death, or of damnation. Others have endeavoured in various ways to mitigate the severity of this opinion. Some modern theologians have taught, in imitation of Augustine, the doctrine that *peccatum originale per se esse damnabile*; but that, for Christ's sake, punishment was not actually inflicted.

But the assertion, that this corruption in and of itself involves condemnation, cannot be proved. For (a) it is irreconcilable with the justice and goodness of God that he should *punish* (in the proper sense of this term) an innocent person for the sins of another. Sin cannot exist, certainly cannot be punished, unless the action is free; otherwise it ceases to be sin. Vide s. 76, III. (b) In those texts of the Old and New Testament which are commonly cited in behalf of this opinion, the *death* spoken of is not *eternal* death, or *condemnation*; but *temporal* death, Gen. i. 2, 17; Rom. v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 22. Vide s. 75, II. 2. (c) Even bodily death is represented in the scriptures as, indeed, the *consequence* of Adam's sin, but not as a punishment, strictly speaking, for any beside himself; for none but himself were guilty of his sin.

In conformity with this view, Rom. v. 12, 14, is to be explained; also Rom. vi. 23, *ζάνατος ὀφύων ἁμαρτίας*, or ver. 21, *τέλος (καρπὸς) ἁμαρτίας*: so called because it *followed* upon Adam's sin, and, as far as he was concerned, was a *punishment* for it. Vide s. 76, III. The doctrine of the Bible on this subject is the following; "The bias of man to evil, and to do that which is forbidden, is in itself *bad*, (Germ. *fehlerhaftes*, *esse in vicio*, *vitiosum*,) Rom. vii. 5; xiii. 18; but it cannot be imputed to man, or he be regarded as punishable on account of it, unless he yields himself to it, and indulges it. Vide Rom. vi. 12; Gen. iv. 7, coll. James, i. 15. This, however, is the case with all men; no one has

lived upon the earth who has not been led by this propensity into actual transgression, and so has become deserving of punishment." Truly, therefore, does the scripture affirm that we are all subject to punishment, (τέκνα ὀργῆς, Ephes. ii. 3;) not, however, because we are born with this disposition, (for this is not any fault of ours,) but because we indulge it, give an ear to our unlawful desires, and so suffer ourselves to be led on to the commission of sin.

IV. *The Source and Origin of Sinful Inclinations, and their Punishableness.*

From the preponderance of sense now explained, *particular sinful dispositions and passions* take their origin, and so are the result and the proof of the sinful depravity of man. But in order that we may rightly estimate the sinfulness and punishableness of these desires, we must attend to the following considerations:—

(1) The desires of man are not *in themselves*, and abstractedly considered, *sinful*; for they are deep laid in the constitution which God himself has given to human nature; they arise in man involuntarily, and so far cannot certainly be imputed to him. The essential constitution of man makes it necessary that everything which makes an agreeable impression on the senses should inevitably awaken correspondent desires. The poor man, who sees himself surrounded with the treasures of another, feels a natural and involuntary desire to possess them. The mere rising of this desire is no more punishable in him than it was in Eve, when she saw the tree, and felt an impulse to eat its beautiful fruit, which is never represented in the Bible as her sin.

(2) The desires of man become sinful and deserving of punishment then only when (a) man, feeling desires after forbidden things, seeks and finds pleasure in them, and delights himself in them, and so (b) carefully cherishes and nourishes them in his heart. (c) When he seeks occasions to awaken the desires after forbidden things, and to entertain himself with them. (d) When he gives audience and approbation to these desires, and justifies, seeks, and performs the sins to which he is inclined. This is followed by the twofold injury, that he not only sins for this once, but that he gives his appetites and passions the power of soliciting him a second time more unfortunately, of becoming more vehement and irresistible, so that he becomes continually more disposed to sin, acquires a fixed habit of sinning, and at last becomes the *slave of sin*. Vide Michaelis, Ueber die Sünde, s. 365, f. But if a man repels and suppresses the involuntary desire arising within him because it is evil, he cannot certainly be punished merely because, without any fault of his own, he felt this

desire. It were unjust to punish any one for being assailed by an enemy, without any provocation on his part.

(3) With this doctrine the holy scripture is perfectly accordant. Even in his state of innocence man felt the rising of desire; nor was this in him accounted sin; Gen. iii. 6. Hence we are never required, either in the Old Testament or the New, to *eradicate* these desires, (which, indeed, is a thing impossible, and would cause a destruction of human nature itself,) but only to keep them under control, and to suppress those which fix upon forbidden things. Vide s. 77. In Rom. vi. 12, we are directed not to let our sinful appetites rule, and *not to obey the body in the lusts thereof*; here, therefore, it is presupposed that these tempting lusts remain. Again, in Gal. v. 24, we are charged to crucify the flesh, with its affections and lusts. It is to those who contend against their wicked passions that rewards are promised, and not to those who have never had these solicitations and allurements to evil. The pretended virtue of such men scarcely deserves the name, and is not capable of reward.

Some texts are indeed cited in which the passions, in themselves considered, are forbidden, as Rom. vii. 7, οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις. Ex. xx. 17, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," &c. Some also in which they are said to be deserving of punishment from God, as Matt. v. 28. But in these texts, such desires are not spoken of as arise involuntarily within us, and for which we are not therefore culpable, but such as man himself nourishes and entertains, or by his own agency awakens within himself, and which he aims to execute. And so in Matt. v. Christ speaks of the actual intention and design of man to commit adultery, if he could; and not of the passion arising in his heart, which he himself disapproves, and immediately suppresses, because it is contrary to the divine law.

(4) The manner in which man is borne away by his passions to the commission of sin is described by James (i. 14, 15) in a way that corresponds with the experience of every one; and this text confirms all the preceding remarks. When desires arise within us, we are in *danger* of sinning. Some present enjoyment of sense tempts us. Enticements to sin spring up. These James calls *temptations*, (elsewhere called σάββαλα, Matt. xviii. 7, 8, ἑστῆρ, Ezek. xvii. 19.) For we look upon that which is represented to us by our senses as charming and desirable, to be a great good, the possession of which would make us happy. This is expressed by ἐξελκόμενος and δολεσόμενος. The image is here taken from animals, which are ensnared by *baits* (δέλεα) laid before them, in order to take them. To these allurements all men are exposed, although

not in the same degree. Thus far there is no sin—i. e., the man is not yet caught in the snare under which the bait lies. But here he must stop, and instead of indulging must suppress these desires—must fly from the bait. Otherwise, *lust conceives*, (ἐπιθυμία συλλαβοῦσα,) i. e., these desires and passions are approved in the heart, and the man begins to think he can satisfy them. This is wrong and sinful. For this is no longer involuntary, but, on the contrary, the result of man's own will, and he is now deserving of punishment. This is what is called *peccatum actuale internum*. But finally, *desire brings forth sin*, the evil intent passes into action, and is accomplished. This is *peccatum actuale externum*. Hence flows *θάνατος*, misery, unhappiness of every sort, as the consequence and punishment of sin.

SECTION LXXIX.

OF THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ANCIENT CHURCH-FATHERS RESPECTING HUMAN DEPRAVITY; AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ECCLESIASTICAL PHRASEOLOGY ON THIS SUBJECT AND THE VARIOUS FORMS OF DOCTRINE WERE GRADUALLY DEVELOPED.

(1) THE oldest Christian teachers were mostly agreed in considering death as a consequence of Adam's sin. Vide s. 76. [It should be observed, however, that in these early writers the term *φθορά* stands not only for *mortality*, but also for *depravity*. Vide Neander, b. i. Abth. iii. s. 1045.—Tr.] But we shall look in vain through the writings of most of the Greek teachers to find the full scriptural idea of an *innate depravity*; or, at least, it cannot be found exhibited with sufficient distinctness or clearness. As there had been as yet no controversy on this subject, nothing respecting it was determined and settled on ecclesiastical authority. Still they agree, for the most part, that the disproportion between sense and reason, or the corruption of human nature, began after the fall of Adam, and has been diffused as a universal disease through the whole human race. That this evil, however, in itself considered, is to be regarded as actual sin, and as such is punished by God, they do not teach; but rather the contrary. So Justin Martyr, Ap. i. 54, seq.; Irenæus, Adv. Hæres. iv. 37, seq.; Athenagoras, Legat. c. 22; Clemens Alex. Strom. iii. (contra Encratitas.) "No one," says the writer last mentioned, "is wholly free from sin; but the child, who has never personally trespassed, cannot be subjected to the *curse* of Adam, (the punishment of his sin.) Yet all who have the use of their reason are led by this their moral depravity to commit actual sin, and so become liable to punishment." The same writer says, in his Pædag. iii. 12, *μόνος ἀναμάρτητος ὁ λόγος*.

τὸ γὰρ ἑξαμαρτάνειν πᾶσιν ἐμφυτον καὶ κοινόν. Cyril of Alexandria, in his Commentary on Isaiah, says, *φυσικὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὐκ εἶναι κακόν* and in his work "Contra Anthropomorph." c. 8, he says, "Adam's posterity are not *punished* as those who with him had broken the law of God." So also Origen, Præf. ad libros περὶ ἀρχῶν, and his followers, Basilus, and Theodorus of Mopsevestia, who, according to the testimony of Photius, wrote a book against those who taught that man sinned *φύσει καὶ οὐ γνώμῃ*. There were some, too, of the Greek fathers who traced the origin of the evil passions and of the actual sins arising from them to the *mortality* of the body—e. g., Chrysostom and Theodoret. This hypothesis has been revived in later times by Whitby, who has attempted to carry it through. Vide s. 76, note.

(2) The same representation is found in many of the fathers of the ancient *Latin church*, even in Africa. They taught that *death* (depravity?) is a consequence of Adam's sin, and yet that it is not, in itself, to be regarded as sin, and punished accordingly. Cyprian (Epist. Synod. Conc. Carthag. iii.) says, "A new-born child has not itself sinned, *nisi quod secundum Adam carnaliter natus, contagium mortis contraxit*." In baptism, the sins of the child (which were still not *propria* but *aliena*) were supposed to be washed away. Ambrosius says, on Ps. xlviii., "There is a bias to sin in all, but this is not actual sin, and liability to punishment; God punishes us only for *nostra peccata*, and not for *alienæ (Adami) nequitie flagitia*." Even according to Tertullian, (de testim. animæ, c. 3,) it is only to *temporal death* that we are condemned in consequence of the sin of Adam. To this opinion, Hilarius and others acceded. The African fathers before the time of Augustine, and even Tertullian, seem, however, to have had less distinct and settled views on this subject than even the Greeks, which arose from their misunderstanding the seemingly obscure phraseology of the New Testament, and especially of the Latin version of it.

[The germs of the controversy which afterwards broke out between Augustine and Pelagius can be discerned in this earlier period. The Alexandrine teachers, and among these principally Clement and Origen, took the side of the human will, and its ability to good. They, however, by no means carried this so far as was afterwards done by Pelagius, and often expressed themselves strongly respecting the entire depravity of man, and his dependence on the renovating influence of divine grace. Vide Clement, Quis dives salv. c. 21. The Eastern teachers were led to vindicate thus strongly the powers of the human will by their opposition to New Platonism, and the Manichean theosophy, by which sin was attributed either to an eternal

principle of evil, to a blind and resistless destiny, or to some necessity of nature, rather than to the perversion of our own moral powers.

The teachers of the Western church, on the other hand, and especially those of Africa, having no such philosophy to oppose, recognised more fully the peculiar Christian truths of the corruption and inability of human nature, and the necessity of divine grace; but they also were far from representing the grace of God as compulsory and irresistible, as it was afterwards done in the Pelagian controversies. This tendency in the Western church is represented by Tertullian, Cyprian, Hilary, and Ambrosius.

As yet, however, these opposing tendencies had not come into open conflict, but awaited the causes which brought them into direct collision in the following period.—Tr.]

But Augustine carried the matter much further. He affirmed the doctrine *de imputatione peccati Adami* in the strictest juridical sense, teaching at the same time the *entire* depravity of man, and his total inability to all good, in such a sense as it is nowhere taught in the Bible. He may have been led to this by having formerly belonged to the sect of Manicheans, who hold very strict sentiments on this point; hence his doctrine *de peccato originali* was called by Pelagius and Julian a *Manichean doctrine*.* He maintained that the consequence of Adam's sin was not merely bodily death, but *eternal*, (*mors secunda, cujus non est finis*;) and that to this all men, even children, who had not themselves thought or done either good or evil, were subjected; though yet the unmerited grace of God delivered some from this punishment, (*decretum absolutum*.) He exhibits these doctrines in his work, *De civitate Dei*, xiv. 1, and else-

* [We subjoin the following remarks of Neander with respect to the charge here, and often elsewhere, brought against the system of Augustine. "The anthropology of Augustine," he says, "is unjustly supposed to be derived from the influence of Manichæism. His doctrine respecting the moral depravity of man was a very different thing from the dualism of Mani, which was derived from the philosophy of nature. The system of Augustine did not, like that of Mani, proceed from his confounding in his conceptions the *natural* and the *moral*, but from a pure fact of moral consciousness. On the contrary, it may be said, that while the hope of finding out, by means of speculation, an explanation of the irreconcilable opposition between good and evil, of which he had become early conscious in the depth of his soul, led him to Manichæism; he was led from it again by coming to apprehend this opposition more and more in a moral light. Again; it was in direct opposition to Manichæism that he adopted the theory, the first germs of which he took from Platonism, that evil is only a subjective deviation of created being from the law of the supreme and only true Being, and not, as taught by Mani, an independent, self-subsisting existence." Allg. Kirchengesch., b. ii. Abth. iii. s. 1206.—Tr.]

where. Fulgentius Rusp. (*De Fide*, c. 29) asserts that children who had lived merely in their mother's womb, and yet died without baptism, must suffer eternal punishment in hell. And so taught many of the schoolmen, according to Peter of Lombardy, l. ii. Even Augustine attributed a certain kind of physical influence to baptism, and confined the grace of God to those to whom this ordinance was administered. He held this doctrine, however, in common with many of the Latin fathers before his time—e. g., Cyprian. The adherents of Augustine were accustomed to vindicate their views by the doctrine of the propagation of the soul *per traducem*, though this is not true of all of them. On the contrary, the adherents of Pelagius, for the most part, denied this doctrine, and were creationists. Vide s. 57, II.

(3) This severe doctrine of Augustine was controverted by Pelagius, and many others who followed him. But Pelagius, in his turn, went too far on the other side, and maintained various principles which obviously are unscriptural. Here were, therefore, two extremes, between which *scriptural truth* lay in the midst, having both reason and experience on its side. In the system of Augustine, on the one hand, there is much opposed to *reason* and *scripture*; and in that of Pelagius, on the other hand, there is much opposed to *scripture* and *experience*. Pelagius not only denied the imputation of Adam's sin, but also the *physical* propagation of human depravity. He taught that the moral nature of man is unaltered, and that man is now entirely in the same state in which Adam was created. Weakness, imperfection, and death, were, in his view, essential to man from the first, and he is punished only for sinful actions. The propagation of human depravity is not physically and by birth, but morally only, from the imitation of bad examples. The declaration that *in Adam all have sinned*, does not relate, according to his scheme, to any *peccatum nascendi origine contractum*; but to that acquired *propter imitationem exempli*. Vide in *Libro de Natura*, ap. August. ad Rom. v. And Julian said, (ap. August. contra Jul. ii. 54,) *peccatum primum MORIBUS, non SEMINIBUS ad posterios fuisse devectum*. Adam set a bad example before his children, and they again before theirs, and so on. In this sense only did Pelagius allow of a propagation of sin from Adam. Vide s. 78, II. 2. The views of Pelagius are very clearly exhibited in the work *De libero arbitrio* (ap. August. de pecc. orig. c. 13): *Omne bonum aut malum, quo vel laudibiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum nascitur, sed agitur a nobis; capaces utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine VIRTUTE, sic SINE VITIO procreamur*.

These views were totally diverse from those of Augustine and other African teachers, and in

many points also from the plain doctrine of the Bible. This deviation from the scriptures Augustine perceived and opposed. Through the resistance of Pelagius he became more zealous and heated, and in his polemical zeal advanced continually greater lengths in his positions.* The theory of Augustine, or the African theory, was, however, by no means universal in the fourth century. In the East, and in Palestine especially, Pelagius was received into favour and protection with many who had agreed in many points with Origen, and who therefore saw little reprehensible in Pelagius. Much, indeed, in his theory differed from that then prevailing through the Eastern church. But from the indifference of so many Grecian bishops on this subject, it is obvious that nothing can have been at that time ecclesiastically determined respecting it, and that the importance of the question by no means appeared to them at first. And even in the Western church out of Africa, there were many who looked upon the Pelagian theory not unfavourably, and on this account it was at first acquitted of the charges brought against it even by Zosimus, the Roman bishop. Through the efforts of the Africans, however, and their connexion with the Anti-Origenistic party, it was finally brought about that the doctrines of Pelagius were formerly condemned as heretical at the church councils, and that the theory of Augustine, after the year 418, became predominant, at least in the Occidental church.

Various attempts were made to unite the two parties, and many took a middle course between them, from whence originated, at a later period, the so-called Semi-Pelagian party. Scotus, and his followers among the schoolmen, very much extenuated the natural depravity of man; in which they have been followed by many of the theologians of the Romish church—e. g., the

Jesuits, who have been on this account often accused of Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism. Among the followers of Augustine, many adhered to his opinion, that even mere original sin, in itself considered, is punished with eternal death, even in the case of children who die before baptism, though they themselves have never done any evil—e. g., Gregor. M. l. ix. Moral, c. 16. Others, to whom this doctrine seemed too severe, held only, that in consequence of original sin man is excluded from the *full joys* of the blessed in heaven, but not merely on that account cast into the pains of hell; in short, that he is placed in a middle state, in which he is neither damned nor yet perfectly happy. So Damasus: *Pœna originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei*. The same representation respecting children who die before baptism is found also among some Greek writers—e. g., in Gregory of Nazianzen, who says respecting them, (Orat. 40,) μήτε δοξασθῆναι, μήτε κολλασθῆσθαι, κ. τ. λ.

(4) *Some additional historical illustrations of the Augustinian and African theory respecting natural depravity and respecting the term, PECCATUM ORIGINIS sive ORIGINALE.*

The depravity of human nature being, according to the Bible, propagated from Adam, and communicated in the way of ordinary generation to children, it was very natural to denominate it *original*; and since, moreover, it is common to all men, and, though not essential to human nature, yet *properly belonging to it* in its present state, it is called *natural*, especially as the term φύσει is used in Ephes. ii. 3. Vide s. 78, I. 2. Both of these terms are found in the same passage in Tertullian, (De Anima, c. 41,) where he calls depravity *malum animæ ex originis vitio* and *naturale quodammodo*. Upon this passage it is important to observe, that he does not use the term *peccatum*, but *malum* and *vitium*; and again, that this is the first passage in the Latin Fathers in which the term *naturale* is applied to this subject. But because the Latin word *naturale* is ambiguous, and might be understood in the sense of *essentiale*, (a sense in which Tertullian would not use it, and in which even Cyril of Alexandria rejected the expression φυσικὸν κακόν, vide No. I.,) Tertullian adds *quodammodo*. The term *naturale*, as used by him, properly means nothing more than *proprium, adhærens, non aliunde contractum*. Vide s. 78, I. 2. Ambrosius, too, says, (Apol. David, c. 11,) *Antequam nascimur, maculamur contagio, et ante usuram lucis originis ipsius excipimus injuriam*. Thus none of these fathers use the term *peccatum*, or pretend that natural depravity in the *abstract*, or in itself, is imputed to man as sin, or punished. Augustine is the very first who uses the term *PECCATUM ORIGINALE, quia originaliter traditur*, as indeed he himself

* [This remark respecting the theory of Augustine, though often made, may be shewn demonstrably to be incorrect. Augustine had developed his full system concerning the inability of man and the doctrine of predestination resulting from it, as early as the year 397, in a work directed to Simplician, bishop at Mailand, some time before Pelagius appeared at Rome, and at least ten years before his doctrines had excited attention and controversy. Neander says,—“Opposition to Pelagianism could have had no influence upon Augustine in forming his system. It may rather be said, with more truth, that Pelagius was excited and induced to develop his own views, by opposition to the principles of Augustine respecting the natural depravity of man, and grace and predestination not conditioned by the free will,” b. ii. Abth. iii. s. 1215. We ought not readily to attribute the opinions of such minds as Augustine’s to external causes. Their own internal impulse, and their effort after perfect consistency, often carry them to extremes, to which others could be driven only by the pressure of controversy. Cf. the Note to the History of Decrees, vol. i. s. 32, p. 252, *Fourthly*.—Tr.]

says in "Opus imperf. contra Julianum," ii. After this time, this term, which perhaps may have been used by some Africans before Augustine, was repeated by some Latin teachers—e. g., by Hieronymus, on Psalm l., and was finally authorized by councils, and adopted into the terminology of the Western church. It was first publicly employed in the Acts (c. 2) of the Milevitan council, in the year 416; and those who deny the doctrine *de peccato originali*, and its punishment, which is removed by baptism, were there denounced with an *anathema*.

But how came it to pass that the word *peccatum* should be employed to designate natural depravity, since this depravity, *in abstracto*, and by itself, is to be regarded as a *disease* or a sickly moral disorder of man, and not as *action*; and since man had no guilty agency in bringing it upon himself? It came in this way: in Rom. vii. 9, and elsewhere, Paul uses the term *ἀμαρτία* in reference to the bias to sin found in all men, or the disposition to do what is forbidden by the divine law; and this is perfectly conformed to the *usus loquendi*. For the Greek *ἀμαρτία* is employed not only with regard to sinful *actions*, but any *fault* or *defective state* or *nature* of a thing; like the Latin *peccatum* and *peccare*. Vide s. 73, II. In this sense, then, they might justly say *peccatum originis*, instead of *vitium*, meaning simply *defect*, *fault*, *evil*. Tertullian, however, did not use the word *peccatum*, probably on account of this ambiguity. But when Augustine found the term *peccatum* used in the Latin Bible in reference to this natural bias to sin, he supposed that he might, and indeed ought, to employ the same. But not distinguishing sufficiently between the different meanings of this word, he contended, that all that must be true respecting this state, in itself considered, which is true respecting sinful actions, on the ground that the same word is used respecting both in the Bible. He then argued in this way; "All sin is punished, or it brings men into a state of condemnation before God, and consequently this natural depravity itself because it is included under *ἀμαρτία*, and is called *peccatum*." Thus arose the scheme of Augustine described in No. 2, although in this he was not throughout consistent with himself. Instead of employing this phraseology, it would have been better for him to have said, The tendency to sin is indeed an evil, a moral disorder—i. e., a wrong and defective constitution of our nature in a moral respect, from which particular actual sins result; it cannot, therefore, be otherwise than displeasing to a perfectly holy God; nor can he, as the scriptures expressly teach, be its author; but neither would God punish men for this, in and of itself. For *punishment* is first inflicted when man suffers himself to be enticed to actual sin, or transgression of the

law; and because none remain unperverted, so all are sinners, and condemned in the sight of God, although the degree of their guilt, and consequently the degree of their punishment, may be different.

After the time of Augustine, various attempts were made to obviate the innumerable mistakes which attended this doctrine *de peccato originali*; and among others, a distinction was made between *peccatum originale* and *peccata actualia*—a distinction which is first found in Joh. Cassianus in the fifth century. Vide Coll. P. P. Sceticor. xiii. 7. There were always, however, among the catholics, even those of ancient times, not a few who disapproved of the application of the term *peccatum* to the corrupt, moral condition of man, and wished it to be abolished. And it happened to many, merely because they rejected this word, to be counted among the Pelagians or Semi-Pelagians. Many of the schoolmen, too, preferred not to use this term; though it is true, indeed, that among them there were many actually inclined to Pelagianism. Vide No. 3. The schoolmen rather chose to use the term employed by Tertullian—viz., *vitium originale* or *naturale*; or *viciositas*, or *depravatio congenita*, or *naturalis*.

As to the German word in use on this subject, *Erb-sünde*, (hereditary sin,) it is still more inconvenient than the Latin *peccatum originale*; for the latter admits, according to common usage, of a correct interpretation, and so, if it is properly explained, may be still retained. But the German word *Sünde* (sin) is elsewhere always used to denote an *action*, so far as it is contrary to the divine law; but never a *state*. Instead of this word, it would be better to use the word *Erb-fehler*, (hereditary defect,) or still better, *Erb-übel*, (hereditary evil,) or more definitely, *das sittliche Erb-übel*, (the moral hereditary evil.) Many of our protestant theologians have therefore for a long time preferred to use the term *natural depravity*. Vide s. 87, I. 2, 3. Dr. Teller proposed to use the word *Temperaments-sünde*, (sin of the constitution or temperament;) this, however, is inappropriate, since it bears another sense—viz., some kind of *prevailing* sin, to which a man is especially inclined from his peculiar organization, or his individual *nature*. Cf. s. 75.

Note.—The term *peccatum originale*, as used in the symbolic books of the Lutheran church, comprises the following things:—(1) The deficiency in true holiness and piety which is found in all men without exception, accompanied with a deficiency in powers for attaining holiness by their own exertions. This is just and scriptural; for in order to be *morally good and pious*, it is necessary for us to *become* so; we are not born with this character; we do not possess in ourselves the powers requisite to this end, and

are dependent on divine assistance. (2) The inordinate passions and appetites which are found in all men; the bias within us to do what is forbidden, and to leave undone what is required; of the truth of which every one's own experience may convince him, and which is constantly insisted upon in the scriptures. Thus, by *peccatum originale*, the symbolic books understand a STATE of man which, morally considered, is not, from the earliest period, what it should be, or what it originally was; and this is certainly just and true, both according to scripture and experience.

These two things taken together are what the theologians of the Lutheran and reformed churches mean when they say, *man is born with sin*, or *in sin*—an expression which is taken from Ps. li. 7. And although this expression is liable to be misunderstood, and indeed in that passage is used in a different sense, yet the thing which they intend by the use of it is true and conformed to the Bible. Vide Morus, p. 117, 118.

It is a common, but very unworthy art of many of the opponents of the doctrine of natural depravity, to make the German word denoting this doctrine, *Erb-sünde*, (*hereditary sin*), which is acknowledged on all hands to be inconvenient, the object of ridicule, as if the doctrine of the protestant church agreed with the untenable positions in Augustine's theory. While they confute this theory only, they assume the air of having overthrown the doctrine of native depravity itself. The scriptural texts which stand in their way are brought into agreement with the most different modern philosophical schools, by the aid of that artificial exegesis which makes anything from everything; so that the scriptures must say just that, and that only, which the authors of these philosophical systems require. Vide Teller's Wörterbuch, art. *Sünde*, and other attempts of the theologians of the Kantian school.

SECTION LXXX.

RESULTS OF THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION RESPECTING THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL DEPRAVITY, AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE MODE OF TEACHING THIS DOCTRINE.

I. Results of the foregoing Discussion.

(1) THE doctrine of the holy scriptures, that the native depravity which discloses itself in the preponderance of sense over reason is to be found in all men without exception, is confirmed by the undeniable experience of all men of all times; and every individual may be convinced of its truth by his own daily experience, and by observation of those around him. Any one who is in the habit of self-inspection will be compelled

led to acknowledge that the confession of Paul, Rom. vii. 18, seq., "To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I find not," is drawn, as it were, from his own soul. Even the heathen nations, and those of their chief philosophers, who did not employ themselves with empty speculations, but who built their views upon the observation of man and of themselves, recognised the existence of this evil. Vide s. 74.

(2) But although philosophy must recognise the actual existence of this evil, it can give no satisfactory answer with regard to the origin of it. Vide Kant, Vom radikalen Bösen. All the philosophemes upon this subject, from Aristotle down to Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, are full of gaps; and in surveying them we meet with one unanswerable question after another. Vide s. 74. Cf. Michaelis, Moral, th. i. s. 127, seq. But there appears in almost all nations a pressing necessity to believe that God made the human race in a more perfect state than that in which it now exists. But they were still unable to solve the riddle. Now this riddle is solved in the holy scriptures more satisfactorily than by all the philosophers. Vide s. 56, ad fin. s. 74, 75, &c. And any one who understands the scriptural account of the fall of man as a mere fable, or as anything beside a narrative of what actually took place, and who is incautious enough to teach these views to the common people and the young, takes away that for which he can give nothing in return; although he may not design it, he lowers the authority of the Bible in the view of his hearers, and does an injury which he will not be able easily to repair.

There were two theories which were more prominent among the Christian teachers of former times, and which even now have their advocates—viz., the *African*, or *Augustinian*, and the *Pelagian*. Vide s. 79. The latter, which nearly accords with the views of the stoics, plainly disagrees with the doctrine of the Bible, and, moreover, has experience against it. Vide s. 79, No. 3. But since it wears, on the first view, a more rational aspect, and since especially it is more agreeable to the wishes of men, who had rather view themselves in a favourable than an unfavourable light, it is not to be wondered at that, in spite of experience, it should have obtained, and still possess, considerable currency. But in Augustine's theory there are also incorrect and untenable positions, and he deduces many false conclusions from texts of scripture wrongly understood. These misinterpretations were in part occasioned, and in part promoted, by the Latin established version, which Augustine followed, and to which he and his fellow teachers were accustomed from their youth. Besides, Augustine's views on the subject of interpretation were deficient. The middle course between

these extremes is accordant with the Bible, with experience, and the system of the protestant church. Vide s. 77, 78.

The objection, *that the scriptural doctrine of native depravity is irreconcilable with the justice and goodness of God*, does not lie so much against the scriptural doctrine itself as against certain false and unscriptural notions which are sometimes connected with it—e. g., against the Augustinian theory. Let the following things be considered—viz.,

(a) It is incorrect to assert, as some do, that if Adam himself had maintained his original innocence, no one of his posterity either would or *could* have sinned. This is nowhere taught in the Bible. The possibility of erring and sinning would have continued, both with Adam himself and with his posterity, even if he had not at that time fallen. And had it been *impossible* for the posterity of Adam, supposing him to have persevered in holiness, to be otherwise than holy, their goodness would have had no value, and would not be entitled to reward. Man would have been a machine, having no power to move except in one pre-established and appointed way. It does not, therefore, follow that there would have been no error and no sin, and consequently no punishment of sin, among men, if our progenitor had not fallen. It is indeed true, that both particular individuals, and the race of man at large, would have been by degrees more and more *confirmed* in goodness, if the state of innocence (or the state of the even balance of the human powers) had continued, as is actually the case with good angels; but this confirmation cannot be understood in reference to men more than to angels as removing the *possibility of sinning*.

(b) When now God foresaw that sin could not be hindered among men, since they are beings endowed indeed with a moral nature, but at the same time possessing appetites and passions limiting the exercise of reason, he provided that the guilt and ill-desert of sin should be diminished in Adam's posterity by allowing Adam to fall, and so a general weakness and depravity to pervade the whole race. A stronger and more incorrupt race would, if it sinned, sin far more deeply and unpardonably than a weaker. Hence we see that the sin of the *fallen angels* is always described in the Bible as far more deserving of punishment and more unpardonable than the sin of the first parents of our race; and their whole moral apostasy is described as far greater than that of man. Those among Adam's weaker posterity who resist the inducements to sin, and are diligent in the pursuit of holiness, do, as it were, overcome themselves; and their virtue can therefore have so much more *internal* worth, and be so much the more deserving of reward. Those, on the other hand, who yield to

these temptations, and sin, although they are by no means free from the desert of punishment, (since God has made known the means by which sin may be guarded against,) may yet, on account of their weakness and inability, hope for pity, forbearance, and a mitigation of punishment. Vide on this subject, Michaelis, *Von der Sünde*, s. 563. Perhaps God designed by permitting the fall to promote many other and unknown ends. Perhaps the example of the fall of man may be instructive to the higher orders of spiritual beings, who are always described in the Bible as standing in intimate connexion with man and having knowledge respecting him.

(c) Death was to Adam the proper *punishment* of his sin; to his posterity it is not, properly speaking, *punishment*, but the inevitable consequence of the sin of Adam. For no mortal can beget an immortal. Vide s. 78, III. Since now death frees us from this *mortal body*, the principal seat of our sinful depravity, and since the Christian doctrine gives us the comforting assurance that in the future life we shall possess a more perfect body, (1 Cor. xv. &c.,) death can no longer be regarded as a punishment, but must rather be considered as a blessing, by all those who fall in with the order appointed by God, and fulfil the conditions on which he has promised happiness after this life. Now it is a doctrine which we are everywhere expressly taught in the New Testament, that we are indebted for this good, for this blessed immortality, to Jesus Christ; and the observation of Paul is therefore well founded, that through the institutes which God has established for the recovery of the human race through Christ, through the divine plan of mercy, we have gained far more than we lost through the sin of Adam and its consequences; Rom. v. 15, seq.

Note.—The disposition to transgress the moral law, from which no man is free, cannot be derived from any deficiency of reason, from error, or want of knowledge. There may be from hence a possibility of sinning either from ignorance or design, but a mere *possibility* of sinning, and an inclination to sin, are very different things. And we feel this disposition even where there is no error or defect of knowledge, yea, even in those cases in which we see most clearly that obedience to the moral law will conduce to our best advantage, and that by disobedience we shall render ourselves miserable. Nor can it be a mere fault of education. For then there would be, among all the multiplied and often opposite modes of education, some *one* which would furnish us with men who would be free from this disposition. Nor is it, as has been before observed, the effect merely of the *bad examples* which we witness in others. This depravity is not exhibited in all men in the same

way. One man is either little, or not at all inclined to those things for which another has a great propensity. All, however, are inclined to perform many actions which they themselves acknowledge to be sinful and injurious. There is in men a general *anomaly*, or a general disposition to transgress the moral law, which does not determine to any one particular vice, but which is differently modified in different persons. Since this disposition seeks out so many and so different deviations, it has a different aspect in different individuals; but in all alike, it appears as a strong disinclination to certain duties, and a vehement propensity to certain actions which are morally bad. What is common to this depravity, as it appears in all men, is the preponderance of that which is represented to us as good or evil by our lower appetites, over that which we perceive in the use of reason to be good. From this depravity no age is free, nor can it in this life be ever wholly eradicated. The faults of youth, such as levity and prodigality, do, indeed, often disappear in later periods of life, but their place is supplied by others, such as ambition and jealousy; and many of the excellences which belong to the period of youth—e. g., innocence, openness, and vivacity, often gradually decay in the years of manhood; and although a more advanced age seems to have the advantage in point of experience and exercise, yet still it cannot be affirmed as a general fact, that this higher age is on the whole morally better than youth. It is therefore a well-known proverb, founded in experience, to say respecting old men who only seem externally to have reformed, that *they have not forsaken sin, but sin has forsaken them*.

II. On Teaching this Doctrine.

The questions relating to this subject are, *Whether the doctrine of man's native depravity ought to be exhibited in popular instruction? and if so, in what way?* On this general subject, cf. Knapp's Essay in Ewald's *Christlicher Monatsschrift*; Jahrg. 2, 1802; bd. 2, st. 1, s. 3, f.

(1) The doctrine of native depravity, as we are taught it both by scripture and experience, is very disturbing, depressing, and humbling in its tendency. The light in which man is here taught to regard himself is not at all favourable or pleasant, and is calculated to lead him to tremble for himself. But feelings of this kind, although highly salutary, are yet unpleasant to the natural man (*σαρκικῶς, ψυχικῶς*), and for the very reason that he is of such a character, he is opposed to everything which awakens feelings of this kind; he prefers to keep this subject out of sight, and is unwilling to hear anything respecting it. It is with him as with a sick man, who is unwilling to acknowledge, either to himself or others, that he is sick, partly be-

cause he is ashamed of his sickness, and partly because he is reluctant to adopt the severe remedies necessary to his cure. Thus it is with the carnal man who refuses to undertake the radical cure of the disorders of his soul, because he would feign conceal his sickness from his own view, and dreads to make the bitter sacrifices which his moral recovery and holiness require. He would rather, therefore, persuade himself and others that he is good, or at least that his case is not so bad as might seem. Now if any one does not believe that he is sick, neither does he believe that he is in any need of a remedy or of a physician; or if he thinks he is only slightly sick, he hopes he shall be able to help himself, or to recover without the aid of medicine. And so any one who thinks in the same way with regard to his moral state will infallibly be cold and indifferent in the use of all the means which the Christian doctrine prescribes for the sanctification of the heart; he will even scorn them as idle and superfluous, because he sees no necessity for them; yea, he will even feel aversion and hatred towards them, as a sick man is accustomed to do towards a bitter and disagreeable medicine. It is therefore very intelligible, and may be psychologically explained, why the opinion, that man is not so depraved as is sometimes represented, and the delusion that the Christian means of cure are inappropriate, superfluous, and may be easily dispensed with, should gain currency in an age and among men distinguished above others in egotism, self-sufficiency, and the love of worldly enjoyment.

(2) We may hence explain the fact why the doctrine of human depravity is repugnant to so many in our age, and why it is almost wholly set aside in the instruction of the common people and of the young. The pretext by which the omission of this doctrine is commonly justified is, that it inspires men with aversion to God, that it makes them irresolute and spiritless in the pursuit of virtue, and that it leads to an unworthy depreciation of oneself, and even to despair, which prevents all improvement. These effects, however, can never be feared when this doctrine is taught as it is in the holy scriptures. Who can bring an example to shew that the scriptural doctrine ever produced such an effect? On the contrary, experience shews that this doctrine, rightly exhibited, produces just the opposite effects, and animates man in the pursuit of holiness, and leads him to the highest exertions of all his powers for the attainment of it. Vide s. 77, II., ad finem.

The true ground why so many forbear to preach this doctrine is, that, for the reasons just now suggested, it is displeasing to many of their hearers, whose favour they would gladly conciliate. It is with them as with those respecting

whom John speaks, ch. xii. 43. Others have never clearly considered the reasons why they forbear to preach this doctrine, but follow blindly the example set them by some of the eminent and lauded preachers of the day. For the great majority of men, and even of teachers, never think for themselves, but depend upon authority. Again: there are, alas! many religious teachers who are themselves unrenewed men, who even while at home were sunk deep in moral corruption, who become still more depraved at the schools and universities, and who, when they assume the sacerdotal robe, alter only their outward deportment, without experiencing a radical change of heart. Such are blind leaders of the blind.

(3) The teachers who adopt the principles just mentioned are accustomed to descant largely upon the *worth*, the *nobleness*, and the *dignity* of man, since discourse like this is heard with pleasure, and it is far more agreeable to be praised than blamed. In this strain, therefore, preachers of such a character often indulge, and even in their instruction of the young dwell on nothing but the dignity of man. In this way many of them suppose they shall elevate man, inspire him with a zeal for virtue, and by means of this feeling of honour raise him to nobleness of character. And it is, indeed, right to point man to the noble faculties which he possesses, &c. This is often done in the Bible. This, however, we should do, and not leave the other undone. In the Bible this is always done in connexion with the doctrine of the moral apostasy of man. If this doctrine be not brought into connexion with it, the doctrine of the dignity of man is injurious; it nourishes pride and self-righteousness, and prevents that self-knowledge which is so essential, and thus leads aside from the way of true reformation, such as God will accept. It leads men to think that they are perfect, and have no need of reformation; that they are in no danger, and at most need only to be ennobled and perfected, and not to be radically renewed. What must be the effect of a doctrine like this in an age in which self-confidence and selfish blindness are the prevailing fault, and have so deeply imbued the minds even of children and youth, that at the age when they are just beginning to learn, they think themselves wiser than their teachers, and from the height to which they suppose themselves to have attained, seem to look down with compassion upon the aged.

(4) From these observations it follows, that it is the duty of a Christian teacher to exhibit the doctrine of moral depravity without regard to the fear or the favour of man, after the example which the inspired teachers have set him—the ancient prophets, Jesus, and the apostles. The *times* have changed nothing belonging to

this doctrine, nor can they. Human nature is the same now that it has been in every preceding age; and the inculcation of this doctrine is not less important in an enlightened than in an unenlightened period. It is by this doctrine alone that the necessity of an entire moral renovation of the human heart can be placed in a strong light; here man learns to understand himself aright, and to think humbly with regard to himself; here he learns to see clearly the difficulties and mighty hindrances which lie in the way of conversion, and attains to the conviction that he needs help, and that without divine assistance he can do nothing. Truly and beautifully has Seneca said, *Initium est salutis, notitia peccati. Nam qui peccare se nescit, corrigi non vult. Deprehendas te oportet antequam emendes*, Ep. 28. This is the great principle upon which the inspired teachers proceeded in all their instructions. Christ, for example, took this course in his conversation with Nicodemus, however strange the doctrine might have appeared to the latter. And there is no better way, none which is more capable of vindication on psychological grounds.

(5) But in order that the teaching of this doctrine may attain its end, it is not enough to set forth the mere dogma, and to prove it connectedly from the holy scriptures, and then to speak of it in the *abstract*; for in that case the wholesome and necessary *application* is easily neglected by the hearer. On the contrary, it ought rather to be spoken of in the concrete; at least, the abstract statement should always be applied to particular concrete cases, and especially to *ourselves*. This is the wise mode of teaching exhibited in the Bible. Vide s. 77, III. 2. In the popular exhibition of this doctrine, therefore, the teacher should begin with making his hearer observant of himself, and endeavour to convince him of his own depravity, or of the preponderance of appetite over reason in himself, as learned from his own experience. This is the easiest way to bring the contemner of this doctrine to silence. For example, let the teacher in his instructions go over all the points which Paul has cited Rom. vii. 7—23, as proof of the moral corruption of man, without at first remarking that this is taught in the Bible. The hearer must confess that he finds it in himself exactly as described—that he is not what he ought to be, and what his own moral feeling teaches him that he must be, in order to please God. When he is brought to this conviction, then let him be shewn that the doctrine of scripture corresponds with his own experience. In this way he will acquire regard for the Bible, as he will see that it gives no ideal description of man, but represents him as he actually is. Then he will be constrained to acknowledge: "Yes! I too am actually so; it is as if I myself were

here described." Has any one come to this point, there is hope that he may be inclined to employ the means of recovery prescribed in the scriptures, and especially in the Christian doctrine; particularly if he is shewn how and wherefore they have so beneficial an effect; and if it is made to consider, that our own good intentions and all the means by which we attempt to help ourselves are inefficacious. In this way is the feeling of the need of help and of a Redeemer to be excited in man; and thus does the knowledge of our moral depravity and inability lead to Christ, as to him through whom alone it can be removed. But all this instruction will be in danger of failing of its effect, unless the hearer perceives that the teacher himself has a personal interest in the matter, that he speaks from his own internal conviction, and that he has experienced on his own heart the efficacy of the means prescribed, and shews their effect in his life and walk.

(6) None of the profound and learned investigations of philosophers and theologians, respecting the nature of human depravity, the mode of its propagation, &c., should have any place in the practical and popular exhibition of this doctrine. It is enough for the teacher to stop with the simple doctrine of the Bible, and merely teach, (a) that all men have been actually so, ever since our first parents transgressed the divine command; and (b) that, according to the Bible, the ground why all their posterity are such lies in our first parents; but that (c) we owe the improvement of our condition, and the restoration of our lost holiness and happiness to Jesus Christ, since he redeems or frees us from sin and its evil consequences, and turns this evil to our good; Rom. vii. 25. For more on this point, vide the article on Christ.

SECTION LXXXI.

EXPLANATION OF THE IDEA WHICH IS COMMONLY CONNECTED IN THEOLOGY WITH THE EXPRESSION "ACTUAL SINS;" AND OF THE DIFFERENT DEGREES OF SIN.

We have thus far treated of the moral corruption of human nature, and its causes; we have also given a history of this doctrine; s. 74—80. We now proceed to consider *particular sinful actions*, whose source is found in this same moral depravity. Vide s. 73, ad finem. We shall treat this subject under the two following divisions—viz., (1) The nature of particular sinful actions, and their different kinds and divisions, s. 81—84; (2) The different *state* which arises in man on the commission of sin, s. 85—87.

I. Additional Explanation of the idea of Sin.

We have before shewn, under s. 73, I., what is meant by the terms *sin* and *law*; and this will

be presupposed in the remarks which follow. Since now we must regard this natural depravity as a *sinful state*, and since we must regard particular sinful actions as the *consequence* and *result* of this state, theologians, since the time of Cassianus, have adopted the division of sin into *peccatum originale* and *peccatum actuale*. Vide s. 79, No. 4, ad finem, and Morus, p. 118, supra. Morus has, indeed, omitted the special consideration of the doctrine *de peccato actuali* in his *Dogmatik*, and assigned the discussion of it wholly to the department of *Morals*. But the general theory of actual sins belongs to the province of *Dogmatical* theology, and is commonly introduced by theologians into this department.

Actual sins are, moreover, commonly denominated *peccata sensu strictiori*. By *actions*, however, theologians do not mean, in treating of this subject, those merely which are *external*—i. e., which are committed by means of the *body* and its *organs*; but also those which are *internal*—i. e., those which take place merely in the soul, and are performed in thoughts, desires, &c. Hence it has been common to subdivide *actual sins* into *external* and *internal*, of which we shall say more hereafter. *Actualis* is a term which belongs to the later Latin, and was first used by Macrobius; it answers to the older term *actus*, *active*, *consisting in action*; or to *activus*, which is sometimes employed in the same sense. Hence Cicero says, *vita actuosa*, *virtus actuosa*, Nat. Deor. i. 40; instead of which Macrobius writes, *virtutes actuales*. Seneca has, *activa philosophia*, Ep. 95, and Quintilian opposes *activum* (the practical) to *speculativum*, (the theoretical.) But sinful actions are denominated *peccata actualia* in opposition to native depravity, because they involve an *actus transitorius*, such as exists in all human actions; they have a beginning and an end. But *original sin* has in this life no end, but continues as long as man remains upon the earth. It is not an *act*, but a *state*. The application of the term *sin* to this state is indeed inconvenient, because, according to the definition given of sin, native depravity cannot be literally so called; a more appropriate name would be, *hereditary evil*. But since the former term is now common among theologians, and the thing denoted by it is accordant both with reason and scripture, it must be understood, and its ground must be known.

In explanation of the subjective definition of sin given s. 73, I.—viz., *a free action which is not conformed to the law of God, or which deviates from this law*, let the following additional remarks be considered. When we would judge respecting any action, internal or external, whether it is sinful or not, our decision must depend upon the three following conditions—viz.,

(1) That the man who commits the action had sufficient knowledge of the law, (*notitia*

legis.) And this presupposes (a) that the law was actually given to man; (b) that it was *known* by this individual, or at least, that it *should* have been known by him, and that so it is his own fault if he remained unacquainted with it; and (c) that he understood the sense of the law, or might have understood it. Is any one of these conditions wanting, the act contravening the law is, indeed, an *evil*, (foolish, hurtful in its tendency, &c.) but not *sin*. Vide s. 73, I. Cf. Rom. iv. 15; v. 13, *ἁμαρτία οὐκ ἔλλογεταί μὴ ὄντος νόμου*.

(2) That the action does not, in fact, agree with the law. The determination of this matter has often in particular cases more difficulty than one would think. The over-anxious and scrupulous man often regards certain actions, both internal and external, as sinful, while they are not forbidden in the divine law; and in this way he needlessly disquiets himself. Another man mistakes on this subject through indifference and carelessness. But a far more common fault is, to allow self-love to pronounce too light and partial a sentence upon our own actions, while, on the other hand, we judge the actions of others too severely. Vide Matt. vii. 3—5. Nor is the obligation of the law the same for all. Some laws are not universally obligatory, but binding only on certain individuals, and in particular cases. The same action may be sin in one man, and not in another. One does it with a conviction that it is not wrong, and so sins not; the other is doubtful, or convinced in his heart that it is wrong, and yet does it, and sins. This may be applied to the so-called *ἀδιάφορα*, *indifferent things*, fastings, amusements, card-playing, dancing, &c. Vide 1 Cor. viii. and ix., and Rom. xiv. 23. The further discussion of the subject of sin *ex conscientia errante sive erronea* belongs to the department of theological *Morals*.

(3) That in the commission of the action, man had the use of his *free-will*, (*τὸ αὐτεξουσίον*, or *ἐλευθέρα προαίρεσις*.) An action which we have been compelled to do against our will, or which we have done without consciousness, cannot be regarded as our own action. This is true not only of evil, but of good actions. In order, now, that the action of a man may be free and so imputable, he must in doing it (a) be in a state in which he can exercise his understanding, and determine his will according to that which his understanding approves; for this is essential to freedom. Therefore no infant, no idiot, no insane person, no sleeper or dreamer, can commit sin, because he has not the use of his understanding. The shameful words and deeds, the blasphemy, &c., which we often see and hear in delirious persons, are not *sins*, because they are not free actions; and if they are afterwards disposed to trouble themselves on account of what they may have said or done in

such a state, they ought to be set at rest. In order that a man's action may be free, (b) his power to act must not be hindered by external circumstances. If, therefore, in any case a man is compelled by some external necessity to act wholly against his will, or if he is barely restrained in acting, so that he cannot proceed wholly according to his own will and intent, then his action is not free, or at least not perfectly free, and so is not imputable, or is not wholly so. Everything depends here upon the *intention*. A man designs to do an evil deed, but is prevented from accomplishing his purpose by external circumstances, and so does not sin indeed externally, but he does in his heart, and in the judgment of God and of his own conscience is deserving of punishment. The case is the same as to the imputation of a good act, the execution of which has been prevented by external circumstances. Vide Matt. v. 28, coll. s. 82.

II. *The different degrees of Sin.*

In common life sins are distinguished into *gross* and *great* sins, and *light* and *trifling* sins, and the latter are judged deserving of less punishment than the former. This difference is founded in the nature of the thing itself. For whoever sins, acts against the obligation which rests upon him to fulfil certain duties; but this obligation has different degrees, according to the difference of the powers of the acting subject, and of his motives to action. Hence it follows that one commits greater sins who has more power and stronger motives for doing right than one with whom these powers and motives were weaker. Again: the less the motives and inducements to sin, and the more the reasons which were calculated to deter from the commission of it, so much the worse is the sin, and so much the more deserving of punishment. The motives tending to withhold from sin are to be judged of from the peculiar situation, the circumstances, the mode of thinking, and the knowledge of each individual; also, according to the nature of the person or thing with respect to which the sin is committed, (e. g., sins against *parents*, to whom we are under greater obligations than to others;) and also according to the consequences which flow from the sin. The consideration of this matter, however, properly falls into the department of theological morals.

In entire conformity with these principles does the holy scripture decide respecting the different degrees of sin, and their desert of punishment. Vide Matt. v. 22; John. xix. 11, *μείζων ἁμαρτία*; Luke, xii. 47, 48; Matthew, xi. 22—24; 1 Tim. i. 15; 2 Peter, ii. 20, 21. But since this difference of degree in sin depends upon so many things, which are not

always obvious, and cannot be duly estimated by others; upon the dispositions and intentions concealed in the heart of him who acts; upon his knowledge, his temptations, his powers and capacities; it is often impossible for us in particular cases to form a correct judgment. God only, who knows the heart of man, and the circumstances in which he acts, can judge truly and decisively respecting his actions. To him, therefore, should this decision be left. Vide Rom. xiv. 4, *ὁ κύριος ἐστὶν ὁ κρίνων ἀλλότριοις οὐκ ἐστὶν*; James, iv. 12; Matt. vii. 1, seq. On this account, it is our wisdom, as well as our duty, although contrary to the common disposition of men, to judge ourselves with all possible strictness, but the faults of others with forbearance and toleration. This, too, is according to the direction of Christ, Matt. vii. 1—5, coll. Luke, xiii. 2—5. Baumgarten has discussed this subject minutely in his “Diss. de gradibus peccatorum;” Halæ, 1744.

Note 1.—The philosophers both of ancient and modern times have been almost entirely agreed that there is a difference of degree in sins; with the exception only of the stoics, who maintained the paradoxical opinion, *that all sins are alike*. Vide Cicero, Parad. iii.; Seneca, Ep. 66; Cicero, De finibus honor. et malor. iv. 27, seq. They assumed that all virtues were equal; and hence it followed, by way of contrast, that all vices were equal; and hence, that all the virtuous and all the vicious were, in their view, on the same level—e. g., one who killed a slave without a cause committed, in their view, an equal sin with one who abused his father. In this doctrine they were opposed chiefly by the peripatetics. But although they maintained this equality of virtues and of vices, they yet ascribed to them a different extent and limitation, so that some were capable of palliation, others unpardonable; because some deviated more than others from the law; and so with regard to the virtues, which were judged of by them according to their different utility. Hence we see that in substance they agreed with others, and only differed from them by this striking proposition, which they selected on account of its strangeness. All which they mean to affirm is, that one transgression is as much a transgression as another; and all, in respect to their internal nature, are alike, because they are all violations of the rule, and so are opposite to the virtues. And the same is taught by the text, James, ii. 10, 11. But this *internal nature* of virtues and vices cannot be made the standard by which their greatness is determined, but the consequences which result from them, the purpose and intention of the soul from which they flow, and sometimes even the mere “so it seems good” of the lawgiver. Vide Tiedemann, System der Stoischen Philosophie, th. iii. s. 151—156.

Note 2.—Some theologians have maintained that sin, or rather the guilt of sin, is *infinite* in the philosophical sense, (*culpam sive reatum peccatorum esse infinitum*.) They resort to this statement in order to explain more easily the infiniteness of the satisfaction made by Christ, and also the eternity of the punishments of hell. Whoever, they say, breaks the laws of the Infinite Being, brings upon himself infinite guilt. But this statement, taken in the strict philosophic sense, is incorrect. For (a) it would follow from this that there was no difference of objects; for the infinite is always like to itself, and cannot be increased or diminished. (b) An action which is directed against a particular object, does not, of necessity, partake of the nature of this object. Whether the object is finite or infinite is a matter of indifference with regard to the nature of the action, and makes no alteration in its character. A finite action cannot become infinite, or involve infinite guilt, merely because it relates to an infinite object. If it could, then every good action agreeing with the divine law must be infinite, and have an infinite worthiness; and so the knowledge which man has of God must be infinite because it relates to an infinite being. (c) This whole opinion rests upon a comparison of divine and human things carried too far, so as to give rise, as in innumerable other cases, to mistake. We look upon the crimes committed against rulers and magistrates as greater than those committed against others, and we punish them more severely; and this with justice. But the reason of this lies not so much in the personal character or worth of the injured object, as in care for the public welfare or security, which is more endangered by any indignity done to the magistracy than to a private person. Hence this crime, in order to deter others from committing it, must be punished more severely than others. But this principle cannot be applied in its whole extent to God; although such human representations are often applied to him. For, properly speaking, God cannot be injured by men; they cannot frustrate any of his plans, nor set aside, disturb, or throw effectual hindrances in the way of any of his counsels. Vide Eberhard, Apologie des Sokrates, th. i. s. 374, f.

SECTION LXXXII.

DIVISIONS OF SIN IN RESPECT TO THE LAW, TO THE KNOWLEDGE AND PURPOSE OF HIM WHO COMMITS IT, AND TO THE ACTION ITSELF.

I. In respect to the Law.

As the law contains both *precepts* and *prohibitions*, it follows that actions deviating from it may be of two kinds—viz., (a) actions forbidden by the law, sins of commission, (*peccata*

commissionis;) (b) declining or refusing to perform actions required by the law, sins of omission, (*peccata omissionis*.) The latter kind, as well as the former, are mentioned in the Bible, and declared to be equally sins, James, iv. 17, "To him that knoweth to do good, (i. e., who has power and opportunity to perform it,) and doeth it not, it is sin;" or, every omission of good, to perform which we are obliged by the divine law, is sin. Cf. Luke, xii. 47; Matt. vii. 19. A man, therefore, who guards merely against sins of commission, so that he cannot be charged with any open violation of the divine will, does not deserve the name of an observer of the divine law. To this character he can lay claim only when he has not to condemn himself for omitting the good which the law required him to perform. Thus, not only does he sin who does what is forbidden by God, but he too who omits to do what God requires. It is, however, a common error of men to regard sins of omission less than those of commission, because they are less externally visible. Some theologians, too, have maintained that sins of omission were less heinous and punishable than those of commission. But this, as a general proposition, and applied to all cases, is false. To neglect to use the powers and faculties given us is often as injurious, sometimes more so, than the abuse of them in sins of commission. But because the evil done in sins of commission is often more immediate and obvious than in sins of omission, where the effect is more slow and is often lost in obscurity, we are easily led to regard the latter as less than the former. In the eyes of God, the thief and the murderer may be less vile than the hardhearted rich man, who refuses to relieve his dying neighbour, and suffers him to perish of hunger; although the former is severely punished by men, while the latter remains unpunished, and even may enjoy the highest repute and honour in the view of men. Christ teaches this, Matt. xxv. 41—46, where those who have not fed the hungry and clothed the naked are consigned by the Judge of the world to the place of torment, as well as other offenders. He applies the term *κακοποιεῖν* to the omission of a good action, Mark, iii. 4; Luke, vi. 9.

II. In respect to the Knowledge and the Will of him who sins.

(1) *In respect to knowledge.* In case of an illegal action, one either knows the law or he does not; hence arises the division of sins into those of ignorance and those of knowledge, (*peccata ignorantix*, and *peccata cum scientia recti commissi*.) Sin, or transgression of the divine law, always presupposes a knowledge of this law; for without the knowledge of the law there can be no sin. Vide s. 81, I. The sin of ignorance is not found, therefore, in the case

of one who is wholly ignorant of the divine law, or who has had no opportunity of becoming acquainted with it; in short, when his ignorance is without any fault on his part. Hence Christ says, John, xv. 22, 24, "Had I not told it unto you, (that I was a divine teacher,) ye would not have sinned, (in rejecting me;) and had I not done such great miracles, (by which they are furnished with the means of judging correctly respecting me,) they had not had sin." An ignorance of this kind, which is wholly without criminality, is called by the schoolmen, *ignorantia invincibilis*; and, however various are the explanations which they give of it, they are agreed in saying, that it must be excused, and cannot be imputed. In particular cases, however, it is very difficult to judge respecting others, whether the ignorance of any one is, or is not, without any fault on his part; for what seems to one easy to be known, so that he can hardly conceive how it should appear dark or difficult, is attended in the view of another with insuperable difficulties and hindrances. Hence we ought to be very cautious in judging. God only can determine infallibly whether, and how far, ignorance is attended with criminality. As soon, however, as any one neglects the means within his reach of acquiring knowledge of the law, his ignorance is no longer innocent; he commits actual sin, and is liable to punishment. In order to a *sin of ignorance*, it may therefore be considered as essential that the person should have been able to know the law, and that his own negligence and forbearing to inquire is the only cause of his ignorance.

Nearly related to these are sins committed *through error*, (*per errorem commissi*;) hence they are often classed with sins of ignorance. Sins of error are those which are committed (a) when one erroneously supposes that a law exists, when in fact there is none—e. g., when one supposes it is his duty to persecute heretics and errorists; (b) when one misunderstands the law, or (c) when, through error, he fails in the application of the law to particular cases; or (d) when he judges erroneously respecting the obligation under which he is laid by the law. The only question now is, whether such an error is without fault, or not; whether it was in our power to avoid it. These different kinds of sin are distinguished in the scriptures, and are always there judged of, according to the principles here laid down—e. g., Luke, xxiii. 34, *Father, forgive them*, (there was, therefore, sin in this case; for they had had opportunity to become better instructed; and yet there were many things which diminished their guilt; and so Christ adds,) *for they know not what they do*. Acts, iii. 17, *κατὰ ἀγνοίαν ἐπαύσατε*; and Paul says, respecting himself, 1 Tim. i. 13, God had forgiven him for persecuting Christians, *ὅτι*

ἀνομιὰν ἐποίησα ἐν ἀπιστίᾳ. Sins in general are sometimes called ἀνομιήματα, Heb. ix. 7. Heb. τὰς, Lev. iv. 2, 13, where sins of ignorance of every kind are spoken of at length. The further discussion of this subject belongs to theological morals.

(2) *In respect to the will.* Here, again, it must be presupposed, that without the free determination of the will no sin can exist. Such an act does not depend upon me, and is not to be regarded as mine. Vide s. 81, I. ad finem. In order to estimate correctly the sinfulness of human actions, and their liability of punishment, regard must be had to the motives and inducements which act on the human will, and the relations of men with regard to them, and the situation in which the offender is placed. According to these circumstances must the degree of the sinfulness of actions be judged and estimated. Sins may be divided, in respect to the intention with which they are committed, into the following classes—viz.,

A. INVOLUNTARY SINS, when one transgresses the law of God, without having formed a proper resolution or purpose of so doing, (*si absit consilium peccandi.*) Among these are:—

(a) *Sins of precipitancy*, “*quæ*,” as Cicero says, (Officiis, I. 8.) “*repentina aliquo motu animi accidunt*,” in opposition to deliberate sins, *premeditated and forethought.* Sins of this kind are committed when persons act so precipitately that they do not once think of the law forbidding the action which they perform, or do not duly consider the reasons which lie against it. They ought to be carefully distinguished from sins which are committed through *levity*. In order that a trespass committed by me should be through mere *precipitancy*, I must not have sought the opportunity to sin; the time between the resolution and the action must have been very short, and the feeling which has carried me away must have been very strong. The sin, too, must be followed by deep repentance, and a firm resolve to avoid the same in future. Such sins of precipitancy ought not, however, to be lightly regarded, because they often plunge us into great calamity, and, if often repeated, cease to be sins of precipitancy. Sins of this nature are mentioned in Gal. vi. 1, where Christians are exhorted to be on their guard against them, and to endeavour, in the spirit of meekness, to restore those who have committed them. Vide also Psalm lxxiii. 2, coll. ver. 23, seq.

(b) *Sins of weakness*, (*peccata infirmitatis.*) These, in the strictest sense of the term, can take place only when one knows that what he does is against the law, but yet is not *physically* able to forbear doing it. They are seen in persons who are not sufficiently confirmed in goodness, who have not a settled habit of doing right, and whose passions are very violent.

Sins, however, cannot be said to be committed from mere weakness, unless he who commits them has used on his part a proper watchfulness, and has resisted his evil desires, and found, after all, that it was impossible for him wholly to exclude them from his mind, or to fulfil his duties and his good intentions. This is the case of which Christ speaks, Matt. xxvi. 41, “The spirit is willing (*πρόθυμον*); but the *flesh* (i. e., the body, by which the soul is so much influenced) is *weak* (*ἀσθενής*);” i. e., as weak men, whose spirit dwelt in a disordered body, they were not able to execute the good purposes for which they had a willingness. The general maxim contained in this passage is the following: men are often hindered by sense and passion from the execution of their best purposes, and yield to the inducements to sin. The scriptures, therefore, always presuppose in these sins a certain goodness of heart, and the serious purpose of avoiding sin, and deep repentance on account of it when it has been committed. Men, therefore, who are totally corrupt, and in whom all moral sense is suppressed, cannot commit sins of weakness; though, on the other hand, it is not entirely true, according to the common affirmation of some theologians, that the pious only and the truly regenerate can commit sins of weakness and precipitancy, and that, as some will say, all the sins of the unrenewed are to be regarded as sins of design, (Germ. *Bosheitssünden.*) For, as even the pious man is frequently borne away by the violence of passion to the inconsiderate commission of deeds which are against his own will and purpose; this must certainly be much oftener the case with unrenewed men; and unless they are in a high degree corrupt and vicious, it cannot be affirmed with certainty respecting them, that they always sin from sheer wickedness, and that they never fight against sin and endeavour to resist it. For a man who is addicted to a particular vice, and who often commits one sin, may yet have in him much which is good, and strive with earnestness and zeal against other sins to which he is tempted. Now, little as sin can in any case be approved or exculpated, it is yet true that many very gross outbreaks of sin in particular cases and persons are to be considered as sins of weakness and precipitancy, and that the *Omniscient* Being often passes a different judgment, with regard to the morality of such actions, from that which men commonly form, or are able to form. This is the case, for example, with theft, suicide, homicide, infanticide, and other similar crimes, which, on account of their consequences, need to be severely punished by human courts.

B. VOLUNTARY SINS, *peccata voluntaria*, or *proæretica*, (from προαίρεσις, *propositum*, con-

silium.) These are committed with a determination of breaking the law of God.

(a) When any one knows the law, and, before he sins, distinctly recollects it, or might easily recollect it, and yet proceeds to sin, then his sin is *voluntary*; so also, when he delights himself in the sin which he has committed, approves of it, and wishes for an opportunity to repeat it, notwithstanding he is convinced, or might be, that the act is opposed to the divine law.

(b) A sin does not cease to be *voluntary* and *deliberate*, because he who commits it may have been urged on by the command, the threat, the solicitation, or the contempt, of men. For in this case it is in my power to leave the sin undone; and if I commit it, I form the resolution of breaking the law of God in order to escape an evil threatened me by man. Vide Matt. x. 28. An exception is of course made with regard to proper *physical* compulsion—e. g., if one strikes another with my hand, against my own will, the action in such a case is no more mine.

(c) It is not necessary that every *voluntary* sin should be a gross one; even the smallest violation of the law which takes place with deliberation is a voluntary sin; and it may even be that an action which is not in itself sinful, and which is only regarded as such from an unenlightened conscience may become a *voluntary sin* by being deliberately performed; for the person in such a case forms a resolution to break the law of God—e. g., when one regards card-playing as forbidden, and yet plays. Vide s. 81, I. 2.

(d) The highest degree of voluntary sin is that in which one sins with *willingness*, from mere wickedness, and for the sake of the sin itself, (peccatum frivolum, or ἐκούσιον.) Every such sin is indeed voluntary; but every voluntary sin does not spring from pure malice or evil. Such a sin exists only when one violates the law without being tempted to it by external solicitations or opportunities. There are, therefore, many *voluntary* sins which do not result from this pure evil, and which are not committed with this perfect cordiality; but which may be even reluctantly performed, through fear of persecution, contempt, or some other cause. In such a case, we have the sin of purpose, not of mere evil. Should one in opposition to his own convictions renounce religion at a time of persecution, or when irreligious opinions were prevalent, he would sin voluntarily; but for him to do this without the influence of persecution, of danger, or of any solicitation from without, would be to sin cordially and from entire wickedness. Paul names this sinning ἐκουσίως, Heb. x. 26, where he speaks of just such a denial of the faith, and justly declares it to be one of the most heinous and unpardonable of crimes.

(e) When from the frequent repetition of a sin, a habit is formed, this sin thus made habitual is denominated a *vice*; e. g., the vice of drunkenness, &c. The term vice is used in two senses—viz., sometimes to denote the habit itself of acting against the divine law; sometimes to denote the particular actions which originate in such a habit. Thus when it is said, a man is guilty of a great *vice*, the meaning is, that he has committed a sinful action which with him is habitual. Hence every vicious man is a sinner—i. e., a transgressor of the divine law; but every sinner is not of necessity vicious. Cf. Michaelis, Von der Sünde, s. 337, seq. and Toellner, Theologische Untersuchungen, th. i. b. 2, Num. 7.

Note.—As the sacred writers always proceed on the principle that God, as ruler, has a right to prescribe laws to men, and that men, as his subjects, are always bound to obey; they describe those who knowingly and wilfully transgress his authority, as *enemies*, *rebels*, and *insurgents*, and their crimes, as *rebellion*, *enmity*, &c.; so Psalm viii. 3; Rom. viii. 7; James, iv. 4. On the contrary, the virtuous man is described in the Bible as *obedient* and *submissive* (ὑπακούων), who willingly and cheerfully bows to the authority of God. *Humility* often stands for *piety*, and *pride* for *wickedness*,—intentional and deliberate sins; and the *proud* are those who commit them. Vide Ps. cxix. 21, 51; xxv. 9. Why are the virtuous called *humble* and *obedient*? All virtue should proceed from religious motives, from thankful love, and a spirit of obedience towards God.

(3) In respect to the *actions* themselves, or the *acting subject*, sins are divided into *internal* and *external*. We act either with our souls simply, or with them in connexion with the body, of which the soul makes use as its organ. This division is found in the New Testament, Matt. ix. 4; Rom. iii. 13, seq.; 2 Cor. vii. 1, (μολυσμός σαρκός καὶ πνεύματος.) *Peccata actualia interna*, are those which are committed merely in heart, or in thought. They are also called *actiones* (*pravas*) *animi*, and are comprehended by Paul under the term ἔργα, Gal. v. 19, seq. coll. Rom. i. 28—31. Among these, however, we are not to include those evil desires that rise involuntarily and without guilt in the hearts of men; which are rather the disease of the soul than its guilt. They are committed only when the desires after forbidden things rising in the heart are cherished, entertained, delighted in, and executed; in short, when, as James says, (ch. i. 15,) sin is *conceived* in the heart. Cf. s. 78, IV.

Peccata actualia externa, are those unlawful actions which one commits with the body and its members. They are divided, according to the different manner in which the disposition of

the soul is made known through the body, into *peccata oris* or *linguæ*, (Matt. v. 22; Rom. iii. 14; James, iii. 2,) *gestuum* and *operis*. The external or bodily actions of men are, however, only so far sinful and liable to punishment, as they depend on the soul or the will, Matt. xv. 18—20; otherwise, they cannot be denominated sins. Vide No. II. 2, of this section. Hence Christ calls the heart of man the *treasury* (*θησαυρός*) of good and evil, where good and evil actions lie concealed, and are prepared, before they are externally exhibited; Matthew, xii. 34, 35, coll. Mark, vii. 21. The body is merely the instrument or subject, which obeys the commands of the soul. Hence it is plain that it is false to consider *internal* sins as less heinous and deserving of punishment than external sins, as is commonly done. This mistake results from the fact that internal sins are concealed from the view of men, and cannot therefore be punished by them. We deceive ourselves here also, by conceiving of the relation between men and God as about the same as that which subsists between man and his fellow man, especially like that between subjects and a human ruler, where thoughts are not liable to punishment, so long as they remain mere thoughts, and are unknown to other men. But to God the mere thoughts of men are as much known as their outward actions. Vide 1 Cor. i. 5, and s. 22; and he can therefore bring them into judgment for the one as well as for the other. Hence, in the Bible, the very significant epithet, *καρδιογνώστης* (*חַרְטָן*) is applied to God. It is also obvious that in very many cases internal sins are, in the sight of God, more heinous and ill-deserving than external. For example: one man occupies his fancy with shameless and unchaste images. He commits internal sin, although no other man can reproach him for it, or punish him, because it is done merely in heart. Another man, ordinarily chaste, is borne away by passion at one time actually to commit fornication or adultery, and thus brings upon himself shame or punishment from man, while the other goes free. Both have sinned. But which of the two sins is, in the sight of God, of the darkest character and the most deserving of punishment, the internal or the external? The decision in this case is not difficult; and if we, like the omniscient God, knew the heart, we should all decide in the same manner with regard to offences of this nature. Hence Christ says, Matt. v. 28, whoever looks upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. Cato pronounced justly a similar judgment: *Furtum sine ulla quoque attractione fieri posse, sola MENTE atque ANIMO, ut furtum fiat*, ADNITENTE; Gellius, xi. 18, ad finem.

SECTION LXXXIII.

OF SOME OTHER DIVISIONS OF SIN AND SINS OF PARTICIPATION.

I. *Some minor divisions of sins.*

BESIDES the divisions of sin already mentioned, s. 82, there are also many others which are either wanting in exactness and philosophic correctness, or are of less consequence, as they cast but little light upon the doctrine itself, and only furnish some contingent characteristics of particular kinds of sin. Some of them are also liable to great abuse. Still, as they are frequently found in the writings of the schoolmen and of modern theologians, it is necessary to understand them as matters of history.

(1) The division of sins in respect to the object of the law against which the sin is committed into those which are committed against *God*, against one's *neighbour*, and against *one-self*, is a very common division, but far from being accurate and just. For the object of every sin, if the *formale* of it is considered, is God. The obligation to obey the law issues from him as the supreme Ruler and Lawgiver. Again; every one who commits a sin, of whatever kind it may be, sins in each case against himself. For in the commission of it he most injures himself.

Note.—We may here notice the division of sins which is found among the schoolmen, into *peccata philosophica* (those committed against the laws of nature), and *peccata theologica*, (those committed against the revealed will of God.) But no characteristics can be given by which these two kinds of sinning can be distinguished from each other; and the guilt and ill desert of both must be necessarily equal, since God is no less the author of the laws of nature than of those of Revelation. We may learn something of the great abuse of this division, of which some of the Jesuits since the close of the seventeenth century have been chargeable, from church history and theological ethics.

(2) Sins have been divided, in respect to their greater or less guilt and desert of punishment, into *mortalia* or *non-venalia*; (unpardonable), and *venalia* (pardonable);—*sins unto death*, and *venial sins*. The phrase *sin unto death* is taken from 1 John, v. 16, where, however it has an entirely different meaning from that which is given to it in this connexion—viz., punishment with death at a human tribunal, *a crime worthy of death, a capital crime*. But this phrase, as used by theologians, is taken in the Hebrew sense, and denotes sins which draw after them death—i. e., divine punishment—e. g., John, viii. 21, 24, ἀποθανέσθαι ἐν τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ ὑμῶν. The term *peccatum veniale* is found even

in Augustine. Very different opinions, however, are entertained by theologians as to the meaning of this division; and there has been much controversy about it, especially between the theologians of the Roman and the protestant church. In order that this term may be understood in a sense conformed to the Bible, it must be explained in the following way; every sin, as such, deserves punishment, (θάνατον ἀποκρίναι, James, i. 15,) nor do the least remain unpunished. The pious man, therefore, either does not sin at all, or if he sins, deserves punishment, (death.) But if any one has sinned through ignorance, heedlessness, human weakness, or precipitancy, he may hope for the pardon (*veniam*) of his sin, since he did not commit it with deliberate purpose. Vide s. 82. Heinous sins remain always deserving of punishment; but those who repent of their sins and with all their hearts turn from them, receive, according to the doctrine of the scriptures, pardon from God, through faith in Jesus Christ; and the Christian knows, that through his faith his sins are truly forgiven him. Vide Rom. viii. 1, οὐδὲν κατάκριμα. 1 John, i. 9, coll. ii. 1; Ps. ciii. 8—18.

(3) As the phrase *to cry to Heaven* is used in the Bible with reference to particular sins, some have thence taken occasion to introduce the division of sins into *clamantia* and *non-clamantia*. The texts are, Gen. iv. 10; xviii. 20; Ex. iii. 7; James, v. 4, coll. Is. xxii. 14. The sins mentioned in these passages have been comprised in the following distich:—

“Clamitat ad cælum vox sanguinis et Sodomorum,
Vox oppressorum, merces detenta laborum.”

But this *crying to Heaven* is not given in the Bible as the definite mark of any particular sins, and it may be spoken of many others besides those to which it is actually applied. It depends merely upon the circumstances. It is *prospopœia*, and is used to denote great and aggravated offences, which have terrible consequences, but which are not punished in this world, either because they remain undiscovered, or because, on account of great public corruption, they are not regarded as sins. Respecting such sins, the Hebrew says, *they cry to God*, or, they call to God for revenge—i. e., they are punished by God with peculiar severity, although overlooked by men. Among sins of this nature, e. g., is *perjury*, respecting which it is expressly said, Ex. xx. 7, that God will not forbear to punish it, although the phrase *crying to Heaven* is never used with respect to it in the Bible. On the contrary, it is said, respecting the blood of Christ, Heb. xii. 24, that it *speaks better things than the blood of Abel*; it calls upon God for favour and the forgiveness of sins, or it results in this, that God does pardon; while Abel's blood called on God to punish, or was followed

by this consequence, that God punished the murderer. In connexion with these texts, vide Sir. xxxv. 18, “The tears of the widow cry over themselves (to Heaven) against him who extorts them.”

II. Participation in the sins of others.

In 1 Tim. v. 22, Paul makes use of the language κοινῶν ἀμαρτίας ἀλλοτρίαις. A *sin of participation* is committed by any one, when the unlawful action, though not performed immediately by him, is yet done *mediately* through him, or, which is the same thing, is occasioned, aided, and abetted by him. Everything, therefore, by which I give to my fellow man opportunity, inducement, or occasion to sin, is a sin of participation. The guilt which rests upon me is greater or less, in proportion as I could have foreseen, or did actually foresee and approve, the sins which my fellow man has committed in consequence of these opportunities and inducements which I placed in his way. In a great variety of ways can one give to another occasion to sin;—by command, by bad advice and counsel (John, xviii. 14; 2 Sam. xvi. 21), by praising wicked deeds, by concealment, by omitting to place all possible resistance in the way of the sin, or by failing to give needful admonition, warning, or correction, (1 Sam. iii. 13.) The mere participator, however, has not always equal guilt with the one who himself directly commits the sin. The guilt of the one may be greater or less than that of the other, or that of both may be equal; and this will be according to the circumstances in each particular case. The more full discussion of the whole subject belongs properly to the department of morals.

There is one class of sins of participation which deserves more particular notice here, although the consideration of it at large belongs to theological morals—viz., *scandals*, so called. We subjoin only a few remarks. Σκάνδαλον (ἐπίσκοπος) is, literally, anything by which one is made to *fall*; it then signifies anything by which one is injured—e. g., snares, plots; finally, in a moral sense, it denotes not only every deliberate and designed solicitation of another to evil, but also everything by which one gives to another occasion to sin, even in a more indirect way, and if he had no intention of so doing—e. g., the bad example which one sets before another. This term is sometimes used in the discourses of Jesus to signify temptation to apostasy from Christianity—e. g., Matt. xviii. 6; John, xvi. 1; but it is also used by Christ in a wider sense—e. g., Matt. xvii. 27, where it denotes the inducement to disobey magistrates, which one offers to another by his conduct; and in general σκανδαλίζειν is with him to *give occasion to sin, to tempt*, Matt. v.

29, 30. Such an offence or scandal may be committed either in word or in external deed. Actions and words may in themselves be right and innocent; but if one can foresee that by them another may be led into sin, it is his duty to refrain from them. On these principles, Paul judges respecting the eating of meats regarded as unlawful, and of flesh offered to idols, in presence of persons who had conscientious scruples respecting it, Rom. xiv. 20—25; 1 Cor. viii. 10—13. The maxims which Paul lays down in these places are very important and worthy of being laid to heart, because they are applicable to all similar cases. The accountability and ill-desert of a person guilty of such an offence is different, in proportion to the deed itself and its consequences. The easier it is to avoid the seductive action, the more important the office and station of the one who does it; the more unlawful the action is in itself, and the greater the evil done by it, so much the greater and more deserving of punishment is the offence.

Scandals or offences are sometimes divided, in respect to the *subject*, into those *given* and those *received*—a division, however, which is in many respects inconvenient; it is further treated of in theological morals. Scandals *given* are those actions of an injurious tendency, to the omission of which one is obligated, either from the nature of the actions themselves, or from the particular circumstances of the case. To commit an action in such a case is *σκανδαλίζειν τινά* (*activé*), Matt. xviii. 6. Scandals *received* are such actions as may prove temptations to some one, but which are either in themselves good and according to duty, or at least indifferent in their moral character. In the first case, one may give offence or occasion sin without being accessory to it, and so without sin on his part. In the second case, it is a duty to abstain from the action, according to the advice of Paul, as we have seen above. This *scandalum acceptum* is *σκανδαλιζήσθαι ἐν τίνι*, Matt. xi. 6; xiii. 57 (the first case); Rom. xiv. 21, (the second case.)

In judging of sins of participation and of scandals, moralists often mistake by carrying the matter too far in theory, and thus weakening the effect of their rule; as, on the other hand, men in common life are apt to judge too lightly and indulgently respecting such sins. In order to guard against this latter fault, which is often very injurious, it is well to reverse the case, and see how we should judge respecting participation in good, virtuous, and noble actions, and how careful we should be to make out our title to reward in consequence of this participation. In this way many incautious decisions respecting these sins would be prevented.

SECTION LXXXIV.

OF THE BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST,
OR THE SIN AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST.

THE latter phrase (the sin against the Holy Ghost), which is introduced into theology, is both unscriptural and very inconvenient, on account of its indefiniteness and vagueness. For there are many sins against the Holy Ghost which are not yet *blasphemy* against him. Vide Acts, vii. 51; 1 Thess. iv. 8. The blasphemy of the Holy Ghost (*βλασφημία, or λόγος εἰς πνεῦμα ἅγιον*) is the sin which is intended in this discussion; and this, too, is the scriptural mode of expressing it. The proof-texts properly relating to this subject are, Matt. xii. 31, 32; Mark, iii. 28—30; Luke, xii. 10; with which many compare the texts Heb. vi. 4—6; x. 29; 1 Pet. iv. 14; John, xv. 22—24, &c., although their reference to this subject is disputed by others.

I. Historical Observations.

Even among the ancients the explanations given of this subject were very diverse, and often very indefinite and unsettled. Athanasius wrote a whole dissertation on this subject; Ep. 4, ad Serapion. In this he states, among other things, the opinion of Origen, that “all the sins committed after baptism were sins against the Holy Ghost.” But in the writings of Origen now extant, he places the sin against the Holy Ghost in the denial of the divinity of Jesus Christ, by means of which he performed miracles (works of the Holy Spirit.) So Theognostus of Alexandria, Hilarius, and Ambrosius, although the latter in one place explains himself differently. In the *Pastor* of Hermas this sin is explained to be blasphemy in general.

Since the fourth century, two explanations have, however, found the most approbation; and although they are both very differently modified, yet the most diverse representations can be arranged under the one or the other of these general classes. (1) The explanation of Chrysostom (Hom. 42, in Matt.), to which Hieronymus also assents, (Comm. in Matt. 12.) According to them, one commits the sin against the Holy Ghost who asserts that the miracles performed by Christ through the aid of the Holy Ghost were done by the agency of an evil spirit. (2) The other is the opinion of Augustine. He is not indeed always consistent with himself in his views respecting the kind of sin which should be regarded as the sin against the Holy Ghost. But he makes the principal character of this sin to be the obstinate impenitence of the sinner till the close of his life, and from this circumstance he explains it, that this sin is *not forgiven*.

To one or the other of these explanations most of the theologians of the Western church have attached themselves, at least in general. The reformers of the sixteenth century came out of the school of Augustine, and generally adopted his views on this subject. Hence the following description of this sin was the most common among the Lutheran theologians of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and a part of the eighteenth centuries—viz., it is committed when any one recognises the Christian doctrine as divine, and inwardly approves it, but yet denies it against his own convictions, opposes and blasphemes it, and perseveres in this deliberate contempt of all the means of grace, through which the Holy Spirit acts upon his heart, even till the close of life.

Against this view, however, many difficulties have been urged. (a) It is said that in the texts of scripture above cited the ordinary operations of the Spirit of God are not intended, but the extraordinary. (b) That every sin, persevered in until death, is followed by condemnation; and that this cannot therefore be a distinguishing characteristic of the sin against the Holy Ghost. For these reasons other theologians prefer the opinion of Chrysostom and Hieronymus—e. g., most of the Arminian theologians, and, after them, Stackhouse, Tillotson, and other English divines. These again were followed by most of the German Lutheran theologians of the eighteenth century, after Pfaff, Schubert, Baumgarten, and others, had assented to this view. For the opinions of the theologians of the Romish church on this point, vide Mart. Gerbert, *De peccato in Sp. S.*, S. Blasii, 1760; and Hirt, *De logomachiis circa Doctrinam de Spiritu Sancto obvis*, where the opinions of the Lutheran theologians are carefully collected. Vide Nösselt's "Bücherkenntniss" for an account of an almost innumerable multitude of other works on this subject—e. g., those of Feuerborn, Musæus, Schubert, Zellner, Hauber, Flatt (a prize essay, 1770), Buchwitz, Semler (1768), &c.

II. Scriptural Representation.

The Pharisees and Scribes attributed the miracles which Jesus wrought to confirm and establish his divine mission, to the devil, with the malicious purpose of rendering Jesus suspected in the view of the people, upon whom his miracles had produced a great impression, as being a magician, standing in alliance with the devil. It was this wicked calumny which led Jesus to make the declaration respecting the unpardonableness of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, according to the express information of Mark, c. iii. 30. The following remarks may serve to explain this declaration of Jesus:—

(a) *Βλασφημία* is any slander or calumny

which aims to disgrace or dishonour any one, whether it be God or created beings, angels and men, 2 Pet. ii. 10, 11; Mark, vii. 22. In this passage it is used in the widest sense, and so includes both. (It is inaccurately rendered by Luther, in Mark, iii. 28, *blasphemy against God*.) Therefore Christ says, "All other sins, and even blasphemies (against God and men), may be forgiven to men (if they seek forgiveness in the appointed way); but for that sin alone, which is committed by blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is no forgiveness to be expected. It is the most heinous of all sins.

(b) The phrase *Son of man* is sometimes applied to the Messiah, considered in his whole character (*Θεοῦ υἱός*); it is however borrowed from his inferior nature, and relates chiefly to his *humanity*. The contemporaries of Jesus were especially offended by the humiliation of the Son of man, which was so contradictory to their expectations respecting the Messiah, Matt. xi. 6; 1 Cor. i. 23. Blasphemy directed against the Messiah was indeed, in all cases, a great offence; but in the ignorant and misguided multitude it was by no means so great a sin as in those who led them astray; and hence in their case there was hope of pardon. They were among those who knew not what they did, Luke, xxiii. 34.

(c) The case was very different with the Pharisees; they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, since they knew that the Holy Ghost acted through Christ, but yet denied it, and cast contempt upon his agency. The support and guidance of the Son of man is constantly ascribed by Christ and the apostles to the Holy Spirit. Vide Matt. iii. 16; John, iii. 34; Acts, x. 38. It is not, however, the *personal* dignity of the Holy Ghost, as God, which is here spoken of, nor does Christ design to say that a sin against one divine person is greater than against another,—for which no reason can be supposed; nor would he intimate that the Holy Ghost was superior to himself and the Father; for, according to his instructions, they are equal in dignity; but he speaks only of the *operations* of the Holy Spirit, and of his *manifestation*, which was so plainly exhibited in Christ. For the *work of God* and the *work of the devil* are here opposed to each other, and in Mark, iii. 29, *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* and *πνεῦμα ἀκαθάρτων* and instead of the phrase, *to cast out devils by the spirit of God*, which is found, Matt. xii. 28, we find the phrase, *by the finger of God*, used in Luke, xi. 20. The sin here described is therefore called *blasphemy against the Holy Ghost*, because it is committed against those divine operations which are especially ascribed to the Holy Ghost as his *economic* work. But it does not follow that the personal dignity of the Holy Ghost is greater than that of the Father

or the Son. The Pharisees, therefore, committed the sin against the Holy Ghost not only by obstinately denying, against their own convictions, the miracles which Jesus performed in proof of his divine mission, and which they knew in their hearts to be performed through divine agency, but by giving them out as imposture and the effect of an evil spirit, with whom Jesus stood in alliance, in order thus to render his doctrine suspicious. This, considering the circumstances in which the Pharisees were, shewed a high degree of wickedness, and was actual blasphemy against God—a designed and deliberate blasphemy, too, which they were by no means disposed to repent of or to retract. Here two questions arise—viz.,

(1) *Can the sin against the Holy Ghost be still committed at the present time?* Those who adopt the opinion of Augustine commonly affirm that it can. But among those theologians who have explained these texts after the manner of Chrysostom and Hieronymus, the opinions on this subject vary. (a) Some of them maintain the affirmative. They think that whoever denies the miracles of Christ, casts contempt upon them, or gives them out as deception, imposture, or magic, still commits this sin, although (as they sometimes cautiously add) no one can undertake to decide whether it has been committed by another. (b) But the other side was taken long ago by some Arminian theologians, (e. g., by Limborch.) They maintained that only *eye-witnesses* of Christ's miracles, as the Pharisees were, could be guilty of this sin, because no others had equal advantages for attaining to a full and undoubting conviction of their certainty. Those in our times who pursue the general course of the Pharisees, deny and ridicule events respecting the historic truth and credibility of which they are in doubt, or which they suppose never to have taken place. Hence it is concluded that this sin can no more be committed, because miracles are no longer performed. So Pfaff reasoned, and after him many protestant theologians. (c) There is still, however, one case in which the same sin which was committed by the Pharisees may be still committed—viz., where one is fully convinced of the historic truth of the miracles of Jesus, and that they were done through the divine power, and yet, in total opposition to his own convictions, and with the same malicious purpose which the Pharisees had, pronounces them to be imposture and deception, the effect of magic or other wicked arts. This would in reality be the same case with that of the Pharisees. For the circumstance of *having seen the miracles oneself* is of no special consequence, and it is enough if one be convinced of their truth. When the conviction of the truth of the miracles is equally strong in one who has not seen them and in one who has,

the same degree of guilt would seem to be necessarily involved in denying them. Such a case indeed will seldom occur, but the possibility of it must be admitted.

(2) *Why does Christ affirm, that this sin cannot be forgiven? and what does he mean by this declaration?* The theologians who adopt Augustine's hypothesis, understand here a real *impossibility*, in the proper and philosophical sense, and derive it from the nature of the sin itself, as being continued to the end of life; respecting which vide supra. Those who follow the other hypothesis have different opinions on this subject. Some understand a real impossibility, but do not enter upon the question, *why* it is impossible. Others take the ground, that this language means only that this sin is forgiven with great difficulty. So most of the theologians of the Romish church who adopt this hypothesis; also many of the Arminian theologians and commentators; likewise Heumann, Pfaff, and other protestants. These again are divided in their opinions, since some suppose that Christ spoke conditionally, meaning that this sin could not be forgiven *if it were not repented of*; and others, that Christ here uses the language of feeling, which is accordingly to be understood hyperbolically, and not literally. Vide Koppe, *Quo sensu peccato in Spiritum Sanctum venia a Christo negata fuerit*; Gott. 1781.

On this question we will give our own judgment. The words of Jesus are, οὐκ ἀφίησεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα—οὐτε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι, οὐτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι (i. e., according to the *usus loquendi* of the Jews, neither *here* nor *hereafter*); ἕως ὅτου ἔστιν αἰώνιον κρίσις, or, according to another reading, ἀμαρτίας, (he incurs the guilt of a sin never to be pardoned, and for which he must endure the pains of hell.) The meaning cannot be, that God *cannot* forgive such a sin. For one who has sinned in a manner ever so aggravated, may yet repent and reform, and then he surely receives forgiveness; and this is truly said respecting blasphemy against God of any other kind. It is obvious that Christ here speaks with feeling and righteous indignation; this is proved by all his words; and on this account it is unwarrantable in us to give these terms an *universal* sense, and to apply them to every similar case. This Koppe has well shewn in the Essay before mentioned. But although Christ spoke with feeling, it does not follow that he went too far, or affirmed anything which is not in strict accordance with truth. For the feeling which Christ exhibits is never accompanied either by error or sin. The case properly stands thus: (a) all experience shews that a man who has arrived at such a point of wickedness seldom comes to a knowledge of the truth or to repentance; hence Paul says, with regard to such sinners, ἀδύνατον γὰρ, κ. τ. λ.; Heb. vi.

4—6. Vide other texts cited at the beginning of this section. (b) But Christ, as one who knows the heart, was most firmly convinced that those whom he addressed would never repent of that deliberate blasphemy, but would persevere in it to the end. The reason why he spoke so decidedly was, *that he knew what was in man*, and did not need that any one should teach him; John, ii. 25; xvi. 30. In this way, the theories of Augustine and of Chrysostom somewhat agree on this point; and we have also a plain reason why Christ speaks so decidedly in this case, while yet we cannot do so in similar cases.

SECTION LXXXV.

OF THE STATE INTO WHICH MEN ARE BROUGHT BY THE COMMISSION OF SIN, AND THE DIFFERENT KINDS AND NAMES OF IT.

I. *The state of sinners in respect to their conduct and disposition.*

THOSE in whose hearts evil desires no more prevail, but rather virtuous feelings and a disposition inclined to moral good, are called *upright, virtuous, (probos, honestos;)* but those who are thus, out of regard to God—i. e., from obedience to the known will and command of God, and from thankful love to him—are called *pious (pios), religious*; although this distinction is not always observed in common discourse. The latter is the state which we are required to possess by the precepts of Christianity. A short summary of Christian doctrine on this point is contained in the first epistle of John. The Bible recognises no other virtue or holiness than that which springs from religious motives; *religious* virtue, we are there taught, is the only virtue which has true worth in the sight of God; and this we are taught even in the Old Testament. Those who possess this religious virtue are there called צדיקים, צדיק, חסידים, שְׂרִים, δίκαιοι, ἄγιοι, ἀγαθοί, εὐσεβεῖς, δοῦλοι Θεοῦ, &c. &c.; one of the opposite character is called ἀσεβής, ἀδίκος, &c. &c. But one who acts according to his corrupt desires, and does so habitually, is called in scripture the *servant or slave* of sin; it is said of him that *he lives to sin, he serves it, he obeys it, he is sold under sin, and it rules over him*. Vide Ps. xix. 14; Rom. vi. 1, 2, 6, 12, 16, 20; vii. 14, 24; xiv. 24; John, viii. 34, seq.; 2 Pet. ii. 19. He only who is placed in a state in which he can govern his desires, and subject his appetites to reason enlightened by divine instruction, is a *free man*, (John, viii. 34;) whoever cannot do this is a *slave* of sin.

The state of all who are devoted to sin is not, however, alike. Every vicious man is, in his own way, a servant of sin; but all are not so in the same way. Three principal classes may be

in general here distinguished. (a) Some adopt the appearance of virtue and piety; they give a saintly appearance even to their crimes, in order to obtain the advantages connected with goodness. These are *hypocrites*, and their fault is called ἀνόμιος, ψεύς, κίβη, קרמה; opposite to which are אמת, אמתה, ἀληθεια, *truth, sincerity*. This is one of the most shameful, aggravated, and dangerous crimes—the hatefulness and destructiveness of which are more fully considered in the department of Morals. Cf. Matt. vi. and xxiii.; Luke, xi. 37—54; 2 Tim. iii. 5. (b) Others have no hesitation in acting out before the world the ungodly desires and purposes of their hearts. Such are called *ungodly, improbi, ἀδικοι, ἀσεβείς, רשעים*, because they do not fear nor regard God or his law; opposite to these are those *who fear God*—i. e., act with reverential regard to his commands. (c) Those sinful and godless men who, by long custom in sinning, have established a fixed habit of it, are called *vicious, wicked, sceleratos*. Cf. s. 82, II., ad finem.

II. *The state of sinners in respect to the consequences which sin involves.*

The different kinds of sinners noticed above are all unhappy, and in the judgment of God deserving of punishment. The feeling of their danger and misery is not, however, alike with them all; and some live even in entire insensibility. In this observation we have the ground of the divisions of the various states which have been commonly made by theologians, and which are founded in experience; though the passage from one to the other of these states is very easy.

(1) Some men very plainly see the unlawfulness of their actions, and the evil consequences springing from them; they often form the purpose of renouncing sin and living better; but the power of the evil inclinations which have obtained the mastery over them is so strong, that they allow themselves to be continually hurried away into sin. Such are in constant restlessness, fear, and anguish, on account of their sins; and their state is denominated by theologians, in conformity with scriptural phraseology, *conditionem sive statum servilem or servitutis, a state of slavery*; and this is taken from John, viii. 34; Romans, vi. 20, and chap. vii. Men in this state are like slaves, who, at least sometimes, if not always, wish to be free, and make attempts for their own deliverance, and yet always remain slaves.

(2) Others lead a sinful life, without having an earnest desire to free themselves from the dominion of sin. They pay no regard to their unlawful actions, and have no scruples about them, either from ignorance or levity, or because they hope to remain unpunished, and from many other reasons, often those which are in the

highest degree foolish. This is called the *state of security*—i. e., freedom from care, like the Latin *securus*;—*status securitatis*, or *libertatis carnalis*, because those who are in it feel free to follow their sinful appetites, (σᾰφέ.) This state is far more dangerous than the preceding one; and with such sinners reformation is far more difficult. Cf. Matt. xxiv. 38; Ephes. iv. 17—19; Jude, ver. 4, seq. The state of such is therefore compared with that of the *sleeping* or of the *dead*, Ephes. v. 14. They live for sin, but are dead to goodness; while it ought to be the reverse.

Note.—Theologians distinguish between this state and that of *spiritual liberty* or *security*. They give the latter name to the state of the pious, the whole disposition of whose heart is so renovated as to be conformed to the precepts of Christianity, who by divine assistance control their evil desires, and are sure of the pardon of their sins. Vide John, viii. 36; Rom. v. 1; vi. 18. For true spiritual freedom consists in being free from the power and dominion of sin, and also from its punishment; and we owe both to Christ. These are the *blessed godly ones* (*Gottseligen*, in 'the proper sense of the term)—i. e., those who are blessed in the conviction which they feel of the forgiveness of God, who internally and from the heart enjoy a happiness in which they cannot be disturbed even by outward calamities. *Happy* and *unhappy* (*selig* and *unselig*) are terms which apply properly to the internal state—the well or ill-being of the soul; *fortunate* and *unfortunate*, (*glücklich* and *unglücklich*,) more to the external state.

(3) Others still come into a state of *hardness* or *obduracy*. This state exists when any one remains insensible and indifferent under the most powerful motives to repentance, so that they cease to make any impression on him. It springs (*a*) from the frequent repetition of sin, and from the settled habit of sinning. This produces a gradual diminution of the power of the motives to abandon sin, and at length an entire cessation of their efficacy. (*b*) But those are in peculiar danger of coming into this state who have had placed before them the most urgent and moving inducements to religion and virtue, but have yet neglected and despised them all. It is in the very nature of the human soul that these motives, at each repetition of sin, lose something of their energy, and that at length an entire indifference must ensue, rendering the conversion of one who has brought himself into such a state *morally impossible*. This state is called by theologians, *statum indurationis perfectum*. It is described by Paul, Heb. vi. 4,—6, and Is. vi. 10, "Who have eyes, but see not; ears, but hear not"—i. e., who are deaf and insensible to all the motives to holiness which are held before them, and which they clearly under-

stand, and who therefore cannot be *healed*—i. e., renovated and made happy. Cf. John, xii. 40; Acts, xxviii. 26, 27; 2 Cor. iv. 4; iii. 14; also Exod. vii. 13.

The words and phrases used in the Bible to denote this state are, (1) כָּבֵד, βαρύνεσθαι, βαρύς. These words are *literally* employed to signify *what is heavy* and *inactive*; they are then used with reference to the members of the body and the organs of sense, as heavy *tongues*, *hands*, *ears*, denoting their inactivity, and the difficulty of their use; Zech. vii. 11; Gen. xlviii. 10; Matt. xxvi. 43; lastly, they are applied to the *soul*, indicating stupidity of the understanding, and slowness of belief; 1 Sam. vi. 6; 2 Chron. xxv. 19; sometimes also the qualities of the will, and sometimes those of the understanding and will both,—an inertness of soul, and an incapacity to the right use of its essential powers. (2) שָׁקֵד, literally, *hard*; Hiphil, שָׁקַד, σκληρύνειν, σκληρύνεσθαι—hence the term σκληροκαρδία, from which *obduracy* is taken. The state of mind now under consideration is often indicated by this σκληρύνεσθαι, as Heb. iii. 8, 15, seq.; Rom. ii. 5; and by שָׁקֵד in the Old Testament, Exodus, vii. 3; Ezek. iii. 7. (3) The words which originally signify *fat*, denote also this state of insensibility and unfeelingness—e. g., יָרֵךְ, *pingue fieri*, παχύνεσθαι, Is. vi. 10, and Matt. xiii. 15; as likewise the Latin *pinguis* is synonymous with *hebes*, *stupidus*, *tardus*—e. g., *ingenium pingue* is the same as *dull* and *obtuse*. The fat of the body of animals is without sensation; and this observation was much more familiar to nations offering sacrifices, and so having much to do with the slaughter of animals, than to us; and hence this phraseology was so current among them. (4) The words which indicate *deep sleep*, in which all external sensation ceases; κατάνυξις, Rom. xi. 8, answering in the LXX. to the Hebrew נִרְדָּמָה. (5) One of the most common words used in the New Testament on this subject is πῶρος, and παρώς, παρωδῶσαι—e. g., Rom. xi. 7, 25; 2 Cor. iii. 15; Mark, vi. 52, καρδία πεπωρωμένη. This word is properly taken from πῶρος, which means, having a *hard*, *indurated skin*, (as in the hands of workmen;) *callous*, without feeling; and so πῶρος, figuratively denotes, according to Hesychius, the same as ἡ ἀναισθησία, and is synonymous with σκληροκαρδία. All these words which signify *hardheartedness* are sometimes used in reference to the understanding, (called נָבִי, sometimes in reference to the will, and often with reference to both. A *soft* heart is, accordingly, *susceptibility* for reasons and conviction, *the open ear of the soul*. A *hard* heart is the opposite, and indicates a want of knowledge and capacity—the remiss use of them, inactivity.

With regard to this *status indurationis* there

has been a great difficulty, which may be stated as follows:—From what has been already said, it appears that when a man comes into this state, he alone is to blame, and has all the guilt of it resting upon himself. This is taught in the scriptures in many of the passages already cited. Still there are other texts of scripture in which God seems to be made the author of this obduracy of men, and of sin in general, and its consequences—e. g., Exod. iv. 21, “I will harden Pharaoh’s heart:” xiv. 17, seq.; Is. lxiii. 17; Deut. ii. 30; Josh. xi. 20; Ezek. xx. 25; and in the New Testament, John, xii. 40, *τετύφλωκεν ὁφθαλμοὺς αὐτῶν καὶ πεπώρωκε καρδίαν*. Rom. ix. 18, also i. 24. These and similar texts were explained by the severe *particularists* of the reformed church, also by the Jansenists and many of the stricter Thomists of the Romish church, to mean, that God is the efficient cause of these effects; that from such men he withdraws or withholds, for some reason to us inscrutable, a certain supernatural or irresistible grace, without which they cannot become holy or happy; and that he does this by his unconditional decree. This interpretation resulted from ignorance of the *usus loquendi* of the sacred writers. Let the student consider the following particulars—viz.,

(a) Even in modern languages we often use expressions by which we ascribe to an individual the remote consequences of his actions, even when he did not design to produce these consequences, and perhaps employed all the means in his power to guard against them—e. g., after I have often exhorted some one to repent, and all without effect, except that, in direct opposition to my intentions, he becomes, through my repeated warnings, only the more unfeeling, I then say, *I have preached him deaf, I have made him harder and more wicked by my efforts*. Thus, Isa. vi. 10, “Make hard this people (by preaching), and let their ears be deaf.” Vide Michaelis’ note on Exod. iv. 21. We speak in the same way when our good purposes have miscarried. But,

(b) In the ancient, and especially the Oriental languages, this mode of speech is far more current than in modern languages. It is altogether appropriate to the whole manner of thinking and speaking in the ancient world; but it has by degrees become foreign to the scientific dialect of the modern world, although it has not wholly fallen into disuse in common life. Hence it often has a strange appearance to the learned, while to the unlearned it sounds more natural. The simplicity of that early age of the world often ascribes everything which takes place under the inspection and special guidance of Providence, whether it be good or evil, directly to God himself, and regards him as the author and efficient cause of every event

and of its consequences, because nothing takes place without his permission and foreknowledge. Vide s. 58, II. 1, and especially s. 70, note, ad finem. Thus, God performs miracles in order to induce Pharaoh to let Israel go; Pharaoh does not comply; and the oftener the miracles are repeated, the more hard-hearted does he become. Now it is said that God hardened Pharaoh, rendered him unfeeling, and even by those very means which should have rendered him feeling; *and at the same time, the calamity which now befalls him is regarded as a punishment which God inflicts upon him*. This last opinion plainly shews that it was not the belief that God acted irresistibly upon Pharaoh; for in that case how could he be punished? This language is then to be understood in a manner perfectly consistent with the personal guilt of Pharaoh. Cf. Rom. i. 26; ix. 17; 2 Thess. ii. 11. In the same way, the *good actions* of men are ascribed to God; and from the misunderstanding of the texts in which this is done originated the doctrine respecting *supernatural and irresistible grace*, as from the misunderstanding of the other, the doctrine of *judicial hardness*. The mode of thinking and speaking now referred to is found also among the Greeks, and indeed in all ancient writings; it occurs in Homer as well as in the Bible, and also in the Arabic writers. In Homer it is said that the Deity infuses *good and evil* into the heart, (*ἐμβάλλει καρδίῃ*;) that he inspires *wisdom and folly*, (Odys. xxiii. 11, seq.;) that he infatuates and deceives men, deprives them of their reason, so that they may act foolishly, deludes their senses, *Zeὺς φρένας εἴλετο*, Il. ix. 377, xix. 137; tempts them to evil, (Odys. xxiii. 222;) and is the cause of the wickedness of men. *For he does everything*. Il. xix. 87, 90, seq.; Odys. xvi. 280, 297, 298; Il. ix. 632, seq.

• • • Ἀλλήκτων τε κακὸν τε
Θυμον ἐνίστηθαι τοῦ Διὸς θέαν. • • •

Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it? Amos, iii. 6.

Note.—The text, Rom. ix. 18, *ὃν θέλει ἐλεεῖ, ὃν θέλει σκληρύνει* means, according to many, *he treats hardly*, like Job, xxxix. 16, (*ἀποσκληρύνει τέκνα*;) and the principal reason for this is, the contrast of *ἐλεεῖν*. This interpretation, however, does not agree with ver. 19; and the whole passage alludes too plainly to the passage in Exodus respecting Pharaoh to admit of this interpretation. This language is therefore to be understood here also in the common sense, and the verse may be thus explained—viz., “The good and the evil which befall men depend alike upon the divine will. Some (who are pleasing to him, as his children) he causes to prosper; others he *hardens*—i. e., he suffers them to feel the consequences of their obstinacy,

insensibility, and indifference to his oft-repeated commands; as in the case of Pharaoh, ver. 17." The same thing which is called *ακληρίναι* here, is called *ἐνδείξασθαι ὀργήν*, ver. 22. Vide Rahn, ad loc. Rom. ix. 17—23; Halæ, 1789.

SECTION LXXXVI.

WHAT PUNISHMENT IS, AND WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF IT; HOW THE DIVINE PUNISHMENTS ARE NAMED IN THE BIBLE, AND WHAT WE ARE THERE TAUGHT RESPECTING THEIR NATURE; ALSO THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF THE DIVINE PUNISHMENTS.

In our treatment of this whole subject we must proceed on the ground of what has been already said on the divine laws and punishments in the discussion of the subject of divine justice, s. 30, 31. Supposing the student already acquainted with these, we proceed to make some additional observations, and a more immediate application of what has been already said.

I. *What is Punishment, and what is its object?*

"Punishment is an evil (suffering, something awakening unpleasant sensations) which the superior inflicts upon those placed under him, on account of some trespass, (the theologian calls it *sin*;) and this, for the sake of maintaining the authority of his laws for the good of his subjects, or to promote their improvement and welfare." This is the general notion of punishment, which is also to be applied to the divine judgments, though with a careful separation of every human imperfection. The following points need to be carefully considered:—

(1) The one who punishes another must in all cases be the *supreme magistrate*, whether it be God or man. For no one has the right to punish who has not the right to give laws, and this is the peculiar province of the supreme magistrate. Vide s. 73, I. All punishments therefore depend upon the law, and one can inflict punishment only upon those over whom he possesses the power of legislation. Consequently the right of punishment belongs to God.

(2) In order to be punished, one must be subject to a law, and have broken it, and in such a way, too, that his transgression can be imputed to him. And this may be when he has either committed unlawful actions himself, or contributed to those of others. But it is only when the trespass can thus be imputed to a person that punishment can be inflicted upon him.

(3) The objects of punishment are, *all unlawful actions*. In human judicatories the *external* actions only are the objects of punishment; because the knowledge of men extends no further than these; but at the bar of God not only these

but also *internal* actions, evil thoughts, designs, and desires, are liable to punishment. Vide s. 82, ad finem.

(4) The *guilt* of a person has, therefore, its ground in his relation to the law transgressed by him, and to its author. On account of this relation he deserves the punishment which is threatened against transgressors—i. e., he must take upon himself the evil connected with the transgression of the law. The guilty person (*qui culpam sustinet*) is called in the scriptures *ὀφειλέτης*, ὁ ἔχων ἁμαρτίαν, ἔνοχος νόμου, ἱποδίκος &c., τέκνον ὀργῆς—one who must give account, &c. Vide Morus, p. 110, s. 4, note 1. All men are described in the Bible as being such; and the sacred writers insist upon it with great earnestness, that men should look upon themselves as subject to the penalty of the law, as the only way for them to become disposed to accept of the means of improvement offered to them, and to comply with the prescribed conditions. Vide s. 80.

(5) *The last end of punishments*. This in general may be best stated as follows: they aim at the welfare and reformation of the subject; or it is their object to support the authority of the law for the welfare and improvement of those placed under it. This subject is treated more at large in s. 31, II. 2, where the opinion of Michaelis, that the only object of punishment is to *deter men from sin* is further considered. The imperfections which cleave to human punishments must necessarily be separated from divine; nor should human punishments ever be made the standard by which divine punishments are to be judged of.

Note.—Some modern philosophers have asserted that God cannot punish, and that *divine punishments* ought never to be spoken of, because what are so called are to be regarded as benefits, and have benevolent ends and results. But merely because punishments tend to promote the good of men, and are designed to secure the most benevolent results, they do not cease to be evils, and become the same with what are ordinarily denominated benefits. The pain which is felt in sickness is beneficial; it makes one mindful in time of danger, leads to caution, and so is often the means of preserving life; still it is an evil which we endeavour to avoid, and the approach of which we fear. Thus it is with punishments. And it is in the highest degree injurious to undertake to obliterate from the minds of the great multitude of unconverted men the fear of divine punishment. Too great caution cannot be used against that miscalled philosophy which does this; for wherever it has found entrance, either in ancient or modern times, it has always destroyed religion, morality, and civil order. Vide s. 156.

impressive manner. He therefore is said to *burn* with anger, but his anger is always *just*.

(2) The divine judgments are inflicted, according to the Bible, (a) *in the present life*; (b) *by death* (although this was strictly a punishment for sin only in the case of the first man, and with regard to all others is only a consequence of the sin of Adam; vide s. 76, III. and s. 80, ad finem); (c) *after death*. All these punishments, according to the Bible, stand connected with the sin of our first parents. For from that arose the moral corruption which is communicated to all mankind. This is the source of actual sins, and these bring punishment in their train. Vide s. 76, seq. From this evil the second Head of our race has freed us.

That the representations given in the Bible respecting the divine *punishments* and their end agree perfectly with what sound reason recognises on this subject is very evident from the description it contains of the nature of these punishments. They are (a) always *just and proper*; vide the texts quoted s. 31; moreover, Rom. ii. 2, *κρίμα Θεοῦ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀλλήλειαν*. Vide also those texts which speak of the *ἀνθρωποκωλύα Θεοῦ*. (β) They have the *welfare of men for their object*. This is the last end for which they are inflicted; (vide the texts cited;) and if this object is not attained with any particular offender, he himself is alone in fault; and his punishment then serves for the good of others, who learn wisdom from his example. (γ) They are *certain*, and will be *inevitably* inflicted; they are not mere empty threats; no one will be able to escape. Vide Rom. ii. 3, coll. Heb. xii. 25, and especially Heb. iv. 12, 13. This follows from the divine *veracity*; these punishments must be maintained in order to uphold the authority of the Divine Being, and to prevent an universal carelessness and indifference about sin. (δ) The divine punishments are also described as *terrible*; as in these expressions: *Our God is a consuming fire; it is a terrible thing to fall into his hands, &c.* Heb. x. 30, 31; xii. 29. For in order that these punishments may attain their end, they must be sufficiently severe to terrify the transgressor, and must meet him in the point where he can be most strongly affected.

III. Divisions of Punishments.

(1) A very ancient division of punishments is into *penam damni* and *sensus*, in reference to the evil itself which is inflicted on any one by punishment. (a) By punishment, a certain good is *withdrawn*. The judgments of men respecting their true welfare and their real interests are very diverse; and consequently the withdrawal of their supposed advantages is variously estimated and felt. To one person, riches appear a great advantage; to another,

not; and so while the former will regard the loss of them as the greatest evil, the latter will not suffer in the least from their loss. It is not here, then, of so much consequence, whether the advantages are real or only apparent, as in what estimation they are held by him from whom they are withdrawn. This withdrawal now is called *pæna damni*, or sometimes *pæna negativa*. (b) When, in addition to this, positively unpleasant feelings are caused and pains inflicted, this is called *pæna sensus*. These two parts of punishment are commonly connected. These unpleasant sensations have their proper seat, either in the body, and are communicated through the senses to the soul, or they are confined to the soul, and have their origin there. The latter are felt the most keenly, and are the most dreadful.

(2) In respect to the connexion of punishment with crime, punishments are divided into *natural*, and *positive* or *arbitrary*. The former are such as result from the internal nature of morally bad actions themselves; the latter are such as stand in no natural and necessary connexion with wicked actions, but which are connected with them merely by the good pleasure (*arbitrium*) of the lawgiver. These two kinds of punishment have been already explained, s. 31, as well as the doctrine respecting the natural and positive laws of God, s. 30.

In this place we shall add a few remarks respecting the *natural* punishments inflicted by God upon men, especially *in this life*; in the following section we shall farther discuss the subject of *positive* punishments.

There has been some dispute among philosophers (into which we do not mean to enter fully now) whether the natural evil consequences of sin ought to be called punishments; and the propriety of this is by some denied. Judging from the common conceptions on this subject, and the common phraseology founded on these, there can be no doubt but that we may and ought to consider the evil consequences resulting from the transgression of the divine commandments as punishment. So we say, for example, with respect to a liar, in whom at length no one places any confidence, or with respect to the voluptuary or drunkard, who brings infamy and disease upon himself, and in all such cases that sin *punishes* itself. Again, if the *leges naturales* are properly called laws, (and whatever is true of law in any case is true of them,) how can it be doubted whether the consequences resulting from the transgression of these laws are properly denominated *punishments*?

But these natural punishments may be distinguished into two kinds:—

(a) Such as are the *necessary* and *inevitable* evil consequences of the actions themselves, and which would result equally from these actions,

were they not forbidden, and were the actions, therefore, not *sins*. They are called *physical* punishments. Among these are all the sicknesses and pains which arise from intemperance of every kind; the poverty which comes from idleness; the grief, sorrow, and shame, which are the results of a dissipated life; &c. It is in order to guard against the necessary evil consequences of sin, and so to diminish them, that the divine law is given; and in this way it is, that what were before mere *evils* now become *sins*. Vide s. 73, I.

(b) Punishments which result from the relation of human actions to the law, or which have respect to the moral character of men. These are called *moral* punishments. These moral consequences of sin fall principally and most heavily upon the soul. Hence they are also called *spiritual* punishments. Among these are, e. g., the reproaches of conscience, telling us that we have violated the law of God, rendered ourselves unworthy of his favour, and disqualified for his blessings; also restlessness of soul, and fear of punishment, from the consciousness of guilt or ill-desert—the fear of God. Rom. iii. 19, 23; 1 John, i. 8, seq.; iii. 14, seq. These are the most fearful and terrible of all punishments.

This distinction between the different kinds of natural punishment is very important, especially in the doctrine of the *atonement of Christ*. Vide s. 111, II. From thence it appears,

(a) That the natural and physical evil consequences of certain wicked actions cannot wholly cease, even after pardon has been bestowed upon men, and they have repented, or after they have appropriated the merits of Christ. For we have no right to suppose that God will remove, in a miraculous manner, the necessary physical consequences of sinful actions. From experience we see that God does not do this in the present life. E. g., if any one has brought upon himself, by his excesses, prolonged sickness or poverty, he will not become at once well in body and estate merely by reforming his courses; but he must continue to feel the necessary consequences of his errors and crimes, just as the consequences of the sin of Adam—death and other temporal calamities—continue to be felt by all his posterity, even by those who are renewed and pardoned. Vide Rom. viii. 10, 18—23. Nor does the Bible anywhere teach us, that in some miraculous way God will, even in the future life, remove all the natural and lasting consequences of actions; it is therefore highly probable that some portion of these consequences will continue even hereafter. But these naturally evil consequences, (as well those which are temporal as those which continue in the future life,) from which we are not entirely freed by the death of Christ, are yet mitigated, and lose

the terror of punishment, to those who are pardoned and sanctified. This experience in the present life teaches us, and the holy scriptures assure of the same. Vide Rom. viii. 1, and v. 1, 3—10. But the *pænæ naturales spirituales* cease entirely with the renewed. Hence,

(b) The principal evils from which man is freed in this and the future life, when he is pardoned and renewed, are, the *moral* consequences of sin; and it is because the believer is freed from these, that even the natural consequences of sin are mitigated to him and lose the terror of punishment. The renewed man will never indeed forget the sins which he has once committed; he will condemn them, and mourn over them; but, as he is sure of pardon, his disquiet respecting them, his fear of God as a judge, and the reproaches of his conscience, will either at once or by slow degrees entirely cease; peace of soul will be restored, together with a lively and joyful feeling of his present happy state, in comparison with his former unhappy condition. This is what the scriptures mean by the *peace of God* in the heart of the man whose sins are forgiven. Vide the texts before cited from Rom. v. and viii.

SECTION LXXXVII.

SOME REMARKS ON “POSITIVE” DIVINE PUNISHMENTS.

IN addition to what we have already said on this subject, in stating the doctrine of divine justice, s. 31, we add here the following remarks:—

(1) The term *arbitrary* punishments (*pænæ arbitrarie*) seems to be somewhat inconvenient, and to be liable to be misunderstood; it is for this reason objected to by very many modern writers, e. g., Steinbart, Syst. s. 130; Eberhard, Apologie d. Sokr. th. i.; and the author of the “Apologie der Vernunft.” And if the term *arbitrary* must be understood to denote a blind caprice, in which no regard is paid to rectitude and propriety, and to the nature of the offence, it could never, without blasphemy, be predicated of the punishments inflicted by God. But no advocate of the *arbitrariness* of God in the punishments he inflicts has ever understood it in this sense; for it cannot be supposed that even a man of common understanding and goodness would punish in such a manner. These evils, which are called positive punishments, are not, indeed, founded in the internal nature of the forbidden actions themselves; they are not the immediate natural consequences of these actions; but they are added to, and conjoined with, the natural consequences of sin, by the special appointment of the legislator; and it is for this reason that they are called *arbitrarie*. They are *mala ex arbitrio*—i. e., *libero Dei (judicis ac*

domini) *consilio sive instituto extrinsecus immissa*. But they are always determined by the rules of Supreme Wisdom and goodness, and have all the qualities of the other divine operations. They are moreover resorted to by God, in cases where his object cannot be attained by merely natural punishments. We should not, then, be over-scrupulous about the use of this term, for when we hear it said that God, the All-wise and just, inflicts arbitrary punishments, the associated idea of blind caprice, acting without cause or reason, falls away at once and of itself. The same is true of this term, as of the expression, *the anger of God*. Vide s. 86. The *arbitrium* of God is always wise, and never a blind caprice, as it often is with men, especially with passionate rulers and magistrates. In case this term were rejected, we might substitute the phrase *free punishments*.

(2) That there are positive divine punishments, especially in the future world, the Bible teaches with sufficient clearness. And indeed, from the scriptural doctrines, *that God forgives sins*, (i. e., removes their consequences,) and *that Christ, the innocent, endured punishment for us*, it seems to follow that the sacred writers believed in positive punishments and their remission. A philosophic argument in behalf of positive punishments is derived from the nature and efficacy of natural punishments, which are not sufficiently great to deter the sinner from crime, or lead him to repentance, so that positive punishments in addition to these are necessary, in order to produce this effect. It was a great object with Michaelis to establish this point. The arguments brought in opposition to it by Steinbart, Eberhard, and others, together with the arguments in its favour, were briefly stated, s. 31.

But since this subject is attended with various difficulties, which can never be entirely removed by human philosophy, owing to the limitation of our minds, the question arises, *What course shall the religious teacher pursue on this subject, and what instruction shall he give respecting positive divine punishments?* In order to come to a right decision on this question, and to be able to answer it for ourselves, we must not proceed upon empty speculations or ideal conceptions, but from the following results of *experience*. The history of all ages teaches that the prevailing notion among men always has been and still is, that God inflicts not only natural, but also positive and arbitrary punishments; or, that moral evil has not only natural evil for its consequent, but also such punishments as depend entirely upon the choice of the lawgiver. Hence sicknesses and other calamities, which stand in no natural connexion with crime, were yet often regarded as the punishments of it—e. g., the pestilence in the camp of the Greeks be-

fore Troy was so regarded in Homer; cf. *Iliad*, xvi. 384, seq. Now, in what way did this idea obtain so wide a prevalence among men, and so strong a hold upon them? If we make history and experience our teachers, we shall come to the following conclusions:—

(a) Human legislators can threaten only positive punishments, because they are able to inflict no other. For they are neither the authors nor the rulers of nature, but are themselves, as well as those over whom they rule, subject to that constitution which God has given to nature. Since, now, men are apt to reason from the human to the divine, they were disposed to transfer to God and his government those procedures and institutions common in human families and states. From hence it is obvious how even heathen nations should have come so generally to this notion. They reasoned thus: As men have the right to enact arbitrary laws and impose arbitrary punishments, this right must belong in a far higher degree to the supreme legislative power, which knows of no limitation. It was by such arguments that they arrived at this idea, though by such alone the reflecting mind is not satisfied. But,

(b) The true cause of this universal belief lies much deeper. There is on this subject a certain feeling of need in human nature which cannot be reasoned away, and which often exercises its power even over the speculative philosopher, although he has long suppressed it by his speculation. It is but too clearly proved by daily experience, that fear of the merely natural consequences of sin is too inefficacious to restrain men from committing it. For these natural punishments man has but little regard, and he thinks he can find means to avoid them, or to secure himself against them. The end, therefore, can be more surely answered by positive punishments. This result, built upon experience, although men were only obscurely conscious of it, awakened in them a feeling which made it necessary for them to believe that there are positive divine judgments. Hence many even of the ancient heathen lawgivers took means to give to *natural* laws and penalties the authority of positive, and for this purpose they intimately associated the civil and religious institutions of their country.

(c) If there are positive *rewards* in the future world, as all concede, it is hard to see how positive *punishments* can be denied. Vide s. 31.

(d) To any one who makes the holy scriptures the source of his knowledge, this subject cannot be doubtful; for the scriptures clearly teach that there are positive punishments, and presuppose them in many of the most important doctrines.

But if any one remains unconvinced by philosophical arguments and by the authority of the

Bible, that God actually appoints positive punishments, he must be referred to the fact and observation above mentioned, that this belief cannot be taken away from a people without endangering its morality. Even if a religious teacher should himself entertain doubts on this subject, it would be foolish and wrong in him to communicate these doubts to the people, and thus deprive them of a belief for which he can substitute nothing equally firm and salutary. The history of all ages teaches that nothing has so injurious an effect upon the morality of people as the persuasion that there are no positive punishments which they have to fear from the hand of God. When such punishments have been expected, the fear of them has always proved a mighty barrier against all the gross out-breakings of sin. For a confirmation of these remarks let the student consult history; cf. also s. 156, II. Note.

But, on the other hand, it is equally the duty of the religious teacher to rectify, by scriptural views, the false opinions which people are apt to form respecting the nature of these positive punishments, and to prevent, as far as possible, their injurious influence. In discharging this duty he may be aided by the following scriptural observations. From the prevailing false ideas respecting positive punishments, occasion is sometimes taken to condemn others, and to pronounce upon them uncharitable censures, as, on the other hand, from the bestowment of positive rewards, many are disposed to extol and to imitate those upon whom they are conferred, supposing them to be the favourites of Heaven. This results from the mistake that prosperity and adversity in this life are proofs of the pleasure or displeasure of God with the conduct of men; something as it is with those who stand in favour or disfavour with human rulers. But all such opinions have a most unfavourable influence upon morality and upon the dispositions of men. The teacher must therefore take pains to shew,

(a) That external prosperity and adversity *in this life* are not distributed by God as reward and punishment for the *moral* conduct of men, (vide s. 71, II.;) and that it is therefore judging hastily to pronounce positively and decidedly that the calamities which befall particular countries or individuals, from natural and not moral causes, are judgments from God, although they may be so overruled by the providence of God, and should be so improved as to contribute to the promotion of moral good and to the diminution of moral evil.

(β) That even although positive divine rewards and punishments should take place in the present life, (which we are not entitled to deny *in thesi*,) yet men are not in a situation, nor in any way qualified, to decide that they are so in

particular cases, because they have no sure and infallible marks by which they can distinguish these from advantages and calamities which result from other causes, and have no connexion with the good or ill desert of men. Hence Christ himself warns against such precipitate judgments. Vide s. 31, coll. Ps. lxxiii. 2, seq.

(γ) The Old Testament is often appealed to, where much is indeed said respecting positive rewards and punishments even in the present life; and by the unguarded application of such texts much injury may be done, even by sincere and well-disposed religious teachers. On this point instruction should be given to the people with due discretion, in conformity with what was said on this point, s. 31, ad finem, in the note. It must be shewn that the same is not true now as was true in that early period of the world, and under the peculiar constitution of the Jewish religion. This matter can be made very plain to any one, by remarking that then there were *prophets*, who, as the divine ambassadors, expressly declared that this and that physical evil was a positive punishment from God; but that, as we have no prophets now, we are unable in particular cases to pronounce a definite decision whether this and that evil is or is not to be regarded as a positive punishment.

(3) Still another chief objection, which is often urged against the existence of positive rewards and punishments in the future world, is this: God would have named the positive punishments which he meant to inflict, and would have settled the manner of their infliction in his laws. This is done, it is said, by every humane and just legislator among men; and it is regarded by us as tyranny and despotism for a ruler to inflict punishment which he has not previously threatened. But this comparison of human rulers and magistrates with God, and of their punishments with his, will not hold. For (a) with human judges and magistrates this regulation is necessary, in order to prevent the judge from acting unjustly or rashly, or from inflicting too light or too severe a punishment under the influence of momentary feeling. But we are secure from any such danger when the punishments to be inflicted are left to the disposal of an omniscient, all-wise, and benevolent Ruler. There is not, therefore, the same reason for this that there is in the case of men. (b) Human criminal codes, even those which are most complete, contain only a few species of crimes; nor can they have any respect in the appointment of the punishment to the motives, the state of mind, and innumerable other circumstances which make the crime greater or less. But to all these circumstances God, who is perfectly wise and just, must have respect. How impossible, now, must it be to give a catalogue of all sins and their punishments, according to their

endlessly diversified degrees and modifications? Who would read, understand, or regard such a catalogue? Would it not make many for the first time, and to their great injury, acquainted with sins of which they otherwise would have known nothing? (c) As the future world lies entirely beyond the circle of our ideas, it might not be even possible fully to describe to us, in our present state, every kind of positive reward and punishment. (d) The fear of a positive punishment at present unknown makes a stronger impression upon the sinner, and is more efficacious in deterring him from sin, than that of a punishment definitely described; for, in the former case, the sinner will always fear the worst, and expect that the punishment will strike where he is most susceptible.

Note.—The holy scriptures, and particularly

Jesus and his apostles, make it a great object to unfold all the consequences of sin, and to shew how we can be freed from them. Those who are teachers of the gospel should follow their example in this respect. They insist particularly upon the *misery of the soul* arising from sin, and upon the punishments of the *future world*. This entire misery, or the unhappy state of both soul and body, as produced by sin, is called in the scriptures by various names—e. g., ὁλεθρος, ἀπώλεια, θάνατος, σκότος, κ. τ. λ. Vide Morus, p. 111, prope ad finem. Of the external evil consequences of sin which befall men in the present life the sacred writers speak less frequently, partly because these are not by any means so great and terrible as the other, and partly because they are perfectly obvious, and fall under the notice of every one.

PART II.—STATE INTO WHICH MAN IS BROUGHT BY THE REDEMPTION.

ARTICLE X.

OF JESUS CHRIST.



HIS important article has been treated in a great variety of ways from the earliest times. The teachers of religion and the interpreters of the Bible have, for various reasons, been

dissatisfied with the simple scriptural representation, and have often predetermined, by the principles of some school of philosophy, or by religious opinions current at their own time, what could

be believed concerning the person, offices, and merits of Jesus Christ. Any declarations of the Bible in opposition to their views have been either overlooked, as if they could not be found, or, by the help of that artificial exegesis which makes anything out of everything, have been so explained as to agree with their preconceived opinions. In this manner has this article especially been treated of late in the protestant church, particularly in the Lutheran church in Germany. And so common has it become to pervert this doctrine in the universities, schools, and in popular discourses and writings, that the teacher who turns aside from the beaten path must possess no small degree of unprejudiced piety. My design is, to exhibit, according to my honest conviction, *the pure, unfalsified doctrine of the Bible*, with its proof, and carefully to

distinguish it from ecclesiastical distinctions, and from other additions and alterations.

The latter I shall consider by themselves, and endeavour to illustrate them from history, and to pronounce judgment upon them according to their true merits.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE DIVINE INSTITUTIONS FOR THE RESTORATION OF MEN IN A GENERAL VIEW; THE EXPECTATIONS, PREDICTIONS, AND TYPES OF THE MESSIAH, AND THEIR FULFILMENT IN JESUS OF NAZARETH.

SECTION LXXXVIII.

OF THE INSTITUTIONS ESTABLISHED BY GOD FOR THE MORAL RECOVERY AND THE SALVATION OF THE HUMAN RACE IN A GENERAL VIEW; AND THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINES AND REPRESENTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT; AS A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO WHAT FOLLOWS.

I. *What is requisite for the moral recovery of man.*

THE Bible everywhere teaches that man is debarred from the enjoyment of that happiness which God intended for him, by the want of holiness, by sin, and deserved punishment. Vide Art. IX. Holiness gives the only right of citizenship in the moral kingdom of God, (Βασιλεία Θεού.) Now because sin is universal among men, all have need of *forgiveness and reforma-*

tion—the remission of sins and regeneration, (ἀφεσις, μετάνοια, ἀναγέννησις.) And since we never attain to perfect holiness in this life, whatever advances we may make, [and hence must be disquieted with regard to our acceptance with God,] it is equally essential that we should have some *quieting assurance* respecting what awaits us, in order to the exercise of true religion, as that we should reform. These, then, are the principal objects at which Christianity aims. If men are to be redeemed, these hindrances to their happiness must be removed, they must be reformed, and must be forgiven, and a comforting assurance that they are so must be imparted. This is done in two ways:

(1) By one method, the power of *sinful affections* is weakened; so that reason will again attain to its dominion over them; by which man will be placed in a situation to lead a holy and pious life, (δικαιῶς καὶ εὐσεβῶς ζῆν, κ. τ. λ.) This means, however, must be of such a nature as to leave human freedom entirely unimpaired. Reformation in a moral being is effected by bringing the desires and inclinations, from which actions spring, under the control of the intelligent mind. It is for this reason that in Christianity a doctrine is revealed to men to be received and believed by them, intended to enlighten their minds, to teach them how to avoid and overcome the temptations to sin, and how to live agreeably to the will of God and their own destination. This doctrine must exhibit the motives for the avoidance of sin and the practice of virtue and holiness in a manner universally intelligible and convincing, equally designed to illuminate the reason and affect the heart. But it must also shew in what way man can attain power to enable him to be holy. For any mere doctrine of virtue, or code of moral precepts, does not confer upon man the power of becoming actually virtuous. This, as Paul says, is τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου. The moral law, with all its precepts, threatenings, and promises, could not by itself make us holy and acceptable. The fault, however, does not lie in the law, but in that weakness and imperfection which results from our depravity, (Sinnlichkeit.) Ἐν ᾧ ἡσθενεὶ διὰ σαρκός. Now in Christianity, as we are taught by the sacred writers, the most perfect instruction of this nature is given to men.

(2) But the Bible teaches us that the recovery of man to happiness requires something more than this instruction. This other means is, the forgiveness of sins, or, freedom from the punishment of sin. Nor was it enough that men should be merely forgiven; their tranquillity and happiness require that they should be able to attain to an assurance and certain conviction of the fact. This can be done through the atonement of Christ. Many ancient and

modern philosophers and religious teachers have, indeed, maintained that no such atonement is necessary, since God forgives the sins of men whenever they reform. But the whole history of the human race, in ancient and modern times, proves that an universal apprehension, arising from a universal feeling of need, has prevailed among men, that besides inward reformation, some other means of propitiating the Deity, and averting the deserved punishment of sin, are necessary, and do actually exist.

The following reasons may be given for this feeling:—viz. (a) Although one should be guilty of no new transgressions, he cannot feel a comforting assurance that the sins which he has previously committed will be forgiven on the ground of his subsequent reformation. Indeed, he can find no reason to believe this, while he has reason enough to fear the contrary. For how can that which is once done be undone, or the consequences of it be prevented? (b) Every man, whatever his advances in sanctification, must still confess that his holiness is very imperfect, and that he frequently sins. How, then, can he hope to deserve the mercy of God by a holiness which is so imperfect and mingled with sin? It is the voice of conscience, then, which has produced and spread so widely among men this feeling of the necessity of an expiation. There is not a nation upon the globe, as Plutarch has observed, which has not certain appointments for this purpose; such as offerings, cleansings, and other religious rites. Cf. Meiners, Geschichte der Religionem, s. 123, f.

Now it will be in vain to endeavour to take away this feeling from man, considering how universal and deeply rooted it is, and that it is founded upon the voice of conscience, and corresponds with the most natural and familiar notions which men form respecting God, and his manner of feeling and acting. The religious teacher who withholds from his people the doctrine of *pardon through Christ*—who represents it as uncertain and doubtful, or entirely rejects it, acts very inconsiderately and unadvisedly. He cannot substitute anything better, or more consoling. And when the consciences of men awake, he will be unable to give other grounds which can prove so entirely sufficient for their consolation.

II. *The different institutions which God has appointed for the restoration and moral perfection of the human race in a general view.*

(1) The means which God employs for this purpose are very various and manifold. They are designed partly to weaken the power and dominion of sin; partly to instruct men, and to shew them the true way to happiness, and give

them power to pursue it. These objects are promoted even by the original constitution which God has given to nature, the movements of conscience, the unhappy feelings which follow upon sinful actions, &c.; also by the common and extraordinary instruction which God has given to men, in one way and another, (πολυμερῶς καὶ πολλοτρόπως, Heb. i. 1;) by the opportunity afforded us of becoming acquainted with the nature of virtue and vice—the happiness of the good, and the wretchedness of the bad, by observing the example and profiting by the experience of others;—in short, by *history*, which is one of the best teachers of the human race.

The history of every nation is useful in this respect; but that of the Jewish nation possesses uncommon interest. Jesus and his apostles allude to it constantly in their discourses. It is indeed highly instructive, and exhibited in such a way as to make the deepest impression upon the most numerous class of men. It always represents God not simply as a *metaphysical* being, but as conversant with men, and acting after the manner of men. It presents clearly before our eyes the attributes of God, the course of his providence, and the salutary discipline he exercises over men. Those religious teachers who entirely reject the use of the Old Testament in the instruction of the common people and of the young, and who would gladly see the book itself cast aside, know not what they do. They deprive themselves and their charge of great advantages. It is, indeed, abused in various ways, as it was at the time of Christ; but this does not prevent its proper use. Respecting the use of the *history* of the Old Testament, vide 1 Cor. x. 6, 11; Rom. xv. 4, and Köppen's excellent work, "Die Bibel, ein Werk der göttlichen Weisheit;" and J. G. Müller, Von dem christlichen Religionsunterrichte; Winterthur, 1809, 8vo.

But the greatest blessing which God has bestowed upon men, as the Bible everywhere teaches, is the appearance of Christ in the world, his instructions, and his entire work for the human race; Rom. xi. 33, 36. Still, we ought not to undervalue or exclude the other benevolent institutions by which God has benefited and does still benefit, not only Christians, but mankind at large. All these means should be considered as inseparably connected, as they really are, and as the scriptures represent them. Cf. Jerusalem, Betrachtungen, th. ii.; Hess, Vom Reiche Gottes; Lessing, Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts; Berlin, 1780.

(2) These means are *universal*. Vide Morus, p. 126, s. 6. God has not, indeed, bestowed them at all times, and upon all nations; since all men in all ages have not been capable of receiving them; but he has selected the most proper in every age and nation; so that the know-

ledge and worship of God, piety and virtue, have never been wholly lost from the earth. We should not confine our attention to the Jewish nation, but should search out and thankfully admire the traces of divine care over nations called heathen. Even in the midst of their imperfect knowledge of God, and of their polytheism, we often find true religiousness and piety, which, notwithstanding their erroneous views, are certainly acceptable in the sight of God. The ancient writers are full of such instances. The gracious care and providence of God is as clearly seen in raising up good legislators, practical sages, teachers of the people, promoters of science and morality, among the Greeks, Romans, and other people of the earth, for their improvement and moral good, as in the institutions which he established among the Jewish people for the same purposes. These natural means which God employs redound as much to his glory as the supernatural.

Paul therefore says expressly, that God has given the heathen opportunity of knowing him; that he has not left himself without a witness among them; and that they, too, will be inexcusable if they leave unimproved that knowledge of God imparted to them through nature, Acts, xvii. 27; Rom. i. 18, seq. Accordingly, the virtue and piety which the heathen practise, after the measure of their imperfect knowledge, is represented in the Bible as agreeable to God. The case of the centurion Cornelius is an example, Acts, x. God accounted him worthy to be entrusted with more knowledge, because he proved himself faithful in the use of that lesser degree which he possessed.

The national pride of the Jews led them into the mistake that God had a special regard for *them*; that they were more agreeable to him than other nations; that they exclusively were his children; and that the Messiah was designed only for them. These mistakes are frequently opposed in the New Testament; there is εἰς Θεὸς καὶ Πατὴρ πάντων, Ephes. iv. 5, 6; 1 Tim. ii. 5, seq. God has no partiality, (προσωποληψία,) Rom. x. 12; Acts, x. 34; all have equal right to the divine blessings, especially to those conferred by Christianity; John, x. 16; Ephes. i. 10; ii. 14, 18; Rom. v. 18, seq.; and the texts cited by Morus, p. 126, s. 6, n. 1, 3. This universality of the divine favours is expressly asserted even in the Old Testament. The prophets frequently affirm that the knowledge of the true God will become universal among the heathen, and that they by no means shall be excluded from it; Deut. xxxii. 31; Isaiah, ii. and lxvi. Indeed, the Old Testament contains promises of far better times in future for the heathen than for the Jews.

(3) They are appointed by God with great

wisdom in reference to the nature of man and the circumstances of particular *times*. Such means are selected as allow the freedom of man, and leave him at liberty to choose or reject. It is the internal force of truth which is made to influence man, and not external compulsory means. Moreover, God, like a wise father and teacher, proceeds according to the time and age of the human race in general, and of nations and individuals in particular. He regulates his instruction according to their capacity. He does not overload their infancy with such laws and precepts as they cannot understand, but saves the higher instruction for the maturer age of a more advanced generation.

This greater or less capability of some generations and nations in comparison with others, should be considered as one reason why God did not earlier disclose certain truths which are peculiar to Christianity, and why he still withholds them from certain nations and countries. For such nations, however, he provides in another way, and leads them to that degree of happiness of which they are capable. He is not confined to one method, as is shewn in the Introduction. Nor is the education of the human race confined to this life; provision will doubtless be made to enable those who are *innocently* deficient here to make up their loss hereafter.

Note.—In the New Testament, the terms *χάρις*, *χάρις Θεοῦ*, *δωρεά Θεοῦ*, are used to denote the whole compass of means employed by God to bring men to happiness, as well as any particular means. Vide Morus, p. 122, 125. The term *χάρις* is used in various senses; and as unscriptural ideas are often attached to it, we shall here briefly explain the scriptural significations. It corresponds to the Hebrew *חֵן*, and sometimes to *חַסֵּד*, and similar words. It signifies (1) in general, the unmerited love and benevolence which God, as the supreme Governor, bears for all his creatures and subjects, and especially for men; and so is synonymous with *ἀγάπη*, *χρηστότης*, *φιλανθρωπία*, Tit. iii. 4; and (2) the consequences and proofs of this gracious regard; in short, all undeserved divine favours; John, i. 16, *χάρις ἀντὶ χάριτος*. These are elsewhere called *χάρισμα*, *δωρεά*, x. τ. λ. Cf. Rom. v. 15. Inasmuch as they are undeserved, they are contrasted with *ὀφείλημα*, Rom. iv. 4.

Hence arise various other significations, by which certain great favours are called *χάρτες*, by way of eminence: as (a) the Christian doctrine and institute in general, and particularly that principal doctrine of Christianity, the gracious forgiveness of sin on account of Christ. *Χάρις καὶ ἀλήθεια*, John, i. 7; *λόγος χάριτος*, the benevolent doctrine, Acts, xiv. 3; *χάρις Θεοῦ*, Tit. ii. 11, *χάρις Χριστοῦ*, and *χάρις* simply, Acts, xviii. 27, seq. (b) Certain employments,

businesses, and offices in the Christian church, and the talents, abilities, and gifts bestowed by God upon particular persons in reference to these offices. Thus Rom. i. 5, *χάρις καὶ ἀποστολή*; also xii. 3. In other texts, *χάρισμα* is used, with which *χάρις* is interchanged as synonymous in 1 Pet. iv. 10, and in the epistles to the Corinthians. From these and similar texts is derived (c) the ecclesiastical usage, in which *gratia* denotes, by way of eminence, the operations of God upon the hearts of men for their improvement and conversion. These operations were called *actiones gratiæ*, and the condition of a converted man *statum gratiæ*. The Latin church, especially since the time of Augustine, has used this word in this sense. Vide Vide infra, s. 129.

From what has been said, it appears that the *grace* of God is only his *goodness*, considered in a particular relation. Grace is the goodness of a superior to a *subordinate* person. The ruler, properly speaking, is gracious only to the subject, and the lord to the slave. The Bible conforms to this usage. God, then, is *gracious*, in the highest sense of this word, because he is the supreme and necessary ruler and governor of men. Everything, consequently, which God does for men, relating to the body or soul, is an operation of his grace, *actus gratiæ divini*. And this grace is *free*, because no one can compel it; and the very idea of *grace* excludes all *merit*, Rom. iv. 4.

III. The particular purpose of God to restore the human race by Christ.

The New Testament teaches that God has determined to bestow his favours upon men through Christ, and to lead them to holiness and happiness by him. Hence Christ is called *ἀρχηγὸς ζωῆς*. Acts, iii. 15, coll. ver. 26. This term is explained by *αἰτιος σωτηρίας*, Heb. v. 9, coll. Acts, xvii. 30, 31. The gracious decree of God to pardon, sanctify, and bless mankind, and the institutions he has established for this purpose, are called *χάρις σωτήριος*, Tit. ii. 11; iii. 4. The following particulars are implied—viz., God designs to free men from the unhappiness occasioned by sin, (*σῶζειν*;) and also to bestow upon them unmerited favours, *χαριτοῦν*, *χάρις*, x. τ. λ.) These favours are pardon, sanctification, and eternal blessedness, also information communicated by God respecting this blessedness, instruction as to the manner how we may attain to it, and strength imparted to us for this end. This grace of God is called *ἡ χάρις Θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ δοθείσα*, 1 Cor. i. 4. It is always represented in the New Testament as bestowed upon us through Christ, and on his account. By him God teaches us and renews us; pardons us on account of his death; and

bestows upon us eternal blessedness through him and for his sake. Everything proceeds from him, and is referred to him. This purpose of God is also described in the Bible by the words *δέλγμα Θεοῦ, πρόθεσις, πρόγνῳσις* and *προορίζειν*, Ephes. i. 4, 11; iii. 11. The Bible says, too, that God made this decree *from eternity*, (*πρὸ αἰώνων*, or *καταβολῆς κόσμου*.) All the divine decrees are of this peculiar nature, as is implied in the particle *πρό*. The passage 1 Pet. i. 20 is very clear upon this subject. From the Old Testament, the passage Ps. xl. 7, seq., belongs in this connexion. This decree is always described as the *free* determination of God. Thus in the passages cited it is called *ἐδοξία δέλγματος*. Not that it would have been consistent for God to desert the human race, and leave it to perish; the divine goodness forbids such a supposition. The simple meaning is, that no external necessity compelled him to it, and that it is his free grace, without any desert or worthiness on the part of men. Paul too, in Rom. ix.—xi., speaks of the free grace of God in respect to the new institute which he established upon earth by Christ.

The following result may be deduced from what has been said:—Christianity is founded upon the principles, (*a*) that all men are considered as sinners in the sight of God; to which the conscience of every one bears testimony, (vide No. I. ad finem;) and that therefore (*b*) they are subject to the punishment of sin, as experience proves. The distinguishing trait of Christianity is this: that it promises to men DELIVERANCE FROM SIN, AND THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN, before it requires of them perfect holiness, acceptable to God. It thus comes to the relief of ignorant, desponding, and feeble man; inspires him with confidence in God, and with love to him; acquaints him with his destination to true holiness and unalterable happiness, and shews the only way by which he can attain it. Any philosophy or system of religion which reverses this order, and demands holiness of men before it gives the power to attain it; which represents holiness as the procuring cause of forgiveness; fails of its object, and asserts and requires an impossibility. The great point in this pardon or amnesty which Christianity promises, is the doctrine that Jesus Christ came into the world to bless sinful men, to free them from sin and death; 1 Tim. i. 15, coll. 2 Tim. i. 10; John, iii. 16, 17. This pardon, however, reaches men only when, under divine guidance and assistance, they act according to the conditions and precepts laid down. Hence forgiveness and eternal life are inseparably connected in Christianity with the requisition of *repentance* and *faith* made active by love. These doctrines are always connected in the scriptures; so Tit. ii. 11—14.

SECTION LXXXIX.

FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF MESSIAH AMONG THE ANCIENT AND MODERN JEWS; THEIR VARIOUS OPINIONS RESPECTING HIM; AND THE PROOF THAT JESUS WAS THE MESSIAH.

I. *The gradual development of the idea of a Messiah among the Israelites.*

(1) THE idea of a former happy condition in the earliest ages of the world is universal among men, and is found too among the Israelites Vide s. 56. But it is quite as natural to the human mind to console itself in the midst of troubles, sufferings, and the feeling of physical and moral imperfection, with the hope of better times to come, and of a future happy condition, either in this life or the life to come, or in both together. Hence arose the fables of the heathen respecting the return of a golden age, the expected dwelling of the gods upon earth, and pictures of a similar nature, in which their wishes and expectations were embodied. These ideas, like those concerning the original golden age, are held by every nation, and are founded, like those, in a feeling of necessity which is deep laid in the human soul. These ideas, expectations, and wishes, are found in every nation; differently modified, however, according to their particular situation and mode of thinking and representation. One people is more bold and confident in its expectations; another is more moderate, hoping and wishing rather than determining and deciding.

(2) The Jewish nation, too, expected such a return of the golden age to the earth; and they were justified in this by the declarations and promises of their oldest prophets. But this expectation of the Jews was peculiar, and distinguished from that of others in this respect, that this period was placed by them in the times when the Messiah should appear. These happy times were called *יְמֵי מָשִׁיחַ*.

(3) But the question here arises—Is the doctrine respecting the Messiah, the Saviour of the world, a doctrine really revealed by God to men; or is it merely a human opinion, originating among the Jews from their accidental circumstances,—in short, a Jewish *fable*, employed by Christ and the apostles for benevolent, moral purposes?

FIRST. The last supposition is maintained in general by those who deny or question all direct revelation; by all, indeed, who deny the reality of *miracles*; for *predictions* belong to the class of miraculous occurrences; and the objections made to one may be made to the other. Vide s. 7, III., s. 72, II. These writers endeavour by various hypotheses to explain the natural origin of this idea. Cf. Stephani, Gedan-

ken über die Entstehung und Ausbildung der Idee von einem Messias; Nürnberg, 1787, 8vo. Eckermann, Theologische Beyträge, b. ii. st. 1; Altona, 1791, 8vo. Ziegler, Entwicklung des wahrscheinlichen Ursprungs der Idee vom Messias, in Henke's Mag. für Religionsphilosophie, b. i. st. 1, Abhandl. 2. Ammon, Versuch einer Christologie des alten Testaments; Erlangen, 1794, 8vo. Their principal opinions may be compressed in the following statement—viz.,

Many brave heroes and deliverers (σωτῆρες, ὑποσώτες) had appeared among the Jews from the earliest period of their history, and had contributed to the public weal. Such were the *prophets* and *great kings*. But the advantages which had been hoped for, both in respect to religious and moral improvement, and also in respect to civil and social welfare, had not as yet been realized, and were still expected in future time. By degrees, all wishes, hopes, and expectations centred in *one* person, who would accomplish all which was desired. This idea did not become general, or rather, did not take its origin, among the Jews until after the Babylonish captivity. This person was expected to be the deliverer and helper of the *Jewish* nation, and principally a temporal deliverer, who would establish an earthly kingdom. This idea prevailed widely among the Jews at the time of Christ, and, by the aid of the allegorical interpretation then current, was carried into the more ancient of their sacred books. Now Jesus, it is said, found this idea, and connected it, such as he found it, with his doctrine; not considering it himself (as many say) to be really true. He modified this idea, and gave himself out for a *spiritual* deliverer of mankind by his *instruction*. Eckermann, therefore, affirms distinctly, that in the whole Old Testament there are no proper predictions of Christ. Beytr. st. 1.

Remarks on this Explanation.

(a) All accounts of the origin of this idea, which are exclusive of direct divine revelation, if not otherwise objectionable, are merely conjectural and hypothetical, and cannot be historically proved. This is the reason why they are so various and contradictory; there is no sure historical ground and basis upon which they can be established and built; they are mere plays of the imagination, mere conjectures as to the manner in which the thing may possibly have been. And indeed, many cases may be imagined *possible*, no one of which can be proved to be historically true, and most of which have historical evidence against them. This discrepancy of views among writers on this subject, therefore, never will or can cease, as long as they proceed in this way.

(b) The assertion of Eckermann and others,

that the Old-Testament descriptions of the Messiah are not descriptions of *Jesus*, but of an *earthly king*, is unfounded. For although the Messiah is often compared to a king, as even God is, he is also named and described as a *prophet* and *priest*. And to free men from sin, to instruct them, and promote their moral improvement, are ascribed to him as the principal part and proper object of his advent. Psalm xxii., xl., ex.; Isaiah, ii., xi., liii.

(c) The predictions of the prophets represent the Messiah not as the king and ruler of a single nation, as the Jewish kings were, but as the king and benefactor of all who should be friendly to him. In the predictions of the Jewish prophets he is promised quite as much, and even more, to the heathen than to the Jews themselves. Vide the passages before cited. The promises given to Abraham, Gen. xii. 3; xxii. 18, are certainly free from any Jewish exclusiveness, and are as comprehensive as possible.

(d) The assertion that the idea of Messiah originated during the Babylonish captivity, or afterwards, and that the earlier Jews differently understood the so-named Messianic passages in Moses and the prophets, is contrary to history. For the idea respecting a Messiah was universal among the Samaritans at the time of Christ, and much earlier. And indeed it was held by the Samaritans more purely than by the greater part of the Jews; as the Messiah was represented by them as the great *Prophet* and *Saviour*, John, iv. 25, 42, seq. Therefore this idea must have existed among the Jews before the religious separation between them and the Samaritans; and consequently before the Babylonian exile. For the Samaritans would not certainly have received it from the Jews after the separation. Whence then did they derive it? They admitted only the five books of Moses from the whole Old Testament. Accordingly, they must have grounded their expectation upon the testimony of Moses, and the interpretation of this testimony given them by the Israelitish teachers sent to them from Assyria, 2 Kings, xvii. 27, seq. The Israelites, therefore, must have had the idea of a Messiah long before the Babylonian exile, and must have found it, too, in the books of Moses.

SECONDLY.—The whole opinion that the idea of Messiah does not depend upon divine revelation, and that it is not contained in the oldest sacred records of the Hebrews, stands in the most palpable contradiction to the clearest declarations of Christ and his apostles. For (a) the writings of the prophets are acknowledged by them to be of divine authority, and the doctrines and predictions contained in them are not treated as fictions and fables, but as truly revealed by God. And (b) it is no less certain

that they teach that there are in Moses and the prophets predictions respecting the Messiah, or benefactor of the world, and that these were fulfilled in Jesus. Jesus himself frequently asserts this in the most impressive and solemn manner, Luke, xviii. 31—33; xxii. 37; xxiv. 27; Matt. xx. 18, 19; xxvi. 54; Mark, ix. 12; John, v. 39, 46. And in this his apostles exactly follow his example. Acts, ii. 16, 25; viii. 18; x. 34; xiii. 23, 32; xxvi. 22, 23; 1 Pet. i. 11; 2 Pet. i. 19, and the Pauline epistles. The apostles themselves therefore believed this.

Now if Jesus and his apostles were merely human teachers, they may *possibly* have erred in this matter; as also many of the Jewish teachers of that time, who interpreted these passages in the same way, may have done. But if they were divinely commissioned, what they say on this subject must be believed. For I am not at liberty to proceed optionally in believing the declarations of a man whom I acknowledge to be divinely commissioned. I am not at liberty to make selection of what I will admit and what reject at my good pleasure. I must rather yield unconditional faith to each and every thing which he, as a divine messenger, teaches and declares. Consistency, then, requires us to go on this principle in this subject. Vide Herder, *Briefe das Studium der Theologie betreffend*, br. 18, 21, particularly s. 303, f. 349—352, th. ii. Cf. Herder's Work, "Vom Erlöser der Menschen, nach unsern drey ersten Evangelisten"; Riga, 1796, 8vo. [Cf. especially Hengstenberg, "Christologie," where this whole subject is more ably discussed than anywhere else.—Tr.]

II. *Various opinions of the Jews at and after the time of Christ respecting the Messiah, and the nature of his kingdom.*

(1) At the time of Christ, and previously, the current opinion of the people in Palestine, and indeed of most of the Pharisees and lawyers, was, that he would be a temporal deliverer and a king of the Jews, and indeed, a universal monarch, who would reign over all nations. Thus they interpreted the passages, Psalm ii. 2, 6, 8; Jer. xxiii. 5, 6; Zech. ix. 4, seq. Hence those who, during the lifetime of Jesus, acknowledged him to be the Messiah, wished to proclaim him king, John, vi. 15, coll. Matt. xxi. 8, 9. The apostles themselves held this opinion until after the resurrection of Christ, Matthew. xx. 20, 21; Luke, xxiv. 21; Acts, i. 6. And Jesus himself, during his life upon earth, proceeded very guardedly, in order to lead them gradually from this deep-rooted prejudice, and and not to take it away at once. Josephus says that the enthusiasm of the Jews in the war against the Romans, was very much increased by this belief of an universal monarchy. Vide

Bell. Jud. vi. 5. Suetonius (Vesp. c. 4) and Tacitus (Hist. v. 13) speak of this expectation spread throughout all the East by the Jews. It was expected that he would institute new religious rites, (John, i. 25;) that he would perform uncommonly great miracles, (John, vii. 31;) that he would be born at Bethlehem, of the line of David, and yet from obscure parents, (John, vii. 42;) and that he would never die, (John, xii. 34.)

(2) Some, but by far the smallest number, had purer ideas respecting the Messiah; and did not so much expect an earthly kingdom as forgiveness of sin, instruction, diffusion of truth, and, in short, spiritual blessings. Simeon had this correct view, (Luke, ii. 30, seq.;) the malefactor on the cross, (Luke, xxiii. 43;) and a few other Jews at the time of Christ. Many pious Jews, too, out of Palestine, may be supposed to have had the same correct views. For even the common people of Samaria had opinions on this subject comparatively pure. Vide John, iv. 25, seq. Jesus approved these opinions as just and scriptural, and always acted in conformity with them. Vide Luke, xvii. 20, 21; John, xviii. 36—38. It is, then, very unjust to charge him with the intention of establishing an earthly kingdom, as is done in the work "Vom Zweck Jesu," Braunschweig, 1778. Vide Koppe "Progr. de sententia Judæorum de Messia et futuro ejus regno;" Gott. 1779.

(3) Many united both of these opinions, and considered the Messiah as a teacher and earthly king at the same time, as the supreme head of church and state. This appears to have been the opinion of the apostles and most of the disciples of Christ, while he lived upon the earth. A multitude of Christians of the Judaizing party, during the first and second centuries, believed that Christ would return to the earth to establish a temporal kingdom for a thousand years—an opinion which has been indulged by many Christians in every age down to the present time.

(4) Some of the Jews at the time of Christ, and previously, were free-thinkers, and appear to have rejected the whole notion of a Messiah as a popular superstition, a fabulous and groundless expectation. Especially was this the case after the destruction of the Jewish state by the Romans. Many of the Jews out of Palestine, especially the learned Grecian Jews, appear to have been of this way of thinking. Accordingly, there is no mention of this idea even in the Book of Wisdom, or in all the writings of Philo. And even Josephus, in his desire to please the Greeks and Romans, appears to have been ashamed of this faith of his fathers, and so always avoids the subject. They were satisfied with mere morality, and connected the Gre-

cian philosophy with the doctrines of the Jewish religion and theology. This silence is the more remarkable, especially in Philo, considering how much he was given to the allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament.

(5) We find all these different opinions repeated in the writings of the Jews who lived after the time of Christ and the destruction of the temple,—in the Chaldaic paraphrases, in the book Sohar, in the Talmud, and in the Rabbin, where so many of the ancient traditions are exhibited.

(a) The opinions of the more modern Jews were very various respecting the importance of the doctrine itself. Some considered it to be the most important doctrine of their faith, and expected that a complete restoration of religion, morality, and happiness, would be effected by the Messiah. In their view he was to accomplish, as it were, a new political and moral creation; so Maimonides. Others considered it as a doctrine of less importance, and seldom mentioned it. Many of them appear, in reality, to have rejected it altogether, or to have been ashamed of it.

(b) In respect to the institutions of the Messiah, and the object of his mission, they exhibited the same diversity as prevailed at an earlier period. Most adhered to the gross opinion of the establishment of an earthly kingdom, and the subjection of the *גוים*. Others made his most prominent object to be, the improvement of doctrine, the restoration of morals, and spiritual blessedness. But these were comparatively few.

(c) Some of the Jews who could not understand how the Messiah should be described by the prophets sometimes as king (Ps. ii., cx.; Is. xi.,) and sometimes as inferior, lowly and despised, (Ps. xxii.; Is. liii.,) invented the doctrine of a *twofold Messiah*, in order to reconcile these accounts; one, the inferior, despised Messiah, Joseph's son, in whom Christians believe; the other, David's son, who is yet to come and establish his kingdom.

(d) Many of the Jews endeavoured to account for the long delay of the Messiah by the sinfulness of which their nation is guilty. The promise, they say, was made conditionally. But this hypothesis derives no support from the Messianic oracles in the Old Testament.

III. *The method of proving that Jesus of Nazareth is the true Messiah.*

(1) This is proved from the marks and descriptions which the Old Testament gives of the Messiah, all of which meet in Jesus in the most remarkable manner. This proof that Jesus is the Messiah promised in the Old Testament, may be made extremely convincing. Christians, however, do not, as Collins supposes, by

any means rely solely on the predictions of the Old Testament for the Messianic authority of Jesus, nor does Christ himself. Vide John, v. 34, seq. For these predictions, though ever so valuable and important in themselves, are always, like all predictions, in a certain degree obscure. The Old Testament is indeed very instructive and useful, when rightly employed, but it is not the only ground on which the confidence of Christians rests. It affords important proof even for Christians, but not the only proof. Vide vol. i. s. 12, II.

This method of proof from the Old Testament is especially useful in convincing the Jews, and in refuting their objections. Thus Christ applies it, John, v. 39—47. All the marks which the Jews consider characteristic of the Messiah, according to their sacred books, agree exactly in Jesus. And all those traits and minute circumstances which are exhibited in passages of the Old Testament acknowledged by the Jews themselves to relate to the Messiah, meet in him as they do not in any other person known in history. He was born at Bethlehem, of the family of David, of which the Jews have now for a long time had no continued genealogical tables. He had a precursor. He confirmed his doctrine by the most striking miracles. He died, was honourably buried, and rose again. His garments were divided. Vinegar was given him to drink. And many other circumstances of the same nature, greater and smaller, which were predicted concerning the Messiah, were fulfilled in Jesus. Such passages are therefore very frequently urged by the apostles against the Jews, in order to convince them.

(2) Christians who acknowledge the divine authority of the New Testament, and the credibility of Jesus and the apostles, have an additional and principal ground of their belief of this truth, in the testimony and information contained in the books of the New Testament. Throughout these books Jesus is represented as the greatest divine messenger, Lord over all, the Saviour of the world, (*Σωτήρ, ὡς τοῦ κόσμου, ὁ Κύριος.*) In short, he is described as the same person whom the Jews call *Messiah*. If divine wisdom had seen proper to raise him up in another country, and under other circumstances, his name and the form of his doctrine might, indeed, have been different, while the substance itself would have continued the same.

According to the constant representation of the New Testament, God himself confirmed the truth that Jesus was the Messiah. He did this by John the Baptist, John, i. 19—41; by voices from heaven at the baptism of Christ, and on other occasions; by angels, Luke, i. 30—38; by Jesus himself, who confirmed the truth of his declarations by miracles, John, iv. 25, 26; Matt. xxvi. 62, 63; and by the apostles commissioned

to be his messengers, Acts, ii. 22—38; 1 John, i. and ii. 1; &c.

Thus in all the passages of the New Testament where it is said that Jesus is the Messiah, or that the Messiah has come in the person of Jesus, the idea is always implied that Jesus is the promised *Lord* and *Redeemer*, the *Benefactor* and *Saviour*. In short, the word *Messiah*, which *grammatically* signifies *king*, becomes a *doctrinal* word, synonymous with *Κύριος* and *Σωτήρ*. And in this way the erroneous views of the Jews respecting the Messiah were corrected. If we would consider the subject in this light, and be satisfied with the representations which the New Testament gives of it, we should easily avoid the difficulties with which many have been perplexed regarding this doctrine. Vide Eckermann, Theol. Beytr. st. 1. We should not then declare, with this writer and others, that the doctrine that *Jesus is the Messiah* belongs only to the Jews, and is not an essential doctrine of pure Christianity. The Hebrew name משיח was Jewish or Israelitish, but the thing denoted by it was intended for *all*, and is a fundamental doctrine of Christianity.

Note.—Works on some of the subjects treated in this section. For information respecting the Jewish opinions of the Messiah, vide Maii "Synopsis Theol. Judaicæ;" Giess, 1698, 4to; Glassner, De gemino Judæorum Messia; Helmst, 1739, 4to; Eisenmenger, Entdecktes Judenthum; Keil (Prof. Lips.), Hist. Dogm. de regno Messia; Jesu et app. ætate; Lipsiæ, 1781. On the point that Jesus is the Messiah, vide the ancient works of Olearius and Schöttgen, in "Hor. Hebr." t. ii. The most complete work after these is that of Bishop Kidder, "Convincing Proof that Jesus is the Messiah," translated from the English by Rambach; Rostock, 1757, 4to. [For a fuller account of the literature of this subject, cf. Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 444, Anmerk. Vide especially the late work of Hengstenberg, Christologie des A. T.—Tr.]

SECTION XC.

OF THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH WE ARE TO INTERPRET THE LITERAL AND FIGURATIVE PREDICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT RESPECTING THE MESSIAH, AND THE NEW INSTITUTE FOUNDED BY HIM.

I. *Brief History of the manner in which Christians have interpreted the Messianic Predictions.*

THE allegorical method of interpretation prevailed among the early Christian fathers, especially the Egyptian fathers—e. g., Justin the Martyr, Pantænus, Clement of Alexandria, Tatian, and still more after the age of Origen. They considered the Bible, as Philo and other learned Grecian Jews had done before them, to

be a repository of every kind of useful information, and especially of all religious truth. Any truth of this kind which they did not find clearly exhibited in it, they introduced by means of their allegorical interpretation, exactly in the same way as the stoics, and many other learned Grecians, had proceeded with Homer and some other of their sacred books. On this principle it was that many of these fathers endeavoured to find all the perfection of Christian knowledge in the Old Testament, and carried back into it the entire Christian system. But in this they deviated widely from the mind of the apostles, who expressly say that the patriarchs saw the promised blessings only from afar off, (Heb. xi. 13,) and that there was much *obscurity* in the predictions concerning Christ, 2 Peter, i. 19—21; 1 Peter, i. 10—12.

But this extreme was objected to by many of the learned fathers—e. g., Eusebius the Emesene, Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodorus of Mopsuestia. Some of these fell into the opposite extreme, and allow few or no passages in the Old Testament to refer to the Messiah. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others, took a middle course between these two parties. This difference of opinion has continued down through all ages of the Christian church. Some have seen the Messiah rarely or nowhere, others everywhere; in the Old Testament; while others still have pursued a middle course. Vide Ernesti, "Narratio critica de interpret. prophetiarum Mess. in eccl." in Opusc. Theol.

II. *Examination of the principles of the theory of accommodation applied to the interpretation of the Messianic Predictions.*

Since the time of Semler, about the middle of the eighteenth century, an opinion has prevailed widely in the protestant church, that the Old Testament contains very few passages, or none at all, which treat literally and properly of Jesus Christ, and that all or most of the passages cited in the New Testament are used in the way of *accommodation*. The following reasons have been offered in support of this theory. The Jews at the time of Christ were very much given to the allegorical interpretation of scripture. Ever after the time of the exile, when the expectation of a Messiah had become universal among them, they had eagerly searched the Old Testament for everything which in the least favoured this expectation; and had succeeded, by the help of their allegorical interpretation, in making their scriptures seem to contain predictions respecting a Messiah. Jesus and the apostles were therefore compelled to pursue the same method, and to use it as a means of gradually bringing the Jews to a better knowledge of religion. Their pursuing this course does not prove that they themselves considered these passages as

actual predictions. That they did not so consider them appears from the fact that they pursued a different course when teaching gentiles, and did not in that case appeal to the Old Testament.

But in this statement we must carefully distinguish between what is true and what is erroneous and exaggerated.

(1) The allegorical interpretation of the sacred scriptures cannot be historically proved to have prevailed among the Jews from the time of the exile, or to have been common with the Jews of Palestine at the time of Christ and his apostles. Although the Sanhedrim and the hearers of Jesus often appealed to the Old Testament, according to the testimony of the New-Testament writers, they give no indication of the allegorical interpretation. Even Josephus has nothing of it. The Platonic Jews of Egypt began, in the first century, in imitation of the heathen Greeks, to interpret the Old Testament allegorically. Philo was distinguished among those in that place who practised this method, and he defends it as something new, and before unheard of, and for that reason opposed by the other Jews; *De Confus. Lingu.* p. 347, seq. Jesus was not, therefore, in a situation where he was compelled to comply with a *prevailing custom* of allegorical interpretation; for this method did not prevail at that time among the Jews; certainly not in Palestine, where Jesus taught.

(2) The writers of the New Testament themselves make a clear distinction between the allegorical and literal interpretation of the Old Testament. When they use the allegorical method, they either say expressly, *here is allegory*, *Gal. iv. 24*, or they shew it by the context, or by prefixing some particle of comparison—e. g., *ὡς περ καὶ ὁ Χρῆστος*, *Heb. vii. 14*; *John. iii. 14*; *Matt. xii. 40*. But they express themselves very differently in texts which they quote as literal prophecy for the purpose of proof.

(3) If the apostles did not allude to the Old Testament in the instructions which they gave to gentiles, it does not follow either that they believed the Old Testament to be of no use to them, or that they did not seriously consider the passages which they cited as predictions in their instructions to the Jews to be really such. The reason why the apostles omitted these allusions in the commencement of the instruction which they gave to the heathen is the same as leads the wise missionary at the present day to omit them in the same circumstances. Their gentile hearers and readers knew nothing of the Bible, and could not, of course, be convinced from an unknown book. The apostles, however, gradually instructed their gentile converts in the contents of this book, and then appealed to it as frequently before them as before Jews or con-

verts from Judaism. This is proved by the Epistles and the Acts of the Apostles. Thus Peter says to the *heathen* centurion, Cornelius, after the latter had become acquainted with the prophets, "Of this Jesus testify all the prophets," &c., *Acts, x. 43*, coll. *Acts, viii. 26—35*, and the epistles of Paul.

(4) It cannot be shewn, in general, that Jesus and his apostles, in compliance with the current prejudices of their contemporaries, ever taught anything or seemingly affirmed anything to be true which they themselves considered as false. No more can it be shewn, in particular, that they adopted and authorized any explanations of the Old Testament which they themselves considered as invalid, merely because they were common among their contemporaries. Such compliance is entirely contrary to their usual course of action; (*vide Matt. v. 19, 23*;) nor can it be at all justified on pure moral principles, as even modern theologians are beginning more and more to allow. When Christ, therefore, says distinctly, *Matt. xxii. 43*, that *David, by divine revelation, called the Messiah, Lord (Ps. cx.)*, he must have believed exactly as he said, and so have admitted a divine prediction respecting the Messiah in this psalm. The same when he says, *John, v. 46*, "that Moses wrote concerning him." Hence it follows, that whenever Jesus and the apostles expressly assent to the Jewish explanations of the Old Testament, or build proofs upon them, they themselves must have considered these explanations as *just*.

Here everything depends upon the doctrine above stated; if Christ and his apostles were mere human teachers, they may have erred; but if they spake as divine messengers, they must be believed on their simple authority.

III. *The principles of Interpretation on which Christ and his Apostles proceed in quoting from the Old Testament, especially the Messianic Passages.*

Undoubtedly many of the same principles often appear in Jewish writings, as well as the same formula of quotation, "thus is fulfilled," &c. *Vide Wöhner, Antiqq. Heb. t. ii.*; *Surenhus, Βιβλος καταλλαγης. Westein ad Matt. i. 22*, and *Schöttgen*, in s. 89 of his book last cited. Now if Christ, by his own example, authorizes the principles which were embraced by the Jews, he himself must have considered them to be true. Whether we must on this account consider them as true, must be determined by the alternative above stated. The principles of interpreting the Old Testament which many modern commentators have adopted, differ altogether from those which Christ and his apostles followed; still these modern principles must not be ascribed to Christ and his apostles, but we must inquire historically, *What were the principles on which Christ and his apostles pro-*

ceeded? These need not necessarily be the same as those which modern interpreters adopt.

(1) God determined *from eternity* (πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου) to send a benefactor and saviour (Σωτήρ, *Messias*) to bless the world made wretched by sin. This purpose was revealed very early, and was from time to time repeated and rendered more plain. Thus Christ and the apostles declare, with the Jews, "that Moses, the Psalms, and the prophets spake concerning him." Vide s. 89.

(2) God saw best to communicate his will to the patriarchs of the Jewish nation, and to transmit this revelation to their posterity by means of extraordinary men, messengers, (ἰσχυροί;) thus making the Israelites, as it were, the depositaries of the divine revelations for the salvation of men during the earlier ages of the world. In this respect, too, Christ and the Jews were agreed; and in this, also, that God had reference, in all his instructions and ordinances given by the prophets, to his great plan respecting the Messiah.

(3) Consequently, according to the doctrine of Christ, the writings of the prophets, from Moses downwards, contain *literal* predictions respecting this Saviour of the world and the new institute to be founded by him, though all these predictions are not of equal clearness.

(4) But to these prophets themselves everything which they predicted was not perfectly plain and intelligible. God saw best to reserve the more clear explanation of the sense of many of his earlier oracles to be communicated by prophets at a later period. Thus many of the predictions respecting Christ and his apostles could be more distinctly and justly interpreted in after times than by the prophets themselves who originally uttered them. This maxim often appears in the writings of the Jews, and is expressly mentioned in the New Testament; 1 Pet. i. 10—12, and 2 Pet. i. 19. Vide Progr. ad h. l. [Vide the discussion of this point in the Bib. Repository, No. I. Art. 4; also No. IV. Art. 4. Cf. Woods on Inspiration, Lect. i. p. 33.—Tr.]

(5) The duties and offices of the Messiah very much resemble the duties and offices of the Old-Testament *prophets, priests, and kings*. These names are therefore frequently applied to him. As a king of the house of David, he inherited, as it were, all the rights, privileges, and titles of the kings, (e. g., of David or Solomon;) as a *prophet*, those of the Jewish prophets, (e. g., of Moses and others;) and as a *priest*, those of the priests, (e. g., of Melchisedec and Aaron.) The character which they possessed, and the actions which they performed imperfectly, and on a small scale, he possessed and performed perfectly, and on a large scale. This canon of interpretation is held by the Rabbins, and is not

in any way objectionable. The case is very much the same as when the rights of an emperor are proved by shewing from the history of the empire that his predecessors possessed them; or when the official rights of a person are established from the ancient privileges of the office, and from the history of his predecessors in it. Cf. Psalm lxxxix. 27, 31—34.

This principle casts light upon the passages of the New Testament, where texts are cited from the Old, which appear at first sight to treat of different persons and objects. All the texts in which the rights, offices, and dignities of the Israelitish prophets, priests, and kings, are the subjects of consideration, relate to the Messiah, the greatest of their successors, and are directly applicable to him. He possesses all the greatness, distinction, and pre-eminence ascribed to them, only in a far higher degree. So it is in the writings of the Jews, and in the New Testament, Heb. i. and ii., and other places.

(6) The Jews generally, though not uniformly, asserted the pre-existence of the Messiah before his visible appearance upon the earth, although the doctrine of his miraculous birth was not as yet entirely clear to them. This is seen in the Chaldaic paraphrases and in the writings of the Rabbins. Christ himself affirms his pre-existence in the clearest manner, John, viii. 58; chap. xvii. seq. The writers just mentioned ascribe everything which was done in the Old Testament for the salvation of men, and particularly of the Jews, to the Messiah, as the efficient or concurrent cause. He led them from Egypt, defended them in their journey through the desert, and spake to them by the prophets. They explained many passages of the Old Testament in which the appearance of God, or of the angel of the Lord, is mentioned, as applying directly to the Messiah. This principle, too, is authorized and adopted in the New Testament. According to 1 Pet. i. 11, it was the *Spirit of Christ* which inspired the prophets of the Old Testament, and communicated revelations through them. According to 1 Cor. x. 4, the *Rock* (a common appellation of God) which accompanied the Israelites in the desert was Christ. When they tempted God by disobedience, they tempted Christ, (ver. 9.) Isaiah, who saw God in his glory, (Isaiah, vi.) is said to have seen the glory of the Messiah, John, xii. 41.

Thus we see why texts of the Old Testament, which treat of God in general, and of his works among men, especially among his own people, are applied in the New Testament directly to the Messiah.

(7) Instruction by means of allegories, symbols, and symbolical actions, is very suitable to men; especially during the childhood both of individuals and nations. Such instruction is

exactly in the spirit of the Hebrews, and of other oriental nations. This being so, it would have been a subject of wonder if instruction of this kind had not been given respecting so important an object as the new dispensation to be instituted by the Messiah. That such instruction was given, the Jews have always maintained; and it is clearly contained in many passages of the Old Testament—e. g., Ps. xl. 7, seq. The writers of the New Testament distinctly teach that some of the ordinances appointed by Moses and the other prophets by divine command, were designed by God to prepare the way for the future Saviour of the world, to point to him, and to be types of him and his blessings. Sacrifice, expiation, and other ordinances of the Old Testament, were not appointed on their own account, but were intended as images of the more perfect ordinances to be expected in future time. Many of the expressions and images in the discourses of John the Baptist and of Christ respecting sacrifices and the sacrificial lamb, lead to this conclusion; and the correctness of it is distinctly declared by the apostles. Vide Col. ii. 17; Rom. iii. 21; the epistle to the Galatians, and Heb. viii., ix., x.; John, xix. 36.

But we are very liable to go too far in the illustration and development of these allegorical predictions; and this study frequently degenerates into an idle amusement. The charge of extravagance in this respect may be justly made against many of the ecclesiastical fathers, and many protestant theologians of later times, especially against Cocceius and his followers, at the close of the seventeenth century. The best way to avoid such mistakes is to admit of no allegorical predictions except such as are mentioned in the New Testament, and to extend the resemblance no further than it is carried there.

But we must not suppose, because some have made this subject ridiculous by their extravagance, that the New Testament does not authorize the belief of allegorical predictions. Such a supposition is most obviously untrue; and the only reason why any have supported it is, that they would *prefer* that an idea so inconsistent, as it seemed to them, with the spirit and ideas of our own age, should not be found in the New Testament. That the design of God relating to the future was not always made known immediately on the establishment of the ordinances of the former dispensation, does not prove that God, in founding those ordinances, had no such design. It was sufficient that he made it known as soon as men were capable of understanding it. Vide *supra*, No. 4.

These allegorical or symbolical predictions and indications are commonly called *types*. So they were called by the fathers, who took this term from Heb. viii. 5; Rom. vi. 7; 1 Cor. x.

6, 11. They were divided into *typos personales*, certain persons (rulers, prophets, priests,) who were the representatives of the Messiah; and *typos reales*, to which the Levitical ritual, sacrifices, and other ordinances of Moses belong. Vide Michaelis, *Typische Gottesgelahrtheit*; Dr. Rau, *Freymüthige Untersuchung über die Typologie*; Erlangen, 1784, 8vo; and, most of all, Storr *Commentar über den Brief an die Hebraer*, particularly s. 199—208.

Note.—In the instruction of the common people, the following view of this subject may be most scripturally and safely presented:—By means of various religious ordinances and remarkable persons among the Israelites, God represented and pointed out the Messiah; to these Jesus and his apostles often allude, in order to shew that the present dispensation was of old designed and decreed by God, and in order to excite a due estimation of these benefits in us, who have not the *shadow* simply, but the full enjoyment and possession of them; Col. ii. 17.

Those who deny any direct revelation of the divine will during the Old-Testament dispensation, declare themselves against allegorical predictions with great zeal. And so they must, in order to be consistent. But this shews that their doctrine is not agreeable to the scriptures, which affirm that both the Old and New Testaments contain direct divine revelations.

(8) Finally, all these observations are perfectly consistent with the principle that many texts of the Old Testament are cited merely on account of some accidental resemblance in subject or expression; in the same way as quotations are made in works of every kind; conveying the idea, *that what was true in the passage cited in one sense is true here in another sense*. Thus the text, Is. liii. 4, 5, “he removed our sicknesses,” denoting *spiritual* sicknesses, is applied, Matt. viii. 17, to *bodily* infirmities. The discourse of Christ, John, xviii. 9, coll. chap. xvii. 12, affords a similar example. Cf. on this subject, Köppen, *Die Bibel ein Werk der göttlichen Weisheit*, th. i. s. 235; Michaelis, *Dogmatik*, s. 122—128; Scrip. Var. Arg. p. 609, seq. respecting *πληρωσθήναι, x. τ. λ.*; Kleuker, *Tractat. de nexu prophetico inter utrumque constitutionis divinæ fœdus*. [Vide also Woods on Inspiration, Lect. ii.—Tr.]

SECTION XCI.

OF THE SUCCESSIVE DEGREES OF THE REVELATIONS AND PREDICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT RESPECTING THE MESSIAH.

DIVINE providence frequently makes a long and secret preparation for great and important events, before they are actually accomplished. Commonly it gives at first only intimations

and distant allusions, but gradually unfolds its designs more clearly. We might expect, then, with much probability, that the divine revelations respecting the Messiah would, at first, be comparatively scanty and obscure, and would gradually become more clear and evident. And such we find to be the fact. Besides, the early childhood of the world and of the Jewish nation was not prepared to receive full information upon this subject. Theologians observe, very justly, that God has most exactly adapted the instruction given respecting the Messiah to the necessities of men, and the circumstances of particular times. The Messiah, accordingly, is sometimes represented under the image of a king, sometimes under that of a prophet, again under that of a priest, &c.; s. 90.

Four periods are commonly distinguished.

(1) *The first period* extends from the commencement of scriptural history to the time of David. In this period there is, by general confession, the most obscurity. From the remotest ages, however, there was a general belief that a time would come, in a distant futurity, in which God would shew signal favour to men, and especially to *pious* men, in some extraordinary manner, by means of his prophets, and particularly *one* of them. This belief was sufficient; "They saw the promised blessings from a distance," Heb. xi. 13.

The first text of this kind occurs Gen. iii. 15. Vide s. 75, ad finem. [Also Hengstenberg's *Christologie*, s. 26, ff.] It was during the life of Abraham, and the times immediately following, if we judge from the Bible, that the general truth was made known, that his family would be the medium of communicating this great blessing to a future age. Here belongs the promise, Gen. xii. 3, that "in Abraham all nations should be blessed." This cannot mean that they should prosper if they received him and his posterity with kindness and treated them as friends, and be unfortunate if they did the contrary; but that this happiness should be diffused over all *through* Abraham and his posterity; he should be the *instrument* or agent in the hand of Divine Providence. Further, Gen. xxii. 8, "In (or through) thy *seed* shall all nations be blessed." This cannot mean that Abraham's posterity, as well as he himself, should be remarkably favoured by God; and all nations friendly to them, and who wished them well, should be prospered on their account. But here again is the idea conveyed that *the great happiness of the nations* should proceed from Abraham and his posterity, the Israelites. The former passage is explained by this. The word נָחַם may be used collectively here, as Paul uses it, Rom. iv. 13. But, in Gal. iii. 11, he refers this נָחַם more especially to the Messiah, and remarks that it may be translated in the singular. Christ

says expressly, that Abraham rejoiced in view of the birth and appearance of the Messiah upon the earth, John, viii. 56; and all the writers of the New Testament agree in referring these texts to the Messiah.

Another text is found in the song of Jacob, Gen. xlix. 10. 'This is not, indeed, cited in the New Testament as a Messianic prediction; but it is so understood by the Chaldaic paraphrast, the Talmud, and many of the Rabbins among the Jews; and by Justin the Martyr, in the second century; and afterwards by Augustine and others among the Christian fathers. The word נִשָּׂא, which Luther renders *held* (hero), has been explained in a great variety of ways. But in whatever way this word is understood, the rest of this text applies very well to the Messiah; and if Abraham expected such a deliverer, and waited for the day of the Messiah, according to the declaration of Christ above quoted, the same certainly may be true, in the view of Christ, respecting his grandson, who had the same promises and indulged the same hopes as Abraham. This text declares, that "*the sceptre shall not depart from Judah*," (i. e., the pre-eminence of this tribe over the others shall continue, although Judah was not the firstborn; that tribe furnished the nation with the greatest kings and warriors, long before the time of the Messiah,) "*until at last the נִשָּׂא (to be descended from it) should come, and to him should other nations gather*"—i. e., many other nations, besides the Jewish, should be subjected to him and dependent upon him. The best translation of נִשָּׂא is *proles ejus, filius ejus*, especially *his great descendant*. After Schultens, Stange has explained this word in the best manner, in his work, "*Symmikta*," th. ii. s. 224, f., Halle, 1802; though I cannot consent to refer the whole passage to Solomon, as he does.

The last text is Deut. xviii. 18, "*A prophet like me will Jehovah raise up*," &c. This text is referred to Christ in the discourses of Peter and Stephen, Acts, iii. 22 and vii. 37; and is probably alluded to in John, i. 45. Moses is giving the distinguishing mark of true and false prophets, and wishes to assure the Israelites that they would not be destitute of direct messengers from God after his death. By itself, therefore, it might be taken *collectively*, meaning "prophets like me," &c. But if at the time of Moses there was a belief in a general reformation of religion and morals, which should be effected in some future time in a special manner, by a prophet sent from God, (the opposite of which cannot be proved,) this word may be used *especially* to denote this future reformer; and Jesus expressly says, "Moses wrote concerning me," John, v. 46.

Besides these, the origin of many of the sym-bolical predictions respecting the Messiah may

be traced to this period; respecting them, vide s. 90.

(2) *The second period* comprises the reign of David. A considerable number of texts are found in the Psalms of David which may be referred to Christ more easily and naturally than to any other person. Some of them make mention of very minute circumstances which had their accomplishment in Jesus. These Psalms are actually referred to Christ in the New Testament. The most important of them are, Ps. ii., xvi., xxii., xl., cx. Now many of the Psalms from which passages are cited in the New Testament as referring to the Messiah, may, indeed, be understood to refer, in their primary and literal sense, to another king, from whose history they may be explained. But this is no objection to considering them, as the New Testament does, to be predictions of the Messiah, according to the principle contained in s. 90, III., No. 5;—e. g., Ps. xlv., lxviii., lxix., lxxii.

Sometimes, in these Psalms, the Messiah is represented as a king and priest—in short, in his exaltation. The wide extension of his kingdom is described; and the spiritual nature of his mission is denoted with sufficient clearness. Thus Psalm ii. and parts of Psalms xvi., xl., cx. Again, he is represented in suffering and humiliation. Thus Psalm xxii. and part of Psalms xvi. and xl. The piercing of his hands and feet, and the parting of his garments by lot, are mentioned in Psalm xxii. 7, 14, seq. His death and resurrection are mentioned in Psalm xvi. 10, 11, and also in Ps. xxii. 25.

It was during this period that the appellation *messias* (χριστός)—i. e., *king*, by way of eminence, became common; because the Messiah was described as a ruler appointed by God, as the representative of the Deity upon earth. At this time, too, it was distinctly predicted that he should be born of the line of David. Vide 2 Sam. vii. 12, seq.; Ps. ii. and lxxxix; Acts, ii. 30; xiii. 34.

(3) *The third period* extends from the reign of David to the Babylonian captivity, and a little later. The writings of the prophets during this period contain many passages which treat of the future restoration of the Jewish state, and of the church, then fallen into great degeneracy, and which encourage the hope that a distinguished reformer and deliverer, commissioned by God, would appear, and that with him the golden age would return to the earth. These blessings are not promised, however, to the Jews only, but also to the heathen, and to all who should desire to share in them. Indeed, far better promises are given in these prophets to the heathen than to the Jews;—e. g., Is. ii. and lxvi.—promises which have been confirmed by the result. In this period, as in the second, the

Messiah is described as a *king* and *ruler*, born from the line of David, as a prophet and a reformer of religion and morals; as Is. xi. 1, seq.; chap. xl.—lxvi.

But the passage, Isaiah liii., is particularly applicable to the Messiah. It describes his humiliation, rejection, death, exaltation, the diffusion of his doctrine, &c. No other person has been found in history to whom this passage can apply, although some have referred it to Hezekiah, others to the Jewish people, and others to Jeremiah. Vide Döderlein, "Uebersetzung des Isaïas," (edit. 3rd.), where he endeavours to apply this passage to the Jewish people. Dr. Eckermann (Theol. Beytr. st. i. s. 192) endeavours to shew that the new Israelitish state is here meant by the *servant of Jehovah*. Stäudlin understands it of Isaiah, explaining it from the Jewish story, that king Manasseh persecuted Isaiah, and at last caused him to be sawn asunder. But this interpretation is *forced*, and the story itself a modern *fable*. Paulus refers the passage to the better part of the Jewish nation, which was called *צדיק* יִשְׂרָאֵל. The New Testament always refers this passage to Christ, and to none else; and all other explanations must be allowed to be difficult and forced. There is no person in history to whom it applies as well as it does to Christ. If we were not sure that it was written long before the birth of Christ, we might be tempted to believe that it was an imitation of the evangelical history, and was an extract from it, clothed in poetical language.

The passage of Micah, (who was a contemporary of Isaiah,) chap. v. 1, was considered by the Jewish Sanhedrim as giving indubitable indication of the birth-place of the Messiah, Matthew, ii. 4, seq. In Zech. xii. 12, 13, we have the lineage of the family of David, from which the Messiah should be born (vide Dathe in loc.); and in Hag. ii. 7—9, an exact indication of the time in which he should appear—viz., the time of the second temple. This passage treats, indeed, more particularly of the gifts, presents, and offerings, which foreigners would bring to the second temple. Still it exhibits those cheerful prospects for the future which were first realized at the time of the Messiah. The passages Mal. iii. 1, iv. 5, 6, respecting the Messiah and his precursor Elias, are more clear.

The passage, Dan. ix. 24, seq., respecting *the seventy weeks* has been commonly considered very important, and as calculated to carry conviction even to the Jews. But the passage is so obscure, and is encompassed with so many difficulties, that it is not so useful as many believe for the purpose of convincing the Jews that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah. Some modern interpreters have even doubted whether the Messiah is the subject of the passage. By *מֵשִׁיחַ* some have understood Cyrus; others, a

king. Modern commentators have laboured with the greatest zeal to throw light upon this subject. Clauswitz, Michaelis, Hassenkamp, Dathe, Blayney, Gerdes, Velthusen, Less, Doederlein, and Berthold, have written upon it; but much yet remains uncertain. Still it cannot be referred to any but the Messiah, without doing violence to the words. And so much is clear from this passage, that the advent of the Messiah is fixed to a time, which has now been past for upwards of a thousand years. The Jews, then, may be convinced from this passage, that the Messiah has long since come; and then, from other passages, that Jesus is the person in whom all the characteristics of the Messiah are found. [Cf. the late Commentary of Hengstenberg on Daniel.—Tr.]

(4) *Fourth period.* We have already shewn in s. 89, from the New Testament and other writers, how general the expectation of the Messiah was about the time when Jesus appeared, and shortly after, especially after the Jews became subject to the Romans, and how this idea was modified by the great multitude, and intermingled with various unscriptural views. A few, however, entertained right conceptions. If we had more Jewish writers of this later period, especially more from the Jews of Palestine, who had written upon the religious opinions of their nation, we should certainly obtain more accurate and distinct knowledge upon this point. Still, in what we do know with certainty, we have enough for our thorough conviction. Further: one age was distinguished above another in the earnest expectation of the Messiah to come, just as among Christians one age is distinguished above another in its belief on the Messiah already come. Even in the Christian church some one doctrine has, at one particular time, been made more prominent than others. And so it was in the Jewish church.

Thus far the first chapter, as introductory. We have now to consider the doctrine respecting Jesus Christ himself, what he was according to the description of the New Testament, and what he performed for the salvation of men. The New Testament proposes Christ himself as the foundation of the Christian faith, John, xvii. 3. We shall treat first of the history of Jesus, or of the doctrine of the *states* of Jesus, in chap. ii.; then of the *person* of Jesus Christ, in chap. iii., (it being inconvenient to treat of this subject first, as is done in many systems;) finally, the doctrine respecting what Christ has done for the good of man, or respecting the *work* and office of Christ (*de munere Christi*), in chap. iv. Morus discusses all these subjects, p. 134—196, and has interspersed many excellent exegetical, doctrinal, and practical observations, but he treats them in a very broken and disconnected way, and in an entirely different order from

what is common in the systems; and, in short, in a manner not very much calculated to facilitate the subject to the student just commencing his theological studies.

CHAPTER II.

HISTORY OF JESUS IN HIS TWO STATES OF HUMILIATION AND OF EXALTATION.

SECTION XCII.

THE SCRIPTURAL REPRESENTATION OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL PERIODS IN THE LIFE OF JESUS; THE SCRIPTURAL NAMES OF THESE PERIODS; THE PROOF-TEXTS; AND SOME CONCLUSIONS.

BEFORE the man Jesus was raised by God to that illustrious dignity (δόξα) which, according to the testimony of the New Testament, he now enjoys even in his human nature, he lived upon the earth in greater depression and indigence, more despised and neglected, than the greater part of mankind. This gave occasion to the division of the whole life of Christ into two parts, or conditions—the state of *humiliation*, and the state of *exaltation*; or better, *status humilitatis et gloriæ*. These conditions might be called, with equal scriptural authority, the states of subjection and of dominion, of poverty and splendour, of lowliness and majesty, &c.

I. Scriptural names of both conditions.

(1) Ταπεινός, ταπεινότης, and ὕψος, ὑψωθῆναι. These, which are the more common theological terms, are taken from Phil. ii. 8, (ἐταπεινώσεν ἑαυτόν,) and ver. 9, (Θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσε.) Ταπεινός denotes, in general, *misery, inferiority, indigence*; and ὕψος, *elevation, greatness, majesty*; James, i. 9, 10; Matt. xxiii. 12.

Note.—The word ὑψοῦν is applied by Christ himself, in a different sense, to his crucifixion, John, iii. 13, 14; viii. 28; xii. 32, 34. For the *verba exaltandi* signify also among the Hebrews, *to hang up, publicly to execute a malefactor*. Vide Gen. xl. 13, 19.

(2) Σάπξ, and the opposite πνεῦμα. Σάπξ and ἄνθρωπος do not denote simple *humanity* and *human nature*, but frequently *weak, mortal, suffering humanity*, and the *depressed condition* in which man lives. They are nearly synonymous with *mortalis, conditio mortalis*. The opposite πνεῦμα denotes *what is perfect, a perfect condition*. Thus Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 50, calls the mortal body of man σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα, which he afterwards calls ἐπίγειον, and σῶμα ταπεινώσεως. The heavenly body he calls πνευματικόν, and the heavenly condition of Christ πνεῦμα. Accordingly, the humble life of Christ upon the earth is called ἡμέραι τῆς σαρκός, Heb. v. 7, and βίος

ἐν σαρκί, 1 Pet. iv. 2. The same explanation must be given to the following terms,—viz., Χριστός ἐληλύθεν, ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, 1 John, iv. 2; 1 Tim. iii. 15, 16; σὰρξ ἐγένετο John, i. 14; σπέρμα Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, Rom. ix. 5; i. 3, 4; and 1 Pet. iii. 18. Vide Döderlein, in Repert. ii. s. 1. f.

(3) The term παθήματα is applied to the state of humiliation, 1 Pet. i. 11; and the phrase αἰ μετὰ ταῦτα δόξαι to the opposite state. For, in fact, the sufferings and calamities of Christ were by no means confined to the last period of his life, but were extended through the whole of his state of humiliation. Cf. Luke, xxiv. 26, where παθεῖν stands contrasted with εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν δόξαν. The phrase δόξα καὶ τιμὴ is used in the same way in Heb. ii. 9 (Ps. viii.), and δοξασθῆναι very frequently in John, as in chap. xvii.

(4) The words τελειωθῆναι and τελειώσεις are applied to the state of exaltation, Heb. ii. 10; v. 9. The phrase, διὰ παθημάτων (τελειώσει), added in Heb. ii. 10, signifies AFTER the sufferings endured. These words are literally used to denote the reward of victors in mock contests, when they receive the prize (βραβεῖον); in which sense Philo uses them. Cf. xii. 23.

II. Most important proof-texts.

These are, on the general subject, 1 Pet. i. 11; Heb. i. 3, 4; v. 7—9; xii. 2, 3, seq. The first of these has been already explained, No. I.; the second will be when we come to speak *de statu exaltationis*. But the two passages, Phil. ii. 6—11; and Heb. ii. 9—11, may be considered as the most full. A brief explanation of these two passages is here subjoined.

(1) Phil. ii. 6, seq. Paul exhorts Christians to imitate, in respect to their feeling towards others, the example of Jesus, who renounced and sacrificed all his own advantages for their good. The passage relates to Jesus, considered as the Messiah. Μορφή Θεοῦ stands in opposition to μορφή δούλου, ver. 7, and so denotes *divine authority and majesty*. Μορφή is the same as σῆμα, ver. 7. The same sentiment is expressed more strongly by the phrase εἶναι Ἰσα Θεῷ—equal to God, the *image of God*. Homer applies the epithets Θεοείκελος, ἀντίθεος—*divine, equal to God*, to Ulysses and Achilles. The antithesis is ὁμοίωμα ἀνθρώπων, ver. 7, which signifies, not merely *similar to*, but the *same as*, men. (“He that sees me, sees the Father,” John, xiv. 9.) Christ is the image of God upon earth, Col. i. 15; Heb. i. 3.

Οὐκ ἀπαλαμὸν ἡγήσατο—i. e., he did not wear his divinity for the sake of ostentation, nor did he make vain a display of it; the antithesis of which is in ver. 3. Ἐξέτισεν ἑαυτὸν, ver. 7, is synonymous with ἐταπεινώσεν ἑαυτόν, ver. 8. Κενός corresponds to the Hebrew קָדַם; and קָדַם

is rendered *poor, needy*, in the LXX., and in Luke, i. 54, where κενούς and πλουτούντας are contrasted. This phrase, then, is synonymous with the one used in 2 Cor. viii. 9, ἐκπαύσεσθε δι’ ἑαυτοῦ, *se ipsum demisit ad statum tenuem*—he let himself down, he freely sacrificed the riches, privileges, and all the divine majesty and glory, which he might still have possessed.

Ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος, *after he appeared as man*, he assumed the form of a servant. Indeed, (ver. 8,) he went so far in his obedience to the divine will, that from love to his Father, and to us his brethren, he submitted to death, and even to a disgraceful crucifixion.

“Therefore” (in reward for his sacrifice and obedience) “has God *highly exalted* him,” (this is explained by what follows,) “and raised him to *supreme* dignity,” (ὄνομα, Heb. i. 4.) The reference is to the name *Lord*, ver. 11, which denotes his *dominion over everything* in his state of exaltation; according to ver. 10, 11; Heb. i. 4. “That before Jesus,” (or at the name of Jesus, the name Κύριος—*audito nomine Jesu*—i. e., before Jesus as their Lord,) “the inhabitants of heaven, earth, and the under-world, should bow the knee”—i. e., *universal* reverence and adoration should be rendered to him, (as to *kings*, Is. xlv. 23;) “and that all, with one mouth, should confess that Jesus, the Christ, is Lord, (Κύριον,) or universal ruler, (ver. 10.) Εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ Πατρός; “this contributes to the honour and glorification of the Father,” John, xvii. 4, 6. Whoever does this, honours the Father; for it is his will that all should honour the Son; John, v. 23; inasmuch as Christ, even now, since his return to God, provides for the extension of the kingdom of God upon earth, and promotes morality and happiness.

(2) Heb. ii. 9—11. Paul shews that man, at some future time, will pass into a happy life, and into a perfect condition, although, while upon earth, he is imperfect and mortal. This he illustrates from the example of Christ, who in this is similar to us.

“We see that Jesus, who [like other men] was inferior in dignity to the angels, (vide Psalm viii. 5,) was crowned with glory and honour, after he had endured sufferings.” (He was thus depressed, in order to suffer death for the good of us all, according to the gracious purpose of God.) “For it became God, from whom all things proceed, and to whose glory everything contributes—it became him (i. e., nothing else could be expected from his justice and goodness) to bestow upon Jesus the highest blessedness, after he had endured sufferings, and had led so many children (worshippers of God) to glory, (the enjoyment of eternal blessedness;) and had thus become the author of their salvation, (ἀρχηγὸς σωτηρίας.) For he that sanctifies (ὁ ἁγιάζων, Jesus) and they who are sanctified (ἁγια-

ζόμενοι) are of ONE race, (or common human origin, ἐξ ἐνός sc. πατρός sive αἵματος, Acts, xvii. 26. He is man, as well as we.) Hence he is not ashamed to call us brethren, (relatives.)" Here we see clearly on what analogy the apostle argues.

III. Results from these and other texts ; and general observations on the doctrine of the conditions of Christ.

(1) The states of humiliation and exaltation concern the human nature only, and not the divine nature of Christ. These texts refer only to the man Jesus, or to Christ as man. For as God he is always the same, (ὁ αὐτός,) and can neither be humbled nor exalted. But the ancient writers frequently express themselves incautiously and loosely upon this subject. Origen says, "the divine nature let itself down from its majesty, and became man." De prin. ii. 6. Gregory of Nyssa says, "κενοῦται ἡ θεότης ἵνα χωρητῇ γένεσθαι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει." Such language, indeed, admits of explanation, and was understood by them in a right sense; but it is hard and inconvenient, and not according to the example of the holy scriptures.

(2) Two things, as we may learn from these passages, are implied in the humiliation of Christ. (a) The abdication, surrender, or renunciation which he made, for the good of man, of the exalted privileges which he could have enjoyed, (*carentia sive abdicatio usus majestatis suæ.*) This is commonly called *κένωσις*, from Phil. ii., ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν, which Luther renders, "Er äusserte, or ent-äusserte sich selbst." The idea, however, is founded rather upon the whole subject of this passage and of other passages, such as 2 Cor. viii. 9, than on this particular word. It is also implied in the idea of his *exaltation*; for he then entered upon the possession and enjoyment of all his rights and privileges. (b) His submission to great misery and to many sufferings. Although innocent himself, as the Bible represents him, yet for our good he *freely* submitted to all that distress and wretchedness which are the inevitable consequences of our sins. Vide Phil. ii. and the other texts cited.

Note 1.—Theologians have disputed whether Christ *laid aside* the use of his divine attributes, or continued in the actual possession of them, only veiling them from the eyes of men. There were various opinions upon this subject in the Lutheran church, even as early as the sixteenth century. But in 1616, a controversy commenced between the theologians of Giessen and Tübingen, and other theologians of Würtemberg. Those of Giessen maintained that Christ frequently *renounced* the use of his divine attributes, and alleged the word ἐκένωσε. But the theologians of Tübingen maintained that the *πρὸς ἰδιωματὸν divinorum* existed in Christ

even in *statu exanitionis*, although he never used them; so that it was a mere *χρῆσις*. This controversy was in a good measure logomachy. The theologians of Saxony rather favoured the views of the theologians of Giessen than of Tübingen. So much, however, is certain, that if the person of Christ, even during his life upon earth, was the person of the Son of God, (as he himself clearly affirms,) it was *possible* for him to exercise his divine attributes. But, on account of the work which he had to perform upon earth, he forbore the full use of them; which is just what the theologians of Tübingen would say. Vide the works cited by Morus, p. 173, n. 3. Cf. p. 192, n. 3. [Cf. Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 470.—Tr.]

Note 2.—Theologians generally allow some use of these attributes on different occasions. Others object that this is not consistent with the *constant* humiliation of Christ while upon the earth, and is not clearly supported by the New Testament. He himself frequently says, especially in the gospel of John, that he performed the miracles which he wrought as man through a miraculous divine power, and as the messenger of the Father. The case was the same as to his instruction. Neither Jesus himself, nor the apostles, ever alluded to his proper divinity in such a way as to imply that it qualified him, as a man upon earth, to instruct and work miracles. "He had resigned his divine prerogatives, and his qualifications are always considered as derived from the Father. Vide s. 102. But this free renunciation of the privileges which belonged to him as God did not exclude the use of them when occasion should require. Christ himself said that he performed his work in common with his Father, John, v. 17, seq., and chap. x.; he that saw *him*, saw the Father, John, xiv. 9; his *glory*, which the apostles had *seen*, was a glory which belonged exclusively to the only begotten Son; John, i. 14.

(3) Although Jesus lived upon earth in humiliation and indigence, *his whole life upon earth* cannot be called, as it is by many, a *state of humiliation*. The passage, Phil. ii., is often appealed to in behalf of this opinion. But Paul evidently mentions the ταπείνωσις, κένωσις, and μορφή δούλου, (ii. 8, 9,) as constituting only a part of this life. The *incarnation* is never mentioned in scripture as belonging to the *state of humiliation*. It is so considered, however, by many of the ecclesiastical fathers; as Origen, Gregory of Nyssa; and by many of the Latins, as Leo the Great, in his epistles. They are consequently compelled to assert that God, or the divine nature of Christ, lowered itself by becoming man. Neither are the forty days which Christ lived upon earth after the resurrection to be enumerated among the days of his humiliation, (ἡμέραι σαρκός.)

(4) The state of humiliation is commonly divided into five *gradus*, degrees, periods; and the state of exaltation into the same number. Some, however, suppose more, and others fewer. The common division and arrangement is taken from the so-named *apostolical creed*. But the object of this creed was not to make a systematic and logical division, and to determine the limits of the two conditions; but to oppose certain doctrines condemned by the orthodox church as erroneous. The *conception* is made to stand first; but this does not belong to the state of humiliation, because the divine nature cannot be lowered; nor could the human nature before it existed. [Vide Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 471.—Tr.]

We proceed now to treat of Christ considered as *man*, or of the man Jesus, in the state of his humiliation upon earth, s. 93—96; and then in the state of his exaltation and glory, s. 97—99, inclusive.

SECTION XCIII.

OF THE ORIGIN, CONCEPTION, BIRTH, AND YOUTH OF JESUS; HIS TRUE HUMANITY, AND THE EXCELLENCES OF IT.

JESUS was the son of Mary, conceived by her in a miraculous manner (*διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου*,) (Matt. i. 18; Luke, i. 35;) of the posterity of Abraham (Rom. ix. 5;) and the royal line of David. The register of his descent is inserted both in Matt. i. 1, seq. and in Luke, iii. 23, seq. They both agree in making him the descendant of David, however they may apparently differ in tracing his descent. Ancient writers did not agree upon the method of reconciling the two tables. The most correct solution is this: that Matthew gives the genealogy of Joseph, of whom Jesus was the adopted son; and Luke that of Mary. Both descended from David; Joseph through Solomon, and Mary through Nathan, who also was David's son. Jesus was born in the reign of Augustus, (Luke, ii. 1;) probably earlier by some four or five years than the common Dionysian mode of reckoning, which we follow; accordingly, in the thirtieth year of the reign of Augustus, 749 (according to Dionysius, 754) from the building of Rome. We subjoin the following doctrinal observations:—

I. *Miraculous Conception of Christ.*

The scriptural view of the events of the world is altogether different and higher than the common view. The Bible derives everything which takes place in the material world directly from the will and agency of the Supreme Being, and refers everything back to him. But it teaches at the same time, in what way, by what means and appointments, God arranges and accomplishes all things which take place around us. With regard to all important events especially,

we are taught, by scriptural principles, that they have their deeper origin in the invisible world, and that the way is prepared for them by God, and that they are finally brought forward into maturity and accomplishment chiefly through the ministry of superior spirits. Such, then, for a higher reason, was the fact respecting that most important of all events, the appearance of the Saviour of the world, and of his precursor. It was required, not only by the Jewish nation, but by the whole ancient world, that great and extraordinary persons, employed by God as instruments for the accomplishment of his designs, should receive some extraordinary and miraculous attestation of their mission, and proofs of their authority. Such attestation was expected at and before their birth, during their life, and at and after their death. Vide Wetstein on Matt. i. 20. Now though God is represented in the Bible as a being high and exalted over all, he is still described as willingly complying with the necessities of men, as condescending to them, and in his intercourse with men acting after the manner of men; especially whenever by so doing he can attain his great objects, their sanctification and salvation. Accordingly, those extraordinary men by whom God intended to promote these objects received his seal to their testimony in that extraordinary manner which was calculated to convince mankind, and to satisfy their expectations. In this manner, the Bible informs us, was the testimony of Moses and all the prophets down to John, of Jesus also and his apostles, confirmed by God.

It deserves to be mentioned in this connexion that the Jews called the Messiah *the second Adam*, (as Paul did,) and that they imagined he would be born as guiltless and pure as Adam was when he first came from the hands of God, and was therefore called *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, (*Υἱός*,) Luke, iii. 38. In common generation, as scripture and experience teach us, the depravity of man is propagated. But Christ is described in the New Testament as similar indeed to us, but without sin.

Πνεῦμα ἁγίου, (Luke, i. 35,) signifies *miraculous divine power*, and is synonymous with *δύναμις ἁγία*. Vide Acts, i. 5, 8. Every extraordinary and supernatural event takes place through the influence of the Holy Spirit, and the performing of all miracles is referred to him. The phrases, *to come upon one* (*ἐπελθεῖν*), and, *overshadow one* (*ἐπισκιάσει*) amount to the same thing: "thou shalt experience a miraculous divine power exerted upon thee; thou shalt become pregnant by this divine miraculous power, in an extraordinary way." In Matt. i. 20, it is briefly said, "that which is born of her *ἐκ Πνεύματος ἁγίου ἔσται ἅγιον*."

The phrase, *conceived from the Holy Ghost*, which occurs in the ancient creeds, (e. g., in

the apostolic creed,) is derived from this passage (Matt. i. 20.) (This phrase was introduced as antithetic to the declarations of such as considered Jesus to be a natural son of Joseph and Mary. For he was so considered by many of the Jews at the time of Christ, (cf. Luke, iii. 23,) and by some Christian sects, as the Ebionites. Vide Iren. Hæres. v., c. i. This same opinion has been advocated lately in a work entitled "Versuch eines schriftmässigen Beweises, dass Joseph der wahre Vater Christi sey;" Berlin and Stralsund, 1792, 8vo. The author of this work does palpable violence to the sacred writers, and has not considered this narrative in the spirit of the age in which it was written. His explanation goes upon the supposition that the first two chapters of Matthew are spurious, and that Luke, in his narratives, followed a report which had circulated only among a few Christians respecting the conception of Christ.) From the New Testament it is certain that before the conception of Jesus Mary was a virgin. Cf. Matt. i. 23, and Luke, i. The extraordinary manner of her conception has led many to say that the name of *παρθένης* belongs to her, even since the birth of Christ. This name, however, is not given to her in the New Testament after this event; on the contrary, Christ is said to be *γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός*, Gal. iv. 4. When the monastic life became popular, and the unmarried state was regarded as the most holy and pleasing to God, the opinion prevailed, that after the birth of Christ, Mary lived, even in the married state, in entire continence, like a nun, and had no children by Joseph. Hence she was called *ἀειπαρθένης*. In the fourth century this opinion was almost universal; and Epiphanius and Hieronymus pronounced Apollinaris, Helvidius, Jovinian, and others, who disputed it, to be heretics. But Basilus the Great considered it as a question of minor importance.

II. True Humanity of Christ.

From the New Testament it is evident that Christ was a real man, both as to body and soul. He had feelings, senses, and organs of sense, as we have. He hungered, thirsted, shed his blood, and died. He exhibits, too, all the properties of the soul. He attained gradually to the knowledge and understanding which he possessed as a man; Luke, ii. 52. He displayed human feelings, joy, sorrow, indignation, &c.; Luke, xxii. 42, 44; xxiii. 46. Paul calls him expressly, *ἄνθρωπος Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς*, 1 Tim. ii. 5. Men are called his *brethren*, Heb. ii. 11—14. He frequently calls himself, *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*; the more proper meaning of which phrase is, *the son of Adam, the great son of Adam*, *ὁ δεύτερος Ἀδὰμ*, as Paul says. But in whatever way this phrase is understood, it clearly denotes the true

humanity of Christ. The phrases, *he came or appeared in the flesh, he became flesh*, denote the same thing; John, i. 14; 1 John, iv. 3; Rom. viii. 4, seq.

But certain popular prejudices and incorrect philosophical principles led some to doubt, and others to deny, this clear truth. Hence the *true humanity* of Christ was expressly mentioned in the ancient creeds.

(1) Some taught that Christ did not possess a *true human body*, but only a bodily phantom and shade; that he appeared *ἐν δοξίσει* or *φαντάσματι*, for such aerial bodies were then ascribed to departed spirits, and even to divinities. These were the persons who believed that *matter* was the origin of all evil, and did not proceed from God, but from an evil and malicious being. Hence, according to their view, the pure divine spirit of Christ, one of the highest æons, could not have dwelt in a material body. Those who held these opinions were called *Docetæ* and *Phantasiasts*; they comprised most of the Gnostics, as Marcion and others; also the Manicheans and their followers.

(2) After the fourth century, others denied the existence of the *human soul of Christ*, believing that it was unnecessary, inasmuch as the Logos supplied its place. We find, indeed, that the oldest fathers had no particular and distinct conception of the human soul of Christ. They did not deny its existence, but they made no distinct and express mention of it in their writings, presupposing it as understood of course. Origen, in the third century, taught, for the first time, the exact doctrine of the human soul of Christ, and shewed its importance. It was a considerable time, however, before this doctrine was introduced into theology as a specific article. It did not become universal among the catholics until after the middle of the fourth century, when Apollinaris the younger appeared, and boldly denied that Christ had a human soul. Afterwards he determined more exactly that Christ indeed possessed the *ψυχὴν*, (animal soul,) which was the organ by which the Logos operated upon the human body of Jesus; but that he was destitute of the *πνεῦμα νοῦς*, (the rational soul,) the place of which was supplied by the Logos. Attention was now excited, for the first time, to this doctrine; it was introduced into the Christian creed; scriptural refutation of the error of Apollinaris was sought; decrees of councils were made, and laws were enacted against it. [Vide Hahn, Lehrb. s. 95, s. 456. Neander, Kirchengesch. b. i. Abth. iii. s. 1060, ff., and b. ii. Abth. ii. s. 904; Abth. iii. s. 1170.—Tr.]

III. Excellences of the Humanity of Jesus.

A. In respect to his *body*.

(1) The beauty of his appearance. Many of

the fathers imagined him to be the ideal of manly beauty; and the painters of succeeding ages have endeavoured to express this in their pictures of him. The New Testament itself gives us no means of determining either for or against such a supposition. Only we must be careful, if we adopt this opinion, not to consider it essential, and must remember the declaration of Christ, *ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ὠφελεὶ οὐδέν*, John, vi. 63; and what Paul says, that *γινώσκειν Χριστὸν κατὰ σάρκα* is not the thing required; 2 Cor. v. 16. Vide Carpzov, Progr. "de forma oris et corporis Christi;" Helmstädt, 1777.

(2) The immortality of his body. We reason thus:—Immortality belonged to Christ because he was without sin, for death is the consequence of sin; Rom. vi. 23. He was not subjected to the necessity of dying, although he actually died, in obedience to God, and from love to us, and for our advantage. This took place, however, not against his will, but with his consent, John, x. 18. Hence Paul mentions it as the express design of the incarnation of Jesus, that he *might* suffer death.

B. In respect to his *soul*. Among these are—

(1) His extraordinary human understanding, sagacity, and knowledge. His whole history proves, that even as a man he was not of the common and ordinary class, but one of those great and extraordinary persons of whom the world has seen but few. But he was like other men in this respect, that his talents and intellectual faculties did not unfold themselves at once, but gradually, and were capable of progressive improvement. Hence Luke records (ii. 52), that he *προέκοπτε σοφία*. Hence, too, he *learned* and *practised* obedience to the divine command, and submission to the divine will, Heb. v. 8; he *prepared* himself for his office, &c.

(2) His perfect moral purity, and the blamelessness of his life. Theologians call this, the *sinlessness* (*ἀναμαρτησία*) of Jesus. The greatest honesty, virtue, and piety shone forth in all the doctrines and discourses, in the whole life and conduct, of Jesus. Hence most of the enemies of Christianity admit this excellence of the moral doctrine and of the person of Christ, and consider him as an example of piety and virtue. Cf. Hess, Geschichte der drey letzten Lebensjahre Jesu. [Also the remarkable passage in Rousseau's Conf. du Vic. Sav. in his Emiliius.] The most important passages which treat of the sinlessness of Jesus are, 2 Cor. v. 21, *μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν*—i. e., *peccati expertem esse* (Is. lix. 8); 1 John, iii. 3, 5, *ἀγνός ἐστι*, and *ἁμαρτία οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐν αὐτῷ*. Heb. iv. 15, "He was like us, but *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*." 1 Pet. i. 19, *ἀμωυ ἀμώμων καὶ ἀσπλουν*. The texts also in which it is said that he was obedient to the will and command of God belong in this connexion; as Heb. v. 8,

(which is called *obedientiam activam*;) and many passages in John.

Jesus being free from sin, was free from the punishment of sin, and from all that evil which men bring upon themselves by their own sins. He suffered what he did suffer, undeservedly and voluntarily. Vide Heb. vii. 27; 1 Pet. i. 19. The sinlessness of Jesus is to be regarded as a consequence of the fact that he was born without moral pollution. Cf. s. 92.

But this subject is frequently represented as if it would have been impossible for the man Jesus to sin; and as if his virtue and holiness were absolutely *necessary*. Cf. Baumgarten, Diss. de *ἀναμαρτησία* Christi; Halle, 1753. But,

(a) The scripture nowhere teaches that the *possibility* of sinning would have ceased in Adam and his posterity if Adam had not fallen. The possibility of erring and transgressing would belong to man, even if he had no natural depravity. Otherwise Adam could not have fallen; for before the fall he was without original sin. The case must have been the same, therefore, with the man Jesus, although he was without natural depravity. Vide s. 80, II. 2.

(b) If it should be *impossible* for a man to live otherwise than virtuously, or if his virtue should be necessary, it would have no value and no merit. All freedom, in that case, would vanish, and man would become a mere machine; according to the remarks made in the place just referred to. The virtue of Christ, then, in resisting stedfastly all the temptations to sin, acquires a real value and merit only on admission that he could have sinned. It was in this sense, doubtless, that Scotus made that affirmation which was alleged against him, *humanam naturam Christi non fuisse ἀναμάρτητον*.

(c) This opinion is, in fact, scriptural. For (a) we are frequently exhorted to imitate the example of Jesus, in his virtue, his conquest of sinful desires, &c. But how could this be done if he had none of those inducements to sin which we have, and if it had been impossible for him to commit it. (β) Improvement in knowledge and in perfections of every kind is ascribed in scripture to Christ; and Paul says, "that through sufferings he constantly improved in obedience (*ἐμαθεν ὑπακούον*)," Heb. v. 8. (γ) We read expressly, that Christ was *tried*—i. e., tempted to sin; but that he overcame the temptation, Matt. iv. 1, seq. This temptation took place shortly before his entrance upon his public office, and tended to prepare him for it. It was intended to exercise and confirm him in virtue, and in obedience to God. But what object could there have been in this temptation, if it had been impossible for Jesus to yield to it? And what *merit* would there have been in his

resistance? No difference is made in the thing itself, and in its consequences, by considering it, with Farmer and others, as a vision and parable, and not as a real occurrence. If it was impossible that Christ, as a man, should sin, it would be hard to find what the Bible means when it speaks of his being tempted, and commends him for overcoming temptation.

IV. *Early History of Jesus.*

As the gospels contain but little important information respecting the events of the *childhood* of Christ, the apostles themselves could not have been acquainted with many credible circumstances relating to it. The apocryphal gospels contain a multitude of stories and fables upon this subject, especially the gospel "infantie Christi." Vide Fabricii Codex apoc. N. T., T. I. It cannot be proved, that Jesus performed miracles before his entrance on his public office, to which he was consecrated by John the Baptist. The supposition is, in fact, contradictory to the clear declaration of John, who calls the miracle in Cana of Galilee, ἀρχὴν σημείων, ii. 11. Joseph was a mechanic. Hence Jesus is called ὁ τέκτων υἱός, Matt. xiii. 55. All the ancient doctors agree that he followed the employment of his father, which is very probable, since he himself is called ὁ τέκτων, Mark, vi. 3. Besides, it was not uncommon for the Jewish literati to learn and practise some handicraft. So Paul did, Acts, xviii. 3. It appears from the united testimony of the ancient fathers that Jesus was *faber lignarius*, τέκτων ξύλων. Even in Hebrew, ער denotes a *carpenter*, by way of eminence, 2 Kings, xxii. 6.

But Jesus was also learned in the Jewish law and all Jewish literature, although he had not studied at the common Jewish schools, nor with the lawyers. Vide John, vii. 15, πῶς οὗτος γράμματα οἶδε, μὴ μεμαθηκώς. Cf. Matt. xiii. 54. Probably Divine Providence made use, in part, of natural means, in furnishing Jesus with this human knowledge. Mary was a relative of Elizabeth, the pious mother of John the Baptist, and a guest at her house, Luke, i. 36, 40. We may imagine, then, that Jesus received good instruction in his youth from some one of this pious, sacerdotal family. We see from the first chapters of Luke, that Joseph and Mary belonged to a large circle of pious male and female friends, in whose profitable society Jesus passed his youth, and who contributed much to his education as a man, especially as they expected something great from him, from his very birth, as appears from Simeon. Respecting the early history of Jesus, vide Casauboni "Exercitt. in Annales Baronii." Hess, in the appendix to his "Geschichte der drey letzten Lebensjahre Jesu;" and Heilmann, "Opusc." tom. ii. p. 501, seq.

SECTION XCIV.

OF THE DOCTRINE OF JESUS, AND HIS OFFICE AS TEACHER.

THE work committed to Christ by God was twofold:—(a) to teach by oral instruction and example; (b) to suffer and die for the good of men. Both together compose what is called the *ἐργον* of Christ, John, xvii. And it was that he might execute *both* of these offices that, according to the Bible, he became man. We treat here, in the first place, of *his office as teacher*.

I. *Commencement and continuance of his office as Teacher; also the names and importance of this office.*

(1) Jesus entered upon his office as teacher, according to the custom of Jewish teachers, when he was about thirty years of age; Luke, iii. 23. Respecting the continuance of his office, the opinions of the learned have differed from the earliest times. The opinions most wide from the truth, are, on the one side, that of Irenæus, that it was sixteen years; and, on the other, that it was only one year. Origen supposed, that it was *three years and a half*, which has become the common opinion, and is founded upon Luke, xiii. 7, 33, and upon the computation of the passover, especially according to John. Cf. Morus, p. 149, s. 3.

(2) The New Testament everywhere teaches that Christ, considered as a man, was qualified by God for his office as teacher, by extraordinary intellectual endowments; like the prophets of old, and his own apostles in after times, only in a far higher degree than they. John, iii. 34, God gave to him οὐκ ἐκ μέτρου τὸ πνεῦμα. The prophets had these endowments, but in a less degree; he, as the highest messenger of God, had them *without measure*. Acts, x. 38, ἔχρισεν αὐτὸν ὁ Θεὸς πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ δυνάμει. Jesus received these higher gifts of the Spirit when John baptized him; for he himself submitted of his own accord to this baptism, by which the Jews were to be initiated into the kingdom of the Messiah. John himself was convinced, by a confessedly miraculous occurrence at his baptism, that Jesus was the Son of God, and heard a heavenly voice which expressly declared him such; Matt. iii. 13—17; John, iii. 31—33, coll. Luke, iv. 1, 14. Whatever, therefore, the man Jesus either did or taught after his baptism, he did and taught as the messenger of God—as an inspired man, under direct divine command, and special divine assistance; ἐν πνεύματι, as the New Testament expresses it. Vide Morus, p. 149, note.

The name of a *prophet*, (προφήτης) which denotes in general an immediate messenger, and authorized ambassador of God, (vide s. 9, No. 2,) was given to Christ, because, as above remarked, he

taught by divine inspiration, and proved to his contemporaries the truth of his doctrine and of his divine mission by miracles; John, xiv. 10. The Jews expected this of the Messiah, whom they hence called *משיח*, *ὁ προφήτης*, by way of eminence. Vide John, vi. 14; Matt. xxi. 11; Luke, xxiv. 19; Acts, iii. 22; and other texts.

Christ commonly called his office as teacher, and indeed his whole office, *ἔργον*, his *work, business*, (cf. John, xvii. 4;) also *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ πατρὸς*, (John, iv. 34, seq.,) in order to shew that the Father himself had commissioned him; according to what he elsewhere declares, that his doctrine was not his own, (discovered by himself as a man,) but revealed and entrusted to him (the man Jesus) by God; John, xii. 49; xiv. 10.

The name *σωτήρ* (benefactor of men) is given to Christ, partly because he died for our good, and partly because he is our teacher by precept and example. Both of these belong to the great work of Jesus, and one ought not to be separated from the other. He himself says (John, xviii. 37) that he was born and had come into the world to proclaim the true doctrine, (*ἀλήθεια*;) and that his kingdom (*βασιλεία*) was the kingdom of truth. But we owe it to his death alone that we become citizens of this kingdom, John, iii. 6. His death is always described as the procuring cause of our salvation; and our sins are not forgiven us on account of our own reformation and holiness, but on account of the death of Christ.

II. Christ's method and manner in his Ministry; and the chief contents of his Doctrine.

(1) The instruction which Christ gave was partly *public*, (John, xviii. 20,) and partly *confidential*, or private. And accordingly the manner and nature of his discourse were different. Like all the ancient teachers, he had two classes of hearers and disciples; the *exoteric*, those who were publicly instructed, and the *esoteric*, the disciples of the inner school, to whom he gave private instruction. The Jews of Palestine, at the time of Christ, were very ignorant, misguided, and prejudiced. Christ was therefore compelled to condescend to their level, and was unable fully to instruct them in many truths, for which they had no relish, and which they could not understand. He could carry them no further than the first elements of his doctrine; and had, first of all, to endeavour to excite them to attention and inquiry. Vide Matt. xiii. 11, seq. Luke, x. 1, 10, *ὑμῖν (esotericis) δέδοται γνῶναι μυστήρια βασιλείας· ἐξαινεῖς (exotericis) οὐ δέδοται*. His disciples were not, however, to keep any secret doctrines (*disciplina arcani*) for themselves, but as soon as their hearers were prepared for it, to give them still further instruc-

tion, and declare to them the whole. Vide Matt. x. 26, 27; Luke, viii. 17.

But although the instruction of Jesus was so variously modified as to manner and subject, according to the wants of his hearers, his doctrine itself was always the same. He had no twofold scheme of salvation—one for the refined and the noble, the other for the mean and uncultivated; but one and the same for all. "Repent and believe the gospel" was his direction, as it was of John the Baptist. This was the great point which he brought to view in all his discourses before rich and poor, enlightened and ignorant. We do not find that Jesus ever withheld or omitted any of his doctrines, or even proposed them less frequently, because they might be offensive or unpleasant to his hearers, or opposed to their inclinations. On the contrary, he exhibited these very hated truths with the most frequency and urgency, because they were the most important, salutary, and indispensable to his hearers. He disregarded their persecution and contempt. The doctrines of his death and its consequences, of the necessity of regeneration and of holiness, are examples of this kind; John, iii., vi., viii., x. His early disciples followed his example in this respect; as appears from Acts and the epistles. And his disciples in all ages are sacredly bound to do the same; and if they do not, they are *unworthy of him*.

Moreover, his public religious instruction was in a high degree intelligible, throughout practical, and adapted to the necessities of his hearers. It was without fear or favour of man, Matt. xxii. 16, 46. He was eloquent and impressive, and skilfully availed himself of the present occasion, place, and circumstances; John, iv. 14, 34, seq. The populace, accordingly, found his instructions far more excellent, impressive, and sincere, than those of the Pharisees or lawyers. With all this, however, he was, as a teacher, in a high degree modest and unpretending. Vide Matt. xi. 29; John, vii. 16—18.

Considering the imperfect knowledge of his hearers, Jesus endeavoured to represent the truth as palpably and obviously to their senses as possible, and frequently spoke in figures. He frequently availed himself of the sayings and proverbs current among his contemporaries. Following the example of the ancient, and especially of the oriental moralists, he frequently taught moral principles in apothegms, as in the sermon on the Mount. But he made the most use of *parables*, which were very commonly employed by Jewish teachers in their instructions. Vide Vitringa, De Synag. Vet. l. 3. Storr, De Parabolis Christi, in his Opuse. Acad., tom. i.

He gave most of his instructions in the *religious dialect* common with the Jews. And many

of his expressions—e. g., in the sermon on the Mount, in his address to Nicodemus, &c., cannot be clearly understood without a knowledge of this dialect. It is the same, for the most part, as we find in the Talmud and in the writings of the Rabbins. But much of the ancient Jewish phraseology had been frequently misunderstood and perverted. These abuses Christ corrected, and gave a different, more just, and important meaning to this ancient phraseology; as wise teachers of religion have always done. But the superior impression which the scriptural language and the phraseology of the Old Testament made, led Christ to use them, in preference to any other, even where another might have answered his purpose.

We observe in all the discourses of Jesus a wise forbearance and indulgence of such prejudices (e. g., respecting the kingdom of the Messiah, s. 89) as could not have been at once removed, or were not necessarily of injurious practical tendency. This is called *συγκατάβασις*, *œconomia*, *accomodatio*. But we find no case in which Jesus ever taught any thing which he considered as false or erroneous, merely because it might be pleasing to his hearers, or agreeable to prevailing prejudices. Such a course would be contrary to his own maxims and his whole mode of procedure, and could not be justified on correct moral principles. Vide s. 64, 65. This, it seems, is more and more conceded by modern theologians. Many who do not consider Jesus as a divine teacher in the strict sense, prefer saying that he *mistook* in this or that particular, to allowing that he declared or taught anything which he himself considered erroneous. They perceive that the latter supposition is entirely irreconcilable with the moral purity which is everywhere exhibited in the character of Jesus. Others, however, who are not willing to allow that Jesus taught anything inconsistent with their own opinions, affirm that Christ did not actually believe, in such cases, what he said, but accommodated his doctrine to Jewish opinions, in which he himself had no belief. But they cannot prove the fact; and they do not consider in what a suspicious light they place his character. One that allows Christ to be a divine teacher, if he would be consistent, must admit his declarations and doctrines without exception, and will not venture to select from them at pleasure what he will believe, or to prefer his own views to those of Christ, or to affirm that Christ could not have taught such a thing, because it appears differently to him, or because it is contrary to the prevailing opinions of his age. See Heringa, Ueber die Lehrart Jesu und seiner Apostel in Hinsicht auf die Religionsbegriffe ihrer Zeitgenossen; a prize essay; Offenbach, 1792, 8vo; Storr, Erläuterung des

Briefs an die Hebräer, th. ii. s. 536, f., and Opusc. Theol. Iste Abhandl.

(2) The contents of the *public* instruction of Jesus. On this subject, and on the plan of Christ in general, cf. Dr. Reinhard, Ueber den Plan des Stifters der Christ. Relig.

(a) He instructed his disciples in the doctrine respecting God and his attributes; especially respecting his impartial and universal love to sinful men, and his desire for the welfare of all, respecting providence, and reward and punishment after death. This last doctrine he made eminently practical.

(b) He taught them with still more particularity the destination of man and the duties of the true worshipper of God; especially the love of God and of our neighbour, in opposition to Jewish exclusiveness. He placed before them the motives for the fulfilment of these duties, and refuted many practical prejudices which were common among the Jews and other nations. He always opposed the arrogance, self-righteousness, and self-confidence of men, and endeavoured to shew them that their virtue was very imperfect, and that they deserved nothing on account of it, and received every favour from the grace of God; Luke, xvii. 9; xviii. 9; Matt. xx. 1, seq.

(c) He endeavoured to give them juster views respecting the Messiah, and the benevolent design of God in his mission, and the new order which he was to bring about—in short, respecting *the kingdom of God*. He proved to them that he was the Messiah, and predicted the wide extension of his religion. He endeavoured to awaken in his hearers a feeling of the necessity of a Saviour.

(d) He instructed them in the exalted heavenly dignity of his person (John, v., viii., x.,) respecting his death, its causes, and happy consequences. He assured them that he was the person *through* whom and *on whose account* men would be saved; that he was the Saviour of men, through whom they obtained freedom from sin and from the punishment of sin; and all this through the influence of his doctrine and instruction, and especially of his death; John, iii., vi., viii., x. He announced the entire abolition of the Old-Testament dispensation and the Mosaic institute, and the near approach of the time when a spiritual and perfect worship should be established universally. Instructions of this kind are mostly found in John. Still they were only the first indications: for Christ had reserved the more perfect instruction to be given by his disciples after his death and ascension. He only went before them, and prepared his hearers for the instruction which they would afterwards give. He sowed, but it was for them and their successors to reap the full harvest; John, iv.

We find, as a general thing, that Jesus, in his *public* instructions, aimed principally at the improvement and correction of the *Jewish doctrine*, in order to prepare and qualify the great multitude for the reception of his religion; while in his *private* instructions, on the other hand, he discoursed more particularly on his own institutions. Vide Matt. xxii. 29; John, iii. 1, seq.; iv. 7, seq. In his public discourses, he frequently treats of general moral truths; not, however, in the common unprofitable way in which men are told what they ought to do, without being told how to do it. He shews how the law of Moses should be interpreted, and warns against the false explanations commonly given to it, and the additions made to it by men, and against the falsification of the Divine commands; Matt. v. seq.

He was accustomed, like many of the Jewish teachers in his age, to travel about with his disciples, and to teach in the synagogues, on the highways, in the market-places, the field, and the temple. Vide John, xviii. 20.

(3) The *private* instruction of Christ.

He had destined his *intimate friends* (esoteric disciples) to be the future teachers, through whom his great plan should be carried into execution. To these he gave more minute explanation and instruction respecting the doctrines mentioned in No. 2. He solved for them any difficulties or obscurities which remained in his public discourses. Vide Mark, iv. 10, 11, 34. But even this instruction was in a great measure only elementary, and preparatory to their future destination. Hence he frequently endures their weakness and their prejudices with wise forbearance; John, xvi. 12—15, 25, seq.; Acts, i. 7, seq. He tells them expressly that they could not understand or endure, at that time, many things which it was important for them to know. And he promises to instruct them more perfectly after his departure, by means of the Paracletus, and to make known to them the whole extent of whatever it should be necessary for them to know and to teach, for their own good or the good of others, John, xiv. 26; xvi. 12—14, &c.

Note.—Although Jesus frequently declares that his doctrine is of divine origin, and revealed to him by God himself, (since he was the greatest of the divine messengers,) we are not to suppose from this that every particular doctrine which Christ taught was given out by him as entirely *new*, and as imparted to him by direct inspiration of God. Many of his theoretical and practical doctrines were known to the Jews of his age, from the writings of the Old Testament, as Christ himself says, Matt. v. 17; or by some other means—e. g., the unwritten instructions of the prophets who lived at and after the time of the Babylonian captivity. But

Christ completed and amended these doctrines, made additions to them, and placed them in relations and connexions which were entirely new and peculiar, thus giving them new weight and interest. This was the case with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, regeneration, prayer, &c. It may therefore be said, with truth, that a great part of all the doctrinal and moral instruction which is found in the discourses of Jesus, actually existed among the Jews of his own age. We find many of his maxims, parables, &c., in the Talmud and the Rabbins. Vide Lightfoot, Schöttgen, and Wetstein, on the New Testament.

But while we willingly concede this, we may also truly maintain that Jesus founded a new religious system. He himself says distinctly that the religious teacher must make use of both new and old doctrines. “A Christian teacher must be like a householder, who brings out of his treasure things new and old; Matt. xiii. 52. But Christ did more than any other religious teacher before or since his time, by teaching, not simply what men have to do, but by providing and pointing out the means by which they can perform their duties. Vide John, i. 17; Titus, ii. 11, seq.

The question disputed by theologians, Whether Christ can be called a new lawgiver, may be decided by these considerations. *Civil* laws and institutions are here out of the question; *such* Christ did not intend to establish, since his kingdom is not of this world. *Law* must be understood as synonymous with *religion, religious doctrine*; according to the use of the Hebrew *תורה*, and the Greek *νόμος*. The question would then be, more correctly, whether he was a *new religious teacher*. The remarks above made shew that Christ is entitled to this name, and in a far higher sense than Moses was. He himself calls his religion, and the ordinances and institutions to be connected with it, *καινήν διαθήκην*, in opposition to the ancient Mosaic dispensation, Matt. xxvi. 28. And Paul calls Christ the *author and founder* of the new dispensation, (*μειστήρ καινῆς διαθήκης*), Heb. ix. 15; xii. 24. His religion, according to Paul, succeeds to the Mosaic, and puts an end to the Mosaic dispensation as such. The term *novus legislator* has been rendered suspicious in the view of some theologians from the use which Socinians make of it, designating by it the whole office and merit of Christ.

Note 2.—Jesus always appeals to his miracles, and proves by them that his doctrine is divine; John, vii. 11. His apostles do the same; Acts, ii. 22. But this proof is altogether rejected by many at the present day, or, at least, very little regarded. This is the case among those, principally, who labour for the abolition of all positive religion, and the introduction of the religion

of reason; for the *positive* divine authority of the religion of Jesus stands or falls with his miracles. The truths of reason which Jesus taught would, indeed, remain valid, although confirmed by no miracles; but, in that case, his declarations would not continue to possess divine authority. We should no longer be compelled to believe in any of his doctrines *because he taught them*, as he always requires us to do; John, iv. Our belief, on the contrary, would be entirely independent of him and of his declarations. His declarations and doctrines would be subjected to the revision of human reason, like the declarations and doctrines of any merely human teacher. The authority of Jesus would not be more binding than that of Socrates, of Confucius, Zoroaster, and other wise men of antiquity. Whoever, then, denies the miracles of Jesus, removes all that is positive in the Christian religion; the sure consequence of which is, that every man may believe as much of the Christian doctrine as he pleases, and is by no means bound to admit the truth of whatever Jesus says, because he is of opinion that the doctrine of Jesus is subjected to the revision of his reason. To such an one the writings of the New Testament may possess an historical, but not a *doctrinal* value. Cf. Rühl, *Werth der Behauptungen Jesu und seiner Apostel*; Leipzig, 1792, 8vo; especially the first treatise.

SECTION XCV.

OF THE HARDSHIPS AND SUFFERINGS OF JESUS.

I. *During his whole life upon the earth.*

ALTHOUGH it is true that Jesus suffered a great deal while he was upon the earth, we should avoid all unscriptural exaggeration of this subject, and not maintain that his whole earthly existence was mere uninterrupted suffering. We find scenes in the life of Jesus which caused him many happy and cheerful hours, Luke, x. 21; Matt. xvii. 1, seq. Jesus, as a man, possessed very tender feelings and warm affections, John, xi. Both pain and pleasure, therefore, made a strong and deep impression upon his heart. The evangelical history exhibits him as at one time in deep distress, and at another in great joy.

His external trials and hardships consisted principally in his great poverty and indigence, Matt. viii. 20; Luke, ix. 58; 2 Cor. viii. 9; the many difficulties and hindrances in the way of the accomplishment of his office as teacher; contempt, persecution, danger, and the suffering which the disobedience and obstinacy of his contemporaries occasioned him. The sufferings which he endured at the end of his life will be considered in No. II. The following remarks will serve to the better understanding of the

doctrine respecting the suffering and adversities of Jesus.

(1) Human infirmities and calamities are of two kinds—viz., (a) *Natural*; which are founded in the laws and constitution of human nature, and are therefore common to all men. Jesus, too, we find, was subject to these, s. 93, but in common with all others; and when he became a true man he of course subjected himself to them. (b) *Contingent*, (accessoriaræ,) which do not happen to all, but only to a few. Such are lowliness, poverty, contempt, &c. Jesus, as a man, was not necessitated to endure these; and the very opposite of them was expected in the Messiah. He submitted to them, because the divine plan for the good of men required it; Heb. xii. 2; Phil. ii. 6, 7.

(2) Many things which are commonly accounted hardships and trials are not so in the eyes of the true sage, who is superior to the prejudices of the multitude. And, on the other hand, many things which are commonly admired as the best fortune do not appear to him either good fortune or real welfare. We should be careful, therefore, not to enumerate among the sufferings and afflictions of Jesus such things as would be so accounted only by the voluptuary and libertine, and not by the wise man. Such things are, his frequent journeys, his being born in a stable, laid in a manger, &c. These circumstances, in themselves considered, were no hardships to a man who disregarded convenience and worldly honour.

Religious teachers must exercise great caution on this subject. There is a double disadvantage in enumerating such circumstances among the *sufferings* of Jesus; one is, that the common people will be confirmed in the error, (which is very prevalent,) of considering the goods of fortune, rank, birth, splendour, and other external advantages, as of great value; the other is, that they will be encouraged in effeminacy and false sensitiveness. The example of Jesus in his humiliation ought, on the contrary, to be employed to shew that a man of true piety and magnanimity needs none of those external advantages which are commonly so highly esteemed, in order to be happy and contented; that a man, even in poverty and humiliation, may be highly useful to others, &c. The sufferings of Jesus, considered in this light, are very encouraging and cheering to despised or neglected worth. And the New Testament makes this very use of the doctrine of the sufferings and humiliation of Jesus—e. g., Hebrews, xii. 2, *αἰσχύνῃς καταφρονήσας*—i. e., he was so superior to his enemies in greatness and strength of spirit that he disregarded their insults and their foolish judgments respecting him.

The sufferings of Jesus are eminently calculated to impress our minds with a view of his

great love to men. He became poor for our sakes, that we might become rich. The proper effect of this view is to lead us to gratitude and cheerful obedience.

(3) Some are accustomed to particularize the sins for which Jesus atoned by particular hardships and sufferings, and also the virtues, for the performance of which he at such times procured us the power. But we ought not to go beyond the New Testament, and to make arbitrary distinctions, which have no scriptural ground. The Bible does not represent Christ as enduring, in the highest possible degree, every imaginable distress of mind and body. The greatness of the merits of his sufferings depends neither upon their continuance nor upon their magnitude and variety. The sufferings of Christ would still possess their whole adequate value, even if he did not endure every imaginable distress.

II. *Sufferings of Christ at the end of his life; commonly called his passion.*

(1) The sorrowful feelings of his *soul*, or his *mental* suffering, his anguish of heart, exhibited most strikingly on the Mount of Olives in Gethsemane; Matt. xxvi. 37—44; Luke, xxii. 41—44. This anguish is described by Luke as great to an extraordinary degree. He felt it shortly before his enemies commenced their abuse. In view of this distress many difficulties have arisen. The martyrs of religion have frequently exhibited, under greater sufferings than these, and tortures which they have actually solicited, a joy and firmness which we have been accustomed to admire. Besides, Jesus exhibited throughout all the rest of his life and his after sufferings an unexampled magnanimity and power. He foresaw his sufferings with cheerful courage, and undertook them of his own accord. But Jesus did not exhibit, either in the last moments of his life, or at any other period, that ill-timed enthusiasm which was so much admired in the Christian martyrs of the second and third centuries; nor, on the other hand, did he shew any cold insensibility to suffering. Both enthusiasts and philosophers are therefore displeased with his allowing himself to feel this fear and timidity; and many interpreters have exerted their skill upon these passages, to pervert their true meaning. Why such despondency and anguish just at this time? We remark upon this subject,

(a) There is nothing in the conduct of Jesus at this time which is inconsistent with a great man. He was far from that apathy and stoicism which the martyrs exhibited, either from affectation, enthusiasm, or insensibility. He actually endured therefore, for a considerable time, the pains of death which are natural to men, as appears from Matt. xxvi. 39—44; John,

xii. 27; and Paul says distinctly, Heb. v. 7, 8, that Christ wished to resemble us, his brethren, in respect to the painful accompaniments of death, in order to qualify himself better to become a compassionate high-priest. "He prayed to God, who could deliver him from death, with loud crying and tears." A forced, stoical apathy is entirely opposed to the spirit of Christ and his religion. Christianity pronounces against everything which is forced, artificial, and unsuited to the nature which God has given us. It is the duty of men to improve and to increase in holiness; but they should still continue to be men, and not be ashamed of human feelings, and of the natural and innocent expressions of them. The example of Christ is instructive in this respect. But the most important consideration is the following—viz.,

(b) These sufferings, as Jesus and his apostles always taught, were endured for our sakes, and were the punishment of our sins. This being the case, it was necessary for Christ to feel that he suffered. He could not, and should not, remain insensible. We must see by his example what we deserved to suffer. Some hours before his death, Jesus assigned this as the true object of his sufferings: "He would shed his blood for the remission of the sins of men," and he instituted the Lord's supper in memory of this great event; Matt. xxvi. 28. This suffering, therefore, arose principally from a view and a lively feeling of the great multitude of sins, their criminality, and liability to punishment. Cf. Harwood, Ueber die Ursachen der Seelenangst Christi, 4 Abhandl.; Berlin, 1774. The history of the sufferings and death of Christ is considered in this light throughout the gospel and epistles. He suffered and died for us, and on our account; and we thus learn what we deserve. This history was not intended to produce a short and transient emotion, or mere compassionate sympathy: and the preacher who employs it for these purposes only neglects its proper object. This is a great fault of many Passion and Good-Friday discourses!

(2) The great *bodily* sufferings and tortures which he firmly endured; with which is connected,

(3) His condemnation to a violent death on the cross, and his undergoing of this sentence. His life of humiliation on the earth *ἡμεῖς σαρκός* closed with his death; for the time which he lived upon the earth after his resurrection did not belong to it. Crucifixion, which was designed for *slaves* and *insurgents*; was a very disgraceful punishment. Vide Galatians, iii. 13, coll. Deut. xxi. 23. Paul therefore considers it as the lowest point of the humiliation of Jesus, and calls it *ταπεινότης* in distinction, Phil. ii. 5—8; cf. Heb. xii. 2. Every thing was ordered by God in such a way as to convince the

world, beyond a question, that his death had actually taken place. Vide the circumstances, John, xix. 30, seq. In that age no one doubted the fact. Jesus was laid in the tomb as plainly dead. He remained in the tomb until the third day, that the fact of his death might be the more certain. His burial was honourable. The passage, Is. liii. 9, may well be referred to this event: "he was destined to a grave among transgressors; but was buried with the rich." The New Testament does not, however, expressly cite it as applicable to this event.

The question has sometimes been asked, Whether the *burial* of Jesus belonged to his state of humiliation or exaltation. It is sufficient to answer, neither to one nor the other. The burial concerned only the lifeless body, separated from the soul. But according to the common way of thinking and feeling among men, the circumstances of the burial were honourable to Jesus, and should therefore be rather connected with his exaltation than his humiliation.

Note.—At the time of the apostles no one doubted the actual death of Jesus. All, Christians, Jews, and Gentiles, as appears from the New Testament, were firmly convinced of it as an undeniable fact. Some, however, appeared in the second century, who either doubted or denied the actual death of Christ; or who gave such a turn to the affair as to remove from his death and crucifixion whatever was offensive to the Jews and heathen. The death of Jesus was not, however, disputed on historical grounds, for there were none; but merely for *doctrinal* reasons. The doctrine of Christ's death was inconsistent with some of their philosophical hypotheses. Most of the Gnostics and Manicheans, who maintained that Christ had a seeming or shadowy body, contended that he did not actually suffer tortures and death; but only *ἐν δοκῇσιν* (seemingly, in his seeming body.) Vide s. 93, II. The Basilidiani maintained that Jesus was not crucified, but Simon of Cyrene in his stead. Cerinthus taught that one of the highest æons, Christ or the *Δόγος*, united himself with the man Jesus, the son of Joseph and Mary, at his baptism; that Christ deserted the man Jesus during his sufferings, and returned to heaven; and that thus the man Jesus alone suffered and died. In accordance with this opinion, he and his followers explained the exclamation of Christ upon the cross, "My God! why hast thou forsaken me?" Matthew, xxvii. 46.

This desertion (*derelictio a Deo*) has been very differently understood, even in modern times. The words which Christ uses are taken from Ps. xxii. 1—a psalm which he frequently cites as referring to himself. It is the language of a deeply distressed sufferer, who looks forward with anxious longing to the termination

of his sufferings, and to whom the assistance of God, comfort, and consolation, seem to disappear altogether, or to delay too long. The phrase *to be deserted by God* is frequently used without implying a prevailing doubt in the actual providence of God; as Ps. lxxi. 11; Isa. xlix. 14. Notwithstanding, this anxious feeling was one of the greatest and most piercing of the mental sufferings of Jesus. At the same time it is very consoling and quieting to one who comes into similar circumstances, especially at the close of his life, since he can count upon being heard in the same way. Thus Jesus was enabled, shortly before his death, when he saw his approaching end, joyfully to exclaim, *τετέλεσται*—i. e., now everything which I had to do or to suffer according to the will of God is accomplished and perfected; John, xix. 30, coll. v. 38. This term refers especially, as *πληρὸν* does in other cases, to the fulfilment of what was predicted concerning him as the decree of God. Vide Luke, xviii. 31; xxii. 37; Acts, xiii. 29.

III. Attributes and Motives of the Sufferings of Christ.

Jesus underwent all these sufferings, and death itself, (1) *innocently*, Luke, xxiii. 14, 15, and the parallel texts, 2 Cor. v. 21; 1 Pet. ii. 22; iii. 18; (2) *freely*, Matt. xvi. 21—24; John, x. 11, 17, 18; xiii. 1, 21—33; xviii. 1—8; (3) with the greatest *patience* and *firmness*, 1 Pet. ii. 23; (4) *from unexampled* and *magnanimous love* to us; also, from *obedience* to God, he herein subjected himself to the will and decree of God. Vide s. 88; John, xv. 13; Rom. v. 6—8.

Theologians call this obedience which Jesus exhibited in suffering, *passive obedience*, from Phil. ii. 8, "obedient unto the death of the cross." The active obedience of Christ, his doing everything which was suitable to the divine will and command, was considered s. 93, III. They are one and the same obedience in reality. The origin and advantage of this distinction will be further considered in the Article on Justification. The various *objects* and uses of the sufferings of Christ will also be considered more fully in the same Article, s. 115. Cf. Morus, p. 160, 161, s. 7.

SECTION XCVI.

OF CHRIST'S DESCENT INTO HELL.

I. *Meaning of the phraseology, "to descend into hell,"* (יָרַד עַל שְׁאֵל, *karabainein eis hēnē*), and an explanation of the texts relating to this subject.

(1) THE ancients believed universally, not excluding the Orientalists and the Hebrews, that there was a place in the invisible world, conceived to be deep under the earth, into which

the disembodied souls of men, good and bad, went immediately after death. The name of this place was ᾠδης, ᾠδης, *orcu*, the under-world, the kingdom of the dead. This word never denotes the place of the damned, either in the scriptures or in the fathers of the first three centuries. Accordingly, the phrase *descendere in orcu* always denotes in the Bible the separation of the soul from the body, and, the condition of the disembodied spirit after death; Num. xvi. 30, 33; Job, vii. 9; Ps. lv. 16; Isaiah, xiv. 15; and frequently in the apocryphal books of the Old Testament. When the heroes of Homer are slain, their souls are said to descend to Hades.

This phrase may then be explained, in this sense, to refer to the death of Christ; and so it is a tropical or figurative representation of his death, and the separation of his soul from his body. When he died, he descended into Hades, and continued there, as to his soul, as long as his body continued in the grave. We find the continuance of Christ in Hades actually mentioned in this sense in the New Testament. Peter, in his speech, (Acts, ii. 27,) cites the passage, Psalm xvi. 10, οὐκ ἐγκαταλείψεις τὴν ψυχὴν μου εἰς ᾠδου, which is always referred to Christ's death and continuance in the grave. The phrase καταβαίνειν εἰς ᾠδου does not indeed occur in that passage; but the omission is merely accidental. It was certainly used by the first Christians respecting Christ as deceased, in the same way as respecting other dead.

(2) But the chief dependence is placed upon two other texts of the New Testament, in which the descent of Christ to hell is expressly mentioned, and in one of which his employment in Hades is thought to be determined.

(a) Ephes. iv. 9. But the context shews that the descent of Christ to hell is not the subject in this text, but his descent from heaven down to the earth, and his subsequent return into heaven.

(b) The principal passage is, 1 Pet. iii. 18—20. Various explanations are given of this passage. In the earliest times, it was universally considered as denoting the continuance of Christ in Hades; and this meaning is undoubtedly the most natural, and best suited to the words, the context, and all the ideas of antiquity. But as this meaning does not accord with modern ideas, various other explanations have been attempted. But the context shews that the continuance of Jesus in Hades is the subject of this passage—i. e., that it treats of the condition and employment of the soul of Christ after death. The apostle is shewing, from the example of Jesus, that suffering for the good of others is honourable and will be rewarded. Christ laid men under great obligations to him, by suffering and dying for them, ver. 18; by what he did too after death, while his spirit was in Hades, ver.

19; (ver. 20 is parenthetic;) by his resurrection, ver. 21; his return to God, and his elevated situation in heaven, ver. 22. The sense then is: the body of Christ died, but his soul was preserved. (Peter always uses σώξ and πνεῦμα in this sense; as iv. 1, 6.) While his body was lying in the grave, his soul (ἐν ᾧ, sc. πνεύματι) wandered down to the kingdom of the dead, and there preached to the disembodied spirits. It was the belief of the ancients that the manes still continued, in the under-world, to prosecute their former employments. Vide Isaiah, xiv. 9. The same belief is seen in the fables of the Grecian kings and judges. Tiresias still continued to prophesy. Vide Isaiah, xiv. 9. Christ, by his instructions and exhortations to reformation, deserved well of men while he was upon earth. He continued this employment in Hades. He preached to the greatest sinners; and Noah's contemporaries are particularized as distinguished examples of ancient sinners, ver. 20. Now that Peter really supposed that Christ descended to Hades appears from Acts, ii. 31.

II. A Sketch of the History of this Doctrine.

For the various opinions of commentators respecting the descent of Christ to hell, cf. Dietelmair, Historia dogmatis de descensu Christi ad inferos, ed. 2; Altorf. 1762; 8vo; Semler, in Programm. Acad. p. 371, seq.; Pott, Epistola Catholica perpetua annotatione illustr., vol. ii.; Göttingen, 1790; Excurs. iii. (ad 1 Pet. iii.); and Dr. Hacker, court-preacher in Dresden, Diss. de descensu Christi ad inferos, ad provinciam Messiae demandatam referendo; Dresden, 1802. [Cf. Hahn, s. 472.]

The passage, Acts, ii., coll. Psalm xvi. 10, was the foundation upon which this doctrine was built. Its simple meaning is, that Christ really died, like other men, and that, while his lifeless body lay in the grave, his soul was in the same place and state with the souls of all the dead. So the early Christians undoubtedly understood it. The question now arose, Was the soul of one who while on earth had been so active for the good of men, idle and unemployed in Hades? No. Hence a third question, What was his employment while there? The same as on earth—he instructed—was the natural conclusion, which was confirmed by the word ἐκνήξ, 1 Pet. iii. 19. But since, in later times, Hades was understood to signify only the place of the damned; and since φιλανθρώποι and sinners are mentioned by Peter in this passage; it was thither—to the place of the damned—that Christ was supposed to have gone, to preach repentance, (κηρύσσειν,) to shew himself as a victor in triumph, &c.

Such is the course which the investigation of this question naturally took. Now the historical sketch itself.

(1) The ecclesiastical fathers of the first three centuries were agreed in the opinion that during the three days in which the body of Christ lay in the grave his soul was in the kingdom of the dead. This opinion they derived correctly from 1 Pet. iii. and Acts, ii. By this representation they supposed, in substance, the condition of Christ, as to his soul during his death, to be described. Thus Irenæus says, "Christ in this way fulfilled the law of the dead," v. 31. Clement of Alexandria expresses himself in the same way. Origen says, *γυνή σώματος γενομένη ψυχῇ*, Contra Celsum, ii. Tertullian says, "Christus forma humanæ mortis apud inferos (est) functus," &c.

They differed in opinion respecting his employment there. Most supposed that he preached the gospel to the ancient believers who expected his advent—to the patriarchs, &c. Vide Iren. (iv. 45, 50,) Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, and others. But Origen and some others seem to have believed that Christ rescued the damned who believed on him in Hades, and transported them to the abode of the blessed. Still, the *descent to hell* is nowhere expressly mentioned in the ancient creeds of the first three centuries, either in the Eastern or Western church. No one in this period held it to be the interment of Christ; nor did any one assert that he went *exclusively* to the place of the damned.

(2) This doctrine was gradually regarded as fixed after the fourth century, and was adopted into the creeds. The phrase *κατάβουρα εἰς τὰ καταβόρεια* was established at the Arian Council at Sirmium, in the year 357, and at many orthodox and Arian councils after that time. It was now inserted in the more ancient creeds, to which it had not previously belonged—e. g., into the apostolical creed, particularly, as it seems, on account of the controversies with Apollinaris. But all the churches had not admitted it into this creed before the sixth century. Ruffin says (Expos. S. Ap.), that the Romish church did not admit this doctrine into the apostolical creed, "*nec in Orientis ecclesiis habetur*," and adds, that the word BURIED which is there used, conveys the same sense. The reason why this doctrine was so much insisted on, and admitted into the creeds, especially after the middle of the fourth century, is, that it afforded a weighty argument against the followers of Apollinaris, who denied the existence of a human soul in Christ. Vide s. 93, II. ad finem. It may be added, that the fathers of the fourth century, and of the one succeeding, adhered for the most part to the opinions found among the earlier fathers, No. 1.

(3) The opinions of the earlier fathers were gradually set aside in after ages, especially in the Western church. The opinion, that the

separation of the soul from the body was all that was intended by the representation of Christ's descent to hell, was by degrees entirely laid aside. The *infernus* was considered by many as the appropriate designation of the place of the damned, and the passage in 1 Pet. iii. as the only proof-text; and so the *descent to hell* became equivalent to the descent of Christ to the place of the damned. Such were the views of many of the schoolmen. Thomas Aquinas adopted the opinion of Hieronymus and Gregory, that Christ rescued the souls of the pious fathers who lived before Christ from the *limbus patrum*, (a kind of entrance to hell, *status medius*.) So also the Council at Trent.

They now began to dispute, whether the soul only of Christ was in hell, or his body also; whether he was there during the whole time in which his body was in the grave, or only on the third day, shortly before the resurrection, &c. Durandus and other schoolmen understood the matter figuratively. According to them, Jesus was not in hell *quoad realem præsentiam* (as to his substance), but only *quoad effectum*. This opinion had many advocates.

The protestant theologians since the Reformation have been divided in opinion upon this subject.

(a) Luther spoke very doubtfully upon the subject, and was unwilling to determine anything decidedly. He agreed at first with Hieronymus and Gregory, in supposing a *limbus patrum* whither Christ went. But whenever he mentioned the subject, especially after 1533, he was accustomed to remark that Christ destroyed the power of the devil and of hell, whither he went with soul and body. This induced the theologians, who adhered strictly to every particular doctrine of Luther, to represent the *descent of Christ to hell* as his victory over the devil, as was done in the *Formula Concordiæ*, art. ix. M. Flaccius had represented the descent to hell as belonging to the state of humiliation. But they represented it as belonging to the state of exaltation, and declared that on the moment of the resurrection Christ repaired to hell, with soul and body, in both natures, shewed himself to Satan and hell as victor, and then appeared alive upon the earth at daybreak. They are not so unreasonable, however, as to demand a belief in all their distinctions respecting this doctrine. Hutter, Baier, Winkler, Carpov, and others, held these views. But there is no foundation for them in the Bible. Some of the ancient creeds say, *the gates of hell* (kingdom of the dead) *trembled at his approach*—e. g., the Sirmian creed, 357.

(b) Beza and other reformers understood the *descent of Christ to hell* to mean his *burial*. Russ and Rambach among the Lutherans assented to this opinion. It is false, however; for de-

scent to hell, in the sense of the ancients, does not refer to the body but to the soul. Vide supra.

(c) Others affirmed that Christ preached the gospel in Hades; some say, to the believers who lived before his advent; others, to the wicked also, and that such as submitted to him were delivered from the place of the damned; almost like the opinion of many of the ancients. Even Seiler thinks this opinion very probable. He supposes, with others, that both the body and soul of Christ were in Hades. But Flaccius, Brentius, Dreyer, and others, agree with the ancients, that only the soul of Christ was there, while his body lay in the grave. But these differ again on the question, whether the descent to hell belongs to the state of humiliation or exaltation.

(d) Some supposed, as Durandus did, that the whole subject should be understood figuratively.

(e) Zeltner, Baumgarten, Oeder, and others, returned to the ancient opinion, and understood *ᾠδῆς* to denote in general the *place and condition of departed spirits*. So most of the English and Arminian theologians.

(f) John Æpinus (a Lutheran theologian at Hamburg, of the sixteenth century) affirmed that Jesus endured in hell the pains of the damned, and therefore accounted his descent thither as belonging to the state of humiliation. He had many followers, though he was not the first who advanced this opinion. Cardinal Nicolaus of Casa had before asserted the same thing in the fifteenth century, and also many reformed and Lutheran theologians since the sixteenth century, as John Agricola, Hunnius, Brentius, Cocceius, and Witsius.

We omit the mention of the peculiar hypotheses of some other theologians.

I. Critical Observations, and a result from what has been said.

Theologians at the present day are agreed, for the most part, that this question is one of minor importance. Some have often affirmed that the passage 1 Pet. iii. did not relate to this subject. But all the other explanations given are forced and unnatural, and the idea, after all, is scriptural, for the passage Acts ii. cannot be explained away. According to the passage, 1 Pet. iii., the soul of Christ actually went to the *place of the damned* (*φύλαξή*, *carcer cæcum*) in Hades, and there preached to the disembodied spirits. Until the last judgment the souls of all the deceased are in Hades, (i. e., they are *manes*, disembodied,) but in different regions, distant from each other, (i. e., *in vario statu*), Luke, xvi. 19—31. Christ, then, during his continuance there, did what he was accustomed to do while yet on the earth for the good of men; he *instructed*

those who needed instruction, and *exhorted*. The object and use of this preaching, which is mentioned in the passage in Peter, we cannot see, since those who are in Hades are always represented by Jesus, the apostles, and Peter himself, as fixed in their destiny, and reserved to the day of judgment. Cf. Luke, xvi.

It will be sufficient for the teacher of religion to say that the phrase, *Christ descended to hell*, teaches (1) that during the time in which the body of Christ lay in the grave he was really dead; and (2) that the human soul of Christ was in the same unknown condition and place to which the souls of all the deceased go, and where they continue till the day of judgment; (3) that in this respect also, as in others, he was like men, his brethren, and that (4) he had a true human soul; Acts, ii. (5) Peter assures us that Christ did this for the good of men; *he preached to the departed spirits*. The nature of this preaching, its particular *object* and *consequences*, what he intended to effect, and did actually effect by it, are entirely unknown to us, as many other things which pertain to the invisible kingdom of spirits. When we ourselves shall belong to that invisible kingdom, and probably not till then, we shall receive more perfect information respecting this subject, if it can be useful for us to have it.

SECTION XCVII.

HISTORY OF CHRIST CONSIDERED AS A MAN, IN HIS STATE OF EXALTATION OR PERFECTION. S. 97—99, INCLUSIVE.

I. Of the Resurrection of Christ.

(1) THE vivification and resurrection of the man Jesus is not, strictly speaking, *pars status exaltationis*, but *terminus a quo*, as some theologians have justly remarked. So his conception was the *terminus a quo* of the state of humiliation. The *state of exaltation*, strictly speaking, commences with the ascension of Christ. The events which preceded were merely preparatory.

(2) The resurrection of Jesus is frequently ascribed in scripture to the Father; Acts, ii. 24, 32; iii. 15. Vide other texts, Morus, p. 174, s. 1, note. Jesus, however, frequently ascribes it to himself, as the Son of God, John, x. 18, coll. ii. 19, “I have power (*ἐξουσίαν*) to take my life again.” He had this power, inasmuch as he acted in common with the Father, and, as Messiah, had received power from the Father adequate to this purpose.

(3) The *proof* of the resurrection of Christ on the third day is to be deduced entirely from the accounts given of it in the New Testament. The *genuineness* of these histories, and the entire *credibility* of the accounts contained in them, are here presupposed. On these grounds we may be satisfied of the truth of this fact, even

if no inspiration is admitted. Vide s. 6, 8. The following circumstances deserve notice—viz.,

(a) The disciples of Jesus had always expected that he would establish a visible kingdom upon earth. They had never understood, and always perverted, what he frequently said to them respecting his death and resurrection. When, therefore, his death took place, they did not believe that he would actually rise again. Vide John, xx. 9, coll. ver. 24, 25. Accordingly they were so incredulous on this subject, that they regarded the first information of the fact which they received as fabulous and unworthy of credit; Luke, xxiv. 11, coll. ver. 22—24. Gregory the Great remarks, justly and happily, *dubitatum est ab illis, ne dubitaretur a nobis*.

(b) After this event Jesus appeared frequently to his apostles and his other disciples. Ten different appearances have been noticed by some writers in the Evangelists. At these times he conversed with his disciples, and gave them such palpable demonstrations of his resurrection that none of them could longer doubt respecting the fact. Vide the last chapters of the gospels, and particularly John, xx. 21, and Acts, i. 2, 3; x. 41. Some, at first, regarded his appearance to be that of a dead man with a *shadowy body*, such as was believed by the Jews, Greeks, and Romans; very much the same as in Homer and Virgil. So Thomas, in John, xx. 25, seq. For this reason Jesus ate with them, and allowed them to handle him, John, xxi.

(c) Thenceforward they were so convinced of the truth of his resurrection that they never were or could be persuaded to doubt respecting it. They spake of it, after the final departure of Christ from the earth, as an established fact, which was universally admitted. They proclaimed it publicly at Jerusalem, where Jesus was condemned, before the Sanhedrim, and other tribunals; nor could any one convince them of the contrary. Acts, ii. 24, 32; iv. 8—13; iii. x., xiii.; 1 Cor. xv. 5, seq.; 1 Pet. i. 21.

(d) No solid *historical* objection has been ever brought against this event; nor has any ground been alleged sufficient to convict the apostles of imposture, because the *data* for such proof are wanting. The event must therefore be regarded as true, until the contrary can be proved by *historical reasons*, or until the witnesses can be convicted of untruth. The enemies of Christianity have often been challenged to produce a single example of a history so well attested as that of the resurrection of Jesus, and followed too by such important consequences, both among cultivated and ruder nations, which has turned out in the end to be false and fictitious. But such an example they have never been able to produce. It is worthy of notice, that we do not find in the whole history of the

apostles that any of the most enlightened enemies of Christianity, even the Sanhedrim at Jerusalem, undertook to say that Christ had not risen, although they hated the apostles so much as to abuse and condemn them. *At that time*, no one ventured seriously to question this fact. The grave was watched; the frightened guards brought the news of what had happened to the Sanhedrim, and were bribed to give out that the disciples of Jesus had stolen his corpse; Matt. xxviii. 11—13. Incredible as this story was, still many of the Jews at first believed it, as Matthew declares, ver. 15 of the same chapter.

To this latter supposition, the *Wolfenb. Ungeannte* has entirely assented, in his work, *Vom Zweck Jesu*, and in the fragment, "Ueber die Auferstehungsgeschichte Jesu," which Lessing published in his "Beytragen zur Geschichte und Literatur," b. 4, 1777. He looks up all possible discrepancies in the narrative which the evangelists have given of minute circumstances, although they would not be sufficient, even if well grounded, to render the fact *historically* suspicious. Vide Doederlein, *Fragmente und Antifragmente*, 2 thle.; Nürnberg, 1781; Semler's "Beantwortung;" 2nd ed. 1780; Michaelis, *Auferstehungsgeschichte Jesu*; Halle, 1783. Among the ancient writers, see Ditten, *Wahrheit der christlichen Religion auf der Auferstehungsgeschichte Jesu*, u. s. w.; and Sherlock, *Gerichtliches Verhör der Zeugen für*, u. s. w.

Some have endeavoured to render this history suspicious, from the fact that Jesus did not *publicly* shew himself after his resurrection, and did not appear to his enemies. Some reply that it does not follow from the silence of the evangelists that he did not. But Peter says expressly that he appeared *ὁ παντὶ τῶ λαῷ, ἀλλ'—ἑμῖν*, (the disciples,) Acts, x. 40, 41. What object, now, would have been answered by this public appearance? Those who had not before received him as Messiah would have rejected him anew; and even although they should effect nothing by it, they would still have given out the whole thing as an imposition. And suppose the whole populace had believed, they might have commenced dangerous innovations, and made arrangements to establish Christ as an earthly king. Cf. John, vi. 15. Those who had no taste or capacity for the spiritual kingdom of Christ would no more have believed in him, or firmly and faithfully adhered to him, after he had appeared to them raised from the dead, and had himself preached to them, than before, when he also preached to them in person, and wrought the greatest miracles before them; so that he himself would have found the truth of what is said, Luke, xvi. 31.

Persons have not been wanting who have considered the account of the resurrection of Christ as allegorical. Semler supposed that

Christ did not *physically* rise from the dead, and that the life which is ascribed to him is spiritual life in heaven and in the hearts of men. Others suppose that he did not actually die upon the cross, but that he lived in private among his friends for a considerable time after his crucifixion, and then disappeared. They suppose that when his side was pierced he fell into a swoon, from which he was revived by the evaporation of the spices in the tomb; without thinking that, even if he had survived the crucifixion, this evaporation in a confined cave would necessarily have suffocated him. Spinoza says, somewhere, that the resurrection and ascension were not events which took place in the *material* world, but in the *moral* world—i. e., they are fictions, ancient Christian fables, which, however, had great moral consequences. Many modern writers, and even some theologians, have adopted this opinion. Dr. Paulus rather inclines to it in his Comments on the Evangelists.

(4) The *necessity and importance* of this doctrine. It is one of the most important of the positive and peculiar doctrines of Christianity, and is so regarded by Christ, and in the whole New Testament. Morus, p. 175, seq., s. 3.

(a) The apostles always represent this as a fundamental truth of the Christian faith. The *ᾠφθη ἀγγέλοις*, *he shewed himself alive to his messengers*—i. e., disciples—is mentioned as a fundamental truth, 1 Tim. iii. 16, coll. Rom. x. 9. The apostles were called *μάρτυρες ἀναστάσεως Χριστοῦ*, Acts, i. 22. Paul therefore says, that if Christ be not risen we can have no hope of resurrection, and our whole faith in him is unfounded; 1 Cor. xv. 14, 17, coll. ver. 5—7; for the instructions of Christ are attested and confirmed as certain and divine only by the resurrection. Cf. 1 Pet. i. 3, and Morus, p. 176, n. 5.

(b) All the apostles agree that Christ by his resurrection received the seal and sanction of God, as the great Prophet and Saviour constituted by him. He himself had claimed to be the Messiah; but his death seemed to frustrate every hope. Vide Luke, xxiv. 20, 21. His resurrection, however, rendered this belief more sure and unwavering. His disciples now saw that he was the person whom he claimed to be. They were compelled to conclude that God would not, by such a distinguished miracle, authorize and support an impostor, who merely pretended to be a divine messenger. Added to this is the fact, that he himself had prophesied that he should rise in three days; Luke, xviii. 33; John, x. 17. The accomplishment of this prophecy proves that Christ did not teach in his own name, but as the messenger of God; as he often said; John, viii.—x. The following are the most important texts relating to this point—viz., Romans, i. 4; Acts, xvii. 31; 1 Tim. iii. 16. The passage, Ps. ii. 7, ‘Thou art my Son,

this day have I begotten thee,” is often referred in the New Testament directly to the resurrection. “I have declared thee (by raising thee to life) on this day (the day of the resurrection) to be the Messiah,” Acts, xiii. 33, 34.

II. The Ascension of Christ.

(1) Jesus spent forty days on earth after his resurrection, in order to render his disciples more sure of the fact, to teach them many important things, and to prepare them for the discharge of their public office. Vide the last chapters of the evangelists, and Acts, i. Afterwards, he was removed to the abodes of the blessed. These abodes are situated in regions invisible to men, at a distance from the earth, and inaccessible to us while we continue here. They cannot be better described than by the word *heaven*, which almost all people and languages have, and which the sacred writers frequently employ. As they use it, it denotes the place of the highest sanctuary of God—i. e., the place where the Omnipresent Being reveals himself with peculiar glory. Cf. John, xiv. 2, 3.

Jesus was taken up from earth in view of his apostles, and borne hence, (*ἐν ᾧ ᾠφθη εἰς οὐρανόν*,) Acts, i. 9—11; 1 Pet. iii. 22; Heb. ix. 10, 11, 24. He ascended from Bethany on the Mount of Olives, Luke, xxiv. 51. He predicted his ascension to his disciples; John, vi. 62; xiv. 2, 3. This doctrine, like that of the resurrection, is enumerated among the fundamental truths of Christianity, 1 Tim. iii. 16, (*ἀνελήφθη ἐν δόξῃ*;) 1 Pet. iii. 22. He taught his disciples to find in all these events confirmation of his declarations, and joy and consolation. As he had risen, the first that arose from the dead, and had been translated to heaven, they too should one day arise, and be glorified, if they reposed faith and confidence in him. They should be with him where he was, at home, in the house of his Father, &c.

Note.—Some modern writers have endeavoured to awaken suspicion respecting the doctrine of the ascension of Christ, from the fact that Matthew, Luke, and John do not expressly narrate this history of the ascension in their gospels, as Mark does in his, and as Luke does in the Acts. But they could not have been ignorant or doubtful respecting this event, any more than the other writers of the New Testament; since Jesus had mentioned it in his early instructions, according to John, vi. 62, and had frequently alluded to it afterwards. The writings of Paul, Peter, and the Acts of the Apostles written by Luke, shew how universal was the belief of this event among the first Christian teachers. And how could these two have been exceptions? Vide the Essays, “Warum haben nicht alle Evangelisten die

Himelfahrt Christi ausdrücklich miterzählt? in Flatt's Magazin, Stück 8, Tübingen, 1802, Num. 2.

(2) According to the clear declarations of the New Testament, Christ lives in the abodes of the blessed, as a *true man*. Cf. Acts, i. 11; xvii. 31; Heb. ix. 10, seq. Vide his appearances in the Acts. But the saints in heaven do not have a gross, feeble, perishable body, like the human body which we possess upon the earth; but a more perfect, imperishable, glorified body, very much like that of the gods of Homer and the Grecians. 1 Cor. xv. coll. s. 152. New Jesus received such a body in heaven, as we shall one day receive; Phil. iii. 21—*σῶμα δόξης* (i. e., *ἐνδοξόν*) αὐτοῦ, which our present earthly body (*σῶμα ταπεινώσεως*) will in future resemble. The same doctrine is carried out, 1 Cor. xv. 42—53. As inhabitants of earth, men have a mortal body, like Adam; as inhabitants of heaven, a refined and immortal body, like Christ, the *second Adam*. Christ, however, did not receive this body immediately on his resurrection; but when he became an inhabitant of heaven. During the forty days which succeeded his resurrection, he ate and drank with his disciples—actions which cannot be predicated of heavenly bodies. He bore, too, on his body the scars and marks of the crucifixion. Some few have supposed that he then possessed a spiritual body, from a misunderstanding of the words *ἑρῶν κεκλεισμένων*, John, xx. 19, 26. The declaration in the epistle to the Hebrews, that he offers to God, as High-priest, his own blood, in the holy of holies, shews that the same Jesus, who according to the divine decree died on the earth for our good, now lives in heaven, and that we may always rejoice in the happy consequences of his sacrifice; Heb. ix. 14, 24, seq.

Note.—The dispute relative to the Lord's supper has occasioned much controversy since the sixteenth century, respecting the *omnipresence of the body* of Christ, which was asserted by many Lutheran theologians. But the doctrine *de omnipresentia* or *ubiquitate of the human body* of Christ, is a mere hypothesis of some theologians, without any sure scriptural support. Indeed, those divine attributes, which, from the nature of the case, cannot be predicated of body in general, cannot be ascribed to the body of Christ, although it be glorified. Besides, we are expressly assured that we shall in future receive a body of the same kind as the heavenly body of Christ, Phil. iii. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 49. Finally, this doctrine is not necessary for the defence of the Lutheran doctrine respecting the Lord's supper. Vide *infra* respecting this doctrine.

(3) There has always been a great diversity

of opinions on the question, How long Christ, as a man, will continue in heaven, and when, according to his promise, he will return and visibly reappear on the earth. Christ himself has promised no other *visible* return than that at the end of the world, as the Judge of men. For his *παρουσία* to destroy Jerusalem, and punish his enemies, is a figurative mode of speech, like the *adventus Dei* so often spoken of by the prophets. But many of the early Christians, who were inclined to Judaism, and expected the establishment of an earthly kingdom, explained many texts in accordance with such an opinion, although there is not one passage in all the writings of the apostles distinctly in favour of it. The apostles always supposed that Christ would remain in heaven until the end of the world, (during the whole time of the New-Testament dispensation,) and not visibly return until that time; although they did not undertake to determine how long this period would continue. Vide Acts, i. 11; 1 Thess. i. 10, coll. 2 Thess. ii. seq.

Here belongs that remarkable passage in the speech of Peter, Acts, iii. 20, 21, which has been so often misunderstood and referred to the restoration of all things. "God has caused the joyful times of the New Testament to appear, (*καιροί ἀναψέως*, cf. 2 Cor. vi. 2,) and has sent Jesus Christ, whom now the heaven hath again received, or still retains, *as long as this happy period of the New Testament* (the new dispensation upon the earth) *shall continue*." Here, then, is no promise that Christ will return to found an earthly kingdom. *Δέξασθαι*, when spoken of a place, always means, according to a Greek idiom, that the place *receives* or *retains* any one. So all the ancient interpreters, and Beza, who denied the omnipresence of the body of Christ from this passage. For this reason the Lutheran theologians have preferred to refer *δέξασθαι* to Christ. The *χρόνοι ἀποκαταστάσεως* are, *the times of the New Testament*, like *χρόνοι διορθώσεως*, Heb. ix. 10. Vide ver. 20. And *ἄχρι* signifies *not until*, but *dum, while, during*; *ἄχρις σήμερον καλεῖται*, Heb. iii. 13. Vide Ernesti, Program. ad. h. l. in Opusc. Theol. p. 483, seq.

Note.—It was intended to teach men by this event, to regard Christ, even in his human nature, as henceforth standing in the closest connexion with God—as in the possession and enjoyment of supreme felicity and power, and as the Ruler and Lord, whose agency and influence were unlimited. The description of God, as dwelling in heaven, suggests the idea of his supremacy over all the inhabitants and events of the world, his controlling providence, boundless reign, and perfect enjoyment. Morus, p. 177, not. extr.

SECTION XCVIII.

WHEREIN THE HEAVENLY GLORY OR MAJESTY OF CHRIST, AS A MAN, CONSISTS; AND THE SCRIPTURAL IDEA OF THE KINGDOM AND DOMINION OF CHRIST.

I. *Scriptural designation of the Glory of Christ.*

THE imperfection and inferiority which Christ had voluntarily assumed during his life upon earth ceased immediately on his ascension. He now became, even as a man, immortal and blessed; Rom. vi. 9, 10; Heb. vii. 16, 25. Even in his human nature he was raised by God to a very illustrious dignity; John, xvii. 5, (δόξα, δαξάσθηναι,) Acts, ii. 33—36; Eph. i. 20, seq.; Col. i. 17. Ὄνομα ὑπὲρ πάν ὄνομα, Phil. ii. 9, 10. He is entitled to honour from every being, even from the higher intelligences, Heb. i. 6; Phil. ii. 9, 10; since he is henceforth raised in glory and majesty above all, 1 Pet. iii. 22. Hence a kingdom is ascribed to him, over which he reigns in heaven. He is called *Kīng*, and divinely appointed *Lord*; ὁ Κύριος, Acts, ii. 36; and Κύριος δόξης, especially by Paul, 1 Cor. ii. 8, (i. e., the glorious, adorable Lord, יְהוָה הַכְּבוֹד, Ps. xxiv. 7, 8.) In Heb. i. 9, Paul applies to Christ the passage, Ps. lxxv. 8, "God hath anointed thee with the oil of joy above thy fellows"—i. e., God honours thee more, and gives thee more privileges, than all the partners of thy dignity—the other kings, or sons of God.

Note.—Various other appellations are applied in the New Testament to Christ, descriptive partly of his supremacy, and partly of his care for the church as its head. Among these are the following—viz., *Κεφαλὴ*, the Christian church being often compared with a *body*, Eph. i. 22, 23; v. 23; *ἀνὴρ*, *maritus*, 2 Cor. xi. 2; and *νυμφίος*, John, iii. 29. Also the appellation of a *shepherd*, and the comparisons taken from it, John, x. 12. So Christ is called by Paul, *ποιμένα τὸν μέγαν*, Heb. xiii. 20, and *ἀρχιποιμήν*, 1 Pet. v. 4. This is a very honourable appellation, since *kings* were called *shepherds* by the Hebrews, Ps. lxxx. 2, seq., like the *ποιμένες καὶ ὧν* of Homer. We must understand, however, by this appellation, a *pastoral prince*, such perhaps as Abraham was, and the orientalists frequently were; the proprietor and owner of the herds, who had servants in his employment as under shepherds.

II. *The Nature and Extent of the Kingdom of Christ, the Administration of his Reign which he carries on from Heaven.*

Cf. Næsselt, Diss. "de Christo homine regnante," Opusc. tom. ii.; Halle, 1773; and the programm, "De Christo ad dextram Dei sedente," p. 10, seq.; Halle, 1787. There are some good remarks, together with many very

unfounded ones, in Dr. Eckermann's Essay, Ueber die Begriffe vom Reiche und der Wiederkunft Christi, in his Theologischen Beyträgen, b. ii. st. 1; Altona, 1891, 8vo. Morus treats this subject admirably, p. 178, seq.

(1) The terms which signify *rule* are sometimes used figuratively, and denote, a *joyful situation*, *happy*, and *honourable in an uncommon degree*—*freedom*, *independence*, *authority*; in short, every kind of distinguished happiness and welfare. Thus the stoic paradox; "omnem sapientem regnare, sive esse regem;" and Cicero: "olim cum regnare existimabamur." In this sense, Christians are called *kings*, 1 Pet. ii. 9; Rev. i. 6. They are said, συμβασιλεύειν τῷ Χριστῷ, to share with Christ the royal privileges, 2 Tim. ii. 12. In the parallel passage, Rom. viii. 17, they are said συνδοξασθῆναι. They are said, also, κληρονομεῖν βασιλείαν, Matt. xxv. 34; and βασιλεύειν ἐν ζωῇ, Rom. v. 17. Accordingly, when Christ is said to reign, his life in heaven may be intended. But this phrase applied to him is not confined to this meaning; it signifies something far more great and elevated than all this, as will appear from the following remarks.

(2) The kingdom of Christ, according to the doctrine of the New Testament, is of very wide extent.

A. It extends over everything in all the universe. "All power in heaven and on earth is given to me," Matt. xxviii. 18. Ὁ πατὴρ πάντα δέδωκεν εἰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. λ., John, xiii. 3. God exalted him, even as a man, above everything which is great and powerful in the material and spiritual world, in order that he might rule over them; and subjected to him even the different orders and classes of good and bad spirits. Christ reigns over them as Lord, Phil. ii. 9—11; Eph. i. 20, 21; Col. i. 15—17; Heb. i. 4—14; 1 Pet. iii. 22. The ground and object of such an extensive rule is this:—There are many things both in the material and spiritual world which operate to the advantage or disadvantage of men. Now, if men are to be peculiarly the subjects over whom Christ is to reign as king; if to promote their welfare and to shield them from all harm; if to punish his own enemies and the enemies of his kingdom, and to bless and reward his followers, are to be his peculiar concern;—he must be able to control all these other objects. For,

B. The reign or government of Jesus, as Christ or Messiah, has a principal respect to the *human race*. He exerts his authority on account of men, and for their advantage. This kingdom is twofold,—viz.,

(a) *Regnum sensu latiori*. Since the time when Christ was received into heaven, (Eph. i. 20,) he has reigned over *all men*, whether they know and honour him or not—i. e., he pro-

vides for them all that spiritual welfare and true happiness of which they are capable. He received from the Father right and power over the human race, John, xvii. 2; Matt. xxviii. 18; Eph. i. 10; 2 Pet. ii. 1.

(b) *Regnum sensu strictiori sive angustiori*, extends over his worshippers, who know and love him; over the whole society (ἐκκλησία, ἡγή) of those who are united, not by external power and compulsion, but by the power of truth and by instruction. This community is therefore called, in the discourses of Jesus, βασιλεία Θεοῦ sive οὐρανοῦ, Eph. v. 5; Col. i. 13. Over this community he exercises the most special watchfulness and care. Its members, when faithfully devoted and obedient to him, are his πρόβατα ἰδία. The foundation was laid and the beginning made in this community during the life of Christ on earth. From the time of John it suffered violence, Matt. xi. 12. But the beginning was small, and, in comparison with what afterwards took place, unobserved by the great multitude; οὐκ ἔρχεται μετὰ παρατήρησεως, Luke, xvii. 20. This kingdom was not extended and widened till after the ascension.

(3) The manner in which Christ governs or rules his kingdom. He reigns as σωτήρ, Eph. v. 23—29.

A. Now, during the continuance of the present state of the world,

(a) By instruction in the truth, John, xviii. 37. At his departure from the world he committed this instruction to his disciples, and especially to his apostles as his ambassadors, that they might communicate it everywhere, without regard to nation or kindred, Matt. xxviii. 18—20. It was to be more extensively diffused and widely propagated by means of other teachers, appointed by the apostles under the guidance and authority of Christ, Eph. iv. 11, 15, 16. Accordingly, in the passages mentioned, Paul derives the qualifications and the ministry (χάρει, χαρίσματα) of teachers from Christ himself, as Christ also himself does, John, x. 1, seq.

(b) By that support, help, and assistance which he imparts to his church, his special concern in its extension, and the frustration of the designs of its enemies, Matt. xxviii. 20; 1 Cor. xv. 25, 26; 1 John, iv. 4; v. 4, 5.

Note.—All the hindrances which stand in the way of the extension of Christianity, and the success of the designs of Christ to promote human happiness, are frequently called ἐχθροὶ Χριστοῦ. This term is borrowed from Psalm cx. 2. Morus has enumerated these hindrances, as presented in the scriptures, p. 180, seq., s. 6. Christ has already removed these hindrances in a measure; he is constantly diminishing them, and at the end of the present dispensation will have entirely surmounted them. Ps. cx. 1, 2; 1 Cor. xv. 25. Morus, p. 181, seq., s. 7.

B. In future, when the present state of the world shall cease, (at which time the greatest revolutions will take place in the whole universe, 2 Pet. iii. 7, 10—13.) Then, and not before, will Christ exhibit himself in all his glory, as Lord of the human race. Paul says, expressly, that all the glory of Christ is not now displayed, Heb. ii. 8; Col. iii. 3, 4; for all have not yet acknowledged him as Lord, and his enemies have still power to harm. But then his glory will become visible, 1 Cor. xv. 26, 27; Heb. x. 13. Christ will solemnly and visibly reappear on the earth, Acts, i. 11; 1 Thess. iv. 16; 2 Pet. iii. 10, 13; Heb. ix. 28; Col. iii. 4. He will raise the dead, John, v. 21—23; Matthew, xxv. He will sit in judgment upon the dead and the living, 1 Cor. xv. 26, 27; Rom. xiv. 10; Phil. ii. 10; and will allot rewards and punishments, John, v. 21—23, 27, seq.; Matt. xxv.; Acts, xvii. 31. According to the doctrine of the universality of Christ's kingdom, he will judge, not Christians only, but all men. Cf. the passages above cited, and Acts, xvii. 31; Romans, ii. 6, 7. But the time of this judgment is unknown, and was so even to the apostles, 1 Thess. v. 1, seq. coll. 2 Thess. ii. 3. Many of the early Christians, however, appear to have supposed that it was near at hand, and was connected with the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple, which was also called παρουσία Χριστοῦ. For the Jews believed that the temple would stand until the end of the world, Psalm lxxviii. 69. But the apostles never adopted or favoured this opinion. Vide Thess. ut supra.

(4) Some further observations on the nature and continuance of the government which Christ as a man administers in heaven.

(a) The government of Christ is described by himself and his apostles as being, not external and temporal, but spiritual, conducted principally by means of his religion, by the preaching of the gospel, and the power which attends it; ἀληθεία, John, xviii. 37; or ῥήματι, Eph. v. 26. Vide No. 3. This fact excludes and refutes the objection, that Christ designed to establish an earthly kingdom, s. 89; and it frustrates the hopes of the Chiliasts, who, agreeably to Jewish prejudices, are expecting such a kingdom yet to come.

(b) This government which Jesus administers, as a man, is not natural to him, or one which he attains by birth, but acquired. He received it from his Father as a reward for his sufferings, and for his faithful performance of the whole work and discharge of all the offices entrusted to him by God for the good of men. Ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ ὄνομα, and διὸ αὐτὸν ὑπερέψωκε, Phil. ii. 9. "We see Jesus, after he had endured death, crowned with glory and honour," &c., Hebrews, ii. 9, 10. The Father is de-

scribed as ὑπόταξας Χριστῷ πάντα, 1 Cor. xv. 24, 27; Acts, ii. 31—36; the discourses of Jesus in John, xvii. 5; Matt. xi. 27, seq.; xxviii. 18; also many of the texts which speak of his *sitting at the right hand of God*, s. 99. Paul, in his epistle to the Hebrews, frequently makes use, in relation to this subject, of the word τελευτῆσαι, which is applied literally to the reward of victors. He explains the idea in a very intelligible manner, Heb. v. 8. Christ learned by his sufferings to obey God and do his will; and he who knows how to obey so well is also qualified to govern well. Vide Morus, p. 184, s. 9, for other texts and comments. This kingdom is therefore called, at one time, the *kingdom of God*, from its founder; at another time, the *kingdom of Christ*, who accomplished the plan of God; and still again, the *kingdom of God and of Christ*, because God and Christ were united in its establishment.

(c) The Israelites imagined, according to the instruction of the prophets, that the kingdom of the Messiah would be an *everlasting* kingdom (αἰώνιος, *perpetuus*, continuing as long as the world should endure. Thus it is always represented in the New Testament. "He will reign over the house of Jacob εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, καὶ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται τέλος," Luke, i. 33. The text, Ps. xlv. 7, ὁ θρόνος σου εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, is explained in the same way, Heb. i. 8. Christ himself says expressly, Matt. xvi. 18, πύλαι ἄδου οὐ κατισχύσουσι τῆς ἐκκλησίας—i. e., the society established by him should not decline and perish, like so many others, but always endure. He said, with great explicitness, Matt. xxviii. 20, that his assistance and special care should extend to his followers ἕως τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος. His friends should enjoy his constant presence, support, and assistance, in every condition of life, until the end of the world that now is.

(d) From what has been said, it appears that the government which Christ as a man administers in heaven will continue only while the present constitution of the world lasts. At the end of the world, when the heavenly state commences, the government which Christ administers as a man will *cease*; so far, at least, as it aims to promote the holiness and happiness of men, since those of our race who labour for this end will then have attained the goal, and will be actually blessed. So Paul says expressly, 1 Cor. xv. 24—28, in entire accordance with the universal doctrine of the New Testament respecting the kingdom of Christ as man. He is speaking of the kingdom of Jesus, or of his office as Messiah, and refers to Ps. cx. 1, "Sit on my right hand, *until* I subject to thee all thine enemies." The phrase, *to sit on the right hand of the Father*, he explains by βασιλεύειν, and comprehends under this term all the

offices of the Messiah and the institutions which he has established for the good of men—i. e., for their holiness and eternal blessedness. These offices (his kingdom) will cease at the end of the world, when all the opposers of the advancement of his kingdom upon earth, and even *Death*, the last enemy of his followers, will be subdued, and when his friends will be introduced by himself into that eternal blessedness to which it is his aim to exalt them. Then will his great plan for the happiness of men be completed, and the end of his office as Messiah will be attained. Thenceforward the Father will no more make use, as before, of the intervention of the Messiah to govern and bless men; for now they will be actually blessed. Christ then will lay down his former charge, and give it over to the Father, who had entrusted him with it. For we cannot expect that the preaching of the gospel will be continued in heaven, and that the other institutions of the Christian church, which relate only to the present life, will be found there in the same way as they exist here upon the earth. In the abodes of the blessed, the Father will himself reign over his saints with an immediate government, and in a manner different from the rule which he causes to be exercised over them through Christ, his ambassador, while they continue upon the earth. Vide Scripta varii argumenti, p. 60, seq., ed. ii. The glory and majesty of Christ will remain, however, unaltered; and he will still far excel his friends and brethren, who enjoy a happiness similar to his own. He will still be honoured and loved by them as their Lord, and as the author of their salvation, John, xvii. 24; Rom. viii. 17; 2 Tim. ii. 12.

SECTION XCIX.

REMARKS ON THE FORM AND SENSE OF THE SCRIPTURAL REPRESENTATION RESPECTING THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND OF CHRIST; AND ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE PHRASE, "TO SIT ON THE RIGHT HAND OF GOD," AS APPLIED TO CHRIST.

I. *Origin and Design of the Formulæ respecting the Kingdom of Christ.*

(1) We must begin with the principle, that many of the images, expressions, and phrases, which are applied to God and his government, are borrowed from those applied to earthly kings. We regard God as possessing everything which is considered great, exalted, and pre-eminent among men, but in a far higher degree. With us everything is small and limited, with him, great, comprehensive, and immeasurable. But now again, we reason retrogressively from the Deity, and from heaven to earth. God, by his agency, is the cause of everything great and wonderful which takes place on the earth, οὐδὲν ἄνεν Θεοῦ. Even the govern-

ment of kings is of divine origin, and they are appointed by the Deity himself.

Τιμὴ (Διοσφρέτος βασιλῆος) δ' ἐκ Διὸς ἐστὶ, φιλεῖ δέ ἐ μάλιστα Ζεὺς,

Hom. II. ii. 197. "Jupiter bestows upon kings their sceptre, and the right to reign over others," v. 205. See also II. ix. 98, 99; and Callim. Hymn. in Jov. ἐκ Διὸς βασιλῆες, κ. τ. λ. They are accordingly the representatives and ambassadors of the gods, bear their image, govern and judge in their stead. Hence they are called *gods, sons of God, διογενεῖς, διοσφρεῖς, Θεῖοι, ἀντιθεοὶ, κ. τ. λ.*

All these ideas and expressions were common with the Israelitish nation, and were solemnly sanctioned by their prophets under direct divine authority. The God JEHOVAH was their proper king, supreme over their state and nation. He governed them through the instrumentality of human regents and deputed kings. Their constitution was *theocratic*,—to make use of a happy term, first applied to this subject by Josephus. Hence the Israelitish state and nation are called the *possession*, and the *peculiar people of Jehovah*, and also, the *kingdom of Jehovah*; as Ex. xix. 6; Ps. cxiv. 2. In the same way the later Jews applied the phrases, *kingdom of God*, or, *of heaven*, to the Jewish state and church, and to the whole religion and ritual of the Israelites. When a proselyte was received by them, he was said to be admitted into the *kingdom of God*, or, *of heaven*. Vide Schöttgen, De regno cælorum (Hor. Heb. T. I. extr.); and Wetstein on Matt. xxi. 25, Note. On this account the Jews called themselves *υἱὸς βασιλείας*, Matt. viii. 12; and Christ said, *the kingdom of heaven* (the rights of the people of God) should be taken from them, Matt. xxi. 43.

(2) The Jews, according to the instruction of their prophets, conceived of the Messiah as a *ruler and religious reformer*, like Moses and the pious kings of antiquity, only far greater, more exalted and perfect than they, (vide s. 89;) and so they spake of the *eternal king*, and the *eternal kingdom* of David, 2 Sam. vii.; Psalm lxxix. They therefore called the happy condition of the church and state under the reign of the Messiah, and the subjects of his government, by way of eminence, *βασιλεία Θεοῦ or οὐρανῶν*. They believed that they exclusively should enjoy this kingdom, and, together with the Messiah, should reign over all nations. After the Babylonian exile, this appellation, applied in this sense to the kingdom of the Messiah peculiarly, became very common, and was probably taken from Dan. vii. 13, 14. It must have been common in Palestine at the time of Christ, but it occurs very rarely in the later Rabbinical writings.

(3) Jesus and his apostles did not, then, *invent*

these words and phrases; they only preserved the terms which they found already existing, and gave them a meaning more just and pure than the common one. This they did, however, with wise caution and forbearance. Christ admitted the expectations of the Jews of *freedom* in the kingdom of the Messiah, but he shewed that this freedom was not *civil* liberty, but freedom from the power of *sin*, John, viii. 32; Luke, xvii. 20. He confirmed the opinion of the Jews, that the sacred writings testified concerning the Messiah, and he agreed with the Jews as to the very passages containing this testimony, but he taught them the more just and spiritual interpretation of these passages. Vide s. 90, III. *By receiving the kingdom of God*, he means, believing in Jesus Christ, submitting to his guidance and obeying his precepts, and thus obtaining the right of enjoying the divine favours promised through the Messiah, John, iii.; Mark, x. 15. The same is meant by *being received into the kingdom of God*, Col. i. 13; Ephes. v. 5. It was for this object that John the Baptist had before laboured, although he was ignorant on many points belonging to the new dispensation; the essentials, however, he understood, and his theme was, "Repent, for the kingdom of God is at hand." He knew Christ to be the "Lamb of God, which taketh away the sins of the world;" and described the Messiah as the ambassador of God, a teacher and expiator, John, i. 29; iii. 27, 32, 34.

(4) These attempts of Jesus and his apostles were very much facilitated by the fact that the terms *kingdom of God* and *kingdom of heaven* were used figuratively even by the Jews. They frequently gave these phrases a moral and spiritual sense, denoting and comprehending all the divine appointments for the spiritual welfare of men, for their happiness in this and the future life; everything, in short, which serves to promote the progressive holiness and proportionate happiness of man in this life, and the life to come, which is his true destination. Hence they conceived of a twofold *kingdom* or *state* of God; one upon the *earth*, of which the dispensation under the Messiah constitutes the brightest and greatest epoch, the other *in heaven*. The pious worshippers of God are translated from the former to the latter. *Here* they live as strangers in a land of pilgrimage, *there* they are at home, in their native land. So they called the latter place *the Father's house, the upper church, the heavenly or new Jerusalem*. And so, comprehensively, the entire sum of happiness after death and in the future world was called *the kingdom of God*.

Now Jesus and the apostles frequently use the phrase *βασιλεία Θεοῦ or οὐρανῶν*, in this sense; and still more frequently do they connect the two senses together. One who is a

member of the kingdom of the Messiah upon the earth, and obey his precepts, has a title to citizenship in the kingdom of God which is in heaven (in the city of God, in the new Jerusalem), Phil. iii. 20, 21, coll. Matt. xxv. 34; James, ii. 5; 1 Cor. xv. 50; 2 Thess. i. 5; 2 Tim. iv. 18; 2 Pet. i. 11. The remark made respecting βασιλεύειν σὺν Χριστῷ, κ. τ. λ., belongs in this connexion. Vide s. 98, II. 1.

(7) From what has been said, it appears that images derived from a *king* and his *subjects*, and their mutual relations, are more proper and suitable than any other to represent and describe the duties, benefits, and privileges of the worshippers of God, and especially of the true followers of the Messiah. But the Jews, who had little taste for what is spiritual, were content with the mere image, and so forgot the thing itself which the image was designed to indicate. They imagined a king reigning *visibly* upon the *earth*.

Jesus and his apostles preserved these same images, but shewed in what way they ought to be understood and applied. They shewed that the Messiah, after his ascension, did not visibly and bodily reign on the earth, but that henceforward he reigned in heaven; and there, invisible to mortal eyes, would rule the inhabitants of heaven and earth (the latter by his religion and visible support) until the end of the world. They shewed, moreover, that this invisible and heavenly government was of far wider extent than the earthly government expected by the Jews, and would embrace not one nation only, but all nations without distinction; because the kingdom of morality, of truth, and happiness, is a kingdom for *all*, such being the destination of all, and God, as a father, being solicitous for the happiness of *all* his children, John, x. 16; ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν Χριστῷ, Eph. i. 10, also πληροῦν πάντα, (comprehendere imperio,) Ephes. i. 23, iii. 19; Col. i. 18. They taught that the whole visible disclosure of the majesty of Christ, and his return to the earth, would not take place before the end of the present constitution of the world. Thus they preserved the ancient expressions and phrases respecting the Messiah and his royal office, which had been common among the Israelites, but so defined and modified the meaning of them, as to give them an entirely different aspect—a different and far more elevated sense than was common—a sense, too, which entirely agreed with the real meaning of the Old-Testament predictions.

Kings are the *sons of God*; and the most illustrious kings are the *first-born*. And so the Messiah; but he, in a far higher sense than all earthly kings, is Υἱὸς Θεοῦ, πρωτότοκος, μονογενής, John, i.; Heb. i. 6; Romans, viii. 29; Col. i. 15, coll. ver. 18. The *sons of kings*,

especially the *first-born*, are the heirs and possessors of the kingdom; and, among the Israelites, themselves ruled as representatives and deputies of the father over particular provinces of his kingdom. Vide Anmerkung zu Ps. xlv. 17. So, too, the Messiah rules over the most important parts of the paternal or divine kingdom. Hence he is called κληρονόμος, *Lord, possessor of the kingdom*, Heb. i. 2. *Kings* decree justice and hold judgment in the name of God, as his ambassadors and deputies, Psalm lxxii. 1. So, too, the Messiah; but he will hold judgment over the living and the dead, in the name of the Father, at the end of the world. In the same way, the other forms and expressions may be easily solved.

(6) This kind of representation and mode of instruction is in a high degree intelligible at all times; it possesses internal truth and reality. But it was particularly adapted to all the conceptions of the Jews, and even of the heathen at that age. It conveyed to them, when it was properly understood, the most exalted and proper ideas respecting God, and his designs in the establishment of the Christian institute and church. At the time of Christ and the apostles, the belief universally prevailed among the Jews, and indeed appears to have been entertained even by the prophets, that God governed the world by means of *angels*, as the servants and instruments of his providence. Vide s. 58, 60. The belief, too, of many subordinate deities, through whose instrumentality the supreme God governed the world, prevailed among heathen nations. Cf. 1 Cor. viii. 5, 6. The apostles, therefore, shewed that God had now entrusted the government of the world and the care of our spiritual welfare directly to the man Christ; and that these ministers of Divine providence, as well as all the other instruments which it employed, were now subjected to him, that all might trust in him alone, as the author of salvation. Vide 1 Cor. *ut supra*. And so Paul, Heb. i., ii., proves that Christ is far exalted above all the servants and ministers of God (angels), who are now indeed made subject and obedient to him. This reference of the apostolical doctrine is very clear from Hebrews, ii. 5, οὐκ ἀγγέλους ὑπέαξε τὴν οἰκουμένην τὴν μέλουσαν, (i. e., the times of the New Testament,) but to Christ *only*, although he lived in humiliation upon the earth, (vide the verse following,) which was always revolting to the Jews.

Note.—To say the whole briefly: the phrase *kingdom of God*, or, *of Christ*, in the sense in which John the Baptist, Jesus, and his apostles, understood it, signifies, *the whole work of Christ for the good of men, and everything which is effected by this work*. Hence the phrase denotes (a) all the benefits, rights, privileges, and rewards which his followers receive in this and

the future life; comprising the doctrine respecting Christ, forgiveness of sin, and all the blessedness which we owe to him; and sometimes comprising, too, the *followers of Christ* themselves (*cives*), who enjoy these blessings; (b) all the duties and the worship which we owe to God and Christ; and so the *conditions* on which we obtain the blessings above enumerated. Thus are the comprehensive phrases, *to enter into the kingdom of God, to see it, &c.*, to be understood. Vide especially Morus, p. 184, 185, n. 3. Cf. Storr, "De notione regni cælestis in N. T." Opusc. Acad. t. i. n. v.

II. Signification of the phrase, "to sit on the right hand of God," as applied to Christ.*

(1) The phrase is borrowed from Psalm cx. 1, which the Jewish teachers at the time of Christ must have considered to be a Messianic psalm, as appears from Matt. xxii. 44, seq. [Vide, for the explanation of this psalm, the note to the author's German translation, 3rd ed.] The origin of this expression, too, is to be sought in a comparison of God with earthly kings. We conceive of kings, rulers, judges, *as sitting on thrones*, when they exercise rule, pronounce judgment, or display all their splendour and majesty. Hence the *verba sedendi* (as *שב*) signify also *to rule, to reign*. God has his throne in the *heavens*, and there Christ, after his ascension, seated himself with God; 1 Peter, iii. 22; Ephes. i. 20; Heb. i. 13. Now for any one to be appointed a place with a king, to be seated with him, or at his right hand, is frequently—

(a) A mere external *mark of honour*, shewing that such a person is highly *respected, esteemed, and loved* by the king. So 1 Kings, ii. 19, seq.; 1 Sam. xx. 25; 1 Macc. x. 62—65. *Standing* at the right hand is the same thing, Psalm xiv. 10. The Grecian and Roman writers furnish abundant examples of the same usage. But it denotes—

(b) *Participation in the government and associated rule*, though not full equality in rank and dignity. Sitting *with* the king is plainly used in this sense, Matt. xx. 21, and frequently in Grecian and Roman writers, and in Grecian mythology. Minerva is represented by Homer as sitting beside Jupiter, and by Pindar as sitting at his right hand, and as giving charges and commands. Apollo is represented by Callimachus as sitting at the right hand of Jupiter, and as *rewarding* singers and poets. In all these cases, *participation in the government and associated rule* are indicated, though not full equality.

* Vide the Programm cited in the preceding Sections, in which the various explanations which have been given to this phrase are enumerated and examined. Cf. Morus, p. 185, n. 6.

(2) Now when this phrase is applied to Christ, we easily see from this analogy what it must mean, and how it must have been understood by ancient readers and hearers. The phrase is never applied to Christ except when his *humanity* is spoken of, or when he is mentioned as Messiah, as Θεάνθρωπος. It is not spoken of his divine character, though Michaelis so explains it, referring it to the seat of God upon the ark of the covenant. The language, "Christ left his seat at the right hand of the Father in order to become man," was first used by the fathers who lived after the fourth century. Such language never occurs in the New Testament. *Sitting at the right hand of God* is always there represented as the reward which the Messiah obtained from God, after his death and ascension, for the faithful accomplishment, when upon earth, of all his work for the salvation of man. It is the promised reward (τελειώσει, βραβεῖον,) which the victor receives after a long contest. Vide Acts, ii. 31—36; Heb. xii. 2. Hence the Father is said to have placed Jesus at his right hand, Ephes. i. 20. This phrase, therefore, beyond doubt, implies everything which belongs to the *glory* of Christ considered as a *man*, and to the dominion over the entire *universe*, over the *human race*, and especially over the *church* and its members, which belongs to him as a *king*. Vide s. 98. This is the reward which he receives from the Father; he takes this place, as a man, for the first time, immediately after his ascension to heaven, 1 Peter, iii. 22; Mark, xvi. 19; Acts, ii. 32, seq. &c. With this his reign in heaven commences. Paul himself explains the phrase by βασιλεύειν, 1 Cor. xv. 25, and opposes λειτουργεῖν (which is applied to angels, vide Heb. i. 3, 4) to καθεζέειν ἐκ δεξιῶν Θεοῦ, Heb. i. 13, 14. One of the most decisive texts is Ephes. i. 20—22, "God raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand," ver. 20. The exaltation and dominion of Jesus, which extends over everything in all the universe, is described ver. 21; and finally his reign over the church is particularly mentioned, καὶ αὐτὸν ἔθηκε κεφαλὴν ἐπὶ πάντα (supreme ruler) τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ver. 22. Cf. 1 Pet. iii. 22.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

SECTION C.

OF THE HIGHER NATURE IN CHRIST, AND HOW IT IS PROVED.

WE have before shewn (s. 93) that Christ was a true man, both as to soul and body; but have

now to shew that, according to the representation of the New Testament, he was not a *mere* man, but that he possessed at the same time such exalted perfections as cannot be ascribed to any mere man, or, indeed, to any created being; or, to speak in the language of the schools, that he possessed a *divine nature*. Caution is necessary in the selection of the texts by which this doctrine is proved.

(1) This doctrine *cannot* be proved,

(a) By *every* text in which Christ is called $\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$, for this is frequently a name by which his work and office, and not his nature, are denoted. There are passages, however, in which $\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ and $\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\gamma\epsilon\eta\acute{\nu}\eta\varsigma$ clearly indicate the higher nature of Christ. Vide s. 73, 6, b. Such texts only must be chosen as are determined by the context and predicated to have this reference—e. g., John, v. 10; and the appellation $\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\gamma\epsilon\eta\acute{\nu}\eta\varsigma$, John, i.; also the texts in which Christ calls God his *Father*, in a sense in which this name is never used by any created being; those, too, in which he ascribes attributes to himself, as Son, which never were or could be predicated of a mortal or created spirit; the texts, e. g., in which he says that he works in common with his Father. It deserves, however, to be remarked, that many theologians ever since the earliest ages have considered the appellation *Son of God*, as denoting simply the divine nature of Christ. These remarks apply equally to the appellation $\Lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, in itself considered.

(b) By those expressions, when taken by themselves, which ascribe to Christ *resemblance to God* in some high degree—e. g., $\epsilon\iota\chi\omega\nu \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon \alpha\omicron\rho\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon$, Col. i. 15, and $\alpha\lambda\alpha\nu\alpha\gamma\alpha\sigma\mu\alpha \delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\eta\varsigma$ and $\chi\alpha\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\eta\rho \upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$, Heb. i. 3. $\text{'}\text{Α}\alpha\lambda\upsilon\gamma\mu\alpha\varsigma \delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\eta\varsigma$ signifies *the radiance of the divine splendour or majesty*; $\chi\alpha\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\eta\rho \upsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ —a *visible image* (imago expressa) of the divine substance. The sense, then, of these representations is this, “The Son is he through whom God hath clearly revealed, or visibly made known himself to men.” So Paul himself explains it, 2 Cor. iv. 4, “As God, at the creation, gave light to the obscure earth, so Christ by his religion gave light to men, and led them to a clear knowledge of God.” Vide John, i. 14, coll. ver. 18. But *other* expressions in the passages just cited, clearly ascribing divine attributes to Christ, are proof of this doctrine, as may be seen below.

(c) Nor is this doctrine proved by those passages which treat of Christ’s state of exaltation, and of the eminent privileges which were conferred upon him as a man, when he entered upon that condition—e. g., a large portion of the passages, Phil. ii., and Heb. i. 6, seq., which are often improperly adduced as proof-texts of his divine nature.

One great evil of an incautious selection of

proof-texts is this, that when one particular passage is found not to prove the point for which it was adduced, the conclusion is readily made that the whole doctrine is incapable of scriptural support.

(2) This doctrine *may* be proved,

(a) By the texts in which Christ is described as far exalted over all the creatures of God, over men, angels, and everything in the universe besides God himself, and indeed as the creator and preserver of all things. Such texts are Col. i. 15, 16, and others already explained, s. 38. The proof in point is not derived so much from the term, $\epsilon\iota\chi\omega\nu \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$, as from what is there predicated of Christ. $\text{Π}\rho\omega\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\chi\omicron\varsigma \pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\eta\varsigma \kappa\rho\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, does not mean, the *greatest* or *first* of all creatures; for we find immediately after, that he himself *created all things*; and we must therefore conclude that he is not the first of all creatures, since he is himself the Creator. $\text{Π}\rho\omega\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\chi\omicron\varsigma$ must be rendered either *king, ruler*, Heb. i. 6, and Rev. iii. 14, where we read $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$ (i. e., $\alpha\rho\chi\omega\nu$) $\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$; or, *he who existed prior to all creatures*, in which sense the Jews called God *primogenitum mundi*.

(b) By the texts in which attributes are ascribed to Christ which can be predicated of no mortal, and which are never ascribed to angels, or to the prophets, or other inspired teachers whom God has employed for the accomplishment of his purposes upon the earth. Such texts are found most frequently in John. Among them are those which contain the phrase so often occurring, “*he descended from heaven*,” John, iii. 31; vi. 31, seq., ver. 62; viii. 23; xiii. 3; xvi. 28. This phrase denotes *superhuman, heavenly*, or, *divine origin and nature*; and is spoken of *manna*, John, vi. 31; and of *wisdom*, James, i. 17; cf. 1 Cor. xv. 47. This language is never used with respect to any mere prophet or inspired teacher. Even John, whose baptism was $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma \omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon$ (of divine origin), distinguishes himself from Christ, who came from heaven, (John, iii. 31;) and speaking of Christ’s return to heaven, he says, “he returned thither $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\nu \eta\nu \tau\omicron \delta \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$, John, vi. 62, and xvii. The text is so clear, that Socinus and others, who denied the superhuman nature of Christ, invented a *rapture* of Christ into the heavens, (raptum in cælum;) or considered the text as referring to the *pre-existence of the human soul*; although not a trace of such an opinion appears in the Bible.

Here it might indeed be objected, “that Christ is described as an *exalted, heavenly spirit*, but not as *God*; he might still have been created.” So the Arians. The objection, however, is not valid; because, in these passages and elsewhere, he is said to exist before any created things, (i. e., ab æterno,) John, i. 1, and xvii. Vide s. 37, in prin. Before the creation of the world

nothing existed besides God; so that whatever had existence then was God himself, belonging to his being and his attributes. This is the direct and incontrovertible conclusion of John in the passage cited. Indeed, Christ is distinctly affirmed to have enjoyed supreme divine glory in heaven. "Restore to me (by *exaltation*) the glory *ἣν ἔχον πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι παρὰ σοῦ*"—i. e., in heaven, (referring to his divine nature,) John, xvii. 5. Such language is never used in respect to any prophet, angel, or any created intelligence. Δόξα, in the last case, cannot refer to the *office* of Christ, or to his *dominion*, for he had none "before the creation of the world." Hence he is called by way of eminence, ὁ ὢν Θεοῦ, (John, v. 10;) ὁ μονογενής, (John, i. 14;) because, among all who are elsewhere called the *sons* or *children* of God, he is alone in his kind, and bears this name in an exalted sense, in which no man, no angel, no created being, can appropriate it, John, v. Vide s. 37.

Christ also frequently alludes in his discourses to his divine nature in another way—e. g., by the word *εἰμί*, John, vii. 29, 34, 36; "before Abraham was, I AM," John, viii. 58. This is the very language in which the immutable God speak of himself in the present time. So the Jews understood it; and regarded it as blasphemy for Christ to apply it to himself, and on this account began to stone him, ver. 59. For never had a prophet or any created being spoken thus of himself.

Christ also frequently ascribed the miracles which he wrought to *himself*. He professed that he *worked*, or acted, in *common* with God, John, v. 17; x. 31. This, again, was never said of any of the prophets. In the miracles of which they were the instruments, nothing, indeed, was done by them, but *everything* by God. Accordingly, the Jews affirmed that by this claim Christ made himself *equal with God*, ἴσον, Θεῷ, John, v. 18; x. 31, seq. They perceived that he used the term *filius Dei* in a sense in which no mere man could use it with respect to himself; and that he made himself *equal* with God, by ascribing to himself what can belong to God only. And Christ does not disapprove, but rather authorizes their conclusion, John, v. and x.

There are many other expressions in the last discourses of Jesus to his disciples (John, xiii., seq.) which never are used in the Bible, and never can be used, in respect to any created being: as John, xiv. 6—9; also ver. 13, 14, where Christ ascribes to himself the hearing of prayer, &c.

These classes of texts prove clearly against Photinus and the Socinians, that the writers of the New Testament did not understand Christ to be a *mere man*, but that they supposed him

to possess a *higher* nature, far exalted above that of men and angels. This the Arians concede. But they affirm that these texts are not sufficient to prove his equality with the Father. Even these texts, however, go far towards proving this point. But it is proved more directly,

(c) From the third class of texts, which shew that Christ is represented by the writers of the New Testament as partaking of the divine nature as fully as the Father, and being as truly God (ὢς πατρί) as the Father; and from texts in which he is called God. All the necessary considerations respecting these texts are found s. 37, 38.

SECTION CI.

OF THE CONNEXION BETWEEN THE DEITY AND HUMANITY OF CHRIST, ACCORDING TO WHAT THE BIBLE DIRECTLY TEACHES, AND THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH MAY BE DEDUCED FROM ITS INSTRUCTIONS.

I. *What the Bible directly teaches respecting the Union of the two Natures in Christ.*

(1) WHEN we compare, without prepossession or prejudice, the various passages which treat of Christ, we clearly perceive that two parts, as it were, or two aspects, are distinguished in the same subject or person. This subject, called *Christ*, is considered as *God*, and as *man*; divine and human attributes are equally ascribed to him in one and the same context; as in his own prayer, John, xvii. 5. It was for this reason that, even as early as the third century, the appellation Θεᾶνδρωτος, or Θεάνδρος, was given him. Vide s. 102. The clearest passages in point are found in John; especially i. 3, coll. ver. 18, which clearly teach, (a) that the same Λόγος, who created all things, and existed from eternity with the Father, as his Son and confidant—the same Λόγος (b) became man, (σὰρξ ἐγένετο,) and lived among men. Hence the ἐνσάρκωσις of the fathers. The passage of Paul, Gal. iv. 4, agrees with the one last mentioned; but, *taken by itself*, is not so clear. So the text, John, xvi. 28, "He who came down from heaven, the same returns again to heaven." The same person who, as man, lived among men, came down from heaven, and existed previously in heaven; John, iii. 13; vi. 62; xvii. 5; also, 1 Tim. iii. 16; John, viii. 40, 57, 58; and chap. xiv.

From these texts it follows, (a) that the Logos, who was from eternity with the Father, is the same person who afterwards appeared upon the earth under the name of Jesus Christ; (b) that this Logos became a real man, (σὰρξ ἐγένετο,) or received a human nature, and not merely assumed an apparent human form. Now, except we deviate arbitrarily from the

words of the Bible, we can explain these facts only on the supposition that in Christ *deity* and *humanity* are distinguished, and yet connected.

(2) This connexion between the Son of God and the man Jesus commenced when Christ was conceived; vide s. 93. For the supposition of the Gnostic sects, and of Cerinthus, that the higher nature was united with the man Jesus at some later period, as at his baptism, is wholly unscriptural. John plainly declares, i. 14, that the Λόγος (the same to whom divine predicates had been ascribed, ver. 1) σὰρξ ἐγένετο. From this passage we are compelled to conclude that the divine nature connected itself with the human, when the latter was conceived. Theologians illustrate this by the human soul, which in conception is united with the human body, and thenceforward animates and governs it. In the same way was the divine nature united with the human, thenceforward composing with it one person, Christ; as our soul and body united constitute one individual *man*, consisting of two very dissimilar natures.

(3) Σάρξ must here be taken, in its common scriptural sense, to denote not merely a man, but one infirm like others, *only without sin*. The theologians of the earliest ages, even of the second century, took occasion from this term to call Christ's becoming man ἐνσάρκωσις and ἐνανθρώπησις, Lat. *incarnatio*. In after times they denominated the same event πρόσληψις, *assumptio*, the assuming of human nature; since we must suppose that the superior nature condescended to the human and became united with it, and not the reverse. This mode of speech, although in itself unobjectionable, is not scriptural. For the phrase, σπέρματος Ἀβραάμ ἐπιλαμβάνεται, Heb. ii. 16, means, that *he assisted, took care of the children of Abraham*. How could σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ denote human nature? Ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι and ἀντελαμβάνεσθαι τίνας literally mean, *to take hold of any one*, Acts, xxiii. 19; then, *to assist, to take care of any one*, Sir. iv. 12; Luke, i. 54.

II. Conclusions from these Scriptural Statements; and a more precise explanation of them.

The connexion of deity and humanity in Christ was,

(1) *Not* of such a nature as that either the deity or humanity was deprived of any essential and peculiar attributes, or in any essential respect changed. For,

(a) The *divine nature* cannot be supposed to have changed. Such a supposition would contradict our very first ideas respecting God. It is not therefore just and proper to say, as some of the fathers did, *The eternal SON OF GOD* (i. e., the Deity) *LEFT heaven, SURRENDERED or RENOUNCED his glory, and condescended to suffering, indigence, &c., on the earth*. Such language is never used in the Bible; and the idea implied

by it is inconsistent with the divine glory. But for the Deity to unite itself with frail humanity is no more unsuitable, derogatory, or dishonourable, than for God to give proofs of his glory in the meanest of his works, to connect himself with them, and in and through them to exert his power and agency.

(b) Nor could the *human nature* be altered in any essential respect by this its connexion with the divine; for Christ would then have ceased to be a true man. If one should say therefore that Christ as a man had, from the beginning of his existence, the possession and use of all divine attributes—that as a man he was almighty, omniscient, omnipresent—and that, as many theologians suppose, he merely forbore the exercise of these attributes as a man, he would thus, in reality, deify the human nature of Christ. Vide s. 92, III. 2. Besides, the passages of the Bible which speak of the *increase* of his knowledge, Luke, ii. 52—of his *not knowing*, Mark, xiii. 32, &c., clearly teach the contrary. For these representations do not bear the explanation which some have given them, that he merely *pretended* that he did not know, *simulabat se nescire*, as Augustine said, that he *pretended* to increase in wisdom, &c. In short, those who form such hypotheses confess with the mouth the true humanity of Christ, while in fact they deny it, and allow to Christ only the veil of a human body and the external appearance of humanity.

(2) The connexion of the two natures must rather be placed in the two following points—viz., (a) in a close and constant connexion of the deity of Christ with his humanity from the commencement of his existence; (b) in a co-operation of the two natures in action, where it was requisite and necessary, and as far as the nature and attributes of each admitted. The scriptural doctrine is this: “the glory (δόξα) which Christ, in his superior nature, had with the Father from eternity (πρὸ καθάβολης κόσμου), was imparted to his human nature, and shared with it when he became man, so far as this human nature was susceptible of his glory; and was manifested whenever and wherever it was necessary upon earth,” John, xvii. 5, 22, 24; chap. xiv., coll. Phil. ii. 9—11.

By the following remarks something may be done to elucidate this subject, and to render it as intelligible as the limitation of our conceptions will permit.

(a) The agency of God is not always *exhibited with equal clearness* in his creatures. His influence at certain times and in certain circumstances appears more strikingly and visibly than at others. The nature of God, however, remains unchanged, amidst all these changes of things which are extrinsic to himself. He is indeed *equally* connected and united with all nature, at

all times, and under all circumstances, from its first origin. In a similar way must we conceive of the relation of the divine to the human in Christ. In the *state of humiliation*, the divine in Christ supported his humanity, wherever and whenever there was any necessity for it; especially whenever his Messianic offices required. The divine nature, however, did not impart to the human any attributes of which the latter, especially in its earthly state and condition, was incapable, or of which it did not stand in need. Nor did the divine nature in itself suffer any alteration by the fate of Jesus while he was upon earth, his sufferings, death, &c. But in the *state of exaltation* the sphere of the agency of Jesus was infinitely ennobled and enlarged. There the influences and the effects of his divinity could appear more visibly. There, in heaven, he is far more susceptible of its co-operation and support, in the government of the world and of the church, than in his humble life upon the earth, John, xvii. 5, 22, 24. Christ, as a man, could not have been raised to such a degree of dignity and glory as to receive supreme dominion over the spiritual and material world, if his nature had not been so united with that of the Lord of the universe, that the boundless perfections of the latter became also the perfections of his nature. The Bible always regards the subject in this point of view; as John, i., xvii.; Phil. ii. 9, seq.; Heb. i.; Ephes. i. 20, seq.

(b) Writers who proceed with caution upon this subject describe the *manner* of the connexion of the divine and human natures in Christ rather negatively than positively. Many, however, endeavour to explain the subject by supposing a *præsentiam arctiorem*, or a *peculiaritatem præsentiae gradum*, and remark that a *præsentia localis*, or *approximatio*, cannot be understood. The subject has been frequently illustrated, ever since the fifth century, by a comparison of the union between soul and body, and from this comparison the ideas and phraseology relative to this subject have been derived. According to this comparison, the human nature of Christ was the instrument and organ of the divine nature, as the body is the organ of the human soul, with and through which it acts and operates upon things extrinsic to itself. The body could not act without the co-operation of the soul. The soul has a deep concern in everything which affects the body, and the reverse. And yet each of the two parts remains, as to its essential nature, unaltered. Vide Ernestii, Progr. Dignitas et veritas incarnationis Opusc. Theol. p. 395, seq.

This comparison casts some light upon the subject, but is not entirely applicable, and must not be extended too far. In the union of soul and body, the question regards the state and ac-

tions of a *spirit* in a *body*. But in Christ, as a man, his deity does not act upon his body *only*, (as Apollinaris supposed,) but upon the human *body and soul both*; and indeed upon the human body principally through the human soul. Here, then, the question regards the union and co-operation of *one spirit with another*.

But here we are destitute of clear conceptions and definite knowledge; as we know not even how the human soul acts upon the body, and is united with it. And here we see the reason at once, why this subject is so obscure to us in our present condition, and why we are so little able to explain the *modus*. When we hear of the *presence* of a spirit, if we avoid considering it as material, we shall obtain only this definite idea, that the spirit is present with us and acts upon us *by thought*. So we are present in spirit with an absent person when we think of him. Further than this, we know nothing. Vide s. 23, I. on the omnipresence of God.

After these observations, we can form this general conclusion: that the deity of Christ, as deity, is indeed everywhere present—i. e., acts in everything; but that it is present with the humanity of Jesus in a peculiar manner, in which it is not present with any other man, or any other created being—that is, that his divinity acts in and through his humanity, so far as the latter is susceptible of this co-operation, in such a way that this deity and humanity united in Christ must be considered as one person. This union is represented in a similar manner by Origen, Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, l. 2. This union or connexion of the humanity of Jesus with God is not *limited* and *temporary*, as in other spirits with whom God is connected, John, v. 26. That here there is something peculiar, which does not take place with respect to others, is shewn by the very peculiar expressions which are used in the Bible with respect to this union, and which are never used with respect to the union of God with his creatures in general.

(c) These thoughts may afford us some conception of the union of the two natures; but they are very insufficient to render the subject entirely intelligible, or to explain the *manner* of this union in a satisfactory way. Morus gives the right view of this subject, p. 138, s. 10. Theologians call it, *mysterium incarnationis*, and the more judicious fathers are unwilling to give any further distinctions respecting the *modus* (τὸ πῶς) but the holy scriptures warrant. But nothing more can be determined with certainty from the New Testament than what has just been remarked. From the limitation of all human conceptions we cannot believe that even the apostles or first Christians understood the subject better than we do. But they did not pretend to insist upon an explanation of things beyond the reach of their senses, and the sphere

of human knowledge and science. They did not doubt or deny these things because they could not be satisfactorily explained. Cf. 1 Cor. ii., iii. Such was the fact, only after men adopted the oracular decisions of an arbitrary metaphysical philosophy, as pronounced first by the Platonists, then by the Aristotelians, and in modern times by other philosophical schools. They now began to insist upon having everything demonstrated; by a natural consequence they refused to believe anything which could not be demonstrated; and the direct consequence of this was scepticism.

The union of soul and body in one person is as inexplicable to philosophy as the union now under consideration. Indeed, if we were mere spirits, and did not know from experience that a spirit, which is immortal, and which belongs entirely to the moral and spiritual world, is, as a matter of fact, united with an animal body, which is dust and earth, into one personal *I*, we should consider it as highly improbable, and indeed contradictory; and our metaphysicians would perhaps make bold to *demonstrate à priori* its impossibility from principles of reason.

Note.—Some have questioned, whether the ideas entertained upon this point might not be illustrated by a comparison of the religious opinions of other nations. We find that many nations not only worshipped deities who had been men, and had lived upon the earth, but believed that certain deities had assumed bodies, and *become incarnate*. This is true especially of those nations which believed in the transmigration of the soul, and were extravagant in their veneration for the *founders of their religions*—e. g., the Indians, Mongoli, Tartars, Druses, and Persians. But these nations exhibit a rudeness and coarseness of conception, and a gross anthropomorphism, from which Christ is far removed, and which never appear among the first Christians, nor indeed in the whole age in which they lived. Whatever distinct conceptions *they* had upon this subject were evidently more refined and suitable to the nature of God than those of other nations. The idea held by the Greeks of an attendant demon or genius, who constantly abode in men, is also entirely different from the Christian view.

(d) Considering, then, how much there is in this subject which is obscure and inexplicable, we ought neither to prescribe any universal formulæ respecting all the more minute distinctions of this doctrine, further than they are clearly founded in the scriptures; nor, after the example of Cyril and Leo the Great in the fifth century, to condemn those who are unwilling to assent to these human formulæ. One particular view may be very important to *us*, and contribute greatly to *our* satisfaction and conviction; but we ought not for this reason to force it upon

all other Christians, or to consider them as less pious and devoted to Christ, because they differ, on some points of this doctrine, from our creed and our phraseology. In fact, the subject lies too much beyond and above our sphere. The opinions of men, therefore, respecting the *modus* of this truth, and their formulæ of this doctrine, will always continue divided and various; and and the hypotheses of the learned will always be differently modified, according to the different systems of philosophy and different modes of thinking which may prevail.

During the first ages of the church nothing was decided upon this subject; the simple doctrine of the Bible was adopted; and the more learned Christians were left at liberty, from the second century, to philosophize upon this subject at pleasure. So it continued till the end of the fourth century. The creeds only decided, *Jesum esse Dei filium è Maria natum*. Even during the violent controversies which began to rage in the fifth century, many of the more moderate concurred with the views just expressed. Melancthon remarked, justly and excellently, in his "*Loci Theologici*," that it is not worth while to bestow much laborious diligence on the *minute* development of this subject; that to know Christ is to know the salvation which he has procured for us; and not studiously to investigate his nature, and the manner of his incarnation: "*Christum—oportet alio quodam modo cognoscamus, quam exhibent scholastici.*" To scholars, indeed, the historical knowledge of these investigations is useful and necessary. But all these subtle inquiries and distinctions are not proper for the instruction of the common people and of the young. This wise counsel of Melancthon was very much disregarded in the Lutheran church at the very period in which it was given; in the Formula of Concord, the theologians prescribed definite forms of doctrine, upon which the greatest stress was laid. Vide s. 102.

(e) The instructions of the holy scriptures upon this subject, (1) are intended to shew that this exalted dignity of the person of Christ confers a very high value upon all that he taught, performed, and suffered for men;—that we are thus bound, according to his precepts, to believe his whole doctrine and work, and to apply these to our own benefit;—and that his doctrines are the doctrines of God, his works the works of God, his guidance and assistance, those of God. Morus gives some fine views to enable religious teachers to present this subject in a truly practical manner, p. 139, seq., s. 12, 13.

(2) But there is one more principal circumstance, to which the scriptures often direct the attention, and by which the importance of this doctrine in a practical respect is still more illustrated. Almost all men feel the necessity of

having a *human God*. It is difficult to love and heartily confide in that immeasurable, invisible, inaccessible God, whom we learn from philosophy. But Jesus Christ (the Logos become man) is not *merely* the immeasurable, the invisible, the inaccessible God; he is a true man of our own race, and we are his brethren. It is therefore easy to love him, and heartily to confide in him; especially considering how much, as a man, he deserves of the human race, by suffering and dying for us. Thus our love to him and our dependence upon him rest mostly upon the fact that he is *man*, and indeed, a man united with God, in such sense as no other man ever was. Vide 1 Tim. ii. 5; Heb. ii. 14—18; iv. 15; (John, xiv. 1;) John, v. 27.

(f) There have been some theologians who have maintained that the interposition of a divine person was *necessary* for the recovery of men; that men *could* not have been delivered in any other way. Some have carried this so far as to seem to set limits to the divine freedom, and to force from God, by presumptuous demonstration, what was merely a free gift. Vide s. 68, ad finem. It were enough to shew the *unsuitableness* of this means, without attempting to prove its absolute necessity. This plan of God is wise, and fully suited to the wants of men; and therefore God has chosen it. The Bible always labours to exhibit this fact as the greatest proof of the free and unmerited love of God, John, iii. 16. How opposite to this is the attempt to demonstrate this truth *à priori*! So thought Athanasius; and Augustine calls those *stultos*, who undertake to demonstrate metaphysically that God *could* not have saved men in another way. Still we find this mistaken wish to have every thing demonstrated even among the fathers. Tertullian said, "God must have become man in order to unite God with men and men with God." Anselmus of the eleventh century argues thus:—"Without *satisfaction*, men could not be saved. To give this satisfaction to God was the duty of men, but the duty was too hard for them. None but God was able to give it. But to him, as the Judge of men, it must be given. Therefore the Son of God must become man, in order, as God-man, to afford this satisfaction to God." Vide s. 114, 2. Some theologians, even in modern times, especially from the school of Wolf, have pretended to demonstrate that this was the only means of rescuing man, and was absolutely necessary for this purpose.

Such demonstrations are entirely unsuitable for promiscuous popular instruction. Christ commissioned his disciples not to demonstrate this truth philosophically, but to *exhibit* it (1 Cor. i.—iii.); to teach it, from their own conviction and experience, with plainness and simplicity, but still with sincere interest, and then

quietly to leave the consequences with God. This was surely very wise; and this is the course which we should pursue. Besides, in this constant vicissitude of philosophical opinions and schools, there is this evident disadvantage, that the truth itself, which is demonstrated by the help of the philosophy of the schools, is either doubted or rejected as soon as the school goes down.

SECTION CII.

HISTORICAL OBSERVATIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL SYSTEM, RESPECTING THE PERSON AND THE TWO NATURES OF CHRIST, UNTIL THE EIGHTH CENTURY.

I. *Earliest Opinions, from the Second to the Fourth Century.*

As early as the third century many points had been established by the catholic councils respecting both the *divine* and *human* nature of Christ, separately considered, in opposition (a) to those who denied that Christ had a real human body (the Docetæ), or (b) to those who either maintained that he was a mere man, or, allowing his higher nature, yet denied his essential divinity and equality with the Father. From that period the catholic fathers introduced into their authorized symbols such distinctions and formulæ as were calculated to oppose the above-named errors.

But it was not until the fifth century that anything definite was established *respecting* THE UNION of *these two natures in Christ*; and on this subject the most various modes of thinking and speaking prevailed, even among the catholic fathers themselves. Those difficult points in this doctrine, respecting which so much controversy existed after the fourth century, do not seem to have occasioned much trouble to the earlier Christians, who had not as yet learned to apply the metaphysics of the schools to the doctrines of religion. And it is found to be precisely so with common unlearned Christians at the present day, who have not their heads filled with those metaphysical systems, in conformity with which, as their models, others adjust and square all their opinions. Hence it does not appear that any Christian teacher of the first two centuries made any attempt to elucidate the mysteries of this subject, and even the heretics of this period passed them by without taking offence. All which was distinctly conceived of during this early period respecting the *manner* in which God became man, was simply this, that God, or the divine nature of Christ became visible in a *true human body*, and assumed real human flesh. Hence the earliest fathers and symbols are satisfied with the term, *ἐνσάρκωσις*,

without going into further explanations: πιστεύω εἰς τὸν Θεὸν σαρκωθέντα. So Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, (Adv. Prax. c. 2,) and even Origen, (ἐπὶ Ἀργύρῳ.)

[The general truth of the above statement of our author, that the early fathers supposed that the Logos assumed only a human *body*, is confirmed by the testimony of Muenschler, Dogmatic History (Translation), p. 63; of Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 456; of Neander, Al. Kirchengesch, b. i. Ab. iii. s. 1063. But there is one exception to this statement in the opinions of Justin, which were formed under the influence of the Platonic philosophy. Adopting the threefold division of man into *body*, *soul*, and *spirit*, which was so common with the Platonic fathers, and of which a fuller account has been given in the first volume, (s. 51, I. 1, note,) he supposed that Christ consisted, like other men, of these three parts, except that, in place of the erring human reason, (Germ. *Vernunft*, in opposition to *Verstand*, or Gr. *πνεῦμα* as opposed to *ψυχή*;) which is only a ray of the divine *Logos*, he had this Logos himself, as the higher controlling principle of his being. In these speculations with regard to the manner of the connexion between the divine and human in Christ, Justin went before the age in which he lived, and furnished the germ of the system which was afterwards further developed by Apollinaris, whose doctrinal predecessor Justin may therefore rightly be considered. Cf. Neander, Allg. Gesch. der chr. Rel. und Kir., b. i. Abth. iii. s. 1063.—Tr.]

The systems of religion from which many of the earlier Christians were converted, appear to have contributed something towards enabling them to receive without difficulty the doctrine of the incarnation of the Son of God. They were familiarized from their youth, in the midst of heathenism, with the idea of the visible appearance of the Deity in human forms; and although when they afterwards became Christians, they considered the accounts of the incarnations of the heathen gods as fabulous, still, by having been familiar with such accounts, they were prepared to receive more easily the fact of the incarnation announced in Christianity; they now had a seeming analogy for it. But on this very account, many of them conceived of the *incarnation* as a degradation of the Deity. Vide s. 93. The converts from Judaism to Christianity had also some analogy for this doctrine in their previous system of belief, which very much facilitated their reception of it, since they were taught by their ancient books, even by those of Moses, to believe in the appearance of angels and of God himself in human form. The student may find many interesting views, illustrating the relation of the various systems of heathenism to Christianity, in Schlegel's "Philos.

der Geschichte;" also in Kreutzer's "Symbolik."—Tr.]

But while, in opposition to the Docetæ, the early fathers contended zealously for the reality of the human *body* of Christ; none in either of the contending parties, before the end of the second century, thought it necessary to prove particularly that he had also a *true human soul*. This was not indeed directly denied, [except by Justin, as just mentioned—Tr.,] still the necessity of proving its existence was not at that time felt; nor indeed was the essential distinction between the nature of the soul and body at all so obvious at that time, certainly it was not used in common practice, as it has since been.

[Tertullian was the first who distinctly taught the doctrine of a proper human soul in Christ. In his anthropology he rejected the common division of man into body, soul, and spirit, and admitted only two distinct principles in all animated existences—viz., *body* and *soul*; the latter of which, however, in man he supposed endowed with higher properties than in the inferior orders. He had not therefore the convenient resort of the Platonic theologians, of interposing an animal *ψυχή* between the Logos and the body in Christ; but must either connect the Logos immediately and without intervention with the body, (which would be to attribute at once to the divine Logos the pain and sorrow, the progress in knowledge, the ignorance, and all the other indications of an imperfect human soul, which appear in the life of Christ;) or he must ascribe to Christ a proper and entire human soul. With this necessity in view, he chose the latter part of the alternative, preferring the mystery and complexity attending the connexion between the divine and human to the absurdities resulting from the former theory, though commended by its simplicity to the speculative reason. Cf. Neander Geschichte, b. i. Abth. iii. s. 1064.—Tr.]

After the third century, Origen first [?] gave importance to this doctrine of the human soul of Christ in his Theology, and brought it distinctly into light, though not on the same grounds by which the doctrine is now supported. [Although Origen agreed with Tertullian in maintaining an entire human soul in Christ, his views respecting the mode of union between the two natures, differed widely from those of Tertullian, and took their colouring from his peculiar philosophical system. The union of believers with Christ furnished him with an analogy for the connexion between the Logos and the human nature in Christ. If believers, he argued, are *one spirit* with their Lord, as Paul affirms, much more must this be true of that soul which the Logos had taken into insepara-

ble union with himself. As the *πνεῦμα* in believers is the actuating principle from which all their feelings and actions spring, much more is it in Christ, the forerunner of believers, the actuating, controlling, and pervading principle, by which his entire humanity is guided and filled. By urging this analogy he drew upon himself the objection which has often been repeated against the same view, that he made Christ a mere man, distinguished from other believers only by a higher degree of the same participation in the divine nature which they enjoyed. Whether this objection fairly lies against the views of Origen this is not the proper place to inquire.—Tr.]

[But the theory respecting the person of Christ advanced by Tertullian, and developed and supported by Origen, was particularly offensive to Arius and Eunomius, and to all who contended for the subordination of the Logos to the Father. According to the earlier doctrine of the church, which they adopted, and which connected the Logos immediately with the body of Christ, they had been able to allege all the appearances of limitation and natural imperfection which he exhibited as proofs against the doctrine of the absolute divinity of the Logos, and in favour of their own views of his subordination. But of this argument they were deprived when a human soul, of which all these imperfections could be predicated, was ascribed to Christ, and his higher nature was allowed in no sense to infringe upon his full and proper humanity. On the theory of Origen, it was no longer possible for them to invalidate the proofs of the absolute divinity of Christ by opposing the numerous evidences of subordination appearing in his life and words, since all these must of course be understood of his humanity, leaving his divine nature, though intimately connected with the human, unimpaired by the limitations of the latter. Hence Arius and his followers strenuously opposed the doctrine of the proper humanity of Christ, and insisted upon the older, indistinct, and undeveloped form of belief, by which the Logos merely animated the body of Christ. Cf. Neander, *Geschichte*, u. s. w., b. ii. Abth. ii. s. 904, ff.—Tr.]

[While, on one side, the Arians at this period infringed upon the human nature of Christ, on the other side, Marcellus and Photinus, of whom we have before spoken, (s. 43,) infringed upon the divine nature and its personal union with the human. Marcellus, inclining, as he did, to Sabellianism, supposed there was a merely outward and temporary operation of the Logos upon Christ, though still, it must be allowed, in such a way as to secure the being of God in him. Photinus went further, and giving great prominence to the human in Christ,

made nothing more of the divine in him than the general illuminating influence which he enjoyed in common with the prophets and other ambassadors of God, though in a higher degree. This doctrine is properly called Photinianism.—Tr.]

[Between these diverging tendencies of opinion, Arianism and Photinianism, the catholic fathers (e. g., Gregory of Nazianz, Gregory of Nyssa, and others) endeavoured to reconcile the personal union of two natures in Christ with the completeness of the human nature. We have thus all the elements of that violent controversy respecting the person of Christ which shortly followed.—Tr.]

Now, after the middle of the fourth century, Apollinaris arose, and denied the existence of a human soul in Christ, or at least of the higher power of the soul. Vide s. 93, II. [His theory was in general the same as that of Justin, before mentioned, only more systematically developed. It seems to have resulted in a great measure from the speculative interest which endeavoured to conceive clearly and to explain what had before been indistinct. And it has certainly the advantage in many respects, and especially in point of distinctness and consistency, over the older indefinite belief, and over the Arian theory respecting the person of Christ, with which in general it agreed. It also sprung from the Christian interest to see in Christ the full, immediate, undisturbed manifestation of the Deity, which, as it seemed to Apollinaris, could not be on the theory of Origen, where a human soul was made the organ of the divine operations. The controversy against Apollinaris brought distinctly into view the necessity, in order to the purposes of man's redemption, of the entireness of the human nature of our Redeemer.—Tr.]

After this period, the investigation of this point took a new turn, the first ground of which was laid in the Arian controversies of the same century. The endeavour now became to make everything clear and determinate; and since the metaphysics of the schools were becoming more and more common, the ancient simplicity was thought to be no longer sufficient.

II. *The two opposing systems, having their origin in the Fourth Century, and appearing in conflict in the Fifth.*

The foundation of both of these was laid by the Arian and Apollinarian controversies.

(1) Some of the Christians of the East—e. g., those of Syria, [and in general the disciples of the school at Antioch,] always made the most accurate distinction between the two natures in Christ, and in all their discourses used terms which indicated this distinction between the divine and human in his person, in the most definite and discriminating manner. This had

been before done by some of the earlier teachers—e. g., Tertullian, (Adv. Prax. c. 27,) still more frequently by Origen, and by some of the earlier councils. But after the middle of the fourth century, when the Apollinarian controversies commenced, the orthodox teachers in Syria and the other Oriental provinces became still more accurate in making these distinctions, and especially were more decidedly opposed to every theory which took from the humanity of Christ its peculiar properties. These were the precursors of the Nestorians.

(2) Others observed no such accuracy, and often employed phraseology which *appeared* to indicate an entire mixture of the two natures, and a deification of the human nature. This was occasioned by the Arian controversies; for many, in order to exalt Christ in opposition to the Arians, seemed almost to forget that he was also a true man.* This tendency exhibited itself more particularly in Egypt and in the Western church, and was carried out into further development at the end of the fourth and commencement of the fifth century. Those who opposed this tendency were of opinion that by phraseology of the kind which the Alexandrine theologians used the doctrine of Apollinaris was countenanced; for his followers often used terms like the following—viz., *God is man, is born, suffered, died, &c.*; Mary is the *mother of God*, (θεοτόκος.) But the Alexandrine teachers could plead in their justification the example of many

of the older fathers who had used similar phraseology. Even Athanasius had spoken of a deification of the body of Christ after the resurrection. Eusebius of Cæsarea, and Gregory of Nyssa, had said that the human nature of Christ was *swallowed up* by the divine, &c. Sometimes even Origen had used similar expressions. These were the precursors of the *Monophysites*. In reality, however, these parties were more agreed than they believed themselves to be, or than they seemed to be, judging from their different terminologies. Everything was now ready and prepared for the controversy, which finally broke out in the fifth century.

[Neander, in his Church-History, (b. ii. Abth. iii. s. 946, ff.) traces back these diverging tendencies to the fundamental difference between the Alexandrine school and that at Antioch, as to the relation between reason and revelation. The Alexandrine school, in following its more contemplative and mystical direction of mind, was disposed to assert the unintelligibility of the union of the two natures, and to magnify the mystery of this union, and to resist all attempts at definite conception and explanation. The school at Antioch, on the contrary, in conformity with its more free and speculative bias, while it did not assume fully to explain the *ὑπὲρ λόγον* of this union of natures, still undertook to discover how much in it was *κατὰ λόγον*.—Tr.]

III. Theory of Nestorius, and the Controversy relating to it.

Nestorius, Patriarch at Constantinople, being born and educated in Syria, adopted the Syrian form of doctrine with regard to the person of Christ, and endeavoured to employ terms which would accurately distinguish between his divine and human natures. This, however, had never before been done in Constantinople. After the Arian controversies, the term *θεοτόκος* had been used very frequently in application to Mary, the mother of Christ, which was also a favourite term with the followers of Apollinaris in Syria. But when, in the year 428, Nestorius became patriarch at Constantinople, he was much surprised by this language. He objected to the term *θεοτόκος*, on the ground that it could not be said that *God* was born or died; and instead of this term he proposed to substitute *Χριστοτόκος*. With this the controversy commenced.

His doctrine, as appears from his homilies, was this: "Christ had two *ὑποστάσεις*, a divine and human, (meaning by *ὑποστάσεις*, as many of the ancients did, *natura*, *φύσις*, or as Tertullian himself employed it, *substantia*;) and only *πρόσωπον μοναδικόν*, one person. These two natures stood in the *closest connexion* (*συνάφεια*), which he considered as consisting principally in the agreement of will and action, but were not

* There is reason to doubt the correctness of the reason here assigned by Dr. Knapp for this tendency of the Alexandrine school, (for it was this school which objected to the distinction of natures contended for by the school of Antioch.) The Arians wholly agreed with the followers of Apollinaris, and with the theologians of Alexandria, in objecting to the distinction of natures in Christ, and in contending for their mixture and oneness, and the transfer of the attributes belonging to each. And it is easy to see how this want of distinction should be promotive of their belief; since it enabled them to transfer to the higher nature of Christ the appearances of limitation in his life, and thus to obtain a proof of the subordination of the Logos, of which they would be deprived were an accurate distinction of natures introduced, and the application to the one of the predicates belonging to the other forbidden. It is a fact deserving of particular notice, that those who have contended most strenuously for the absolute divinity of Christ, have been also those who have insisted most upon the rights of his humanity, and for a careful distinction between the predicates of the two natures; while those who have held that the Logos is the most perfect among all created beings, but not God in the proper sense, have equally infringed upon the humanity of Christ, and have always opposed the distinction of natures. It was not, then, in opposition to the Arian, but rather to the Photinian form of doctrine with regard to the person of Christ that the Alexandrine tendency found the occasion for its further development.—Tr.]

mixed or transformed. Each nature still retained its peculiar attributes, as is the case in man, who consists of two *ὑποστάσεις*, soul and body. All these attributes and actions were predicable of one person, (*πρόσωπον*), but not of both the natures; the *inferior* were predicable only of the human nature; the superior only of the divine nature. Accordingly, the terms, *Deus natus, mortuus est, Mater Dei*, *Θεὸς ἑσαρκωτός*, were very unsuitable and unscriptural. These could be properly predicated only of *Christ*, (the name of the person.)”

Hereupon Nestorius was openly attacked, at first in Egypt. His chief opponent was Cyril, the patriarch of Alexandria, who maintained his own theory in opposition, and accused Nestorius of dividing Christ into *two persons*; because *φύσις* was the word used at Alexandria for what Nestorius called *ὑπόστασις*, and *ὑπόστασις* for what he called *πρόσωπον*. They disagreed, therefore, more in words than in reality. At length, in the year 431, the followers of Nestorius were condemned as heretics by the council at Ephesus. The whole party separated from the catholic church, and continues in the East to the present day. [For a more full account of the doctrines of Nestorius, with the original passages, cf. Gieseler, *Lehrb. d. k. Gesch. b. i. s. 85, ff.* Neander, *Gesch. b. ii. Abth. iii. s. 951.* As to the separate community of the Nestorians, cf. Neander in his Appendix to the History of this Doctrine, *b. ii. Abth. iii. s. 1171.* Also Mosheim (*Murdock's Trans.*), vol. i. p. 431, note. Whether the whole dispute between Nestorius and Cyril was mere logomachy is a matter of dispute.—Tr.]

IV. The Doctrine of Eutyches, and the Controversy respecting it in the Fifth Century.

Eutyches, an abbot, and presbyter in cloister at Constantinople, was one of the most zealous opponents of Nestorius. In order to oppose his doctrine more successfully, he affirmed, after the year 448, that Christ had only *one* nature (*μία φύσις*) after his deity and humanity were united. He called this nature, *φύσις σεσαρκωμένη*, the nature *made human*. In this way he supposed he could express the most intimate connexion between the *two natures*, which, in his opinion, were too widely separated by Nestorius, so as to make two persons in Christ. He meant, in fact, to say nothing more nor less than that there was only *one Christ*. The whole obscurity consisted in the word *φύσις*, which he understood to mean *person*; as Athanasius himself did in the fifth century, and also Ephraem the Syrian. This controversy, therefore, like the former, was, in fact, mere logomachy.* Eutyches appealed, and

with truth, to Athanasius, Cyril of Alexandria, and other ancient, and especially Egyptian, teachers, who *appeared* to abolish the distinction of the two natures. *Eutychianism* may therefore be truly said to have existed before Eutyches; to prove which Salig published a treatise at Wolfenbütel, 1724, 4to.

Hence arose another unhappy division in the church. The patriarch of Constantinople joined with Pope Leo the Great in opposing Eutyches, and accused the latter of reviving the heresy of Apollinaris, and of denying the true humanity of Christ. He protested against this conclusion; but they would not allow that his words admitted any other sense, and he was too obstinate to alter his terminology. At the Council at Chalcedon in the year 451, his doctrine was condemned as heretical. Here arose the sect of the Monophysites, which continues in the East to the present day.

In order to render the difference between themselves and the catholics and Nestorians clearly discernible, some of these Monophysites employed paradoxical statements and phrases, like the following:—viz., one of the Trinity suffered and was crucified; the deity of Christ so penetrated his humanity as to render his body *incorruptible*, (*ἀφθαρτον*.) This, however, was denied by others, because it favoured the Docetæ. Some also, even of the Monophysites, believed that the divine nature was omniscient, but not the human nature connected with it, (Mark, xiii. 32.) These were called Agnoëtæ.

[Note.—As Photinianism and Apollinarianism were the opposite extremes of this doctrine in the former period, so now were Nestorianism and Eutychianism. Between these the catholic fathers took a middle course, and condemned, on the one hand, the *συνάφεια* of Nestorius, as indicating a mere external and moral connexion between the two natures in Christ, and, on the other, the *σύγχυσις* or *μεταβολή* of Eutyches, as indicating such an entire interpenetration of the two natures as must destroy the peculiarities of each. The catholic doctrine in opposition to these extremes is expressed in the following symbol, established at the Council at Chalcedon, 451, under Marcian.

writers on doctrinal history. The principal peculiarity of it is placed in this point: while Eutyches admitted that before the incarnation (or, which was doubtless his meaning, *according to conception, and not in reality*) there were two natures in Christ, yet after this they did not remain distinct, but constituted *one nature*, not merely by a *συνάφεια*, as Nestorius held, but by a real *σύγχυσις* or *μεταβολή*, so that his human nature could no longer be said to be *consubstantial* with that of other men. Briefly, it is Eutychianism to say that Christ is constituted *of* or *from* two natures, but does not exist in two natures, (*ἐκ δύο φύσεων, not ἐν δύο φύσεσι*.) Cf. Neander, *Gesch. b. ii. Ab. iii. s. 1078.* Also Murdock's Mosheim, vol. i. p. 433, Note.—Tr.]

* [The doctrine of Eutyches respecting the person of Christ has been more definitely stated by other

Ἐπόμενοι τοῖνυν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν, ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν νύον τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν συμφώνως ἅπαντες ἐκδιδάσχομεν, τὴν ἐν τῷ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἐν ἐν τῷ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, Θεὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθῶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς, λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιον τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας· πρὸ αἰώνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, ἐπ' ἐσχάτων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὸν αὐτὸν, δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν, ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου τῆς θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν, νύον, κύριον, μόνογενῆ, ἐκ δύο φύσεων [ἐν δύο φύσεσι] ἀσυγχύτως ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον· οὐδαμῶς τῶν φύσεων διαφοράς ἀνηρημένης διὰ τὴν ἑνωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ιδιότητος ἐκείρας φύσεως καὶ εἰς ἐν πρόσωπον, καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συνερχούσης, οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον, ἀλλ' ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νύον καὶ μόνογενῆ, θεόν λόγον, κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν· καθάπερ ἄνωθεν οἱ προφῆται περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐξέπαιδενσε, καὶ τὸ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῖν παραδέδωκε σύμβολον.

There can be no reasonable doubt which of the two readings, ἐκ δύο φύσεων, or ἐν δύο φύσεσι, ought to be preferred. The whole force of the symbol, as far as it is directed against Eutychianism, lies in the latter reading, since Eutyches would allow that Christ was constituted ἐκ δύο φύσεων. The reading ἐν δύο φύσεσι is supported by good authority, probably from the whole course of events at the Council of Chalcedon, and more consistent than the other with the context, as the word γνωριζόμενον is of difficult construction with ἐκ, and, on the contrary, reads naturally with ἐν. Cf. Neander, b. ii. Abth. iii. s. 1110.—Tr.]

V. The Theory and Sect of the Monothelites.

This sect arose in the seventh century, from the attempt of some, who were rather inclined to the side of the Monophysites, to unite the Nestorians and Monophysites with the catholic church. They persuaded the emperor Heraclius to enact, that Christ, after the union of his two natures, had only *one will* and *one action of the will*. To this it was thought all parties might assent, and thus become united. At first, many were inclined to adopt this opinion, and among others, the patriarchs at Constantinople and Rome. But a number of councils were held upon the subject, and the catholics at last came to the conclusion that this opinion would introduce only a different form of the doctrine of Eutyches. They therefore maintained a *twofold will* in Christ—i. e., one for his divine, and one for his human nature; but at the same time that these were never opposed and always agreed. The other party maintained that there was but

one will; since the human will of Christ did not act separately, but was subject to the divine will, and governed by it. Both parties were right in opinion, and only misunderstood each other. The latter, however, was outvoted, and at the third Council at Constantinople, in the year 680, was condemned as heretical; and thus the sect of the Monothelites arose in the East. [Cf. Hahn, s. 464. Gieseler, s. 162.]

Note.—Another controverted point was the relation of Christ to the Father, in the union of his two natures. The ancient fathers had commonly used the appellation *Son of God*, as a name of the divine nature of Christ, and not as a name of his person and office. They found some texts of scripture, however, in which the human nature of Christ is also plainly designated by this name; as Luke, i. 35. In order to relieve themselves from this difficulty, without relinquishing their position, they said, “Christ, as God, was the *natural Son of God*, (i. e., he was, in a literal sense, eternally generated by the Father, he received his deity communicated to him from eternity, Ps. ii.,) but as man he was the *Son of God by adoption*—i. e., by the communication of the divine nature at the time of his conception, he was raised as a man to this dignity. And in this there is no heresy. But as these terms and representations respecting *adoption* were frequently employed by the Nestorians, they were gradually omitted by the catholics. This doctrine was, however, revived in Spain in the eighth century, 783, et seq., by Felix, Bishop of Urgel (Urgelitanus), and was approved by many in the West. Others regarded it as a revival of Nestorianism; councils were held upon the subject in Italy and Germany; and at length the opinion of the Adoptionists was condemned as heretical.

Respecting all these controversies, vide. Walch, Ketzergeschichte.

These unhappy dissensions should serve as a warning to every Christian who loves peace, not to take upon himself to define and decide respecting subjects which the holy scriptures have left undecided; as Morus truly observes, p. 138, s. 10, coll. s. 101.

SECTION CHII.

HISTORICAL OBSERVATIONS CONTINUED; THE ANCIENT ECCLESIASTICAL TERMINOLOGY RESPECTING THIS DOCTRINE EXPLAINED.

I. Terminology of the Fathers.

THE ecclesiastical terminology on this subject came gradually into use, and originated partly before the controversies of the fifth century, partly at the time of these controversies, and in consequence of them. Many ancient terms were differently defined and understood after that

period. This indefiniteness of phraseology, and the various use of terms, were the principal occasion of these controversies. The terms employed ought, first of all, to have been explained and understood.

(1) *Some ANCIENT general terms respecting the person of Christ, and the relations and actions of his deity and humanity.*

(a) The ancient fathers were in the habit of calling the mutual relation of the deity and humanity united in Christ, *οικονομία*, which signifies arrangement, institution, regulation; also, *the fashion and manner in which anything is done or arranged*. So it is used by Polybius, and Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, and by Paul, Ephes. i. 10. In the same way, Tertullian (Adv. Prax. 2) used the word *œconomia*, and rendered it *dispensatio*.

(b) They endeavoured to find some term which should appropriately designate the whole person of Christ, as composed of deity and humanity. As the New Testament contains no single word of this kind, they at last decided upon the word *θεάνδρος* or *θεάνθρωπος*, *God-man*; as Tertullian had been accustomed to say, *Deus et homo*, and Origen *Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος*.

(c) They called the power which the deity and humanity of Christ had of working in common, *ἐνέργεια θεανδρική*, *vis*, sive *operatio deovirilis*. This phrase first occurs in the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagitus, Epist. 4. Theologians, therefore, afterwards called the particular actions of Christ, as God and man, or his mediatorial works, *operationes deoviriles*; also, *ἀποτελέσματα*. Vide s. 105.

(2) Various terms were originally used to denote the two subjects (*πράγματα*, *res*, as Cyril of Alexandria calls them) connected in Christ. In the Latin church the oldest term was *substantia*. So Tertullian, “*substantiæ duæ,—CARO ET SPIRITUS*,” Adv. Prax. 27. They had previously been contented with the simple formula: “*Christum esse Deum et hominem verum*.” The word *substantia* was still used in this sense by the Latin church in the fourth century, and sometimes even by Leo the Great in the fifth century. It signified, as they used it, *ens singulare*, or *individuum*. It was, however, regarded as ambiguous, since it also signified *existence itself* and *that which really is*. The word *natura* was gradually found to be more appropriate and definite. It had been early used by Ambrosius; but after the Council at Chalcedon, in the fifth century, it became, by means of Leo the Great, the usual and characteristic term of the catholic fathers.

In the Greek church, also, many terms were originally in use. (a) *Ἰπόστασις*. This word answers exactly to the Latin *substantia*. It was used by Nestorius, and before him by many whose orthodoxy was never doubted. (b) *Φύσις*.

This word was used at the same time in Egypt, and was one cause of the controversy between Cyril and Nestorius. Vide s. 102, iii. (c) *Ὀυσία*. This word was early in frequent use; but through the efforts of Cyril and the Roman bishop, in the fifth century, the word *φύσις* became current as orthodox.

(3) The terms used to denote the whole Christ, as consisting of two natures.

The Latin church used the word *persona* for this purpose; and this, being very definite and unambiguous, has been retained. Respecting its definition, &c., vide s. 104. But the Greek church had a great variety of terms to express the same thing, which occasioned the greatest confusion.

(a) *Πρόσωπον*. This word was, in fact, the least ambiguous, and answered exactly to the Latin *persona*, (a *suppositum intelligens*, which has its own proper subsistence.) In many churches this was originally the most common word. It was so even among the Syrians, who derived their word *parsopa* from it. Accordingly, Nestorius said, *πρόσωπον ἐν καὶ δύο ἰπόστασεις* (natures) *ἐν Χριστῷ*. But the word was uncommon in Constantinople, Egypt, and elsewhere. In these places they used instead the word—

(b) *Ἰπόστασις*. Among the Greeks this word means *the actual existence* (*ὑπαρξις*) of a thing, *the existing thing*; also, *an individual*. It was therefore a far more ambiguous word than the other. Cyril used it to denote the whole Christ; but Nestorius, his separate natures. Vide s. 102, III. Cyril and the Roman bishop said: *εἰς Χριστὸς, μία ἰπόστασις, δύο φύσεις ἐν Χριστῷ*. This party prevailed, and introduced *ἰπόστασις* as the common word by which the orthodox were distinguished. Even they, however, sometimes still used the word *πρόσωπον*. The word *ἰπόστασις* may also have been regarded as more scriptural, from Hebrews, i. 2, *χαρακτήρ ἰπостояσεως*; but here the *person* is not the subject of discourse. Vide s. 100. The Nestorians still adhered to their *πρόσωπον* and *parsopa*.

(c) *Φύσις*. This word was applied to the person of Christ by many teachers of the fourth century, long before Eutyches. Athanasius and Ephraem the Syrian had affirmed, without being pronounced heretics, that there was *μία φύσις* in Christ. Eutyches, then, in the fifth century, thought that this word, already authorized by the catholic fathers, was the best adapted to express the most intimate connexion between the deity and humanity, in opposition to Nestorius. Vide s. 102, iv. His opponents, however, understood the word differently, and so made heresy out of it.

(4) *The words, comparisons, and established distinctions employed to illustrate the manner of the union of the two natures.*

(a) The most ancient words used by the fathers to denote the union of the two natures convey the idea of a mixture of these natures. Among others was the word *σύγκρασις*, *commixtio*, and *misceri*, which is used by Tertullian (adv. Prax.) and by Cyprian, and even in the fourth and fifth centuries by Gregory of Nyssa and Ephraem the Syrian. This word occasionally escaped even from Leo the Great, the zealous opponent of Eutyches. Of the same kind were the words which frequently occur in the writings of the Grecian, and more especially the Egyptian, teachers of the third and fourth centuries—viz., *μεταβολή*, *μεταποιήσις*, *μεταμόρφωσις*. But the word *συνάφεια* was preferred by Nestorius and some others. But for this very reason it was rarely employed by his opponents. The other words *σύγκρασις*, κ. τ. λ., which denote a mixture of natures, were rejected at the Council at Chalcedon, because they were used by Eutyches, and the word *ἕνωσις*, *unio*, was there established in their place.

(b) The illustrations of the manner of this union employed by the ancients.

(a) *Comparisons and images.* Some of these are very gross, and exhibit very imperfect conceptions. Tertullian said, (Adv. Prax. 27,) “The deity and humanity in Christ were *mixtura quædam, ut electrum ex auro et argento*.” Origen and Basilus the Great compared this union to iron heated in the fire, (penetrated through and through by the fire;) Ephraem the Syrian, to a compounded medicine; Origen, in another passage, and Theodorus of Mopsuestia, to the marriage connexion (*two, one flesh*)—a comparison of a more moral cast; Cyril of Alexandria and Leo the Great, to the union of soul and body, which comparison they particularly advocated.

(3) Many new terminologies were invented after the controversies commenced, in order to distinguish one sect from another, and to obviate various unscriptural representations. Thus, the natures in Christ were said to be connected *ἀχωρίστως*, *ἀδιασπéτως*, and *ἀδιαλύτως*—i. e., indissolubly and permanently, and not merely for a season; for the Gnostics taught that the *Æon* Christ was separated from the man Jesus at the time of the death of the latter; and Marcellus taught that the Logos would at some future time return to the Father. In opposition to these and similar errors, the above determinations were therefore adopted by the Council at Chalcedon. Thus, too, in opposition to Eutyches, this union was said to be *ἀνυγχίνως*, (such that a third nature had not arisen from the union of the two natures, as when material things are mingled;) each nature existed by itself, unaltered in its kind, *ἀτρέπτως*. Christ, it was said, should be *one, ἐν πρόσωπον, μία ὑπόστασις* *θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου*. This *ἕνωσις* was said to be *οὐ συνώδης*, (not appa-

rent, but real;) *ὑποστατική*, (such that the two natures remained unchanged as to their kind, although they were essentially united—a term used by Cyril;) *ὑπερφυσική*, (supernatural,) &c. After the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the schoolmen of the West adopted these terminologies into their systems. The orthodox Greeks also constantly preserved them, in opposition to the Monophysites, Nestorians, and other heretics.

II. Later Distinctions.

During the sixteenth century, after the death of Luther and Melancthon, not only were the old subtleties in the doctrine respecting the nature and person of Christ revived by many Lutheran theologians, but many new ones were introduced. The occasion of this was, the controversy respecting the Lord's Supper between the zealous adherents of Luther and the Reformed theologians. The Reformed doctrine was at that time approved by many Lutheran theologians. The opposing party, therefore, and especially James Andreä, Chancellor at Tübingen, and Mart. Chemnitz, endeavoured, by new distinctions in the doctrine respecting the person of Christ, to draw the line of distinction between the two systems as finely as possible. Ecclesiastical authority was given to these distinctions by the “Form of Concord.” Such subtleties as these do not appear in the “Loci Theologici” of Melancthon. On this subject the following particulars should be known—viz.,

(1) Luther affirmed the *true and substantial* presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper. But in the sixteenth century many of his disciples and zealous followers went beyond their teacher in this matter. Some of them advocated in fact, if not in words, a *physical* presence of the body of Christ. Beza, on the other hand, and other Reformed theologians, shewed, as Zwingli had done before, that this could not be supposed; considering that the human body of Christ is now in heaven, and could not, as a real human body, be present in more than one place at the same time.

(2) Against these objections the Lutherans maintained, either the *actual constant* omnipresence of the body of Christ, as Andreä appears to have done, or, that it *could* be present every where (*ubique*), whenever and wherever he would, and the case required. This was the view of Luther, Chemnitz, Hülsemann, and many others. Hence they were called by their opponents *Ubiquitarians*, and there was much controversy respecting the omnipresence of the body of Christ.

(3) In order to render this presence of the body of Christ more intelligible, assistance was sought from the doctrine *de communicatione idiomatum interna et reali*. Here Chemnitz was

the most active. They proceeded on the ground that the human nature of Christ was united in the most intimate manner with the divine nature, that it was penetrated, as it were, by the divine nature, and received all divine attributes by communication. They invented for this purpose the "*genus communicationis idiomatum majesticum*." At length they displayed this fine web of subtilty and terminology in the "Form of Concord."

(4) Hereupon new dissensions and schisms arose in the Lutheran church in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For the theologians of Brandenburg rejected the "Form of Concord" altogether, and the theologians of Helmstädt disapproved and rejected particular doctrines contained in it, such as the doctrine of the omnipresence of the human nature of Christ. The controversy which thus arose did great injury to the Lutheran church.

SECTION CIV.

A BRIEF EXHIBITION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL SYSTEM RESPECTING THE PERSON AND THE TWO NATURES OF CHRIST; AN EXPLANATION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL PHRASEOLOGY NOW IN USE IN THE DOCTRINE "DE COMMUNICATIONE IDIOMATUM;" AND A CRITICAL JUDGMENT UPON THE SAME.

FROM s. 102, 103, the gradual origin and increase of the learned ecclesiastical distinctions and terminologies is clearly seen. The most important of these only are still retained. How many of them are plainly founded in the holy scriptures may be determined by s. 100, 101.

I. Established Form of Doctrine respecting the Person of Christ, and the Union of his Two Natures.

There are two natures in Christ, the *divine* and *human*. The *Son of God* (i. e., the divine nature) united himself so closely and intimately with the human nature, that *one person* is made from these two united natures. *Person*, in philosophical language, is a *rational existence*, (beasts then are not persons,) *which has its being and subsistence in itself*, (subjectum intelligens, volens, libere agens.) Thus Boëthius in his book, "*de persona et natura*," cap. 2. The abstract of person, or the existence of such a being, is called *personalitas*. This union, therefore, in being *personal*, (unio personalis,) is distinguished from the other kinds of union of God with his creatures, and even from that of God (the Father) with the man Jesus; vide s. 101. We may say that the triune God is in some sense united with Jesus. But neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit have so connected themselves with the human nature of Christ, that we can say that the Father or the Holy Spirit became man. This can be said, on the

authority of the Bible, only of the Son of God. The condition which arises from this union is called *unio* (ένωσις); the beginning of this union, or the act of uniting, *unitio*, which is therefore synonymous with *incarnatio*, (ένσάρκωσις.) This personal union is a real, not simply a moral, mystical, or figurative union; still it is a *supernatural* union, such that one nature is, as it were, *penetrated* by the other (*permeata*;) although the manner, the internal *modus*, of this is to us inexplicable, and such that the most intimate connexion subsists between the two in their mutual actions. Theologians call this union of one nature with the other, and their mutual relations, *περιχώρησις*, observing, however, that no mixture (σύνχυσις) of the two natures takes place, and also that this union is inseparable and indissoluble, (ἀχωρίστως.) Other distinctions and terminologies, which had their rise in the controversies relating to this subject, may be seen in s. 103.

II. Effects of this Personal Union of the Two Natures; and the Consequences deduced from it.

(1) The *impersonality*, ἀνπροσώπια, *impersonalitas*, of the man Jesus, or of the human nature of Christ. Theologians maintain that the human nature of Christ does not subsist in itself, but in the person of the Son of God, or that in itself it is ἀνθρώπαιος, and that it has ένπροσώπια in him. For, if personality is ascribed to the human nature of Christ, he must be conceived as composed of two distinct persons. This distinction was directed principally against the opinions ascribed to the Nestorians, and also against the opinions of the Apollinarians, Monothetæ and Agnoëtæ. If we would form any clear idea from this distinction, we must understand it, not in a physical, but in a *moral* sense, as Ernesti remarks in his programm "*De incarnatione*." All that is intended by it is this, that the man Jesus never was a *mere* man, and never acted from *simple* human power (ἀπ' έαν- του), in any such way as to be separated from the Son of God, and, as it were, independent of him. And this is the representation of the New Testament. When, therefore, Christ says, *I do*, *I teach*, &c., he speaks of the *whole Christ*, in which the divine is the superior and reigning nature, by which the inferior or human nature is governed and used as an instrument, just as we, when we speak of ourselves, *our persons*, mean soul and body together.

Note.—In this way, and in this way *only*, can we explain the fact that Christ should speak of himself in the very same discourse, and indeed in the very same sentence, as man, and again in such terms as the eternal and immutable God alone uses of himself—e. g., John, xvii. 5, "Glorify me with the glory which I had with thee before the world was;" in the same man-

ner as, when we speak of ourselves, we sometimes employ terms which are applicable only to a spiritual nature, and, at other times, terms which are applicable only to a corporeal nature; the former in relation to the soul, the latter in relation to the body; because these two natures are united in us in one person.

(2) Another consequence deduced from this community of the two natures is, *that one nature communicates its own attributes to the other, (communicare idiomata.)*

(a) If by this statement it is meant that the properties of each of the two natures are regarded as belonging to the *whole person*, it is unobjectionable. For in the very same way we ascribe to man the attributes of soul and body, though exceedingly diverse. Accordingly, the New Testament and the discourses of Christ himself represent that the glory which Christ, as to his divine nature, had with the Father from eternity, belonged also to his human nature, and, so far as this nature was susceptible of this glory, was communicated to it, and became particularly visible from the commencement of his state of exaltation. Vide John, xvii. 5; Phil. ii. 9—11. Cf. s. 101.

(b) There is great objection, however, to the opinion, that all the attributes of one nature are *really (interne et realiter)* communicated to the other. But the strict Lutheran theologians of the sixteenth century, and especially Chemnitz, were led by their views respecting the Lord's supper to insist strongly upon this opinion. Vide s. 103, II. To meet the objections which would be brought against it, they made the following limitations—viz.,

(a) Because the Deity is incapable of change, the attributes of the human were not communicated to the divine nature, but only the attributes of the divine to the human. This *communicatio idiomatum* was not, then, *mutual or reciprocal*.

(3) All the attributes of the divine nature cannot be communicated to the human, but only the *attributa operatica*, (those which imply action and activity,) e. g., omnipotence, goodness, justice, &c. The *attributa quiescentia*, (those which imply rest and inaction,) e. g., infinity, eternity, &c., are incommunicable. Vide s. 18, III. 2.

But this opinion, after all these fine distinctions, is not founded in the scriptures, and the texts cited in its behalf do not prove it. Vide *infra*, de *propositionibus idiomaticeis*. Moreover, it is liable to many objections.

(N) Nothing more was necessary in order to the action of the human nature of Christ, than for it to be determined and impelled by the divine nature in something the same way as the human body is impelled by the soul; in which case each part retains its own attributes, and there is no necessity for the attributes of the

soul to be communicated to the body. This was the view of many of the most ancient and orthodox fathers of the church.

(c) The attributes of the Deity are *inseparable*. Where there is one, there are all. And no conception, certainly no clear conception, can be formed of such a division. The divine nature is altogether incapable of change. And if the human nature were changed in any essential respect, Christ could not continue a true man.

(d) Christ himself said, that as a man he was unacquainted with many things. He changed his place as a man. He learned, and increased in wisdom. How, then, can I say, that as a man he was omniscient, omnipresent, and all-wise?

It is far better to be content with the more simple and more scriptural opinion, that each nature retained its peculiar attributes, and that the human nature was supported, guided, and endowed with strength and wisdom by the divine nature, whenever there was occasion. Vide s. 100, 101. And many good Lutheran theologians, even of the sixteenth century, acknowledged that this was sufficient.

(3) Still another consequence deduced from the personal union of the two natures is the *communio operationum*—i. e., all the actions done by either of the two natures must be considered as the actions of the whole person. So whether Christ acts from the impulse of the divine nature, or as man, in either case the whole person acts. In the same way the actions of a man, whether of his soul or his body, are ascribed, without hesitation, to the whole person. The most rational and intelligible opinion on this subject, however, is this, that the humanity of Christ is the instrument by which his deity acts; though in such a manner that the peculiar attributes and properties of his humanity are not set aside. In all those actions, therefore, where the humanity of Christ had occasion for instruction, support, and guidance, it received the same from his divinity. Such actions (and all which belong to his mediatorial work are such) are called by theologians, *operationes deoviriles*. Vide s. 103, I. 1.

The ancients expressed the same thing by saying that there was *one will* in Christ, and that his humanity assented to the will of his divinity, and acted according to it. So Nestorius, and even the orthodox of that age. But after the controversy of the catholics with the Monothetæ, the former advocated two wills in Christ, the latter only one. Vide s. 102, V.

(4) From the theory of the *personal union*, and the *communication of attributes*, various formulæ and modes of speech have been derived. Only a part of them occur in the scriptures. The rest, which should have been omitted, were occasioned by theological controversies. They

are called *propositiones*, and are divided into two principal classes. Respecting all the minutæ of this subject, vide Baumgarten, Glaubenslehre, where they are treated at length. [Cf. also Hahn, s. 94, s. 445.]

I. "*Propositiones Personales sive Hypostaticæ*"—i. e., such as are derived from the notion of the Personal Union itself of the Two Natures in Christ. These are again divided into two classes.

(1) Propositions in which the peculiar properties of either of the two natures are ascribed to the whole person, or in which the concrete of the person is connected with the concrete of either of the two natures—e. g., *Christ is man, the son of man, the son of David*, where the concrete of the person is connected with the concrete of the human nature; or, *Christ is God, the only begotten Son of God* (in the theological sense), where the concrete of the person is connected with the concrete of the divine nature. Such propositions occur in the Bible and occasion no mistake.

(2) Propositions in which the concrete of one nature is predicated of the other nature (*concreta naturarum de se invicem prædicantur*)—e. g., *God is man, the man Jesus is God, the son of Mary, or of David, is God*. Theologians observe here, that the case is not the same with the *abstracta naturarum*. Thus it would be improper to say, the *humanity* (of Christ) is the deity (of Christ.) Anciently, in the fourth and fifth centuries, such propositions were frequently employed, vide s. 102; but they were objected to by Nestorius. They are indeed capable of a proper explanation, but they easily occasion mistake. Besides, they have no analogy; as nobody says, *animus est corpus, corpus est animus*, &c. The texts which are appealed to (Rom. i. 3; Luke, i. 35; Matt. xvi. 13, 16) are not in point. For the appellation, *Son of God*, in these texts, may be the name of person and of office, and is not necessarily the name of nature. In the text, 1 Cor. xv. 47, "the second Adam is the Lord from heaven," *κύριος* also is the name of person, and not of nature.

II. "*Propositiones Idiomatice, sive de Communicatione Idiomatum*;" such as denote the Communication of Attributes, (*Idiomata, Proprietates, Affectiones*.) These, again, are divided into two principal classes.

(1) Propositions in which the attributes of one nature are ascribed to the whole person (named from one of the two natures), or in which the subject is either a concrete of person or a concrete of nature, but the predicate is an *idioma* of the divine or human nature. These are divided into three classes—viz.,

(A) Propositions in which the attributes and actions of one nature or the other are ascribed to the whole person; or, where the subject is a

concretum personæ, but the predicate an *idioma alterutrius naturæ*. A proposition of this kind is called *idiomatica*, or, *ἀντιδοτική*, (*ἀντιδοσις*, retributio.) This has analogy in its favour—e. g., *man (the soul) thinks; man (the body) eats*. In this case, both of these actions are predicated of the whole person. Such propositions frequently occur in the scriptures—e. g., *Christ suffered, rose from the dead, wrought miracles by his own power, is mortal, is omnipotent*. Thus in John, xvi. 51, "*I (the whole person) speaks) came from heaven, (the divine nature;)*" John, x. 12, "*I lay down my life (the human nature) for the sheep;*" and in many other texts. Vide Morus, p. 143, s. 4.

(B) Propositions in which the attributes peculiar to each nature are predicated of the same, or in which the subject is a concrete of one nature, and the predicate an *idioma* of the same nature; as when we say, *the soul is immortal, the body is mortal*. Thus Matt. ii. 1, *Jesus was born*; Acts, ii. 22, 23, *Jesus was crucified*; or, making the subject a concrete of the divine nature, *the only begotten Son of God*, (if this name is given to the divine nature,) *was from the beginning, created the world, is omnipotent, &c.* This language is very common in the Bible; and the nature which is the subject of discourse is often expressly mentioned—e. g., *Christ κατά σάρκα*. Vide Morus, p. 142, s. 1, n. 1.

(C) Propositions in which the peculiar attributes of one nature are predicated of the other. These propositions are divided into two classes, corresponding to the two natures in Christ.

(a) Propositions in which the attributes of the human nature are predicated of the divine nature, or where the subject is a *concretum divinæ naturæ*, but the predicate an *idioma naturæ humanæ*. This is called *ιδιοποιήσις*, because the divine nature appropriates to itself what belongs to the human nature. The texts cited as examples are the following:—viz., Gal. iv. 4, "God sent his Son, born of a woman;" Rom. v. 10, "We are reconciled with God, through the death of his Son;" Acts, iii. 15, "The prince (auctor) of life was slain;" 1 Cor. ii. 8, "Ye have crucified the Lord of glory;" but especially Acts, xx. 28, "God bought the church with his blood." But the reading in the last passage is very uncertain. Vide s. 37. And though some of these and other texts may possibly be examples in point, they are not distinctly so. For the appellation *Son, Son of God*, in these passages, may be the name of the whole person of the God-man (Messiah), and is not necessarily the name of the divine nature.

(b) Propositions in which the attributes of the divine nature are predicated of the human nature; or in which the subject is a concrete of the human nature, but the predicate an attribute of the divine nature. This is called, *κοινωνία*

τῶν θεῶν, sc. ἰδιωμάτων, μετάδοσις, ὑπερύψωσις, βέλτωσις, *genus ἀνθρώπινον*, sive *majestaticum*, because divine attributes are communicated to the man Jesus—e. g., *Jesus, or the Son of man, is almighty, omnipresent, omniscient, &c.* The most probable texts are John, iii. 13; vi. 62, “The *Son of man* will return to heaven, where he was before.” But these do not teach that divine attributes are *communicated* to the human nature of Christ; and, in truth, the phrase *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* here denotes the whole person, the Messiah, although the appellation is taken from his humanity. The texts, Matt. xxviii. 18, 20, “All power is given to me in heaven and in earth,” and “I am with you,” &c., (from which the communication of *omnipotence* and *omnipresence* to the humanity of Christ has been concluded,) are irrelevant to this point; for they treat of the state of exaltation, and the *whole Christ* speaks of himself, and not merely his humanity. For other texts, vide Morus, p. 144, n. 3.

Note.—This whole third class of propositions was disapproved even by many of the ancient fathers, who were of the opinion that it should be entirely discarded, because it has no clear authority from scripture. So Origen and many others. But Cyril and Leo the Great, in the fifth century, advocated these propositions in opposition to Nestorius. And in the seventeenth century, Chemnitz and the “Form of Concord” brought them again into vogue; and especially the *genus propos. auchematicum*, on account of their bearing on the doctrine of the Lord’s supper, Morus, l. 1. n. 2.

They ought to be discarded for the following reasons—viz., (1) They have no clear support from scripture; vide *supra*. (2) They are contradictory to all the analogies to which we can appeal in other cases. Who would say, the soul dies; the mind eats, digests; the body thinks, philosophizes? although, indeed, the *concretum naturæ, man*, is used in such cases. They give rise to propositions which, though capable of a reasonable explanation, are very offensive in their form, and the occasion of ridicule from the thoughtless. Such are the following: *God died, and was buried; the man Jesus is eternal; Mary was the mother of God; one of the Trinity was crucified, &c.* All the offensiveness of these propositions is removed by using the name of the person, Christ. (3) Such expressions lead the great mass of men into gross and material conceptions of God, and confirm them in such conceptions, which they are always inclined to form. For this reason they were discarded by Nestorius, though even he admitted that they *might* be explained in such a way as to give a true sense. Cf. Morus, p. 145, n. 2.

(2) The second class of *propositiones idioma-*

tice comprises those propositions in which the works belonging to the mediatorial office of Christ are ascribed to the person, named from either of the two natures, or from both united. This class is called *genus propositionum ἀποτελεσματικόν*, from ἀποτελεσματα, *effectus* sive *opus*, sc. *mediatorium*. This is thus described in the language of the schools: “*Apotelesmata, sive actiones ad opus mediatorium pertinentes tribuuntur subjecto, vel ab humana, vel a divina, vel ab utraque natura denominato.*” This corresponds with analogy; because these actions were performed through the union of the two natures. Such propositions frequently occur in the scriptures, and are founded upon the *communio operationum utriusque naturæ*. Thus, I can say, *CHRIST raises the dead, redeems and judges men.* But I can also say, either that *the Son of God*, (in the theological sense,) or that *Jesus, the Son of man, does the same things*; Luke, ix. 56; Gal. iii. 13; 1 John, iii. 8; Heb. i. 3; vi. 20.

This *genus apotelesmaticum* is made very prominent in the “Form of Concord,” on account of the controversy in the sixteenth century between Osiander and Stancarus, theologians of Königsberg. Osiander taught that Christ atoned for the sins of men *only as God*, and not as man. Stancarus, on the other hand, taught that the *human nature only*, and not the divine, was concerned in the mediatorial work. The other theologians decided justly that both natures were here concerned. These two theologians, indeed, expressed themselves inaptly, but appear not to have been so unscriptural in their opinions as many supposed them to be. Osiander only designed by his declarations to exhibit, in a clear light, the high worth of the merits of Christ; and Stancarus only wished to obviate the mistake that Christ endured sufferings and death *as God*. As for the rest, vide Morus, p. 146, last note.

CHAPTER IV.

THE WORK OF CHRIST, AND WHAT HAS BEEN EFFECTED BY IT.

SECTION CV.

SCRIPTURAL NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF THE WORKS OF CHRIST, AND THEIR SALUTARY EFFECTS; ALSO, THE NAMES OF CHRIST AS THE SAVIOUR OF THE WORLD.

I. *General Names of the Works of Christ for the good of Men.*

(1) Ἔργον is frequently used in the New Testament in the discourses of Christ himself, John,

iv. 34; xvii. 4. It signifies the *business, works*, which he had undertaken. In the passages cited, his business is called *ἔργον τοῦ πατρὸς*, or *τοῦ πέμψαντος*; because it is considered as a commission given him by the Father. It is also called *ἐντολή*, *mandatum, commission*, John, x. 18; xii. 49.

(2) Many *ecclesiastical* terms were afterwards adopted in addition to these scriptural terms. Among these is the word *munus*, which is very appropriate, as it means *business, work*; and thus answers to *ἔργον*. The word *officium* was used in the same sense, and became the most common name for the work of Christ in the Latin church. Tertullian says (con. Marc. iii. 16), respecting Christ, "*Officium prophetæ, nuntiantis divinam voluntatem*." Hilarius, of Poitiers, in the fourth century, says, "*Officium Christi propriam cognitionem Dei afferre*," and "*Officium Christi pœnale*." These terms were retained in the protestant church, and *officium* and *officia* were the most common terms with Melancthon, Chemnitz, and others. But because, in Germany, *munus* and *officium* were commonly rendered by words which denoted *offices, posts of honour*, (Germ. *Amt, Ehrenamt*,) they were so rendered here, and in this way occasion was given to associate several incorrect ideas with this subject. So they spoke of the mediatorial *office* of Christ, instead of his mediatorial *work*; and of the three *offices* of Christ, instead of his *threefold work*, or the three parts of his mediatorial work. On account of this ambiguity of the words *officium* and *munus*, Ernesti preferred to say, "*De opere Christi salutari*."

II. General Description of the Objects of the Mission of Christ, and of the Benefits flowing to Men through him.

(1) In some passages the object of his advent to the earth is stated in general terms to be to rescue men from their unhappy condition, and to transfer them into a more happy situation—e. g., John, iii. 16, "Those who believe in him shall not be miserable, (*μὴ ἀπολλύσθαι*), but shall become happy, (*ζωὴν ἔχειν*)." Also, Heb. ix. 15, where *ἀπολύτρωσις* means *liberatio ab infortunio*, and *κληρονομία*, *possessio beatitudinis*. Cf. Luke, xix. 10; 1 Tim. i. 15. Christ is said to have come, 1 John, iii. 5, 8, *ἀμαρτίας αἶρεν* and *καὶ ἐργα τοῦ διαβόλου, peccata*. The word *σῶζειν* which occurs frequently in these passages, like the Hebrew *יָצַו*, involves the two ideas of freeing from misery and translating into a happy condition. The same is true of the word *σωτηρία*.

(2) In other passages the benefits which Christ has bestowed, and his desert of the human race, are comprised in a shorter description, and only particular parts of his work are

mentioned—e. g., John, i. 17, which treats of the great advantages which Christianity has over the Mosaic doctrine and institute, (*νόμος*.) Christianity bestows the greatest blessings, *χαρὶς καὶ ἀλήθεια*—assurance of the most sincere love of God, or of his free, unmerited *grace*, and of his *truth*. John, xiv. 6, "I am the *way*, the *truth*, and the *life*"—i. e., I am he through whom you come to God, who qualifies you to enter the abodes of the blessed; and this my promise is true; you may safely confide in it; I am the author and giver of life—i. e., of happiness. Heb. ii. 14, "By his *death* he deprived the devil, the author of all injury and wretchedness, of his power to harm; he freed us from the *fear of death*, and procured us the pardon of our sins." The passage, 1 Cor. i. 30, should be cited in this connexion: "Through him God has bestowed upon us true wisdom—has established a dispensation which truly deserves the name of a wise dispensation, (in opposition to the pretended wisdom of men, ver. 21;) he is the cause of our *forgiveness*—God pardons us on his account; he *sanctifies* us through him, (after forgiveness has been bestowed;) to him we owe *deliverance* from the power, dominion, and punishment of sin."

III. Scriptural Titles which are given to Christ as the Saviour of the World.

The names, *Messiah, Christ, King, Lord*, which denote the elevation and dignity of Christ, have also a reference to the benefits which he bestowed upon us, and to the works which he performed for the good of men. For he is *Messiah, King, Lord*, for the very purpose of delivering us from misery, and of bestowing blessings upon us. These titles have been considered, s. 89, 98. Their *doctrinal* meaning, then, as applied to this subject, is *Σωτήρ, (κόσμον), Saviour, Benefactor* of men. The following titles imply more directly the idea of his being the *Benefactor* of our race.

(1) *Ἰησοῦς*. This is indeed the name by which he is more properly distinguished as man; but at the same time it may have been given to him as a *significant* name, denoting his future works and destination, according to the custom in giving names, common in the East. Indeed, the New Testament expressly declares that he received this name by divine appointment, on the command of the angel: *Σώσει λαὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ ἀμαρτιῶν*, Matt. i. 21; Luke, i. 31; ii. 21. This name was common among the Jews at the time of Christ, and is the name of the Jewish leader, *Joshua*, which is accordingly rendered *Ἰησοῦς* by the LXX., and Heb. iv. 8. The Hebrew name *יְהוֹשֻׁעַ* or *יְהוֹשָׁעָה* is derived from *יָצַו*, Hiph. *יָצַו*, which answers to *σῶζειν*, (as *σωτηρία* does to *רָצָה*), and signifies, according to Hebrew and Greek usage, not merely a *deli-*

verer, but in general, a benefactor, one who bestows blessings.

(2) Σωτήρ. This word agrees in signification with Ἰησοῦς, and answers to the old German word, *Heiland*, (Saviour.) For σωτήρ denotes one who has not only saved a person from extremity and wretchedness, but translated him into a happy condition. Cicero says, (in Verr. ii. 63,) “Is est Soter, qui salutem dedidit,” and remarks that it is “*ita magnum, ut latino uno verbo exprimi non possit*.” Vide Ernesti, Cl. Cic. in h. v. In this sense the Greeks applied it to their gods—e. g., to Jupiter, (so also it is applied to God, Luke, i. 47;) also to their rulers—e. g., Antiochus, Ptolemy Soter. So Philo names the emperor. The LXX. give this name to Moses and other Jewish leaders. Christ now is called in the New Testament, by way of eminence, Σωτήρ τοῦ κόσμου, the Saviour of the world, the Benefactor of the human race, Luke, ii. 11; John iv. 42. So when the word σώζειν is spoken of Christ, it signifies to bless; and σωζόμενοι, the blessed, is a name given to pious Christians, 2 Cor. ii. 15; and σωτηρία signifies all the blessedness which Christians receive from Christ, not only in the life which is to come, but in that which now is, 1 Pet. i. 10, seq.

(3) Μεσίτης. This word was used in various senses by the ancients. Among the Greeks it meant conciliator, (a negotiator, or peace-maker between contending parties,) sponsor, arbiter. When this term is applied to Christ in the New Testament, it is taken from Moses, and implies a comparison of Moses with Christ. Moses is called by Philo (de v. Mos.), and by Paul; Gal. iii. 19, μεσίτης, in the sense of mediator, ambassador, negotiator (internuntius, interpretes), as mediator between God and the Israelites; because he spoke and acted in the name of the Israelites with God, and in the name of God with the Israelites. The passage, Deut. v. 5, where Moses describes himself as standing ἀνὰ μέσον Κυρίου καὶ λαοῦ, affords the origin of this appellation. With this the works of Christ were compared; he was called, 1 Timothy, ii. 5, μεσίτης Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων, partly inasmuch as he treats with God in the name of men, and does with God everything which is possible for our good; and partly because he treats with men in the name of God, and, as his ambassador, founds a new institute, and assures to men the complacency and favour of God. In this respect he is called, Heb. viii. 6, μεσίτης κρείττονος διαθήκης ix. 14, καὶ νῆς διαθήκης, the founder of a new and more excellent dispensation than the ancient Mosaic dispensation. Cf. xii. 24.

(4) Ὁ προφήτης, ἡ προφητία, the prophet, an ancient Jewish appellation of the Messiah, since he was conceived to be the greatest of all the messengers and teachers sent from God. This term is derived principally from the passage, Deut.

xviii. 15, which is referred to Jesus by Peter Acts, iii. 22, seq.; and by Stephen, Acts, vii. 37. Vide s. 91.

(5) Ὁ ἀπόστολος. This appellation occurs Heb. v. 1, ἀπόστολος—τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἡμῶν—i. e. the messenger, ambassador of God, whom we (Christians) profess. Christ frequently, especially in John, applies to himself the phrase ἀπέστειλεν ὁ Θεός, John, xvii.

The various other titles which were given to Christ, from the particular benefits which he conferred upon men, including the figurative names, ἀρχιερεύς, ἀνός, ἄμπελος, δάμα, will be noticed in their proper places.

SECTION CVI.

WHAT IS CONSIDERED IN THE SCRIPTURES AS PROPERLY BELONGING TO THE WORK WHICH CHRIST PERFORMED FOR THE GOOD OF MEN; EXPLANATION OF THE WORD “REDEMPTION,” AS USED IN THE BIBLE; AND WHAT IS THE MOST CONVENIENT AND NATURAL ORDER AND CONNECTION FOR EXHIBITING THE DOCTRINE OF THE ENTIRE MERITS OF CHRIST.

I. What belongs to the Work of Christ, or to Redemption.

(1) THE declaration of his doctrine, and instruction respecting it. To this many of the titles applied to him refer: as ὁ προφήτης, ὁ ἀπόστολος, (s. 105,) διδάσκαλος, &c. &c. Respecting the discharge of his office as teacher, vide s. 94. It needs only to be remarked here, that instruction in this divine doctrine is by no means mentioned in the New Testament as the only object of the advent of Christ; still it is represented as a great object, and as an essential part of his work upon the earth, or of the work of redemption. So he himself represents it. In John, xvii. 3, 4, he expressly mentions instruction in the true religion (“that they should acknowledge thee as the true God”) as belonging to the ἔργον, which was given him by the Father to do; and in John, xviii. 37, he says, that he was born and had come into the world in order to propagate the true religion, (ἀληθειαν.) He everywhere taught that he was lawgiver and king, so far as he was a true, an infallible teacher, that he reigned over the minds of men, not by external power and constraint, (like the kings of the earth,) but by the internal power of the truth which he preached. Cf. John, iii. 34, xii. 49, 50.

(2) The sufferings and death which he endured for the good of men. This, too, Christ himself always mentions as an essential part of this work—e. g., John, iii. 14, seq. In the allegory John, vi. 51, where he compares himself with the manna, he means by the bread of heaven the doctrine respecting his person, and especially respecting the sacrifice of his body for the good

of men, (ἐπὶ ζῶντος τοῦ σώματος;) which he inculcates as a doctrine of the first importance. In John, xii. 27, he says, "For this purpose (to die for the good of men, vide ver. 24) God had brought him into such distress, and therefore he would readily and cheerfully endure it." Cf. John, xiv. 31. The institution of the Lord's Supper was designated to commemorate "his blood shed for the remission of sins;" Matt. xxvi. 28. That Christ died for the good of all men is the universal doctrine of all the apostles; Heb. ii. 9. Paul calls this suffering of Jesus *παράδοξον*; Rom. v. 19, coll. Phil. ii. 8; Heb. v. 8; because he endured it in obedience to the will of God. He contrasts it with the *παράδοξον* of Adam, and says that by it we have obtained forgiveness and the remission of sins. If, then, we would adhere to the declarations of the scriptures, we shall not separate this part from the other; but consider them both, one as much as the other, as belonging to the work of Christ.

Many indeed maintain that the annunciation and diffusion of his *doctrine* was the only object of the *life* of Christ upon earth, and that his *death* is to be considered merely as a *martyrdom*, by which he gave an example and pattern of steadfastness and devotion to the will of God, and a confirmation of the truth of his doctrine. But,

(a) The assertion that this was the *only* object of his life is inconsistent with the declarations of scripture. We do not find that the scriptures particularly mention his death as an example of *steadfastness*; at least, they do not dwell upon this view, or regard it as the principal point. *Remission of sins* and *eternal life* are mentioned by Christ himself as the principal object which he had in view, John, iii. 16; Matt. xxvi.

(b) As to the other assertion, that his doctrine was *proved* and *confirmed* by his death, we find not a single passage among all that speak of his death and the object of it which give us to understand that the truth and divinity of his religion was *proved* and *confirmed* by this means, although they were so by his *resurrection* and *ascension*. The passage, Heb. ii. 10, cannot be appealed to in proof of this assertion; for διὰ παθημάτων means, *after sufferings* and death had been endured, and refers to Christ. Nor can the passage, John, xvii. 19, be appealed to, "I have *sanctified* (according to some, *sacrificed*) myself, that they also might be sanctified by the truth." The meaning of this passage is: "I have entirely *consecrated* (as ver. 17) myself to this service, in order to give them an example which they should follow in the proclamation of the true religion; that they also may deny themselves, take up my cross, renounce all worldly prospects, and live solely for me and my cause." Thus we see that on this subject the opinions of Christ and of the first Christians were entirely differ-

ent from those above mentioned; and we ought not to ascribe to those times and writers the ideas which are now current among so many. But, in *not* considering the death of Christ as designed to confirm the truth of his doctrines, the scriptures are entirely right. And if they had so considered it, they would plainly have been wrong. It is strange that those who advocate this point should have overlooked this. For,

(c) The steadfast death of a martyr can never prove the truth of the doctrine for which he dies; for almost all religions can point to their heroic martyrs. *His own firm belief of the truth for which he died* is all that can be concluded from the death of a martyr. The religion of Jesus, therefore, would have a very uncertain ground if it rested upon this fact, and depended for proof upon this argument. Besides, although Jesus died with great firmness and magnanimity, it is still certain that he did not endure death with that tranquillity and joy which have been admired in so many martyrs of the Christian and the other religions. Consider his agony in Gethsemane, Luke, xxii., and previously, John, xii. 27. If this, then, were all, Jesus has been surpassed by many martyrs. Vide s. 95, II.

(d) During the short continuance of his office as teacher, Jesus did not exhibit the whole compass of the doctrines of his religion, even to his apostles, because he was with them but a short time, and the truths to be taught were many, and the disciples were as yet incapable of receiving most of them; John, xvi. 12. It was not till after his death that these doctrines, in all their extent, were exhibited, developed, and applied by the apostles, and were at the same time increased by the addition of many others about which Jesus had said nothing clearly. He designed to prepare the ground, and to begin to *sow*, but they were to enter into the full harvest; John, iv. If, then, as is frequently said, he designed to seal or confirm his doctrine by his death, he could only confirm so much of it as he himself had already taught, leaving us in uncertainty respecting the rest, and respecting its whole later development.

(e) If the writers of the New Testament believed that Jesus lived upon the earth *merely* for the purpose of *teaching*, it is hard to see why they should ascribe such distinguished excellences to his person; and why the Deity should be united with him in a manner in which it never was with any other man, or any other created being. As a mere man, he might have been taught by God, and have preached a doctrine revealed to him by God, and have founded a new religion and religious institutions, as Moses and the prophets did, and afterwards the apostles themselves. He himself delivered only the

smallest part of his doctrines; nor did he widely disseminate even these. He taught only three years, in a few provinces, within the small circuit of Judea and Galilee; and he saw but little fruit of his labours. The apostles, on the other hand, lived through a long course of years, added to the number of the doctrines of the Christian religion, and widened their scope, disseminated them through many countries, and saw the happiest results of their labours. In short, they did, as Christ himself predicted, *greater things* than he himself accomplished; John, xiv. 12. Were Christ, then, *a mere teacher*, he must in many respects give place to his apostles, and rank as inferior to them. On this supposition, he would only have the preference of originating, founding, and *giving the tone* to his religion; while, on the contrary, according to the representations of the apostles, and before them of John the Baptist, he had an infinite superiority over them, and over all the teachers who had preceded or would follow them. These had done and could do nothing which could bear any comparison with what he had done for the human race; for to him *alone* are men indebted for their entire happiness here and hereafter. Even John the Baptist, whom Christ described as the greatest of all prophets, esteemed himself unworthy to offer him *the most menial service*; John, i. and iii. 28—36. "Whosoever believes in him has eternal life." Where was this ever said of a prophet or apostle? Where is it said that whoever believes on Moses or Paul has eternal life? The writers of the New Testament, then, must have supposed, if they do not speak and judge quite inconsistently, that the design of God, in the mission and death of Christ, extended to something more than mere *instruction and example*. They must have believed that he was a far more exalted person than any human teacher who preceded or would follow him.

(f) Where is it said, respecting James, Stephen, or any other martyr, that he *died for men*? But this would have been said of them if this language had meant nothing more than giving an example and furnishing confirmation to a doctrine. Paul himself protests against this idea, as derogatory to Christ, and abhorrent to the feelings of Christians, 1 Cor. i. 13.

II. Explanation of the word ἀπολύτρωσις or λύτρωσις, (Redemption,) and a development of the idea contained in it.

(1) The primary and literal signification of λυτρόω is, to *redeem* by the payment of a ransom of money or something else. For λύτρον is *pretium redemptionis*, and is used by the LXX. to translate the Hebrew קָנָה, Exodus, xxx. 12, seq. Thus it is used, e. g., when speaking of redemption from captivity or slavery, which is effected by the payment of a ransom, or when

speaking of a person's property which is in the hands of another, and which he then *redeems*. In this sense λυτρόω frequently corresponds to the Hebrew words קָנָה and קָנָה, and λύτρωσις to the substantives derived from them—e. g., Lev. xxv. 25, 30, 48, 49. But,

(2) Λυτροῦν and λύτρωσις frequently convey the general idea of any *rescue and deliverance* from an unhappy situation, as from *slavery*; or deliverance from any other, even moral evil, without either the literal payment of a *ransom* or anything like it; precisely like קָנָה and קָנָה. *Slavery and captivity* so often befel the Hebrews that they were in the habit of comparing every species of wretchedness with this severe calamity. Captivity stood with them for great calamity; as Job, xlii. 10, God freed Job from *captivity* when he restored him to health and prosperity. *Captured people*, Ps. liii. 7, signifies *unhappy people*. Every deliverance from misfortune, even where no *ransom*, in the literal sense, was paid, was with them λύτρωσις; the deliverer, λυτρώτης; the means of deliverance, λύτρον, as Morus properly translates it. It is not said merely of deliverance from bodily evil, but is transferred to spiritual evil. Accordingly, the LXX. frequently translate קָנָה and קָנָה by σώζειν, Job, xxxiii. 28; and by βύσσαι, Is. i. 2 which are then synonymous with λυτροῦν.

(3) The writers of the New Testament follow this Hebrew and Hebrew-Greek usage, and employ these words to denote any preservation and deliverance, even in cases where no ransom, in the proper sense, is paid—e. g., ἡμέρα ἀπολύτρωσεως, Eph. iv. 30; ἐγγίζει ἀπολύτρωσις, Luke xxi. 28; and ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος, Rom. viii. 23; and Moses is called, Acts, vii. 35, the λυτρώτης of the Israelites, although he paid no ransom for them. In this sense is ἀπολύτρωσις applied by Jews and Christians to the Messiah, and denotes, when spoken of him, the *rescue and deliverance* which he has procured for us.

In all the variety of their opinions respecting the Messiah and his designs, the Jews differed also in opinion respecting this deliverance which they were expecting from him.

(a) Many Jews, who supposed the Messiah would be a temporal ruler, placed this λύτρωσις, principally, at least, in a temporal deliverance of their nation from its enemies and oppressors. Cf. λυτροῦν Ἰσραὴλ spoken of the Messiah, Luke, xxiv. 21; which is expressed by ἀποκαθιστάναι βασιλείαν τῷ Ἰσραὴλ, Acts, i. 6.

(b) But those of the Jews who were better instructed understood this ἀπολύτρωσις which was ascribed to the Messiah in a spiritual and moral sense only. In this sense Christ himself and his apostles always understood it. Now it was common to conceive of Sin as having a power and dominion which it exercised over sinners, (vide s. 85, I.,) and to conceive of the

author of sin (the deceiver of our first parents) in the same way; and so of *Death*, (the consequence and punishment of sin,) which is described as a tyrant, who has men in his power. One who perishes, or becomes miserable, is his captive and slave. But, according to the representations of the New Testament, Christ frees us (a) from the power and dominion of sin by means of *instruction* and counsel received by us in faith. Ἀλγεία ἐλευθερώσει ὑμᾶς—Τίς ὑμᾶς ἐλευθερώσει, κ. τ. λ., John, viii. 32—36. He accomplishes this deliverance by means of his *doctrine* and *example*. But (β) he frees us also from the punishment of sin, or procures us forgiveness, by his *death*, (atonement.) We cannot experience the good resulting from the *first* part of this redemption, and have no true capacity for it, before we are made sure of the *second*.

This twofold deliverance is expressed by various phrases, which sometimes denote the one kind, sometimes the other, and sometimes the two together. Among these phrases are the following:—σῶζειν ἀπὸ ἁμαρτιῶν, Matthew, i. 21; παθαρίζειν ἀπὸ ἁμαρτίας, John, i. 7, 9, &c. So also λυτρώω and λύτρωσις are used sometimes to express the one kind of deliverance or the other, and sometimes both together, Heb. ix. 12; 1 Pet. i. 18; Rom. iii. 24. What is expressed by the phrase λυτροῦν ἀπὸ ἀδικίας, Titus, ii. 14, is expressed by ἑξαίρειν, Gal. i. 4; and Christ himself says he gave his life λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν—i. e., he died for the delivery and rescue of men, Matt. xx. 28. In the same way, the other words of *buying* and *redeeming* are used mostly for *every kind* of rescue and deliverance, and in this sense are transferred to Christ; as, ἀγοράζειν, ἑξαγοράζειν, 1 Cor. vii. 23. "The Lord that *bought* them," 2 Pet. ii. 1; Gal. iii. 13; Rev. v. 9.

III. *The Order and Connexion in which the particular topics belonging to the Article respecting the Merits of Christ may be most conveniently and naturally treated.*

It is most natural here to have respect to the twofold object of the mission of Christ; (a) to free men from the unhappy condition into which they are brought by sin, "that they may not perish," John, iii. 16; and (b) to procure for them true happiness in the present and the future world, "that they should have eternal life," John, *ubi supra*. Hence appears the propriety, in the systematic treatment of theology, of separating the doctrine respecting the work (opus) of Christ, from the doctrine respecting the *good*, or the *benefits* themselves, which Christ has procured for us by his work, (*beneficia Christi*.) The *first* part exhibits the means which God employs to recover the human race through Christ; the *second* part, the results of what Christ did. This same distinction is made

in the holy scriptures in other places besides John, iii.; as Rom. v. 9, 10, *ῥάνατος* is the *opus Christi*; *κατάλλαξις* is the *result*, or the blessing which Christ bestows; 2 Tim. i. 10, "through the *gospel* (*opus Christi*) he has brought life and immortality to light, (*beneficia*.)" According to the example of the Bible, therefore, the whole subject may be arranged in the following manner—viz.,

I. Of the *work* of Christ, or the *redemption* which he has effected,—his *mediatorial work*, (*redemptio*.) This comprises,

(1) Deliverance or redemption from the punishment of sin, which is effected by his death or his blood, together with the doctrine of the *justification* or *forgiveness* of men, the fruit of this redemption. S. 108—115, incl.

(2) Deliverance from the power and dominion of sin, which is effected, through divine assistance, by the instruction which Christ gives by his doctrine and example. S. 116, 117.

Each of these kinds of deliverance belongs equally to this *ἀπολύτρωσις*, or *redemption*. Only we must have the forgiveness of our past sins, and assurance of the same, before we can avail ourselves of what is contained in the second part. Hence we have adopted this order. And so the Bible teaches; we are first *pardoned*, then *sanctified*. The first is effected by the death of Christ, the second, with divine assistance, by the instructions of Christ, when received and obeyed in faith.

II. On the result of all these works undertaken for the good of men, or the *blessedness* to which men attain in this life and the life to come, in consequence of these works, (*beneficia Christi*.) S. 118—120, incl.

But before we enter upon this plan, we must say a few words respecting the method commonly pursued, especially in former times, in discussing the doctrine of the mediatorial work of Christ; s. 107.

SECTION CVII.

OF THE METHOD FORMERLY ADOPTED OF CONSIDERING THE WORK OF CHRIST, AS CONSISTING OF THE PROPHETIC, PRIESTLY, AND KINGLY OFFICES.

It has been for a long time the custom in the protestant, and especially in the Lutheran church, to consider the mediatorial work of Christ as consisting of three *offices*, (*munera, officia*, Germ. *Ämtern*)—viz., the *prophetic, priestly*, and *kingly*. This method was not universal among the Lutheran theologians, though it was the most general from the seventeenth century down to the time of Ernesti. In 1768—69 he wrote two *Programma*, "De officio Christi triplici," which are found in his "Opusc. Theolog.," p. 411, seq., and in which

he objects to this method, for many reasons. Most of his reasons (for they are not all of equal validity) have so much weight, that Zachariä, Döderlein, and many other protestant theologians since his time, have pursued an entirely different method. Seiler, Less, in his "Prakt. Dogmat." and others, adhered to the old method, and endeavoured to defend it. Also Dresde, whose "Obss. in tripartitam divisionem muneris mediatorii;" Vitel. 1778, 4to; contain many excellent historical remarks. We shall speak *first* of the origin and history of this method, and *then* of the reasons why it does not appear to be proper in the systematic treatment of theology.

I. Origin and History of this Division.

The title $\pi\rho\phi\eta$, $\chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$, *Unctus*, gave rise to this division. In its common use, it properly signifies a *king*. But it was considered according to its etymology, and thus new significations were formed. The question was, "Who, in the Old Testament, was *anointed*, or consecrated to office, by *unction*?" This was found to have been the custom most frequently with respect to *kings* and *priests*. Accordingly, Ambrosius, Ruffinus, and other ecclesiastical fathers, declared that $\pi\rho\phi\eta$ denoted the *kingly* and *priestly* office. But it was found that *prophets* also were sometimes anointed. And so Clement of Alexandria and others declared that Christ was called $\pi\rho\phi\eta$ because he was a *prophet*. Vide Dresde, s. 5. Now when they saw that Christ was actually called *king, priest, and prophet* in the scriptures, they put these two things together, and declared that the whole mediatorial work of Jesus consisted in these three kinds of works. Eusebius, in the fourth century, in his Church History, and also in his "Demonstratio Evangelica," (iv. 15,) is the first who appears to have distinctly connected these three parts, and to have considered them as belonging to the mediatorial work.

This division, then, is not so modern as Ernesti appears to suppose. Indeed, it may have been originally derived by the Christians from the *Jews*. For the Rabbins and Cabalists ascribe to the Messiah a *threefold dignity* (crown)—viz., *the crown of the law, of the priesthood, and of the kingdom*. Vide Schoettgen, in his work on the Messiah, s. 107, 298. At least both of them formed the division in the same way. But among Christians it was never the general rule of faith, but only employed as a figurative mode of representing the doctrine. Anciently it was most common in the Greek church. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others, shew traces of it. It was therefore seen in the Confession of Faith of the modern Greek church in the seventeenth century, and it is still common in the Russian church. Anciently in the Latin church it was

sometimes, though seldom used. But the schoolmen never used it in their acroamatical instructions; for which reason the theologians of the Romish church in after times used it but seldom, although Bellarmin and many others do not discard it. For the same reason, Luther and Melancthon, and other early Lutheran theologians who separated from the Romish church, do not make use of this method in treating of the doctrine of the mediatorial work of Christ. But after the seventeenth century it was gradually introduced into the systems. It appears to have been first introduced by Joh. Gerhard, in his "Loci Theologici." At least it is not found in Chemnitz. It was afterwards employed in popular religious instruction, and was admitted by Spener into his Catechism; until at last it became universal to treat of the doctrine respecting the mediatorial work of Christ according to this division and under these heads. In the reformed church it was adopted by Calvin, who was followed by many others. It is also adopted by many Arminian and Socinian writers.

II. A Critical Judgment respecting this Method.

Morus, indeed, acknowledges that nothing depends upon exhibiting the doctrine in this particular form, and that the truths themselves may be expressed in other words, and without this figurative phraseology. At the same time he undertakes to defend it, though not in a very satisfactory manner. The following reasons seem to render it unadvisable for theologians to make use of this form in the scientific treatment of this doctrine.

(1) It appears from No. I. that this manner of presenting the subject arose entirely from an etymological explanation of the word $\pi\rho\phi\eta$, and from an allegorical sense of this title founded upon its etymology. For, according to the true use of the word in the Bible, Messiah signifies only *king*. Many were anointed, but kings were called, by way of eminence, *the anointed*.

(2) All these words, when applied to Christ, are figurative. Such figurative expressions are, indeed, very good and instructive in themselves, and must be suitably explained in the acroamatical and popular treatment of theology. But it is more convenient to express the ideas themselves in the first instance by literal language, and not to make figurative expressions, although they may be scriptural, the ground of our divisions. And so indeed we proceed with respect to the other figurative terms applied to Christ in the Bible, as *lamb, physician, shepherd, door, vine*. And why should we proceed differently here? Thus we can consider Christ as *king*, and as a divinely authorized *teacher* (prophet), in both his states; and especially as making atonement (High Priest); and *then* we can explain the figurative terms, and shew the meaning of the

words *sacrifice*, *intercede*, and *bless*, when spoken of Christ.

(3) When theologians attempt to determine definitely which of the works of Christ are denoted by each of these titles, they themselves differ widely from one another; because these titles are figurative, and so admit of various significations, according as they are understood in a more limited or a wider sense. On this account, it is inconvenient to make this division the basis of our treatment of this subject. It may easily occasion confusion of ideas. Some (No. I.) admit only two offices, the *royal* and *priestly*, and comprise the *prophetic* office in the *priestly*, because the priests were employed in teaching. But even those who admit three offices are not united. The opinion which Baier formerly held, and which Seiler follows, is one of the most current in the Lutheran church—viz., the *prophetic* office comprehends the works of Christ as divine teacher, in order to free men from ignorance and to point out to them the way to happiness (*oblatio amissæ salutis*); the *priestly* office comprehends the whole work of atonement, or deliverance from guilt and the punishment of sin (*acquisitio amissæ salutis*); the *kingly* office comprehends the labours of Christ for the good of his followers and of his church, and for the more general diffusion of truth over the earth, (*collatio amissæ salutis*.) But others again define and divide differently.

(4) The advocates of this division appeal to the Bible, where these figurative titles, king, prophet, high priest, frequently occur in application to Christ. But the sacred writers do not mean to designate by these titles the *very works* of Christ, as Redeemer, which theologians understand by them. The sacred writers mean frequently to describe by these titles the *whole* object of the mission of Christ and his *whole* work. These titles were derived from the ancient Jewish constitution, and were used by the apostles, for the most part, in their instructions to Jews and converts from Judaism, to whom the sense concealed under these figures was at once intelligible. At first the Jewish institute was administered by prophets and priests only, and if this state of things had continued, and the Israelites had never been governed by kings, Christ would not have received the name of *king*, and would not have been compared to a king. But since the royal dignity was the highest among the Israelites, the dignity of Christ was compared with it, and so he was called a *king*.

The following remarks may shew the idea which is attached to these names in the scriptures, and the manner in which they are there used.

(a) *Prophet*. This name was given to Christ not *merely* because he was a *teacher*, but also

because he was a *messenger* or *ambassador* of God, according to the original signification of the word. He performed *all* his works, suffering and dying, as well as teaching, as *prophet*—i. e., as the messenger of God. He is called a prophet especially in comparison with Moses, according to the text, Deut. xviii. 15, coll. Acts, iii. 22. Vide s. 91, I. But Moses, besides being a teacher and the founder of the Jewish religion, performed also the works of a *ruler* and *priest*, and did not transfer, till afterwards, one part of his duties, the priesthood, to Aaron. Moses, therefore, enacted laws, instructed, ruled, sacrificed—all as *prophet*—i. e., as commissioned by God.

(b) *King*. Here the case is the same as above. This name is given to Christ, not *merely* because he rules, guides, and protects his followers and church, but also because he is a *teacher of the truth*; as he himself declares, John, xviii. 37, that his kingdom consists in announcing, promoting, and diffusing the truth. Vide s. 106, I. 1. Now according to the common explanation, and the minute distinction which is here introduced, this would intrude upon the *prophetic* office.

(c) *Priest*. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, from the fifth chapter and onward, Christ is often compared with *priests*, and especially with the Jewish high priest. But this comparison is derived from the text, Ps. cx. 4, which Christ refers to himself, and to which Paul appeals in the abovenamed epistle. The reason why such frequent use was made of this comparison in this epistle is, that it was written principally to converted Jews, who, however, were inclined to apostatize from Christianity, and who looked upon the origin of the Mosaic religion and the whole Jewish ritual as far more elevated, splendid, and magnificent, than the Christian. In comparison with this, the origin and rites of Christianity appeared poor and insignificant. On this account, Paul compares Christ, in the first place, with Moses; and then, from the fifth chapter and onward, with the Israelitish priests. He shews his resemblance to them, and at the same time, his great superiority over them. These figures and comparisons are not, therefore, so intelligible to Christians, who are unacquainted with the Levitical ritual and priesthood. To such, then, all this must be explained before they can properly understand these comparisons. Is it not, therefore, more suitable and judicious, first to exhibit the truth itself in plain and literal language, as Christ and the apostles so frequently do on this subject; and *then*, to shew by what figures and comparisons this truth is represented in the scriptures, and to explain the meaning of these figures and comparisons? We do not mean to imply that these figurative terms are in themselves objectionable, and

should not be used in the more popular Christian instruction. We only mean, that in the first place the truth should be taught without figures; that then the figurative terms contained in the Bible should be explained; and that afterwards literal and figurative language should be used *alternately*. And for this we have the example of the scriptures themselves. These figurative terms are by no means in themselves objectionable; for, according to the principles of the human mind, they exert a more powerful influence, illustrate truth more clearly, and impress it more deeply upon the heart, than can be done by literal terms. Only they must be properly explained.

[The ancient method of considering the work of Christ under the form of a threefold office has been revived of late, and is adopted in the systems of De Wette, Schleiermacher, and Tholuck.—Tr.]

We now enter upon the plan marked out at the close of s. 106.

PART I. OF CHAPTER IV.

ON REDEMPTION FROM THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN; OR, ON THE ATONEMENT OF CHRIST, AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF MEN BEFORE GOD—THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ATONEMENT.
S. 108—115.

SECTION CVIII.

OF THE VARIOUS OPINIONS RESPECTING THE FORGIVENESS OF SIN BY GOD, AND THE CONDITIONS ON WHICH FORGIVENESS MAY BE GRANTED; AND AN APPLICATION OF THIS TO THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT.

I. The "Forgiveness of Sin," Various Opinions respecting it, especially in regard to the Conditions of it.

It is the uniform doctrine of all religions, that transgression of the divine law incurs inevitable punishment; but that no sins are altogether irremissible; that, on the contrary, God is inclined to remit the punishment of sin, on certain conditions. For the object of religion is not only to point out to men their destination, but also to impart to them peace and composure of mind with regard to their destiny here and beyond the grave. The opinions of men respecting the conditions on which the pardon of sin depends, may be divided into several classes. Some have united many of these conditions together, as requisite to pardon; others have depended wholly on some particular one.

(1) *Sacrifice, and other religious rites and ceremonies.*

(a) We observe that sacrifice is *universal* among all nations as soon as they rise above the first brutal condition. The Bible places it in the very first period of the world; Gen. iv., viii. 20, 21. Many ancient and modern philosophers have greatly wondered how an idea in itself, as it seemed to them, so unworthy of God, could have occurred to men, or could have prevailed so universally among them. But there is a feeling lying deep in our nature which compels men to look around for some means of conciliating the favour of the Deity, and of averting the deserved punishment of sin. Vide infra, No. II., and s. 88, I. 2. Why *sacrifice* was the means selected for this purpose, and why accordingly it was sanctioned by divine appointment among the Israelites and their ancestors, may appear from the following considerations.

Men conceived of the Deity as *corporeal* and *like themselves*. Vide s. 19. Hence arose the idea of sacrifice. They hoped to conciliate the favour of God by the same means by which they endeavoured to gain the favour of men, supposing that what was pleasing to men would be so to God. The thought that internal goodness and integrity of heart are alone pleasing to God, however plain this may appear to us, was entirely beyond the comprehension of rude and uncultivated man. But even allowing him to have some idea of this, he would still feel, as we must, that his holiness was very imperfect, and afforded a very doubtful pretension to the approbation of God. Besides, he would be disquieted by the fear that his *past* transgressions might not be cancelled, or be undone, by any *succeeding* holiness, and that punishment therefore was still to be apprehended. He accordingly brought *gifts* and *presents* to his gods, to render himself acceptable to them. And so, in the ancient languages, the words which mean *gifts*, *presents*, also signify *sacrifice*. It was supposed in the earliest times that the gods were personally, though *invisibly*, present at the offering of these gifts, and when the offerings consisted of food, as was commonly the case, that they themselves partook, and enjoyed the *sweet savour*, (the sweet smell of the flesh of the offerings, *ἡρώα*, Hom. II. iv. 49; xxiv. 68, seq.) Hence offerings were called the *food and drink* of the gods. Homer describes Jupiter and the rest of the gods as going from Olympus to a festal sacrifice which the Ethiopians presented to him, and which lasted twelve days; II. i. 423, seq.; xxiii. 206, 207. It was the object of these gifts to express gratitude to the gods for blessings received, to obtain future benefits, and to avert the evils which they were supposed to ordain or to inflict in anger.

The opinion of Ernesti, Doederlien, and many others, that sacrifices were originally only *thank-offerings*, and that the *expiatory sacrifice*

was first introduced by Moses, is without proof. The three kinds of sacrifice above named are found to exist together in all nations. Even the sacrifices of Abel and Noah, Gen. iv. and viii., were designed to obtain good from God, and to avert evil, (the anger of God.) Homer gives, Il. ix. 495, the great principle on which all nations who have sacrificed have uniformly proceeded, "that meat and drink offerings conciliate the gods with men when they err and sin." Even *men* were sacrificed to the gods when it was thought that the common flesh of beasts was insufficient to appease their anger, or to avert their displeasure. This was the case principally in the ages of the greatest rudeness and barbarity, when men imagined their gods to be as wild, revengeful, and blood-thirsty as themselves. But such sacrifices were resorted to even by the cultivated Greeks and Romans, in case of plague or any great calamity; and, notwithstanding the strictness with which they were forbidden by the laws of Moses, they were frequently practised even by the Jews.

Respecting the origin of sacrifices, vide Sykes, *Vom Ursprunge der Opfer*, with Notes by Semler; Halle, 1778, 8vo; and Wolf, *Vom Ursprunge der Opfer*, in his *Vermischten Schriften*.

(b) As some of these nations became gradually more civilized, many among them perceived that such a use of sacrifices was inconsistent with just ideas respecting God and his attributes, and that men could never obtain from the Deity by sacrifices even those things which they hoped to obtain by them. The use of them, however, could not be done away immediately by legislators and the institutors of religion, because nothing could be substituted for them; they were thus, of necessity, continued as a part of the external worship of God. All that the more enlightened could do was to prevent them from becoming injurious, and, if possible, render them promotive of higher objects. To the ancient usage they must affix nobler ends, and employ sacrifices as sensible representations for teaching virtue, and improving the moral condition of the people. Such attempts were made in many cultivated nations. The ancient forms were preserved, while a more elevated and better sense was affixed to them. But the results of this course were not equally happy in every case. The ordinances which Moses was required to make by divine commandment are distinguished in this respect above all that we find among the ancient heathen nations. Moses was fully convinced that offerings in themselves could never secure the actual forgiveness of sin *from God*. He did not therefore ordain them for this purpose. He proceeded on the principle which Paul declares, Heb. x. 1. All the

prophets who succeeded Moses held the same views, Ps. l. 8; li.; Is. i. 11; Jer. vi. 20; Amos, v. 22, &c. But it was necessary that sacrifices should be preserved; otherwise, that gross and uncultivated people would soon have deserted the worship of God. Moses therefore ordained sacrifices, as Paul justly says, Heb. ix. 13, for *external purification* simply. For this reason no sacrifices were appointed by God in the Mosaic institute for such offences as murder, adultery, &c.; not because such offences could not be forgiven by God, but because the civil welfare required that the punishment of them should not be remitted. For it was the object of God in appointing these sacrifices,

(a) That they should release from the *civil* punishment of certain crimes. The commission of a crime rendered one unworthy of the community of the *holy* people, and *excluded* him from it. The offering of sacrifice was the means by which he was *externally* readmitted to the Jewish community, and rendered *externally* pure; although he did not, on this account, obtain the pardon of his sin from God. It was designed that all who offered sacrifice should, by this act, both make a public confession of their sins, and at the same time see before them, in the sacrifice, the punishment which they had deserved, and to which they acknowledged themselves exposed. Hence sins were said to be *laid upon* the victim, and *borne away* by it when it was sacrificed. 'This transaction manifestly had its ground in the idea of substitution. "What thou deservedst to suffer, (death, punishment,) this beast now suffers." Therefore the design of the sacrificial code of Moses was not to provide atonement for sins, but to represent sin as great and deserving of punishment; in a word, "to lead to the knowledge of sin;" Gal. iii. 19.

(3) Another end of the sacrifices appointed by Moses was, as we are taught in the New Testament, to point the Israelites to the future, and to prefigure by types the greater divine provision for the recovery of the human race, and to excite in the Israelites a feeling of their need of such a provision. Vide Gal. iii. and iv., also the Epistle to the Hebrews. On this subject, cf. s. 90, III. 9.

Old and cultivated nations, like the present nations of Europe, now for a long time unaccustomed to sacrifices, would not be so favourably affected by seeing death inflicted as a punishment upon a victim, as by having the truth represented by this rite stated simply and impressively. But a gross people, still in the infancy of its improvement, would be more moved and influenced by such a transaction. They have more sympathy with beasts than we have; as is shewn by the great influence of the fables of *Æsop*. And hence many heathen nations began

to neglect, and sometimes even to despise sacrifices, as they gradually advanced in cultivation. The case was the same with the Jews, and especially with the more cultivated Grecian Jews. But at the time of Christ there were still some Jews zealously devoted to the service of the altar, who committed the frequent and very general mistake, that God would forgive their sins *on account of their sacrifices*, notwithstanding the decided testimony which their ancient prophets had borne against this opinion. Paul, therefore, argues against it in some of his epistles.

Note.—Many suppose that sacrifices were appointed in the very earliest times by an express command from God himself. This supposition is rendered probable by the consideration that the Bible always regards sacrifices as rites well-pleasing in the sight of God. They are represented as acceptable to him, and approved by him from the time of the flood, and even before; Gen. iv. and viii. If sacrifices were actually commanded by God, we must suppose that God instructed the first race of men on this subject, after the manner above described; but that his instructions were gradually forgotten and passed out of mind. The fact, however, of the *original* divine appointment of sacrifices is not clear from the Mosaic records. And as the results of the investigation are the same, whether the supposition be true or false, we have had no reference to it in the previous remarks upon sacrifices.

(2) Self-inflicted *penances*, and arbitrary sufferings which the sinner lays upon himself, in order to obtain from God the remission of punishment.

This is a foolish error. We should think a human legislator very irrational who should permit the criminal to select a punishment at pleasure, in place of the one threatened in the law. This error, however, is very widely spread, especially among the Indians, and nations who inhabit southern climates, whose religious require of them self-inflictions which are incredibly severe. They frequently go so far as to believe that an *innocent* man may undertake such sufferings for *others*; and thus obtain for them forgiveness from God. This error is founded upon the mistaken opinion that God, like man, will be touched with *compassion* at the sight of these self-inflicted sufferings, and thus be inclined to remit those which are due. *Fasting* was also regarded in the light of a self-infliction, by which the forgiveness of sin might be procured. The great mass even of the Jews practised all these penances, with the grossest conceptions of their nature and efficacy. Vide 1 Kings, xviii. 28. The prophets, therefore, frequently reprove them for this erroneous opinion, and teach them the truth; Is. lviii. seq. Cultivated nations frequently entertain the same

false religious views, which are extremely injurious to morality. Even Christians are not entirely freed from them, after all that the New Testament contains to the contrary.

(3) *Good works*, so called, on condition and account of which God is supposed to remit sin.

It was supposed (a) that one who had reformed might atone and make satisfaction for his *past* sins by some works of distinguished virtue; or (b) that even one who had not reformed entirely, but was still addicted to certain sins, might be pardoned by God for these sins, on account of some great, difficult, and useful labours which he might perform—suppositions, to be sure, both false and unphilosophical! They have their ground, however, in the fact that good works are sometimes the means and motives *with men*, in bestowing pardon. An injured man sometimes forgives the offender on account of some favour which he may have received from him. A government sometimes forgives one offence in a person, who in other respects has deserved well of the rulers as individuals, or of the state; on account, therefore, of *their own interest*, which he has promoted. This circumstance, that in these cases men forgive offences on account of their *own advantage*, which has been promoted by important services, is overlooked when they are compared with the conduct of God. We are not able to confer any good or benefit upon God by our best works. By these works we serve and benefit *only ourselves*, and we cannot demand or deserve a reward from God for actions for the very performance of which we are indebted to him, Luke, xvii. 10. It would be as foolish for us to require recompence from God for these services as for one who has been rescued from danger to demand reward from his deliverer instead of giving him his thanks, or for a patient to demand reward from his physician instead of paying him his fee, on the ground that by following his directions he had escaped from danger or sickness.

This opinion has taken such deep root in the minds of men of all classes, and has spread so widely, that it cannot be entirely eradicated even from the minds of Christians. It prevailed among the ancient heathen, and especially among the Jews. The latter held the foolish opinion (which has been revived in another form among Christians) that the worth and merits of their pious ancestors, particularly of Abraham, would be imputed to them, and that thus, through their substituted righteousness, they themselves might be freed from the strict observance of the law. Against this mistake, John the Baptist, Christ, and the apostles, zealously laboured. Vide Matt. iii. 9; Rom. iii. 5. The Jews believed that God was bound in justice to forgive and save them, on account of the promise

which he had made to Abraham. Vide Rom. ix.—xi., coll. s. 125.

(4) *Repentance and reformation.*

This condition of forgiveness has always appeared the best and most rational to the more improved and reflecting part of mankind, to whom the former conditions must have appeared unsatisfactory. Even the Old and New Testaments are full of passages which assure us that God forgives sins after deep repentance, and the moral reformation consequent upon it; Ps. xxxii. 3—5; li. 8, 12, 17; Luke, xviii. 13, seq. The writings of the Grecian and Roman philosophers also are full of passages which mention this as the only acceptable condition. Seneca says, "*Quem pœnitet peccasse, est innocens.*" But even after recognising this condition, very disquieting doubts must remain, respecting which, vide No. II. A satisfactory assurance respecting the forgiveness of *past* sins would still be wanting. This leads us to the second part.

II. *Application of these Remarks to the Scriptural Doctrine concerning the Atonement of Christ.*

(1) The condition mentioned No. I. 4, however reasonable and obvious it may be in itself, appears from experience and the history of all times, to be unsatisfactory to the great body of men. They never have received nor can receive from it a quieting assurance of the forgiveness of sins, and especially of those committed before their reformation. All nations hope, indeed, that God is disposed to forgive sins when they are forsaken; but men need something more than this. They must have something *external* and *sensible*, to give them assurance and conviction that their sins have actually been forgiven. This assurance they endeavoured to obtain by sacrifices. Vide No. I. They believed universally that *besides* the moral improvement of the heart, some additional means were necessary to conciliate the favour of God, and to avert the punishment of sin. Cf. Hom. II. ix. 493—508. This opinion is so deeply wrought into the human soul, and arises from such an universal sense of necessity, that any attempt to obliterate it or to reason it away would be in vain. To deprive men of this opinion, that the favour of God may be conciliated and the positive assurance of pardon obtained, would be to tear away the props upon which their composure and confidence rest, without being able to substitute for them anything so clear and satisfactory; and thus would be an act of injury and cruelty.

(2) But what is the origin or ground of the feeling that reformation alone is insufficient, and that something else is necessary to avert the judgments of God from the sinner, and to inspire him with confidence that they are or will be averted? This feeling is founded in the mo-

ral nature of man, or in the voice of *conscience*. Vide s. 88, I. 2. For,

(a) However far a man may advance in holiness, his conscience still declares to him that his holiness is very defective, and that he frequently commits sin, and that his sin deserves punishment. And the more upright and virtuous the man is, the more tender and strong will this feeling be. How, then, can he hope by a holiness so imperfect, polluted, and stained with sin, to secure the favour and approbation of God, and to escape unpunished? To one who feels thus, how desirable and welcome must be the assurance that, notwithstanding his imperfect holiness, God will still be gracious to him on certain conditions!—the more desirable and welcome, the more he sees that he can never attain this assurance on any of the conditions above mentioned, No. I., 1, 2, 3. This assurance it is the object of the Christian doctrine of *atonement* to impart.

(b) Although a man were thoroughly reformed, and should commit no more intentional sins, he would still remain in an anxious uncertainty with respect to his past sins; for there is no ground to believe that *on account of one's improvement* God will remit the punishment of sins committed before this improvement commenced. Indeed, without an express assurance from God to the contrary, there are many reasons to fear that he will punish the former sins even of the penitent. This assurance to the contrary can be found alone in the Christian doctrine of the atonement of Christ.

This feeling of necessity, therefore, this apprehension and belief that besides improvement we need and must find some other means of obtaining assurance from God that the punishment of sin will be averted from us; this feeling lies deep in the soul of man, and is founded in his moral nature, in the voice of conscience. Let no one say that all men do not have this feeling, and that he himself neither has it now nor ever has had it. This feeling may be suppressed for a time by levity, or the tumult of passion, or by cold and heartless speculation, or by both of these causes united; but it commonly revives in due time, especially in the hour of affliction, on the approach of death, or on other occasions which compel men to serious reflection. It then demands from them, as it were, its rights, and frequently to their great confusion; it excites anxious doubt and solicitude, and spreads out a dark futurity to view. This is a situation of frequent occurrence, but one in which no person would wish to be. Kant therefore, refers to this feeling in his philosophical theory of religion. On occasions like these such disquieting doubts and fearful apprehensions will often rise irresistibly, even in the minds of those who are above superstitious weakness, and, indeed, of

speculative philosophers themselves, whose feelings had been the most suppressed and deadened. From these feelings no one is secure, however firmly established in his theory; for the philosophy of the death-bed is a different thing from the philosophy of the study and of the school.

A religion, therefore, coming with credentials from Heaven, which, on divine authority, gives to man satisfaction upon *this subject*; which shews him a means, elsewhere sought in vain, by which he can obtain composure and assurance against anxious doubts, and which teaches him to look forward with joy into the future world; such a religion may well claim to be considered a religion of high and universal utility. Those who rob the Christian religion of this doctrine rob it of that which more than anything else makes it a blessing to man.

(3) There is still another view of this subject. The great mass of mankind in all ages have no correct ideas respecting virtue and vice, or respecting God and divine things. It is not strange therefore that they should have always and almost universally believed that God might be conciliated by the most insignificant actions which they might perform without sincere reformation, and which, indeed, they sometimes supposed might take the place of reformation. This was their idea of sacrifices, ceremonies, penances, fasts, &c. They made but little account of moral purity and holiness of life. To relieve themselves of the trouble of caring for their own virtue they supposed that the virtue of others might be imputed to them. Vide No. I. and Meiners, *Geschichte der Religionen*, s. 125, f.

At the time of Christ and the apostles these common mistakes prevailed, though in different forms; throughout the Jewish and heathen world. Now in the establishment of a universal religion, such as the Christian was intended to be, this fact demanded special attention; (and not merely on account of that particular age, but on account of all following ages; because these same mistakes prevail among men in different forms at all times;) for the moral improvement of men, and the sincere and pure worship of God must be the great objects of this religion. But while it has these high and spiritual objects in view, and should make it possible for men to attain them, it must also be *universal*, designed for *every individual*. It must regard the necessities of *all men*, and not merely of the few who account themselves wise, and esteem themselves philosophers. Sacrifices, on account of their imperfections and perversion, were to be forever abolished. The other conditions of forgiveness were no longer to be tolerated, being false and injurious to morality. *Sincere reformation* was the only condition left, and this was

accompanied with the anxious solicitude before mentioned. This internal reformation and holiness was made by Jesus the indispensable condition of forgiveness, though not the *procuring-cause* of it; since, owing to the *imperfection* of our holiness, we could then never have obtained forgiveness. Now, in order to relieve the mind from the solicitude still accompanying this condition, and to satisfy this feeling of need, something *external* must be added, which should powerfully affect the senses, not only of the Jews of that age, but of the heathen and of men in general. This must be something which would be obvious to every one, and not merely to a few; something, too, which would not hinder or weaken the personal exercise of virtue and holiness of life, but rather promote and strengthen them.

Such is the doctrine of the *atonement of Christ*. This can never lead to security in sin or indifference with regard to it, (as it has often been supposed to do,) because *personal reformation* and *holiness* (*μετάνοια, ἀγιασμός*) are connected with it as an indispensable duty, as *conditio sine qua non*. Christ died for men once for all, and suffered the punishment which they would have endured for their sins, and which their consciences tell them they could not have escaped, even after their reformation. And thus the necessity of continuing to sacrifice was removed, and the injurious consequences which attended sacrifices were obviated. "*By Christ*, and his sacrifice, men obtain from God (as Paul declares, Acts, xiii. 38) the forgiveness of all their sins; and consequently, *even of those which, according to the law of Moses, were unpardonable*—i. e., would be irremediably punished," (for which reason sacrifices were now no longer necessary. No. I.)

On *one side*, the infliction upon Christ of the penalty which we deserved places the authority and sanctity of the divine law in the clearest light, and shews the certainty of the execution of the divine punishment upon sin in a manner at once striking and in the highest degree *alarming*. Cf. Romans, iii. 26, *Εἶναι αὐτὸν (Θεὸν) δίκαιον*. This doctrine thus guards against indifference to sin, and, as experience teaches, exerts a powerful influence in reforming and ennobling the moral character of every one who believes it from the heart.

On *the other side*, this doctrine awakens in those who heartily receive it, *love to God*, who has made use of so great and extraordinary means for their forgiveness. It also excites gratitude to God and to Christ. Vide the passages of the New Testament cited by Morus, p. 153, s. 6. One who really believes this doctrine, and does not feel the most lively love and gratitude to God and to Christ, and does not sympathize with all which the New Testament says upon

this subject, (1 John, iv. 10, 11; John, iii. 16; Rom. v. 8; viii. 32,) must be destitute of every tender sensibility and of every human feeling. The proof that this doctrine does actually excite this feeling and is adapted to the necessity of man, may be seen not only in the joyful reception with which it met from the better part of the Jews at the time of the apostles, but also in the approbation of it in succeeding ages, which has been, and is still, expressed by so many men of all nations; and also in the astonishing effects which it has produced.

God, therefore, as the scriptures represent, (Rom. iii. 25,) has set forth Jesus as a *Propitiator*, to assure men of his gracious disposition towards them; in order, by this means, both to lead them from a merely external service of him to a *spiritual* worship, and also to convince them in an affecting manner, as well of his holiness and justice as of his compassionate goodness and grace; and so, by the alarming apprehensions and thankful feelings which flow from such considerations, to influence them to exercise pure virtue, sincere piety, and devotion to God, to cherish and exhibit love to him who first loved them. This representation, which is founded on the holy scriptures, contains nothing irrational, and is entirely suited to the moral nature of man.

SECTION CIX.

SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE NECESSITY OF THE FORGIVENESS OF SIN; WHAT IS MEANT BY FORGIVENESS, PARDON, JUSTIFICATION; AND THE SCRIPTURAL TERMS BY WHICH THEY ARE DESIGNATED.

The Necessity and Indispensableness of Forgiveness.

As sin is justly represented in the holy scriptures as a very great evil, from which no one is free, so, on the other hand, the forgiveness of sins is described as one of the greatest benefits, which no one can do without. It is very important for the religious teacher to lead those committed to his charge to consider this subject as it is exhibited in the scriptures; for almost innumerable mistakes are made respecting it by men in every rank and of every character, the high and the low, the enlightened and the ignorant. Many make but little account of sin, and, through levity or erroneous speculation, overlook its consequences, and of course make light of forgiveness. Others believe that they can easily obtain forgiveness, and rely on the mercy of God, or on the *merits of Christ*, without on their part performing the conditions upon which their trust in these merits and their experience of them must depend.

These injurious mistakes are opposed in many passages of the Bible.

(1) In such as describe the ruinous consequences of sin, and which present the judgments of God in a fearful and terrific light, as severe and intolerable—e. g., Heb. x. 31; Ps. xc. 11; cxxx. 3. To the same purpose are many of the examples given in the scriptures, especially in the history of the Israelites.

(2) In such as describe the judgments of heaven upon those who do not fulfil the conditions prescribed, and are destitute of faith in Jesus Christ, as *certain* and *inevitable*—e. g., Heb. iii. 12, 13; Rom. ii. 1—3, coll. i. 32.

(3) In such as shew that no one can enjoy tranquillity and happiness who has no assurance that his sins are forgiven—e. g., Heb. x. 26, 27. The example of David and other saints, who have been deeply troubled on account of their sins, and anxious for the consequences of them, contain much instruction upon this subject, Psalm li, cxxx., &c.

II. Scriptural Terms and Phrases denoting Forgiveness.

The pardon or forgiveness of sin which men obtain from God is expressly mentioned in the New Testament as the effect and consequence of the atonement or redemption (*ἀπολύτρωσις*) of Christ. In Eph. i. 7, the *ἀφενεὶς παραπτώματων* is represented as belonging to the *ἀπολύτρωσις* διὰ αἵματος Χριστοῦ, and as a *consequence* of it. Cf. Col. i. 14; Heb. ix. 15; "Christ died εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ παραβάσεων." Romans, iii. 24, "We are pardoned, δικαιούμενοι διὰ ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ," &c. The principal terms are the following—viz.,

(1) *Καταλλαγή, reconciliation*, (Germ. *Ver-söhnung*), and *καταλλάσσομαι*. Cf. Morus, pages 113—166, s. 9—11. This phraseology was primarily used with respect to *enemies* who were reconciled, or who became friends again; 1 Cor. vii. 11; Matt. v. 24. Then it was transferred to God. The first origin of this phraseology with respect to him is to be found in the fact that men had gross conceptions of the subject, and supposed the manner of the divine conduct to be like that of men. Whoever transgressed the law of God provoked him to anger—i. e., to displeasure and to a strong expression of it. (Hence the judgments of God are called *ὀργή, ἐκδίκησις Θεοῦ*.) God must now be appeased, and the transgressor must endeavour to make God again his friend. Such was the common and popular language on this subject—language which was universally intelligible, and which is always used in the holy scriptures in a sense worthy of God. Vide s. 86. Thus when it is said in the New Testament, Θεὸς ἡμῖν καταλλάττεται, the meaning is, that through Christ he withholds the expression of his displeasure, the punishment of sin. Thus Paul

uses this phraseology, 2 Cor. v. 19, and explains it by the addition *μη λογιζόμενος παραπτώματα* like the Hebrew *לֹא חֲשָׁבָה*, Psalm xxxii. 1, 2. In Rom. v. 11, he uses the phrase *καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομεν*, in the same sense—i. e., we obtain from God the forgiveness of sin. The latter passage shews clearly that *καταλλαγὴ* does not denote the *moral improvement* of men, as Eberhard, Gruner, and others explain it. On the contrary, the term always implies the idea of the *mutual reconciliation* of two parties, by which two or more who were not previously on good terms become friends again. *Καταλλαγὴ*, then, as Morus remarks, (p. 165, ad finem,) means, the *restoration of friendship, and the means of effecting this, through Christ*; and *καταλλάσσειν* is, *to bring about, or restore harmony and friendship*. This harmony does not subsist between God and men as long as men are considered as transgressors, and God is compelled to punish them as such. They do not love God as their father, and he cannot love them as his children. That they learn how to love him, and that he is able to love them, they owe to Christ. He therefore is the *peace-maker*, the restorer of friendship, *ὁ καταλλάσσειν*.

(2) *ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν, ἀφίεναι*, and the similar phrases *καθαρίζειν, χαρίζεσθαι ἁμαρτίας, πάρεσις, &c. &c.*

(a) *Explanation of these terms and of the sentiment contained in them.* *ἄφεσις* and *ἀφίεναι* are used literally to denote *release*, as from captivity, Luke, iv. 18; also remission of debt (debiti), Matt. vi. 12. Now *sin* was very frequently compared both with captivity and with debt; and hence, probably, this term was first used by the LXX. as correspondent with *לֹא חֲשָׁבָה*. This phrase was always opposed to the *inflicting of punishment*, or the *wrath of God*, and denotes *remission, forbearing to inflict punishment*; Ex. xxxiv. 7. In Mark, iii. 29, *ἔχειν ἄφεσιν* is contrasted with *ἐνοχὸς ἔστιν κρίσεως*. *To take away sin, and take away punishment*, were thus one and the same thing with the Hebrews, Is. liii. And so it comes to pass that the words which stand for *sin* also stand for *punishment*. Thus to *forgive sin*, and to *heal sickness* (*pena peccati*), were frequently the same, Matt. ix. 2, 5, 6, coll. Ps. ciii. 3.

Similar to these are the other popular terms: as, *πάρεσις*, which is, the *act of overlooking*, Rom. iii. 25. God does not *look* upon sins, he *forgets* them, does not think of them; in opposition to *thinking of them, placing them before his countenance* (Psalm xc. 8)—i. e., *punishing them*, &c. Also, *χαρίζεσθαι παραπτώματα*, Col. ii. 13, spoken of the *remission of guilt*; *ἐξαλείφειν ἁμαρτίας*, Acts, iii. 19, answering to the Hebrew *סָחַח*, Is. xliii. 25; used also by Lysias. The figure in this case is taken from an *account book*, in which the name of the debtor is obliterated

when he has paid his debt, or when it is remitted to him.

The phrases, *καθαρίζεσθαι ἀφ' ἁμαρτιῶν, παύζεσθαι, &c. &c.*, *to be purified, washed, to purify oneself*, occur very frequently. They were derived from the very common comparison of sin with stains and impurities. Hence Moses ordained purifications and washings as significant or symbolical rites. These phrases were used, first, in respect to men, and denoted self-purification (*καθ' ἑαυτὸν*),—i. e., moral reformation, 1 John, iii. 3; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Heb. x. 22; which however could not be done *independently* of God, but by his assistance; secondly, in respect to God. He is said to *purify* men from sin—i. e., to consider them as pure, innocent—not to punish them. So Ps. li. 4, "*Wash me from mine iniquities*;" 1 John, i. 9; 2 Pet. i. 9, *καθαρισμὸς τῶν πάντων ἁμαρτιῶν*.

(b) Some are not content with making the forgiveness of sins to consist in the removal of the *punishment* of sin, but would have it extend to the removal both of the *guilt* (*culpa*) and *punishment* of sin, since both belong to the *imputation of sin*. This statement, understood in a popular sense, is not objectionable; but strictly understood, it is. The established theory respecting the remission of sin has been transmitted from the time of Anselmus (s. 101, ad fin.), who brought the whole doctrine of justification into a judicial form, and arranged it like a legal process. Thus, when a thief has stolen, he must both restore the property stolen and suffer punishment. The *guilt*, in this case, is not removed by the punishment. The advocates of this opinion, therefore, comprehended under justification a special *acquittal of guilt*, different from the *acquittal of punishment*. This acquittal of guilt they considered as the *imputation of the righteousness of Christ* imputed to men by God, in the same way as if it had been wrought by them. In this way, as they thought, was the guilt of sin removed. Vide s. 115. But,

First. This distinction between the guilt and punishment of sin is never distinctly made in the Bible when the forgiveness of sins is spoken of. Some have considered this distinction as implied in the passages which speak of the *purification* or *washing away* of sins, or in which sins are compared with debts; but without sufficient reason. The Bible makes justification the mere forgiveness of sins—i. e., removal of the punishment of them; without any special *acquittal of guilt* connected with it; as Rom. vi. 7, seq. Vide s. 110, "*De obedientia Christi activa*," from which the doctrine "*De obedientia Christi passiva*" must not be separated. The obedience of Christ shewn in acting and suffering is one and the same. The fruits of this obedience we enjoy, as will be seen from the texts cited below. The Bible does not se-

parate one kind of obedience from the other; neither should we. Vide s. 115.

Secondly. The remission of the guilt of sin is not essential, and does not contribute to the real tranquillity of the sinner. The guilt of a sin once committed cannot be effaced. The conscience of the transgressor can never be made to pronounce him innocent, but will always regard him as having sinned. It is enough to compose his mind, to know and be convinced that the punishment of sin has been remitted. But how can he be made to believe, and be happy in believing, that he is innocent, when, according to the testimony of his own conscience, he is guilty.

Thirdly. The theory which teaches that the guilt of sin is removed is founded upon a comparison of the conduct of God towards men with the conduct of men among themselves, which is here entirely inapplicable. A criminal (e. g., a thief) who sins against his fellow men does them an injury. He must therefore make good their loss, besides suffering punishment. But men, by sinning, do not injure or rob God. They wrong *only themselves*. Now if men fulfil the prescribed conditions of obtaining pardon, God remits the punishment of sin; but *God himself* cannot remove the *guilt* of sin, in its proper sense. For God cannot err, and consider an action which is actually wrong, and consequently involves guilt, as *right* in itself. He, however, can forgive us, or remit the punishment which we deserve. He can regard and treat us, on certain conditions, as if we were innocent.

(3) Δικαίως, δικαιοσύνη and δικαιοῦν, λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, &c. τ. λ.

These terms of the Grecian Jews can be explained only from the Hebrew usage. דָּקָא, in Hebrew and Arabic, in its primary and physical sense, means, *rectus, firmus, rigidus fuit*; then, in a moral sense, *rectus fuit*, in various modifications, degrees, and relations—e. g., *verus et verax fuit, bonus, sc. benignus fuit; severus, æquus, JUSTUS, INNOCENS fuit, right, such as one should be*; Ps. cxliii. 2, "No man is right in the sight of God." Hence we can explain the significations of דָּקָא, δικαιοῦν, *facere justum*; and of δικαιοῦν, *feri justum*. A man may be justified in two ways—viz.,

(a) By perfect holiness, virtue, or uprightness of conduct; by being actually *just*, or *such as one should be*. Hence the phrase *to justify*, or *to consider, pronounce, treat, reward one, as right*, according to the above-mentioned sense. In this sense it is used by the LXX., Ps. cxliii. 2, οὐ δικαιοῦσεται ἐνώπιόν σου πᾶς ζῶν, and Ezek. xvi. 51, 52. This is called *justificatio interna*. In this sense it is understood, in the important passage respecting justification, Rom. v., both by Socinians, who reject the doctrine of satis-

faction, and by those of the Romish church who advocate good works as the procuring cause of salvation. But this interpretation does the greatest violence to the words in this passage.

In connexion with this meaning, δικαιοῦν sometimes signifies *emendare, probum reddere*, Psalm lxxiii. 13 (in the Septuagint), and Rev. xxii. 11, seq. Some of the schoolmen call this *justificatio physica*.

(b) One who is guilty is said to be justified when he is declared and treated as *exempt from punishment*, or *innocent*, or when the punishment of his sins is remitted to him. This is called *justificatio externa*. The terms *justification, pardon, accounting righteous*, occur in the Bible much more frequently in this sense than in any other, and so are synonymous with *forgiveness of sin*. This sense is founded on the *judicial* meaning of the word דָּקָא, *to pardon, acquit, pronounce innocent*, spoken of the Judge (דָּקָא innocens); and of the opposite, דָּמָא, *dammere, pro reo declarare* (דָּמָא, reus)—e. g., Ex. xxiii. 7; Prov. xvii. 15, seq. This is transferred to God, who is conceived as the *judge* of the actions of men. Here, however, we must be careful not to carry the comparison too far, and must abstract from our conceptions all the imperfections which belong to human conduct. He *condemns, or judges*,—i. e., he *punishes*;—*antecedens* (the part of human judges)—*pro consequente*. The opposite of this, *to acquit, pardon* (δικαιοῦν), is then *to remove punishment*. This is done, however, as the Bible everywhere teaches, not *propter justitiam internam hominis*, as at human tribunals; for no one is innocent and pure from sin; Rom. iii. 19, seq. According to the gospel, God bestows favour upon men gratuitously, on account of faith in Christ, on condition of holiness and of persevering in Christian confidence.

The principal texts which support this doctrine, and in which δικαίως and δικαιοσύνη stand in this sense, are Rom. iii., iv., v., in opposition to the Jewish doctrine of the desert of works. These passages will be examined in the following sections. In Romans, iv., the term δικαιοῦν is used ver. 5; λογίζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην, (*to pardon*, the opposite of λογίζεσθαι ἁμαρτίαν, *to punish*), ver. 6; and ἀφιέναι ἁμαρτίαν, ver. 7. In Rom. v. 9, 11, δικαιοῦν and καταλλάττεσθαι are interchanged in the same way; and δικαιοσύνη is explained by ἐλεῖς ἀπὸ ἁμαρτίας καὶ θανάτου. The words δικαιοῦν, δικαιοσύνη, are also opposed to ὀργή Θεοῦ, Rom. i. 17, 18; to κατάρσις, Rom. v. 16, 18; to ἐγκατείν, Rom. viii. 33. Cf. Storr, "De significatione vocis δικαίος in Nov. Test." Opusc. Academica, t. i.

Note.—The writings of theologians present great diversity and difficulty in determining the idea of δικαίως and δικαιοῦν. Most of the an-

cient Lutheran theologians, with whom Döderlein and Seiler agree, consider justification as being merely the *removal of punishment*; while Koppe, Zachariä, Less, Danov, and others, comprise in this idea the whole purpose of God to bless and save men, of which the removal of punishment is only the commencement. These theologians maintain that *justification* is the same as *predestination*, only that justification is the less definite word of the two. Vide Zachariä, Bibl. Theol. iv. s. 548, seq., and especially Danov, Drey Abhandlungen von der Rechtfertigung; Jena, 1777; in answer to which Seiler wrote, "Ueber den Unterschied der Rechtfertigung und Prädestination;" Erlangen, 1777, 8vo.

Those who hold the former opinion consider the conferring of good as a consequence of justification, and appeal to the obvious texts, Rom. v. 1, 18, 21; Gal. iii. 11. They remark, that exemption from punishment and bestowment of blessing are not one and the same thing, since one who is acquitted in court is not, of course, promoted and rewarded. Those who hold the latter opinion mention the fact that בָּרַךְ frequently means, *benefit, blessing, recompence*, and construe the phrase לְבָרַךְ אֱבְרָהָם לְכָל הַיּוֹם, λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, which is first spoken of the faith of Abraham, Gen. xv. 6, to mean, *to reckon as a merit, to reward*; in the same way, Psalm cvi. 31, and Romans, iv. 4, where Paul himself explains בָּרַךְ by μισθός. The declaring Abraham righteous did not consist in the simple forgiveness of his sins, but in the bestowment of blessing and reward. Cf. James, ii. 21.

The following considerations may help to settle the controversy:—

(1) The purposes of God to forgive the transgressor his sins, and to make him happy, are one and the same; but they may be distinguished in our *conceptions of them*, and then his bestowing reward is the immediate consequence of his granting forgiveness. For when God forgives one his sins, the bestowment of the promised good immediately succeeds. And when God sees one incapable of this good, he does not forgive his sins.

(2) The sacred writers do not, in their terms, so carefully distinguish and so logically divide these two ideas, which are so nearly related, as we do in scientific discussion. This is the less strange, as the words δικαιοῦν and δικαιοσύνη have very many and various senses, one of which frequently runs into the other. The words are sometimes used in the Bible *exclusive*, beyond a doubt, of the idea of *blessing*, and sometimes also *inclusive* of it.

(3) But this should not hinder us from distinguishing these ideas, and considering them separately, for the sake of clearness in scientific discussion. Here, however, as in respect to all

the divine purposes, we must guard against the idea of *succession*; and also against mistake from a comparison with human tribunals, where one may be entirely acquitted, without, however, receiving reward, or any further provision for his welfare. The accused is absolved, and then left to seek his fortune where he pleases. But this is not the manner of God. Upon every one whom he forgives, or whom he counts righteous, God immediately bestows, on the ground of faith in Jesus Christ, all the good and blessing which the subject of his grace is capable of enjoying. This is the reason why the sacred writers frequently connect these two ideas in the same word. Cf. Noesselt, Pfingstprogramm, *De eo quid sit, Deum condonare hominibus peccata, penasque remittere?* Halæ, 1792, (in his Exercitt.)

Morus (p. 151, s. 5) has therefore well defined and explained the scriptural idea of the *forgiveness of sins* in the wide sense in which it frequently occurs in the Bible, as including (1) exemption by God from the fatal consequences of sin—i. e., from fear of the suffering or punishment consequent upon sin, and from this suffering and punishment itself, (μὴ ἀπολέσθαι, John, iii.); (2) the bestowment of blessings, (ζῶην ἔχειν,) instead of this deserved punishment. For both we are indebted to Christ. The ground and motive, however, of the forgiveness of sin on the part of God is his unmerited *goodness and benevolence*. This is the uniform representation of the holy scriptures, John, iii. 16, seq. Morus, p. 152, s. 6.

SECTION CX.

ILLUSTRATION OF THE SCRIPTURAL STATEMENT
THAT MEN OWE IT TO CHRIST ALONE THAT GOD
JUSTIFIES THEM, OR FORGIVES THEIR SINS.

SINCE sin consists in transgression of the *divine law*, it is the prerogative of *God alone* to forgive sin. So the Bible everywhere teaches; Ps. li.; James, iv. 12, coll. Luke, v. 21. The gospel teaches that we are indebted for this forgiveness to Christ alone,—that God forgives on *account of Christ*. It everywhere magnifies this as one of the greatest divine favours, and as the foundation of all our blessedness; John, iii. 16; vi.; Heb. ix. 15; Rom. v. 1. Accordingly, the doctrine of forgiveness through Christ is always enumerated by the apostles among the principal doctrines and elementary principles of Christianity, which were never to be withheld in religious instruction. Vide 1 Thess. i. 10, Ἰησοῦς ὁ ὑπόμενος ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς ἐρχομένης, et alibi. The Acts of the apostles and their epistles shew that they always commenced with this doctrine, and referred everything to it, both with Jews and Gentiles, enlightened and ignorant; because it is equally essential to all.

The following classes comprise the principal proof-texts relating to this point:—

(1) The texts which declare that Christ has atoned for us; and that to procure the remission of sins was the great object of his advent to the world; and that he accomplished this object; 1 John, ii. 1, 2; Heb. i. 3, *Δι' ἐαυτοῦ καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν.* Heb. ix. 26, "He has appeared before God (*πεφανέρωται*, ver. 24) with his offering, (*διὰ θυσίας αὐτοῦ*), to take away sin, (*εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἁμαρτίας*),"—i. e., he sacrificed himself for us, he died for us, to free us from the punishment of sin, (*vide* ver. 14.)

(2) The texts which require from us an unlimited confidence (*πίστις*) in Christ, for the reason that we are indebted to him and to his person for our spiritual welfare and our acceptance with God. Acts, xxvi. 18, *λαβεῖν ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν—πίστις ἐν τῇ εἰς ἐμέ.* ii. 38; Rom. v. 1, *Θεοῦ χάρις ἐκ πίστεως, εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς Θεόν* (the favour of God and peace of mind) *διὰ Χριστοῦ*, (which we owe to Christ.) Eph. i. 7, *Ἐν ᾧ (Χριστῷ) ἔχομεν ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ αἵματος αὐτοῦ*—i. e., *τὴν ἄφεσιν παραπτωμάτων.*

(3) The texts which teach that there is no other way besides this in which the forgiveness of sin can be obtained. Heb. x. 26, "For those who apostatize, contrary to their better convictions respecting Christ (*ἐκουσίως ἁμαρτανόντων*, ver. 23; iii. 12, 13), there remains no atoning sacrifice (*θυσία περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν*),"—i. e., there is no way for them to obtain the forgiveness of their sins, since this is the only way, and this way they despise. Cf. Heb. vi. 4, seq. The discourse of Peter, Acts, iv. 12, *Οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ σωτηρία, κ. τ. λ.* *Σωτηρία*, in this passage, is *good, happiness*, here and hereafter. *This happiness can be obtained through no other person.* The name (person) of no other man under heaven is given to us for this object. *Ὄνομα* here is connected *ἐν ἀνθρώποις*, *no name among men.* The meaning is, "We are directed by God to no other man, however holy, through whom to obtain safety and happiness, besides Jesus Christ."

(4) The texts which teach clearly and expressly that God forgives men their sins, or justifies them, and frees them from the punishment of sin, solely on account of Christ. Acts, x. 43, "To him gave all the prophets witness, that whoever believes in him should through him (*διὰ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ*) receive remission of sins." (Cf. Ps. xxii. xl., cx.; Is. liii.) Acts, xiii. 38, "Διὰ τοῦτου ὁμῖν ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν καταγγέλλεται, even of those from which you could not be justified according to the law of Moses." 1 John, ii. 12, *Ἀφίενται ὑμῖν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι διὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, propter Christum.* Rom. v. 10, *Κατηλλάγημεν τῷ Θεῷ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ Υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*, coll. ver. 18, and 1 Thess. i. 10; 2 Cor. v. 21, "God treated him, who had

never sinned, as a sinner, in our stead, that we might be forgiven by God; *γενόμεθα δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* (i. e., *δίκαιοι ἐνώπιον Θεοῦ*) *ἐν αὐτῷ*," on his account, ver. 19.

But the passage which exhibits the mind of Christ and the apostles most fully and clearly is Romans, iii. 21—28. Cf. Noesselt, Abhandlung, Opusc. t. ii. Paul here opposes the prevailing mistake respecting the *merit* of good works, and of the observance of the law, and the opinion that God loved the Jews alone, and comparatively disregarded every other people. Paul shews that, on the contrary, God feels a paternal interest in *all* men, and is willing to forgive *all*, since all, as sinners, need forgiveness; but that men can never obtain a title to this forgiveness by their own imperfect obedience to the law, but only by faith in Christ, to whom they are indebted for this favour, and in a way exclusive of all personal desert. "Now (in the times of the New Testament) we are made acquainted, by the Christian doctrine, with the purpose of God to forgive us (*δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, ver. 22, 24,) without respect to the observance of the law as anything meritorious, (*χωρὶς νόμον*;) of which purpose frequent indications appear even in the Old Testament. This is God's purpose to forgive men, on account of their faith in Jesus Christ, without their own desert. This forgiveness is extended to all (Jews and Gentiles) who believe in Christ. *All* are sinners, unworthy of the divine favour, and deserving of punishment. But God, in the exercise of his impartial, paternal love, desires to make all men happy, and accordingly intends this to be the means of the happiness of *all*. But this forgiveness is bestowed upon them without their *deserving* it, (*δωρεάν*), from the mere *mercy* (*χάρις*) of God, through the atonement of Christ. God hath appointed Christ to be an atoning sacrifice, (*ἱλαστήριον*), or a propitiator *through faith in his blood*, (i. e., God forgives us on his account, if we place our whole reliance upon his death, endured for our good.) He now indulgently forgives us our past sins, (committed before our conversion to Christ; cf. Heb. ix. 15.) He now shews (in these times of the New Testament) how merciful he is to *all* men, by forgiving (*δικαιοῦντα*) every one (Jew or Gentile) who believes in Jesus Christ, (*τὸν ἐκ πίστεως*.)"

The question arises, *how* and *by what means* has Christ procured for us pardon from God, or the forgiveness of sins?

We find many clear declarations upon this point in the discourses of Jesus himself, especially in the Gospel of John, where he frequently speaks of his death, and of the worth and advantages of it; John, iii. 14; Matt. xxvi. We find passages of the same kind even in the discourses of John the Baptist, John, i. 29; and in

the prophecies to which Christ appeals as referring to himself; Ps. xxii., xl.; Is. liii. But this doctrine is more clearly explained, developed, and applied in the instructions of the apostles. While Christ was visibly upon the earth, he laid the foundation for this doctrine, but left it for his disciples to make a more full development and application of this, as well as of many other doctrines, after his sufferings and death should have become facts which had already taken place. That the views which they give upon this subject did not originate merely in the conceptions then prevalent among the Jews and heathen, but are exactly suited to the universal necessities of man, is clear from s. 108.

But there have always been some in the Christian church, and many in modern times, to whom this doctrine, so clearly taught in the New Testament, has been offensive, as it was formerly to many Jews and heathen; 1 Cor. i. 2. And so they endeavour to give a different view from that given in the New Testament of the nature of the benefits which Christ has conferred upon the human race, confining them to his *doctrine*, and the results of it. So Socinus, and many of the same opinion in other parties. Sometimes they endeavour to deduce their opinions by a forced interpretation from the Bible. Sometimes they hold that the subject should not be definitely stated, at least in popular discourse,—that it is sufficient to say, in general, *we obtain forgiveness of sin through Christ, or through faith in Christ*, leaving every one to understand this statement in his own way. But the meaning of this indefinite phraseology must certainly be explained in theological instruction. Should it, then, be withheld from the people? and is it honest to refer the common people and the young to the holy scriptures by the language employed, and at the same time to teach them something widely different from what is contained in the Bible? If the conscience of any one does not pronounce such conduct inexcusable, he should renounce the idea of being a Christian teacher. The question here is not, how the doctrine may be understood by learned men, judging independently of the authority of Revelation, but how the doctrine is taught in the New Testament? Since this book lies at the foundation of religious knowledge, the doctrines and ideas which it contains should be explained, and in a way which will be intelligible to those who hear. And considering how adapted to the wants of man the scriptural doctrine of forgiveness is, what a powerful influence it exerts, how much it does to tranquillize the mind, to purify and elevate the character, it would be an act of rashness and cruelty to destroy the faith of men in it, and to rob them of a belief in place of which nothing can be sub-

stituted at once so plain to the reason, so beneficial to the character, and so consoling to the heart.

The Bible ascribes the forgiveness which is procured for us by Christ principally to the following points—viz., (1) his *sufferings* and violent *death*; which is often called, according to the Hebrew idiom, *αἷμα Χριστοῦ* and *σῶματός*. This is the principal thing. In connexion with this it places (2) his *resurrection*, and (3) his *intercession*. On these grounds God justifies or forgives men. These three parts will therefore be separately considered. S. 111, 112.

Note.—We should not stop with one of these particulars, and overlook the rest. The resurrection of Christ, according to the New Testament, assures us of the validity of his atonement; and his intercession imparts a deep conviction that, although he has ascended into the heavens, he is still mindful of us, and cares for our welfare. These three points together compose the entire *meritum Christi*. Persons are said *mereri*, or, *bene mereri de aliquo*, when they assist another to obtain possession of any advantage. Sometimes these advantages themselves, which are obtained by the assistance of a benefactor, are called *merita*. But the custom of the schools, ever since the time of the schoolmen, has been, to call the *death* of Christ, so far as we are indebted to it for pardon and eternal happiness, the *meritum Christi*, by way of eminence; meaning that we owe these spiritual blessings to the death of Christ, without denying that he has deserved well of the human race in other ways. Considering that this phraseology has now become established in systematic theology, Morus (p. 171, 172, s. 5) justly thinks that it should be preserved, as a deviation from it might produce confusion.

SECTION CXI.

OF THE SUFFERINGS AND DEATH OF CHRIST; HOW FAR WE ARE INDEBTED TO THEM FOR OUR JUSTIFICATION OR PARDON; TOGETHER WITH OBSERVATIONS ON SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL ATTRIBUTES (AFFECTIONES) OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST.

We shall adhere, in this place, simply to the doctrine and representations of the New Testament, and hereafter (s. 114) treat of the various explanations which have been given in later times of this doctrine, and of the various ecclesiastical opinions DE SATISFACTIONE.

I. *The Sufferings and Death of Christ; and how far men are indebted to them for their Justification or Forgiveness.*

By the sufferings and death of Christ, according to the scriptures, many objects and ends which God had in view were attained, and they

may therefore be considered in various lights, all of which are important and full of instruction. Thus the death of Christ furnishes a proof of the great love of God and of Christ to us. It is an example of the greatest steadfastness, confidence in God, and patience, &c. And these views of it are often presented in the New Testament, but by no means the most frequently. The sufferings and death of Christ are mainly considered as the *ground or procuring-cause* of our forgiveness and of our spiritual welfare. "All men are sinners, and consequently deserving of punishment. The ground on which God pardons them, or forgives their sin, is the *sufferings and death of Christ, or his blood shed for them*. He endured the misery which we should have endured as the penalty of sin, in order that we might be saved from deserved punishment." Such is the uniform doctrine of the Bible, the reason and object of it are plain from what was remarked in s. 108. Without this doctrine the Bible is not consistent. Our forgiveness, then, does not depend upon our *reformation and holiness*, by which we deserve nothing from God, (Gal. ii. 21;) but upon the *death of Christ*, of which our holiness is the result. The death of Christ is the *antecedent*, our holiness the *consequent*.

This doctrine is briefly and summarily taught in the following passages, part of which have been already explained, and the remainder of which will be hereafter; viz., Matt. xxvi. 28; Rom. iii. 25; v. 8, 9; Eph. i. 7; Heb. ix. 12, 15, 28; 1 John, i. 7.

The *death* of Christ, however, is not here mentioned, exclusively of his other sufferings. Vide s. 95. All together constitute that which Paul calls the *ἵπασις* of Christ, Rom. v. 19, because he endured them from obedience to God, Phil. ii. 8. Theologians call them all *obedientia passiva*. But death, especially a violent death, most deeply moves our sensibilities, and comprises, as we regard it, the sum and substance of all other sufferings and punishments. For this reason the New Testament makes more frequent mention of the *death, blood, and cross* of Christ.

The following passages clearly and distinctly teach that Christ has effected the deliverance of man from the deserved punishment of sin, by means of his sufferings and violent death—viz.,

(1) The texts which teach that Christ suffered or died *for* all sinners, or *for* all the sins of men; διὰ (παρὰ) τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, περὶ (πολλῶν), but more commonly ὑπὲρ (ἁμαρτιῶν or παντῶν or ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν), Hebrew, *ḥy*. E. g., Matt. xxvi. 28, "The blood shed for many, for the remission of sins." Rom. iv. 25; v. 6; 1 Cor. xv. 3; 2 Cor. v. 14, 15; 1 Pet. iii. 18; Is. liii. 5, seq.

It has been objected against this proof, that

to do a thing *ὑπὲρ τίνος*, sometimes means simply to do it *for the good of any one*, to instruct him, improve him, or to give him an example. So Col. i. 24, where Paul speaks of his sufferings *for the good of (ὑπὲρ)* the Colossians and of the whole Christian church, because he was persecuted by his enemies, and then imprisoned at Rome. But the sense even here is, "he congratulates himself that he can undergo in his own person what would otherwise have befallen the whole church; while the general hatred lights upon him, others escaped." When now this phraseology is used in the New Testament with reference to Christ, it never means that he died to *teach men*, &c.; but always, *instead, in the place of men, to deliver them*. He suffered what we should have suffered; endured the penalty of the law, which we should have endured. This is confirmed by the passage Is. liii., from which these terms are so frequently borrowed in the New Testament. And this is decisively proved by the passage Rom. v. 6, where it is said that *Christ died for (ὑπὲρ) sinners*. This cannot mean that by his death he gave men an example of firmness, or sought to reform them. For in ver. 7, we read, "There are but few instances among men (like that of Damon and Pythias) of one dying for an *innocent* friend; and indeed the examples are rare of one dying (as Peter was *willing* to do *ὑπὲρ* Χριστοῦ, John, xiii. 37) even for a *benefactor*, (ἀγαθός.) But there is no example of one dying for rebels and criminals, to rescue them from the death which they deserved, and yet so did Christ die for us." Paul could not have expressed his meaning more clearly. Accordingly, he says, 2 Cor. v. 14, "Did one (Christ) die for all, then were all dead."

Further; if this phraseology meant nothing more than is contended for by the objector, it might be used with reference to the death of the apostles and other martyrs. But this is never the case in the New Testament. No one of them is ever said to have died for the world, for sinners, or sin. It is said respecting Christ exclusively, ὅτι—εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανε, 2 Cor. v. 14, 15, coll. 1 Cor. i. 13, "Was Paul crucified for (ὑπὲρ) you?"

The meaning, then, of the phraseology, "Christ suffered *for us*, or *in our place*," is this: "Since Christ suffered for our sins, we ourselves are freed from the necessity of enduring the punishment which they deserved. It is the same as if we had ourselves endured this punishment; and therefore it need no longer be feared." The epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, and Hebrews, are full of texts of this import. Cf. Morus, p. 151, and Storr, *Doctrina Christ.* p. 254.

(2) The texts which teach that Christ was treated as a sinner; and this in our stead, that

we might be considered as forgiven by God. 2 Cor. v. 21, where ἁμαρτία or ἁμαρτωλὸν ποιεῖν, is, *to treat one as a sinner, to punish him*; as the opposite δίκαιον ποιεῖν or δικαιοῦν is *to treat as innocent, to forgive*. Jesus was treated in this way ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, which is explained by what follows, "that we, on Christ's account, might be treated by God as just or innocent"—i. e., might be saved from deserved punishment; γινώμεθα δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ—i. e., δίκαιοι ἐνώπιον Θεοῦ. So also Gal. iii. 13, "Christ hath redeemed us (who as sinners must fear the threatenings of the law) from the threatened punishment of the law (κατὰ νόμον), γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατὰ νόμον," for ἐπικατάρατος, (as in ver. 10;)—i. e., by enduring for us a cruel capital punishment, (to which, according to the law of Moses, only the grossest offenders were liable.) Cf. Isaiah, liii. 4—6, from which the apostles frequently borrow these and similar expressions.

(3) With the passages already cited belong those which teach that Christ *took upon himself* and *bore* the sins of men—i. e., endured the punishment which men would have endured for their sins. In Hebrew the phrase is נָשָׂא, or לָבַשׁ; in the Septuagint and the New Testament, φέρειν or αἰρεῖν ἁμαρτίας. It occurs in the text, Is. liii. 4, which is always referred by the New Testament to Christ. Also John, i. 29; 1 Pet. ii. 24; Heb. ix. 28, &c. Some would render φέρειν or αἰρεῖν ἁμαρτίαν by *auferre peccatum, to make men virtuous, to reform them in a moral respect*. The only passage in the New Testament in which the phrase will bear this interpretation is 1 John, iii. 5, where it is equally capable of the other rendering. The phrase commonly has the meaning first given, and a different interpretation does the greatest violence to the passages in which it occurs; the comparison being so clearly derived from *sacrifices*.

But what is the origin of this signification of the term? In the Old Testament, sin is frequently compared with a *burden* which *oppresses* any one, and which he is compelled to *carry*, when he feels the unpleasant consequences of sin, or is punished. So in Arabic, *to bear one's own or another's burden*. Hence the phrase was used in reference (a) to the *victim*, which was sacrificed for the atonement of sin. The victim was supposed to have the sin or punishment *laid upon it*; Lev. xvi. 21, 22. (b) In reference to *men*; and *first*, to such as were punished for their own sins, Lev. xx. 19; xxiv. 15; and, *secondly*, to such as were punished on account of the *sins of others*, Lam. v. 7, "We must bear the sins of our fathers." Ezek. xviii. 20; also, Is. liii., "The punishment *lies* on him; he *bears* our sins." This sense holds in the passages cited from the New Testament. John, i. 29, "Behold the (sacrificial) lamb acceptable to

God, which *bears* the sins of the world!"—a comparison drawn from sacrifices. This comparison is inapplicable, according to the other interpretation—the Lamb which makes us pious and virtuous. In Heb. ix., the figure implied in προσερχεῖς is taken from sacrifices. In 1 Pet. ii. 24, the two ideas are distinguished; first, "he bore our sins on the cross," (i. e., suffered on the cross the punishment of our sins;) then, "that we might die to sin (spiritually), and live wholly to holiness, (δικαιοσύνη.)"

(4) The passages which teach that the death of Christ was a *ransom* for us, (λύτρον, ἀντί-λυτρον,) 1 Tim. ii. 6, and even in the discourse of Christ, Matt. xx. 28. The term λύτρον denotes anything by which one is *freed, delivered*, Vide s. 106, II. The meaning of the proposition, then, is this: *The death of Christ was the means of delivering and rescuing us from the greatest misery, from the punishment of sin*; or, according to Heb. ix. 12, "Christ, αἰώνιον λύτρον ἐνράμενος, effected our eternal liberation from misery and punishment;" Is. xliii. 3, 4.

(5) All the texts which compare the death of Christ with the sacrifices and Levitical ordinances of the Old Testament; also the texts which teach that the death of Christ obtained, *once for all*, and in a far more perfect manner, the advantages which men had hoped to obtain from their sacrifices and expiatory rites. This doctrine was indeed founded in the ideas prevalent at that period, and was particularly evident and convincing to the Jews then living, and to such of the heathen nations as were accustomed to the rites of sacrifice. But it was by no means intended for such exclusively; since it is also founded in a feeling which is universal among men, that some means of atonement are necessary; s. 108. The apostles, therefore, in their instructions to *Jews, heathen, and Christians*, derive their expressions and comparisons from *sacrifices*, and only in their instructions to *Jews*, from the particular services of the Mosaic ritual.

The idea which lies at the foundation of this comparison is this: "*Christ by his death liberated us from death*" (punishment of sin), which we should have suffered; and we should see in him (a) what dreadful consequences our sins incur, and (b) how gracious God is, in forgiving us for the sake of Christ." Ephes. v. 2, παρέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν· Θεῷ προσφορὰν, θυσίαν, ὁσμην ἐνωδίας. Romans, iii. 25, (ἱλαστήριον.) Heb. ix. 7, 11—29; x. 1—14; Acts, xiii. 38, &c. Hence the term αἷμα (*cædes cruenta*), which so frequently stands for the death of Christ, is to be understood in its full sense. It frequently stands in such a connexion as shews that the figure is derived from the blood of the sacrificial victim, and from the qualities ascribed to it—e. g., Heb. ix. 13, 14, αἷμα ταύρων καὶ τράγων, in opposition to αἷμα Χριστοῦ—καθαριεῖ. 1 John, i. 7, "The

blood of Christ *cleanses*," &c. 1 Pet. i. 19, "The blood of Christ, a *lamb without spot or blemish*."

Taking all these texts together, there is no room to doubt that the apostles entertained the opinions respecting the death of Christ, and its effect, which were ascribed to them at the commencement of this section. These opinions have been shewn (s. 108), not only to correspond with the particular circle of ideas with which they were familiar at that period, but to meet a universal necessity of man. This is a necessity, indeed, which is but little felt by the learned, and least of all by the merely speculative scholar. Vide 1 Cor. i.—iii.

II. Universality, and Perfect and Perpetual Validity of the Atonement.

(1) Its *universality*. Two points must here be noticed.

First. According to the clear testimony of the Bible, Christ endured death for the *whole human race*; 2 Cor. v. 14, 15, *ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων*. Ver. 19, "God reconciled the *world* to himself through Christ." 1 Tim. ii. 6, *δοὺς ἑαυτὸν ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων*. 1 John, ii. 2, "He is the propitiator, not only for our sins, (i. e., those of Christians,) but also for the sins *ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου*," &c. But the passages which are most explicit upon this subject are found in the epistle to the Romans, where Paul controverts the mistaken opinion of the Jews that the blessings of the Messiah's kingdom belong exclusively to the posterity of Abraham. He shews, Romans, v. 12—19, that as one man was the author of sin in the world, and of the consequent punishment which *all* now endure, so one man is the author of salvation and forgiveness for *all*. In Romans, iii. 9, 22, he shews that as the moral disease is universal among men, the remedy must needs be universal; and, in ver. 29, that the benevolence of God is not confined to a small portion, but embraces the whole family of man.

In such passages of the New Testament, the term *πολλοί* or *οἱ πολλοί* frequently stands for *πάντες*. E. g., Rom. v. 19, *οἱ πολλοί* stands for *all men* who are obnoxious to punishment and need forgiveness; as it reads ver. 12, 18. The same in ver. 15. Cf. Matt. xx. 28; xxvi. 28; 1 Cor. x. 33, &c. The Hebrews used the word *רבים* in the same way, Is. liii. 12. *All* involves the idea of *many*, and hence in the ancient languages the words which signify *many* are often used to denote *universality*—so *many!* such a *multitude!* This was the case especially where only one was pointed out in contrast to the many; *one* for so *many!*

Note.—The question has been asked, *whether Christ died for the ungodly*. The strict particularists and predestinarians answered this ques-

tion in the negative, on the ground that the death of Christ does not actually secure the salvation of the wicked, and is of no advantage to them. But because some, by their own fault, derive no advantage from the death of Christ, we cannot say that the death of Christ does not concern them, and that Christ did not die for them, any more than we can say that divine instruction has no power in itself to reform mankind, because many will not allow themselves to be reformed by it. Moreover, this opinion is inconsistent with the New Testament. In 2 Pet. ii. 1, the false teachers and deceivers, whom a dreadful destruction awaited, are said expressly *to deny the Lord who bought* (redeemed) *them*. Misunderstanding and logomachy may be obviated by attending to the just remark of the schoolmen, that the *design* of the death of Christ, and the *actual results* of it, should be distinguished. *Actu primo*, Christ died for all men; but *actu secundo*, not for all men, but only for believers—i. e., according to the purpose of God, all might be exempted from punishment and rendered happy by the death of Christ; but all do not suffer this purpose actually to take effect with regard to themselves; and only believers actually attain to this blessedness.

Secondly. Christ removed the *whole* punishment of sin; his death atoned for *all* sins. So the apostles declare. 1 John, i. 7, "The blood of Christ cleanses from *all* sin." Romans, v. 16; viii. 1, *οὐδὲν κατάκριμα τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ*, Acts, xiii. 38, &c. But an apparent difficulty is here suggested, which must be answered from the discussion respecting punishments, (s. 86, 87,) and can therefore only be touched here.

Now there are two kinds of punishments—viz., *natural*, such as flow from the nature and character of the moral action itself, (e. g., debility and disease from luxurious excess;) and *positive*, such as do not result directly from the nature and character of the moral action, but are connected with it by the free will of the lawgiver. God actually threatens to inflict such positive punishments upon the wicked, especially in the future world; just as he promises, on the other hand, to bestow positive rewards in the future world upon the righteous, s. 87. Again; the natural punishments of sin are of two kinds—viz., (a) *physical*, as sickness in consequence of immoderation; and (b) *moral* (by far the worst!), such as disquiet of mind, remorse of conscience, and dread of God; s. 86, II. 2.

Now, has Christ redeemed us from all these punishments? Those who mean to speak strictly and logically reply, *no!* Christ has redeemed us, properly speaking, only from *positive* divine punishments in the future world, and from that kind of *natural* punishments which may be called *moral*, or the evil results of sin in a moral respect.

Even the man who is reformed still retains the consciousness of the sins which he has committed, and reflects upon them with sorrow, shame, and regret. But the pardoned sinner knows that God, for Christ's sake, has forgiven his sins; and so is no longer subject to that disquiet of mind, pain of conscience, dread of God and despair—the *pœna moralis* of sin, which render the wicked miserable.

The *physical* part of natural punishment indeed remains, even after the transgressor is reformed. If any one, by his extravagance, has made himself sick and poor, he will not, in consequence of being pardoned and renewed, become well and prosperous. The physical consequences of sin continue, not only through the present life, but probably through the life to come. They can be obviated only by a *miraculous* interference of God, which is nowhere promised. But these very physical consequences of sin, whose evil is so lasting, are like a bitter medicine; they have a good effect, and secure us from turning again from the right path. Although one who is pardoned has therefore no right to expect that the physical evils resulting from his transgression will be counteracted by his being subsequently forgiven, yet he may hope, both from what has now been said and from common experience, that these evils will be very much diminished, will lose the terror of punishment, and contribute to his good. Such is the case exactly with bodily death.

The same truth is taught in the Bible, not indeed in a scientific manner, which would be unintelligible to men at large, but in the popular manner, in which it should always be taught. (1) The Bible never says that Christ has entirely removed the physical evils which naturally result from sin. (2) When the sacred writers say that *Christ suffered punishment for us*, they mean principally the *positive* punishment, from which he has liberated us by his sufferings and death. Vide s. 87, No. 2. They also teach, (3) That one who trusts in Christ can take courage, can love God and confide in him without dreading his anger, and without distressing himself in view of his past guilt, which is now forgiven him for the sake of Christ. The remission of the *moral* punishments which naturally flow from sin is thus set forth in a manner which ought to be followed by the public teacher. Vide s. 109, ad finem. (4) But the terms *pardon* and *forgiveness* of sin are frequently used in the New Testament in a wider sense, comprehending all the divine favours which the pardoned receive from God; they denote the whole amount of the *blessedness*—the *salvation*—which the pardoned enjoy. Vide s. 109, Note. If, therefore, (5) the natural physical consequences of past sins are not removed, they still lose their severity; they are rendered mild and in many

respects beneficial; they are vastly overbalanced by the various blessings bestowed, and thus cease, in their actual effects, to be punishments. The holy scriptures, therefore, declare with truth, that the blood of Christ atones for *all* sins. Cf. the programm of Noesselt, above cited.

Note.—Theologians have been divided on the question, whether the apostles held that the sins committed before Christ, or during the Old-Testament dispensation, were forgiven by God on account of the atonement to be afterwards made. Doederlein and others take the negative side. They say that the ἀπὸ τοῦ προγεγονότος ἁμαρτημάτων, Rom. iii. 25, may denote the remission of the sins which the Jews and Gentiles of that age had committed before their conversion to Christianity. The παραβάνεις ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ, Heb. ix. 15, may be understood in the same way, or may denote the sins which were irremissible during the Old-Testament dispensation. Vide ver. 9. But the context of this passage is more favourable to the common interpretation.

Besides, the affirmative of this question is supported, (1) By the whole analogy of scripture. The Jews of that age agree with Christ and the apostles in teaching that men of the earliest times hoped for the Messiah—that the divine ordinances of the former dispensation referred to him, and pointed him out—and that all the pious of antiquity confided in him. Vide John, viii. 56; Luke, x. 24; 1 Pet. i. 10, 11. Cf. s. 90. (2) By the passage, Heb. ix. 26, where this doctrine is plainly implied. "God appointed that Christ should suffer and die for *all* sins, and *once* for *all*. Otherwise, it would have been necessary that he should suffer more than once (πολλάκις) from the beginning of the world; since there were always sinners in the world." This plainly involves the sentiment that Christ died for the men who lived before him. The opinion of Læffler and other modern writers, that pardon through the death of Christ related only to the new converts from Judaism and heathenism is entirely false and contradictory to the New Testament. Vide Gal. iii. 21, seq.; Romans, i. 18, seq., coll. 1 Thess. i. 10; John, iii. 13—16; Romans, v. 18, 19; and especially 1 John, ii. 1, 2.

(3) The other attribute of the atoning death of Christ is, its *permanent* and *perfect validity*, (*perennitas, perennis valor meriti Christi*.)

This doctrine is held in opposition to those who believe that the expiatory sacrifice of Christ is not valid and sufficient for the atonement of some particular sins, and who therefore seek for other means of obtaining pardon, such as penances and satisfactions. This opinion has not only prevailed in modern times, especially since the middle ages, throughout the whole body of the Romish church, but former-

ly, though in different forms, even in the times of the apostles, among Jews and Gentiles. Vide s. 108, No. I. Paul therefore shews, especially in his epistle to the Hebrews, that Christ had sacrificed himself *once for all* (ἅπαξ) for all sins, and that now no more sacrifices, penances, and expiations are necessary for men. Heb. vii. 27, Τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἐφάπαξ, ἑαυτὸν ἀνενέγκας. Heb. ix. 25, 26—28, “He appeared at the close of this age, ἅπαξ εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἁμαρτίας; and then ἅπαξ προσερχθεὶς εἰς τὸ πολλῶν ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας. So also, x. 14, μὴ προσφορᾷ τετελείωκεν εἰς τὸ διυλεῖν τοὺς ἁγιαζομένους. Accordingly, Christ is said, ix. 11, by his once entering into the heavens, to have procured *eternal redemption*, (αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν.)

SECTION CXII

OF THE INFLUENCE WHICH THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST, AND HIS SUBSEQUENT EXALTATION AND INTERCESSION, HAVE UPON OUR FORGIVENESS OR JUSTIFICATION.

It was observed (s. 110, *ad finem*) that the New Testament points to three particulars in the justification procured for us by Christ. The first of these, the death of Christ, was considered, s. 111. We come now to treat of the two remaining particulars.

I. The Influence of the Resurrection and Exaltation of Christ upon our Justification.

We have before examined (s. 37) what is uniformly taught in the Bible respecting the resurrection of Christ, and the great importance of this event, and all this is here presupposed. The resurrection of Christ is mentioned, in connexion with our justification, with the most distinctness in the two following texts—viz., 2 Cor. v. 15, “Christians should not live for their own pleasure (ἑαυτοῖς ζῆν), but for the honour of Christ, and according to his will, τῷ ἐνερ αὐτῶν ἀποθανόντι καὶ ἔγερθέντι” (sc. ἐνερ αὐτῶν); and Rom. iv. 25, “He died (according to the divine purpose) διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν, ἡ γέρθη διὰ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἡμῶν.”

What is meant by his being raised for our justification must be gathered from other passages. 1 Pet. i. 3, “God has made us, by means of Christianity, reformed men (*born again*), that we might cherish a firm hope (εἰς ἐλπίδα ζώσαν, sc. of future happiness, ver. 4), through the resurrection of Christ. 1 Pet. i. 21, “God has raised Christ and rewarded him with glory (the state of exaltation in the heavens), that he—the risen and glorified Christ—might be your confidence and hope in God”—i. e., that you should consider him as the person to whom alone you are indebted for the confidence which you now are enabled to repose in God. 1 Cor. xv. 17, “If Christ were not risen, then the con-

fidence (πίστις) which you feel in him would be vain; ἔτι ἐστὶ ἐν ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν”—i. e., you could not be certain of that forgiveness which you now hope to obtain from God through Christ. Cf. Rom. viii. 34.

From these passages taken together we can easily gather the relation and connexion in which the resurrection and exaltation of Christ stand to our justification and forgiveness. The resurrection of Christ, then, cannot be considered to have any desert *in itself alone*, nor can it be supposed, *separately considered*, to have freed us from the punishment of sin. But, according to the Bible, the resurrection of Christ and his subsequent reward in heaven give attestation and confirmation to all that he *taught* and *suffered*. For since God raised and rewarded Christ, we must conclude that *He* fully approved of everything which Jesus taught and performed—and that Christ must have accomplished His designs. Did Christ suffer and die with the intention of liberating us from the punishment of sin, we may be sure, since his resurrection and exaltation, that he fully attained this object, and that we can now through him lay claim to reward and eternal happiness. This is what Peter means by *πίστις καὶ ἐλπίς ἡμῶν*. In the passage cited from 1 Cor., Paul means to say, that if Christ were not risen, we might be led to suspect that he had not performed what he promised and undertook to perform.

We are now prepared to understand the meaning of the declaration in the Epistle to the Romans, ἡ γέρθη εἰς δικαιοσύνην ἡμῶν—viz., *in order to afford us certainty of our forgiveness*, of which we could have no certainty if Christ had remained in the grave. Vide Acts, xiii. 37, 38. Accordingly, the resurrection and exaltation (δόξα, as Peter has it), of Christ are the *confirmation* and *assurance* of our justification, while the sufferings and death of Christ are properly the *procuring* cause of it.

II. The Influence of the Intercession of Christ upon our Justification.

(1) Sketch of the history of this doctrine.

Many theologians, and some of the ecclesiastical fathers, represent intercession as a continued external action of Christ, different from his atonement, by which blessings are not only *imparted* to us, but likewise *procured* for us. Among the fathers who held this opinion were Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory the Great, Paulus of Aquilia, and others; among modern theologians, Calvin, and of the Lutheran church, Chemnitz, Baumgarten, and others. These writers regard the intercession of Christ as a distinct work performed by him in his state of exaltation in heaven. They have very different conceptions, however, respecting the manner of this work, some of which are very gross. Many

of them contended for an *intercessio verbalis*—e. g., Cyprian and Augustine; and their opinion was adopted in the Romish church. Accordingly, Luther renders *ἐντυγχάνει*, Heb. vii. 25, “*Er bittet für sie*,” (*he prays for them*.) So Petavius, Hollaz, Quenstedt, and many others, among the Lutherans. They also differ widely from one another respecting the nature, object, and continuance of this intercession. Some consider it as belonging to the sacerdotal office, in which case the comparison is drawn from the Jewish high priest in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Nothing definite upon the subject appears in the symbols, except in the Augsburg Confession; and even there no distinct explanation is given.

Another theory, which entirely divests the subject of its material dress, and which has therefore been more generally approved in modern times, was first distinctly stated by Philip Limborch, the Arminian theologian, and by Musæus in the seventeenth century. They consider the intercession of Christ to be merely the relation in which he, in his state of exaltation, stands to sinners, as their Redeemer, and not as a continued action, by which he still promotes the welfare of men, and by which salvation is still *procured* for them. The same opinion is found in Ballhorn's dissertation, *De intercessione Christi sacerdotali*, (among Walch's *Vorsätze*;) Göttingen, 1774. This opinion, however, does not exactly correspond with the doctrine of the Bible.

(2) *Explanation of the texts relating to this subject, and an elucidation of the ideas contained in them.* These texts are—

(a) 1 John, ii. 1. “When a Christian has committed sin, (let him not despair of pardon, but encourage himself with the thought, that) we have *παράκλητον πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*, in Jesus, the righteous.” Here *παράκλητος* is, *patronus, advocate, defender*, (*Fürsprecher*, Luther.) This name is given by Philo to the ministers and favourites at court, who promise to any one the favour of the king; and also to the high priest, the expiator of the people. Vide Programm, *De Christo et Spiritu Sancto paracletis*, in “*Scripta varii argumenti*,” Num. iv. In this respect it is that Christ is called *Παράκλητος*. He is our *expiator*, *ἱλασμός περὶ ἡμαρτιῶν*, ver. 2. Accordingly, the meaning of this passage is, that since Christ is exalted to heaven, and while he continues there, we may be firmly convinced that God will be gracious to us, and for Christ's sake will remit the punishment of our sins; and that Christ, in his state of exaltation, continues without intermission his cares for the welfare of men.

(b) Rom. viii. 34. Here Paul says, “No one can condemn (*κατακρίνειν*) the friends of God, (Christians.) They are exempt from punish-

ment. Christ died for them; and indeed, (what might add to their comfort,) had risen again, was seated on the right hand of God, *ὁς καὶ ἐν-τυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*, (*vertritt uns*, Luther.) *Ἐν-τυγχάνειν*, joined with the dative, means *occurrere alicui*; then, *adire, convenire alicui*, Acts, xxv. 24; joined with *κατὰ* (*τίνος*), *accusare*; Rom. xi. 2; with *ὑπὲρ* (*τίνος*), *medium se alterius causa interponere*, to interpose in behalf of one, to intercede for him; as here, *intercedere pro aliquo, deprecari, causam alicujus agere*. From this text it does not appear that this intercession was performed by words. The principal idea is, “Christ is now, as it were, our patron with God; his being with God in heaven gives us the consoling assurance that through him we are for ever reconciled with God and freed from the punishment of sin; and that, as the advocate and patron of the pious, Christ still prosecutes in heaven his labours for their welfare.”

(c) Heb. vii. 25, seq. Here the case is the same. “Christ (being an eternal high priest) can for ever bless (*σῶζειν εἰς τὸ παντελές*) all those who seek the favour of God through his mediation, since he ever lives *εἰς τὸ ἐντυγχάνειν*”—i. e., since Christ ever lives with God in heaven we can always be sure of forgiveness and of every divine blessing; for he is not in heaven in vain, but even there continues to be engaged for our welfare. The phrase *intercessio sacerdotalis* is taken from this passage; for the figure here, as in the whole chapter, is borrowed from the Jewish high priest, who on the great day of atonement entered into the most holy place and made expiation for the sins of the people, (*pro populo intercedebat apud Deum*.) He did not do this, however, by words (he spake no word, vide Ex. xxviii. and Lev. xvii.), but by action—namely, by offering the blood of the victim. The object of this comparison, then, is to shew that Christ performs with God in the heavenly world what the Jewish high priest did yearly for the people upon the earth. It refers, then, both to the permanent validity of the atonement of Christ, and to his continued labours in heaven for the salvation of men. Respecting this figure, cf. Morus, p. 155, seq.

(d) Heb. ix. 24—a parallel passage, which confirms the above explanation. “Christ did not enter into an earthly temple, like the Jewish high priest, but into heaven itself, *νῦν ἐμφανισθῆναι τῷ προσώπῳ Θεοῦ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*”—the very phrase applied to the high priest when he presented to God, in the temple, the blood of atonement for the people. It means, therefore, “in order to procure for us a firm assurance of being expiated, or of forgiveness of our sins, and of the enjoyment of all the spiritual blessings connected with forgiveness.”

The intercession of Christ before God in the

heavenly world denotes, then, both the lasting and perfect validity and efficacy of his atonement, of which we obtain consoling assurance by his abiding with God in his state of exaltation, and also the continued wakeful care which Jesus Christ exercises in heaven over his followers on the earth. In short, the intercession of Christ is one of the chief employments which Christ prosecutes in heaven in his state of exaltation, as the King and Patron of men, and especially of the Christian church, and its individual members; s. 98. He is our Paracletus and Patron, therefore, not merely in respect to what he formerly did for men while upon the earth, but also in respect to the efforts which he still continues to make for our welfare.

The Bible nowhere teaches that this *intercession* consists in *words*. But considering that Christ must still be regarded as a man, though in heaven, there is no objection to representing the thing under the figure of actual intercession. In brief, Christ does for us all and more than could be done among men through verbal intercession, or other kinds of interposition, by a powerful human advocate. The passage, Heb. xii. 24, may here be compared: "The blood of Christ speaks better (for us) than the blood of Abel." The blood of Abel cried to God for vengeance upon Cain. The death of Christ moves God, not to punish, but to bless and forgive.

SECTION CXIII.

THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF PARDON OR JUSTIFICATION THROUGH CHRIST, AS AN UNIVERSAL AND UNMERITED FAVOUR OF GOD.

I. The Universality of this Benefit.

It is universal as the atonement itself. Vide s. 111, II. If the atonement extends to the whole human race, justification must also be universal—i. e., all must be able to obtain the actual forgiveness of their sins and blessedness on account of the atonement of Christ. But in order to obviate mistakes, some points may require explanation. Justification, then, is *universal*,

(1) In respect to the *persons to be pardoned*.

All men, according to the Bible, may partake of this benefit. It was designed for all. Vide especially Rom. iii. 23; v. 15; s. 111, in opposition to Jewish exclusiveness. It is bestowed, however, *conditionally*; certain conditions are prescribed which are indispensable. Those who do not comply with these conditions are excluded from the enjoyment of the benefit. Justification and forgiveness are not, therefore, universal in effect (*actu*), and this *solely* through the fault of men.*

Another conclusion from the universality of justification is, that every one may be *sure* of his forgiveness. This certainty, however, must not be founded upon inward *feelings*, which are frequently deceptive, but upon an actual compliance with the conditions on which God will forgive sins. If any one finds in himself the signs of true faith, of sincere love to God and Christ, of a renewed heart, and of a virtuous, Christian disposition, he is justified. Romans, viii. 16, "The holy, Christian temper (*πνεῦμα*) wrought in us by God gives us the clearest and surest proof that we are the children of God." 1 John, iii. 7; 2 Peter, i. 9, 10. This certainty is in the highest degree necessary to our tranquillity and happiness; 1 Tim. i. 16; 1 Cor. vi. 11; 1 John, v. 18—20.

(2) In respect to *sins* and the *punishment of sin*.

(a) As to *sins*; the position that all sins without exception are forgiven for Christ's sake is proved partly from the power and efficacy of the atonement of Christ, which is extended to all sins, (vide s. 111, and the texts there cited;) and partly from the texts which promise forgiveness of all sins, even the greatest and blackest, to those who comply with the prescribed conditions of pardon; Ezekiel, xviii. 21, 22; Psalm, ciii. 3; 1 Cor. vi. 11; Ephes. ii. 5; 1 Tim. i. 15. The sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be regarded as an exception. Vide s. 84.

(b) As to the *punishment of sin*, the answer to the question, whether the pardoned are exempt from *all* the punishments of sin, whether, therefore, justification is *plena et perfecta*, may be learned from s. 111, II. The *natural* and *physical* evils which result from past sins, indeed, remain, but they are mitigated and rendered more tolerable, and are divested of the terror of punishment by the cessation of the *moral* evils which result from sin, which takes place in consequence of the entirely different relation in which men stand to God after they are once pardoned. The *positive* punishments of sin are entirely removed, and man receives even here the expectation of *positive* divine rewards, and of the full enjoyment of them in the life to come.

(c) In respect to *time* and *lasting continuance*.

First.—The scriptures uniformly teach that forgiveness extends through the whole life of man. He may receive pardon at any time, while life continues, *so soon* as he fulfils the requisite conditions of forgiveness. This last clause should be carefully and expressly annexed, in order to preserve men from security and

terms *objective* and *subjective* justification. Objective justification is the act of God, by which he proffers pardon to all through Christ; subjective is the act of man, by which he accepts the pardon freely offered in the gospel. The former is universal, the latter not.—Tr.]

* [This is very conveniently expressed by the

carelessness in sin. Formerly many teachers, especially in the Lutheran church, were incautious in the use of language on this subject. They used the general phrases, *the door of mercy stands ever open; man can obtain avour (forgiveness) in the last moment of life*, without suitable explanation and cautious limitation. But while it is important, on the one hand, to shew that God is indeed ever ready to forgive, it ought, on the other hand, to be observed, that man is not always capable of forgiveness; that forgiveness is necessarily connected with repentance, as an indispensable condition, (not implying, by any means, that repentance is the procuring-cause of forgiveness;) that repentance and holiness are important things, which cannot be accomplished in a few moments, and that therefore it is extremely dangerous to delay them to the end of life, especially considering that we do not know that we shall then have our reason, or that we shall not die suddenly. The sincere Christian teacher will render such considerations as impressive as possible, in order to disturb *security* in sin. He should guard, however, with equal caution, against the mistake of those who represent repentance and holiness as the *meritorious ground* of forgiveness.

The frequent perversion of the doctrine of justification gave rise, at the end of the seventeenth and commencement of the eighteenth century, to the *terministic controversy*. Joh. Ge. Böse, a deacon at Sorau, in endeavouring to avoid one extreme fell into another. He held that God did not continue to forgive, even to the last, such persons as he foresaw would harden themselves in impenitence, but that he established a *limit of grace*, (*terminum gratiæ sive salutis peremptorium*.) to which, and no further, he would afford them grace for repentance. He appealed to the texts which speak of God as *hardening* or *rejecting men*, some of which have no reference to conversion and forgiveness, and some of which are erroneously explained by him. Vide s. 85. Ad Rechenberg, at Leipsic, and others, assented to this opinion, though with the best intentions. But Ittig, Fecht, Neumann, and many others, opposed this opinion, and wrote against the work of Böse, "*Terminus peremptorius salutis humanæ*," and against Rechenberg. They were in the right. This opinion is not taught in the holy scriptures, and is calculated to lead the doubting and anxious to *despair*, and to place them, as many sorrowful examples teach, in the most perilous condition, both as to soul and body, especially on the bed of death.

The doctrine that repentance and holiness are the *meritorious ground* of salvation would have equally terrible consequences. According to this doctrine, we should be compelled to deny all hope of salvation to one who had lived an

impenitent sinner till the last part of his life; which the Bible never does, and which is in itself cruel. The conscience even of the good man must say to him on his death-bed, that his imperfect virtues are insufficient to merit heaven. In neither of these instances, then, would there be any consolation; but despair would be the result of this doctrine in both.

Secondly. If one who has obtained the forgiveness of his sins is guilty of new transgressions, he forfeits the blessing of forgiveness, and all its salutary consequences; and by new offences incurs new punishments, which, after his fall, are justly more severe and intolerable than before. Still it cannot be said, as it has been said by some, that in case of apostasy God considers the sins once forgiven at the time of repentance as not forgiven, and that he still imputes them to the transgressor. There is no reason for this supposition; and such is not the case in human courts. The Bible uses the terms, *sins are blotted out, no more remembered*, Ezekiel, xviii. 22; xxxiii. 16; Psalm ciii. 11, 12. So Paul says, (Rom. xi. 29,) that God will never recal or take back the gifts which he has promised and bestowed, (*ἀμεταμέλητα χάρισματα.*) Vide Wernsdorf's Dissertation on this subject in Coll. Dissertat. t. i. p. 607, seq.

Thirdly. Even those who after their reformation and the bestowment of forgiveness fall away and transgress anew, may again obtain the forgiveness of their sins as soon as they repent and believe in Christ. So the Bible everywhere teaches, both in the Old and New Testament; Ezek. xxxiii. 11; 1 Thess. v. 9. Christ commands us to be forgiving to our neighbour who has wronged us, since in this we shall resemble God, who is easily reconciled, and who willingly forgives sin. Therefore the precept, Matthew, xviii. 21, 22, is applicable to God. This position is confirmed by the examples of many apostates in the Bible, who, after the commission of great offences, were again received into favour—e. g., David, 2 Samuel, xii.; Peter, Matt. xxvi., &c. The condition of repentance and faith, however, is indispensable. Vide Ps. li.; Morus, p. 211, seq.

But from the earliest ages Christians have entertained various erroneous opinions upon this subject. The opinion prevailed, even during the earliest ages, that great sins committed after baptism (by which ordinance the Christian was supposed to receive the remission of sin) could not be pardoned without great difficulty, if indeed at all, on which account many delayed baptism till the end of life.

The *excommunication* of great offenders had been common among Christians from the time of the apostles, (as it was among the Jews, which indeed at that time was necessary.) But now, in the second and third centuries, Montanus,

Novatian, and many others, began to exercise this prerogative very severely, and in order to invest it with more terror, insisted that the excommunicated should never be restored, in opposition to those who were too lenient in re-admitting them. Montanus, however, declared expressly that they might still obtain forgiveness from God, (Tertullian,) and even Novatian was willing to leave it undetermined how God would deal with them.

But afterwards, some particular teachers and some whole sects maintained that one who is excluded from the Christian church is excluded from the favour of God and placed beyond the reach of pardon. This opinion prevailed extensively in the Romish church. It was based on the principle, *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. In opposition to this error, the ancient creeds prescribed the declaration *Credo remissionem peccatorum*. This same error is controverted in the Augsburg Confession, Art. 13. The ancient apostolic church was far removed from such an opinion. In the second epistle to the Corinthians, Paul advises that the incestuous person whom he had required to be excommunicated in his first epistle should now be restored, since he had repented of his crime, and had put away his offence. And even there, where he advises his excommunication, and even undertakes to punish him, 1 Cor. v. 5, he will by no means have him excluded on this account from the favour of God, but declares, on the contrary, that he inflicts punishment with the very intention of saving his soul, *ἵνα πνεῦμα σωθῇ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κυρίου*.

II. *Justification or Forgiveness is an unmerited Divine Favour.*

That man can merit the divine favour and forgiveness by good works or virtues is an old mistake, which continues to be widely prevalent, and is ever appearing again in some new form. Against this mistake, which prevailed among the Jews and the Christian converts from Judaism, the apostles laboured incessantly, in entire accordance with that reasonable declaration of Jesus, Luke, xvii. 10, "When we have done everything which we are bound to do, (although no one can ever pretend that he has,) we are still servants who have deserved nothing, (*ἀχρεῖοι*), for we have done only our duty." All our good works do not confer favour upon God, or lay him under obligation. The observance of his laws is our duty, and tends to *our own good* merely.

In Rom. iii. Paul particularly illustrates this doctrine. Ver. 24, he says, "through Christ we are justified, *δωρεάν, τῇ χάριτι Θεοῦ*"—i. e., from mere free grace, which we have not deserved, and which we cannot repay. Vide Matt. x. 8. Paul therefore calls justification,

δωρον Θεοῦ, Ephes. ii. 8. But the Jews and the Christian converts from Judaism in that age were particularly inclined to the opinion that the external observance of the divine law, especially of the Mosaic *ceremonial* law, the most perfect of any, was meritorious, and more than anything else procured forgiveness from God. This mistake is controverted by Paul in his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians. He shews that man is justified by God, *οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ὁ χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου*, (not because he observes the law, Tit. iii. 5; 2 Tim. i. 9;) Rom. iii. 20, 21, 28, ch. vi.; Gal. ii. 16—21, seq. *Νόμος* has frequently indeed in these chapters a special reference to the divine law given by Moses, because this was regarded by the Jews as the most perfect. But it is by no means to be limited to this sense. Paul affirms the same in respect to obedience to all the divine precepts, since this obedience is always imperfect, Rom. iii. 28, vi. 14; Gal. iii. 17, 29, 23; and *οἱ ἐπὶ νόμου* are not merely the Jews, but all who subject themselves to the divine laws, thinking to merit the favour of God by obedience. The Jews considered their observance of the law as meritorious, and many Christians hoped to be justified on the same ground. Paul opposes this opinion, and proves that Christians cannot consider obedience as the meritorious ground of justification, for which they are indebted to Christ alone. But what Paul says respecting works, applies equally, in his opinion, to obedience to all laws, to works in general, even to *Christian* works. He does not speak exclusively of the law given by Moses; his positions are general, applying equally to all the laws of God, whether given by Moses, by Christ, or in any other manner. Vide Progr. ad Rom. vii. 21, in *Scripta Varii argumenti*, No. xii. Our obedience to the divine law is not, and cannot be, in itself *meritorious*. That this is a general doctrine is perfectly clear from Rom. iv.—e. g., ver. 4, "He that works for hire (*ἐργάζεσθαι*), 1 Thess. ii. 9, seq.) receives his wages, not through the *grace* of him for whom he labours, (as we all receive pardon from God,) but from the *obligation* of his employer to recompense him." Now if we receive the reward through grace, our works contribute nothing to this end,—they are not the meritorious ground of our pardon.

Paul also employs the argument, that if we by our obedience to the law could merit pardon, the atonement of Christ would be entirely in vain. The fact that we do not obtain forgiveness in this way renders the atonement necessary, Gal. ii. 21.

But why is this doctrine taught in the holy scriptures? If God made our works of legal obedience the measure by which he bestowed pardon and reward, we should have but a poor

prospect. For how imperfect is our obedience, especially during the early stages of the Christian life! How defective is it, even in the best and most advanced Christians! The greater advances a man makes in holiness and in Christianity, the more he sees and feels his imperfection. What feeble hope would the good man then have, if his own works (which his conscience pronounces very imperfect) should be the procuring cause of his pardon! The Christian teacher who inculcates such an opinion knows not what he does. Melancthon expressed this very well in the Augsburg Confession, Art. 4.

For a further consideration of this subject, and an account of the controversies respecting it with the Romish church, vide *infra*, s. 124, 125.

SECTION CXIV.

OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES RESPECTING THE NATURE AND MANNER OF THE ATONEMENT OF CHRIST; AND A NOTICE OF SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT WORKS ON ATONEMENT AND JUSTIFICATION.

THE common word authorized by ecclesiastical usage for denoting the atonement is *satisfactio* (Germ. *Genugthuung*.) This word is not indeed found in the Bible, but is in itself unobjectionable, taken in the large sense in which it was formerly understood in the church, and freed from the false opinions sometimes connected with it in later times. This word was originally a *judicial* term, and was applied for the first time (with many more of a similar nature) by Tertullian, who was himself a jurist, to the atonement of Christ. "*Christus peccata hominum, omni satisfactionis habitu expiavit*," *De patientia*, c. 10. It has since been retained in the Latin church, though it occurs but seldom in the Latin fathers, and did not become general until the time of the schoolmen, and especially of Anselmus.

The words *satisfacere* and *satisfactio* relate originally to matters of *debt*,—the payment of *debt*, *debiti solutio*. They are then applied *figuratively* to other things, which have, or are supposed to have, some resemblance to debt. Hence we find them used in the following senses—viz., to discharge a debt for any one (*satisfacere pro aliquo debitore*), to make him content, to comply with his wishes, to fulfil his desire, to do what he was bound to perform, to beg him off and obtain his pardon. Hence the phrases *satisfacere officio*, *muneris*, *expectationi*, *promissis*; *satisfacere populo* (to comply with its wishes), *ἱκανὸν ποιεῖν*, Mark, xv. 15; *accipere satisfactionem*, (to accept the payment or apology offered, or the request for pardon.) *Satisfacere* often denotes not merely payment with money, (though

this is the ground of this usage,) but every other mode of discharging debt or obligation.

Now when Tertullian and other ancient writers found the words *λύτρον* and *ἀντίλυτρον* applied in the Bible to the atonement of Christ, (s. 106,) they were very naturally led to adopt the word *satisfactio*. The two former words properly denote a *ransom*, *pretium redemptionis*. These writers retained the figure, and compared the unhappy, sinful condition of man, sometimes with *captivity*, sometimes with *debt*, both of which comparisons are scriptural. Sins are frequently called in the Bible *ῥεῖσματα*. From these Christ freed men by his death. This death of Christ was therefore compared with the sum which is paid as ransom for captives or debtors, to liberate them from captivity or release them from debt. At first this was considered only as a figurative mode of speech, denoting that God was by this means *satisfied* or *appeased*. But afterwards this phraseology came to be understood literally, and many hypotheses dishonourable to God were suggested in explanation of this idea.

But, as Morus has justly observed, there is no injury to be apprehended from retaining this word, which is now authorized by ecclesiastical usage, if it is only so explained as to convey the same meaning as *λύτρον*, *ἀπολύτρωσις*, and similar scriptural terms. The phrase, *Christ has made satisfaction for us*, should therefore be explained to mean, that Christ by his death has procured for us from God perfect forgiveness and the remission of sins; so that now we have no punishment to fear, but rather blessings to expect.

The following are some of the principal methods of explaining this subject, and the ecclesiastical theories respecting it.

(1) During the first two centuries most of the ecclesiastical fathers adhered, in a great measure, to the simplicity of the scriptural representation of this subject, and attempted no definite explanation of the manner of the atonement beyond what is given in the scriptures, and in doing this, made use for the most part of scriptural phraseology. They represented the death of Jesus as a *sacrifice*.

But a theory, some traces of which had appeared even during the second century, became prominent during the third and fourth centuries, and continued a long time the prevailing theory among the learned in the Greek and Latin churches. The advocates of this theory took the word *λυτρόσις* in its primary and literal sense, denoting release from captivity or slavery by the payment of a ransom, (*λύτρον*, s. 106.) With this they associated the idea of the power and dominion of Satan over the whole human race, in a sense not warranted by the Bible. They referred to the texts affirming that Christ

freed us from the power of the devil. Thus originated the following theory:—*Ever after the fall the devil had the whole human race in his power; he ruled over men like a tyrant over his vassals, and employed them for his own purposes.* Thus far they had the support of the Bible. But here they began to philosophize beyond what is written. *From this captivity God might indeed have rescued men by the exercise of his omnipotence; but he was restrained by his justice from doing this with violence. He therefore offered Satan a ransom, in consideration of which he should release mankind. This ransom was the death of CHRIST, (as a divine being.)* In accordance with this theory, Origen interpreted the text, Matt. xx. 28, "He gave his life a ransom for men," as denoting the ransom paid to the devil, not to God. *Satan had consented to the compact; but he wished fraudulently to retain Jesus, whom he considered only as the best and most pious man under his own power, and so slew this innocent being. He was now, therefore, justly COMPELLED to liberate the human race.*

This theory was first adopted by the Grecian church, and especially by Origen, (Comm. in Matt. xx. et alibi,) through whose influence it became prevalent, and was adopted at length by Basilus, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzen, Nestorius, and others. From the Greeks it was communicated to the Latins, among whom it was first distinctly held by Ambrosius, and afterwards by Augustine, through whose influence it was rendered almost universal in the Latin church. In this church they endeavoured to perfect the theory. Satan, they added, was *deceived* in the transaction; for taking Jesus to be a mere man, and not knowing that he was also the *Son of God*, he was not able to retain even *him*, after he had slain him. And it was necessary for Christ to assume a human body in order to deceive the devil, as fishes are caught by baits. This view occurs frequently in the writings of Leo the Great, in the fifth century. Cf. Semler, *Geschichte der Glaubenslehre*, prefixed to Baumgarten's "Polemik;" Doederlein, *Diss. de redemptione a potestate diaboli*, in his "Opuscula;" and Cotta, *Hist. doctrinæ de redemptione sanguine Christi facta*, in his edition of Gerhard's "Loci Theologici," prefixed to th. 4.

So prevalent was this theory in the Latin church before the twelfth century, that Abelard declares, "*Omnes doctores nostri post apostolos, in hoc conveniunt;*" and Bernhard of Clairvaux was so firmly persuaded of its truth as to declare that Abelard, who held that the devil never possessed, in a literal sense, such power as was ascribed to him, ought rather to be chastised with rods than reasoned with.

But after the twelfth century this theory gradually lost ground, through the influence, prin-

cipally, of the schoolmen who lived after the age of Anselmus and Abelard; and another theory was substituted in its place. Vide No. 2. Peter of Lombardy, however, still continued more inclined to the ancient theory. In the Greek church, too, this hypothesis was gradually abandoned, and was opposed even earlier than in the Latin church. John of Damascus attacked it as early as the eighth century, and maintained (De fid. Orthod. l. 3) that Christ brought his blood, which was shed as a ransom, not to the devil, but to God, in order to deliver men from the divine punishments. So the scriptures, "He offered himself to God for us, a spotless victim." This is implied in the whole scriptural idea of sacrifices, which were offered only to God.

(2) The other theory, of which also some traces appear in the early ages, is the following. Proceeding on the idea of *debt*, the authors of this theory maintained that the relation of all sinful men to God is the same as that of a debtor to his creditors. We find it distinctly said, as early as the fourth century, that Christ paid what we should have *paid*, or what we owed. The idea of sacrifice and of his offering up himself was still associated with this. The learned now began to carry out the former idea, at first, indeed, in a manner not inconsistent with the scriptures. The *debt* was *sin*, and could not be cancelled, or the *punishment remitted*, unless satisfaction or payment were made. Since men were unable to do this of themselves, Christ did it for them; and God accepted the ransom, (the death of Christ,) and forgave men, as if they themselves had made satisfaction.

We find very clear traces of this theory as early as the fourth century in the writings of Athanasius, of the Grecian church; and still more clear, in the writings of John of Damascus, who expressly rejected the theory stated in No. 1. At the same period, in the Latin church, we find indications of the same theory in the writings of Hilarius of Poitiers, (Com. in Ps. liii.) But the schoolmen of the eleventh and twelfth centuries gave this theory a greater currency than it had had before, and spun it out to a finer subtlety. They attempted to determine the idea of atonement with philosophical and dialectical accuracy. But they could not do this if they confined themselves to the plain and popular phraseology of the Bible; they therefore selected the judicial word *satisfactio*, which had been already used by the older writers. The idea on which they began, in this case as in others, was itself scriptural; but by philosophizing upon it they gradually declined from the simple doctrine of the Bible. This was the case particularly with Anselmus, whose system has been generally adopted, even by Lutheran theologians. He defined *satisfactio* to be *debiti*

solutio. His system is exhibited most fully in his work, *Cur Deus Homo?* He maintained the absolute necessity of satisfaction, in the metaphysical sense. His whole theory is derived from the civil process respecting debt among men, transferred to the tribunal of God. But such is not the representation of the Bible, where the compassion and undeserved love of God is made the ground of this transaction, and not any judicial notions of this nature. God is compared with a ruler who forgives from his forbearance and his compassionate love, and does not proceed according to stern justice; Matt. xviii. 26, 27.

The following is the system of Anselmus:—Man owes reverence to the character of God, and obedience to his laws. Whoever withholds this reverence and obedience due to God, robs God of what belongs to him, and must not only restore that which he withheld, but pay an additional amount, as amends for the dishonour brought upon God. Thus it stands with sinners. The payment of this debt is the *satisfaction* which every sinner must make to God, according to the nature of his offence. For God cannot in justice remit the debt (or punishment) unless satisfaction is made. This man could never do, nor indeed any other than God himself. And yet to him, as judge, must this satisfaction be made. The expedient was then devised for the Son of God, as God-man, by his death to make this satisfaction. He was able to make this satisfaction only as God; but as man, he was also able to be surety for men, and then himself actually to pay the debt, or make satisfaction for them. Cf. s. 101, ad finem.

This fine-spun juridico-philosophical theory was exactly in the spirit of that age, and was almost universally adopted by the schoolmen, though with various modifications—e. g., by Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Gabr. Biel, and others. Among these, however, a controversy arose respecting the value of the blood of Christ in cancelling the debt of the human race. Thomas Aquinas maintained that the value and worth (*valor*) of the blood of Christ were in themselves *infinite*, on account of the infinite dignity of the person of Christ; and that this ransom not only *balanced* but *outweighed* all the sins of all men. He was followed by the Dominicans. This appears, too, to have been the opinion of Anselmus. Duns Scotus, on the other hand, maintained that God was *satisfied* with this ransom, although it had not in itself any infinite value or worth. God, however, accepted it as sufficient and equivalent. He thus endeavoured to approximate to the doctrine of the Bible, which always represents justification as a free gift, and a proof of the entirely unmerited love of God. He was followed by the Franciscans. But even

this statement was founded upon the judicial doctrine of *acceptilatio*, when anything insufficient is accepted as valid and equivalent. Cf. Ziegler's Essay, *Historia dogmatis de redemptione inde ab ecclesiæ primordiis usque ad Lutheri tempora*; Göttingen, 1791, 4to.

(3) On the theories and explanations of this doctrine which have prevailed since the sixteenth century.

(a) The system of Anselmus had been extending through the Romish church ever since the twelfth century, through the influence of the schoolmen, who added to it various new subtleties, distinctions, and terminologies. This same system was adopted, in main, though with the slight alteration of some terms and representations, by a considerable number of protestant theologians. Luther, Melancthon, and the other early reformers, adhered to the simplicity of the Bible, and avoided these subtleties. But after the death of Luther, the theologians of the Lutheran church took sides in great numbers with Anselmus and Thomas Aquinas. They now introduced many of the unscriptural hypotheses and distinctions established by the schoolmen, and thus deformed the doctrine and rendered its truth doubtful in the minds of many. Their great error consisted in representing this subject too much after the manner of men, and, of course, unworthily of God. The symbolical books of the protestants have, in the meantime, adhered to the simple Biblical representation; and these exaggerated opinions have been held rather by particular teachers and schools than by the protestant church generally.

The following are examples of these faulty representations and expressions:—*God, it is said, was actually INJURED by the sins of men; he was ANGERED and ENRAGED! in the strict sense; it was necessary that he should be PROPITIATED, and that his ROBBED honour should be restored; that he could not be moved to compassion till he saw blood flow.* These figurative expressions ought either to be wholly avoided in the scientific statement of the theory, or to be justly and scripturally explained. God cannot be injured in the literal sense; his honour cannot be destroyed or diminished. But those who used these inconvenient expressions did not mean by them what they really imply. The proper idea which lies at the foundation of such phraseology is this: that the laws of God must be kept holy and inviolate; that God does and must strongly express his displeasure at the transgression of his wholesome laws; and that therefore punishments are necessary for their maintenance.

Again; many held that the guilt of sin is infinite, (*infinitum debitum*, s. 81, ad finem,) and that, consequently, Christ endured *infinite punishments, the pains of hell itself*, (Morus, p. 169, No. 4,) to the same amount as all sinners taken

together would have been compelled to suffer; that the satisfaction of Christ was absolutely necessary, and the only possible way for the restoration of the human race; that some particular sins were atoned for by each part of the sufferings of Christ; that the blood of Christ had a physical efficacy, &c. &c.

(b) These false representations, and others like them, which are so dishonourable to God, gave rise to various controversies. Reflecting persons rejected much of this phraseology and this mode of representation as contrary to reason and scripture. Many also disapproved of the harmless term *satisfactio*, and of all the figurative expressions relative to *debt* and the *judicial processes* respecting it which had been introduced by Anselmus, because they were so often perverted. At the same time, they did not deny any essential part of the doctrine itself, but only wished to simplify the subject, and to adhere closely both to the principles and words of the Bible. This scholastic system and this technical phraseology were, on the contrary, defended with great zeal.

(c) But since the sixteenth century there have not been wanting persons who not only disliked and rejected the ecclesiastical form and phraseology of this doctrine, but who opposed the doctrine itself on philosophical and theological grounds. Among these were Lælius Socinus and Faustus Socinus in the sixteenth century, and their numerous avowed or secret adherents in the same and the following centuries. They made the desert of Christ to consist merely in his *doctrine and instruction*. By his death he only confirmed his doctrine, and gave an example of patience, firmness in suffering, and obedience to God. The followers of Socinus endeavoured to shew that there are no *positive* divine *punishments*; since if this were true, the atonement, which principally relates to the removal of these, would fall away of itself, (s. 111, II.) These views were embraced by many of the Arminian and English theologians and philosophers, who were followed, in the eighteenth century, by great numbers of German protestants. Vide the Essays on this subject in Eberhard, *Apologie des Socrates*; and Steinbart, *System der Glückseligkeitslehre*, &c.

Philosophers are at liberty to speculate upon this subject, according to their own views and their favourite theories, variable and transient as they are. If they please, they may investigate the subject independently of the Bible, and propose the results of their investigation for the examination of the learned. They ought, however, to avoid the error, so frequently committed ever since the time of Socinus, of thinking that the Bible must necessarily contain the doctrines approved as true on the philosophical principles of their own particular schools—the fault of in-

terpreting the Bible, not according to its own spirit, and the spirit of the age in which it was written, but according to the views of particular sects of philosophers in their own times—a fault which has been often repeated of late by the adherents of Kant and his successors. Let any one consider the various and contradictory theories of the different philosophical schools in our own age. Now each of these schools attempts to support its own theory by the authority of the holy scriptures. But *all* of these theories cannot possibly be founded in the Bible; and who can say which of them all is so?

What is *essential* in the common ecclesiastical system respecting the atonement is clearly revealed in the scriptures, and is entirely adapted to the spirit of the sacred writers and their whole mode of thinking, to the wants of the age in which they wrote, and to the wants of mankind at large. Vide s. 108, seq. Morus has briefly exhibited the *essentials* of this doctrine, p. 150—155, s. 4—6.

(4) Many protestant theologians began as early as the seventeenth century to depart by degrees from the theory of Anselmus, which presents so many difficulties, and is liable to so many weighty objections, and to bring back this doctrine to the simplicity of the Bible. The book of Grotius, “*De satisfactione Christi*,” (Leiden, 1617; Halæ, 1730, ed. Joach. Lange,) was the first thing done towards undermining the system of Anselmus. Grotius indeed made the ecclesiastical system the ground of his work, but he deduced the necessity of satisfaction, not so much from the injury done to God as from the holiness and inviolableness of the divine laws, which render punishments necessary for the good of men. In this he exactly accorded with the Bible. He shewed that there was no internal and absolute necessity for this satisfaction, but that the necessity was only *moral* or *relative*. These and other views of this scholar became gradually more current among theologians, who sought both to bring them into a still nearer agreement with the Bible and also to reconcile them with the established system of the church.

Some protestant theologians have made use of the new systems of philosophy which have become successively prevalent in modern times, to illustrate and defend the doctrine of the Bible and of the church. Thus Carpzoy, Baumgarten, and others, made use of the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy. Vide also Reinbeck, *Tract. Theol. de redemptione per lytron*; Halle, 1710, 8vo; Theod. le Blanc, *Erweis der Genugthuung Jesu Christi*, with the preface of Rambach; Giessen, 1733, 8vo;—one of the best of the older works. Stäudlin and others have made the same use of the philosophy of Kant, as Kant himself has done in his “*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen*

der blossen Vernunft." But others, with equal zeal, have employed these very same philosophical systems in opposition to this doctrine of the Bible. One of the most zealous opponents of the doctrine of the atonement in modern times is Dr. Löffler, in his work, "Ueber die kirchliche Genugthuungslehre; Züllichau, 1796, 8vo.

(5) The frequent attacks made in our own age both upon the ancient ecclesiastical system and upon the doctrine of the Bible itself have made it necessary to state this doctrine more accurately than was formerly done. Many moderate theologians have endeavoured so to exhibit this doctrine that it should agree both with the decisions of Revelation and with the acknowledged principles of sound reason, thus rendering it intelligible, and obviating the most important objections against it. Since the middle of the eighteenth century many have laboured to effect this object, though not with equal success. Among these are Ernesti, Töllner, Danov, Noesselt, (Vom Werth der Moral,) Less, Griesbach, (Praktische Dogmatik,) Döderlein, (Dogmatik,) Michaelis, (Gedanken von der Sünde und Genugthuung; Göttingen, 1779, 8vo,) and Seiler, (Ueber den Versöhnungstod Jesu, with some essays, &c., 2nd ed.; Erlangen, 1782, gr. 8vo; in connexion with which the doctrine of justification is treated.) The lastmentioned writer endeavours to refute the objections of Eberhard and Steinbart. Among the latest writers on this subject is Dr. Gottlob Christ. Storr, (Pauli Brief an die Hebräer erläutert; Tübingen, 1789, 8vo; 2nd Ausg. Tübingen, 1809. Second part, *Ueber den eigentlichen Zweck des Todes Jesu*, s. 363—692.) He holds that the object of the death of Christ is not directly the *reformation* of men, and that their exemption from punishment is not the effect of their reformation; but that the direct and immediate object of his death is, *to procure the forgiveness of sin, and to make atonement*. Another writer is Schwarze, (in Görnitz,) "Ueber den Tod Jesu, als ein wesentliches Stück seines Wohltätigen Plans zur Beglückung der Menschen; Leipzig, 1795, 8vo. The discourse delivered by Dr. Reinhard, at the *Reformationsfeste*, on the text, Rom. iii. 23, seq., containing a brief and practical statement of the scripture doctrine of the atonement, excited much attention, especially from the unusual manner of its publication, and led to many writings for and against the doctrine of the Bible. Among these the following work is in many respects favourably distinguished:—"Der Widerstreit der Vernunft mit sich selbst in der Versöhnungslehre, dargestellt und aufgelöst, von Krug;" Züllichau, 1802, 8vo.

The essential points in the theory adopted by the moderate theologians of the protestant church may be thus stated:—God had a twofold object

in view—viz., (a) to preserve inviolate the authority of his law given for the good of man. How could this be effected otherwise than by the punishment of transgression, threatened and actually inflicted? (b) But as a slavish fear of God is utterly inconsistent with pure religion, (φόβος ἐκβάλλει τὴν ἀγάπην, 1 John, iv. 18,) some means must be chosen to free men from their reasonable *fear of punishment*, and to give them a certain *assurance* that God would forgive them, be gracious to them, and count them worthy of his favour, in such a way, however, as not to occasion indifference with regard to sin. Both of these objects were attained by the sufferings and death of Christ; the *first* by the proof given, through the sufferings of Jesus, that God abhors sin and will not leave it unpunished; the *second*, by the declaration of God that Christ had suffered these punishments for our good, in our stead, and on our behalf. Death is the consequence of sin, and is in itself a great evil. We must regard it as the sum of all evils and terrors. (Hence in the Bible *death* stands for *every kind of misery*.) Especially is this the case with a violent and excruciating death, which is the punishment of the greatest criminals. Such a death did God himself inflict upon Christ, who was himself entirely guiltless, (ἅγιος καὶ δίκατος.) God, however, could not be so unjust and cruel as to inflict such a punishment upon an innocent person without object or design. Hence we may conclude that Christ endured his sufferings and death for men who should properly have endured these punishments, in order to inspire them with confidence in God, with gratitude and love to him, and to banish all fear of the divine punishments from their hearts. It all comes back, therefore, at last, to this, that God chose this extraordinary means from the impulse of his own sincere love and benevolence to men. Thus the scriptures always represent it, and on this view we should always proceed in our religious instructions. Vide Morus, p. 152, seq., s. 6. But if men would be certain that they have in this way obtained the forgiveness of their sins, they must place their entire dependence on Christ; they must repent of their sins; by the help of God lead a holy life, and punctually observe all the divine laws. This is an indispensable duty and an essential condition of salvation through Christ; and to one who has sincere love to God and to Christ, this will not be difficult. Obedience to God, being prompted by love and gratitude, will be yielded with cheerfulness. No one, however, must consider his repentance or holiness as the *meritorious* ground of forgiveness. For forgiveness is not the effect and consequence of our holiness, but flows from the death of Christ.

This doctrine thus exhibited cannot be injurious to morality; on the contrary, it produces the

most beneficial effects upon those who believe it from the heart, (s. 108, II.) So experience teaches. We see the most convincing proofs of the beneficial tendencies of this doctrine in those Christian communities, both of ancient and modern times, where it has been faithfully taught and cordially believed. [Cf. Tholuck, *Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner*, s. 104, ff. Hahn, *Lehrbuch*, s. 475—500. Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, b. ii. s. 245—355. Neander, b. i. Abth. ii. s. 70—78. Flatt's *Magazine*, b. i. s. 1—67, Ueber die Möglichkeit der Sünden-Vergebung.—Tr.]

SECTION CXV.

OF THE ACTIVE OBEDIENCE OF CHRIST.

I. *What is meant by Active Obedience; and a History of this Doctrine.*

CHRIST's cheerful discharge of the commission given him by God is called his *obedience* (*ὕπακοή*); according to the example of the Bible—e. g., Phil. iii. 9; Rom. v. 19; Morus, p. 161, s. 7. Morus justly defines the obedience of Christ to be, *peractio eorum, quæ peragere debuit, et in peragendo summa virtus*. Christ exhibited this obedience in two ways—viz., (a) by *acting* (*agendo*)—i. e., by keeping and observing the divine laws; (b) by *suffering*, (*patiēdo*)—i. e., by cheerfully undertaking and enduring suffering for the good of men, in accordance with the divine determination. Cf. s. 93, III., and s. 95, ad finem. The former way is called *obedientia activa*, (not *active* in the sense of *busy*, which would be *actuosa*, but in the sense of *acting*, Germ. *thuender*;) the latter, *obedientia passiva*. These two ways may be thus distinguished in *abstracto*. But they ought not to have been separated from each other. Christ's active obedience is not properly different from his passive obedience. His obedience is one and the same in all cases. *Suffering*, in itself considered, so far as it consists in unpleasant sensations, is not obedience. A person may suffer and not be obedient, but impatient, disobedient, and refractory. But for one to suffer obediently, or to shew obedience in suffering, this is an *acting*, a fulfilment of duty, or that virtue which is called *patience*, one of the greatest and most difficult of virtues! But how can a virtue, which consists entirely in acting, be called *passive*? In truth, then, the obedience of Christ is one and the same thing, consisting always in *acting*. It is that virtue by which Christ fulfilled not only the moral laws of God, but also the positive divine commands which were laid upon him, to suffer, to die, &c. Obedience is never wholly passive, and what is simply passive is not obedience. But a person shews obedience by acting in suffering.

Theologians commonly hold that the active obedience of Christ was as much a part of his atonement or satisfaction as his passive obedience. This opinion might be more clearly and definitively expressed as follows:—The satisfaction which Christ has made consists both in his enduring the punishments incurred by men and in his yielding a perfect obedience to the divine laws. This is what is meant by theologians. This opinion is derived from the twofold obligation of men (a) to keep the divine laws, and (b) when they have failed, to suffer punishment for their sin. In this way the satisfaction of Christ came to be considered as consisting of two parts, *active* and *passive*. This view was then connected with the theory of Anselmus, respecting the removal of the *guilt* and *penalty* of sin. The suffering of Christ removes the *penalty*, and his active obedience the *guilt* of sin; and the perfect righteousness of Christ, or his fulfilment of the law, is imputed to us, in the same way as if we ourselves had fulfilled the law, and thus our defective obedience is made good. Respecting this doctrine *de remissione culpæ et pænæ*. Vide s. 109, II. 2. This is in brief the common theory, which will be more particularly examined, No. II.

We subjoin a brief *history* of this doctrine. Good materials for this history may be found in Walch's *Inaugural Disputation*, de obedientia Christi activa; Göttingen, 1754, 4to.

Passages are found even among the ancient fathers, which teach that the fulfilment of the divine law by Christ is to be considered as if done by us. Vide the passages cited by Walch. Many of these passages, however, appear very doubtful and indefinite, and this doctrine was by no means universally established in the early church. Even Anselmus, who built up such an artificial system, did not make this application of the twofold obedience of Christ. This, however, was the tendency of his theory, especially of the doctrine, *de remissione culpæ et pænæ*. But after his time, this explanation of the satisfaction made by Christ by means of his twofold obedience was adopted by several schoolmen, who now looked up texts for its support. But it was never very generally adopted by theologians of the Romish church. In the protestant church, on the contrary, it has been almost universally taught by our theologians since the sixteenth century, and even introduced into the "Form of Concord," (Morus, p. 169, n. 5,) which, however, never received an universal symbolical authority in the Lutheran church. This explanation is not found in the other symbols. One reason, perhaps, of the reception of this explanation in the protestant church, is the supposition that the theory *de obedientia activa* could be used to advantage against the catholic tenet of the value of one's own good works.

Another reason is, that the imputation of the active obedience of Christ was denied by the Socinians and Arminians. For these reasons, most of the Lutheran and Reformed theologians accounted this doctrine essential to sound orthodoxy. But doubting whether the active obedience of Christ constitutes a part of his satisfaction, has no influence upon the plan of salvation through repentance, faith, and godliness. Baumgarten and Ernesti have therefore justly enumerated this dispute among those of secondary importance. And, in fact, the difference among theologians upon this subject has often been more apparent than real. There were, indeed, some protestant theologians, even in the former century, who denied the desert of the active obedience of Christ—e. g., the Lutheran theologian Karg, or *Parsimonius*; also the Reformed theologian John Piscator, who had many followers; more lately, Jo. la Placette, and others. The same was done by many of the English theologians, who in general adopted the Arminian views. But from the end of the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century the opinion was by far the most prevalent in the Lutheran church that the active obedience of Christ is of the nature of satisfaction, or *vicarious*. This opinion is defended even by Walch in the place just referred to.

But since the time of Töllner the subject has been presented in a different light. He published a work entitled, “*Der thätige Gehorsam Christi*,” Breslau, 1768, 8vo. In this he denied that the active obedience of Christ is of the nature of satisfaction. Upon this a violent controversy commenced. Schubert, Wichmann, and others, wrote against him, and he, in reply, published his “*Zusätze*,” Berlin, 1770. The best critique of this matter is that of Ernesti, Theol. Bibl. b. ix. s. 914, f. For the history of the whole controversy vide Walch, *Neeuste Religionsgeschichte*, th. iii. s. 311, f. The subject is considered also in Eberhard, *Apologie des Socrates*, th. ii. s. 310, f. Of late years, a great number of protestant theologians have declared themselves in behalf of the opinion that the active obedience of Christ is properly no part of his satisfaction, which is the effect solely of his passive obedience. Among these are Zachariä, Griesbach, Döderlein.

II. *The worth and uses of the Active Obedience of Christ.*

That Christ did render this perfect obedience is clear, both from the fact of his being *sinless*, (s. 93, iii.) and from the express declarations of the Bible, Matt. v. 17; John, iv. 34, viii. 29; Phil. ii. 8. Cf. likewise the texts Ps. xl. 7, cited by Paul, Heb. x. 5. This perfect obedience is useful to us in the following respects:—

(1) This obedience of Christ stands in the

most close and intimate connexion with his whole work for the good of mankind. His sufferings and death could not possibly have the worth and the salutary consequences ascribed to them in the scriptures, if Christ had endured them otherwise than as innocent and perfectly holy. His *innocence* and *perfect virtue* are therefore frequently mentioned by the apostles, when they speak of the worth of his sufferings and death, Heb. ix. 14; 1 Pet. i. 19; iii. 18. In Heb. vii. 27, Paul shows that the death of Christ was so infinitely superior to all Jewish sacrifices, because Christ was *sinless*, and was not compelled, like the Jewish priests, first to purify himself by offering sacrifice for his own sins.

(2) Christ's obedience to the divine laws is useful and instructive to us, in furnishing us with a perfect example of holiness and spotless virtue. Christ explained the divine laws not merely by instruction, but by action. His whole conduct was a living recommendation of the purest and most perfect morality, and powerfully plead in behalf of virtue. To this the New Testament frequently alludes, 1 John, iii. 3; 1 Pet. ii. 21; Heb. xii. 2.

(3) But besides this, the active obedience of Christ, taken by itself, is considered by many a separate part of his satisfaction, as well as his passive obedience. Vide No. 1. They suppose it to be *vicarious*, in itself considered, or that it will be *imputed* to us—i. e., that merely on account of the perfect obedience yielded by Christ to the divine law we shall be regarded and treated by God as if we ourselves had perfectly obeyed. Accordingly, they suppose that Christ, in our stead, has supplied or made good our imperfect obedience to the divine law. To this view there are the following objections—viz.,

(a) Christ never spoke of an imputation of his obedience and virtue, as he frequently did of his sufferings and death. The same is true of the apostles. Christ frequently speaks in general of his doing the will of his Father for the good of men, and teaches that this obedience will be for the good of those who believe on him. He does so very frequently in the Gospel of John, iii. iv., vi., xiii., seq. 17. But here he refers to his whole obedience both in acting and suffering, and does not separate one from the other. Indeed, there are passages where the apostles must necessarily have spoken of the active obedience of Christ as *vicarious*, if they had held any such doctrine. E. g., Rom. vii., viii., where Paul laments the weakness and imperfection of human nature, by which man is unable, even with the best intentions, perfectly to fulfil the divine commands. In this connexion, nothing would have been more consoling than the mention of the vicarious obedience of Christ, by which our imper-

fect obedience is made good. But nothing of all this! For the consolation of the pious, he mentions only the *death, resurrection, and intercession* of Christ, Rom. viii. 33, 34.

The active obedience of Christ, however, is not excluded. In Rom. v. 19, the apostle makes mention of it. In this passage, which is cited as one of the most important proof-texts, we read, "As through the disobedience of Adam many became sinners, so through the obedience of Christ many are made righteous," or are pardoned. In ver. 18, the *παράπτωμα Ἀδὰμ* and *δικαίωμα Χριστοῦ* are contrasted. Now, according to the uniform scriptural usage, this obedience of Christ does not refer simply and exclusively to his active obedience, but principally to his obedience to the divine command to suffer and die for us, Phil. ii. 8; Heb. v. 8, 9. But in the passage cited, the apostle clearly comprises under the word *ὑπακοή* the whole obedience of Christ, and teaches that this, especially as shewn in suffering for us, is for our good. Cf. Rom. x. 4. On the whole, then, our position, that the perfect obedience of Christ to the divine commands, *separately considered*, (i. e., disconnected from his death,) is never mentioned in the Bible as meritorious, is confirmed. The scriptures declare that the whole obedience of Christ, exhibited both in acting and suffering, is for our good. But they never divide this obedience, as theologians have frequently done. The whole obedience of Christ is useful to us principally on account of his obedience shewn in suffering.

(b) The perfect obedience of Christ, it is asserted, must needs be imputed to us, in order to make good our defective obedience to the law, since the *justice* of God demands perfect obedience. But to this it may be answered, (a) That it is difficult to see how this is necessary; for our imperfect obedience to the divine law is either *guiltless* on our part,—in which case there is no imputation of guilt, and consequently no reason why another's righteousness should be imputed to us,—or it is *guilty* and deserving of punishment. But this punishment is already removed by the sufferings and death (the passive obedience) of Christ. But that the guilt as well as punishment of sin is and must be removed by Christ, cannot be proved. Vide s. 109, II. 2. (β) It is inconsistent with many other principles and declarations of the Bible—e. g., with the principle that man will be rewarded or punished, *κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ*, Rom. ii. 6. Here the imputation of the merit of *another's* works is entirely excluded. The ancient prophets, and all the teachers of the New Testament from the time of John the Baptist, contended strenuously against the opinion of the Jews respecting the imputation of the vicarious righteousness of Abraham. Vide s. 108, I. 3. We should not therefore expect such a doctrine

as this from them; but the scripture doctrine of the merit of the whole obedience of Christ is fully secured against perversion by the frequent inculcation of diligence in holiness. Vide s. 114, ad fin. It has as little resemblance to the Jewish doctrine of the merit of the good works of Abraham, as it has to that of the Romish church, respecting the desert of the good works of the saints.

(c) Many questionable conclusions may be deduced from this doctrine, which would indeed be rejected by its advocates, but which cannot be easily avoided.

(a) We might conclude from the doctrine that the obedience of Christ is imputed to us, and that on account of it we are rewarded by God, that the long-continued and high virtue of a confirmed Christian is of no greater value in the sight of God, and will receive no greater reward, than the imperfect virtue of a beginner; for the deficiencies of the latter in personal holiness will, according to this doctrine, be made up by the perfect obedience of Christ imputed to him—i. e., considered as his own obedience. But this is contrary to the fundamental principles both of reason and revelation.

(β) However much this doctrine may be guarded against perversion by saying that the personal virtue of the Christian is not excluded or dispensed with, it must doubtless weaken the motive to holiness of life, and thus prove injurious to the interests of morality. Why was it necessary for Christianity to point out so many means of holiness, in order that we might attain perfect happiness, if in *this way* it could be at once attained with so little difficulty and labour.

Note.—It may help to settle the controversy on this subject to consider that it has originated solely in mistake. Two things have been separated which never can be put asunder, and which never are in the Bible, but, on the contrary, are always connected. All that Christ did and suffered for our good receives its peculiar worth from the fact that he did it from obedience to the divine will. This is the virtue or obedience of Christ. If we would partake of the salutary consequences of his sufferings, we must, under divine guidance and assistance, follow his example. This is an indispensable condition. The two things are always connected in the Bible, and should be in our instructions; and then this doctrine cannot be abused. The remarks made by Morus, p. 170, 171, are directed to this point.

The Bible indeed justifies us in saying, (1) that *everything* which Christ *actively performed* during his whole life, in obedience to God, is salutary to us, was done on our account, and for our good. But (2) we therefore truly affirm, that *our whole happiness (σωτηρία)* is the fruit in a special manner of his obedience to the

divine command, both in his suffering and in all the actions of his life. Had he not shewn this obedience, we should not have attained to this happiness. So the scriptures everywhere teach. The obedience of Christ in suffering is therefore the foundation, and imparts to us the assurance, that all his other obedience, in respect to all the divine commands, will be for our benefit; John, vi. 51; iii. 14—16; xii. 24; 1 John, iv. 9; 1 Thess. v. 9, seq. No injury to morals need be apprehended if the scripture doctrine is followed, and things which belong together are not separated. Vide s. 114, ad finem.

PART II. OF CHAPTER IV.

ON REDEMPTION FROM THE POWER OR DOMINION OF SIN.

SECTION CXVI.

OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS DOCTRINE; ITS CONFORMITY WITH SCRIPTURE; AND THE MANNER IN WHICH WE ARE FREED FROM SIN THROUGH CHRIST.

I. Importance of this Doctrine.

IN treating of the work of redemption, writers have commonly considered only the first part—the *atonement*, or *freedom from the punishment of sin*. But *deliverance from sin* belongs as really to the redemption of Christ as deliverance from punishment, which indeed Ernesti and others have before remarked. By the *death* of Christ we are indeed, as the scriptures teach, delivered from the punishment of sin. But since the disposition to sin is so strong and universal among men, (and this is the whole cause of their degeneracy and unhappiness,) some means must needs be pointed out, in the proper use of which they may, under divine assistance, overcome this bias and propensity to sin, and may attain to true holiness and the practice of virtue, acceptable in the sight of God. If Christ had not shewn us such means, his work of redemption would have been incomplete, and his atonement in vain. For we can participate in the blessings of redemption, even after we have obtained forgiveness, only by avoiding sin and living righteously. And had not Christ furnished us with means to do this, his atonement would be of no avail.

The reason why this has not been commonly considered in the systems of theology as making a part of the work of redemption, is, that the Socinians have regarded it as constituting the whole of this work, exclusive of the *atonement of Christ by his sufferings and death*. Evangelical writers, therefore, though they did not en-

tirely omit this important part of Christ's work, passed it by in this connexion, in order to avoid all fellowship with such an opinion, and to afford no appearance of diminishing in the least from the influence of the atonement or satisfaction of Christ. But in conformity with the Bible, even the ancient fathers considered both of these things as belonging to the work of redemption—e. g., Cyril of Alexandria, Leo the Great, and Gregory the Great. The latter says, "Christ became man, not only to atone for us by his sufferings and death; but also to instruct us, and to give us an example." This is the full scriptural idea of ἀπολύτρωσις. Cf. s. 106, II. Therefore redemption (ἀπολύτρωσις) comprises the two following parts—viz., (1) Deliverance from the punishment of sin (ἵλασμός, atonement, καταλλαγή); (2) from the power and dominion of sin. The former is effected by his sufferings and death, and is confirmed by his resurrection and intercession. The latter is effected by his doctrine, accompanied by divine power (the assistance of the Holy Spirit,) and by his example.

The connexion of these two parts, as we learn it from scripture and experience, is this:—When an individual is assured of his forgiveness through Christ, he is filled with the most sincere love and gratitude to God and to Christ. "He to whom much is forgiven, loves much;" Luke, vii. 47. These feelings render him disposed and desirous to obey the commands of God and Christ. This obedience, flowing from love, is not burdensome, but easy and joyful; 1 John, v. 3, seq. The actual participation in the benefits of this second part of Christ's work, belongs, therefore, in all its extent, to those only who have experienced the benefits of the former part. A Christian teacher, therefore, proceeds preposterously, and contrary to the example of the holy scriptures, when he exhibits and inculcates only the second part, either passing the first in silence, or exciting doubts with regard to it, or casting contempt upon it. He ought to connect the two parts, and to exhibit them clearly and scripturally, as the apostles have done. The method of the apostles has been proved the best by experience. Whenever the atonement of Christ, or the first part of the work of redemption, has been omitted, little has been effected by preaching morality, and holding up the example of Jesus. Men may be taught in this way what they should be, but are left ignorant of the means of becoming so.

II. This Doctrine True and Scriptural.

It is the doctrine of the Bible, that Christ became man, not only to free us from the punishment of sin, but from sin itself. Jesus himself says this, John, viii. 32, 36, seq. Cf. John, vi. The writings of the apostles contain passages

of the same import—e. g., Titus, ii. 11—14. Here Paul shews Titus what he ought to teach. He says (ver. 11, 12), that Christianity makes men pious and virtuous, and gives them the most cheerful anticipations of the future. Now (ver. 14) he mentions the *redemption* of Christ, implying (a) that he died for us (ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν); (b) that he designed to deliver us (λυτρώσεται) from all unrighteousness (ἀπὸ πάσης ἀνομίας), and make us the friends of God, and ready for all good works, (Christian virtues.) Here plainly ἀπολύτρωσις implies both the particulars above mentioned. So 1 Pet. i. 18, Christ delivered us (λυτροῦν) ἐκ ματαίας ἀναστροφῆς, *from a sinful, heathenish, vicious life*. Ephes. ii. 9, 10, “We are *παιδοῦντες ἐν Χριστῷ ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς*”—i. e., renewed, placed in a situation in which we can act virtuously. Gal. i. 4, “Christ gave himself *περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν* (to deliver us from sin), and to rescue us from our former condition in the service of sin, (ὥπως ἐξέλθῃται ἐκ τοῦ αἵματος πονηροῦ.)” The two things are connected still more clearly, 1 Pet. ii. 24, “Christ suffered on the cross the punishment of our sins; we ought therefore to die to sin, and live entirely for holiness. For to his sufferings are we indebted for all our blessedness (this *twofold good*); *by his stripes we are healed.*”

In order deeply to impress the mind with the close connexion and the practical use of both of these parts, the apostles frequently transfer the terms relating to the death of Christ to the moral improvement or holiness of men, effected by him. E. g., We ought to die spiritually to sin, as he died for it bodily; to *rise*, &c. Vide the texts already cited; also Rom. vi. 4; viii. 10, &c.

More important still are the passages which teach that Christ delivered us from the *power and dominion of Satan*, as Ephes. ii. 2; that he has *destroyed the power of the devil*, &c.; John, xii. 31, seq. This phraseology is best explained by the passage, 1 John, iii. 8, ὁ ποιῶν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκ διαβόλου ἐστίν (diaboli filius, or *diabolo similis*, ver. 12; John, viii. 44); for he sinned of old (ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς). Again, Εἰς τοῦτο ἐφανερώθη ὁ Υἱὸς Θεοῦ, ἵνα λύσῃ ἔργα διαβόλου. The latter clause, ἔργα διαβόλου, is clearly synonymous with ἁμαρτίαι. Sins are thus described, because the devil is regarded as the author of them, and because by committing sin we resemble him, and are instruments in his hand; as, on the contrary, ἔργα Θεοῦ, are *virtuous and pious actions*—such as flow from likeness to God, or love to him.

III. The manner in which Christ delivers us from Sin.

If we would obtain definite conceptions upon this subject, we must come down to the simplest

possible ideas, and avoid the vague and obscure expressions with which mystics are wont to darken their own views. In representing the matter briefly, writers are often content with saying that *new power and ability* to do good is afforded us by Christ. This representation accords perfectly with the holy scriptures, with the promise of Christ, and with Christian experience. From this language, however, we are not to understand that any *miraculous* assistance is furnished by Christ. This power is usually afforded in a natural manner, and the scriptures themselves clearly point out the means by which it is obtained. That Christ frequently and distinctly promised his aid and support at *all times* to all his followers, if they on their part performed the requisite conditions, is made certain from the scriptures; Matt. xxviii. 20. The term *δύναμις Χριστοῦ* occurs frequently in John and in the epistles. Vide John, xv. 1, seq.; 2 Cor. xii. 9; 2 Pet. i. 3, 4.

This assistance of God and Christ which is promised to Christians in connexion with their use of the Christian doctrine, does not act in a manner inconsistent with the powers and constitution of human nature, but wholly in accordance with them. According to the wise constitution of our nature, all our actions are principally dependent upon the fixed determination of the *will*, which is again dependent upon the *strength and clearness* of the motives present to the *understanding*. Now we are frequently hindered by external circumstances which are beyond our control from the practice of virtue. In this case we are without guilt, and the omission cannot be imputed to us. (Here, however, we are liable to deception by thinking we are without fault, when this is not true.) But often the fault is in ourselves. We allow sense to rule our reason. We refuse properly to consider the motives placed before us, or we neglect opportunity of instructing ourselves respecting duty; or are chargeable, perhaps, with both of these faults. If now, in this case, we disobey the law of God, we are apt to bemoan our weakness and want of power for doing good. Such faults and weakness of the understanding and will cannot be corrected by any miraculous power afforded by Christ; and the virtue which should be effected by such a miraculous power would cease to be a personal virtue of the one in whom it was wrought, and consequently could not be imputed to him. There is no other way but for man to learn the motives to piety and the avoiding of sin which are presented in the Christian doctrine, and to form the fixed resolve that, under divine guidance and assistance, he will govern his own will by what he knows to be the will of God and Christ. Only then, when he has done everything on his part, can he count upon the divine assistance. Until man has

done his part, he is incapable of that assistance which God and Christ have promised to afford. If we are wanting in this thankful love to God and Christ, which has been before insisted upon, we must also be wanting in the disposition either to learn or obey his will; and in this condition, we are of course disqualified for his assistance.

These remarks lead directly to the answer of the question, How are we delivered by Christ from the power and dominion of sin? When we derive the motives for obedience to the divine precepts from the instructions and example of Christ, and suffer these to control our affections, and when we do this from grateful love to God and to Christ, we then fulfil the conditions which are essential on our part, in order that we may rely upon this promised guidance and assistance. We shall shew, in the following section, what is taught in the Bible respecting the efficacy of the instruction and example of Christ, in overcoming the power of sin. By the *instruction* of Christ we obtain exact and distinct information respecting the nature of sin and its consequences, &c. His *instruction* and *example* shew the means and motives for avoiding sin, and leading upright and pious lives, (*δικαίως καὶ ἐνσεβῶς*.)

SECTION CXVII.

OF THE DELIVERANCE FROM THE POWER AND DOMINION OF SIN, FOR WHICH WE ARE INDEBTED, UNDER DIVINE ASSISTANCE, TO THE INSTRUCTION AND EXAMPLE OF CHRIST.

I. Scriptural Doctrine respecting the Efficacy of Christ's Instructions in subduing Sin.

(1) THE doctrine of Christ informs us distinctly what are the requisitions of the divine law, and how we should order our life in conformity with them; it teaches us to notice every deviation from this law, and the dreadful consequences of disobedience; and it gives these instructions in a manner which is plain and intelligible to every mind. This comprehensive and complete instruction as to the whole extent of Christian duty gives the Christian doctrine a great advantage above other moral codes, in which only the more violent outbreaks of sin are at all noticed. The apostles everywhere exhibit, with great earnestness, this advantage of the Christian doctrine, and Christ himself declares it to have been one great object of his coming into the world, to give this instruction. Accordingly, Matt. v. 21, seq., he gives examples of this more complete instruction about the duties of man, as drawn from the divine commands.

Those religious teachers, therefore, mistake very much who make the *doctrines of faith* the only subjects of discourse, entirely omitting

Christian ethics, and perhaps speaking contemptuously of them. These moral instructions constitute a most valuable portion of the Christian system. Even the enemies of Christianity, both in ancient and modern times, have done justice to the morality of the gospel. But our own age does not need to be warned so much against this fault as against the opposite one of inculcating the mere morality of the Bible, and of speaking disrespectfully of the evangelical doctrines. The teachers of religion should connect the two together, as the sacred writers do, and should draw the motives to holiness, virtue, and moral purity from the doctrines of the Christian religion. Vide s. 116, I. ad finem. It was not the manner of Christ to teach the duties without the doctrines of religion. Neither he nor his apostles separated the one from the other. The gospel contains both. The doctrine respecting Christ, and the other great doctrines of faith, afford a powerful support to moral lessons, and so they are uniformly employed by the apostles. This method, however much disregarded at present, deserves to be seriously recommended to every teacher of religion who is desirous of promoting the true and lasting interest of his hearers. Christian ethics teach us our duty; and Christian doctrines open the sources from which we must draw strength to perform it. In popular discourse, then, instruction in morals should always be connected with and derived from evangelical doctrines.

(2) The Christian doctrine gives full instruction respecting the manner of suppressing our sinful inclinations, and the means we should use to overcome temptation to sin, to weaken the power of sense, and to make constant advances in holiness. Tit. ii. 11, seq., "The salutary system of Christianity is designed by God for all men. It teaches us (*παυδεύουσα*) to renounce all irreligion (*ἀσέβεια*), and all the sinful passions that prevail among men (*σοφίαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι*); and, on the contrary, to live wisely, piously, and virtuously on the earth." 2 Pet. i. 3, 4, seq. This passage contains the following truths:—"God gives us power to lead a *virtuous life* (*ζωὴ καὶ ἐσέβεια*), and shews us the means of doing this *by the knowledge of God*," (i. e., the Christian scheme, whose author is God.) Ver. 4, "By this knowledge we attain to pious and godlike dispositions, (*θείας κοινωνίας φύσεως*, as children resembling our Father,) and distinguish ourselves from the great mass of mankind, who live in immorality." "Thus we are placed in a situation to practise all the Christian virtues, (ver. 5—7,) and are not *ἀγροὶ οὐδὲ ἀκαρποί*," (i. e., are always employed in works of virtue, and disposed to whatever is good.)

Christianity therefore justly requires of its friends, to whom it gives such perfect instruc-

tion as to the observance of the divine precepts, to maintain the most unsullied purity of character. John is fully justified in declaring (1 John, ii. 4,) that he is a liar who professes to be a friend and follower of Christ, and does not keep his commandments. The same writer justly remarks that the Christian who is in earnest in overcoming his sins, and who acts out of pure love to God and to Christ, will not find it difficult to fulfil the commands of God, *αἱ ἐντολαὶ αὐτοῦ βαρεῖαι οὐκ εἰσίν*; 1 John, v. 3, coll. Matt. xi. 30. He therefore assures us, in entire conformity with experience, that a true Christian, by his obedience to Christian rules, and by constant exercise, can advance so far, that virtue will become his confirmed habit, and the preponderating disposition to sin will become subordinate, *οὐ δύναται ἁμαρτάνειν*, 1 John, iii. 8, 9.

Note.—Paul and the other apostles were accustomed to connect the *history* of the person of Jesus Christ, in his humiliation and exaltation, with his doctrine. From this history they deduce some of the advantages which we enjoy as Christians, and also some of our duties and the motives to the discharge of them; or they refer to this history in inculcating these duties, in order to render them more impressive. Thus they frequently ascribe to the sufferings and death of Christ a power to subdue sin, and to excite pious affections. An example of this is Heb. ix. 14, seq., “If even the blood of beasts took away external impurity, and rendered those who were expiated externally clean, according to the law of Moses, how much more must the blood of Christ purify us from *sin*” (dead works)—i. e., render us holy; “that we may be placed in a situation to worship God in a manner acceptable to him.” Still more clear is the passage 2 Cor. v. 15, “He died for all, *that* they should not live according to their own choice (*ἑαυτῶ*), but according to the will and commands of Christ, who died for them.” The love of Christ in offering up himself for them, should incite them to grateful love, and to willing obedience to his commands; 1 Peter, i. 18, 19, “Christ delivered us by his *blood* from an idolatrous and sinful course of life.” There are many more passages of the same nature.

From a comparison of these texts it is easy to see that no direct or miraculous physical agency is here ascribed to the death of Christ, nor any power derived from it which is peculiar and distinct from the influence of the doctrine respecting Christ. The influence of the death of Christ in promoting a reformed and holy life, takes place in the following way:—The consideration of the death of Christ promotes (*a*) abhorrence and dread of sin, and regard for the divine law, while we see so severe a punishment inflicted upon Christ. In the death of

Christ, then, we see sin, in all its dreadful consequences, and the inviolable sanctity of the divine law. (*b*) Love, gratitude, obedience to God and Christ, and zeal in obeying his commandments, are also effects of contemplating Christ’s death. Thus 2 Cor. v. 15, coll. Gal. ii. 20; 1 John, v. 3; Rom. viii. 3, 4, “Because Christ was punished for our sins, we ought, from gratitude, the more carefully to obey the precepts of the law,” (*δικαίωμα νόμου*.) Here, then, the effect is produced upon our *affections* through our *understanding*.

The apostles ascribe a similar influence in promoting reformation and holiness to the *resurrection* of Christ and his *exaltation* in the heavens, 2 Cor. v. 15; Col. iii. 1; Heb. xii. 2. By the resurrection and exaltation of Christ, his whole doctrine, and all which he did for us, receive new importance, and are rendered clear and certain; and if we confide in him, and obey his precepts, we may now look forward with cheerful anticipations to a reward in heaven. For (1) he has gone before to the place whither we shall follow him if we love him, and seek to resemble him, (John, xiv. 2, 3;) and (2) while we continue upon the earth he still cares for us, and is active in promoting our welfare. Christ himself frequently connects these two things, John, xv., xvi., xvii. Vide s. 112, II. What a powerful influence in promoting piety and holiness must these considerations exert upon the heart of every man who cordially believes and embraces them!

II. Influence of Christ’s Example in aiding the Practice of Virtue.

There is a propensity to imitation implanted in all men. Good and evil examples often exert an influence upon the heart indescribably great, and sometimes almost irresistible. This propensity, as well as the love of distinction, ought therefore to be turned to account in education. Good examples do far more to improve and ennoble the character, and to perfect holiness, than mere lessons and rules. *Longum et difficile iter est præcepta*, says Seneca, *breve et efficax per exempla*. Such examples act more strongly and directly upon the senses, and excite the heart to virtue and everything noble and great.

The example of Jesus is held up for imitation everywhere in the New Testament, as the most perfect model of every virtue. It is made the indispensable duty of all his followers to conform to it in all their conduct. Vide 1 John, ii. 6; iii. 3; 1 Pet. ii. 11, “He has left us example (pattern, *ὑπογραμμὸν*), that we should follow his steps.” But the example of Christ is recommended to us for imitation, not only in respect to his general integrity, purity of morals, and entire blamelessness, (in which he

was perfectly exemplary, and the only one indeed who ever was so; vide s. 93; III.;) but also in respect to *particular* virtues, especially those which are more high and difficult, which require a great struggle and effort, such as patience, trust in God, firmness in suffering, the practice of humility and self-denial. In these respects, Christ himself commends his example to the imitation of his followers. Vide 1 Pet. ii. 21—23; Phil. ii. 5, seq. We have still further encouragement to imitate the example of Jesus by the reward bestowed upon him, the man Jesus, in consequence of his piety and virtue, which we also may expect to receive, so far as we are capable of it, if we follow him. Vide Phil. *ubi supra*, and Heb. xii. 2, 3.

It is an excellent rule which is given by some of the ancient Greek philosophers, that in our whole life and in all our actions we should have the example of some great, wise, and virtuous man in view, and that we should imagine him to be the witness and overseer (*custos et pædagogus*) of all our conduct. They advised that we should do everything under the notice, as it were, of such an inspector, and inquire at every step what *he* would do or recommend in this case; would he approve or disapprove? Could I do or say this thing if he were present without blushing? &c. Epictetus (Enchir. c. 51) recommends Socrates and Zeno for models; Seneca (Ep. 11. Extra.), Cato, and Lælius. Christians can select no greater and more perfect man to be the witness of their conduct and guide of their morals than Jesus. And we know, too, that we may not only *imagine* him to be the witness and judge of our conduct, but that he actually is so. He knows all our thoughts and actions, and will be the sole Judge of the living and the dead. So we are taught by Christ himself in his discourses recorded in John, and by all the apostles. Both Christ and his apostles require Christians to do everything *ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ*.

The passage Heb. xii. 1, 2 deserves to be noticed among the many which speak of imitating the example of Christ. Paul first compares the firm and pious sufferers of antiquity, whose example in suffering the Christian ought to imitate, with spectators and witnesses, who look upon our race and contest, and encourage us to perseverance. Among these witnesses is Jesus, who far surpasses the rest, who is the best example of confidence in God, and of every virtue, and who constantly observes us, and will finally reward us if we follow him.

But those only who possess the character described, s. 116, I., *ad finem*, are properly capable of imitating this example of Jesus. Men who have not felt the consciousness that their sins were forgiven, and have not been renewed in the temper of their mind, have no taste or

capacity for this imitation of Christ. Nor can we properly require of them what they in this situation are incapable of performing. We can make them feel, however, if their moral sensibility is not entirely deadened, how far below this example they stand, and how good and salutary it would be for them to imitate it.

PART III. OF CHAPTER IV.

ON THE PRESENT AND FUTURE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WORK OF CHRIST.

SECTION CXVIII.

SCRIPTURAL TITLES OF THE SALVATION PROCURED BY CHRIST FOR MEN; ITS GENERAL NATURE; THE DOCTRINE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT RESPECTING THE ABOLITION OF THE OLD-TESTAMENT DISPENSATION BY CHRISTIANITY, AND THE ADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM IT TO THE WORLD.

I. Scriptural Names of the Blessings of Christianity, and their Nature.

SOME of these names are literal, others figurative. The most common are the following—viz., *Εὐλογία*, בְּרָכָה, denoting every kind of benefit, Ephes. i. 3; Gal. iii. 14. *Χάρις*, חֵן, חֶסֶד, John, i. 16, “Through his infinite love we have obtained *χάριν ἀπὲρ χάριτος*,” an undeserved benefit superior to the other, in opposition to the Mosaic dispensation, (ver. 17,) which could not secure this forgiveness of sin, and the blessings connected with it, which are here intended by the word *χάρις*. The word *ζωή* is also frequently used, *vita vere vitalis, happiness*. Also *ζωοποιεῖσθαι*, *ζῆν*, κ. τ. λ., in opposition to *ἀπολεία* and *θανάτος*, *unhappiness*, John, iii. 36; x. 11; Ephes. ii. 5, where the figure is continued, “Through Christ he has *vivified* and *raised* us up,” &c.

The Jews had anciently very diverse opinions respecting the *nature* of the blessings to be expected from Christ. Only a few of the better instructed conceived that these benefits were entirely of a *spiritual* nature. For such blessings the great mass had no taste. They expected, for the most part, temporal blessings, and hoped, under the Messiah, to be rich, honourable and mighty. Vide s. 89. And these expectations have prevailed in a large portion even of the Christian world. Accordingly, many, in direct opposition to the spirit of Christianity, have associated the promises of earthly good and temporal welfare, made under the Mosaic institute, with the precepts of the New Testament. We may, indeed, hope and expect to obtain from God all that good, even of a temporal nature, or

which we are capable, and of which we stand in need. But through *Christ*, and *observance of his precepts*, we cannot hope to obtain earthly good. For the design of his religion is to withdraw us from earth and sense, to improve and ennoble the heart, and to procure the enjoyment of high spiritual blessedness; Philippians, iii. 14, 17, 20. On this ground, therefore, the Jewish idea of the coming of a millennial kingdom of Christ upon the earth is entirely objectionable. The apostles never indulge in such expectations, but take every opportunity to contradict them. They call those who entertain such ideas *σαρκικοί*, persons who adhere to what is sensible and exterior, have no taste for what is spiritual, and are not therefore real disciples of Jesus. Hence Paul says, Ephes. i. 3, "God has blessed us, through Christ, *πάσῃ ἐδόξα ἡ πνευματικὴ ἐν ἑπουρανίῳ*." *Πνευματικός* is here opposed to *σαρκικός*, and implies that the blessings spoken of are not designed for the body and the senses, but for the mind. The phrase *ἐν τοῖς ἑπουρανίῳ* (sc. *τόποις*; vide verse 20; ii. 6, 12) does not signify *in the Christian church*, but denotes, literally, the blessings which we shall enjoy *in heaven*, which is our home, where we are citizens, (not in the visible world.) Hence in Heb. viii. 6, he calls the blessings which are bestowed upon us through Christ, in comparison with the promises made under the Mosaic dispensation, *κρίττονα ἀγαθά*. In Heb. vii. 19, he says, that there is through Christianity, *ἐπεισαγωγὴ κρείττονος ἐλπίδος*, (i. e. it inspires the hope of more great and distinguished divine favours,) since the Mosaic institute is removed.

The blessings bestowed upon us through Christ are commonly divided into *general* or *public*, (such as relate to the whole human species,) and *particular, privata*, (such as relate to each individual Christian.) Among the former is, as the New Testament everywhere shews, the abolition of Judaism, (the ancient institute,) and the establishment of a new dispensation and institute, by which all the nations of the earth might be united in one common religion. We shall first treat of the removal of the ancient church of God, and of the establishment of the new; and then of the particular benefits of Christianity.

II. The Abolition of the Mosaic Institute, and the Union of Jews and Gentiles in one common Religion.

(1) The Israelitish constitution and religion (*νόμος*) were only temporary and national. They were designed, in their first origin, only for a barbarous and rude people, destitute of moral cultivation. But the human race was not destined to remain always in a state of infancy; and as soon as men were prepared for a more

high, perfect, and spiritual instruction, that more imperfect kind, intended for beginners, would of course be omitted. The Jewish institute was designed to be only preparatory; such is the uniform doctrine of the apostles, especially of Paul. Vide the Introduction, s. 12, where we have cited the most important texts, which are principally contained in the epistles to the Galatians and Hebrews. Now, therefore, according to their instruction, Christ had abolished the law. (Christ himself, for good reasons, gave at first only hints which led to this conclusion—e. g., John, iv. 21—24; x. 16. He left the full development of this doctrine for his disciples.) Rom. x. 4, *τέλος τοῦ νόμου Χριστός*—i. e., *τέλος ἔφερε τῷ νόμῳ*. Heb. vii. 18, 19; Gal. iv. 4, 5; Eph. ii. 14, 15. According to these and other passages Christ has freed his followers from obligation to observe the law of Moses; and the punishments threatened in it do not relate to those who believe in Christ. Vide Gal. iii. 13, *Χριστὸς ἐξηγόρασεν ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς κατάρας τοῦ νόμου*—i. e., from the punishments which the Mosaic law threatens.

Here two questions arise—viz.,

(a) How are we to understand those texts which teach that the Mosaic law and institute are removed and declared to be null by the *crucifixion*? Such texts are, Gal. iii. 13; Eph. ii. 16; iii. 15; and especially Col. ii. 14, "He took it away, and nailed it to his cross,"—by his crucifixion he declared it invalid. The apostles everywhere teach that the new dispensation through Christ (*καινὴ διαθήκη*) commenced at his death, and was by that event solemnly sanctioned and introduced. Eph. v. 25, 26; Heb. xiii. 20; ix. 14, 15, where the preparatory economy of Moses, consisting in sacrifices, is compared with the preparatory economy of Christ, consisting in the sacrifice of himself. Christ himself calls his blood which was shed, *αἷμα καινῆς διαθήκης*, Matthew, xxvi. 28. Consequently, the ancient Israelitish dispensation ceased with the death of Christ, because at that event the new dispensation commenced. We see by this what value was attached to the death of Christ, and how everything in this new dispensation through Christ proceeds from it. The day of his death is the consecration-day of the new covenant. The new covenant is not dated from the time when he began to teach, but from the time of his death.

(b) Are *all* the Mosaic laws abolished by Christ, and no longer obligatory upon Christians? From the passages cited we must certainly answer in the affirmative. But the laws of Moses are of different kinds; and many of the older theologians maintained that Christ abolished only the *ceremonial* and *civil* law of the Israelites, and not the *moral* law, especially that contained in the decalogue. But in the

passages of the New Testament which treat of the abolition of the law there is no allusion to this threefold distinction. Paul includes the whole under νόμος, Romans, vi. 14; Gal. iii. 19, 25. Besides, many of the laws of Moses, which are truly moral, are expressed and stated in such a way as to shew plainly that they were designed, *in that form*, only for the circumstances and wants of the Israelites at the time being—e. g., "Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the land," (Palestine;) and the law respecting the Sabbath.

The mistake upon which this limitation is founded may be pointed out. Moral laws are in themselves universally obligatory, and unalterable as the laws of nature. There are, doubtless, many such moral laws in the code of Moses, as well as of Solon, Lycurgus, and others. But they are not binding upon Christians because they are parts of the Mosaic code, and stand in the decalogue, but (a) because they are founded in the constitution of human nature, which God himself has given us, and are therefore laws of nature, and (b) because Christ has commanded us to obey them. In the same way, we observe the moral laws which stand in the codes of heathen legislators—Confucius, Solon, Lycurgus, &c.; not because they have given them, but because these laws are universal, and founded in our very nature. When a ruler introduces a new statute-book into his dominions, the old book, after its rejection, is no longer the rule by which right and wrong are determined, although much in it still remains true. Just such is the case here. Morus well observes (p. 243, *infra*), that Christians observe the moral precepts in the Mosaic code, *quia ratio dictat, et Christi doctrina proponit, proponendoque confirmat. Judæi vero tenebantur ea observare, quia ratio dictabat, et Moses, jussu divino, præscripserat.*

In this way we may understand the declaration of Christ, Matthew, v. 17—19, "that he was not come to destroy the law and the prophets, (νόμον καὶ προφήτας,) and that all the divine commands contained in them must be punctually obeyed." This does not conflict with the doctrine of Paul. Christ was neither able nor willing to abrogate these *universal laws*, because they were given by God for all men; not, however, because they were given by Moses. It was, on the contrary, the design of Christ still more to illustrate these laws, and to recommend obedience to them by his doctrine and example.

The question, Whether the ten commandments of Moses should be retained in the moral instruction of the common people and of the young, has been much controverted of late. (Cf. Thom. Bocio, Etwas über den Decalogus, oder, von der Verbindlichkeit der zehn Gebote

für die Christen; Schmalkalden, 1789, 8vo; Hufnagel, Ueber den Religionsunterricht, nach den zehn Geboten; Zachariä, Bibl. Theol. th. 4; Less, Döderlein, Reinhard, in their Christian ethics.) From what has been already said, it is plain that the *Ten Commandments* are not obligatory because they are laws given by Moses. They are not therefore, *of necessity*, fundamental in Christian instruction. No injury, however, is to be apprehended from making them so, any more than in the first Christian church, if the manner in which Christ and the apostles allude to the moral precepts of Moses and the Old Testament be only made our model. The intelligent and conscientious teacher will be very cautious in declaring to the common people and the young that the Ten Commandments are abrogated, since he might be easily understood to mean, that the duties enjoined in them are no longer obligatory. The instruction which God has given through Jesus, respecting the moral law and our duties, is much more perfect and extensive than that which was given, or could be given, through Moses. Our hearers should therefore be led directly to this more copious fountain of knowledge. This will not prevent our connecting instruction from the Old Testament with that from the New, as Christ and the apostles did, especially since the history of the Old Testament so well elucidates and explains many points of duty.

In those churches in which the decalogue is incorporated, by their very constitution, into the system of instruction, it is neither necessary nor advisable for the teacher to urge the discontinuance of this custom. By this course he would do more hurt than good. He will proceed more properly and judiciously by confirming, completing, and enlarging from the New Testament all the particular moral precepts contained in the decalogue, making the decalogue, in this way, serve only as a guide to Christian instruction. He will do well also to connect with or append to the catechism a good outline of Christian doctrines and morals, exhibited in a natural order, and in an intelligible and practical manner, according to the holy scriptures.

(2) It was the great object of Jesus to establish an universal religion, by which all nations of the earth might be united in one common worship of God. Vide John, x. 16, "One fold and one Shepherd." Cf. Reinhard, Ueber den Plan des Stifters der christlichen Religion. But this plan in its whole extent could not be carried into effect, nor indeed was it designed to be, until after his departure from the earth. Vide John, xii. 32. In order to render this plan practicable, it was essential that the Mosaic institute should be abrogated, and declared to be thenceforward abolished. Without this, Jews and Christians could never be brought

together, or united in a common religious society. The Jews were distinguished by national pride and contempt for all the rest of mankind. They considered themselves exclusively as a holy people, beloved of God. All other nations seemed to them to be desecrated, and hated by God. They exhibit, as Tacitus says (Hist. v. 5), *Odium hostile adversus omnes gentes*; and, as Paul says, 1 Thess. ii. 15, *a universal misanthropy, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐναντίον*. And what was the occasion of this hatred and separation? Their misunderstanding the Mosaic laws, and putting a false interpretation upon them.

In opposition to this, the great principles of Christianity are, *the love of God and universal philanthropy*, and that all upright and true worshippers of God, of whatever nation they may be, are equally acceptable to him, have equal rights, and an equal share in the blessings of Christianity, John, iv. 21—24; Acts, x. 35; Romans, x. 12; Gal. v. 6. This assimilation and union, by which all distinction between Jew and heathen would cease, could not be brought about except by the abrogation of the Mosaic institute, which was designed by God to be only a preparatory economy. One of the principal passages relating to this subject is Ephes. ii. 12—19, coll. Col. i. 21, seq.; Ephes. ii. 10, seq. “Christ has united the two (Jews and heathen), has done away the cause of their enmity, has established harmony, brought them both together into one society, and given them citizenship in the kingdom of God; this he did by removing the *wall of partition* (μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ, ver. 14), that separated between heathen and Jews, and prevented their becoming one people.” This *wall of partition* was the Mosaic law, as he himself explains it, ver. 15, νόμος ἐντολῶν. This he calls, in ver. 14, ἔχθρα, *the cause of enmity*.

SECTION CXIX.

THE HAPPINESS WHICH CHRISTIANS OBTAIN IN THIS LIFE FROM CHRIST.

We treat now of the *particular* benefits of which every professor of Christianity partakes when he performs the prescribed conditions. Vide s. 118, I. ad fin. As our existence is composed of two very unequal portions, these blessings are likewise of two kinds. We enjoy some of them even in the present life, and others not before we enter the future world; s. 120. It must always be borne in remembrance, that the apostles derived all these spiritual advantages, of whatever kind, from Christ, and that they connect these, as well as the rewards of the pious (*natural and positive*), in such a way with the history of Jesus, that they represent him as the procurer of them all. This method of in-

struction is perfectly suited the wants of mankind. General truths become much more intelligible, clear, and certain, by being placed in connexion with true history, from which they receive a positive sanction. We find that the ancient teachers of religion among the heathen pursued the same course. And this is a proof that they better understood the constitution of man than those Christian teachers who would separate everything historical from the exhibition of Christian truth. Vide s. 108.

The spiritual blessedness which believers in Christ receive through him, even in the present life, consists, according to the doctrine of the New Testament, in the following particulars:—

I. Assurance of the undeserved Benevolence, the Constant Favour, and Paternal Love of God.

The apostle places this class of spiritual benefits in the closest connexion with the whole history of Christ, representing them always as the fruit of the atonement. Their doctrine is, that whoever is sure of the forgiveness of his sins (and this assurance he receives through the atonement of Christ, or through faith in Christ as a Saviour and expiator), and, under the guidance and assistance of God and Christ, lives conformably to the divine precepts (which he learns from the Christian doctrine and from the example of Christ), such an one is capable of receiving the divine blessings which are promised to such, and he can at all times be assured of the favour and paternal love of God; he will be treated by God and Christ as a friend, and made partaker of their happiness, so far as he is susceptible of it.

Various figures and expressions are used in the scriptures to represent these fruits of the atonement, and of faith in it. But they all convey one and the same idea. They ought not therefore, in systems of theology, to be separately considered, in different chapters or articles. The following expressions are some of the most common—viz., *sonship, the right of adoption, election, access to God, and union* with him. We shall now briefly explain these terms.

(1) *ἰοθεσία Θεοῦ*. This is a term which was originally borrowed from the Israelitish church. In the ancient languages the phrase, *children of God*, denotes the peculiar friends, the favourites of the Deity. The Israelites received this name, and also that of *firstborn*, to denote their pre-eminence above other people. Vide Ex. iv. 22, 23. Hence in Rom. ix. 4, the Israelites are said to possess *ἰοθεσία*—i. e., the rights of the favourite people of God. This term is transferred to true Christians, in order to denote the relation which subsists between them and God. Those who endeavour to resemble God in their conduct, and who faithfully obey his commandments, have a higher capacity for happiness and reward than others who are wanting in these

traits of character. We hence conclude, with reason, that God loves and favours them more than others who are unlike him. One who loves God as a son loves his father, and seeks to resemble him as a dutiful son seeks to resemble his father, will be loved by God in return, as a dutiful son is loved by his father. All the advantages and spiritual benefits, therefore, which we obtain through faith in Christ, and obedience to his precepts, are considered as belonging to *νιοθεσία*, because they are all proofs of the paternal love of God. Vide Gal. iv. 4, 5; iii. 26; Rom. viii. 15 (*πνεῦμα νιοθεσίας*, a filial disposition), and ver. 23 (the reward of Christians); Ephes. i. 5; 1 John, iii. 1, 2. This right of adoption we owe to Christ, as the author of Christianity and our Saviour. Those only possess this right who believe in him as Χριστός and Σωτήρ. Hence John declares (i. 12), "He gives to all who believe on him the privilege (*ἐξουσία*) of considering themselves the *children of God*;" which privilege they obtain, according to ver. 13, not by descent from pious ancestors, according to the Jewish prejudice, but solely by true faith in Jesus Christ, and from the holiness and likeness to God arising from and connected with faith.

The apostles give this appellation to the sincere worshippers of God the more readily and frequently on account of the name of Christ, *τίς Θεός*. God treats Christians as his peculiar friends on account of Christ, who is his most beloved and chief favourite, *πρωτότοκος, μονογενής*. Vide Gal. iii. 26, 27; iv. 4—7.

Pious Christians are thus called the *children of God* in a twofold sense: (a) because they love God as their Father, and obey him from love; (b) because they, on account of this disposition, are loved in return by God, as obedient children, and so obtain from him forgiveness of sins and other Christian blessings. Both of these ideas are sometimes implied at the same time in this term.

[In the older writers of the English church (as well as in the ancient fathers, and the most devout and spiritual writers of other nations,) we frequently meet with the idea, that the relation existing between man and God, denoted by *sonship*, is not merely a relation of *feeling*, but also of *nature*. This is sometimes illustrated by saying that we are not adopted by God into his family in the same manner in which a wealthy benefactor sometimes adopts a destitute and orphan child, conferring upon him great privileges, and giving him the name of *son*, to which he has no natural title. In such a case, this name would denote only that the person on whom it was conferred held the same place in the affections of the benefactor, and exercised in return the same feelings of gratitude and dutiful reverence as an own son would

in similar circumstances. And this seems to be the more general sense in which this appellation was used in reference to the friends and worshippers of God before the Christian dispensation, and to those few who, like the devout Cornelius, are found fearing God even in the midst of heathenism. But this term, when applied to believers in the New Testament, has a superior meaning, and points to the gift of the Spirit of adoption, which, in the highest sense, is peculiar to the Christian dispensation, and consequent upon the completion of Christ's work. By being born of God, and receiving this peculiar grace, the Spirit of adoption, believers become partakers of "the divine nature," and possessed of an internal principle, the fruits of which are the love and obedience in which the essential nature of sonship is sometimes placed, but which are in reality only the signs or effects of that new life in which it really consists. The possession of this Spirit by Christ, though in a far higher degree of intimacy, seems to be one of the grounds of his bearing the title of Son. And the manner of the Spirit's presence and operation in believers is compared by the sacred writers with the hypostatical union of the divine and human natures in Christ. These ideas may be, indeed, carried so far as to involve error. But it is an important question whether they have not a scriptural basis. Is the comparative infrequency, in our later theological writings, of these ideas, which were so current in the fathers of the English church, the result of an advance or a decline in theological science?—Tr.]

(2) All the words which literally signify to *choose* and *elect* are frequently employed in order to denote the distinguished *favour* and *love* of God to his people. We are accustomed to select from many things that which is the best, most desirable, and valuable. Hence to say a thing is *chosen* is often the same as to say it is *valuable* or *useful*—e. g., *σπεῖος ἐκλογής*, Acts, ix. 15. Now, because our love rests upon those objects which appear to us good and valuable, the words which in the oriental languages signify to *select*, signify also to *love*, to *wish well* to *any one*, to *benefit him*, in a distinguished manner. In the same way is *בחר* used in Hebrew—e. g., Deut. iv. 57, where *בחר* is added. The LXX. sometimes render it by the word *ἐκλέγεσθαι*, as in the passage cited, and sometimes by *ἐνδοξεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν*. The New Testament employs the words *ἐκλέγεσθαι* and *ἐκλεκτός* in the same manner. In the Old Testament, the Israelites were denominated, by way of eminence, the *chosen* or *beloved* (*בְּחֻרִים*) of God. This term was then transferred to Christians, who become worthy of the love of God by faith in Jesus Christ, and by conduct conformed entirely to the divine will—e. g., Matt. xxiv. 24; 1 Pet. ii. 9. *Ἐκλέ-*

γινώσκει is therefore *Christianum facere*, as 1 Cor. i. 27, 28. In the same way the *verba cognoscendi*, in the ancient languages mean *to love, to be friendly to any one*. Thus Christians are said to be γινώσκοντες ἰπὸ Θεοῦ, *amici Deo*. Gal. iv. 9; 1 Cor. viii. 3, coll. Ps. lv. 14.

(3) The terms which denote the *drawing near* of God to men, or *union* with him. God was conceived of by the ancient world as corporeal, and as resembling man. Thus many believed that he was literally and actually more present in one place than in another, and that he approached the place where he wished to exert his power, and that otherwise he *withdrew* or *absented* himself. Vide s. 23, II. From such conceptions a multitude of figurative expressions have arisen in all the ancient languages. These expressions appear very gross and unworthy of God. At first, however, they were literally understood by the great mass of mankind. But afterwards, as the views of men became enlarged and improved, they were understood figuratively, and were interpreted in such a way as to be consistent with the divine perfections. The terms, *the approach, or coming of God to any one, the connexion of God with any one*, denote a high degree of his favour and love, and of the active display of these feelings, his assistance and agency; and so the *withdrawment of God, and his forsaking any one*, denote, on the other hand, the withdrawing of his love and the benefits resulting from it. Thus קָרַב denotes the *friendship of God*, Ps. lxxiii. 28, coll. Zech. ii. 10, 11. And thus Christ promises to his disciples that he and his Father would *come* and make their abode with them—i. e., would be always connected with them, and never withhold from them their special assistance and protection; in short, would be to them what one friend is to another in guiding and upholding him; ver. 21, ἐμφανίζεν. Thus Jesus consoles his disciples who were lamenting his departure. Cf. Rev. iii. 20, and Matt. xxviii. 20. The terms, ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν (or μένομεν) ἐν Θεῷ, Θεὸς ἐστὶν (or μένει) ἐν ἡμῖν, which occur John xvii. 21, and 1 John, iii. 24, &c., denote, in the same way, a high degree of the special favour and friendship of God, agreement of disposition with him, and his assistance connected with his favour. Cf. John, xv. 1, “Whoever is and remains faithful and devoted to him shall be treated by him in the same manner in return; he shall be united to him, as the branch is united to the vine.”

From these and similar passages the mystics have taken occasion to speak of a *secret union* (*unio mystica*) with God and Christ. They commonly express this by the terms, *the indwelling of God in the heart, sinking down into God, the communication of God, the enjoyment*

of him, &c. &c. Some of them associated very gross conceptions with these phrases; cf. s. 23. After the eleventh and twelfth centuries such language became more common in the Western church. It was understood by some in a literal manner, and in a sense unworthy of the character of God; by others, in a manner entirely conformed to the Bible, but yet sometimes too indistinctly. Luther, Melancthon, and other reformers, retained the phraseology of the ancient mystics, and it was adopted into the systems of theology. Some made a special article on the subject of the *mystical union*; though Melancthon and others took pains to controvert the gross ideas of the fanatical mystics. Hence it came to pass that this phraseology was thus used mostly in homiletical and catechetical discourses, and that formerly many sermons and books were written upon this subject.

In the holy scriptures these terms denote sometimes the agreement of the dispositions of the pious with the law of God; sometimes the peculiar favour and friendship of God towards them, and the special proofs of it, and also their enjoyment and feeling of the tokens of this friendship.

There is no reason, therefore, for making a particular article in the systems of theology upon this subject. Caution, however, should be used in Christian instruction to prevent the notion that there is anything properly miraculous in this matter which is not according to the Bible. This caution is the more necessary, as many enthusiastic parties frequently employ such expressions with regard to these divine influences, and give them such a meaning as implies an *immediate illumination* independent of the holy scriptures. So the Quakers and Bohemians. And it has sometimes happened that well-meaning though unenlightened Christians have received the doctrine of these sectarians as scriptural because it was expressed in scriptural phraseology.

Another reason for calling these proofs of the love of God, and the experience of them, *unio mystica*, is, that they are inward, and enjoyed by spiritual fellowship, and are unseen and disregarded by those who have no taste or capacity for such experiences. A satisfactory and full explanation of these feelings cannot be given to those who have no experience of them, as is the case with all matters of experience. Paul said, very truly, Col. iii. 3, “*Your (the true Christian’s) life in God*, (i. e., your divine life, which is acceptable to God—your happy life as Christians,) like the present life of Christ in heaven, in the full enjoyment of happiness, is concealed (κρυπταί) from the great multitude of men;” they do not regard it as happy or desirable because they have no taste for it.

II. *Happiness and Peace of Mind, and a joyful Prospect of the Future.*

We owe to Christ, according to the doctrine of the New Testament,

(1) *Inward peace and happiness.* These spring from the firm conviction that through Christ we have obtained from God the forgiveness of sin, and from the joyful consciousness of the power of God, and his approbation of our feelings and conduct. This state of mind is frequently expressed in the New Testament by *παῖρσις*, *cheerful confidence in God*, in opposition to an anxious and slavish fear of punishment. Thus Heb. iv. 16, *προσερχώμεθα μετὰ παῖρσις τῷ θρόνῳ τῆς χάριτος*, "We may now with joyful confidence expect unmingled good from God, and supplicate him for it." 1 John, iv. 17, *παῖρσις ἔχειν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κρίσεως*, to be able to look forward to the day of judgment with cheerfulness. Cf. 1 John, iii. 20, 21, *peace of God, or with God*. Rom. v. 1, 2, *Εἰρήνην πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἔχομεν, δικαιοσύνην—προσαγωγήν εἰς χάριν Θεοῦ*, &c. Ver. 11, "We can at all times rejoice in the assurance of divine favour, (*καυχώμεθα ἐν Θεῷ*;) and this, Christ by his atonement has enabled us to do." By this assurance and confidence the soul of the true Christian comes to such a firm, steadfast, and composed frame, as enables him to endure unmoved the greatest trials. He is deeply convinced that the greatest adversities contribute to his highest good, and are the means which God, as a kind father, employs for the welfare of his children, whom he is educating not merely for this short life, but for eternity, Rom. v. 3; viii. 28, 32.

(2) *The most cheerful prospect of the future, or a certain hope of our future blessedness.* One great object of Christian instruction is, to awaken, confirm, and cherish this hope. It is always used as a motive to diligence in holiness, to self-denial, and to steadfastness in all the sufferings and adversities of the present life. Rom. v. 2, *ἐλπὶς δοξῆς Θεοῦ*—i. e., of the divine rewards. Rom. viii. 17, 18, 24, seq.; 1 Pet. i. 3; 2 Cor. vii. 1, 4, 8, seq. All this is everywhere connected with the history of the person of Jesus in his humiliation and exaltation; and confirmation of the views now given is drawn from his *sufferings and death*, as Heb. ix. 15; from his *resurrection and subsequent exaltation*, as John, vii. 28; xvii. 24; 1 Thess. v. 8—10. By his death we are delivered from death. His resurrection and his exalted station are pledges to us that he will actually perform all that he promised, and will bring us to that place to which he has gone before—to our proper home, and our Father's house.

We ought not, however, in hope of the future world, to forget the present. We should re-

member that God designs that we should live for the present world, and that our happiness hereafter depends upon our good improvement of the time now allotted us. Faith in Christ and grateful obedience to all his requirements should render us happy even here. 1 Tim. iv. 8, *εὐσέβεια—εὐπαγγελίαν (ἔχει) ζωῆς τῆς νῦν καὶ τῆς μελλούσης*. This cheerfulness and joy which so visibly distinguish the pious Christian, and more than ever in the midst of sufferings and adversities, often compel those who are without to wish that they were as pious and as enviably happy as they see him to be. Many are in the case of King Agrippa, (Acts, xxvi. 28,) who confessed that but little was wanting to persuade him to become a Christian. But they stop here, because they are unwilling to employ the simple means necessary for obtaining the Christian character, and dread to sacrifice their sinful propensities.

SECTION CXX.

THE HAPPINESS WHICH CHRISTIANS OBTAIN THROUGH CHRIST IN THE FUTURE LIFE.

THIS subject also is placed in the New Testament in the most intimate connexion with the history of the person of Jesus Christ, and is deduced from it. He is the procurer of this happiness. This subject needs only to be briefly and summarily stated here; since the scripture doctrine respecting the happy and unhappy condition of men after death will be more fully exhibited, s. 147, et seq.

I. *Our Deliverance from Death obtained through Christ.*

Death is always represented in the New Testament as the effect and consequence of sin. Now since Christ has delivered from the consequences and punishment of sin, he must also be regarded as the cause of our deliverance from death. The resurrection of the dead—i. e., the complete restoration of the whole man, both as to soul and body, is a blessing for which the human race is indebted, according to the New Testament, to Christ. Vide John, xi. 25; 1 Cor. xv. 22. The resurrection of the dead was generally believed among the Jews at the time of Christ and the apostles, and only the Sadducees denied it. But Christianity gave to this doctrine a new support and sanction. It now became intimately connected with the religion of Jesus and with the history of his person, like everything else relating to the deliverance and welfare of man.

(1) Christ and the apostles have the merit, which is unquestionably great, of casting new light upon the doctrine of life beyond the grave, and the future restoration of the whole man, and

giving it a certainty it never had before. They exhibited this truth in such a way that on one side it serves for the comfort and consolation of mankind, and on the other, to urge powerfully to the practice of goodness and holiness in the present life. Vide Heb. ii. 15; 1 Thess. iv. 13, 18; 1 Cor. xv. 30, 57, 58; Acts, xxiv. 14—16. Paul therefore says, very truly, 2 Tim. i. 10, that Christ is φώτισας ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου—i. e., by his instructions he brought to light, and clearly and infallibly revealed, the doctrine of a happy immortality.

(2) But this doctrine is intimately connected in the New Testament with the history of the person of Christ. According to the New Testament we are indebted for our hope of a future restoration to life by the resurrection,

(a) *To the death of Christ.* For the deliverance of man from every kind of misery, and from all the punishment of sin, and consequently from death, is always derived in the New Testament from the death of Jesus. Vide s. 111. The clearest passage of this kind is Hebrews, ii. 14, "Christ became man in order to take away (ἵνα καταργήσῃ) by his death the power of him who is the author of death, *the devil*," (from whom death and every calamity is derived, since he is regarded as the author of sin, which brought death in its train. Vide 1 Cor. xv. 56.) Here belongs also the passage, Rom. v. 14—19, where Christ is compared with Adam. Adam brought death into the world by his disobedience, Christ brought in *life* by his obedience, (ἰπακοή, willing obedience to the divine will, especially to the divine purpose that he should suffer and die for us.) The same thing is briefly expressed, 1 Cor. xv. 21, thus:—"As Adam was the cause of the death of all men, so all owe it to Christ that they shall be raised at the last." This corresponds with the language, ver. 55, θάνατος κατεπόδη εἰς νίκην, *death overcome (by him), henceforth ceases*; and also with 2 Tim. i. 10, καταργήσας τὸν θάνατον, *taking away the power of death, vanquishing it*—i. e., freeing men from it, and awaking them to eternal life. And in the Revelation of John, the victory of Christ is made to consist principally in the fact that through him *death ceased to be*; Rev. xxi. 4, θάνατος οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι, or, *was cast into the lake of fire*, xx. 14—i. e., was removed and able no more to hurt.

Note.—The Bible mentions it as one of the blessings resulting from the work of Christ, that all mankind will be raised by him—e. g., 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, coll. John, v. 21, seq., and consequently the wicked as well as the good. Some theologians, indeed, have objected to considering resurrection in the case of the impenitent as a *blessing*, and have rather regarded it as a punishment. But a great value is ascribed in the Bible

to mere existence, even in the present life, where we live in the midst of so many evils and adversities. Life in itself is always more valuable than non-existence, or annihilation; although it seems that for some men it would have been better never to have been born; as Christ himself says, doubtless in the language of a current proverb, Matt. xxvi. 24. Now although the wicked are to be punished in the future world through their own fault, the preservation of their life does not on this account cease to be a blessing; still less is it changed itself into a punishment, by the punishments which will be consequent upon it. The ancient fathers, Athanasius, Augustine, Theodoret, Hilarius, and others, understood the subject very much in this way.

(b) *To the resurrection of Christ.* Morus, p. 175, s. 3.

The New Testament teaches, that from the resurrection of Christ we may and should argue the possibility and reality of our own. Was God able to raise Christ, and did he actually raise him, from the dead; he is both able to raise us, and will actually do so. The resurrection of Christ is therefore a sensible confirmation of the doctrine of our resurrection. So Paul argues, 1 Cor. xv. 12—20. In Acts, iv. 2, it is said that the apostles taught through Jesus *the resurrection of the dead*—i. e., by his example. As God raised up Christ in order to confer upon him a reward in heaven, we are to share in the same reward and happiness, and to be with Christ. We can therefore be certain of our resurrection; 1 Thess. iv. 14; 2 Cor. iv. 14; 1 Peter, i. 21. Christ is therefore called ἀπαρχὴ κεκοιμημένων, 1 Cor. xv. 20, 23, and πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, *the first that rose*, Col. i. 18, because he must be ἐν πᾶσι πρωτεύων. Cf. progr. "de nexu resurrectionis Jesu Christi mortuis et mortuorum," in *scripta varii argumenti*, N. ix.

(c) *To the more perfect condition of Christ in heaven.* Christ and the apostles everywhere teach that it is the will of God that Christ should continue and complete in heaven the great work which he commenced on earth for the restoration of the human race. He has therefore empowered Christ to raise the dead and to hold a day of judgment, with which Christ will accomplish his great work for the good of man. He himself declares this, John, v. 21, 25—29, and represents this charge as entrusted to him by the Father. In John, xi. 25, he says, ἐγὼ εἶμι ἡ ἀνάστασις καὶ ἡ ζωὴ—i. e., the cause of the resurrection and vivification of men, he to whom they are indebted for this; cf. ver. 26. Paul says, Rom. xiv. 9, that by his death and resurrection he has shewn himself to be Lord (κυριεύειν) of the dead and living; and 1 Cor. xv. 25, 26, he will conquer and disable death, the last enemy of the human race. Cf. s. 98, 99.

II. *Our Deliverance from Punishment after Death, and our Happiness in the Future World obtained through Christ.*

The consequences and punishment of sin continue even into the future world; and it is there first, according to the scriptures, that the positive punishments of sin are completely inflicted. Now Christ has not only freed us from these punishments (eternal condemnation) on certain conditions to be fulfilled by us, (vide Romans, v. 9; 1 Thess. i. 10, *ἡνόμενος ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης*;) but we owe to him our whole welfare and blessedness in the future world, (*ζωὴ αἰώνιος*.) There the happiness begun in the present life will continue and be perfected, and everything by which it is now interrupted will be removed. Besides, according to the New Testament, we may expect that God will there confer positive blessings and rewards. Paul says, 1 Thess. v. 9, *ἔσται ἡμᾶς ὁ Θεὸς οὐκ εἰς ὀργὴν, ἀλλ' εἰς περιποίησιν σωτηρίας* (the attainment of happiness) *διὰ Χριστοῦ*. But how do we attain this happiness through Christ?

(1) *By the doctrine of Christ.* This gives us (a) Information respecting the nature of future happiness, so far as we are now capable of understanding it. Vide 1 Timothy, i. 10; 1 Cor. xv. (b) Direction how we may obtain the possession of it. The religion of Christ derives motives to piety and godliness from the blessedness of the future world, shews us the means by which we may attain it, and prepares us for it. John, iii. 16; vi. 51; 1 John, ii. 25, the great end of the Christian religion (*ἐπαγγελία*) is to give men *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*. By the Christian doctrine, and obedience to it, we are made (through divine assistance) to resemble the holiness and righteousness of Christ in this world, in order that we may hereafter be rewarded, as he is; 1 John, iv. 17; 2 Thess. ii. 13, 15; iv. 14. Hence the Christian doctrine itself is called *ζωή* and *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, because it shews ὁδὸν ζωῆς; John, xvii. 3. But,

(2) Our enjoyment of this happiness is described as principally owing to *Christ's death and subsequent exaltation*. (a) Our entire freedom from misery and our being placed in a happy condition is ascribed to the death of Christ, (vide No. I.,) and consequently the happiness of the future state must also be a consequence of this event. Heb. ix. 15, "We obtain through the death of Christ *ἐπαγγελίαν αἰωνίου κληρονομίας*." 1 Thess. v. 10, "He died for us," *ἵνα σὺν αὐτῷ ζήσωμεν*. (b) Since Christ is exalted in heaven, he cares for the good of men. He is *αὐτίος σωτηρίας αἰωνίου τοῖς ἀπακούουσιν αὐτῷ πάνσι*, Heb. v. 9, coll. vii. 25. And as he has received power from the Father to raise the dead and hold a day of judgment, he

has also received charge from him to distribute rewards to the righteous and to introduce his followers into the abodes of the blessed. Vide Matt. xxv. 32, seq.; John, x. 28, 29, *ζωὴν αἰώνιον δίδωμι αὐτοῖς*, xvii. 2; 2 Tim. iv. 18, et seq.

ARTICLE XI.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONDITIONS OF SALVATION.

This Article, and the following, exhibit the manner in which Christians may attain to the promised happiness. The Eleventh Article treats of the conditions which the Christian doctrine prescribes to men, and which must be performed by them if they would actually enjoy this blessedness. These conditions are, *repentance and faith*. The Twelfth Article treats of the assistances by which God enables men to perform the prescribed conditions, or, technically speaking, *De operationibus gratiæ, sive de æconomia gratiæ*.

SECTION CXXI.

ON THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF "FAITH," AS THE ONLY CONDITION OF SALVATION; TOGETHER WITH REMARKS RESPECTING THE SALVATION OF THE HEATHEN AND OF INFANTS.

I. *Outline of the Christian Doctrine respecting Faith; the origin and ground of the same.*

(1) JESUS and the apostles, in the instructions which they give to adults who are acquainted with the Christian doctrine, always insist chiefly on *faith in Jesus Christ* as the great condition of obtaining the salvation purchased by Christ. The whole happiness of the Christian (his *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωτηρία*) is derived from this single source; and the *unbeliever* (*ἀπιστήσας*) loses this happiness, and brings upon himself *misery*, (*ἀπώλεια, κατὰρσις*;) Mark, xvi. 16; Romans, i. 17; iii. 21, 22, "the gospel makes known the determination of God to forgive all who believe on Jesus Christ, on account of their faith, (*ἐκ* or *διὰ τῆς πίστεως*;)” Hebrews, x. 38, 39, seq.

(2) The doctrine of faith is therefore inseparably connected with the doctrine of the *atonement* and of *justification*. The latter can be obtained only through faith. Therefore, cf. s. 108, where the plan of this doctrine is stated.

We are led even by natural religion to the following points:—"Man must regard himself as morally imperfect, and in such a way, too, as to imply guilt on his own part; or, which is the same thing, he must acknowledge himself to be a sinner, a transgressor of the divine precepts. He must acknowledge that he ought to

avoid and abhor sin, place his confidence in the mercy of God, hope for pardon and forgiveness from him, and that he ought to form and execute the serious purpose of obeying the divine precepts and living acceptably to God." This might be called the *faith of reason*. But this philosophical faith is wanting in that certainty and evidence which is necessary to tranquillize the mind; it is insufficient to satisfy those whose consciences are awakened; as we have before shewn, s. 108. Experience teaches that a faith of this general nature is not able to answer those feelings which rise in the inmost soul even of the best of men. There must be something *positive and historical* upon which they can rely; some express assurance from God of his forgiveness; or they will be left in the most distressing uncertainty. The greater part of the human race, in all nations, are therefore united in believing that something must be done in order to conciliate the favour of God to sinners, and to induce him to forgive their past offences; and also that their mere reformation, and their living in the practice of virtue, imperfect as their goodness will always be, is insufficient to secure the divine forgiveness, and can afford no quieting assurance that pardon is obtained. Vide s. 108. Now Christianity rejects all the means of conciliating the favour of God, in which the great body of men place their confidence, and which were common among Jews and Gentiles at the time of Christ. It regards them as affording false grounds of peace, and as being injurious to morality; and in place of them inculcates *faith in Jesus Christ*, and the atonement made by him, and makes this, exclusive of the personal deserts of believers, the sole ground of all the benefits which they enjoy.

In this manner, the doctrine respecting the conditions of salvation is brought into the closest connexion with the other positive doctrines of Christianity, and especially with the history of the person of Christ. To the greater part of mankind this scriptural faith possesses far more interest, evidence, and certainty, than a merely philosophical faith can ever give. The latter must be for ever attended with uncertainty, doubt, and fear of the reverse of what is hoped for. And this uncertainty and fear may become, in moments of suffering and adversity, extremely disturbing, and perhaps lead to obstinate despair. For we cannot obtain from philosophy any express assurance of the will of God relative to our forgiveness. Again: the scriptural account of faith in Christ as the only condition of salvation excludes wholly all the false motives to duty which are so injurious to true morality. The essentials of the scriptural doctrine on this point, and their connexion with each other, may be clearly seen in the following statement. The Christian should strive after the greatest

possible moral perfection, (likeness to God.) This effort should result from willing *obedience* to God, and this again from thankful *love* to God, and *confidence* in him, and not from slavish fear of punishment; 1 John, iv. 18, 19. But this love, this grateful confidence, cannot exist unless man is convinced that God is graciously disposed towards him, and will forgive his sins. God does not forgive sins, however, on account of good works, self-inflictions, sacrifices, &c., but on account of Christ; s. 108. We must therefore believe that Christ by his death has procured forgiveness and salvation. But would we come to the actual enjoyment of the promised forgiveness, we are under indispensable obligations to live henceforward in the strictest observance of the divine commands from grateful love to God and to Christ. Consequently we must become familiarly acquainted with the divine precepts and must regulate our whole conduct according to them; and how to do this we are fully taught in the *Christian doctrine*. And thus *faith* as much involves our *doing* the divine will, as it does our knowing it.

The personal enjoyment and possession of forgiveness and saving grace, and of the whole sum of Christian blessedness which God has promised to bestow, is called *applicatio gratiæ*, and the condition on which we obtain these blessings (*conditio gratiæ*) is *faith*. Vide Morus, p. 197, seq., s. 1, 2. Those who enjoy these blessings are called in the scriptures by different names. Vide Morus, p. 197, note 3. Cf. Töllner, Wahre Gründe warum Gott den Glauben an Christum will, in his "Vermischte Aufsätze," th. ii. st. 2.

II. On the Salvation of Heathen and of Children.

(1) When treating of the conditions of salvation established in the Christian scheme, we speak in reference to *Christians*—i. e., those who have opportunity and capacity to become acquainted with Christianity, and to convince themselves of its truth, without undertaking to say what means for attaining salvation God may give those who are ignorant of Christianity, or who remain unconvinced of its truth through unintentional mistake, and without criminality on their part. God is not limited to one single method, which he is compelled to employ equally at all times and among all men. The Bible says, indeed, that God will punish the heathen on account of their sins; not, however, because they did not believe in Jesus Christ, if this was not their fault, but because they did not act agreeably to the knowledge which they possessed, and the law of nature with which they were acquainted; Rom. i. 21, seq.; Ephes. ii. 1, 2. The holy scriptures, therefore, never regard the heathen merely as such, as excluded from salvation. Such pas-

sages as Mark, xvi. 16, do not relate to the heathen who are innocently ignorant of the gospel. The word ἀπιστεῖν does not signify *not to believe*, but to *disbelieve*, and always implies guilt. The conclusion sometimes drawn from such passages is as improper as it would be to conclude from 2 Thess. iii. 10 that the child and the infirm man should be left to perish by hunger; as Heilmann well observes. No one will ever be condemned for guiltless ignorance, or for unintentional and innocent mistake; but only for guilty rejection and contempt of the truth, or for living contrary to the truth when once known. What Mark expresses by ἀπιστεῖν, John expresses by μὴ πιστεύειν, (*to be unbelieving*;) John, iii. 18; xii. 47, 48; and these two modes of expression are synonymous. Vide John, iii. 36. Hence ἀπιστία and ἀπειθεῖα were frequently interchanged as synonymous, Rom. iii. 3; xi. 20, 23, 30. Now the ἀπειθοῦντες or ἀπιστοῦντες are (*a*) the *unbelieving*, those who do not receive the words and declarations of another as true, who do not give them credit; (*b*) the *disobedient, obstinate, contumaces*;) in which sense Xenophon and other classical writers use the word ἀπιστεῖν. Now the terms, ἀπειθεῖν Χριστῷ, ἀπιστεῖν, μὴ πιστεύειν, ἄπειθεῖν Χριστόν, are used in the New Testament to designate those who are disobedient to Christ, and do not follow his precepts, always implying guilt on their part. This is done in two ways: (*a*) by despising and rejecting Christianity when it is once made known, or when opportunity is given for understanding and examining it; Rom. iii. 3; 2 Cor. iv. 11; (*β*) by living in opposition to Christian truth when it is understood and embraced, and by neglecting its precepts. Vide Tit. i. 16. In both of these cases there is *guilt*; and hence punishment (κατάκρισις) ensues. The word *unbelief*, therefore, often designates at the same time these two kinds of guilt—e. g., Mark, xvi. 16; John, iii. 18—21; xii. 47, 48.

Those heathen, now, who do not belong to one or the other of these classes, are not *disbelievers*, though they may *not believe* in Christ. Upon such, therefore, condemnation is not pronounced in these passages. They are not indeed *obedient* to Christ, nor yet *disobedient*. Thus one who is not the subject of a certain king may not indeed be obedient to his laws, either because he is ignorant of them, or not bound in duty to obey them; but he cannot on this account be called *disobedient*. Disobedience always presupposes an obligation to obedience.

(2) God has not seen good as yet to bring all nations to the knowledge of Christianity. And, little capable as we are of understanding the plan of God in this respect, we ought not to conclude from this circumstance that the Christian revelation is unnecessary and may easily

be dispensed with. It has pleased God to leave many nations for thousands of years in a barbarous and savage state. But can we conclude from this fact that intellectual cultivation and moral improvement are superfluous and useless, and therefore missions are unnecessary? Nor, on the other hand, can we conclude from this circumstance that God cannot save the heathen because they have not enjoyed the light of Christian revelation. Human happiness has as many degrees and gradations as human cultivation and refinement of manners, and all men are not capable of one and the same degree. They cannot all, therefore, be treated by God in the same manner. One thing may be indispensable to the happiness of some persons and of some nations, while to others the same thing is quite superfluous, because they are as yet incapable of enjoying the happiness arising from it. It is not said in direct words in the New Testament, *that God will make the heathen eternally happy*. If this were said, there are many who would pervert it. But it is expressly asserted that God does not demand more from any one than he is able with his knowledge and abilities to perform; Luke, xii. 48, seq.; and also, that he who faithfully serves God according to the knowledge and means which he enjoys, and does what he considers to be his duty, is acceptable to him; Acts, x. 35. Cf. Morus, p. 129, note 9. According to the testimony of the holy scriptures, God will have reference, in determining the character and conditions of men, to the knowledge they have had, the dispositions they have cherished, and the actions they have performed. We may confidently expect from the goodness of God that since he has heretofore given to so many nations only the light of nature, he will not make them miserable for the want of that higher knowledge of which they are innocently destitute. And since there is a future life, we may trust that he will there lead them to that higher degree of happiness and clearness of knowledge which they did not attain in this life, because, without fault of their own, they were here incapable of receiving it. To such a dispensation in the future world there is at least an allusion in Rev. xxii. 2, *in the tree of life, by the river of life, whose leaves serve for healing to the nations* ἐξ ὧν ἐθεράπευαν τῶν ἐθνῶν.

The great body of the Jews, from the earliest ages, denied salvation to the heathen, on the principle, *Extra ecclesiam non dari salutem*. But this is entirely opposite both to the Old Testament and to the spirit of Christianity. Even Mahommed did not go to this degree of exclusiveness. Nor did the more ancient Grecian fathers deny salvation to the heathen, although they philosophized about it after their manner. E. g., Justin the Martyr and Clement of Alexandria held that the Λόγος exerted an

agency upon the heathen by means of reason; and that the heathen philosophers were called, justified, and saved by philosophy. But afterwards, especially after the third century, when the false Jewish notions respecting the church (s. 134) were introduced into the West, and the maxim was adopted, *Extra ecclesiam non dari salutem*, (which was the case after the age of Augustine,) they then began to deny the salvation of the heathen; though there were always some who judged more favourably. Thus Zwingli, Curio, and others, believed that God would pardon the heathen on account of Christ, although in this life they had no knowledge of his merits. Cf. the historical account in Beykert's Diss. "de salute gentium;" Strasburg, 1777; and a short statement of the opinions of others in Morus, p. 128, 129, where he justly recommends to our imitation the exemplary modesty of the apostles when speaking on this point. The whole subject was investigated anew on occasion of the violent attack which Hofstede, a preacher in Holland, made upon the *Belisaire* of Marmontel. This gave rise to Eberhard's "Apologie des Socrates." Cf. also Töllner, Beweis dass Gott die Menschen auch durch seine Offenbarung in der Natur zur Seligkeit führe; Züllichau, 1766, 8vo. Many modern writers have treated this subject in such a way as to lead to a feeling of indifference towards Christianity; but this result need not be feared from the scriptural representation here given.

(3) We must apply these same principles to the subject of the *salvation of infants*. None have ever really doubted respecting the salvation of those who have died in infancy, before they attained to the full use of their understanding. For since there is a future life, we may expect with certainty that God will make such provision there, that both children in the literal sense, and those who are children in understanding and knowledge, will be able to obtain what they were here deprived of without their own fault; and that in his goodness, wisdom, and justice, he will bestow upon them that degree of happiness of which they are capable.

Theologians have pursued two different methods in treating of this subject.

(a) Some are content with saying that God will pardon and save infants on account of the merits of Christ, which extend to all, although they may not have believed in Christ during their life-time; and that their being born with natural depravity will not harm them, because they themselves are not to blame for it. These writers refer to Rom. v. 15—17 for an analogous proceeding. This is the most simple and the safest view.

(b) Others, misunderstanding the passage, Mark, xvi. 16, suppose that faith in Christ is

an indispensable requisite for salvation in all men; and have therefore (together with some schoolmen) embraced the doctrine of a *faith of infants*, which they have variously explained and described, as *fides pręsumpta*, *implicita*, *per baptismum sine verbo* (some say, *sine cognitione infusa*); *talis affectio in infante qualis Deo placet*. The schoolmen describe it as *dispositio ad iustitiam*. But none of them succeed in conveying any intelligible idea. Nothing is said in the New Testament about such a faith. Faith always presupposes *knowledge*, and power to exercise the understanding. Now since children have neither of these requisites, faith cannot be ascribed to them; nor indeed *disbelief*, unless the word is used very improperly. The mere want of *faith* is not *dammable*, but *unbelief* only, or the guilty destitution of faith. Those who have adopted this view have thus been compelled (as appears from the preceding remarks) to vary the idea which is uniformly attached to the word *faith* when adults are referred to, as soon as they speak of children, and to call something in them by this name which is nowhere else so denominated. The passage, Matt. xviii. 6, does not bear upon this point, since the disciples of Christ are there meant Cf. the Article on Baptism, s. 142, and Morus, p. 249. From the words of Christ, however, Matt. xix. 14, "Of such is the kingdom of God," it is clear that he considers *children* as belonging to his kingdom. And this is enough.

SECTION CXXII.

OF THE VARIOUS SIGNIFICATIONS OF THE WORD FAITH, AS USED IN THE BIBLE; SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL PASSAGES RELATING TO FAITH; THE PARTS OF WHICH FAITH IS MADE UP; AND SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT THEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS OF FAITH.

I. Significations of *πίστις*; and Explanation of the principal texts relative to Faith.

The terms, *faith*, *the faithful*, &c., frequently occur in the religious dialect even of the Hebrews. They were originally taken from the language of common life, and transferred into the religious phraseology of the Jews, where they express various nearly related ideas. From this Jewish dialect Christ and the apostles borrowed these terms. The Hebrew words *אֱמוּנָה*, *אֱמֻנָה*, were translated by the Hellenistic Jews (e. g., the LXX.) by the words *πιστεύω*, *πίστις*, and were also rendered in the same way by Christ and his apostles.

אֱמוּנָה primarily signifies, *to be firm*; and then, *to be certain, sure, confident*. Hence *אֱמֻנָה* signifies, as *πίστις* does, aside from its religious use, *truth, faith, integrity, honour, proof* (Acts, xvii. 31), and *conviction*, (Rom. xiv. 23.) When

things are spoken of, *πιστεύω* and *πιστεύειν* signify, *to hold them* (whatever they are, events, doctrines, laws) *as certain*; when persons are spoken of, they signify, *to trust in them, to rely on their words, declarations, works*. These words were used in the same sense in reference to persons and things, in the language of common life among the Jews. In Hebrew they were construed with the particles *א* or *ב*. Hence in the Septuagint and in the New Testament, *πιστεύειν* is construed with *εἰς* and *ἐν*, frequently too, as in pure Greek, with the dative—e. g., *εἰς* or *ἐν* Χριστῷ, τῷ Χριστῷ, εὐαγγελίῳ, &c. The term occurs for the first time, in the religious sense, in reference to Abraham, Gen. xv. 6, *ἐπίστευσε* Θεῷ—i. e., considered his promise as sure, relied on it, and acted accordingly. It frequently occurs afterwards in the Old Testament—e. g., Exod. xiv. 31; Psalm lxxviii. 22, 32, &c.

To believe, therefore, (a) when commands, promises, doctrines, events, are spoken of, signifies, *to consider and regard them as fixed and certain*; (b) when God is spoken of, it denotes our whole duty to him, *love, confidence, and obedience to his commandments*, because everything which comes from him is certain and infallible; (c) when prophets and the messengers of God are spoken of, *to believe them*, means, *to receive and obey what they make known as of divine origin and infallibly certain*. This term is employed in the Koran in the same way. These main ideas are differently modified according to the different objects which are received by us as certain. And hence we can easily derive the strictly religious senses in which this word is used in the New Testament.

(1) *Πίστις* frequently signifies *religion itself* and the particular doctrines of which it consists, (*fides, quæ creditur*, or *fides objectiva*;) like *Iman*, in the Koran, and *אמנה* in the Talmud. It is thus used for *Christianity* in general, Jude, ver. 3, 20, ἀγνωστῇ πίστει, Gal. iii. 23. Also in the phrases *ὑπακοὴ πίστεως*, *fides apostolica*, *Nicæna*, &c. *Νόμος πίστεως* is the doctrine which requires faith.

(2) It is more frequently used *subjectively*, denoting the approbation which one gives to a teacher, and the obedience which he yields to his instructions, after being convinced of the truth of his doctrine and the divinity of his mission. This approbation is called in the schools, *fides qua creditur*. Thus John, v. 46, *πιστεύειν* Μωϋσῇ; Matt. xxi. 25, 32, Ἰωάννῃ. When used in the gospels in reference to Jesus it denotes the acknowledgment of him, and obedience to him, sometimes as a prophet, and indeed the greatest messenger of Heaven; and sometimes as Messiah. Hence Christians are called *πιστεύοντες*, *πίστοι*. Synonymous with *πιστεύειν* are *πειθεσθαι*, *ὁμολογεῖν* Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, *ἐλπεῖν*

Χριστοῦ, or *ἐν* Χριστῷ, *Κύριον εἰπεῖν*, Ἰησοῦν, *ἐπιχαλεῖν* ὀνομα Χριστοῦ. The opposite terms are *ἀπιστεύειν*, *ἀπειθεῖν*, *μὴ ὑπακοῦν* εὐαγγελίῳ. Closely connected with this is,

(3) The sense, *trust, confidence*, *πεποιθήσις*, which arises from the conviction of the truth and divinity of a doctrine, and is manifested in different ways.

(a) When one is convinced of the power and goodness of another, and therefore confidently hopes for help and assistance at his hand, and this not only because he is *able*, but also *will-ing* to help and befriend him. This use is common in profane writings, in Hebrew (*אמץ* and *אמץ*), in the Septuagint, and in the New Testament. Isaiah, xxviii. 16; Matt. xix. 2, &c. This confidence is therefore sometimes expressed by the word *ἐλπίς*, Rom. v. 5, by *ἐλπίζειν*, with *ἐν* and *εἰς*, and by other similar terms. For the same reason, the confidence one may feel that God will enable him in an extraordinary manner to work a miracle, is called *πίστις*—e. g., Matthew, xvii. 20; Acts, vi. 5, 8; 1 Cor. xiii. 2. This faith is technically called *fides miraculosa*—the faith of miracles.

(b) When one is convinced that another will do what he says, (is veracious and faithful,) he depends entirely on his promises, and certainly expects their fulfilment in every case, and from this confidence complies with everything which the other requires. Thus Abraham's faith in God is described; and thus the terms *πιστεύειν* Θεῷ and *Λόγῳ* Θεοῦ are often used, Ps. cvi. 12; Hab. ii. 1.

From this wider meaning has arisen the proper Christian sense of *saving faith*, which Paul frequently uses in his epistles to the Romans and Galatians, where he controverts the mistake of the meritoriousness of observing the divine law. Here *πιστεύειν* Χριστῷ and *πίστις* denote the firm persuasion that we owe our whole spiritual welfare to Christ, or to the free, unmerited mercy of God on Christ's account, and our trust in God and Christ arising from hence, Gal. ii. 16; iii. 6; Rom. iv. 16, seq. This kind of Christian faith is compared with that of Abraham. He confided in God in the same manner, according to the measure of his knowledge. He relied on the promise (*ἐπαγγελία*, Rom. iv. 20) of God respecting a numerous offspring, and on the other great promises connected with this, (although he saw the good, as Paul says, only *πόρρωθεν*,) without doubting, (*οὐ διεκρίθη*, and *πληροφορηθεῖς*, firmly convinced,) though the thing promised was apparently improbable, (*παρ' ἐλπίδα*, ver. 18.) Now as Abraham confided in the promise of God, (*ἐπίστευσε* Θεῷ,) Christians should also confide in the promise of God and Christ, and look to God for salvation and blessedness, in this life and the life to come, in and through Christ,

and not on their own account, or on the ground of their own merit, of which they have nothing to boast. This is what theologians call *justifying* and *saving* faith.

The two former senses of faith are not excluded from this third signification, but are always presupposed and included in it. One who would obtain forgiveness through faith in Christ must (a) have an acquaintance with the Christian religion, and a persuasion of its truth; he must regard it as of divine authority, and embrace it with all his heart; and (b) he must actually rely on the divine promises contained in this religion, and prove the reality of his confidence by his feelings and actions. The latter sense springs out of the former. How could Abraham have confided in God if he had been destitute of the knowledge of God, of his attributes, and promises? Hence when Paul would give a complete description of true Christian faith, he often comprises both these ideas quite distinctly under the word *πίστις*, Rom. iii., iv., and James, ii. 19—24, where *πιστεύειν* refers sometimes to *knowledge* and the *assent* of the *understanding*, and sometimes to the *confidence* which springs from them.

Note.—The passage Heb. xi. 1 has always been considered one of the most important with regard to the subject of faith, and so indeed it should be, though its sense has been frequently perverted. The meaning of this passage needs to be distinctly exhibited. Paul here speaks of faith, or confidence in the divine promises or declarations, *in general*, especially of that exercised in sufferings and persecutions, (in order to preserve Christians from apostasy,) not exclusive, however, of the peculiar saving faith of the Christian, as he also hopes to obtain forgiveness and salvation through Christ. This is taught by the examples of Rahab, Samson, Jephthah, and others, which are mentioned. Paul does not undertake to give a logical definition of faith, but only distinctly to describe its characteristics, without which one cannot lay claim to the possession of faith. But this is the very reason why the passage is so worthy of note, and so practically useful; for it shews what is requisite to faith in general, according to Paul's ideas of it, and what traits it must always possess, however different may be the objects to which it is directed. A person shews his faith by being firmly and unhesitatingly convinced, on the mere testimony of God, (1) with respect to things which are not actually present with us and in our possession (*ἐπαύρομενα*)—e. g., future deliverance, future blessedness, promised by God, of whatever kind it may be, temporal or spiritual; (2) with respect to things beyond the reach of our senses, (*οὐ βλεπόμενα*). *ἰσχύς* and *ἐλπίς* are synonymous in this passage, and signify *firma persuas-*

sio. Paul himself explains his meaning in ver. 6: the pious man must believe that God exists, (although he does not see him,) and that he will reward his worshippers, (although the reward is not immediate.) Here therefore both *knowledge* and *assent* to the truth, and the *confidence* which is the result of them, are requisite, in order to the existence of faith in the wider sense in which it is here used.

II. Theological Divisions of Faith; and the parts of which it is composed.

(1) The Bible frequently says respecting one who professes Christianity, *that he has faith in Christ*. Vide No. 1. But this faith is twofold. One may understand and externally profess the doctrines of Christianity without obeying them or feeling their transforming influence upon his heart; or he may apply them, according to their design, to the improvement of his heart and the sanctification of his dispositions; in short, he may do all that God requires of him in the Christian doctrine. The faith of the former is called *fides externa, historica, or theoretica*; that of the latter, *fides interna, habitualis, salvifica, (salutary, saving, σωτηριος)*. The former kind of faith, disconnected with the latter, is sometimes called *dead* faith, because it is *ineffectual*, and contributes nothing to our improvement or salvation. The phrase is taken from James, ii. 17, 20, 26. The latter is called *living, viva, actiuosa*, because it exerts a salutary influence in promoting our happiness and true welfare.

Christian faith, in its whole extent, is therefore a conviction of the truth and divinity of the Christian scheme of salvation, and a conduct conformed to this conviction. One who believes the Christian religion in such a way as to act in accordance with it, and who allows his affections to be governed by his belief, is a true Christian, and possesses *fides salvifica*. As to one who willingly and cheerfully follows the commandments of God and Christ, and sedulously conducts himself by the rules which they have prescribed, the Bible says, either that *he is obedient to God and Christ, or he believes in them*. Hence these two terms are synonymous; Morus, p. 201, n. 3. The definition, therefore, which Crusius gives in the passage before cited, is just: *saving faith is a cordial approval of, and compliance with, the divine plan of salvation*.

(2) *On the different parts of which faith consists.*

Faith is made up of different parts, all of which, however, must belong to it, in order to its being perfect. The different objects of Christian instruction, to which faith refers, form the ground of this division. There is a faith in events, in doctrines, commands, and promises. These objects will be particularly

considered in the following section. Now Christian faith, in a general view, embracing all these objects, is considered by theologians as consisting of three parts—*knowledge, assent, and trust, or confidence, (notitia, assensus, fiducia)*, which will now be considered. Whenever entire Christian faith is spoken of as comprehending all the objects just mentioned, this division is perfectly applicable. But all these parts do not belong to Christian faith as directed to each particular object. They all belong only to the *faith in promises*. *Knowledge* and *assent* merely are requisite to the faith in *events and doctrines*; and a will and inclination to obey, to faith in the *divine commands*. To avoid this inconvenience, faith might be made to consist in two particulars—*knowledge*, and a *disposition* of heart correspondent to this knowledge, (*ἐπίγνωσις καὶ αἰσθησις*, Phil. i. 9,) according to which one would be inclined to obey the divine commands and confide in the divine promises. Many theologians prefer this division. But in what remains we shall follow the common threefold division.

(a) *Knowledge of the subject to be believed*, is, from the very nature of the case, an essential part of faith, of whatever kind it may be. Paul asks, *How can men believe, if they are not instructed?* (if they do not possess knowledge of the things to be believed,) Rom. x. 14. This knowledge cannot, indeed, in every case, be equally thorough and comprehensive. In many of the early Christians it was at first very general and confined, as indeed it is often still, to some of the great elementary truths. But however limited and imperfect this knowledge may be, it always implies certainty, and must amount to a *firm conviction*; otherwise, from the very nature of the human mind, it can produce no effect on the will, and it ceases to be *faith*. For we believe only that of which we are certain. Cf. the terms *ὑπόστασις* and *ἐλεγχος*, Heb. xi. 1, and *πληροφύρεσθαι*, Rom. iv. 21, where it is contrasted with *doubting*; also James, i. 6. But this conviction should be effected by reasons which enlighten the understanding, by instruction intelligible to the human mind, not by authoritative and compulsory decisions. The mere reception of a doctrine on the word or command of another, without being ourselves convinced of its truth, is not *faith*, but *credulity*. Christ and his apostles therefore prescribe *instruction*, (*κηρύσσειν*,) and make faith a result or effect of instruction—e. g., Mark, xvi. 16. And Paul derives *πίστις* from *ἀκοή*, Rom. x. 17, &c. From these remarks we can easily see how far to admit the *fides implicita* of the schoolmen. They mean by this, faith in such doctrines as we do not understand, and of which we are not convinced by reason, but must receive on the mere word and authority of the church. From

these remarks, too, we can easily form an opinion respecting the *faith of children*, for which some contend. Vide s. 120, ad finem.

(b) *Assent*. This is divided into *general (assensus generalis)*, by which is meant the general reception of known truth as credible and sure; and into *particular (assensus specialis)*, by which is meant the special application of certain general truths of the Christian doctrine to oneself—e. g., Christ died for men, and also for me. It is this latter kind which more frequently produces salutary feelings and emotions in the soul. Vide the examples, Rom. viii. 31—39; 1 Tim. i. 15, 16; Morus, p. 201, s. 6. This is commonly expressed in the New Testament by *δέχεσθαι* and *παράδεχεσθαι*, as Mark, iv. 20, where *ἀκούειν* implies the *knowledge* of the truth, *παράδεχεσθαι*, *assent* to it, from whence the result *καρποφορεῖν*. 1 Thess. ii. 13, where *παραλαμβάνειν λόγον*, merely to *hear instruction*, is distinguished from *δέχεσθαι*. 1 Cor. ii. 14, the carnal man, obedient only to his passions, does not assent (*δέχεσθαι*) to the divine doctrine, &c.

Although assent should always be connected with the knowledge of the truth, because the will should be governed by the understanding, yet we find that it is often withheld from truths which cannot be doubted, from the prevalence of prejudice or passion. So it was with the contemporaries of Jesus in Palestine. They could not deny that the miracles which he wrought were real miracles, and yet they did not yield him their assent. Like to these are all who at the present day, from love to sin, refuse obedience to the truth which they know. Such persons commonly endeavour to persuade themselves and others that the cause of their unbelief has some other ground besides their own will; hence they give ready credit to every semblance of reason for doubting the truth and divinity of Christianity.

If this assent, therefore, is genuine, it must act on the heart of man. The will must be controlled and governed by the truths which the understanding acknowledges and embraces as true. Otherwise this assent resembles that which, according to James, ii. 19, we allow even to devils. Cf. James, i. 22; Luke, viii. 13; and Heb. iv. 2.

It will be understood, of course, that this assent has different degrees, respecting which we shall say more hereafter,

(c) *Trust, or confidence*. Knowledge and assent become, in respect to the divine promises given to Christians, *confidence*—i. e., a firm conviction that the promises given by God will surely be fulfilled. Morus, p. 202, n. 2, justly says, “that to the assent of the understanding there must be added a *trust* in that grace (of God) by which one conducts himself conform-

ably to this gracious promise." All the three parts, therefore, of which faith consists, are comprised in that faith which relates to the divine promises; while, from the very nature of the case, only knowledge and assent belong to the faith relating to events, doctrines, and commands. Here, on the contrary, from the very nature of the subject, all the three parts must consist together. This state of mind in Christians is called in the New Testament *πειθίσσις, παρρησία, ἐλπίς, &c.* Ephes. iii. 12; Heb. iii. 6; 1 John, ii. 28.

Note.—On the method pursued by Jesus and the apostles in teaching the doctrines of faith. They do not confine themselves merely to enlightening the understanding (*διδάσκειν*), but, in connexion with this, they would always have an appeal made to the heart, (*παρακαλεῖν*.) So 2 Tim. iv. 2; 1 Tim. iv. 13; 2 Cor. v. 20, &c. They always employ the effect produced in the understanding by truth, to move and excite the affections of their hearers or readers. Thus their instruction is always *perfectly practical*. The beginning must indeed be always made by informing the understanding. For how can a man believe or perform anything with which he is unacquainted? Vide Rom. x. 14. But the Christian teacher who is content, as is often the case, with giving lifeless instruction to the understanding, and who supposes that the approval of the affections will follow of course, betrays great ignorance of human nature. For experience proves that the state of the heart exerts a great influence on the attention paid to truth, and on the whole activity of the understanding. If the heart is wanting in love for the truth, the understanding will be very slow in coming to a clear knowledge, just discernment, and proper estimation of it, and the reverse. According to the method of Christ and his apostles, therefore, which is adapted to the very nature of the human soul, the teacher who labours to promote the conviction and conversion of men, must *begin at the very outset* by inculcating the most clear, practical truths, in order that the heart may first become favourably disposed to the truth, and that the understanding may thus become more susceptible of what is taught. He must then employ again the truths which he has thus communicated to excite and move the affections. And whatever knowledge is conveyed to the mind should always be so directed by the Christian teacher as to excite and move the affections.

SECTION CXXIII.

OF THE DIFFERENT OBJECTS OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE TO WHICH FAITH REFERS; AND THE RELATION OF FAITH TO THE SAME.

THESE different objects were enumerated, s.

122, II. 2, and will now be separately considered.

The truths of the Christian religion which faith embraces may be reduced to the following classes:—

I. *Doctrines, and Historical Facts.*

Historical facts are here classed with doctrines because the Christian religion is founded on facts; such, for example, as that Christ died, rose again, &c. The firm conviction that these doctrines or events are true is called, with regard to the former, *fides dogmatica*, with regard to the latter, *fides historica*, (in the more limited sense.) For examples of the former kind, vide Heb. xi. 2, seq.; of the latter kind, Rom. x. 9, 10; John, xx. 29; 1 Cor. xv. 3. The apostles always placed the doctrines of Christianity in the most intimate connexion with the person and whole history of Christ, and in this way gave general truths, such as the paternal love of God, and his readiness to forgive, the authority of positive Christian doctrines. Vide Art. x. Christ and the apostles teach no Christianity independent of the person and history of Jesus Christ. Their whole system is founded on the fact that Christ is the great Messenger promised by God, and that life everlasting may be obtained through faith in him; and to these truths they constantly refer; John, xx. 31. To extend and perpetuate the knowledge of these facts all the gospels were written, and all the apostles laboured in their oral and written instructions. As soon as the doctrines, laws, and promises of Christianity are separated from the history of Christ, they lose that *positive* sanction which they must have in order to answer the demands of the great mass of mankind. The apostles therefore always built their instructions on the history of Christ. Cf. 1 Cor. xv. 2, 3, 14. And the teacher who regards the directions and example of Christ and of the early Christian teachers, and who is convinced of the importance of these peculiar doctrines of Christianity, will follow their example in this respect, that instead of withholding these doctrines from the youth whom he is called to instruct, he will place them before their minds in a manner adapted to their comprehensions. And he must disapprove the course of some who confine their instructions to the truths of natural religion. But even supposing that the teacher should doubt in his own mind respecting the importance of these peculiar Christian doctrines, he ought to know, from the mere principles of human nature, that the dry exhibition of the truths of reason, without the vehicle of history, is ill adapted for the instruction of the common people and of the young. He ought to know, too, that there is no history which can be used to more advantage for the purpose of rendering the great

truths of religion evident, impressive, and practical, than the history of Christ. In neglecting this method, or objecting to it, he has considered only one side of the subject, and while he supposes he is proceeding very philosophically, his conduct is, in fact, exceedingly otherwise. Happy the teacher who knows from his own experience the salutary efficacy of the positive doctrines of Christianity! Supposing him, however, not to have this experience, he ought, for the reasons above given, to adopt this most reasonable method of instruction. Cf. Müller, *Vom christlichen Religionsunterrichte*; Winterthur, 1809, 8vo.

But in order that the general doctrines of Christianity may exert an influence on any one's feelings and dispositions, he must exercise the *assensio specialis* (s. 122, II.)—i. e., he must be convinced of the applicability of these doctrines to himself; he must appropriate and apply them to himself; he must feel, for example, that Christ died not only for all men, but also for him. For our confidence in the divine promises given through Christ and on his account must depend on our conviction that they relate personally to ourselves, that they are given to us. To produce this conviction should be the great object of the teacher. For religion should not be so much the concern of the head as the interest of the heart.

II. The Divine Promises.

The divine promises constitute a very important part of the Christian doctrine. The faith in them which is required of us as Christians has not so much respect to the promises of *temporal* good as to those of spiritual and *eternal* good which we may obtain through Christ and on his account.

The following particulars may be noticed with respect to this faith—viz.,

(1) True faith in the divine promises consists in a confident and undoubting hope that God will fulfil them, and will actually bestow upon us the good which he has promised. All the three parts of which faith consists (knowledge, assent, and confidence, Rom. iv. 16) belong to this kind, s. 122. Paul illustrates the nature of this kind of faith by the example of Abraham, Rom. iv. 20; Gal. iii. 8, 16. Abraham had great promises made to him (*επαγγελία*), the fulfilment of which, at the time they were given, was quite improbable; and yet he maintained a firm faith. We may mention here the examples of the faith of the Israelites, John, iii. 14, coll. Num. xxi., and Heb. iv. 1. In the last-cited passage, faith in *Christian* promises is not, indeed, the particular subject of discourse. But all which is true of faith in other promises of divine favours is also true of faith in *Christian* promises. The only difference in the two cases

is the difference of the objects upon which faith fixes. The signs and characteristics of it are the same. Vide Heb. xi. 1, (s. 122, ad finem.) Hence Paul calls all who believe in the divine promises (*οἱ ἐκ πίστεως*), *Abraham's children*—i. e., like him, and capable of a similar reward.

(2) The promises given to Christians, as such, have all reference to *Christ*; Morus, p. 203, s. 7. They are placed in the most intimate connexion with his person and history. Christ is therefore always described as the ground of our faith, (*fundamentum fidei*.) We are taught everywhere that Christ died for us, that on his account God remits the punishment of sin, and bestows upon us everlasting happiness. It is in *these* divine promises that we are required to believe—i. e., we must be persuaded that God will fulfil them for us. Vide Rom. iii. 15; viii. 12, 17; iv. 24. Theologians call this kind of faith, or this firm conviction that God will perform his promises to us, and for Christ's sake be gracious to us, the *application* or *laying hold* (apprehensionem) of the *merits of Christ*. Both the theory itself and this term rest upon the authority of the New Testament, although the term *παραλαμβάνειν Χριστόν* in Col. ii. 6, signifies, *to be informed respecting Christ and his religion, to hear Christian doctrines*. This idea is commonly denoted by the terms, *πιστεύειν τῷ λογῷ τοῦ στανου, εἰς ὁφείδεντα, &c.* Vide Morus, p. 203, n. 1. But in John, i. 12, the term *λαμβάνειν Χριστόν* is used to denote this *self-applying faith*, for it is directly explained by the term *πιστεύειν*.

(3) The result of this confident faith in the divine promises is the possession or enjoyment of the promised good, or the reward. God is not only able to perform his promises; he is likewise *true and infallible*. But he never makes promises to men on the ground of their desert, for they have none; but all his promises are *undeserved*. He gives them, indeed, on condition of *faith* (*διὰ πίστεως*), Rom. iv. 4, 16; but yet *δωρεάν* and *κατὰ χάριν*, and not as *ὀφείλημα*. This truth is thus expressed in the same connexion (ver. 3); a man's observing the divine law can not be imputed to him as a merit, but faith only *λογίζεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. Cf. Gen. xv. 6. For obedience to the divine law is what we *owe*. Nor can we find anywhere, even in the greatest saint, an obedience so perfect as to satisfy conscience. Now since Christians are to have good bestowed upon them through Christ, and on account of faith in the divine promises, and since this good is commenced in the removal of punishment, or the forgiveness of sin (*justification, pardon*), this faith is called *justifying* (*justificam*); as Paul says, in the passage cited, *δικαιοῦμενοι δωρεάν διὰ τῆς πίστεως*. Paul illustrates this by the example of Abraham. His faith in the divine promises was imputed to him

by God as a merit—i. e., he was rewarded on account of his faith. The promises made to him of a favoured posterity and the possession of Canaan were fulfilled to him as a reward. In Heb. xi. 31, Paul illustrates this by the example of Rahab. Her faith (a firm conviction that the God of the Israelites is omnipotent, and would fulfil his promises to the Israelites, and give them the land of Canaan) was the occasion of her being *pardoned*, and not perishing with the rest of the Canaanites, οὐ συνάπλετο τοῖς ἀπειθήσασιν, or, as James says (ii. 25), ἰδικαιώθη. In this case, indeed, the object of faith is different from the object of Christian faith. But the result (reward) is the same; and the *characteristics* of it are the same. In the case of Rahab, the good bestowed was earthly and temporal; in the other, spiritual and eternal.

III. The Divine Laws or Precepts.

Since to *believe*, in the large sense, is the same as to receive and obey the Christian doctrine in *all its parts*; its *laws and rules* of action must be as perfectly acknowledged and received as its *promises*.

(1) *Statement of the doctrine of the New Testament on this subject.* One who believes the divine promises receives the good promised on account of his faith; but it is not optional with him to receive this part only of the Christian doctrine, and to refuse obedience to the laws which it prescribes. No one can say, *I will hold fast to the promises, and leave the observance of the law to others.* These two things cannot be separated; and they are both implied in *believing in Christ, or the gospel.* Christ and the apostles everywhere teach that the observance of the precepts of Christianity, or holiness, cannot be separated from faith in Christ. Obedience is the fruit of faith. Matt. vii. 21, "He only who *does the will of my Father* can enter into the kingdom of heaven." John, xv. 14; Luke, vi. 46—49; 1 John, ii. 3—6, which is the most decisive text. Paul expresses himself in the same manner on this subject, Gal. v. 6; Ephes. iv. 22, and here certainly he does not contradict James. The latter is very explicit on this subject, especially in the second chapter of his epistle, where he remonstrates against the perversions of the doctrine of faith, as if a mere knowledge and cold assent to the truth, a dead faith in Christ, disconnected with the practice of holiness, could be sufficient.

This disposition of the Christian to live in entire conformity with the precepts of the Christian doctrine is called φρόνημα πνεύματος, Romans, vii. 6, 7, 18—i. e., the renewed temper produced by God, by means of Christianity, the holiness, love, and zeal for virtue produced in the Christian by the Holy Spirit. It is opposed to φρόνημα σαρκός—i. e., the disposition to

live according to sinful propensities. This disposition is everywhere ascribed to God, or to the Holy Spirit, as the author of *Christianity*, the guide of the pious, and the promoter of all Christian perfection. In Romans, viii. 1, this state is described by the phrase περιπατεῖν κατὰ πνεῦμα, and in ver. 9, by πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ, a Christian state of mind, a disposition like that of Christ, and for which we are indebted to his assistance and instructions. In 1 John, iii. 24, the same term is used. In Gal. v. 22, the term καρπὸς πνεύματος is used, denoting Christian virtues, actions proceeding from a heart renewed by the Holy Spirit, through the influence of Christianity. In Rom. vi. 6, &c., this character is called, metaphorically, καινὸς ἄνθρωπος, and the renunciation of the previous love and habit of sinning is called μετάνοια, the *putting off of the old man*, &c., which will be further considered hereafter. Faith in the divine promises, thus connected with obedience to Christian precepts, or holiness, is called *living*, or *active faith*, *viva, actiosa, operosa, practica*. Paul himself speaks of a faith (δὲ ἀγάπης) ἐνεργουμένη, Gal. v. 6.

(2) *On the use of the words LAW and GOSPEL, in the Bible and in theology*, and inferences from it. Morus treats this subject as an Appendix to c. 3, p. 238—244.

(a) When the words νόμος and γράμμα are used in the New Testament in opposition to εὐαγγέλιον and πνεῦμα, the former do not mean precepts respecting the conduct of men in general; nor the latter merely the promises (ἐπαγγελία) given to Christians. But νόμος and γράμμα frequently denote the *Mosaic law*, or the whole Old-Testament institute and religion; εὐαγγέλιον, πνεῦμα, and other similar terms, the *whole* Christian doctrine, its commands as well as its promises. Thus, e. g., the sermon on the Mount, Matt. v., is *purely evangelical*, even in the precepts respecting conduct which it contains; John, i. 17; Rom. viii. 2; 2 Cor. iii. 6; iv. 6, seq.; Morus, p. 240, s. 4.

This will help us to explain many of the texts in which the apostles speak of the great advantages which the *gospel* has over the *law*; where they say the law was imperfect, was not designed for all men in all ages, is not obligatory on Christians, and is supplanted by Christianity. Much like this is found in Rom. iii., iv., vii., viii., and Gal. iii.

But the schoolmen, and many theologians who followed them, did not distinguish accurately between the various senses of the words νόμος and εὐαγγέλιον in the New Testament. And notwithstanding it is clearly asserted that the whole Mosaic institute, as such, is superseded by Christianity (vide s. 118, II.), yet many held the opinion that the law given on Mount Sinai was designed, as far as its moral

part is concerned, for the whole world, and is obligatory at all times, even on the ground of its having been there given. They understand the *Christian law* and the *law of Moses* to be synonymous, and believe that the Mosaic law, as such, (the ceremonial part only excepted,) is obligatory upon Christians. On the other hand, they always understand *εὐαγγέλιον*, according to its etymology (joyful news), to mean, not the whole Christian doctrine, but only that part of it which contains the promises.

This departure from the scriptural usage gave occasion to adopt the division into *law* and *gospel* in the theological sense. Such, then, is the state of the case. *Gospel*, in the wider sense, is the whole Christian doctrine, as composed both of precept and promise. This is the most common sense in the New Testament. In the narrower sense, it is the promises of the Christian doctrine, especially those of pardon through Christ. In this sense it sometimes occurs in the New Testament; Rom. x. 16, coll. ver. 3—15; Rom. i. 16, 17; iii. 21; Acts, xiii. 32; xx. 24, *εὐαγγέλιον χάριτος Θεοῦ*, 1 Cor. ix. 23. In this sense theologians have always used it. *Law* generally signifies in the New Testament the Mosaic law; but sometimes the precepts of God and of Christ, Gal. vi. 2, &c.

(b) By *law* and *gospel*, as used in theology, the whole sum of the doctrine of salvation is meant. By the *law* is understood the sum of all the divine precepts given to man in the Old and New Testament; or, the whole *moral law*; Morus, p. 238, seq., s. 2. From this we learn what God has commanded and forbidden, and of course what sin is. By *gospel* is understood all the promises relating to the salvation of man through Christ, whether contained in the Old or New Testament. These assure men of grace and forgiveness, and thus comfort and encourage the sinner; this is what is more properly called *εὐαγγέλιον χάριτος*.

This definite theological use, which is not in itself unscriptural, was common before the Reformation in the Romish church, and was employed by the schoolmen in their systems. Because the decalogue contains *moral precepts*, and is called, by way of eminence, *law*, and because *νόμος* occurs sometimes in this sense in the New Testament, they called all moral precepts the *law*; and because *εὐαγγέλιον* signifies, etymologically, a *joyful message*, and occurs sometimes in this sense in the New Testament, they called all the *promises of God*, inasmuch as they are of a joyful nature, *gospel*. This was proper in itself. The fault lay in their regarding this as the only scriptural use, and accordingly endeavouring to adapt it to all the passages in which *law* and *gospel* occur. Luther and Melancthon, and also the Swiss reformers, retained the established usage of these terms,

and from them it has been adopted by other theologians of the protestant church into their systems. The Arminians, in the seventeenth century, made the first attempt to shew, some of them, that this is not to be found in the Bible, and others, more justly, that it is not the only scriptural use. They taught that the gospel comprehends laws as well as promises, and that one as well as the other must be comprised in faith in Jesus Christ. But the old division was for a long time retained by protestant theologians, even in their homiletical and catechetical instructions; nor was there anything objectionable in this. Although this use of these words is not the only, nor even the common scriptural usage, yet there is good reason for this distinction (Morus, p. 240, s. 4), if it is only properly explained. The truth which is designated by it cannot and ought not to be passed over. For it is plain that rules for conduct and promises of blessing are of altogether a different nature, have different ends, and produce different effects, and that both therefore must have different predicates. The Christian doctrine contains both. From the nature of the human soul, promises of a great good awaken pleasure in the mind, and incite to willing effort to do everything which can secure the enjoyment of this good. But this very nature of the soul makes rules for feeling and conduct necessary. Precepts and promises must be most intimately connected. And the promises must be made to serve as a spring and motive to obey the divine commands. This obedience is an indispensable condition, and unless it is fulfilled the promised good cannot be bestowed. This is the doctrine of the New Testament. The Christian teacher must therefore make use of the law, in order to promote the knowledge of sin, and repentance, and to shew the unhappy consequences which, according to the Christian doctrine, result from sin both in this life and the life to come; and that he may employ for this purpose everything, as well in the Old as in the New Testament, which bears on this subject. Vide Morus, p. 242, s. 7.

Note.—The passages, Rom. iii. and Gal. iii. and iv., relating to the law and its abolition, have been misunderstood in two different ways, which should be carefully guarded against.

(a) Some have taught that believers have nothing to do with the law, since Christ has fulfilled it for them; and they appeal to these passages. They would embrace only one part of the gospel—its promises, and would gladly be relieved of the other, and thus overthrow all morality. Such were the doctrines of many of the fanatics at the time of the Reformation and afterwards. Morus, p. 241, s. 6. The same thing was charged upon Agricola in the sixteenth century, and his followers, the Antino-

mians. Hence the fifth and sixth articles were introduced into the Form of Concord.

(b) Others have supposed that the Mosaic ceremonial, or civil law *exclusively*, is intended in those passages where it is said that man deserves nothing of God by observing the law—e. g., Rom. iii. and Gal. iii. and iv. They maintained, accordingly, that although the favour of God could not be conciliated by obedience to the ceremonial law, it might be by the observance of the moral law. Thus the Socinians and many others. But Paul knows nothing of such a distinction, and what he says, he says of the whole Mosaic law, moral as well as ritual. The observance of the one is as little meritorious as of the other; and what is true of the moral law of Moses is true, according to his express declaration in these passages, of the whole moral law, whether learned from nature or from the Christian doctrine. Vide Progr. in Rom. vii. et viii., in “Scripta vari argumenti,” Num. xii. The following is the doctrine of the apostles:—Obedience to the divine law is not the ground, or the procuring-cause, of our forgiveness and salvation. (And happy is it for men that it is not; for were it so, no man of an enlightened and tender conscience could ever be sure of salvation.) Faith in Christ who died for us is the only ground of our acceptance. Still obedience to the divine law is an indispensable duty in connexion with this faith; indeed, it is practicable and easy only while this faith exists. The strict requirements of the moral law cause us to see clearly how deficient and imperfect we are, since while we allow that the law requires only what is right, we are yet unable to conform to it. They also excite in us a deep feeling of our need of a different dispensation, coming in aid of our imperfection. And by seeing our need, we become disposed to embrace the provisions for salvation which God offers. Thus the law leads us to Christ, Rom. iii., vi., vii., and the Epistle to the Galatians.

SECTION CXXIV.

OF THE CONNEXION OF THE PARTS OF WHICH FAITH IS COMPOSED; THE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEGREES OF FAITH; AND THE CONDITIONS ON WHICH IT IS SAVING.

I. *The relation in which the parts belonging to Faith stand to each other.*

HERE the following cautions should be observed—viz.,

(1) We should not separate one part of faith from another, or insist more upon one than another, or imagine that the different parts may exist at different times. This mistake has been made by some with respect to the *promises*,

(gospel,) and the *rules* of conduct, (law.) Some insist wholly or disproportionately on the latter, and thus alarm one who is just beginning a religious life, and who feels himself to be still weak. This is the fault of those who preach only the law or morality, who are always telling men (though they generally know it sufficiently without being told) what they ought to be, without shewing them the proper means of becoming so, and how they may acquire the requisite power. Others dwell entirely on the promises, and neglect the law, instead of deriving from the promises the motives and power to obey the law, as the Bible does, 1 John, iv. 10, 19; iii. 3; Gal. ii. 20. Vide s. 123, ad finem. At the present day, the former mistake is the more common one, and therefore needs to be guarded against more carefully than the other.

(2) We should not consider the manner in which faith arises in man, and in which one part of it follows another, to be uniformly the same in all cases; nor should we prescribe the same order and succession as essential to all. The physical and moral constitution of men is so different, and the circumstances under which they begin to amend their lives are so unlike, that the same form and method cannot possibly be prescribed to all. The neglect of proper attention to this difference among men gives easy occasion to uncharitable judgments, to hypocrisy, anxiety, and scrupulous doubts.

The common representation is that which Melancthon has given in his “*Loci Theologici*.” Reformation is commenced by means of the law, which convinces man of his sins. Then follows the distressing sense of the merited divine displeasure, and the desire of obtaining pardon. Here the gospel comes in for man’s relief, and imparts comfort and consolation. Hence arise faith, and the fruits of it; and from faith, forgiveness of sin and the assurance that it is remitted.

In this way does the moral change in men frequently, but not always, take place. The order is not important, provided all the essential parts of faith are exhibited. Faith can no more be wrought in all Christians in the same manner than the sciences and arts can be learned by all in the same manner. With one, the terrors of the divine threatenings and punishments must be used in the first instance; with another, of a more mild and gentle disposition, the infinite love of God and his promises must be used. Though beginning in different ways both may come to the same result. When we compare the accounts of conversions recorded in the Old and New Testament, we observe this very difference. They all exhibit the great essential of faith; but the manner in which they came to the possession of it is different. Books

containing accounts of the conversion of particular men are very useful; but we should beware of making the experiences of individuals and the way in which they may have been led to faith a rule for all. Vide Toellner, *Theologische Untersuchungen*, st. i. ii.

[*Note.*—Neander has illustrated this important point very fully in his “*Denkwürdigkeiten*,” and also in his “*Gelegenheitsschriften*.” The Fifth Article in the latter collection of Treatises, entitled, “The Manifold Ways of the Lord in the Work of Conversion,” is worthy of the careful study of all engaged in promoting religion in the world. It is a deep saying of Origen, that what Paul said of his becoming all things to all men, that he might gain some, is applicable in a far higher sense to the Saviour himself, in the methods he employed while on the earth, and still employs in heaven, to bring men to saving faith.—Tr.]

II. *Signs by which we can discover the Existence of true Faith.*

To every Christian it is of the first importance to know whether he possesses true faith, that he may be sure of his being accepted by God. These signs may be reduced to two classes, which correspond with the instructions of the New Testament.

(1) *Christian dispositions.* These are called in the New Testament *φρόνημα πνεύματος*, or *πνεῦμα*. Vide s. 123. Rom. viii. 14, 16, “The renewed Christian temper (*πνεῦμα*) produced in us by God, by means of Christianity, affords us inwardly the surest proof (*συμμετρεῖ*) that we are the children of God,” that we resemble him, that we love him, and that he loves us a father loves his children. Eph. i. 13, 14, “Ye are sealed by the Holy Spirit—i. e., the Christian disposition, for which you are indebted to God, is a sure proof to you that God loves you and will bless you; it is a *pledge* (*ἀρραβών*) to you of future reward.” Thus, too, 1 John, iii. 24, “By the *spirit* (that renewed temper for which we are indebted to Christ and the Holy Spirit) we know that we are true Christians, and beloved by God.” The Christian may therefore be sure that he has faith when he is conscious of hatred to sin, sincere love to God and Christ, to the good and pious, and of a constant effort to increase in holiness or moral perfection.

(2) But these dispositions must be exhibited in the external conduct, by actions which flow from grateful love to God and Christ, and from other religious motives, (*καρποὶ πνεύματος*.) These, therefore, are infallible signs of faith. Vide 1 John, ii. 29; iii. 7, seq. Christ said, Matthew, vii. 16, “By their fruits ye shall know them.” Entire reliance cannot be placed

upon evidences drawn from mere internal feeling. One may easily deceive himself with regard to his own feelings; and if a certain degree of feeling is insisted upon as necessary, those who do not come up to this standard, while yet they may have faith, will be easily led into mistake, and involved in doubt and distress. Nor can we properly demand that every one should give the time and hour when he began to believe; for faith is not always instantaneous, but, from the very nature of the human soul, is sometimes gradual. Vide Spalding, *Vom Werth der Gefühle*.

Note.—The common theological phrase, *internum testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, is derived from Rom. viii. 16. (The passage, 1 John, v. 6, 8, does not relate to this point.)

(1) This passage treats directly of the inward conviction which Christians obtain of their being forgiven by God, from the new disposition which he has produced in them by means of Christianity. By this they are sure (*a*) that they are now free from the divine punishments, which they had reason to fear while they continued unrenewed and followed their sinful desires; and also (*b*) that they have a share in all the rights and privileges of believers, and shall be partakers of the promised blessedness in future.

(2) But under this phrase theologians include the internal conviction which Christians have of the divinity of the Christian doctrine. But this conviction arises only by way of inference. The Christian reasons thus:—Because more is effected for the moral good of men by means of Christianity than by all other means, (as he can say from his own experience,) it follows that this doctrine is *divine*, or that we must believe what Christ and his apostles say when they declare it to be divine. John, vii. 17, “One may be sure from his own experience that what Christ affirmed is true, that he did not speak of himself,” &c. Cf. 1 Thess. ii. 13. This conviction depends, therefore, on the experience of each individual Christian. He himself must have felt the efficacy of the Christian doctrine in his own heart. Hence this is called the *experimental proof* of the divinity of the Christian religion; and Christ himself insists upon it, John, vii. 16, 17; 1 Thess. ii. 13. Every true Christian must have this *experience*; but it cannot be used to convince one who is not a true Christian, because he has never felt in himself the better influence of the Christian doctrine; still less can this experience be brought in proof of the divinity of the books of the Bible. It only proves the divinity of the doctrine contained in them. Vide Less, in the Appendix to his “*Wahrheit der christlichen Religion*,” and Noesselt, *Diss. de Sp. S. test.*; Halle, 1766. Cf. s. 7, II., ad finem.

III. *The different degrees of Faith; the possibility of losing Faith and of falling away.*

(1) The knowledge, intelligence, and whole mental state of men are very different, as well as their natural constitution, temperament, and faculties. Hence we infer that faith cannot have the same degree of perfection in all. We are not responsible, however, for the weakness and imperfection of faith any further than it is *criminal*; a subject, the consideration of which belongs more properly to theological ethics. The Bible accordingly distinguishes between a weak, imperfect, incipient faith, and a strong, perfect, confirmed, and assured faith. It compares the state of one just beginning to exercise faith, to childhood, and that of the more confirmed Christian, to manhood. Vide Romans, iv. 19; 2 Thess. i. 3; Ephes. iv. 13, 14; 1 Cor. iii. 1.

(2) But no Christian can make pretensions to the highest possible degree of perfection in faith, although he should constantly strive after it. Great imperfections and innumerable defects always remain even in the best Christians, partly in respect to their knowledge, partly, and indeed mostly, in respect to their practice of known duties. Vide Ps. xix. 13; Phil. iii. 12; James, iii. 2. This ought frequently to be noticed by the teacher, in order to humble the pride of men, and to excite more zeal and effort in the pursuit of holiness, and more watchfulness against sin. This consideration leads us to say,

(3) It is *possible* that even the best and most perfect Christian should lose his faith, and apostatize. The Bible clearly teaches that one may lose his faith, and therefore fail of the blessedness promised on condition of faith. Vide 1 Tim. i. 19; vi. 21. Christ himself mentions, (Luke, viii. 13,) the *προσχαίρους*, who indeed possessed true faith, but did not remain steadfast. And for what purpose are the frequent exhortations to constancy in faith given in the holy scriptures, if there is no possibility of its being lost? Cf. Gal. ii. 2; Heb. vi. 4, seq. Still the way of recovery stands open even to the apostate while he lives; Luke, xxii. 32; Ps. li. 2—19. Cf. s. 113. But from the very principles of our nature it is plain that reformation and the recovery of faith must be more difficult the oftener one who had begun to walk in the way of holiness returns to unbelief and sin; 2 Pet. ii. 20—22; 2 Timothy, ii. 26.

Note 1.—Many have held that true faith cannot be lost. Against this opinion the above paragraph is directed. (a) Some fanatics have held that faith could not be lost or destroyed, even by living in sin and vice. So taught the Valentiniens, according to Irenæus; and more lately, the enthusiastic Anabaptists, Munzer, &c., at the time of the Reformation. They are

condemned in the thirteenth article of the Augsburg Confession. (b) The advocates of absolute decrees also held that he who had once attained true faith could not lose it, because God could not alter the irrevocable decree he had once formed respecting his salvation. And as faith is made in the Bible an indispensable condition of salvation, one predestined to salvation could not, in their view, lose faith. Cf. s. 32, ad finem. Augustine was the first who held this doctrine. He was followed in the fifth century by Prosper of Aquitania, and in the ninth century by Gottschalk, although the latter expressed himself doubtfully on this subject. Calvin and Beza, in the sixteenth century, adopted this doctrine, which, together with the doctrine *de decreto absoluto*, was established by the Synod at Dortrecht, 1618, as an article of faith, in opposition to the Arminians.

[*Note 2.*—On the doctrine of the saint's perseverance there has been much needless debate. To prevent this, and to arrive at a just and satisfactory conclusion as to this doctrine, it is important to dismiss whatever does not properly belong to it, and to make the subject of inquiry as specific and simple as possible.

First, then, it is no part of this question, whether it is in itself *possible* that believers should fall away; or whether they are *liable*, or *exposed* to this, or are *in danger* of final apostasy. The advocates of this doctrine may admit all this as really as its opponents. Indeed, it is often asserted by them (e. g., in the articles of the Synod of Dort) that believers not only may, but if left to their own strength certainly will draw back to perdition.

Secondly. It is admitted on both sides that Christians are to be warned of their danger, after the example of the scriptures; and that this danger should be set before them as a means of awakening them from slumber, inciting to duty and watchfulness, and making them faithful unto death.

Thirdly. It is admitted also on both sides of this question that the belief in the doctrine of perseverance will probably have a bad influence upon those who think themselves Christians when they are not, and even upon *true* Christians in a state of declension.

Fourthly. All, too, will admit that many who *appear* for a time to have Christian faith, and belong to the visible church, do in fact apostatize.

When these conceded points are dismissed from the question, what remains at issue between the advocates and opponents of this doctrine? Merely this, *Whether God will actually preserve all true believers from final apostasy, and keep them through faith unto salvation?* In arguing this point, nothing is necessary for the advocates of this doctrine but to prove from

scripture that God has purposed and promised to preserve all whom he has renewed by his Spirit. If this can be shewn, the warnings and exhortations contained in the scriptures, so far from being inconsistent with the promise and purpose of God, are the most suitable means of securing their fulfilment; since no motive tends so powerfully to keep Christians, as intelligent and moral agents, from apostasy, and to secure their perseverance, as the exhibition of their danger.

As to the power of God to employ such means and exert such an influence on Christians, in perfect consistency with their moral agency, as shall hinder the hurtful tendencies of the world and their own hearts, and bring them to heaven, there can be no reasonable doubt.

It may be proper to ask, in conclusion, whether the objections commonly urged against this doctrine do not derive their chief strength from misapprehension and mis-statement, and from a vague use of terms? Let the simple inquiry be made, whether believers will in fact fall away and perish; and let this question be answered in a purely scriptural manner, and the common objections will lose their force, and the doctrine of perseverance be acknowledged to be adapted to glorify God, and to comfort and animate the pious.—Tr.]

IV. The Attributes essential to "Saving" Faith.

(1) *Constancy to the end of life, (perseverantia.)* This is called by Paul *ὑπομονή*; Heb. x. 36, coll. iii. 14; 1 Cor. xv. 58. (In Matt. xxiv. 13, the subject is not *salvation*, but *temporal deliverance*.) This constancy must extend to all the parts which belong to faith. One must neither renounce the Christian doctrine in general, and apostatize from it, (Luke, viii. 13; 2 Pet. ii. 20;) nor may he give up particular doctrines which are essential to the Christian system; 1 John, ii. 24. He must remain unshaken in his reliance upon the divine promises; Heb. vi. 12; Col. i. 23. He must avoid most cautiously all disobedience to the divine commands; 1 Timothy, i. 18, coll. Ezek. xviii. 26.

(2) *Growth and increase in faith, (incrementa fidei.)* (a) We must endeavour to extend and perfect our knowledge of Christian doctrines and duties; Heb. v. 12; vi. 1, seq.; Phil. i. 9, seq. (b) We must make constant advances in holiness, and in the practice of all Christians virtues. We must strive daily to be freed from our remaining faults, and to cherish and deepen our hatred to sin (*pœnitentia quotidiana*), 1 Pet. ii. 1, 2. Holiness and the practice of Christian virtue must become habitual with us; 2 Cor. vii. 1. The observation often made by theologians, that there is no pausing here, that we must either advance or recede in goodness, is true from the very nature of the human mind.

(3) The evidence of faith by good works.

A. The various meanings of the word *ἔργα* in the holy scriptures. A careful examination of these would have prevented many mistakes and controversies.

(a) *Ἔργον* denotes an action, in the widest sense, whether morally good or bad—e. g., God rewards man according to his works, Romans, ii. 6, &c. Hence *ἔργον* also signifies *an employment, business, office*; an office in the church, for example, as in 2 Tim. ii. 21, seq.

(b) The phrase *ἔργα ἀγαθὰ* or *καλά*, or *ἔργα* simply, frequently denotes particular actions which are conformed to the law of God, or Christian virtues, which God has promised to reward, in opposition to *ἀμαρτίαι* or *ἔργα πονηρά*; Matt. v. 16; Rom. ii. 7; 1 Tim. v. 24, 25, &c. In this sense the word *ἔργα* is used by James throughout the whole of the second chapter of his epistle. Cf. James, iii. 13. With James, then, *good works* are pious actions, such as are done with reference to God—i. e., such as flow from love to God and a spirit of obedience. Such actions only are pronounced by the scriptures to be true virtues, because they flow from religious motives. They are *Christian* good works whenever they are done with a particular reference to Christ.

But this term came to denote, in a narrower sense, *particular works of love*, such as *alms*, &c.; Acts, ix. 36; 1 Tim. vi. 18, &c. During the middle ages the Roman church made this particular sense the prominent one, and accordingly ascribed great merit to *almsgiving, presents to cloisters, churches*, &c., s. 125. But such works are called *good* in the holy scriptures only so far as they are an active exhibition of love and obedience to God, and as they flow from religious motives.

(c) Quite different from this is the meaning of the term *ἔργα νόμων*, (sometimes simply *ἔργα*;) when used by Paul in opposition to *πίστις*, Rom. ii., iii., iv.; Gal. ii., iii., &c. Vide Progr. "De dispari formula docendi, qua Christus, Paulus et Jacobus de fide et factis disseverentes uti sunt, item que de discriminibus *ἔργων νόμων* et *ἔργων ἀγαθῶν*," (1803, in "Scr. Var. Argum." Num. xii. (Translated in the Bib. Repository, Jan. 1833.)) Correspondent to this phrase is that in the writings of the Rabbins, *מעשים והנהיגות*, which denotes the fulfilment and observance of the divine law and of its particular precepts, whether they are of a moral nature or not, and whether they are given by God through Christ, Moses, or by the law of nature. Vide s. 113, II., and s. 123, and fin. in the note.

Paul allows, and frequently expressly declares, that whoever should perfectly obey this law, in whatever way made known to him, should actually *live* by it, or enjoy the blessedness promised by God as a reward, not because

he could demand this as something which he had earned, but because God had promised it. But no man, in his present condition, can boast of such an obedience as this, and therefore none can hope to be accepted with God and blessed on the ground of his obedience to the divine commands, (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου.) Paul expresses himself very clearly on this point, Tit. iii. 5, coll. ver. 3; 2 Tim. i. 9; Ephes. ii. 8. The reason, therefore, why he excludes obedience to the divine commandments as a ground of our forgiveness, or why he holds that obedience is not the meritorious cause of forgiveness, is, that we do not in reality obey the divine law in such a manner as to enable us to rely on the divine promise above mentioned. And yet God has declared that he will shew mercy to us; this must therefore be done in some other way, and by some other means—namely, by faith. It is on this account that he excludes the ἔργα νόμου, or our supposed obedience to the divine commandments, from faith in Christ, and from the forgiveness and salvation to be attained through faith, Rom. iii. 20, et passim. But as to ἔργα ἀγαθά—i. e., the virtues performed from love to Christ, Paul would not more exclude them than Christ and James did. On the contrary, he derives them, as they did, from faith, and insists strenuously upon them, and in the very passages in which he denies merit to ἔργα νόμου—e. g., Rom. ii. 7—10; Ephes. ii. 10, seq. Cf. s. 108, 123, ad finem.

Paul and James are therefore agreed in fact. And there is no difference in the meaning of the words πίστις and δικαιούσθαι as used by them, but solely in the use of the word ἔργα. Paul speaks of the foolish mistake, by which one would obtain life and salvation from God by his supposed fulfilment of the divine law, while in reality he does not keep the law. James speaks of the pious, unpretending exercise of virtue, which is the first fruit and the evidence of faith, and therefore rewarded by God. Paul and James, as well as Christ, disapprove of the former, while both of them, as well as Christ, require the latter, with great seriousness and earnestness.

B. *What Christ and the apostles teach as to shewing faith by good works.* They are all agreed in saying that an indolent and inactive faith (νεκρά, James, ii.) is of no advantage, and is entirely contrary to its object. For faith is designed wholly for active life, and must be manifested and proved, so often as there is opportunity, by the practice of holiness. This is what James so well insists upon in the second chapter of his epistle. His doctrine is, that every Christian must possess faith in God, (the knowledge of God, and that trust in him resulting from this knowledge;) but that this faith must be exhibited in works, (*fruits*, chap. iii.)

What good does it do for one to say, I know and honour God, and confide in him, if he does not prove this by his pious actions? If Abraham had professed faith with his mouth, but had not obeyed when God commanded him to offer up Isaac, would that have pleased God? No! He did not receive the divine approbation and blessing until he proved in fact that he had right conceptions of God, and that he placed unlimited confidence in him. In the same way Christ shews that man must be known by his works, (καρποί,) and prove by them that he truly fears God, Matt. vii. 16—24; John, xiv. 15; xv. 14. And Paul, too, teaches that God will reward men for the uniform practice of virtue, (ἰσομενῇ ἔργων ἀγαθῶν,) Rom. ii. 7, and that, while Christians are indebted for their salvation to the mere grace of God, and not their own works, they are yet placed by the divine commands under obligation to practise these ἔργα ἀγαθά, Ephes. ii. 8—10. Thus he calls the virtues καρπὸς πνεύματος, (the fruits of a heart renovated by the influence of the gospel,) Gal. v. 22, 25. In Rom. viii. 1, 13, he says, that one is not a Christian who has not πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ. Vide other passages in Morus, p. 212, Note.

The uniform doctrine of the holy scriptures is therefore briefly this:—"Faith is the condition of salvation. (Hence so high a value is placed upon it, from the beginning to the end of the scriptures.) But this faith cannot exist unless the heart is truly renewed and made holy; and this inward renewal is evidenced by good actions or works. Now this faith, and the holiness inseparably connected with it, and the exhibition of it by good works, is rewarded by God. This faith and what is connected with it is therefore the *condition* of salvation (*conditio salutis*;) but not the meritorious cause, (*causa meritoria*;) for *salvation* is an *unmerited* favour. Vide Romans, iii. 24, 25; vi. 22, seq. Cf. s. 125.

SECTION CXXV.

OF THE NATURE OF CHRISTIAN GOOD WORKS OR VIRTUES; THE RELATION IN WHICH THEY STAND TO SALVATION; AND THEIR MERITORIOUSNESS.

I. *The true nature of Christian good works.*

THEIR worth or capability of being rewarded (not their *merit*) consists partly in their conformity to the rules of conduct which God has given to Christians, (*materiale actionis*;) James, ii. 11, and partly in the *end* to which they are directed, and the *motive* by which they are performed, (*formale*.) An action, therefore, is not a *good work*, although it may be right and lawful in itself, when it results from impure and

unworthy motives, such as vanity, ambition, the gratification of inclination, &c. The Christian performs *good works* only when he acts from thankful love to God and Christ, and in unconditional obedience to their requirements; in short, from motives drawn from the Christian religion, Romans, xii. 2; 2 Cor. v. 15; Phil. i. 11; John, xiv. 15, 21, and almost the whole of the first epistle of John.

We can here distinguish three cases—viz.,

(1) In acting, the Christian may be conscious of this motive, and act solely on account of it.

(2) But it is neither possible, nor requisite, that he should at all times, and in every action, be distinctly conscious of this motive. For one acquires, from long exercise in virtue as well as in vice, a *habit* of action. And since this habit presupposes a high degree of perfection, the value of actions performed under the force of this principle is not less, but often greater; for they imply a prevailing feeling of piety and love to God.

(3) Filial obedience to God, or religious motives, are not always the single and only motives to good actions, even in Christians. Their own advantage, reward, fear of punishment, the maintenance of a good reputation, &c., influence them to action. These motives, in themselves, should not be entirely banished, as some rigorous moralists, who are ignorant of human nature, would do. For God makes use of these very means to hold men to the observance of his laws. They may therefore be used by us as assistances. But it is clear that an action which results from such motives *merely*, cannot be called a pious Christian action, or a *good work*, although in itself it may be useful, commendable, and even acceptable to God. Vide Rom. ii. 14, 26, 27; Acts, x. 4, 34, 35. The teacher, therefore, should beware, in Christian education, of drawing the principal motive from ambition and selfishness; for these principles will exclude every good and religious feeling, and introduce manifold evil into the youthful heart.

In Christian good works, therefore, everything depends upon the state of mind, the disposition (*πνεῦμα*, Gal. v. 22) with which they are performed. That man only is capable of good works (in the Christian sense) who has a pure and prevailing love to God and Christ, and whose principle it is to practise all known good and to avoid all known evil, because such is the will of God and of Christ. God and Christ estimate the worth of an action, therefore, not according to the external appearance, upon which men look, but according to the disposition of the heart, which men do not see. Hence an action may frequently appear to men to be trifling, insignificant, or even blamable, while in the sight

of God it is commendable and of great price. Such was the act of Mary in anointing Jesus, which his disciples blamed, Mark, xiv. Christ, however, called it a *good work*, because it was a pious deed—i. e., because it resulted from sincere and grateful love to him; and such actions only are, in his judgment, *good works*. Vide Töllner, Ueber die Beschaffenheit eines guten Werkes, in his "Theol. Untersuch.," th. ii.

Note 1.—Good works are required from every Christian, so far as he is able to perform them, Gal. v. 25; 1 John, ii. 6; iii. 7. Cf. s. 123. The last clause contains a necessary limitation. For sometimes he finds no opportunity, or is placed in circumstances unfavourable for exhibiting, by his outward actions, the pious dispositions concealed in his heart. Moreover, those just commencing a religious life, and who, though they have real faith, have it in a less degree, (s. 124,) cannot exhibit that perfect and mature fruit which is expected from advanced and confirmed Christians. But God judges of the goodness of actions according to the inward disposition and the sincerity of the heart. In a good work this rectitude of motive is indispensable. Ephes. iv. 20; 1 John, ii. 6. We cannot therefore say that faith is *always* rich in virtues; for it *cannot* always be so. Nor will his unfruitfulness be charged against any one as a sin, unless he himself is to blame for it. In this matter God is the only infallible judge.

Note 2.—When the Bible speaks of the necessity of *Christian* good works, it refers only to *Christians*, and to what is required of them according to the Christian doctrine. No one who is destitute of the knowledge of Christianity without his own fault can be required to live according to its rules, or be punished merely because he does not. Nothing will be required of any one which has not been given him. Christian actions may indeed be more perfect and noble in themselves than others, because they flow from more perfect, pure, and elevated motives; but the good actions of those who are not Christians do not cease to be good and acceptable to God because they do not flow from Christian motives. Cf. the example of the centurion Cornelius, Acts, x., and the declaration of Paul, Rom. ii. 6—11. In the former passage, (ver. 35,) Peter ascribes φόβον Θεοῦ to the heathen centurion Cornelius; and in the latter, Paul calls the actions of heathen ἔργα ἀγαθά; and both teach that truly religious actions in heathen are acceptable to God, and will be rewarded by him. The doctrine of Augustine, therefore, *virtutes ethnicae esse splendida vitia*, is false. He taught that all which man does as *man*, without supernatural and irresistible grace, is *sin*. Hence he affirmed that the heathen were condemned because they could *not but sin*. Vide

s. 121, II. [Cf. "Bib. Repos." Jan. 1833. Art. Augustine and Pelagius.—T.R.]

II. *The Relation which exists between the Good Works of Christians and their Salvation.*

There was a controversy in the Lutheran church in the sixteenth century on the question, *Whether good works are essential to salvation?* Ge. Major, a theologian of Wittenberg, and some of the disciples of Melancthon, held the affirmative; Flacius and others, the negative. Nic. Amsdorf of Raumburg went so far as to say (1559) that they stood in the way of salvation—a horrible position if it is understood to mean, that obedience to the divine law is damnable. But this was not his meaning; he only meant to affirm that the opinion that good works could merit salvation is dangerous to the soul. And in this he was right; but so was Major in his position.

The difficulty may be removed by considering in what the *salvation* of Christians consists.

(1) It is begun, the foundation of it is laid, in the forgiveness of sin, or justification in the narrower sense. This is the free gift of God, and cannot be merited by good works, s. 113, II. But this blessing is forfeited by one who omits good works, and commits sin. Vide 1 John, iii. 6; Gal. v. 19; 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10. Good works, therefore, are necessary for the continuance (*conservatio*) of this benefit. They are, when they *can* be performed, the condition of pardon, though not the meritorious cause of it.

(2) Salvation consists in the divine rewards, or proofs of the divine favour; partly those which are natural, such as quiet of soul, peace with God, &c., and partly *positive*, bestowed both in the present and future life, as we are taught by the scriptures. These rewards cannot be merited by good works in themselves any more than the forgiveness of sin. But faith, and the good works connected with it, are the conditions on which alone these rewards are obtained, and the degree of reward is regulated by the degree of zeal in holiness which is exhibited; Matt. xxv. 20—29; 2 Cor. ix. 6; Gal. vi. 7, &c. For obedience to the divine law is as essential a part of Christian faith as to trust in God through Christ, s. 123. Good works are therefore always described in the Bible as the effects and fruits of Christian faith, James, ii. 26, seq.

We may therefore justly say, as Major did, that good works are essential to the attainment of salvation, as a condition, and we may also say, as Flacius and Amsdorf did, that they are not to be regarded as meritorious, or the procuring cause of our salvation. Cf. F. T. Rühl, *Werth der Behauptungen Jesu und seiner Apostel*; Leipzig, 1791, 8vo; especially the 4th Essay, "Seligkeit beruht allein auf Glauben," u. s. w.

Also Storr, *Commentar zum Brief an die Hebräer*, th. ii.

III. *History of opinions respecting the meritoriousness of Good Works.*

God has determined and promised to reward the good actions of men. But this reward is not something *earned* by men, (s. 108, II.,) which God is bound to pay them; it is *given* to them of his free, undeserved goodness. Hence these rewards are called in the New Testament χάρις, δωρεά, ἔπαυσις, (approbation,) δόξα, στέφανος—terms which imply gifts and undeserved rewards. These rewards are intended to excite men to love God more sincerely and to yield a cheerful and willing obedience to the divine commands, notwithstanding the difficulties with which this obedience is attended.

But obvious as this doctrine is to sound and unprejudiced reason, the great mass of mankind, of all ages and religions, have regarded certain external actions as meritorious and propitiatory. This error, as far as it is theoretical, results from false notions respecting God, and our relations to him. This is the reason why it is so prevalent, in one form or another, among the Jews, the heathen, and Christians. Vide s. 108, II. But this theoretical error would have been easily escaped or exploded if it were not connected with the depraved inclinations of the human heart. Love to sin makes men quick in inventing theories which will allow them to indulge in it at pleasure, and yet assure them of the favour of God. We shall here briefly exhibit the false opinions which have prevailed on this subject among Christians.

(1) Many Christians, (especially the converts from Judaism,) even in the times of the apostles, cherished the opinion that their acts of supposed conformity to the law, such as almsgiving, sacrifices, ceremonies, circumcision, and obedience to other particular precepts of the ceremonial and moral law of Moses, were meritorious. They even believed that the good works of their ancestors were imputed to them. Hence Paul shews, in his epistles to the Romans and Galatians, that man deserves nothing of God for his supposed obedience to the divine law; that the opinion of the meritoriousness of our own works is in the highest degree injurious; and that God forgives and rewards us solely on account of faith, without any desert on our part, (δικαιοῦν δωρεάν, διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ.)

But here again a mistake was made on the other side, and Paul was understood to speak lightly of the observance of the divine law. He himself complains that he was thus misunderstood, Rom. iii. 8; vi. 15; Gal. v. 13. The same thing has happened to Luther, Arndt, Spener, and other Christian teachers of ancient and mo-

dern times, who have followed in his footsteps. Even in the age of the apostles there were some false Christians, and even false teachers. They lived a sensual, disorderly life, and justified this on the ground that *Christians are free from the law*. Against such a sentiment there is much said in the epistles of John, Peter, and Jude. Others believed that an inactive faith would suffice, and that works are not important. They were content if they were only orthodox in head. James, in the second chapter of his epistle, is strenuous in opposing this sentiment. He shews that true Christian faith cannot exist unless it is exhibited by Christian virtues. Cf. the Essay above cited in "Scripta Varii Argumenti."

(2) Notwithstanding these clear instructions of the New Testament, these two mistakes respecting the merit of works and the sufficiency of an inoperative faith, have always prevailed among Christians. The mistake respecting the merit of works was adopted into the whole system of the Latin church. This will now be shewn from history.

A. During the dark ages, after monastic principles became prevalent in the Western church, the worship of God, piety, and holiness, were supposed to consist almost wholly in *external rites*. They believed that God would be induced by certain external actions to bestow favour on mankind. They thought they could merit his approbation somewhat as the day-labourer earns his wages by toil. Much importance was attached to works of beneficence, to almsgiving and presents, especially to cloisters and churches. They thus kept to the sense in which ἔργα ἀγαθά is sometimes used in the New Testament—viz., *opera benefica*, stopping, however, with the outward action, and leaving the disposition of the heart out of account. Vide s. 124, ad finem. They also insisted upon self-inflictions, fasts, and other external punishments, arbitrarily imposed; just as the Jews formerly did. They even relied, like the Jews again, upon the virtues of the saints, and upon *their treasure of good works*. These views led to great corruption in morals, and a wide remove from the genuine spirit and true nature of Christianity.

B. After the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the schoolmen, and especially Thomas Aquinas, began to admit these views into their theological systems, and to defend them by logical arguments. They reasoned (a) from the term μισθός, which is frequently used in the Bible to denote *wages earned*, as 1 Cor. iii. 8, where the Vulgate has *meritum*; and also from many of the old Latin fathers, who had said, *merere hominem salutem*, &c. But by such language they meant nothing more than *consequi, impetrare*, in which sense *merere* is used by Cicero and other Latin writers. And in general in all the ancient languages, and in the Hebrew and

Greek, the terms which denote *wages, recompence*, are used for *reward* of any kind, whether deserved or not. The meaning in every case must be determined by the context. In the New Testament, what is called μισθός is also called χάρις and δωρεάν in the same context. We are said to receive μισθὸν δωρεάν. Thomas Aquinas taught that when man of his own accord performs benevolent actions, gives alms, endows churches, &c., God considers this as done to him, and sees fit (*æquum, congruum*) to *recompense* the act. This he called *meritum de congruo*. (b) Again, he appealed to the doctrine of Augustine, *De gratia supernaturali spiritus sancti*. This grace produces good works in the regenerate, which therefore *merit* salvation, because they are derived from the Holy Spirit. He called this *meritum de condigno*. The unregenerate cannot perform any such meritorious works, because they do not possess this grace. He was followed in his opinions by other teachers; and in the sixteenth century this doctrine was confirmed by the council at Trent.

C. This false theory, so greatly injurious to morals, was vehemently opposed by the German reformers of the sixteenth century. Luther especially argued against it from the principles contained in Paul's epistles to the Romans and Galatians, which were directed against similar mistakes made by the Jews. But, in the heat of the controversy, Luther frequently went to the other extreme, and sometimes expressed himself with too little precision and distinctness. He sometimes appeared not only to deny merit to those works which the monks regarded as meritorious, and to all self-righteous works, (Paul's *works of the law*), but also to speak slightly of *Christian virtues*, and rather to depreciate than recommend them; though this was far from his intention. But afterwards, when his doctrine was misapplied by some who appealed to his authority, he became more guarded, and expressed himself more definitely. Melancthon especially took pains to guard against these perversions in the Augsburg Confession (Art. iv.), in his Apology, and in his "Loci Theologici." After the death of Luther, Melancthon and some of his associates endeavoured to analyze the subject still further, and to obviate all mistake. But they were poorly rewarded for their pains, since they were charged with departing from Luther and adopting the errors of the Romish church. Hence much controversy arose in the Lutheran church in the sixteenth century, which ran out for the most part into mere logomachy, as in the case of Major and Amsdorf. It was hoped that the Formula of Concord would put an end to this strife, Morus, p. 214. But the adherents of the Romish church still appealed to the second chapter of James, in opposition to Luther. He

and his associates did not know how to defend themselves against this argument, and did not sufficiently understand the difference between ἔργα ἀγαθὰ and the ἔργα νόμου, which were regarded as meritorious. This is the reason why he and the authors of the "Magdeburg Centuries," and some other theologians, spoke so discredibly of this epistle.

Note.—The circumstances of the Christian teacher in our days are frequently such, that, after the example of Christ and the apostles, he must sometimes insist more upon faith as the ground of pardon and salvation, and sometimes more upon the fruits of faith, or pious Christian actions. He should take the former course when he has to do either with sinners who are sorrowful and truly penitent on account of their sins, or with those who have a self-righteous disposition, and hope that they shall be forgiven and saved on account of their supposed obedience to the law, and their virtuous conduct. Vide Luke, xxiii. 40, seq., xviii. 9; Rom. iv. 5; Acts, xvi. 30. He must do this in order to shew that salvation depends entirely upon a disposition of sincere and unwavering confidence in God—(i. e., upon *faith*), since God and Christ, who know the heart, have regard solely to the disposition. In this way one who is proud of his virtue, self-righteous, and pharisaical, will learn wherein he is deficient.

He must take the latter course—that of recommending *good works*, or the fruits of faith—when he deals with those who undervalue or neglect the pursuit of holiness either through levity, indolence, or the love of sin; who persuade themselves that a mere external profession of faith will be sufficient; who say, *Lord, Lord; but obey not his commandments*; and who pervert the doctrine of justification through faith to excuse a life devoid of goodness, perhaps openly sinful. Such persons must be made to see that their sentiments are false, and that there are some infallible signs by which it may be known whether a person possesses true faith; as a tree may be known by its fruits. These signs are pious actions, which are the invariable attendants of faith, and which the true believer will never fail to perform whenever he has opportunity. Matt. vii. 16; xix. 21; xxv. 31—46; Rom. ii. 6; 1 Tim. vi. 18; James, ii.

SECTION CXXVI.

EXPLANATION OF THE TERMS WHICH ARE USED IN THE SCRIPTURES TO DENOTE BOTH THE EXTERNAL PROFESSION OF CHRISTIANITY (FIDES EXTERNA) AND INTERNAL MORAL IMPROVEMENT AND SANCTIFICATION.

It is the general custom to treat of *repentance, conversion, renewal, regeneration, sanctification,*

in separate and distinct articles (*loci*); but this was not the case anciently. Neither the ecclesiastical fathers nor the schoolmen treated these topics separately. It was not until the sixteenth century that this method was adopted; and the chief object of this at first was to explain more fully these scriptural terms and obviate different errors relating to them. But afterwards the distinction was more finely drawn, these doctrines were more separated, and particular proof-texts were sought for each. But many of these distinctions are not to be found in the Bible. All of these terms denote the *improvement* of men, and imply the same divine agency; although sometimes the gradual progress and the different degrees of moral improvement are distinguished. The better plan is, therefore, to bring all these topics together, and to treat of them in one and the same article, as, indeed, most theologians now do. So Morus, p. 220, seq., s. 6. The case is the same with respect to *calling, illumination*, and similar expressions, which will be explained in Art. xii., *De operationibus gratiæ*, s. 130.

I. *Scriptural idea of the words denoting Conversion*, (ἐπιστροφή, ἐπιστρέφειν, by which the LXX. translate the Hebrew שׁוּב.)

Ἐπιστρέφειν frequently stands alone, sometimes connected with ἐπὶ or πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, *to turn to God*. This term is derived from the very frequent comparison of the actions and conduct of man with a way, and with walking in it; whence the religion itself which one adopts is itself called ἡγῆ. But this term is used in two different senses—viz.,

(1) It denotes the *moral improvement* and *holiness* of men when they repent of their sins and forsake them. In this sense is the term commonly used in theology, Ezek. iii. 19; Joel, ii. 12, 13; Matt. xiii. 15; Acts, iii. 19. This turning is produced by God, or the Holy Spirit, by means of revealed truth. The same is expressed by the word μετανοεῖν, by which also the LXX. render the Heb. שׁוּב. These two forms of expression are frequently interchanged as synonymous, as Acts, xv. 3, coll. xi. 18. "The heart is *turned away* from the love of sin, and inclined to efforts after what is good and right, under the assistance of God and the Holy Spirit." Vide 2 Cor. vii. 11; Jer. iii. 12, 13, (an exhortation to the Israelites to return to God, from whom they had departed.)

(2) It denotes sometimes the external transition from a false religion to the true,—the renunciation of idolatry; Hos. iii. 5; Ezek. xiv. 6. Hence it is applied in the New Testament (a) to *Gentiles* who enter into the external Christian community, Acts, xx. 21; xxvi. 18; 1 Thess. i. 9; (b) to Jews becoming Christians, Acts, ix. 35; xiv. 15; 2 Cor. iii. 16.

These two senses ought to be distinguished in the explanation of this term. For though conversion of the former kind is the object of the latter, yet it is not always attained. But sometimes the two meanings are connected together, because the first is the object of the second, and with many is actually attained. Thus when the apostles preach conversion to Jews and Gentiles, they mean *both*; for neither Christ nor his apostles encouraged a merely external introduction into the Christian church. Still they require men to enter into the external church because there are the means of conversion found.

II. *Scriptural idea of the words denoting Regeneration*, (παλιγγενεσία, γεννᾶσθαι ἄνωθεν ἢ δευτέρον, ἀναγεννᾶσθαι. Also the synonymous terms ἀνακαλῶσις, ἀνανεοῦν, καινός ἄνθρωπος, καινὴ κτίσις, κ. τ. λ.)

The word παλιγγενεσία denotes frequently any entire alteration of state, by which one is brought into an entirely new and reformed condition, or placed in a better situation. The change indicated by this term is, however, as Morus justly observes, in every case, *mutatio in melius*, p. 223, note at the top. Vide "Scripta Varii Argumenti," Num. vi. Thus Cicero (Att. iv. 6) calls his restoration from exile, παλιγγενεσία; and Josephus (Ant. xi. 3) calls the restoration of the Jewish land after the captivity παλιγγενεσία πατρίδος. The stoics spoke of παλιγγενεσία τῶν ὁλῶν. In Roman law, the manumission of a slave was called his *regeneration*. In Matt. xix. 28, it denotes an introduction into a new and happy situation, whether the resurrection or the establishment of the Messiah's kingdom be understood.

When the Israelites spoke of a person changing his religion, they used the phrases *birth, new birth, &c.* When a *Gentile* passed over to Judaism (became a proselyte), he was regarded by the Jews as *new born, a new man, a child* just beginning to live. As such he was received into their church, and obtained civil rights. Even in the Old Testament the term יָלֵד is used in reference to *proselytes*, Ps. lxxxvii. 5, coll. Is. xlix., li., liv. This might be called *external regeneration*. The term was afterwards used by the Rabbins in a *moral* sense, since it became the duty of one who had been admitted into the Jewish church to live according to Jewish laws, and to have a better moral disposition. This is *internal, moral regeneration*. The term was used in both of these senses by the Jews at the time of Christ and the apostles.

Now it was not the manner of Christ and the apostles to invent new terms, but to borrow terms from the ancient Jewish phraseology, and transfer them to Christianity. Hence we find all these words used in the New Testament in three different senses—viz.,

(1) To denote one's passing over *externally*

from Judaism or heathenism to the Christian society, and making an external profession of the Christian, in opposition to the Jewish or heathen religion, which the Christian renounces. Thus Paul says, Ephes. ii. 15, "Christ has united Jews and Gentiles into one church," (εἰς καὶνὸν ἄνθρωπον, which cannot here denote *internal* reformation, as this could not be predicated of all.) Cf. James, i. 18. Thus Peter says, 1 Pet. i. 3, "God hath brought us to the profession of Christianity (ἀναγεννήσας ἡμᾶς), in order to enable us to obtain salvation." Paul frequently says of those whom he had induced to make profession of Christianity, that he had *begotten* them (γεννᾶν), Philem. v. 10; 1 Cor. iv. 15; and ὠρίνειν, Gal. iv. 19.

(2) To denote the *internal* or *moral renewal* of the heart and of the whole disposition of man. This is the object of one's becoming a Christian, to renounce the love of sin, and love what is good, and to practice it from motives of love to God and Christ. This state is effected in Christians by God, or the Holy Spirit, through faith in Christ. The *creation of a new heart* (reformed disposition) is mentioned in this sense, even in the Old Testament, Ezek. xxxvi. 26—28; Ps. li. 12. In other passages the term *circumcision of heart* is used, Deut. x. 16; elsewhere a *new heart, a new spirit, a new mind*, which has God for its author, Ezek. xi. 19, 20; Psalm l., li.; Is. i., &c. In this sense Paul speaks of putting on the *new man*, and putting off the *old man*, of a *new creature*, after the *image* of God, Ephes. iv. 22, 24, and Col. iii. 9, 10, and ἀνακαίνωσις νοός, Rom. xii. 2, and ἀνανεοῦσθαι τῷ πνεύματι, Ephes. iv. 23, seq. Here belong all the texts, in John and elsewhere, which teach that man *must be born* of God, or the Holy Spirit—i. e., become his child, love him, in disposition and conduct resemble him, that he may be loved by God in return; for all which he is indebted to God or to the Holy Spirit, 1 John, iii. 9; v. 1; John, i. 12, 13. Cf. the remarks respecting *νιόθεσία*, s. 119, I. 1. These different terms, therefore, refer to one and the same thing.

(3) In many passages these two senses are combined, because internal regeneration is the object of external regeneration; exactly as in the case of *ἐπιστρέφειν*. Among other texts is John, iii. 3, 5, "Whoever is not born of baptism and the Holy Spirit (i. e., does not consecrate himself by baptism to the profession of my religion, and does not become, through divine assistance, a *reformed man, a child of God, a friend of God*, like him in moral character) cannot be considered a member of the Messiah's kingdom (βασιλεία Θεοῦ)." Hence baptism is called, Tit. iii. 5, *λουτρήν παλιγγενεσίας*, because we are not only solemnly admitted by this rite into the Christian society, but are likewise

thereby obligated, according to the precepts of Christ, to become reformed in character; and on this condition have all the rights and rewards of God's children granted and assured to us. So the Rabbins expressed themselves with regard to the baptism of proselytes. And for this reason the most ancient fathers, Ignatius and Justin, call baptism *ἀναγέννησις*.

III. Scriptural idea of the term *μετάνοια*.

This word is used by the Greeks to designate a change in a person's opinions, aims, dispositions, with respect to particular things. Thus the phrase, *εἰς μετάνοιαν ἄγειν*, signifies *to induce any one to alter his opinion*, and to adopt another. Polybius uses the word *μετανοεῖν* in relation to a general who designed to stake battle, but afterwards determined differently. Plato contrasts *προνοεῖν* (to use forecast) and *μετανοεῖν*, (to reconsider when it is too late.) In Heb. xii. 17, it is said that Esau could not obtain the alteration of his father's opinion, (*μετάνοια*.) In the classical writers, however, this term is not used to denote particularly an alteration in the moral state of the mind or heart. This use first prevailed among the Grecian Jews, and was derived by them from the Septuagint. The Hebrew *נָחַם*, is commonly expressed in the Septuagint Version by *μετανοεῖν*, as Is. xxx. 15, though sometimes also by *ἐπιστρέφειν*. The Hebrew *נָחַם* is rendered in the same way, Jer. iv. 28. These significations run together, since we determine not to repeat that which causes us sorrow. Hence the words *μετανοεῖν* and *μεταμέλεισθαι* are connected as synonymous, 2 Cor. vii. 8, coll. Luke, xvii. 4. This word, accordingly, like *ἐπιστροφή*, and other similar terms, is used in the New Testament, in a wider and a narrower sense—viz.,

(1) It denotes the forsaking of a religion which one had formerly professed, and is professing a new (the Christian) religion, (because there is in this case a change of view and opinion with respect to religion;) Acts, xx. 21, where it is said that *μετάνοια εἰς Θεόν* is preached to Jews and to Gentiles, in connexion with *πίστις εἰς Χριστόν*. Thus Luke, xxiv. 47, and other texts. Vide Morus, p. 222. In the same way as the return of the Israelites from idolatry to the true religion was called *μετάνοια*, could the conversion of Jews or Gentiles to Christianity be so called.

(2) It more commonly denotes a moral change. And (a) it expresses the entire moral renovation or conversion of men, in the widest sense; and (b) the commencement of this change, when one begins to abhor the evil which he loved, and to form the sincere purpose of forsaking it. It is frequently used in this narrower sense in the holy scriptures, and this is its most common use in theology, as will be

further shewn, s. 127. This change always presupposes an entire revolution in the views and feelings of the subject of it; he begins thenceforward to love and practise good instead of evil. This was the great subject of the preaching of John the Baptist; *Μετανοεῖτε* was his continual theme, Matt. iii. 2, 11; Luke, iii. 8. The same may be said of Christ, Mark, i. 15. It here denotes a radical alteration, or a change by which an entirely new direction is given to one's life and efforts. Hence the phrases which occur so frequently, *μετανοεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν* or *ἔργων νεκρῶν*, Acts, viii. 22; Heb. vi. 1. Hence, too, *μετανοεῖν* and *ἐπιστρέφειν* are interchanged as synonymous, Acts, iii. 19, 26; Rom. ii. 4.

(3) The writers of the New Testament frequently connect the two meanings of the word *μετάνοια* together, since the object of an external change of religion is always the improvement of the heart. Acts, xi. 18, "God hath granted even to the heathen *μετάνοιαν εἰς ζωὴν*." The ancient ecclesiastical fathers, even in the Latin church, also connected with this word the idea of repentance and reformation in the moral sense; and Lactantius proposes well (Inst. Div. vi. 24) to render it by the word *resipiscencia*. But the word commonly employed in Latin theology was *pœnitentia*, by which the Vulgate renders *μετάνοια*; which is not, indeed, incorrect in itself, but often rather ambiguous, and sometimes quite inappropriate. Cf. Morus, p. 224, s. 2. After the fourth century writers began to understand this word according to the *Latin etymology*, and to vary from the usage of the Bible. The influence of Augustine contributed to the wide diffusion of this error. He insisted upon the derivation of the word *pœnitentia* from *punitio* or *pœnio*; because man himself punishes his own sins, and therefore receives forgiveness. *Pœnitentia est quædam dolentis vindicta, semper puniens in se, quod dolet commisisse*, De Pœnit., c. 8. He was followed by other Latin teachers, especially by Peter of Lombardy and other schoolmen. The unscriptural idea that *pœnitentia* is not only repentance for past sins, but punishment, self-inflicted, on account of them, has prevailed widely not only in the Romish but also in the protestant church.

This sort of *pœnitentia* is expressed in the Roman church by the German terms, *Busse* (penance, punishment, in the shape of a fine or mulct), *Busse thun* (to do penance), *büssen* (to atone), the last of which terms expresses more clearly the false associated idea. Many protestants have therefore wished that when the error of the Romish church implied in this term was abandoned, this term itself, which so easily leads into mistake, had also been given up. Christ has freed us from the punishment of sin, and an atonement on our part is not possible.

Even when we *repent* (μετανοῶν)—i. e., *alter* and *reform*, we *make no atonement*, but we receive great blessings. Vide the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, c. v. and vi. But there is no word in German [and the same is true in English] which answers fully to the Greek μετάνοια. And if the scriptural idea of this term is explained in the early catechetical instructions, the inaptness of the terms by which it is rendered need not be so much regretted, since people in common life are not accustomed to take words in their etymological sense.

IV. *Scriptural idea of terms denoting Holiness or Sanctity*, (ἀγίωσθη, ἀγιασμός, κ. τ. λ., also δούτης, δόσις. Heb. שָׁרָף, with its derivatives.)

The words ἀγίος, ἀγιαῶν, שָׁרָף designate primarily whatever is *singled out, selected*, or *best in its kind*. Vide s. 29. It was first applied in the ancient languages to *external* excellences and privileges; afterwards, to those of an *internal* and *moral* nature. Hence arose the twofold use of these terms in the Bible, which must not be overlooked; they denote *sanctitas externa*, and *interna*.

(1) All the Israelites are called by Moses שָׁרָף, and holiness is ascribed to them without respect to their moral conduct, but merely from the circumstance that they were (externally) separated from the Gentiles, and (external) professors of the true religion. The same way of speaking became common in respect to Christians, who are frequently called in the New Testament ἀγίοι, ἁγιασμένοι, merely from the circumstance that they profess externally the Christian religion, and belong externally to the Christian community, and thus are distinguished from Jews and Gentiles. Hence all who were received into the visible Christian church by baptism, were called ἀγίοι, *Christians*, without respect to their moral disposition, as appears from the epistles to the Corinthians.

(2) These terms are also evidently used by the sacred writers in a *moral* sense. Lev. xix. 2, "Be ye holy, for I am holy." Cf. 1 Pet. i. 14—16. So ἀγιασμός, in Rom. vi. 22, is the same as δικαιοσύνη in ver. 18, 19, *virtue, righteousness*; ἁγιασμένη, 1 Thess. iii. 13, and ἀγιαῶν, v. 23. 'Ἀγιασμός, in Heb. xii. 14, is that *without which no man shall see the Lord*. The same is true of δόσις and δούτης, Ephes. iv. 24; Luke, i. 75, δούτης καὶ δικαιοσύνη. It here denotes that blamelessness of feeling and conduct which is required, according to the divine precepts, from a true worshipper of God, and especially from a Christian, and also the habitual abhorrence of sin and love of moral excellence. Cf. 1 John, iii. 7, δίκαιός ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνος δίκαιός ἐστι. Rom. vi. 18, δουλεύειν δικαιοσύνη, coll. ver. 19, "He is dead to sin, and lives entirely for virtue." In this way the Christian becomes

like God, and loves him from similarity of disposition, and in return is loved by God, as a dutiful son who resembles his father is loved by him. Man is destined for holiness, and the happiness proportionately connected with it. Vide s. 51, II.; and when any one is admitted into the community of the saints, (the Jews under the old covenant, and Christians under the new,) his holiness is the great object aimed at. The church is designed to be *schola sanctitatis*. Otherwise, his admission into the church and his fellowship with the saints will be of no advantage to him; indeed, his condemnation will be aggravated in consequence of these privileges. *Holiness* is therefore the evidence and result of *conversion*, or of *repentance* and *regeneration*. One who is destitute of holiness, or who is negligent in the pursuit of it, is not *converted*, or *born again*, or has not *repented*. For an account of the nice distinctions and technical definitions of the words *conversion*, *regeneration*, *repentance*, *renewal*, *sanctification*, which theologians formerly introduced into their systems, vide Morus, p. 223. [Also cf. Hahn, s. 523, ff.—Tr.]

SECTION CXXVII.

STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF MORAL REFORMATION; ITS COMMENCEMENT; ON PUTTING OFF REPENTANCE; AND ON LATE CONVERSIONS.

I. *Scriptural Doctrine respecting Repentance and Conversion; inferences from it; and an Explanation of Technical Terms.*

(1) Two things are justly considered as essential to the commencement of reformation—viz., the knowledge of sin as sin, and the sorrow of soul arising from it, or bitter penitence on account of sin and abhorrence for it. Christian repentance is therefore a *lively* knowledge, agreeably to the precepts of the gospel, of the sin which we have committed, as a great evil. This knowledge is called *lively* when it is efficacious and influences the will, in opposition to a dead knowledge, which has no influence upon the determinations of the mind. These two things must belong to reformation of every kind, and to whatever object it relates, for they are founded in the very nature of the human soul. Whenever a change takes place in human views and feelings, whether entire or partial, it is always effected by the same laws, and involves the same general feelings. In order that a man may renounce a particular vice, (suppose drunkenness,) his understanding must first apprehend it as a fault, and must see its injurious consequences. The first effect is therefore produced upon the understanding, and next, through that, upon the will. The lively conception of the evil consequences of past transgression or

of habitual vice awakens sorrow for sin, aversion to it, and a determination henceforward to avoid it. But Christian reformation does not consist in the giving up of particular sins and vices, but in renouncing sinful dispositions and principles, in the turning of the heart from the love of sin to the love of goodness. Particular outbreaks of sin may be compared with particular symptoms of a dangerous disease; attempting to remove these will be in vain, unless the disease itself is entirely cured. If this is done, these symptoms of course disappear. In the same way we should strive, not only to be rid of particular sins, but to be renewed in the whole temper of our souls.

The same things are essential to every kind of reformation—e. g., Jer. iii. 12, 13, where the Israelites are exhorted to renounce their idolatry; and 2 Cor. vii. 8—11, which describes the feelings produced among the Corinthians by the rebuke which Paul administered to them on account of their indulgence to the incestuous person; and these feelings were the cause of their reformation, or of their putting away the offence. Here *μετάνοια* is said expressly to consist mainly in *λύπη κατὰ Θεόν*, *godly sorrow*, which was very beneficial to them after they became conscious of their guilt. Cf. Ezek. xviii. 21, seq.; Luke, iii. 10—14.

Now since the nature and operations of the human soul are the same at all times, it is not to be wondered at that the manner of moral reformation is described in the Old Testament as essentially the same as in the New. And, indeed, the *process* of reformation could not be different in the Old Testament and the New, since it depends upon the unaltered constitution of the human soul, of which God himself is the author. The experience of David, (after his affair with Bathsheba,) recorded in Ps. li., is full of instruction on this point. It consists of the knowledge of his sin and desert of punishment, sorrow, repentance, desire of forgiveness, the earnest wish for reformation and for confirmed goodness; also of love, confidence, and sincere gratitude to God. Cf. Ps. xxxii.

The nature of reformation, and especially of its commencement, are clearly described by Christ in two parables.

(a) The parable of the pharisee and the publican, Luke, xviii. 9—14. The pharisee is very proud of his virtues and merits, and thinks no man is better than himself, and is fluent in praise of his own good works. The publican acknowledges his sins, is troubled, and penitent. He utters the simple feeling of his heart in the few words, "God be merciful to me, a sinner." And Jesus decides, that the latter went down to his house forgiven by God, the other not. Here the man who believes that he shall

obtain the grace of God on account of his own works or worthiness, through pride and selfish blindness remains ignorant of himself and his great imperfections, and does not see God as holy and just. He is not therefore inclined to embrace the doctrine of forgiveness through grace without personal merit, and accordingly he is not forgiven. This mistake is called self-righteousness, from Rom. x. 3. Cf. Dan. ix. 18; Is. lxiv. 6. This mistake is one of the most injurious and dangerous, because the man who makes it persuades himself that he does not need reformation.

(b) The excellent parable of the prodigal son, Luke, xv. The object of this parable is twofold. First, to shew in what way a man comes to the knowledge of sin, and to the feeling of guilt; how he must humble himself, and acknowledge his unworthiness of the divine favours, and yet have confidence, and lay hold of and embrace the undeserved forgiveness of God. Secondly, this parable shews how gracious and kind the feelings of God are, and how ready he is to forgive the repentant sinner. Vide Luke, xv. 7, 10. Cf. Töllner's Essays in his "Theol. Unters." Bd. i. th. 2, s. 390, seq.; "Busse und Glauben;" also, "Ueber die Parabel vom verlorenen Sohn."

(2) *Sorrow for the sins we have committed*, (*λύπη*, 2 Cor. vii. 9, 10,) which is also an essential part of reformation, is called by theologians *contrition*, *brokenness of heart*, (Germ. *Zerknirschung*.) Our older theologians justly render and explain this term by the phrase *Reue und Leid*, (penitence and sorrow.) The term is taken from the Hebrew *לֵב נִשְׁבֵּר וְרֵעָה רַחֵם* (lit. *wounded heart*), Ps. xxxiv. 19; Is. lviii. 19; Ps. li. 19. Both of these terms are applied to a *desponding, contrite, troubled* mind, whatever the cause of the distress may be. Cf. Is. lxi. 1, and other passages cited by Morus, p. 218, h. 9. The lively knowledge of sin as a great evil, necessarily involves unhappy feelings and sorrow, (*dolor animi*, *λύπη*), Ps. li. 19; Jer. xxxi. 19; Luke, xviii. 13. And since we are drawn away to sin by the strength of our passions, and cold reason is far too weak to afford the necessary resistance, other feelings must be opposed to those which incline us to sin, in order to counteract their influence; for man is not merely a rational being, but is composed of sense and reason, (Germ. *Vernunftig-sinnliches Wesen*.) Now it is a great object, and one of the chief advantages of religion, to excite and maintain these penitential feelings. Sorrow for sin is highly beneficial in its influence, and is essentially involved in true and radical reformation. Hence Paul, 2 Cor. vii. 9, calls this penitence and sorrow, *λύπη κατὰ Θεόν*, *acceptable to God*, *agreeable to his will and purpose*—because it

contributes to our salvation, (*εἰς σωτηρίαν.*) And because it does so, it is a repentance not to be repented of, (*ἀμεταμέλητον.*)

But this sorrow for sin is very different in degree both as to *strength* (*intensive*) and *continuance*, (*extensive*.) Men differ exceedingly from each other in respect to constitution, temperament, and the entire mental disposition. Accordingly, their feelings, and the manner in which they express them, are very different. No general rule can therefore be prescribed for all, respecting the degree of sorrow which it is necessary to feel, and the manner in which it must be expressed. We have no definite measure of human feeling, no *mathesis affectuum*. Let this, then, be the only rule by which we try ourselves and others: *Sorrow for sin is then only sufficiently great* (for the purpose of reformation) *when it produces in us a constant aversion to sin, remaining through our whole lives*. It implies the sincere wish, *Would that I had not transgressed the divine commands*, and also the acknowledgment of the desert of punishment on account of such transgression. But while one is inclined from his very temperament to sorrow and despondency, or to violent outbursts of feeling, another is naturally disposed to cheerfulness, is more considerate and reserved, and gives little vent to his emotions. Besides, there are different degrees, both of actual sin and of inward corruption, in different men; and their feelings of sorrow will of course vary accordingly.

Sincerity of heart is the great requisite here; Ps. xxxii. 2. It is on this only that God looks with approbation. The accurate recollection of each *particular* sin we have ever committed is neither necessary nor possible. Still less are the *external, visible signs* of penitence and sorrow essential to reformation, unless they arise from the deep, sincere sorrow of the heart. Whether the feelings of the heart shall be expressed by external signs depends wholly upon the difference of men as to natural temperament and organization. As to tears, lamentations, and sighs, they are of very little consequence in this matter. Provided the heart be renewed, whether it be with or without tears is a point of indifference. The tearless repentance of a man of a sedate cast of mind may be more sincere and acceptable to God than the penitence of a person of a more effeminate mould, which is attended with sighing and weeping, but which often passes soon away and leaves no abiding effects. Cf. 124, I. II. We should beware, however, of considering persons to be hypocrites because they make these violent demonstrations of feeling—a rash decision too often made! On this point we are liable to mistake, and religious teachers have often, from the earliest times, been in fault here. Many made too much of the

term *contrition*, and undertook to lay down definite rules on this subject, and appealed to some examples and passages in the Bible, which are not, however, universally applicable—e. g., the repentance of David, Mary Magdalene, Peter, and the *repentance in sackcloth and ashes* mentioned in the Old Testament, which, however, does not describe reformation of heart, but the public external rites employed in case of pestilence and other great calamities. Such vehement expressions of feeling are not required of all men. The example of David, who spent three quarters of a year in trouble on account of his sins, is frequently mentioned here. But he had himself to blame for this; since he himself confesses, Psalm xxxii. 3, 4, that he endeavoured to *keep silence* respecting his sins—i. e., to exculpate himself before God, to palliate his guilt, and to avoid the necessity of humble confession and penitence. As soon as he acknowledged his sin and repented of it, God forgave him, ver. 5.

Christianity does not lay down any definite rule, or prescribe any artificial efforts by which this moral change must be effected. It requires from each nothing but what is adapted to his nature. Peter *wept*, and considering his character and his crime, this was natural. The publican only *sighed*. Zachæus does not appear to have done either the one or the other. And yet the penitence and reformation of all was acceptable in the sight of God.

According to the precepts of Christianity this change must result in the suppression of the reigning desires of the flesh, and in restoring dominion to those principles of reason which are conformable to the will of God; and thus renovating the whole man, and making him, before carnal (*σαρκικός*), to be spiritual (*πνευματικός*), obedient to the precepts of Christianity, and in a state prepared to enjoy the guidance and assistance of God, or the Holy Spirit. Cf. Romans, vii. 25; viii. 1, seq.

Theologians call the reformation of men who were before entirely rude and savage, *penitentiam primam*, or *magnam*; that of those who are in a better moral condition, but still need reformation, *penitentiam stantium*, or *secundam*, or *quotidianam*. And all, even the greatest saints on earth, stand in need of this daily repentance, though in different degrees. None can justly consider themselves perfect. All must acknowledge themselves sinners, deficient and imperfect. So the whole scriptures require us to feel; and everywhere insist upon sincere and unpretending humility, and condemn the opposite dispositions.

(3) Sorrow or penitence for sin must flow from the *knowledge* of sin—i. e., from a consciousness that we have acted contrary to the divine law, and therefore deserve divine punish-

ments. Hence it follows that we should impartially examine our actions according to the law of God. Now when one sees that he has been ungrateful and disobedient, and rendered himself unworthy of the divine favour; when, in view of this, he feels sorrow and sincere penitence, and begs God to pardon his sins and avert deserved punishment; this is called *making confession of sin to God, (confessio.)* This is not, then, as some would have it, a particular part of repentance. It is the opposite of *concealing, exculpating, palliating* one's sins before God, (refusing to acknowledge them as such, and to seek forgiveness for them.) Proverbs, xxviii. 13, "He that covereth his sins shall not prosper; but whose confesseth and forsaketh them shall have mercy." So Christ represents it in the parable of the prodigal son, Luke, xv. Vide Psalm xxxii. 3—6; Dan. ix. 4; 1 John, i. 8, where *saying we have no sin* is opposed to *ὁμολογεῖσθαι ἁμαρτίαν*, ver. 9, *to acknowledge and repent of sin.*

The Bible says nothing of the necessity which the Romish church teaches of making confession to men as to *representatives* of God. It recommends, however, the practice of confessing our faults to experienced Christians, and of opening to them the state of our hearts, as conducive to vital religion. Cf. James, v. 16.

(4) Sorrow for sin and hatred and abhorrence of it are always founded on a previous knowledge of sin; but they are produced in two ways—viz.,

(a) By contemplation of the divine *precepts* and the *penalty* threatened in the law against transgressors. The divine laws were given for our highest good. Every violation of them both destroys the happiness flowing from obedience and incurs the punishment annexed to disobedience. When the sinner seriously revolves such considerations as these, he must necessarily feel mingled emotions of shame, terror, anxiety on his own account, and abhorrence for sin itself. We find that Christ and the apostles made use of these considerations in order to awaken a salutary fear in the minds of their hearers. Vide Matt. iii. 7, 10; Luke, iii. 3, seq.; Heb. x. 29, seq. This is called by the schoolmen and in the Romish church, *attritio*, or, as Thomas Aquinas has it, *contritio informis*—i. e., *imperfecta, inchoata, (dolor de peccato e metu puniarum.)*

(b) By contemplation of the *divine promises* contained in the gospel. When we consider, *on one side*, the undeserved love and kindness of God, exhibited in so many ways, and especially through Christ, and which has sought in every possible manner to lead us to true happiness in this life and the life to come, and has invited and encouraged us by the greatest promises, (John, iii. 16;) and when we consider,

on the other side, our own levity and negligence, our wilful rejection of the means of good offered us by God; when we consider all this, we must be constrained to feel the deepest penitence and shame, abhorrence for sin, and love to God and Christ who have done so much for us. These motives have a great and mighty efficacy in promoting radical reformation. Jesus and the apostles use these motives more frequently than any others. Their whole heart, as it were, lives in them. Vide John, iii. 16; xxi. 15, seq.; 1 Pet. iv. 1—3; Tit. ii. 10, 11. The schoolmen and the Romish church call this *contritionem (dolorem de peccato e dilectione oriundum.)* Thus this very consideration of the great blessings for which we are indebted to Christ leads to faith in him. He who knows that much has been forgiven him, loves much, Luke, vii. 47. Since Christ has done so much for us, and has even died for us, we are led to place our whole trust in him, and look to him for all our happiness, and to obey his commands from grateful love, John, iii. 5, 14—21. We see that by our sins we are rendered unhappy, that by our own merit we cannot obtain the favour of God, not even by our best works. Hence we confide in Christ, and seek through faith in him to obtain forgiveness of God, *ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοῦνται*, Gal. iii. 24. In this way we become *children of God, (Τῶι Θεῷ διὰ πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ, ver. 26,) beloved of God, and blessed by him.*

Many of the schoolmen and theologians of the Romish church reject altogether the motives first mentioned, asserting that they are not at all promotive of our moral improvement. The Antinomians of the sixteenth century expressed themselves in a similar manner with many others. It is true that this *attrition* may be so abused as to lead to a despair which will absolutely prevent instead of promoting reformation. But still when it is cautiously made use of, especially in the case of rude and uncultivated men, it produces a very good effect, and is therefore employed in the Old Testament, by John the Baptist, and Jesus himself, with many classes of hearers. Some are entirely incapable of the tender emotions to which the appeal is made in this second class of motives. Their heart must be broken and softened before it can become susceptible of the motives of the gospel. There is in this respect the same difference even in adult persons that there is between children, some of whom are ill-mannered and rude, and others docile and well-disposed. The wise teacher will employ different means with these different cases; and so must also the teacher of religion. Vide Töllner's Essay (No. 1) "Busse und Glauben."

When one is reformed, the love of sin, now renounced, is succeeded in his mind by *holiness, diligence in duty, or pious Christian dispositions*

and a holy Christian walk. Cf. s. 126, IV. Hence some theologians of the Lutheran church in the sixteenth century, took *pœnitentia* in so wide a sense as to include *faith* and *diligence in good works*.

Morus (p. 216, 217, s. 2) has given a good summary statement of the different parts of reformation here separately considered. The *inward man* is principally regarded in Christian reformation. The object is not merely to restrain the gross outbursts of sin, but to rectify the whole disposition and heart, so that the subject of it will henceforth act from entirely different motives and principles. The holy scriptures, both of the Old and New Testaments, insist everywhere that the *νοῦς, καρδιά, πνεῦμα, ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, must be renovated. The terms, *circumcision of the heart, new heart, renovation, regeneration, new creature*, all express this truth. Vide John, iii. 1—21; also No. vi. in "*Scripta Varii Argumenti*," above cited. If any one expects to succeed, by attempting to amend externally, or in any other way than by a radical change of heart, he will be disappointed. Vide No. i. 1.

II. Delay of Repentance; and late Conversion.

This subject is treated more fully in Christian ethics.

(1) The *danger and evil* of delaying reformation. (a) The *danger and difficulties*. The longer one continues in sin the more fixed becomes his habit of sinning, and of course the more difficulty will he find in breaking loose from it. He will thus become more and more the slave of sin, and be constantly bound with stronger chains. The longer therefore reformation is deferred, the more difficult it becomes. Besides, external circumstances are not in our power. Many die suddenly; others lose the use of their reason, or in their last moments are entirely unfitted for the mental efforts which are requisite for attending to the important concerns of religion, &c. (b) There must always be an *evil and injury* attending late reformations, however thorough and sincere they may be. God proportions the rewards he bestows to the degree of zeal which one shews in goodness, and to the length of time during which he has exhibited it. Vide s. 125, II. One who has just commenced a virtuous course, and has made but little advancement in it, cannot expect a great reward. In the future life, he must remain inferior to others, and thus suffer for his remissness and negligence.

(2) The opinions of theologians have always been very much divided on the question as to the *possibility* of late repentance, and the worth of it. Vide the history of these opinions in Hegelmeyer's Diss. "*de sera pœnitentia*," p. i.; Tübingen, 1780.

First. Most hold, with truth, that late reformation is possible, and that God may pardon (though with the limitations mentioned, No. 1.) even those who defer repentance to the last, if it is then thorough and sincere. They hold, however, for the reasons above given, that such late conversions are very doubtful, and that great caution should be used in speaking confidently of the salvation of those who put off religion to the last, lest this should tend to confirm others, to their great injury, in their prevailing errors. It is unsafe for men to pronounce any opinion in such a case. For there is no evidence of true faith but the works of the life. None but God can look into the heart. But since God can look into the very soul; since he will forgive, without exception, all who sincerely repent of their sins, and ask forgiveness through Christ, in the way which he has prescribed, (1 Tim. ii. 4; 2 Pet. iii. 9;) and since the grace of God is limited to *no time*, to *no terminum gratiæ preceptorium*, (s. 113, l. 3;) there can be no doubt, *in abstracto*, but that God will really forgive those who seek for pardon, though it may be late, if their desire be only sincere and earnest. He will bestow even upon such that happiness and reward of which they are susceptible. The example of the malefactor on the cross (Luke, xxiii. 40—43) is justly referred to in behalf of this opinion. The Christian doctrine justifies us in promising pardon and mercy to all, even the greatest sinners, at all times, provided they will only accept these offers. To cut off, therefore, an unhappy dying man from all hope, and to thrust him into despair, is without scriptural warrant, and highly presumptuous and cruel.

Secondly. Others regard late repentance as impossible, and hold that one who has deferred it to the last cannot hope for pardon; because, they say, late repentance never can be *true* or *sincere*, and this is a condition indispensable to forgiveness. They appeal to the example of many who in prospect of death gave signs of repentance, but who, as soon as danger was past, became worse than before.

But (a) there are also examples of a different kind—examples of those who, like the thief on the cross, became repentant and believing in circumstances of imminent danger, and who yet have afterwards manifested an unshaken fidelity. (b) Those who advocate this opinion often mistake the want of *perseverance* in faith for the want of *sincerity* in it. (c) The examples mentioned do not prove that late repentance is *never* sincere and thorough, but only that it is *not always* so; which indeed is true.

The great argument, however, which is used on this side is, that *conversion is not the work of a moment*, (not *subitanea* or *instantanea*;) but requires *time*, earnestness, zeal, practice. This

is true from the very nature of the human mind. But this only proves the great difficulty, the uncertainty and danger of such late conversions, and not the entire impossibility of them. Many men, in whom the work of conversion is not completed, are still not entirely *evil* and destitute of all good. The seed of goodness frequently lies in their hearts, while its growth and fruitfulness are impeded and prevented by various internal and external hindrances. But this work may have been silently and unobservedly going on in the midst of these difficulties. And now unexpectedly some external circumstance occurs as a means of awakening. The person hears a moving exhortation, is reminded of some promise or threatening from the Bible, is placed in imminent danger, or in some such manner is aroused, and impelled to attend more earnestly to the concerns of his soul. These circumstances depend on Divine Providence, and God makes use of them as means for the conversion of men. This appears to have been the case with the malefactor on the cross. Probably there had been a long preparation in his mind for the result to which he then came. The passage, Heb. vi. 4—6, Ἀδύνατον—παρρησιόυντας—ἀνακαλῶν ζῆν εἰς μετάνοιαν, has no relation to this point. This passage refers to those who persevere in apostasy, and the rejection of religion. The phrase, ἀδύνατον ἔστω, means only that it is *impossible for men*. Cf. Matt. xix. 26.

Those theologians who differ so widely from the Bible as to hold that the forgiveness of men depends *altogether* upon their holiness or obedience to the divine commandments, and not upon faith in Christ and his atonement, are indeed hard pressed in this point. If they would be consistent, they must deny salvation to those who delay repentance till just before the close of life, and who therefore do not exhibit the fruits of this change. So even Steinbart thought. The holy scriptures, on the contrary, teach that God forgives men on account of their faith in Jesus Christ; that holiness is the consequence of this faith, and that without this faith in Christ man is not able to live holy. Now if a man, whose reformation begins with faith, is prevented by death from exhibiting the fruits of this faith, (which, however, he would have exhibited had he lived longer,) he cannot, on this account, be excluded by God from happiness; although his happiness will be less than that of others who have pursued a long course of active virtue. Thus we might conclude *in abstracto*; the determination in particular given cases must be left with God.

Note.—The work of Noesselt, "Ueber den Werth der Moral und späten Besserung," (Halle, 1777, 8vo, Ausg. 2, 1783; especially s. 220, seq.,) contains much on this subject which is ex-

cellent. This work was occasioned by the unsettled, partial, and indefinite views contained in many works on this subject, especially in those which held up the opinion that late repentance is impossible or of no avail; such, for example, as that of Saurin, "On the Delay of Conversion;" Edward Harwood, "On the Invalidity of Repentance on the Death-bed;" and Steinbart, on the question "What Value can be allowed to Sudden Conversions, especially on the Death-bed; and what is it advisable publicly to teach on this subject?" Berlin, 1770, 8vo.

SECTION CXXVIII.

REMARKS ON THE FALSE OPINIONS AND PERVERSIONS CONCERNING THE DOCTRINE OF REPENTANCE, WHICH HAVE BEEN GRADUALLY ADOPTED IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

MOST of these mistakes have arisen from false ideas, agreeing with the depraved inclinations of the human heart, respecting *forgiveness of sin, propitiating God, and the merit of good works*. Cf. s. 108, and s. 125, III.

I. Penance of the Excommunicated.

The apostles and other ancient Christian teachers held that it is the prerogative of God alone to forgive sin, and that men are bound to confess their sins to him, and to seek forgiveness from him. So taught Justin the Martyr (Apol. 2), and others. But even as early as the times of the apostles the custom (which had before prevailed among the Jews) of excommunicating gross offenders from the church (ἀφορισμός) was adopted by Christians, and was indeed necessary *at that time*. The rites attending restoration to the church became constantly more numerous and complex during the second, third, and fourth centuries. Those who were restored were compelled to perform *public penance*, (*pœnitentia publica*.) The excommunicated person (*lapsus*) was bound (1) to labour to convince the church of the reality of his penitence and reformation. He appeared therefore in public in a mourning dress; he fasted, wept, and begged for prayers, (*contritio*.) (2) He was bound to make a public confession of sin, and to ask forgiveness of the church; and this, in order to humble him and to warn others, (*confessio*.) (3) His undergoing these and other trials and punishments imposed upon him as the condition of his being readmitted, was called *satisfactio*; and he obtained *pacem*. Vide Morini *Tractatus de pœnitentiæ sacramento*. This was originally only church discipline, and nobody pretended that it was connected with the forgiveness of sins by God, who looks not upon the outward man, but upon the heart. Indeed, Montanus in the second century, and Novatian in the third, though they were so rigorous in church discipline that

they were unwilling to readmit a person who had been once excluded, did not deny that he might obtain forgiveness from God.

II. *Penance supposed the means of obtaining the Forgiveness of God.*

We find that the great body of Christians since the second century have entertained very erroneous apprehensions respecting this excommunication. Many believed (although the doctrine was not as yet formally sanctioned by the authority of the church) that a person by being excommunicated from the church is also excluded from communion with God. But they also held that when the church forgives a person and admits him again to their fellowship, God also forgives him and admits him to his favour. And this opinion was more dangerous in its tendency than the former. The church, and especially those who ruled over it, who had the most to say in this matter, came to be regarded more and more as the representatives of God. Vide s. 135, I. Hence great importance was attached to the external rite in the readmission of the excommunicated. The idea became prevalent, that God is influenced, and moved as it were to compassion, by fasting, weeping, kneeling, begging, and sighing. In short, it was believed that a person could obtain forgiveness of God by the same external means by which the favour and forgiveness of the church and its rulers could be obtained. And the teachers of religion often contributed to the increase of such errors by insisting injudiciously upon these external rites. Even Origen sometimes expressed himself in this unguarded manner—e. g., in Homil. 15 in Levit. After the fourth century, the service of God was made to consist more and more in mere outward ceremonies.

III. *Auricular Confession.*

When the Christian church was much enlarged, the Grecian church in the third century, and the Western church in the third and fourth, commuted the public confession of the excommunicated for private confession to be made to a presbyter appointed for that purpose. Vide Sozom. ix. 35. This too was soon abolished in the Grecian church, but it was retained in the Latin church. Hence arose by degrees the practice of *auricular confession*, and then, slowly, the whole system of public penance. At first the *lapsi* only were bound to confess their grosser offences to spiritual guides, before they could be reinstated and allowed to approach the holy supper. But in process of time, every Christian was required to confess to the clergy all his sins, even the least of them, before he could be admitted to the Lord's table. The clergy and the monks confirmed the populace in the persuasion, to which it was itself predisposed, that con-

fession to the priest was the same as confession to God; and that the priests gave absolution in God's stead.

This much-abused principle, that confession must be made to spiritual teachers and the heads of the church, is found very early, even in the third century—e. g., in the writings of Origen (Homil. in Levit.), and especially of the Latin fathers, Cyprian, Hieronymus, and Augustine. They compared the presbyter with a physician, who cannot heal a disease if he is not made acquainted with it. In all these rites, there is much which is good, and which might be practised to great advantage, and, indeed, was so in the early church. But afterwards, when the priesthood and laity had both very much degenerated, they were greatly perverted and misapplied.

IV. *Penance imposed by the Clergy.*

At first the church imposed the *satisfaction* to be made by offenders. This was now done by the ecclesiastic, to whom confession was made. The penalties imposed by him were now no longer considered merely as *satisfaction given to the church*. It was believed, that by these same means God is rendered propitious and his judgments are averted. It was also believed that the teachers and ministers of the church are the representatives of God. These ministers were now frequently compared, as indeed they had been during the third century, with the Levitical priests, who, in God's stead, imposed punishments for the purpose of atoning for sin, such as prayers, fasts, almsgiving, and other rites and gifts, which were now looked upon as meritorious good works, s. 125. The ecclesiastics and monks had *books of penance*, in which the penalties were assigned for each particular sin. Vide Joh. Dalläus, *De penis et satisfactionibus humanis*; Amst. 1649.

V. *The Doctrine of Indulgences.*

At last the doctrine of *indulgences* was introduced. This was destructive of all morality. The practices of *penance* and *confession* which, at least during the darker periods of the middle ages, maintained to some degree an external discipline and order, fell at once into neglect and disuse. For by means of indulgences the people obtained remission of the penances, and freedom from the canonical or ecclesiastical punishments of sin, which were imposed by their father confessors. These indulgences were first granted by the bishops, when an individual offered of his own accord to perform some good work, to give alms, to found charitable institutions, to build churches, &c. They were afterwards sold for mere *money*. After some time the pope appropriated the trade in indulgences to himself, and during the thirteenth and four-

teenth centuries carried on a wide extended monopoly in this business. Indulgences could now be purchased even for *future* sins. It was the prevailing belief that these indulgences deliver not only from canonical punishments—i. e., from those imposed by the laws of the visible church, but also from the divine punishments, since the pope is the vicar of God and of Christ. After the thirteenth century this practice was sustained by the doctrine *de thesauro bonorum operum*, which the church, and especially the pope, the head of the church, were supposed to hold at their disposal, s. 125. The abuses attending this practice gave occasion to the reformation in Germany and Switzerland in the sixteenth century.

VI. Scholastic System of Penance.

These erroneous opinions, which had gradually arisen, were brought into a formal scholastic system by the schoolmen, and especially by Peter of Lombardy in the twelfth, and Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. The whole doctrine of the Bible respecting *moral reformation* and a *change of heart* was thus changed into a matter of *external penance*. This became the prevailing system of the Romish church, and all these principles of the schoolmen were sanctioned by the Council at Trent, Sess. 14.

The following are the main principles of the schoolmen—viz.,

(1) *Penitentia* is derived from *punio*, according to Augustine, and therefore denotes *the punishment of oneself*. Hence originally the German *Busse*, which signifies, *punishment, atonement, &c.* Vide s. 126, IV.

(2) Each particular sin must be atoned for by particular *satisfactions*.

(3) Therefore every Christian must confess all his sins to the minister of the church, as a *priest and judge*, placed in God's stead.

(4) Conversion, therefore, consists of three things—viz., *contritio*, or *compunctio cordis*, *confessio oris*, (to the priest in God's stead,) and *satisfactio operis*, (*satisfaction* rendered by performing the penances imposed.) All this was borrowed from the ancient ecclesiastical discipline. Vide No. I., on the distinction between *attritio* and *contritio*. Cf. s. 127, I. 3.

(5) This *satisfaction*, or atonement, must be made by prayer, alms, fasts, and other external rites and bodily chastisements. Accordingly, Peter of Lombardy says, *Oratio dominica delet minima et quotidiana peccata. Sufficit oratio dominica cum elemosynis et jejuniis*. Vide s. 108.

(6) This *pœna satisfactoria*, which must, in the usual course, be endured, may be somewhat remitted, says Thomas Aquinas, by means of *indulgences*. But this principle was afterwards very much extended. Vide No. v.

(7) One who is not absolved of his pardonable sins by rendering such satisfactions goes at death into *purgatory*, where, in the midst of torments, he must make atonement for them. The doctrine *de purgatorio* was propagated during the fourth century in the West, and universally prevailed from the ninth to the eleventh centuries. It was believed, however, that souls could be freed from purgatory, or, at least, that their continuance there could be shortened by having masses said for their souls. Vide s. 150.

ARTICLE XII.

ON THE OPERATIONS OF GRACE; OR THE DIVINE INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING REPENTANCE AND FAITH; S. 129—133, INCLUSIVE.

SECTION CXXIX.

EXPLANATION OF THE TERMS "GRACE, OPERATIONS OF GRACE, MEANS OF GRACE," AND OTHER PHRASES EMPLOYED IN THEOLOGY ON THIS SUBJECT; AND THE CONNEXION OF THIS DOCTRINE WITH THE PRECEDING.

I. *Connexion of this Doctrine with the foregoing; and the Import of it.*

THE whole Christian doctrine is given by God to men in order to bring them to faith and repentance, and consequently to eternal happiness. For they are not capable of this happiness until they perform the conditions described in Article xi. But, as the scriptures teach us, we are not at present in a condition to amend ourselves, and by our own powers to fulfil these conditions, *without some higher assistance and guidance of God*. This incompetency is owing to the power of sense, and its preponderance over reason, or, which is the same thing, to *natural depravity*. Vide sec. 77—80. Now, though man needs a moral change, his will, according to both scripture and experience, being in a high degree depraved, he is yet unable, without divine help and assistance, either to awaken within himself earnest desires after holiness, or to execute the good purposes he may form, and persevere in them, or to perform the other conditions upon which his salvation depends. All the arrangements, therefore, which God has made, in order to produce in those who live in Christian lands faith in Christ and a change of heart, and to secure their continuance, and thus to bring men to the enjoyment of the promised salvation, are called by the general name of *grace*, or the operations

of divine grace, (*operationes gratiæ*, German, *Gnadenwirkungen*.)

II. The Various Names by which these Operations are commonly designated in Theology.

(1) *Gratia*. By this term is understood, in theology, the divine operations or power (*assistance*) exerted in producing repentance or conversion. It is contrasted with *nature*, and by this is meant, the natural powers of man, which, on account of his depravity, are regarded as too weak and insufficient to effect this moral renovation, and therefore need to be elevated and strengthened by God. The state of one who is enlightened by Christian doctrine, and by a faithful use of it, under divine assistance, is renewed, is called a *state of grace*, (*status gratiæ*.) This is opposed to the *natural state*, (*status naturæ*, or *naturalis*,) by which is meant the state of one who is not as yet enlightened by the Christian doctrine, or renovated by its influence, and has not yet experienced the assistance of God. Morus, pages 234, 235. Augustine first used the word *gratia* to denote the supernatural agency of God in conversion. He held this agency to be, in reality, *miraculous*, and therefore *irresistible*. Vide sec. 132. This use of the term has since been retained in theology, even by those who have discarded the erroneous opinions of Augustine.

Χάρις is used in the Bible to denote (a) the *undeserved divine favour towards men in general*; (b) the *result and proof* of this favour in the particular blessings bestowed; and (c) *more especially the blessings for which we are indebted to Christ*, pardon, the forgiveness of sins, and all the Christian privileges connected with forgiveness. Hence *all the operations of God on the hearts of men*, in promoting repentance and holiness, are comprehended by the sacred writers under the term *χάρις*, as being the most distinguished favours; although these are not the only favours intended by this term in its scriptural usage, but the others now mentioned are also often designated by it. Vide s. 88, II., note.

The whole series of operations and means which God employs to bring men to the enjoyment of the blessedness procured by Christ is called in theology, *œconomia gratiæ*, the *œconomy* or *dispensation of grace*, (Germ. *Gnadenanstalt*, or *Einrichtung*.) Theologians distinguish here (α) *actus*, or *operationes gratiæ*—i. e., the gracious, salutary influences (also called *auxilia gratiæ*) by which men are brought to salvation, and (β) the *media gratiæ*—i. e., the means which God employs in exerting these influences on the hearts of men; the means of repentance or holiness. These means are, the *Word of God*—the divine doctrine, especially that made known through Christ. The theo-

logians of Tübingen have sometimes given the name *gratia applicatrix* to these divine operations, because, through them, God applies to us the merit of Christ to be embraced by faith—i. e., he places us in a condition in which we actually realize the fruits of Christ's merits.

(2) These *operationes gratiæ* are sometimes called the office of the Holy Spirit, (*officium*, or *munus Spiritus Sancti*, or better, his *opus*, *business*, *work*, cf. s. 105, I. 2,) because the sanctifying divine influences are frequently ascribed in the scriptures to the Holy Spirit. Some theologians have ascribed a *fourfold*, and others a *fivefold* office to the Spirit, in renewing the heart of man—viz., *elenciticum*, *didacticum*, *pædagogicum*, *paracleticum*, and others, *epanorthoticum*. A different division is made by others. This form of the doctrine is derived from the passage, John, xvi. 7—15. But there the thing principally intended is the instruction which the apostles should receive from the Holy Spirit, by which they themselves should be enabled to teach men, to exhort them to repentance, and to convince (*ἐλέγχειν*) them of their unbelief. This passage, then, does not speak of the renewing influences of the Holy Spirit on the hearts of *all* Christians; though all these renewing influences are, beyond a question, ascribed everywhere in the scriptures to God, and especially to the Holy Spirit. Vide s. 131.

Note.—The various, and mostly fruitless, controversies which have prevailed among theologians, especially since the time of Augustine, respecting the manner in which the agency of God is exerted in renewing the heart of man, and likewise the various technical terms and fine distinctions which have been introduced, have rendered this article one of the most difficult and involved in the whole system of theology. These subtleties, however, should have no place in the religious instruction given to the unlearned Christian. It is sufficient for him to know (1) that he owes his renewal not to himself and his own powers, but (2) that it is the result of that powerful divine assistance which God denies to none for this purpose; (3) that faith and repentance are not produced by an irresistible influence, but that man can resist them; (4) that in the case of those who enjoy the Word of God (revealed religion), the saving change is effected by God, through this Word, as a means; and that (5) those, therefore, who enjoy the Word of God are to expect no divine assistance entirely disconnected from it, though they may look for this assistance in connexion with the faithful use of the Word of God; and that, accordingly, (6) man must not be passive and supine in this work, but carefully use all the opportunities and means which divine grace affords him.

Erasmus remarked in his work, "Contra

librum Lutheri de servo arbitrio," that it is not essential that one should be able to determine accurately and logically the manner in which grace operates on the heart, if he only inwardly experiences these renewing influences. Not every one who imagines that he understands the manner in which the divine agency is exerted has himself, of necessity, actually experienced it, and the reverse. Nor is it either necessary or possible, in particular cases, to determine definitely how much man himself (*natura*) has contributed to his own improvement, and how much *grace* has done for him, provided he sincerely believes that he owes his entire renewal to the unmerited divine compassion. Vide Morus, p. 229, note, and p. 236, 237.

SECTION CXXX.

WHAT ARE THE OPERATIONS OF DIVINE GRACE FOR PROMOTING THE REPENTANCE AND SALVATION OF THOSE WHO LIVE IN CHRISTIAN LANDS; AND WHAT MEANS DOES GOD EMPLOY IN EXERTING THESE INFLUENCES ON THEIR HEARTS?

I. In what the Operations of Divine Grace consist; and in what order they follow.

We shall first exhibit this doctrine in the form in which it is commonly treated in theological systems, and then shew how it may be more simply and intelligibly represented.

(1) The common method in theological schools is to describe these various divine operations by figurative terms drawn from the Bible, often using them, however, in a different sense from that in which they are there used, and then to treat particularly and separately of *calling*, *illumination*, *regeneration*, *union with God*, *sanctification*, and *renovation*. The result of this has been, that these particular parts are conceived of as different and distinct, while in truth they are most intimately connected. Vide s. 126, in prin. Theologians make the following division of these influences, and suppose them to follow in this order:—(a) Man is invited by the truths of the Christian religion to repent and accept the salvation offered him, (*vocatio*.) (b) He now attains a proper, lively, and salutary knowledge of Christian truth, (*illuminatio*.) (c) When the understanding entertains just views, then the *will* is renewed. Good feelings and dispositions arise in place of sinful ones, (*regeneratio*.) (d) This work of illumination and regeneration must be carried on by ever-increasing divine influences; and thus progressive sanctification, or entire holiness, will be effected; and the higher the degrees of divine influence, the more closely will man become united with God, (*unio mystica*.) The proper scriptural import of most of these terms was explained s. 126; and the *unio*

mystica in s. 119, I. 3. Cf. Morus, p. 232. *Calling* and *illumination* still remain to be explained.

(a) *Illumination*. This word is commonly explained in theology in such a way as to render it applicable only to the true believer. It denotes that true and living knowledge of the doctrines of salvation which has a powerful efficacy upon the *will*, which is not the case with the knowledge which unregenerate men possess. So that, as theologians explain it, *illuminare alicquem* is the same as *cum effectu salutari docere alicquem*. Of such a kind, indeed, must our knowledge be, in order to be salutary and saving; and to make it so is the object of the divine influences. In the Bible, however, this term is differently used in a wider and narrower sense. To enlighten, φωτίζειν, ὡτίζειν, means, (a) to instruct, teach. It is used by the LXX. as synonymous with διδάσκειν, &c. τ. 2. And human teachers are said to enlighten men as well as God. Thus, Eph. i. 18, "The eyes of the understanding being enlightened;" and iii. 9, φωτίζειν; and 2 Cor. iv. 6; Heb. vi. 4, φωτισμός. For φῶς is *intelligence*, *clear knowledge*, and the opposite, σκότος, is *ignorance*. Of the same import is the phrase, ἀνοίγειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, Acts, xxvi. 18, &c. All this is the same as the phrase, δοῦναι γνῶσιν σωτηρίας, Luke, i. 77. (β) *Light* and *darkness* also signify *prosperity* and *adversity*. Hence, in the scriptural use, (γ) both meanings are sometimes united in these words, (in the widest sense)—instruction, and the happiness which results from it. Thus Christ is said φωτίζειν τὸν κόσμον, and to be φῶς κόσμον, a *teacher* and *benefactor* of the world, John, i. 4; viii. 12. In the scriptures, therefore, illumination signifies, instruction in those truths which God gives to men for their salvation. It is always the end of this illumination to influence the will and to promote holiness; but through the fault of man this end is not always attained. Those with respect to whom the design of God is attained are savingly enlightened. But in a wider sense even the wicked may be said, according to the scripture use of this term, to be *enlightened*—i. e., converted. Hence φωτισθέντες is frequently a general name of those who live in Christian lands, because they are better instructed, although they are not all savingly enlightened.

(b) *Calling*, *gracious calling*. Theologians understand by this term the offer of the blessings purchased by Christ which is made to men, whether they accept the offer or not. This use of the term has its origin principally in some of the parables of Christ, in which he describes the blessings of the Messiah's kingdom, or Christian privileges, under the image of a great feast, to which many guests (κεκλημένοι) are invited, many of whom despise the invita-

tion, and only a few accept it, as Matt. xxii. 3, seq. Now some have undertaken to apply this beautiful figure employed by Christ to all the cases in which *κληρῖς*, *κλητοί*, *καλεῖν* occur in the apostolical writings, by which the greatest violence is done to these terms. In most of the passages of the New Testament, in which *καλεῖν* stands without any further qualification, it signifies, not merely to *offer* Christian privileges to any one, but actually to impart them. It denotes admission into the Christian church, and the enjoyment of Christian rights. *Κλητοί* are those who have not only received an invitation to become Christians, but are real Christians, (such as are admitted;) and *κληρῖς* is, in general, that divine favour conferred on any one by which God counts him worthy of the privileges of Christianity. It is therefore frequently a blessing bestowed only upon actual Christians. *Κληρῖς* therefore frequently signifies the particular advantages which any one obtains by means of Christianity. Vide Romans, i. 7; 2 Thess. ii. 14; 2 Peter, i. 3; Eph. iv. 4, *ἐλπίς κληρῖς*. Heb. iii. 1, *κληρῖς ἐπουράνιος*, &c.; and when Christ says, Matt. xx. 14, many are *called*, (enjoy the advantages of Christian instruction,) few belong to the *chosen*, (those who are truly good and acceptable to God.)

But what is the origin of this use? From the ancient use of the words *καλεῖν* and *καλεῖν*. They were used to denote *calling*—i. e., *accepting, receiving; designing or nominating any one to a particular service, employment, office, privilege, &c.* Hence it was said of priests and prophets whom God took into his service, that they were *called*; and so of Abraham, whom he chose to be his peculiar friend; and of the Israelites, whom he received and selected from others, as his own people—e. g., Is. xlviii. 12. The particular members of the Christian society to whom this benefit happened are called *κλητοί*. Thus Paul uses the words *κληρῖς*, and *καλεῖν* of the external election of the Israelites to be the people of God, Rom. xi. 29, and ix. 11. This phraseology was now applied to Christians, denoting partly their external reception in the Christian community, (Rom. ix. 24,) and partly all the advantages and blessings which they receive through Christianity. We are able, therefore, according to Morus, to distinguish three different uses of the word *καλεῖν* in the New Testament, when it is used in reference to religion—viz., (a) to *admonish or counsel any one for his best good*; (b) to *instruct him as to his welfare, to point out to him and furnish him the means of attaining it, (faith in Christ, which is active in good works;)* (c) to *offer and promise this good to any one*. So in the parables of Christ. When, therefore, God is said to *call* any one, the meaning is, in the theological sense, that he teaches him, or causes him to be

instructed in the truths of salvation, that he may embrace them, and act accordingly, and that he promises him all the blessings and privileges connected with the Christian doctrine.

(2) The method best adapted to the nature of the subject is to divide all which God does to assist us in obtaining the blessings promised in the gospel into three principal classes—viz.,

FIRST. The first divine influences are intended to communicate to man the *knowledge* of the truths of the Christian religion, and of the blessedness purchased by Christ for mankind, (*illuminatio*, in the wider sense.) This must necessarily come first; for how can a man be disposed to desire or accept a divine favour of which he knows nothing? Paul therefore says, very justly, Rom. x. 14, “How should they serve God in whom they do not believe? And how should they believe in him of whom they know nothing (*οὐ οὐκ ᾔκουσαν*)? And how should they know anything of him without being instructed?” By this instruction man becomes acquainted with the divine decree, (*predestinatio*), that the happiness promised through Christ is intended even for *him*, and that he must appropriate it to himself; that Christ has redeemed *him*, died for *him*; and that he therefore may obtain the forgiveness of sin, and eternal salvation, &c. In this way man is invited to receive and obey the Christian doctrine, that his heart may be thus disposed; and this is called *vocatio*, in the widest sense.

This calling is sometimes said to be *universal*. If by this is meant that the Christian religion and the blessedness attainable by it is actually offered to all, and that all have opportunity to become acquainted with it, and that those who do not know and receive it can blame only themselves, the statement is false, and contrary to historical fact. For the blessings of Christianity are not published, even to the present day, to all nations, to say nothing of all men; because God must know that at present all are not prepared to receive these blessings, though doubtless he does not wholly neglect even such, but in a different way conducts them to all that happiness of which they are capable, and will doubtless continue to do so throughout the future world. Vide s. 121, II. Cf. s. 88, II.

In another sense, however, this gracious calling is truly and scripturally said to be *universal*; in the sense, namely, (a) that all people and individuals have free access to the grace of God in Christ as soon as they have opportunity to become acquainted with it; and (b) that every real Christian, without exception, may enjoy the whole sum of blessedness procured by Christ, by complying with the prescribed conditions, (*πίστις καὶ μετάνοια*, Art. xi.)

SECOND. The next class of operations go to secure our actual enjoyment of the blessedness

promised us and procured for us by Christ. These operations take effect when man no longer acts in opposition to the knowledge which his understanding has received; but faithfully complies with it, follows what he knows to be right, and allows his will to be governed by it; so that his knowledge is no longer dead, but living. It is in fact the same divine agency which enlightens the understanding and renews the will. Whatever is done in the understanding has the renewal of the will for its object, and is for this end effected. This divine agency has for its aim the production of faith and repentance, the excitement of Christian dispositions, and the salutary consequences thence resulting; Rom. v. 5, *πνεῦμα ἁγίου*; xiv. 17, *δικαιοσύνη, εἰρήνη, χαρὰ, ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ*. Tit. iii. 4—7. *The pouring out of the Holy Spirit* is, in this passage, producing and communicating the Christian temper of which God is the author, and by which we become *κληρονόμοι ζωῆς αἰωνίου*.

This is *calling* in the stricter sense, [or *effectual calling*,] and *regeneration* (*conversio transiiva*) in the theological sense; s. 126.

When any one feels a firm and lively conviction of the truths of salvation with which he is acquainted, God grants him power to subdue his sinful desires, and cheerfully to obey the divine precepts. Thus (*a*) the internal hindrances to faith and repentance, by which we are kept from the enjoyment of spiritual happiness, are removed; and ignorance, error, prejudice, and the prevailing bias to sense, are weakened. Vide Morus, p. 226, n. 1, where the texts of scripture are cited. (*b*) On the contrary, man is led by God to entertain better views, is inclined to faith and repentance, and is brought into a state in which he is ready and able to repent and believe. Both of these particulars are comprised in the expression of Christ, *God draws* (*ἐλκύειν*) *men to believe in him*—i. e., he convinces them, and renders them disposed to this duty, John, vi. 44. Vide Morus, p. 227, Note 2.

THIRD. The third class of divine operations relates to the preservation of faith, and the continuance of the entire happy condition resulting from it. Faith is *saving* only on certain conditions. These are, its firmness, growth, and increase, and the shewing of it by good works, or Christian virtues. Vide s. 124, IV. This class comprehends, therefore, (*a*) those divine operations and institutions which tend to increase our knowledge of the great truths of salvation, and perfect our acquaintance with them. The state resulting from these influences is commonly called *illuminatio regentorum*. (*b*) Those influences by which the Christian is advanced in holiness and fitted for the practice of Christian virtue, so as to attain a habit of goodness, (*renovatio* and *sanctificatio*, in the theo-

gical sense; s. 126.) Both of these influences are noticed 2 Thess. ii. 17, Θεός—σπριζαι ὑμᾶς ἐν παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἁγαθῶν. The latter is mentioned 1 Thess. v. 23, Θεός—ἀγαθὰ ὑμᾶς δότελεῖς. Cf. iii. 13.

Note.—When the enlightening of the mind into the knowledge of the truths of salvation and the learning of these truths is spoken of, it is only so far as these truths are *practical*, and stand in connexion with the plan of salvation (Art. xi.), and so have an influence on the holiness or moral improvement of men. These illuminating divine influences are not intended to convey learned theological science to the mind, or to teach the holy scriptures theoretically. All this must be done by each individual by his natural efforts. The divine influences are directed only to *moral* ends, producing faith and repentance, and renewing the heart. It is therefore possible for an unregenerate and wicked man, who has not therefore experienced these renewing influences, to possess a fundamental theoretic knowledge of religion, which he may have acquired by his own diligence. And if he is a teacher, he may clearly explain to others the doctrines of the Bible, and convince them, and thus be the means of good. Cf. Phil. i. 16—18. This good, however, will be very much prevented by the fact that hearers give much more regard to the example than to the doctrines of their teacher, and that what does not go from the heart does not commonly reach the heart. Again; these divine influences have different *degrees*, since the *capacity* for them is different in different men. Vide s. 124, III.

II. The Means which God employs in producing these effects.

The doctrine of the protestant church has always been, that God does not act *immediately* on the heart in conversion, or, in other words, that he does not produce ideas in the understanding and effects in the will, by his absolute divine power, without the employment of external means. This would be such an immediate illumination and conversion as fanatics contend for, who regard their own imaginations and thoughts as effects of the Holy Spirit. Morus, p. 231, note. The doctrine of the protestant church is, that God exerts these reforming influences *mediately*; and that the means which he employs with those who have the holy scriptures, is *the divine doctrine taught in them, especially the truths of Christianity*, in their full extent, comprising *law and gospel*, (*precept and promise*.) On this subject, cf. s. 123, III. It is only through the medium of these truths that these effects are produced, and not in a direct manner.

The sacraments, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, are enumerated among the *means of grace*,

and are so called. This is proper, if we remember that these sacraments do not exert an influence through themselves alone, as external rites of religion, but only as connected with the word of God, or so far as the truths of the Christian religion are connected with them, are sensibly exhibited and impressively set forth by them, and so through their means are personally appropriated by men. Everything here comes back to the Word of God, or the revealed doctrines of Christianity, which is the medium through which God exerts his influence, even in the sacraments,

The fact that God exerts these influences in the conversion of men, through the doctrines of revelation, is established,

(1) By such passages of scripture as expressly declare that faith, repentance, and holiness, are excited and produced in the human heart by God, through the influence of Christian truth; as 2 Pet. i. 3, "The divine power hath given us, by means of the Christian doctrine (*ἐπίγνωσις*), all the means which we need in order to live piously and godly." Rom. x. 17, 18, *ἡ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς*; cf. ver. 14. James, i. 18, "God has renewed us *λόγῳ ἀληθείας*." Connect with these all the texts in which the Christian doctrine is compared with seed sown by God, falling upon the human heart, and bearing fruit, Luke, viii. 11, seq.; 1 Pet. i. 23, *σπάρῃ*. 1 John, iii. 9, *σπέρμα Ἀδὰμ οὐ μένει ἐν αὐτῷ*. 1 Thess. ii. 13; 2 Tim. iii. 16; John, viii. 31, 32.

(2) The texts which declare that through this divine doctrine Christians are brought to the enjoyment of blessedness, and are preserved in it. John, xvii. 17, 20; 2 Cor. iii. 6, *πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖ*, 1 Tim. iv. 16, "If thou rightly teachest the Christian doctrine *σεαυτὸν σώσεις καὶ ἀποθνήσκεις σου*." Ephes. vi. 13—17, where it is shewn in figures that by the right use of the Christian doctrine one may advance far in all Christian virtues, and may secure himself against apostasy. 1 John, v. 4, "By your faith in the Son of God you overcome the world." James, i. 21, the Christian doctrine is called *ἔμφυτος λόγος*—i. e., the doctrine implanted in Christians, in which they are instructed; as Paul uses *φύτευειν*, 1 Cor. iii. 6, seq., adding *δωράμενος σώσαι ψυχὰς ὑμῶν*. Morus cites other passages, p. 225, s. 1, note 1.

Note.—It has become common in theological schools to denominate the *divine doctrine*, the sum of which is contained in the holy scriptures, the *Word of God*, from a literal translation of *הַדְבָר הָאֵלֹהִים*, *ῥῆμα*, or *Λόγος Θεοῦ*, or *Χριστοῦ*. This term denotes the declarations, oracles, revelations made in the Bible, and hence the *divine doctrine*, or *instruction* in general, as Psalms cxix., civ., cv., &c. Thus in the New Testa-

ment the Christian doctrine is denominated simply *Λόγος*. In later times it has become common to call the Bible itself, considered as a book, the *Word of God*, and many have ascribed a *divine* and *supernatural* power to the Bible as a book. In this way occasion has been given to the mistake of ascribing to the book, as such, what belongs to the *truths* or *doctrines* contained in it. This is never done in the holy scriptures themselves. There the *Word of God* is the divine doctrine itself, with which we are made acquainted by this book, but which can be efficacious without the book, as it was in the first ages of Christianity, before the writings composing the New Testament were written. For the power lies not in the book itself, but properly in the doctrine which is contained in the book. Vide Toellner, Ueber den Unterschied der heiligen Schrift und des Wortes Gottes, in his "Vermischten Aufsätzen," 2te Samml. s. 88, f.

SECTION CXXXI.

HOW IS THE DIVINE ORIGIN OF THESE GRACIOUS RENEWING INFLUENCES PROVED FROM THE HOLY SCRIPTURES? AND REMARKS IN EXPLANATION OF THE SCRIPTURAL PHRASEOLOGY ON THIS SUBJECT.

I. Scriptural Proof of the Divine Origin of the Influences of Grace.

MANY texts are frequently cited here which do not belong to this subject, but which refer only to miraculous gifts, which the apostles and some of the first Christians received, and not at all to the renewing influences which are imparted to *all* Christians. Such are 1 Cor. xv. 10; 2 Cor. iii. 18. Still there are many texts which relate directly to this subject, a few only of which will be here cited, under two principal classes.

(1) The texts which teach that God, or, what is the same thing, the Holy Spirit, works by his power in the hearts of Christians, 1 Thess. ii. 13; Ephes. i. 19; Rom. viii. 1—6. Hence the whole renewed and sanctified state of the true Christian is denominated *πνεῦμα* and *φρόνημα πνεύματος*, as in the passages cited. Vide s. 123, II. 1, and s. 124, II. Through this influence, the flesh or sense (*φρόνημα σαρκός, σὰρξ*) loses its dominion over reason, and the will is renewed; all which results from God, or from the Holy Spirit, who dwells and works in the hearts of Christians.

Now in the same way as the influence of God or of the Holy Spirit (*ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργεῖ πνεῦμα*) takes place in true Christians, the *ἐνέργεια τοῦ Σατανᾶ, σαρκός, &c. &c.*, works in unbelievers and sinners—e. g., Ephes. ii. 2; cf. i. 19, 20. For

as Satan is regarded and described as the author of evil and wickedness in depraved and unbelieving men, so is God the author of goodness and virtue in enlightened Christians. So Rom. v. 5; Ephes. iv. 30, *καπὸν πνεῦμα ἁγίου*, to counteract by sin his salutary influences.

(2) The texts in which all the specific spiritual benefits which Christians enjoy are ascribed to God, or to the Holy Spirit, as the author, or efficient cause. There is not one among all these benefits which is not somewhere described as produced by divine influence. Thus (a) *instruction* in Christianity (illumination), John, vi. 45, 65; Ephes. i. 17, 18, "God gives us *πνεῦμα σοφίας*; by the Christian doctrine;" 1 Thess. iv. 9; 1 Cor. xii. 3, 8. (b) *Conversion and faith*, and the entire sum of Christian blessedness (*κλήσις*), Phil. i. 6; Ephes. i. 11; ii. 5, 10; iii. 16; Acts, xvi. 14; 2 Tim. ii. 25. (c) *The effects and consequences of faith*; such as *good intentions, readiness to good works, and skill* in doing them, Ephes. iii. 16; 2 Pet. i. 3; 2 Thess. ii. 17; Rom. xv. 5. Indeed, the very execution of our good purposes is represented as the work of the Spirit, 1 Cor. i. 8; 1 Pet. v. 10; Rom. viii. 13, 14; ix. 1; xiv. 7; Phil. ii. 12, 13, "The Christian who is in earnest about his own salvation should exhibit all diligence and zeal; and yet he should cast himself upon the divine guidance and assistance, since he can do nothing of himself. For it was God who had awakened in the Philippians (when Paul was among them) a serious desire for salvation, and who aided in the execution of this desire, (although Paul was absent from them.) And this he did *ἐν ἐπιδοχίᾳ*—i. e., for all this the Philippians were indebted to the mere mercy of God, to his free, gracious will."

II. Remarks Explanatory of the Scriptural Phraseology on this subject.

(1) There are many passages in the Bible which, taken by themselves, appear to affirm an immediate influence of God in the renewal of men—an influence, therefore, which is *miraculous and irresistible*, and involving an exertion of his bare omnipotence. And so there are passages, where, on the other hand, it seems to be taught, that God denies and withholds from men the means for their improvement, and renders them hard, obdurate, &c. In other passages, however, it is expressly said that God employs means, and that these are accessible to all men. Vide s. 130, II. These influences are described in these very passages as *resistible*. It is distinctly taught that man is not to be *compelled*; that he himself must not be inactive about his own moral welfare; that he is free to will and choose good or evil. Hence good and evil actions are ascribed to *man himself*, and considered

as imputable to him. We find these two ways of representing this subject connected together in the same manner in the Old Testament, and in other ancient writings—e. g., those of the Arabians and Greeks. Cf. the texts cited s. 85, II. 3. According to these, God puts good and evil, wisdom and folly, into the hearts of men, and is the author both of their prosperity and their overthrow. And yet, according to these same writers, the good actions of men are rewarded by God, and their wicked actions punished by him, as their own actions; whereas if they came from God, they would not be imputable to those by whom they were performed.

(2) *Are not these two representations really contradictory?* Such they may appear to us, who are accustomed to different distinctions and expressions from those which were formerly common respecting divine influences, the freedom of the human will, and its relation to Divine Providence. Those especially who are scientifically educated are apt to bring these subjects into a philosophical form, and to express them in scholastic terms. Hence in modern languages we have appropriate expressions with regard to freedom, &c., even in common discourse. Such was not the case in ancient times. And for this reason we frequently find difficulties and contradictions where they saw none. On the one hand, the ancient world acknowledged, with us, that God governs everything, and that nothing can take place without his co-operation; on the other hand, they knew that the human will must at the same time remain free, because the actions of men would otherwise cease to be their own actions. If men were moved like machines, and wrought upon like statues, their actions could not be imputed to them. But in the ancient world, the means by which God acts were not always so carefully distinguished as is common at present. And even when these means were known, they were more seldom mentioned. The sacred writers, indeed, well understood them, for they frequently mention them, but not in every case distinctly. Thus it happens that many things were generally described by the ancients as the immediate effects of divine power, which actually took place through the instrumentality of means which were either unknown to them, or which they left unmentioned. And so, many effects of the divine agency which have a miraculous aspect were really produced by natural means. To those who are unacquainted with the ancient phraseology, the description given of those effects in the ancient manner of thinking and speaking seems to imply that God brought them to pass by an immediate and irresistible agency. Vide s. 70, Note ad fin.

Now what did Augustine and his followers

do? They took only one class of these texts, and interpreted them as they would the language of accurate philosophers, without paying any regard to the extreme simplicity of style in which the Bible was written. They drew conclusions and general doctrines from these texts, which were never drawn by the authors themselves from these premises; and all this from ignorance of the ancient manner of thinking and speaking. Vide s. 85. Illiterate persons have generally understood this scriptural phraseology better than others.

From these passages, Augustine and his followers deduced the doctrine of the *irresistible grace of God* as something which is miraculous in its nature, and which, according to his unconditional decree, he bestows upon some men, and withholds from others. Without this grace, man could not recover himself to holiness, because, since the fall, he possesses no freedom of will in spiritual things. Man can do *nothing* which will contribute to this end. He is entirely passive under these operations of grace. Augustine depended much on the passage, John, vi. 44, "No man can come to me unless the Father draw him," (*de gratia irresistibili et particulari.*) The meaning of this passage is, "No man can come to me unless the conviction of the great love of the Father (in giving me to the world from love to it) induces him, under divine guidance and co-operation, to come to me, and believe on me."

Even Origen (*περί ἀρχῶν*, iii. 19) noticed both these classes of texts, and said that they should not be separated, but taken together, that they might not contradict one another, and that *one* sense might be deduced from them both. And in fact, the two things, the earnest efforts of *man* and the assistance of *God*, are connected in the holy scriptures. Morus therefore observes, very justly, p. 225, s. 1, that the following result may be deduced from the various texts of scripture taken together:—"God leads us, *by means of his truth*, to faith and repentance." Truth is the means which God employs for this end. So the symbols and the protestant theologians. Vide *ubi supra*, note 5.

(3) The following ideas, though variously modified, are found to have prevailed generally in the ancient world—viz., that all life, activity, and motion throughout the universe, proceed from spirits or invisible beings. And even the extraordinary and unusual mental excitements, the talents, acquisitions, courage, and magnanimity which appear among men, were derived from the inspiration of higher spirits, and viewed in connexion with them. They believed, too, very generally, in evil spirits, to whose influences (under the divine permission) they ascribed the wicked purposes, the errors, faults, and calamities

of men. Cf. s. 58, II. With this mode of representation the holy scriptures plainly agree throughout. Vide the article on the Angels. They however take no part in the superstitious notions which heathen antiquity, and even the great mass of the Jews, connected with this representation. From all these they keep aloof. But, on the other hand, the Bible is equally far from agreeing with that modern mechanical philosophy which tends to set aside the influence of spiritual beings, and, as far as possible, that of God himself. According to the Bible, there are good and evil spirits, which in various ways operate on the earth and on man. But there is especially a *divine Spirit* (רוח קדוש), in an eminent sense, which operates in and upon true Christians, as it did in the times of the Old Testament upon the Israelites. Christians are indebted to Christ for this Spirit, whence he is called πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ, the *Paracletus*, the counsellor of the pious, whom Christ sends in his own stead from the Father, John, xv. 16. As soon as any one believes in Christ, this divine Spirit begins to influence his heart, and, as it were, to *dwell with him*. And all the good which such an one now thinks or does—his knowledge, his holiness and happiness—he owes solely to him. He it is whom Christ truly enlightens in his understanding and guides into all the truth. Nor can he accomplish anything good without *his* agency. He does not, however, exert his influence upon all in the same manner. He renews the heart and all the dispositions of every true Christian (*donum spiritus sancti ordinaria*); but upon some in the first Christian church he exerted a peculiar agency, enduing them with the gifts of teaching, of working miracles, &c. (*donum extraordinaria*.) Cf. 1 Cor. xii. 4—11, also s. 39, coll. s. 19, II., and s. 9, III., IV.

To the great bulk of mankind, who are unaccustomed to the arbitrary and mechanical philosophy of the schools, and who are unperturbed by it, this simple and truly animating representation, which is everywhere given in the New Testament, is more intelligible, clear, and consoling, and has more influence on their heart, and is more conducive to their moral improvement, than all the philosophical and metaphysical reasonings on Divine Providence and co-operation, how deep soever they may apparently be.

(4) The uniform doctrine of the holy scriptures is, therefore, that God effects the moral change and renovation of the human heart, not *immediately*, but *mediately*, and that the means which he employs is the *Christian doctrine* in all its extent, its doctrines, precepts, and promises. Vide No. 2, ad finem. But the Bible also teaches, that the cause of the effect which is produced by this divine doctrine lies *not merely*

in the power and weight of the arguments by which Christianity is proved, or of the truths which it exhibits, but *principally* in the power and agency of God, who, by means of this doctrine, acts in the souls of men. Theologians say, "*Divina efficientia a doctrina ipsa, ejusque vi et efficacia discernitur.*" This clearly appears from the passages before cited, especially from 1 Cor. iii. 6, 7; Phil. ii, 12, 13; 2 Thess. ii. 15—17; i. 11; Ephes. i. 16—20; iii. 16—20; 1 Pet. i. 15; Acts, xvi. 14, and many of the discourses of Jesus, especially those recorded in John—e. g., iii. 13—17, &c.

This now entirely agrees with the promise of Christ, (a) that after his departure from the earth he would support by his constant and special assistance all those who should believe on him, even to the end of life; and (b) that the Holy Spirit of God should always work among them, through the Christian doctrine. This the apostles everywhere repeat. And so they describe the whole moral renovation and perfection of man as the work of God, or of the Holy Spirit; Ephes. i. 19; James, i. 5, 18; where, however, this work is said to be accomplished *λογῷ ἀληθείας*, iii. 17, seq.; Heb. xiii. 20, 21.

When this doctrine is rightly understood—(i. e., in such a way that human freedom, or the moral nature of man, is not violated)—sound reason cannot object to it. For it affirms no new revelations or irresistible influences. The manner, however, in which this influence is exerted cannot be understood by reason, because the subject belongs to the sphere of things above sense. This we are taught by Christ and the apostles. When Christ (John, iii.) had told Nicodemus that the Holy Spirit effects a moral regeneration in men, the latter thought the doctrine incredible, and was unwilling to believe it. Christ replied, (ver. 8,) that it would be unreasonable to consent to believe only what is directly perceived by the external senses, and the whole manner of whose existence and operation we could see, as it were, with our own eyes. He illustrates this by a comparison with the wind, which we cannot see and follow with our eyes, but of whose actual existence we may be convinced by its effects; as, for example, by the sound which it makes. And such is the fact here. And there are a number of important passages of the same import, in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chap. i.—iii., and especially ii. 14. Cf. Morus, p. 237. Here *ψυχικός ἀνθρώπου* is not the *natural man*, for which *φυσικός* would be the word; but the *carnal man*—i. e., (where objects of knowledge are spoken of,) one who will acknowledge and receive in religious matters no higher divine instruction and guidance, who will believe nothing but what he perceives by

his external senses, (*σαρκικός*), one who has no perception of the truths revealed by the Holy Spirit, (*τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἁγίου*.) No wonder, therefore, that he does not yield his assent to these truths, and that they even appear foolishness (*μωρία*) to him. For such doctrines require to be differently discerned from those which are merely of human discovery; they must be discerned *πνευματικῶς*. We reject human doctrines, or renounce them, when they do not instruct or satisfy us. But since God cannot err, the truths which he has revealed, and which we know from our own convictions to be such, may not be judged of by us in the same manner. We are not at liberty to oppose or renounce them because they may chance to be displeasing to us, or because they may be hard and unintelligible.

(5) But the scriptural views of the agency of God in producing the moral renovation of man, when carefully examined, are by no means inconsistent with the philosophy of the day. They agree in all essential points with the doctrine which is confirmed by experience and reason, respecting the providence and agency of God. For (a) all *ability* and *power* which man possesses for perceiving the truth, and for choosing either good or evil, is derived solely from God. (b) But God must also concur by his agency in the use and exercise of these powers, and preserve them to us in the moment of action. Vide s. 69. (c) We owe it to God, too, that we have opportunities to exert our faculties, and objects about which we may employ them. Through the divine ordering and government, we have teachers, and all the other internal and external assistances for acquiring knowledge of the truth, and for making progress in goodness. If we are deprived of these aids, we are not in a case either to understand the truth, to practise virtue, or to do anything great and useful. Vide s. 70. Everything from without which contributes to our moral good is ordered by Divine Providence and is employed by God for the promotion of his designs; so that to him alone are we indebted not only for all temporal, but also for all *spiritual* good; although by all this our freedom of will is not in the least impaired. Vide s. 70, I. But being unable to fathom or comprehend the *manner* of the divine government, we cannot presume to determine positively *how* God can or must control us, and in what way he may, or may not, exert an agency in promoting our moral improvement. On this subject we must confine ourselves wholly to *experience*, and especially to the instructions of the holy scriptures, if we make them the ground of our knowledge. Nor must we renounce this doctrine because we cannot understand the internal *modus* of it.

SECTION CXXXII.

A SKETCH OF SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL THEORIES RESPECTING THE OPERATIONS OF GRACE, AND THE FREEDOM (OR ABILITY) OF MAN IN SPIRITUAL THINGS; AND THE CONTROVERSIES ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

I. *Opinions of the early Greek Fathers.*

In the earliest ages, shortly after the time of the apostles, there was no controversy on this subject, as Augustine himself acknowledges. In the exhibition of this doctrine most of the first teachers contented themselves with that simplicity which prevails in the New Testament. They so express themselves, that while they affirm, on one side, that man receives assistance (*auxilia*) from divine grace, they still allow to him, on the other side, *freedom* of action. Nothing was said from the first to the third century about *irresistible* grace. Vide s. 79, in the History of the Doctrine of Original Sin. So Irenæus says in many passages, "that God compels no man; that we are free, and can choose good or evil." Clement of Alexandria says, "that God indeed *guides*, but never *binds* our free will; and that hence to *believe* and to *obey* is in man's power." In the third century, Origen expressed his opinion still more definitely than the fathers who had preceded him. In his work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, (l. iii. c. I.) he says, we are indebted for faith to God alone. He gave us the means of faith. From him come both the faculties which man has of doing right, and the preservation of these faculties. But the use of these faculties bestowed upon us depends upon ourselves. When therefore in some passages of the New Testament the improvement of man is ascribed solely to God, and in others to man himself, there is no contradiction. For even that which depends upon our own free will cannot take place without the divine assistance; and God does not work in us without our own co-operation. For he does not bind the free human will. With these sentiments, Athanasius, Basilus the Great, Chrysostom, and other fathers of the Greek church, perfectly agree.

[*Note.*—The early Greek fathers were led to insist thus strongly upon *αὐτεξούσιον, ἐλευθερίαν, προαίρεσιν*, (*the self-determination, freedom of the will*;) by standing in immediate conflict with the views of man prevailing throughout the heathen world, and especially among the contemporary Gnostic sects. Before Christianity was promulgated, it had become almost universal to regard man as acting under the same necessity to which material nature is subjected. Evil was supposed either to belong to matter, and to be inherent in the human organization, or to result from an irresistible fate and necessity. Thus the free and accountable agency of man

was theoretically obscured, and practically also, as far as the image of God, which is never wholly effaced, can be obscured by theoretic error and moral corruption.

The publication of Christianity cast new light upon the condition and relations of man. While, by revealing a remedy, it implied his helplessness and need, on the other hand, by offering pardon, it implied his *guilt* and *exposure to punishment*, and by appealing to the divine portion in man it awakened him from his apathy as to moral obligation and effort. The whole nature of the Christian remedy, consisting not of magical or physical influences—which would have been requisite had man been under a natural necessity of sinning—but of moral means, calling our moral faculties into exercise, contained an implied contradiction to the pagan and Manichean philosophy, and struck at the root of every view which derives evil from a necessity of nature rather than from the perverted use of our moral powers.

From these considerations it may be explained that the early Greek fathers should have insisted so disproportionately upon the freedom of the human will, though they by no means went into the Pelagian excess of ascribing to it an independency on divine grace. Had they been placed in as immediate contact with the stoical or pharisaical doctrine of human self-sufficiency, as with the Pagan and Gnostic idea of natural necessity, they would, doubtless, have given to man's inability and dependence on God that place which human freedom and power now hold in their system.

As it was, the excess to which the Greek fathers carried this point laid the foundation for the divergency between the Eastern and Western churches, which will appear in the sequel of this sketch.

With regard to the anthropological views of the Greek fathers of this period, cf. Neander, *Kirchengeschichte*, b. i., Abth. iii. s. 1049—1060.—Tr.]

II. *Opinions of the early Latin Fathers; and the Doctrine of Pelagius.*

We find that most of the ancient Latin fathers agreed with this simple doctrine of the Greek church. So Hilary, of the fourth century; nor were any objections made to him before the time of Augustine, near the beginning of the fifth century. We find, however, in Africa, even before the time of Augustine, some traces of the peculiar expressions and sentiments which were afterwards formed by him into a system, which he held in opposition to that of Pelagius. Tertullian, who in the rest of his system does not differ from the Greeks, opposes *gratiam divinam* to *natura*, and says that the *vis gratiæ* is *potentior natura*, (the

natural powers of men,) *De Anima*, c. 21. He, however, allows to man *liberi arbitrii potestatem*. Cyprian, in the third century, comes still nearer to the opinions of Augustine. And indeed there must have been many in Africa before and at the time of Augustine who held the essentials of his system.

This induced Pelagius, (who was a native of Britain, but who was extensively read in the works of the Greek fathers,) in the beginning of the fifth century, to analyze and collate the doctrines of the Greek fathers, and especially of Origen, and to draw consequences from them which they themselves had not authorized. He taught that three things should be distinguished in man, the *posse, velle, and agere*. For the *faculty or power* to do good men are indebted to God alone (*gratiæ*), who had granted it to human nature. *To will* and *to act* depends upon man himself. Still men are so assisted by the grace of God that their willing and acting is facilitated. But the means which God makes use of in affording his aid are *doctrina* and *revelatio*. He made this last point more prominent than any of the teachers who had preceded him; and this was well. But in other points he deviated from the doctrine of the Bible—viz., (a) by denying *natural depravity*; (b) by deriving our ability to do good solely or principally from the power with which our nature was originally endowed by God; (c) and by allowing to God no real instrumentality in the conversion and sanctification of men. According to this system, God works only by means of the Christian doctrine—i. e., he is the author of this doctrine, which contains more powerful motives than any other.

Against this system Augustine contended. In Africa, councils were held in opposition to Pelagius, in which his doctrine was condemned. The Christians of the Eastern church, of Palestine and elsewhere, did not, however, assent to this decision; and the same is true of many in the Latin churches beyond the bounds of Africa, and at first even of the Roman bishop himself. This was owing, partly to the extravagant zeal of Augustine, and to the mixture of many erroneous opinions in his system; and partly to the guarded and ambiguous phraseology of Pelagius, by which he concealed his departures from the scriptural doctrine. But at length Augustine succeeded so far in his efforts, that the doctrine of Pelagius was condemned, and the condemnation confirmed by the Emperor. And thus the theory of Augustine obtained the predominance, at least in the West.

III. Augustine's Doctrine respecting Grace.

(1) He held that human nature is so depraved (s. 79) that it no longer possesses freedom of will in spiritual things (*carere libero*

arbitrio in spiritualibus)—i. e., is unable to understand *spiritual things*, (the truths of salvation contained in the scriptures,) or to act conformably with them, without the divine instructions contained in the scriptures, and the gracious assistance of God, although he may possess freedom in natural things (*liberum arbitrium habere in naturalibus*)—i. e., he may learn God from nature and reason, and fulfil many of his duties. The Bible, too, teaches that the wicked come at length to such a habit of sinning that they become the slaves of sin, (John, viii. 32, 36; Rom. vii. 23,) and that they can be delivered from this slavery only by faith in Jesus Christ and by divine assistance. Since now Augustine was led, by opposition to Pelagius, to exaggerate the doctrine of natural depravity, (vide s. 79, 80,) he represented the assistance afforded by God in the improvement of man as truly *compulsory*, and of such a nature as to infringe upon human freedom. The ancient fathers, on the other hand, held to τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, understanding by this term, or the term *liberum arbitrium*, (which Tertullian first borrowed from a term in Roman law,) the power of man to choose *good or evil* freely and without *compulsion*. This view was universally held in the East, and in the West, too, before the Pelagian controversies.

(2) Augustine made a careful distinction between *nature* and *grace*. Vide s. 129, II., and Morus, p. 234, note 2. Grace alone can renew man; he can do nothing for this end by the powers of mere nature. And it is true, in a certain sense, according to the Bible, that *man alone cannot deliver himself; that by his own unaided powers he cannot renew himself*. But Augustine went further than this, and the additions which he made are not scriptural. Man, he said, can do nothing which will at all contribute to his spiritual recovery. He is like a lump of clay, or a statue, without life or activity. Hence, he denied virtue and salvation to the heathen, and to all who are not enlightened by grace. Vide s. 121.

(3) This divine grace, which alone is able to renew the heart, is described by Augustine as *efficax* and *sufficiens*—i. e., alone sufficient to overcome the power of sin, (in which Augustine was right,) and also as *irresistibilis*. For he conceived grace to be the direct operation of divine omnipotence, acting in a miraculous manner, *qua voluntatem hominum indeclinabili vi ad bona trahat*.

(4) Augustine made a threefold division of grace, founded on the doctrine which he held in opposition to Pelagius, that *to will, to be able, and to perform*, depend solely on divine grace—viz., (a) *gratia excitans* or *incipiens*, that grace which renders the human will inclined to faith, excites good emotions, and produces the begin-

nings of faith. Other names given to this incipient grace are, *præveniens, pulsans, trahens, vocans, præparans*. (b) *Operans* or *efficientis*, that grace which imparts faith and new spiritual powers for the performance of duty. God produces good desires and determinations in man by the truths of the Christian religion. (c) *Co-operans, perficiens, or assistans*, that by which the believer is assisted after his conversion, so that he will be able to perform good works, and to persevere in faith.

Augustine differed from all the theologians who had preceded him, in teaching that *grace anticipated the human will, (prævenire voluntatem.)* This may be understood in a very just and scriptural sense. But Augustine meant by it nothing less than that the first good desires and determinations to amend are miraculously produced, or infused into the heart by divine grace; whereas the earlier theologians had uniformly taught that God gives man, in the use of means, opportunity to repent, and that he guides and assists in this work by his own agency; but that man himself must be active, and must form the resolution to repent, and have a disposition to do so; in which case divine mercy will come to his relief, (*quod voluntas hominum præveniat auxilia gratiæ.*) To this view, however, Augustine could not consent, because he denied all power to the human will. In this work, man, in his view, is entirely *passive*. But many of his followers in the West differed from him in this particular, and adhered to the more ancient representation. Afterwards they were frequently numbered with the Semi-Pelagians, and in the sixth century their doctrine was condemned.

(5) With respect to the manner in which saving grace operates, Augustine believed that in the case of those who enjoy revelation, grace commonly acts by means of the *word*, or the divine doctrine, but sometimes *directly*, because God is not confined to the use of means. On this point there was great logomachy. Real conversions, even in such extraordinary cases as that of Paul, are effected by the *word of God*, and the believing reception of it; although the circumstances under which the word is brought home to the heart may be extraordinary.

(6) Augustine connected all these doctrines with his theory respecting the *unconditional decree of God*; respecting which vide s. 32. He taught that the anticipating and efficient grace of God depend not at all upon man and his worthiness, (susceptibility,) but solely on the decree of God. God, according to his own will, elected some, from all eternity, from the whole mass of mankind, in order to make them vessels of mercy, (susceptible of his grace;) while from others he withholds this renovating grace, that they may be vessels of wrath. He imparts, in-

deed, to all the *anticipating grace*; but *efficient grace* only to a few—viz., the elect. Of this procedure none can complain; for God is not bound to bestow his grace upon any. Thus the efficacy (*efficacia*) of grace on the heart is made by him to depend on the unconditional decree of God, (*ab electione Dei*;) and also the opposition (*resistentia*) of men; the latter on the *decreeum reprobationis*. For God does not will to exert the whole power of his grace upon the heart of those who prove reprobate. *Why* he does not we are unable to determine; this is one of the unfathomable mysteries of the divine decrees. Such doctrines as these are distinctly expressed in many of the writings of Augustine,—as in his work, *De predestinatione Sanctorum*. He is not, however, at all times consistent with himself; and feeling how hard his doctrine is, sometimes expresses himself less severely. [For a more complete view of the system of Augustine, cf. the Jan. No. of Bib. Repository, for 1833, Art. Augustine and Pelagius.]

IV. *Controversies on Particular Points in the Augustinian System.*

The system of Augustine respecting grace was, taken as a whole, made fundamental in the Western church in the ages succeeding his. Some adopted it entire, others only in part; most, however, dissented from it in some particulars, and lowered it down, so to speak. They retained many of his terms, but employed them in a more just and scriptural sense. Others, on the contrary, adopted the system of Pelagius, or endeavoured to compose a new system by combining his opinions with those of Augustine. The principal points on which a difference of opinion existed in the Latin church were the following—viz.,

(1) The doctrine of *predestination*. Although Augustine believed in unconditional decrees, this doctrine never became universal in the Latin church. Most of the members of this church, until the ninth century, held only to those passages in his works in which he expressed himself with less rigour. But in the ninth century, when Gotschalk began to advocate unconditional decrees strenuously, a vehement controversy arose. Vide s. 32, note. His principal opponents were Rabanus Maurus, Hinkmar, and others, who justly derived predestination from God's foreknowledge of the free actions of men. In this opinion they had many followers, though a large number still adopted the theory of Augustine, after moderating and modifying it in various ways. To this party Peter of Lombardy and other schoolmen belonged. Luther and Melancthon (as well as Calvin and Beza) were at first strong Augustinians; but they afterwards abandoned his doctrine of predestination, while Calvin and

Beza still adhered to it, and made it a doctrine of their church. Vide the sections above cited. Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the most violent controversies on this subject raged in the Romish church, between the Jansenists, who were zealous Augustinians, and the Jesuits in the Netherlands and France. The latter agreed very nearly in sentiment with Rabanus, and had many supporters.

(2) The doctrine of *the freedom of the human will* and its relation to the operations of grace. On this subject there are three principal systems.

First. The Augustinian, which allows to man no freedom of will in spiritual things, according to the statement above made; No. iii. The strenuous adherents of Augustine above named entirely agreed with him in this particular; and the doctrine of the entire inability of man in spiritual things, in the sense of Augustine, was zealously advocated by the Dominicans, who in this followed Thomas Aquinas. Out of this arose the violent controversy which prevailed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, *de auxiliis gratiæ*, between the Dominicans and Netherland theologians on the one side, and the Jesuits and their adherents on the other, and afterwards, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, between the Jesuits and Jansenists. Luther, with Carlstadt and some others of his coadjutors, belonged at first to this high party. The former defended this doctrine in his book, *De servo arbitrio*, against Erasmus. Afterwards, however, his views became very much more moderate, and he retained but little more of the doctrine of Augustine than the terms in which it was expressed. He was followed by a large number of the theologians of his church.

Secondly. The scholastic system. Most of the schoolmen endeavoured to moderate the theory of Augustine. They taught that grace is indeed powerful and efficacious, but that man is not compelled by it, and can resist it. The assent of the human will must *accompany* grace, without which it is inefficacious. They allowed, therefore, the freedom of the will in a certain sense. They held that the will of man can either follow or resist grace; while still they admitted that grace has a certain influence in the renovation of man, not indeed miraculous, but yet acting physically in connexion with the divine word. They were followed afterwards in the Romish church by the great body of the Jesuits, who on this account were involved in much controversy with the Dominicans, Jansenists, and others, who were strict Augustinians, and by whom they were accused of inclining to Pelagianism. At the time of the Reformation, in the sixteenth century, this theory prevailed far and wide in the Romish church, and was defended by Eck and Erasmus against

Luther. It was adopted by Melanethon, and expressly avowed by him after the death of Luther, and by the theologians of his school in the sixteenth century. Others, however, would not swerve from the earlier system of Luther, though the difference which now existed between the two parties was more in words than in reality. This doctrine was called by the latter *synergism*, and its advocates *synergists*, because they taught that the operations of grace are accompanied by the action of the human will. The principal advocate of this synergism was Victorin Strigel, and its principal opponent Flacius. Since that period the opinions on both sides have assumed a much more moderate shape, and a great deal of logomachy has ceased; but there still remains a difference of opinion on this point in the protestant as well as in the catholic church.

Thirdly. The system of Pelagius. Many think that this system is better than any other to remove the contradiction between human freedom and the influences of grace. Pelagius entirely denies any physical influence of grace, and any alteration of the will effected by means of it. God, indeed, operates on men, but merely through the (natural) power of the truths of religion, of which he is the author. Man has ability both to understand these truths and live according to them, and also ability to sin. And this is the freedom of will essential to man. God causes the renovation of the heart, but *merely* through the influence of Christian doctrine, inasmuch as this doctrine, of which God is the author, contains more powerful motives to improvement than any human systems. Vide the Estimate, No. ii. ad fin. Many modern theologians have received this system entirely, and some have undertaken to interpret the common ecclesiastical formulas and the Augustinian phraseology in conformity with it. Respecting these controversies and systems vide the works of Vossius, Sirmond, Mauguin, Serry, Norisius; also the works of Semler, Walch (*Ketzergeschichte*), Rösler (*Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*), and others. [Cf. Neander, *Kirchengesch.* b. ii. Abth. iii. Bretschneider, b. ii. s. 606.—Tr.]

V. *Later History of this Doctrine.*

Since the seventeenth, and especially since the eighteenth century, many theologians of the protestant church have laboured to cast light on the doctrine of the operations of grace and the efficacy of the divine word, and to exhibit this doctrine in a manner correspondent with the principles of modern philosophy. Some have declared themselves decidedly in favour of the Pelagian system. Others have adopted it only in part, or, while they have held it, have disguised their belief by using the terms of the

Augustinian or scholastic theory in an entirely different sense from what belongs to them, in reality denying physical influence. In this point, however, the protestant church is agreed, that the Holy Spirit does not act *immediately*, but *mediately*, through the word, s. 130, II. So clearly do the symbols teach. Morus, p. 231, n. 1. Still there is a great diversity of opinion on the question about the manner in which the Holy Spirit acts through the word, and on the question whether these operations may be denominated *supernatural*, and in *what sense*. On these points there are two principal theories prevalent in the protestant church.

(1) Many hold that although grace operates through the word, there is still connected with the word a special power of the Holy Spirit, in enlightening and converting men. This power, however, is never exerted *without*, but always in connexion with the word. *Conjunctum cum usu doctrinæ auxilium Dei, quod ille fert utentibus ea*, Morus, p. 228, note. The greater part, though not all of the early protestant and Lutheran theologians, were of this opinion. So Melancthon. Some gave such a turn to this doctrine that they were suspected of fanaticism. This was the case with Herm. Rathmann, a Lutheran preacher in Dantzic, who affirmed in his work, "*Gnadenreich Christi*," 1621, that man is so depraved that the Word of God can by itself exert no power on his heart, unless the almighty power of the Holy Spirit is connected with it. Upon this a great controversy arose in the seventeenth century. Some, too, of the party of the pietists, in the eighteenth century, expressed themselves so vaguely on this point that they were suspected of fanaticism. But, in fact, neither their opinions, nor that of Rathmann, can properly be called *fanatical*. Fanatics and enthusiasts believe in an illumination and renovation of man effected *immediately* by God, without the use of the word, or the truths of the holy scriptures, of which consequently they speak with disregard. So, e. g., the Quakers. Vide Morus, p. 231, s. 5, for a brief view of their system.

Many modern theologians have entirely departed from these views, (vide No. 2;) while, on the other hand, many have adhered to the more ancient theory, and defended it against all attacks. E. g., C. A. Bertling, *Vorstellung was die Lutherische Kirche von der Kraft der heiligen Schrift lehre*; Dantzic, 1756, 4to. The author of the "*Freundschaftliche Unterredungen über die Wirkungen der Gnade*," 2te Ausg. 4 thl.; Halle, 1774, 8vo. Also the "*Briefe über die Wirkungen der Gnade*," by the same author, which is the best work in favour of this theory. Gottl. Christ. Storr, "*De Spiritus Sancti in mentibus nostris efficientia, et de momento ejus doctrinæ*;" Tubingen, 1777, 4to.

Cf. Gehe, Diss. inaug. de argumento quod pro divinitate religionis Christianæ ab experientia ducitur; Göttingen, 1796.

This theory, however little it may accord with the prevailing principles of modern philosophy, is strongly supported by many passages of scripture, s. 130, s. 131, II. 4.

(2) Others, on the contrary, hold that the divine and *supernatural* (though they do not like to make use of this word) power of the *word of God*, by which man is converted, is not to be looked for in connexion with the word, but as belonging to the word itself. They thus consider the power by which man is renewed and made holy, to be in no sense a *physical*, but rather a *logico-moral* power. This opinion, which is fundamentally Pelagian, was ingeniously defended in the seventeenth century by Claud Pajon, a reformed theologian of Orleans; it led, however, to much controversy. This opinion was first fully exhibited in the Lutheran church, after the eighteenth century, by Joh. Ernest. Schubert, in his "*Unterricht von der Kraft der heiligen Schrift*;" Helmstädt, 1753, 4to. It was against this work that Bertling wrote. Cf. No. I. It was afterwards defended by Spalding, "*Ueber den Werth der Gefühle in Christenthum*," and by Eberhard, "*Apologie des Sokrates*," thl. i., iii. The most copious and learned work on this subject is, Junkheim, "*Von dem Uebernatürlichen in den Gnadenwirkungen*;" Erlangen, 1775, 8vo. This theory has been adopted by most modern theologians of the protestant church, and essentially even by Morus. They frequently employ, indeed, the ancient phraseology and formulas, but in a different sense from that in which they were originally used—a sense which is considered by them more rational, i. e., more conformed to the philosophical system adopted by these modern theologians. We shall now give a brief historical account and illustration of this theory, which at present is the most popular and current among protestant theologians, adding, however, a *critique* as we pass along.

SECTION CXXXIII.

EXHIBITION OF THE MODERN THEORY RESPECTING THE DIVINITY OF THE OPERATIONS OF GRACE, AND THE POWER OF THE WORD OF GOD.*

I. *How does God act in promoting the Moral Improvement and Perfection of Men? and in what consists the Divinity of the Operations of Grace?*

(1) God does not act in such a way as to

* How far I assent to this theory, either on scriptural or other grounds, will appear from the previous sections. Where I agree with it entirely, I shall state it as my opinion; wherever it appears to me erroneous—I. e. not demonstrable from the Bible—I shall give it as the opinion of others.

infringe upon the free will of man, or to interfere with the use of his powers. Vide Phil. ii. 12, 13. Consequently, God does not act on man *immediately*, producing ideas in their souls without the preaching or reading of the scriptures, or influencing their will in any other way than by the understanding. Did God operate in any other way than through the understanding, he would operate *miraculously* and *irresistibly*. And the practice of virtue under such an influence would have no internal worth; it would be compelled, and consequently incapable of reward. But experience teaches that the work of reformation and holiness is not effected violently and at once, but by degrees; which could not be the case if God acted irresistibly and miraculously. Experience teaches, too, that man can resist; and so the Bible says expressly, Matt. xxiii. 37; Heb. iii. 8, seq.; John, vii. 17; Acts, vii. 51. We find, also, that the moral reformation of man cannot take place without earnest and zealous effort, (the working out of salvation with fear and trembling, Phil. ii.,) or the vigorous exercise of one's own powers; and that man must be anything rather than passive and inactive in this matter. The Bible teaches the same thing, and so requires of men that they should reform, change their heart, Acts, ii. 38; viii. 22. It exhorts them to increase in knowledge and virtue, Ephes. ii. 10; Tit. ii. 17; 1 Pet. ii. 1, 2, seq. And for what purpose has God given to man the direct revelation of his will, if it is not to be used and employed by God himself in promoting the salvation of men? Hence all genuine protestant theologians, on whatever other points they may differ, are agreed in this.

(2) The divinity in the operations of grace consists,

(a) *In the doctrine revealed by God.* For by means of this, faith is excited and preserved in men. This doctrine could not have been discovered by man without a divine revelation; and God is the author of all the effects which result from it. In the same way we properly ascribe to a discourse, or to a great writer, all the beneficial effects which may result from his discovery or writings, and regard him as the author of these effects. All this is true; but this is not all which the Bible teaches on this subject. The Bible teaches that besides this there is an agency of God connected with divine truth and accompanying it; or that there is connected with the divine word an operation of God on the hearts of men, having for its end their improvement and holiness. Vide s. 131, II. 4.

(b) *In the wise and beneficent external institutions which God has established*, by which man is led to the knowledge of the truth, and his heart is prepared and inclined to receive it.

Who can fail to recognise the divine hand in these external circumstances, by which so powerful an influence is exerted upon us; and which are often entirely beyond our own control? How much does the moral culture and improvement of man depend on birth, parentage, early instruction, education, society, example, natural powers, adversity, or prosperity! Vide s. 131, II. 4. These circumstances are frequently mentioned in the Bible, Rom. ii. 4, seq. Hence it follows that God has made wise arrangements for the good of man, which may properly be called *grace*, inasmuch as they are proofs of his undeserved goodness. It follows also that God withholds his assistance from none, and that the work of moral renovation is effected in a manner entirely adapted to our moral nature, not forcibly, irresistibly, instantaneously, but gradually. Vide s. 126, seq.

Now, so far as the end which God has in view, in wisely ordering these circumstances and appointing these means, is attained—i. e., when man does not himself resist their influence, this grace may be called *efficacious*. Still it is exerted in such a way that no one is *compelled*. Grace never acts *irresistibly*. The renewal of man is effected by God through the Christian doctrine, the influence of which can be resisted, because it acts on the will through the understanding; and the will is not *necessarily* determined, but only rendered disposed to determine itself for a particular object. In the physical world the law of *sufficient reason* and of necessity prevails; in the moral world, the law of *freedom*. God, therefore, who himself has given this law, will not act in contradiction to it. Frequently, however, one cannot prevent the good impressions and emotions which arise on hearing or reading the truths of the Christian religion; just as he is unable to prevent the sensations or ideas which external objects produce in his mind, through the senses. This observation, which is founded on the nature of the human soul, gave rise to the position which was taken in the controversies between the Jansenists and Jesuits; *gratiam non esse irresistibilem, sed inevitabilem*. For although man cannot prevent in every case good impressions and emotions, he is able to prevent the consequences of them in actual reformation.

II. *In what manner does God operate on the heart of man through the Word, in promoting his Moral Improvement?*

On this point theologians are divided.

(1) The natural power of truth acts first on the human understanding. The Christian doctrine makes us acquainted with God, with his feelings towards us, and with what he requires of us. It delivers us from ignorance and prejudice. For all this we are indebted to God. God

gave us these instructions that they might have an effect upon us—i. e., that they might act powerfully on the will, and excite in us good feelings and resolutions. Thus the consideration of the divine promises revealed in Christianity tends to lead our minds to repose confidence in God. The consideration, too, of these promises, and the examination of our conduct by the divine precepts, produces sorrow and repentance. These precepts and promises, which the Christian religion makes known, are adapted to produce zeal for virtue or holiness. At first our powers for goodness are weak; but by exercise they increase in strength and become confirmed. Vide Art. xi. All this takes place according to the natural laws of the human mind; but the effect produced does not cease on this account to be the work of God.

(2) But the New Testament always ascribes to the Christian religion a greater power and efficacy in rendering men virtuous and happy than to any truth ever discovered or taught by man, or supported merely by arguments of human wisdom. Thus Paul says, Romans, i. 16, *εὐαγγέλιον Χριστοῦ* is *δύναμις Θεοῦ εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι*. In 1 Cor. i. and ii. he shews that the gospel had produced greater effects than any human system ever did or could produce, although exhibited in the most eloquent, forcible, and convincing manner. Cf. John, vi. 63, and John, iii. Experience and history confirm this. Philosophers and moralists, who depend upon the internal strength and validity of their systems derived from human wisdom, have never been able to accomplish such great and wonderful results as the Christian religion has produced, although exhibited without eloquence or human wisdom. What merely human teacher of morals could ever boast of so great and remarkable an effect from his instructions as we read of in Acts, ii. 37, and viii. 27—38? And whence is all this? Some have thought it to be owing to the *divine authority* on which the Christian doctrine is published. This authority, they say, exerts more influence on one *who acknowledges it*, and removes doubts and difficulties more easily, than the most convincing arguments and the most eloquent address, which depend on nothing more than mere human authority. But why have not other religions, which have also been published on *divine authority*, produced these same effects? This *divine authority* cannot therefore be the *only* ground of the difference. With this must be connected the *internal* excellence of the religion itself, and the salutary nature of its doctrines. These two taken together constitute the whole cause, so far at least as it is *externally* visible, of the facts under consideration. But even these do not satisfactorily account for all the effects produced by the Christian doctrine; they are not assigned by the holy scrip-

tures as the principal cause from which these effects are explicable. The scriptures teach that the cause of these great effects does not lie merely in the power and weight of the doctrines of Christianity, and the evidence by which they are supported, *but principally in the almighty power and influence of God*, who through the Christian doctrine works in the souls of men. Vide s. 131, II. 4. This efficacy of the divine doctrine is called in theology, *the power* (*vis, efficacia*) *of the divine word*.

(3) *Inferences drawn from the preceding statement.*

(a) The power of the word of God, or the agency of the Holy Spirit, is not *physical* but *logico-moral*—i. e., the Holy Spirit acts upon the human soul in a manner conformed to our rational and moral nature. This influence is founded in the knowledge of the truths of Christianity, and of the motives contained in it, by which the human will is *drawn*, but not *compelled*. To this is added, on the part of man, the firm conviction of the divine origin and authority of this doctrine, and of the divine superintendence by which its effect on him is increased. Power to convince and reform is imparted to and connected with the Christian doctrine in the same way as power to germinate and grow is given to seed, and power to heal, to medicine.

This last statement is in itself true and scriptural. Cf. Mark, iv. 28. But it is not inconsistent with the other equally scriptural view of the influence of God on the heart of man. For he does not act on us otherwise than by means of the Christian doctrine, and consequently not in a compulsory and irresistible manner, *but in a manner conformed to the moral nature of man*, although the internal *modus* of his agency may be inexplicable to us. And who can explain the internal *modus* of the effects produced by God in the natural world? John, iii. 8. Vide s. 131, II. 4. To believe, therefore, that there is an *influxum* (*vim physicam*, or as others express it, more guardedly, *physico-analogam*), is, according to what has now been said, not *contrary* to scripture, but conformed to it.

(b) But however powerful the operation of the divine word, and of God by means of his word, may be, man himself must not, in the meantime, be inactive and sluggish; Phil. ii. 12, 13. For the effect of the divine influence on the heart of any one depends on his making a right use and proper application of the divine doctrine, and on his whole conduct in regard to these divine influences. If he disregards these influences, and neglects to improve them in the proper manner, he can no more be benefited by them than one can be satisfied and nourished without the use of food. Such is the uniform representation of the Bible. Vide Mark, iv. 20,

seq.; Luke, viii. 15, *Κατέχειν λόγον ἐν καρδίᾳ καλῇ καὶ ἀγαθῇ, to embrace and obey the truth with an upright and sincere heart.*

(c) Theologians call the operations of grace *supernatural*. By this they cannot mean to denote a direct, and of course irresistible, agency of God in the soul of man, or anything properly *miraculous*. This term cannot, therefore, be taken here in that strict sense in which philosophers use it. According to the Pelagian theory, these influences can be so called only because they are exerted through the divine doctrine which is *supernaturally revealed*, (in respect, therefore, to the *means* by which they are exerted;) and hence are more efficacious than mere unassisted reason could be. Thus we call *supernatural* knowledge, that for which we are indebted to divine revelation, and *natural*, that to which we can attain through our own reflection. According to the theory of the ancient theologians, which is more accordant with the holy scriptures, with Christ, and the apostles, these influences are also called *supernatural*, because *they cannot be explained by any of the known laws of nature*; John, iii. 8; 1 Cor. i. 2. Vide s. 131, II. 4. In respect to the manner in which the influences of grace are exerted on the human soul, a manner entirely suited to its moral nature, the operations of grace may, indeed, be denominated *natural*, as they are by Eberhard, in his "Apologie des Socrates."

(d) Theologians distinguish between *nature* and *grace*. In this they follow Augustine. Vide s. 132, II. But they have differed very much in determining what are the *motus gratiæ*, and what the *motus naturæ*, and how they can be distinguished. The common opinion has been, that the doings of the unconverted, even their virtues, flow from their nature, and therefore, according to Augustine, are not pleasing to God, or capable of reward. Of the actions of the regenerate only can it be said that they are acceptable in his sight, and flow from the influences of grace. Vide Spener, Vom Unterschied der Natur und Gnade; Erfurt, 1715. But there are difficulties attending this opinion, s. 125. To determine the *marks* by which nature and grace may be distinguished, the matter can be stated as follows:—Everything which we owe to the right use of the Christian doctrine, and to the agency of God through his truth, is the effect of *grace*; and everything in us which has not its origin or foundation in the use of the divine truth is the effect of *nature*. If, then, we can ascertain how much we owe to our being instructed in divine truth, and to the influences of God by its means, we may also know how much we owe to *grace*. Proceeding in this way, we do not treat *nature* (or that essential constitution which God has given to man) with contemptuous disregard; nor are we compelled, in

denying *grace* to the heathen, to deny decidedly that they had any virtue, or can attain to salvation.

Note.—In popular religious instruction the teacher should confine himself to such clear and scriptural points as Morus has exhibited, (pages 236, 237, note 4,) illustrating these by the Bible and experience, and setting aside all learned theological disputes and scholastic terms.

(1) God has endued man with reason and conscience. By the aid of these principles, man is enabled to learn much respecting the nature and will of God, and to act conformably to this correct knowledge, Rom. i. 19, 20; ii. 14, 15, seq.

(2) But the holy scriptures give us a far more perfect knowledge of God and of our duty. The revealed religion contained in them has much which is peculiarly excellent, and which is not taught in natural religion. And, according to the testimony of the scriptures, God has promised his special assistance, support, and guidance, to those who possess them, and obey the precepts contained in them. And this promise is confirmed by experience; Rom. i. ii. We ought therefore thankfully to receive, and faithfully to obey, the instruction contained in the holy scriptures.

(3) No one can understand, discern, or receive with approbation the instructions of the holy scriptures, unless he is *taught* the truths contained in them; nor can any one obey these instructions, unless the hindrances which stand in the way of his reception of them, in his understanding and will, are removed, 1 Cor. ii. 14.

(4) To be delivered through divine instruction and assistance from our ignorance, our mistakes, prejudices, and from our evil passions, is a great and invaluable benefit; and we owe this benefit to none but God and the Holy Spirit. Vide the texts cited, s. 130.

(5) There are, and always will be, great difficulties and hindrances, both within and without, by which our assent to the truths of revelation will be weakened, and our progress in holiness retarded; and these difficulties and hindrances cannot be overcome and removed without the constant assistance and support of God, John, v. 44; viii. 43, seq.; Ephes. iv. 18, and other passages. Vide s. 130, 131.

(6) We need therefore, in commencing and continuing a life of piety, the help, support, and guidance of God. We ourselves, however must not in the meantime be inactive, but must conscientiously employ the means which God has given us, and faithfully obey the instructions and directions contained in the Bible, always remembering that we owe these means of improvement and virtue to God only, and that without him we can do nothing. Phil. ii. 12, 13.

[Note.—The opinions of the Lutheran theologians since the time of our author have been equally diversified as when he wrote, and perhaps more so. This is the less strange, as it is now a conceded point that their own established standards are at variance among themselves on the doctrine of the operations of grace. Cf. s. 32, Note. Henke, Eckermann, and Wegscheider, follow out the positions of Morus, Junkheim, Michaelis, Doederlein, and others, to the full Pelagian extreme, and make the grace of God in conversion to be only that general agency by which he has endued man with rational powers, written the law upon his heart, instituted Christianity, and caused it to be promulgated, and by which, in his providential arrangements, he gives to every man opportunity and excitement to repentance. Ammon also (Summa, s. 132, 133) makes the renewing grace of God to consist *procuracione institutionis salutis, excitacione per exempla virtutis illustria, pauperlatate, calamitatibus, admonitionibus amicorum et inimicorum*.

All these writers agree in making the operations of grace merely external, in the way of moral influence, and in denying an immediate agency of God upon the human mind. In this, their system is stamped with one of the most essential features of Pelagianism. Cf. Neander's development of the Pelagian system in Part iii. of the 2nd vol. of his Church History.

There is another class who are distinguished from the former by admitting an immediate divine agency in the moral kingdom, though they differ among themselves as to the relation of this influence to the agency of man, especially at the commencement of the life of faith. Bretschneider contends strenuously for an immediate divine influence as indispensable to conversion. At the same time, he supposes it to depend upon the character and state of the individual who is the subject of this influence, whether grace *alone* produces faith in him, or whether he himself contributes anything towards it. The operations of grace, accordingly, are not uniform, but as various as the states in which it finds man, from untutored barbarism, to the highest degree of illumination and refinement enjoyed in Christian lands. Nearly the same views are expressed by Reinhard in his Theology.

Neander and Tholuck, as will be obvious to any attentive reader of their works, hold prominently, that even in faith there is a divine element—that it can by no means result from the unaided efforts of man; that, besides the general influence of Christianity, there is an internal influence of the Spirit of God—a drawing of the Heavenly Father—but that man also is active in this work; and that it is an unwarrantable assumption to undertake to settle immovable limits to these two conspiring agencies, or to

solve the mystery belonging to the secret operations of grace.

Again: Schleiermacher, Marheinecke, and others belonging to the more appropriately philosophical school of theologians, have restored the entire system of Augustine as to immediate and efficacious grace, and the absolute and unqualified dependence of man upon God for the very commencement of faith. With regard to this class, it is remarkable, that while Augustine and Calvin rested the proof of this doctrine mainly upon scriptural authority, these have been led to adopt and now maintain it on grounds purely philosophical. The weight of the names of such writers has raised the Augustinian and Calvinistic theory of grace far above the contempt and reproach with which it was heretofore treated by the great body of Lutheran theologians.

A few extracts, under distinct heads, will shew something of the manner in which this doctrine is treated by writers of this class, and how much importance is attached by them to the idea that the divine influences are *immediate*, and not merely moral and external. Our extracts are drawn from two of the more lucid and popular writers. The statements of Schleiermacher and others of the same school upon this subject, though still more decisive on the point in question, are so intimately interwoven with the whole of their system, and receive so much colouring from it, as to require more explanation to render them perfectly intelligible than the present limits will allow.

That such an influence is *to be desired*, is affirmed by Reinhard in the following passage from the 4th vol. of his "Moral," s. 129:—"When one considers the innate depravity of which man is conscious—the weakness of his moral powers hence resulting—the innumerable perversions to which those constitutional feelings and propensities which are in themselves good, are liable, the disordered states which arise from these perversions, and which more or less hinder a true moral development—in fine, the many external causes which nourish and strengthen depravity, and render genuine reformation exceedingly difficult,—when one who is in earnest in the work of improvement considers all this, he must feel the wish arise, that God would lighten this arduous work, and come in aid of his efforts."

Objections having often been made to the *possibility* of such influences, by Reimarus, Lessing, and others, on the ground that violence would thus be done to the intellectual and moral nature of man, Bretschneider thus replies:—"That God has power to act inwardly on the souls of men, and to awaken ideas in their minds, cannot be denied. As the Creator of spirits he knows their nature, and how he can

operate upon them; and as almighty, he must be able to produce in his creatures any effect which he desires. Does any one deny this power to God, he erects between him and the spiritual world an insurmountable wall of partition; and in order to be consistent, must deny that God is the governor of the world in general, any more than he is of the spiritual world. The possibility of an inward agency of God upon the world of spirits cannot therefore be denied, although the manner in which this agency is exerted is inscrutable; which indeed is true as to the manner of all the divine operations."

* * "With what truth now is it presupposed that these influences must hamper the free agency of the mind, and reduce the subject of them to a mere machine? Does not the very nature of the case require that reason, the recipient, should *actively* receive, retain, and appropriate that which is given it? Does not the teacher often, in giving instruction to the child, suddenly interrupt the course of his thoughts, and put him on an entirely new train of ideas? But are the laws of mind in the child violated by this interruption? The teacher, it is said, makes use of words. But cannot God, by an *adloquium internum*, cause new thoughts in the souls of men? Or are words the only possible way by which a Spirit can impart his light to other spirits, and teach them." Dogmatik, b. i. s. 129, ff.

But an immediate influence of this kind is not only *desirable* and *possible*, but also highly *probable*. Here again Bretschneider remarks:—"As God stands in connexion with the material world, and by his most full and perfect life continually operates upon it, he must also stand in constant connexion with the moral world, otherwise there could be no moral government." Dogmatik, b. ii. s. 600. This *probability*, drawn from the co-operation of God in the material world, is stated still more strongly by Reinhard. If there is an immediate concurrence and agency of God in the material world, as generally conceded by German philosophers and theologians, such an agency is much more to be expected in the moral world, since this is a far more congenial sphere for divine operations. "In the material sphere, the connexion between natural causes and effects is obvious to the senses, and must therefore be principally regarded by us, although even here the scriptures commonly mention only the highest and last cause, which is God. But in the kingdom of freedom, there is no such mechanical connexion between cause and effect, but an unimpeded intercommunion of beings freely acting; here, therefore, there can be no reason why we, with the scriptures, should not conceive of an immediate influence, since such an influence is far more adapted than one which is mediate, to the sphere of

which are we now speaking." Moral, b. iv. s. 258.

But while these writers contend for the fact of immediate divine influences in promoting the renewal of men, they are careful to guard against the perversion of this doctrine by enthusiasts and fanatics. "The *reality* of these influences," says Bretschneider, "cannot be proved from experience. The influences of grace, as such, cannot be distinguished in consciousness from others; because our consciousness informs us only of the effect, and not of its origin; takes note only of the change itself which passes within us, but is unable to feel whether it comes from God. * * * As the agency of God in the material world always appears to us as natural, and in the effects produced we never discern the supernatural cause, so his agency in the moral world will always appear to us as natural, and conformed to the laws of psychology, and we are unable in our consciousness to distinguish him as the acting cause." Dogmatik, b. ii. s. 600. Cf. Reinhard's "Moral," b. iv. s. 264.

In this manner do these writers contend for the fact of immediate divine influences, by arguments derived from the need of man, the perfections of God, and the analogy of his agency in the material universe; and at the same time guard against the perversions of this salutary opinion by enthusiasts who, in the words of Tucker, "think they can see the flashes of illumination, and feel the floods of inspiration poured on them directly from the divine hand, and who undertake to give an exact history of all his motions from the very day and hour when he first touched their hearts."

It may be remarked here, that Kant conceded the possibility of immediate operations of grace for the conversion of man, but denied that they could be either proved or disproved from philosophy. The belief in such influences he held to be useful in awakening the hope that God would do for us what we ourselves might be unable to accomplish in the work of our moral renovation.—Tr.]

APPENDIX.

OF PRAYER AS A MEANS OF GRACE.

THE doctrine respecting *prayer* is commonly treated in systematic theology in connexion with the doctrine of the operations of grace. But as the full discussion of this subject belongs rather to Christian ethics than to theology, it has by some theologians been either wholly omitted, or only cursorily noticed in their systems. On this subject we shall make here only the following remarks. The prayer of Christians is a means of grace included under Christian doctrine, and

not to be separated from it. For the influence of prayer is not to be derived from the mere act of those who pray. It stands in connexion with the power of the religious truths to which prayer relates.

(1) Statement of the philosophical theory respecting prayer.

The following is the theory respecting prayer which has been adopted in modern times, especially in the eighteenth century, by Mosheim and Morus, and which is held by many philosophical and theological moralists. One who institutes a merely philosophical examination of prayer, and passes by all the positive promises to the supplicant contained in the holy scriptures, and especially in the Christian system, will yet allow, if he understands the nature of man, a great *moral* influence to prayer. For it is the means of reminding us of the great truths of religion, and of impressing these truths deeply on our hearts. It excites, moreover, a sure and grateful confidence in God and his promises, and a longing desire after the enjoyment of the blessings which he has promised. It is therefore, in itself, of a most beneficial tendency, and has an indispensable influence in promoting moral improvement, and in purifying the heart. A man is not prepared for the blessings which the Christian doctrine promises, and is not capable of free, moral improvement, unless he acknowledges God as the author of them, and has a lively perception of these benefits, and an earnest desire to obtain them. Now from this desire after divine blessings springs the wish, directed to God, that he would bestow them upon us, and this is the inward prayer of the heart. If these feelings are strong and vivid, it is common and natural to us to express them in *words* and in the form of an address to God, whom we conceive to be present with us, and acquainted with our thoughts and wishes. (The *verbal* expression is, however, by no means essential to prayer. A soul directed to God is all which is requisite.) By the very act of prayer, this vividness of conception is very much heightened, and in this way our desires and our longings are cherished and strengthened by prayer itself. In this exercise God is made, as it were, present with us; and while we are engaged in this duty, we feel as we are accustomed to feel in direct intercourse with a person who is near at hand listening to us, and who by our words and requests is rendered favourable towards us and becomes intimate with us. To the philosopher all this may appear illusion and imagination, but if he looks at experience, which on this subject is worth more than all speculation, he will find that this aid is indispensable to any one who means to make religion a matter of serious and lasting interest. Experience shews that good thoughts, purposes, and resolutions, unac-

panied by prayer, amount to nothing, because they leave the heart cold and the mind unaffected.

(2) *Examination of this view of prayer.*

It is true that prayer, considered merely as a means of improvement, has great moral advantages—i. e., that it has a great effect on our moral improvement, that it withholds from evil, tranquillizes the soul, and is in every way promotive of the interests of morality and sincere religion. But it is also true, that it would cease to produce these results which are expected from it if we should content ourselves with this theory of our philosophical moralists, and did not confidently hope to obtain the blessings for which we ask. One who considers the often-repeated assurances, “he that asks shall receive,” &c., as delusive, and not serious or sincere, will find that he wants an inward impulse to prayer. He can exercise no earnest desires, no real confidence, and no hearty gratitude. It is not our business to inquire *how* God can hear and answer our supplications without infringing upon his immutability, or altering the established course of nature. We are to be satisfied with knowing that he can do more than we understand, and that he can and will do everything which he has promised. Such considerations, connected with *personal experience*, are enough to secure us against every doubt. Neither Christ, nor the other early teachers of morals, nor the prophets of the Old Testament, ever made use of the motives to prayer, so often used at the present day, derived merely from its *moral advantages*. Their great motive to prayer is, *that it will be heard*, upon which they could depend as confidently as the child does upon its father, when it requests what is needful for it. This is the great motive by which prayer should be inculcated on the common people and the young, otherwise they easily get the erroneous impression that prayer, as such, is of no advantage, and in reality useless, since it is not heard. On this account Jesus and the other teachers of morals and religion in ancient times did wisely, both in omitting to mention the motives to prayer derived from its moral uses, and in inculcating it on the simple ground *that it is heard*, without philosophizing upon the question, *in what way it has an influence*. And certainly Christians do well in holding fast to the doctrine of Jesus and of the holy scriptures. Cf. Cramer, *Die Lehre vom Gebet*, nach Offenbarung und Vernunft untersucht, u. s. w.; Keil und Hambrugh, 1786, 8vo; and Nitzsch, *Diss. inaugural.*, Ratio qua Christus usus est in commendando precandi officio; Viteberg, 1790; also, “Nonnulla ad historiam de usu religiosa precationis morali pertinentia,” by the same author, and published at the same place, 1790, 4to.

Two points deserve particular consideration in this connexion.

(a) The feeling that prayer is necessary is absolutely universal. The history of all nations who have had any religion shews that prayer is everywhere recognised as an auxiliary to piety, which is indispensable and founded in our very nature. Experience, too, teaches that those religions which inculcate frequent prayer, and insist upon it as a duty of the first importance, are the most practical, and can enumerate among their followers more examples of men eminently religious and virtuous than other religions which make prayer of less importance, and at most prescribe certain public prayers and set formulas. Next to the Jewish and Christian religion, the Mohammedan has exerted the most influence on the heart, because it so strenuously inculcates prayer. This religion, next to the Jewish and Christian, has had the greatest number of truly religious professors and devout worshippers of God. [Cf. the work of Tholuck on *Sufismus*, or the doctrine of the Sufis—a Mohammedan sect in Persia.—Tr.]

(b) Christ makes it the special duty of his followers to *supplicate God in his name*, and promises to them a sure audience, which he would, as it were, procure for them, John, xiv. 13; xvi. 23, 24. This duty is inculcated by the apostles upon *all Christians*. The sentiment of many passages taken together is this: Pray with reference to Christ and his work, consequently in belief or sure confidence in him and in his promises. In prayer we must be deeply convinced that he is the author of our salvation, that even now he is mindful of our interests, and makes the things for which we ask his own, and intercedes with God to hear our requests. In this respect he is represented as our *Paracletus* and *Advocate* with God, 1 John, ii. 1. But the blessings which Christianity promises to us are not temporal, but spiritual. Desire to obtain these is always conformable to the divine will, and as far as they are concerned, the hearing of prayer is certain.

ARTICLE XIII.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHRISTIAN SOCIETY OR CHURCH.

[The common order is to treat, first, of the sacraments, and then of the church; but the reverse order is in many respects more natural and proper; for both of these parts of divine service have a principal relation to the church. By baptism we are solemnly initiated into the church; and by the Lord's Supper, the members of the church solemnly renew and perpetuate the remembrance of Jesus Christ, and of

the blessings which he has bestowed upon the human race.]

SECTION CXXXIV.

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH; ITS OBJECT; ITS NAMES; AND THE DIVISIONS OF THE CHURCH COMMON IN THEOLOGY.

I. *Idea of the Christian Church; its Object; and an Explanation of its Scriptural Names.*

THE *Christian church*, in the widest sense, may be defined to be, *the whole number of those who agree in worshipping God according to the doctrine of Jesus Christ*. In this wider sense it agrees with the word *Christendom*. Its object is, *to maintain and perpetuate the Christian doctrine, and by means of ordinances and exercises observed in common, to promote the practice of it*. Such is the great body of mankind, that without some common duties and some external ordinances, the Christian religion could scarcely be maintained among them; certainly it could not be kept from totally degenerating. The government and preservation of the church are everywhere properly ascribed to Christ, as its head. The same scriptural principles are therefore applicable here which were above laid down in the doctrine respecting the kingdom of Christ, s. 98.

The scriptural names of church are,

(1) Ἐκκλησία. This term is used by the Greeks to denote an assembly of men, called together on the authority of the magistracy; from ἐκκαλέω, *evoco, convoco*—e. g., Acts, xix. 32, 39. The Hebrew קהל is used in the same way, especially in the books of Moses, and is commonly translated in the Septuagint by ἐκκλησία. The same is true of the Hebrew קהל. The term קהל (קהל), denoted secondarily all those who belonged to the Jewish people, and professed the Jewish religion. Christians took the word from the Jews, and like them used ἐκκλησία to denote (a) particular societies of Christians in particular cities or provinces—e. g., ἐκκλησία ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ, κ. τ. λ., Acts, viii. 1; (b) the religious *assemblies* of these societies, and the *places* in which they met—e. g., 1 Cor. xi. 18; xiv. 19, 28, &c.; (c) the whole sum of those who profess the Christian religion, wherever they may be—e. g., 1 Cor. xii. 28; Matt. xvi. 18, seq.

(2) Συναγωγή and ἐπισυναγωγή. and these, too, are used by the Septuagint to render the words קהל and קהל. But they were employed by the Grecian Jews about the time of Christ to denote their places of prayer, or *oratories*, and the congregations connected with them. Vide Vitringa, de Synagoga Vetere. And so we find them used in the New Testament, to denote the religious assemblies of Christians, and the

places where they held them—e. g., Heb. x. 25; James, ii. 2. These terms, however, were never used, like the preceding, to denote the whole of Christendom.

(3) There were also various figurative names employed—e. g., βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν, or τοῦ Θεοῦ. So frequently in the discourses of Christ. Vide s. 99, I. But this term denotes not simply the Christian religion and church; it comprehends all to whom belong the rights, duties, and the entire blessedness of the pious followers of Christ, in this life and the life to come—e. g., John, iii. 3; Matt. v. 3. Σῶμα Χριστοῦ (of which he is the κεφαλὴ)—a figurative expression used to denote the intimate connexion between believers and Christ, and to impress upon them the duties of mutual harmony and brotherly love; Rom. xii. 5. He is the head, we the members, Eph. i. 22, also chap. iv. and v. Ναὸς Θεοῦ, 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17,—used to describe the dignity and holiness of Christians, and the inviolableness of their rights. Οἶκος Θεοῦ, 1 Pet. iv. 17, seq. Besides these, all the terms used to designate the Israelites as the peculiar and favourite people of God are transferred to Christians in the New Testament—e. g., λαὸς περιούσιος, Titus, ii. 14; λαὸς εἰς περιποίησιν (περιποιήσεως), 1 Pet. ii. 9; ἐκλεκτοί, κ. τ. λ. The Israelites were the *ancient people of God*, (under the παλαιὰ διαθήκη,) in opposition to the *new people of God*, (under the καινὴ διαθήκη.) And this ancient people is always regarded as the stock from which the new sprung, Rom. xi. 17, seq.; Acts, xv. 16. And on this very account Paul earnestly warns Christians, in the passage cited, against despising or undervaluing the Jews.

II. Divisions of the Church.

(1) Into *universal* and *particular*. The church universal comprehends within itself all who profess the Christian doctrine, No. I. But since all Christians cannot agree respecting doctrines and forms of worship, it is natural that those who do agree in these respects should enter into a more intimate connexion. Hence have arisen particular churches, differing according to place and time, doctrine, forms, &c. Hence the division of the church into the Eastern, Western, Roman, African, Papal, Lutheran, Calvinistic, &c. Again; these particular churches are subdivided into *ecclesiæ singulares*, by which are understood the separate communions belonging to one particular church, since even these often differ according to time and place, and even with respect to doctrines and usages. Thus we have the Lutheran church in Saxony, Brandenburg, Sweden; the Reformed church in England and Switzerland, &c.

(2) Into the *true church* and *false churches*, and their subdivisions. This division must be

retained *in abstracto*, although it should be applied very cautiously *in concreto*, or to particular cases. We may see, in general, that that Christian church deserves eminently the name of the true church in which there is an entire agreement with the doctrine of Jesus and the apostles. The more it obeys Christ in everything which he has commanded, the more worthy is it of this name, Eph. v. 23, 24. But there has never been a church respecting all whose members this could be said; nor was there any such, even during the times of the apostles, as we see from their writings; there has never been a particular church wholly free from errors and deviations from the doctrine of Jesus. Christ himself declares that in his church on earth there will always be error and truth, good and evil mingled together. Vide s. 135, II. It is therefore better to say that is the true church, or, more properly, has the most truth, in which there is found a nearer agreement with the doctrine of Jesus and the apostles than in other churches.

On this subject the opinions of Christians are so divided that it is impossible to give any *general characteristic marks* of the true church which would be approved by all. The definition of the true church will always depend upon the individual belief and conviction of every Christian; and each one regards that church as true which is most accordant with his own views. The following principles, however, may be of some practical importance:—

(a) No one church is in the exclusive possession of the truth. There are in every church faults, defects, and errors; and so it was at the time of the apostles, and so it is in all human societies and institutions.

(b) Nor is there, on the other hand, any Christian church which is wholly wanting in the truth, or which does not profess many useful and important truths, although mixed more or less with error. We cannot in this matter judge of the particular members of a church from the established and received doctrines of their church without doing the greatest injustice. In this respect wrong is often done; for experience teaches that there are often good Christians in a church which professes many errors, and which has a bad constitution; and, on the contrary, that there are often connected with very excellent church-establishments those who are unworthy of the Christian name. These observations have given occasion to the division of the church into *pure* and *impure*, according as more or less errors or false principles are embraced. We also speak of a *corrupt church*, by which is meant particularly a church in which false *moral* principles, exerting an injurious influence upon the life and Christian walk, are mingled with Christian doctrine. It remains

therefore true, that the separate Christian communions are of different value and excellence according to their greater or less purity in doctrine, and according to the greater or less adapt- edness of their external polity and forms to promote moral improvement. It cannot therefore be in itself an indifferent matter to which of these one belongs. No one, however, should desire to make his own individual conviction the unconditional rule for all others, and despise and condemn those who do not agree with himself.

(c) If there is no church in which the system of doctrine, the regulations, forms of worship, &c., are perfect and incapable of improvement, it follows that improvements may and ought to be made in them whenever and wherever there is a necessity for it, and that it is an entirely false maxim to adhere invariably to what is ancient; and never to alter. It does not belong, however, to any particular member, not even to a public teacher, to urge his supposed improvements upon the church. And correct as is the principle *de reformatione ecclesiarum*, in the abstract, its practical application is attended with very great difficulties.

(d) To unite externally all the different churches is not practicable; and even if it could be done, would occasion more injury than benefit. And notwithstanding all the difference as to opinion and form in religious matters, mutual love and toleration may still exist. This is proved by the history of the church in ancient and modern times.

(3) The church is divided into *visible* and *invisible*. This division is entirely rejected in several of the new systems—e. g., in those of Gruner, Döderlein, and others. They seem, however, to have taken offence merely at the terms. These are, indeed, new; and have come into use since the Reformation. But the thing itself which is intended by these terms is well supported, and is as ancient as the Christian church itself, and was acknowledged as true by Christ and the apostles and the whole early church. These terms came into use in the following way:—Luther denied that the Romish church, according to the doctrine and polity which it then professed, is the true church. It was then asked, *Where then was the true church before him?* To which he answered, that it was *invisible*—i. e., before the Reformation those Christians had constituted the true church, and held the pure doctrine, who, without regarding the authority and commandment of men, had followed the scriptures according to their own views, had lived piously, and kept themselves free from the errors of the public religion; and such persons there always had been, even at the most corrupt periods, although they had not always been known. It was from

this just observation that this division arose. Cf. Confess. August., Art. vii. and viii., and Apol. A. C.

Protestants understand by the *invisible church* true Christians, who not only know the precepts of Christ, but from the heart obey them, Matt. vii. 21. This church is not always clearly seen; indeed, to speak justly, it is known only to God, Col. iii. 3; while from the eyes of men, who judge only according to the external appearance, it is wholly concealed. On the contrary, the *visible church* consists of all who by profession belong externally to the church—i. e., attend public worship, partake of the sacraments, &c.; for wherever the Christian doctrine is proclaimed, and the rites prescribed by it are observed, there the visible church is. Not every one, therefore, who belongs to the visible church, even if it be one of the best, does on this account belong also to the invisible church. For in the visible church there are often wicked men and hypocrites. This is not, then, a division *generis in species*, but *eadem res diverso respectu*. The same is true with respect to other societies—e. g., the republic of the learned.

There are not wanting passages in the New Testament in which this distinction is plainly made, although it is not expressed in this manner. For, first, the word *ἐκκλησία* in many texts denotes the whole number who make an outward profession of Christianity, without having any reference to their inward state—e. g., 1 Cor. i. 2, &c. Vide No. I. But, secondly, in other passages such predicates are given to the church as do not apply to all who profess Christ, but only to that better and nobler part which is called the invisible church—e. g., Eph. v. 27, *ἀγία, ἄμωμος, μὴ ἔχουσα σκῆλον ἢ ῥυτίδα*, &c. Here belongs the remarkable passage, Mark, ix. 38—40, where the disciples of Jesus would not acknowledge a person to be a genuine follower of Christ, because he did not belong to their society, their external church, and was not, as it were, enrolled as belonging to their corporation; on which point Christ sets them right. Cf. Matt. xv. 22, seq. That in the visible church (*βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*) the evil and the good are mingled together, and cannot be externally separated without injury to the whole, is taught by Christ in the excellent parable, Matt. xiii. 24—30. The wicked are compared with the tares, although they belong to the external, visible church; but the good, who belong both to the visible and invisible church, are compared with the wheat. Cf. the text, Matt. vii. 21, above cited.

Note.—Christ regards all who from the heart believe in him (the members of the invisible church) as a present which God has given him, and so calls them; and upon them, he says, he bestows eternal life. Vide John, vi. 37; xvii.

2, 6. The better, pious part of mankind are spoken of as belonging to God,—they are his children; and this his possession he gives over to the charge of Christ, to lead them to eternal life. This is a great and heart-affecting idea; and if such a thought had been found in Plato or Xenophon, there would have been no end of praising it; but in the holy scriptures it is less regarded.

(4) The church is divided again into *militant* and *triumphant*. By the church *militant* is meant Christians in the present life, so far as they have to contend with many internal and external sufferings, adversities, and persecutions. By the church *triumphant* is meant the society of Christians in heaven, so far as they are freed from all these trials, and enjoy the most perfect rest and blessedness. The *church*, however, is here used, in the narrower sense, for the *invisible* church and its members. This division was taken principally from the text, Rev. xii. 7, seq., though this is rather a description of the rest to which the church will be restored here upon the earth, after long persecutions and calamities. It is also derived from those passages in which the dangerous and toilsome life of Christians is compared with a strife and conflict, which will soon be over—e. g., 2 Tim. iv. 7. Here too must be mentioned the text, Heb. xii. 22, 23, where the noble thought is exhibited, that we compose but one society with the host of blessed angels and the company of the saints now rewarded in heaven (τετελειωμένων δικαίων), of whom Jesus is the Head; and that when we have completed our course here below, we shall join this upper society in our native land.

Note.—Among the writings of the older protestant theologians, in which this division and the other topics introduced in this section are treated very thoroughly, that of Jo. Musæus, *De Ecclesia*, (Jenæ, 1675,) deserves particular mention.

SECTION CXXXV.

ATTRIBUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH; THE ECCLESIASTICAL TERMS COMMONLY EMPLOYED TO DESIGNATE THEM, AND THEIR SIGNIFICATION.

It has been common, in imitation of the ancient confessions, to predicate of the true church the four attributes, *una, sancta, catholica, apostolica*. In the apostolic symbol it is called a *holy Christian church, the society of the saints*; in the Nicene symbol, *one only, holy, Christian, apostolic church*. Most of these terms are taken from the New Testament, though they are there used in a different sense from that in which they are employed in the later ecclesiastical phraseology. And this difference should be carefully noted.

It must be remarked in general that all these attributes properly apply only to the *invisible* church, although many of them may be predicated also of the *visible* church, when rightly explained. The doctrine of the *perpetuity* of the church may be most conveniently considered in connexion with these.

I. Unity of the Church.

This predicate has an entirely different meaning in the New Testament from that which it bears in the common ecclesiastical phraseology. Its two significations will therefore be separately considered.

(1) When the unity of the church is spoken of in the New Testament it is a *moral* unity which is intended. The import of this term is, that all who worship God according to the doctrine of Jesus should regard themselves as members of one society, and as such should exercise mutual brotherly love; that notwithstanding all differences of birth, condition, knowledge, opinions, and forms, they should still constitute but *one church*, or religious society, worshipping one and the same Lord, even Christ, and partaking in common of the blessings promised to his followers. That there should be such a union among his followers was the last will, the testament of Christ; John, xiii. 34, coll. xv. 1, seq. And in order to this, it is not essential that there should be a full and entire agreement of opinion on every particular doctrine. Christians, though differing as to their mode of thinking, their particular opinions and forms, and though divided into particular communions, ought to regard themselves as constituting still but one church, and so to live together in unity of spirit. This is the true spirit of Christianity; it infuses feelings of toleration. And the more one has of the mind of Christ the more tolerant will he be to others; and especially, because he knows that not only his Lord, but his brethren, see much in him which requires forbearance. Vide Tit. iii. 3—5.

This unity of the church is mentioned in those passages in the New Testament in which warnings are given against disturbers of the peace and against controversies; and in those also in which it is taught that it is the design of Christianity to remove all distinction between Jew and Gentile, and to unite all nations in a common religion; respecting which vide sec. 118, II.

The principal proof-texts here are, John, xvii. 20, *ὅνα πάντες ἐν ὧν* John, x. 16, “one fold, one shepherd;” and Ephesians, iv. 3—6, and ver. 13, *ἐνότης πνεύματος*, because all worship one God and one Christ, have one baptism and one doctrine. The *ἐνότης πίστεως* in ver. 13 is one and the same Christian doctrine, professed alike by Jews and Gentiles who believe in Christ,

who ought therefore to love each other as brethren. Galatians, iii. 28, πάντες εἰς ἐν Χριστῷ. Rom. xii. 5, πολλοὶ ἐν ὁμῇ ἡμεν, coll. ver. 13; x. 17; 1 Cor. i. 12, 13; viii. 6. The true spiritual unity of Christians is therefore placed by Christ himself in this, that they believe in the only true God, and in Jesus, as the Saviour of the world; that they love him, and from love to him obey his commandments, and especially that they love one another. By this only can the true disciples of Christ be known; not by external names and forms, but by faith, working by love—the love of Christ and our neighbour.

(2) But there gradually arose, after the second and third centuries, an entirely different conception of the unity of the church. It first originated among the fathers in the West, in consequence of their transferring to Christianity certain incorrect Jewish ideas which were disapproved by Jesus and his apostles, and which had the most injurious results. The unity of the church was placed by them in an entire external agreement as to those doctrines and forms which were handed down from the times of the apostles, through the churches founded by them, and in the external connexion and fellowship of the particular societies founded upon this agreement.

The most ancient passages relating to this subject are found in Irenæus, (i. 10,) Tertullian (De Præscript. Hæret. c., 20, ad fin.) and Cyprian, (in his Book, "De Unitate Ecclesiæ.") The object contemplated in this external connexion of churches was at first very good; it was designed by this means to set bounds to the ever encroaching corruption in doctrine and life, and to remove false teachers. But when the rulers of the churches no longer possessed the genuine spirit of Jesus, then, through these principles and the consequences derived from them, the hierarchy was gradually established; and intolerance and the spirit of persecution and anathematizing became very prevalent. Even the papal hierarchy rests entirely upon these principles, and originated from them. The principal bishops now established a kind of college or secret society; and this *unity of the church* was made dependent, first, upon many heads, then, upon *one visible* head of the church. And whoever ventured to dissent from the doctrine or the ordinances of the principal bishops, who held together and governed their churches, was excluded from church-fellowship and declared a heretic. Even Cyprian derived the one true church in the West from Peter, because he taught at Rome, and because the church there was the mother of most of the churches in the West. The bishops regarded themselves therefore as the successors of the apostles, and as the representatives of God and of Christ; and whoever was excluded by

them from church-fellowship was excluded by God himself; and it was early believed and taught that he was at the same time excluded from salvation. Vide s. 128, II. Hence even Cyprian states in his book the principle, *extra ecclesiam illam unicam et veram [externam or visibilem] non dari salutem*—a principle from which so many false doctrines were afterwards deduced. Vide s. 121, II.

Upon these supports does the whole false system of the hierarchy in the Romish church depend. Vide Henke, De Unitate Ecclesiæ, in his "Opuscula." But there is no such *societas Christiana*, nor ought there, according to the design of Jesus, to be any which shall resemble civil societies; for this leads to a hierarchy, and all the evil consequences which flow from the collision of secular and spiritual power.

Protestants have never had properly *one church*, but *churches*, (*ecclesiæ*.) Such, at least, is the language employed in the Augsburg Confession, Art. vii., and in the other public instruments, even in the peace of Westphalia; and it is in this that protestantism is distinguished from consolidated popedom. The Roman-catholic idea of the church is vindicated in a very subtle and plausible manner in the work, "Idea Biblica Ecclesiæ Dei," by Franc. Oberthür, vol. i.; Salzburg, 1790, 8vo, vol. ii. 1799. He proceeds on the definition, *Quod sit ecclesia schola quædam, quam Deus erexerit, nutriendæ ac promovendæ internæ religionis causa*, in which, however, there does not seem to be anything insidious.

II. The Sanctity of the Church.

This is twofold—viz.,

(1) *External*; and this is predicated of the church so far as it is distinguished from other religious societies (e. g., Jewish or Gentile) by the superior excellence of its religious principles. In this wider sense, even the Jews are, in the Old Testament, often denominated *holy*; and taken in this sense, the visible Christian church may justly be called *holy*; for it is not the moral character of the members which is designated by the term in this wider sense. And so all Christians, even those who are such merely by external profession, are often denominated ἅγιοι in the New Testament. Vide s. 126, IV.; also 1 Pet. ii. 9.

(2) *Internal, or moral*. The whole object of the establishment of the church, and the instruction communicated in Christian doctrine, is to bring the members of the church, under divine guidance, to this internal holiness. This is said by Paul in the passage cited, Ephes. v. 26, 27, coll. Tit. ii. 14. But this object is not actually attained in respect to all who belong to the external visible church, but only in those who belong to the invisible church. It can therefore

be truly said only of the invisible church, that it is *holy* in this internal, moral sense.

Many have been led, by confounding these different meanings, and by misunderstanding those passages in which it is made the duty of every Christian to be holy, to adopt the principle that even the external or visible church must be a society consisting only of renewed persons or saints, and that a church which tolerates within itself unholy or unregenerate persons cannot be a true church, and so is to be excluded from Christian fellowship. It was on these principles that the Novatians proceeded in the third century, and the Donatists in the fourth and fifth. And they were still more frequently maintained by the Anabaptists and other fanatical sects in the sixteenth century. The same principles have been revived in still more modern times by the quakers, and many other fanatics and separatists.

But they do not consider that in all external human societies good and evil must be mixed, and that often the Omniscient only can discern and distinguish the hypocrites, who are much more injurious than the openly vicious. And so Christ pronounced that the external church could never be pure from evil, and that the tares and the wheat must be suffered to grow together; Matt. xiii. 3, seq., ver. 24—31, 47—50; and so, too, he himself endured Judas among his apostles. Too great severity often terrifies the good and keeps them at a distance; and wicked ancestors often have descendants who are good and useful members of the church, but who would not have been so if their ancestors had been excluded. The external, visible church cannot, therefore, be a society consisting of pious Christians only; it is rather a *nursery* (*seminarium*), designed to raise up many for the invisible kingdom.

Still, however, it is always right, and certainly according to the spirit of Christ, for like-minded Christians to associate together, and to establish among themselves institutions which they may deem promotive of piety, or even to form smaller societies, in which they will permit those only to participate who have a like object and possess similar dispositions with themselves, excluding all others, the *ecclesiæ in ecclesia* of which Spener spoke. They should beware, however, against running in this way into spiritual pride, against holding themselves to be better than others, and against regarding those who do not join them, and are not enrolled among them, as worse Christians than themselves. It does not belong to the government to interdict such associations, if they do not disturb civil peace and order, any more than to forbid and hinder other private associations of citizens for other lawful objects. The reasons for and against these associations are canvassed in

Burkhardt's "Geschichte der Methodisten;" Nürnberg, 1795, s. 123, f. The history of the church teaches that these smaller associations have had, upon the whole, a highly beneficial effect. In times of ignorance and unbelief they have been the depositories of uncorrupted Christianity. Without the Waldenses, the Wickliffites, and the Hussites, the Reformation would never have taken place.

III. *The Catholic and Apostolic Church.*

A different idea is attached to the term *catholic* in modern times, and especially in the protestant church, from that which anciently belonged to it. *Catholic* is now used in its etymological sense, and is synonymous with *universal*. And the church is said to be universal, because all in the whole earth who profess Christ belong to it, and because Christianity is not merely a national religion, or the religion of a country, but one which may be professed by all men without distinction. The church is called *apostolical*, because the members of it profess to adopt the doctrine taught by the apostles, and contained in their writings; according to Eph. ii. 20, "built upon the foundation of the apostles." But anciently *καθολικός* was synonymous with *ὁρθόδοξος*, and *fides catholica* was the same as *fides orthodoxa*, which was the faith held in opposition to heretics, because it was supposed that the true faith, which accords with the will of Christ and the apostles, must be the universal faith of all Christians, and be found in all the churches established by the apostles. Hence *ecclesia catholica* is that *quæ habet fidem sive veritatem catholicam*—i. e., the right and pure doctrine and constitution, in opposition to those churches which have not the pure apostolic doctrine, but belong to the heretics. They proceeded on the principle that there is only one true church, (vide No. I.,) and in order to establish and maintain this, the principal churches and their bishops throughout the Roman empire (*καθ' ὅλην οἰκουμένην*) had gradually formed a separate church union. Whatever agreed with this was *καθολικόν*, otherwise *αἰρετικόν*. The genuine apostolic doctrine was supposed, however, to be found in those churches which the apostles themselves had founded. To these churches, and to the doctrine handed down in them from the times of the apostles, the appeal was therefore made, in the controversies in which the catholic fathers were engaged with the heretics; and it was by this appeal, an appeal to *tradition*, that they confuted them. Vide Introduction, s. 7, III. But the whole body of Christian churches professing the orthodox doctrine handed down in the apostolic churches were called the *catholic, orthodox, or apostolic church*, because they all agreed in the doctrines and regulations prescribed by the apostles to

the churches founded by them—e. g., by Peter to the church at Rome, by Paul to that at Ephesus, &c. The earliest passages relating to this subject are found in Irenæus, Adv. Hæres. l. iii., and especially in Tertullian, De Præscript. Hæres., c. 20, 21. It is there said, for example, *Tot ac tantæ ecclesiæ, una est; illa ab apostolis prima, ex qua omnes. Sic omnes primæ, et omnes apostolicæ dum una; omnes probant unitatem, etc.* Vide the Essay of Henke before cited.

Note.—The infallibility of the church was not believed during the first centuries. Between the period of the Nicene Council in the fourth century, and Gregory the Seventh, many traces of this opinion appear. From Gregory the Seventh until the Western schism in the fourteenth century, it was placed mostly in the infallibility of the pope. From that period until the Council at Trent, the idea prevailed that only the church collected in general council is infallible. Since that period, the opinions of catholic theologians have been divided on this point. Some (the genuine Romanists) make the pope the subject of this infallibility; others (and among these even Febronius) suppose the œcumenical councils alone infallible; others still (and principally the French theologians since the middle of the seventeenth century) attribute infallibility only to the church dispersed at large. At present this doctrine is wholly abandoned by some of the more liberal catholic theologians. Vide the excellent book (written by a catholic,) entitled *Kritische Geschichte der kirchlichen Unfehlbarkeit, zur Beförderung einer freyern Prüfung des Katholicismus*, Frankf. a. M. 1792, 8vo. Cf. also the very learned and liberal work, entitled “*Thomas Freykirch, oder Freymüthige Untersuchung von einem katholischen Gottesgelehrten über die Unfehlbarkeit der katholischen Kirche*, 1r. b.; Frankf. und Leipzig, 1792, 8vo.

IV. The Perpetuity of the Church.

Christ himself teaches, with the greatest assurance, that the religious society and constitution founded by him will never cease, but be perpetual. *All the powers of decay and destruction shall not get advantage over it, πάντα ῥθον* (where all which perishes or is destroyed upon the earth is collected) *οὐ καταχύσουσιν αὐτῆς*, Matt. xvi. 18. It is the doctrine of the New Testament that Christ, as the Ruler of the church, is now actively employed in heaven for its good, and that he will continue until the end of the world to support and enlarge it. Vide Matt. xxviii. 20; 1 Cor. xv. 25, coll. Ephes. iv. 16, and s. 98, respecting the kingdom of Christ. This, however, is not to be so understood as to imply that the particular forms of doctrine which prevail at any particular time, and the particular church communions originating from them,

will be of perpetual duration. Changes must necessarily here take place. The history of the church teaches that one mode of church polity succeeds another, and that yet, however great these changes may be, Christianity still survives. External constitutions and economies resemble the scaffolding, which aid in the construction of the building, but are not the building itself. They may be taken down and broken to pieces when they have answered their purposes, and the building will then proceed in a different way. That this is so, is proved by the history of the church. It has been, however, a common mistake for the members of certain particular churches—e. g., the catholic, Lutheran, and others, to suppose that if their particular constitution should cease the whole Christian church and Christianity itself would perish. So most in *all* the separate communions still think, and always have thought; and yet the Christian doctrine and church have hitherto been perpetuated, notwithstanding the greatest revolutions in states and in ecclesiastical polities; and this beyond a doubt would still be the case, even if the particular churches and establishments now existing should perish. The spirit and essential nature of Christianity may remain, however much its external form may be altered. Christianity, however, is not so connected with any one place or nation that it must necessarily be perpetuated there, nor has any one church a promise that its descendants shall be Christians. We know from the history of the church, that where Christianity was once most flourishing, it has since been expelled, either by superstition or unbelief, and it has thence travelled to other regions which were formerly sunk in the deepest night of ignorance. Let the reader call to mind the former flourishing condition of the Eastern churches, and then compare with it their present state. Every church should make the use of this fact which is suggested in Rev. ii. 5.

SECTION CXXXVI.

OF THE HEAD OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH; AND OF THE INSTITUTIONS ESTABLISHED TO MAINTAIN AND EXTEND IT, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC TEACHING.

I. The Head of the Church.

THE only true Head and supreme Lord of the Christian church is Jesus Christ, according to the uniform doctrine of Christ himself and the apostles. Vide Morus, p. 278, s. 2. Those who profess his doctrine are brethren, and as such have equal rights. Vide Matt. xxiii. 8. Hence he is called *ὁ ποιμήν, ἀρχιποιμήν, κ. τ. λ.* John, x. 12; 1 Pet. v. 4; Heb. xiii. 20; and *κεφαλὴ ἐκκλησίας*, Ephes. i. 22, iv. 15; Col. ii.

10. Nor is he called by these titles merely in a figurative sense, but because, in his exalted state, he exercises unwearied and watchful care over men, and especially over his church and its members. Vide s. 98, respecting the kingdom of Christ.

Christ therefore by no means wished that his apostles should exercise a lordly dominion over other Christians, Luke, xxii. 24, and they never assumed such authority, but expressly protested against it. Vide 1 Pet. v. 1—3; 1 Cor. v. 6, seq. Nor was it his will that *one* of the apostles, or his successors, should possess supremacy and magisterial power over the church, like what is asserted in the Romish church respecting Peter and his successors, of which there is not a trace in the New Testament or in the first centuries, as appears from church history. The text, Matt. xvi. 18, *upon this rock I will build my church*, relates indeed to Peter and his merits in diffusing the Christian faith. For history teaches that he really laid the first foundation of the *great building of the house of God* after the departure of Christ, both from the Jews, Acts ii., and from the Gentiles, Acts x.—a building which is firmly based (built on a rock,) and which will endure until the end of the world, whence he is always pre-eminent among the apostles. But nothing is said in this passage respecting his own supreme and judicial power over the church, or that of his successors. Peter is here spoken of as a disciple, and not as a ruler and governor. Morus explains this passage very well, (p. 284, seq. n. 3.)

It is therefore justly affirmed in the protestant church that Christ has constituted no *visible head* of the whole church who is to hold his place upon the earth, and to act and make decrees as his representative and in his name.

It is quite another question, *Whether the Christian church has not the right to commit to some one the charge and government of its external public concerns?* This right the church certainly has; and if good order is to be preserved, it must be exercised, because all the members of the church cannot take part in its government. Thus it was in the apostolic church. But the one, or the many, who are appointed to this duty, and who constitute an *ecclesiam repræsentativam*, possess this pre-eminence not *jure divino*, but *humano*. They ought not therefore to give out their decretals as *divine*, and in the name of God. Their enactments are merely human, and ought to have no more than human authority; they may be altered, improved, &c.

Since, moreover, in every well-organized society there must be subordination, no good reason can be given why this should not be introduced among the officers and teachers of the Christian church, and why one should not have

more authority than another. In this way, at a very early period, a great pre-eminence over the other occidental bishops was ascribed to the Roman bishops, and he was called the head of the (occidental) church, while as yet there was no absolute dominion or magisterial power over the church allowed him. But for a further account of this matter we must refer to canon law and church history.

II. The Office of Teaching in the Church.

Every Christian has the right, and indeed is under obligation, to do all in his power to maintain and promote Christian knowledge and feeling. Vide Rom. xv. 14; Gal. vi. 1; Eph. v. 19; vi. 4; 1 Thess. v. 14. But since all Christians have not the time, talents, or other qualifications requisite for this work, some were set apart by Christ, whose appropriate business and calling it should be *to teach and counsel* those committed to their charge; and these were to be the instruments through whom he designed that his doctrine should be maintained and transmitted, and the practice of it promoted. Paul therefore derives the institution of the different kinds of officers and teachers in the church directly from God and Christ, and says that each received a different office and employment, according to his talents and gifts; 1 Cor. xii. 28; Eph. iv. 11, 12; and in the latter passage he says that this arrangement was made for the perfection and edification of the Christian church, (*ἵνα καταρτίσωμεν—εἰς οἰκοδομὴν σώματος Χριστοῦ*.) They are hence called *ἐνγέρετας* and *διάκονοι Θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ*—those who stand in the service of God and Christ, and are employed by them as instruments. They are also called *fellow workers with God*, (*συνεργοί*.) 1 Cor. iii. 9.

The Christian office of teaching was therefore appointed by Jesus Christ himself as an institution designed for the maintenance and spread of the gospel through all ages. And he had the right to do this, as being commissioned and authorized by God himself to be the founder and head of his church. No one of his followers can therefore consistently undervalue this institution, or wilfully withdraw himself, on any pretence, from the assemblies of Christians for the purpose of religious instruction. Matt. xxviii. 18—20; Eph. iv. 11, seq.; Heb. x. 25. But it is necessary, in order to obviate various abuses and mistakes, that we should here more particularly illustrate some points relating to the office of teaching.

(1) The *apostles* were set apart, as public teachers and as founders of Christian churches, *directly* by Christ himself; and they again, as ambassadors for Christ, appointed a perpetual office of teaching, and the public assembling of Christians for worship, and other institutions, calculated to impart strength and perpetuity to

the church. Cf. the first chapters of the Acts of the Apostles. Cf. also Spalding, Vom Werth und Nutzen des Predigtamts, 2te Ausg.; Berlin, 1773, 8vo.

The teachers in the apostolic church are divided into *ordinary* and *extraordinary*. Among the latter are included the *apostles* themselves, the *evangelists*, (who were missionaries and assistants of the apostles,) and in general all who were not appointed as permanent teachers over particular churches, but who were employed in extending Christianity, and in founding new churches. Among the former—the ordinary and permanent officers and teachers of each particular church—were *ἐπίσκοποι, πρεσβύτεροι, ποιμένες, διδάσκαλοι*, (of which the general name is *ἡγούμενοι, officers, rulers of the church*, Hebrews, xiii. 7, 17, 24.) Some of these had more to do with the external concerns of the church, (*presbyteri regentes, ποιμένες*), and others were more especially employed in instruction, (*presbyteri docentes, διδάσκαλοι*.) But for a more particular account of this matter we must refer to church history.

These officers and teachers were not appointed immediately by Christ himself; and in the first church they were not always appointed in the same way and by the same persons; certainly no rule was given respecting this point which should be binding in all places and at all times. The apostles never imposed teachers upon any church, but left to the churches the enjoyment of the right belonging to them of choosing their own teachers. This right of choosing their officers was sometimes exercised by the churches—e. g., Acts, vi. 2, 3, 5; 2 Cor. viii. 19; and sometimes they left it to the apostles, or persons commissioned by them, to whom was committed the care of the public affairs of the church—e. g., 2 Tim. ii. 2; Tit. i. 5, seq.

But all these teachers and overseers, appointed either by the churches or their rulers and representatives, were regarded in the New Testament as appointed by God, or the Holy Ghost, or Christ—e. g., Acts, xx. 28; Col. iv. 17; because their consecration took place on his authority, and according to his will. It is common to denominate the naming and consecration of any one to the office of teaching, his *calling* (*vocatio*), because *καρ* and *καλεῖν* are used in the scriptures with respect to the designation of prophets and other teachers, and the divine commissions entrusted to them. And this calling, even in application to the teachers of religion at the present day, may be denominated *divine*, so far as it is accordant with the divine will, and with the order which God has established; in the same way as the institution of government is called *divine*, Romans, xiii. 1. At the present time, however, this calling is never *immediately* from God. And every teacher may be sure that

he has a *divine* call (i. e., one in accordance with the divine will) when in a regular manner he has received a commission to his office from those who have the right to induct him, and after careful examination, in the presence of God, has found that he can hope to discharge its duties with the divine approbation. The characteristics of a teacher who is acceptable to God and to Christ are briefly enumerated, 1 Tim. iii. 2—7; 2 Tim. ii. 24; Titus, i. 5—9; 1 Pet. v. 2, seq.; and by these each one may examine himself.

That a teacher of religion should be solemnly consecrated to his office, or ordained, is a regulation which is indeed useful both to the teacher himself and to the church; but, in itself considered, it is not a matter *juris divini*; it is nowhere expressly commanded by God, and contributes nothing, considered as an external ceremony, to efficiency and activity in the sacred office. Luther himself pronounced ordination not to be necessary, and said that a rightful calling is sufficient to make any one a rightful teacher, and this is the consecration of God. And this is very true; for the right to teach does not properly depend upon ordination, but upon vocation. On protestant principles, the ordination of a teacher is nothing else than a public approval and confirmation of his calling to the office of teaching; so that thenceforward he may begin his work, and enjoy his rights. Morus, p. 282, n. 3.

The act which is now called *ordination*, and which is still retained in the protestant church, is something very different from *ordination* according to the use of the ancient church, and the old ecclesiastical Latinity. *Ordinatio* was there the same as *χρηρονομία*, and was taken from military life among the Romans, like the word *ordines*; for Christians were called *milites Christi*. It was therefore synonymous with *constitutio, constituere ad munus publicum*, and was the same with *vocare*. But afterwards they made a separate order of the clergy, and allowed them entirely peculiar privileges, and an ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and then called them *ordo*, in the same sense in which the Roman senate is called *ordo, ordo senatorius*, with which it was compared; and when any one was received into this order by special consecration, he was said *ordinari*.

The right of ordaining, according to protestant principles, is not confined to particular persons—e. g., bishops; but it can be performed by any one who is commissioned to do it by the church, or by their functionaries and representatives. *The imposition of hands* in the induction of teachers into office is mentioned—e. g., 1 Tim. iv. 14; Acts, xiii. 3; and is a ceremony borrowed from the Jewish church, where it was practised with regard to all to whom any office

was given, to whom anything was promised, or for whom any blessing was implored from God, as a sign of blessing, invocation, &c.—*symbolum collationis*.

There is one practice in the protestant church with reference to this subject which is a real remnant of popery—viz., that an ordained person may still teach and administer the sacraments, even when he no longer properly fills an office as a teacher of religion, as if ordination put a *character indelebilis* upon a person; while the truth is, that the permission and the right to discharge these duties depend upon a person's vocation to the sacred office, and not upon his ordination. In this respect, therefore, the practice of the protestant church is inconsistent with its theory, and many evil consequences are the result.

(2) *Of the rights of Christian teachers.*

First. As to the rights of teachers, they have, merely as teachers, no other than to instruct and counsel that part of the church entrusted to their care, to perform the services of public worship, and in return to expect their maintenance from the church; 1 Pet. v. 2, 3; Acts, xx. 28; 1 Cor. ix. 6—14. The church and the government may, however, if they see it to be best, confer still other rights, privileges, and immunities upon teachers.

Note.—As to the manner in which the church shall be governed, and by what sort of persons, and how instruction shall be provided for, there are no precepts given in the Bible. Properly, all Christians have a right to teach—every father his own family; and even to administer the sacraments, as even Tertullian truly observes. There is, therefore, truly a *jus laicorum sacerdotale*, as Grotius, Salmasius, Böhmer, and Spener have maintained. Even among the Jews the teachers of the people were not priests, but laymen; and any one who had proper qualifications might teach in the synagogue or in the temple. Among the ancient Israelites the prophets were commonly not from the order of the priesthood, but for the most part from other tribes, classes, and orders of the people. But for the sake of good order, the business of teaching and of performing the services of public worship must necessarily be entrusted to some particular persons; otherwise irregularities and abuses are inevitable; as may be seen from the example of some sects which allow every one to teach, 1 Cor. xii.

Secondly. It was not long, however, before other rights and privileges were conferred upon the teachers of the Christian church; partly such as had belonged to the *Jewish priests* (with whom Christian teachers were compared) and even to the *heathen priests* within the Roman empire, and partly such as were given to the extraordinary teachers in the first Christian church, and especially to the apostles. To these extraordi-

nary teachers Christ promised extraordinary gifts of the Spirit, and many of their peculiar privileges and rights were founded upon these gifts, and could not be claimed by their successors, to whom these gifts were not imparted.

Among these is especially the *office* or the *power of the keys*, (*potestas clavium*.) This includes the power of forgiving or not forgiving sins, like what is common in the protestant church at confessions, or at the preparation for the Lord's Supper; (against which there is nothing to be objected, if it is understood that this absolution is not *collativa*, but merely *declarativa* or *hypothetica*;) and also plenipotentary power, either to exclude any one from church fellowship, or to receive him again; so that the entire administration of church discipline is called *officium clavium*. Vide Morus, p. 286—288.

But with regard to this there are more mistakes than one which need to be answered.

(a) In all the passages of the New Testament which are appealed to in behalf of the power of the keys, the apostles only—the *extraordinary* teachers of the church—are spoken of.

(b) In the passages Matt. xvi. 19 and xviii. 18, nothing is said about forgiving or not forgiving sins, but about *binding* and *loosing*, which in such a connexion always mean, in the Syriac, Chaldaic, and the Rabbinical writers, *to forbid* and *to allow*. Cf. Lightfoot and Weststein on these texts. The meaning is—"You, as my ambassadors, shall have power in the Christian church (*χρῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν*) to make regulations and to give precepts, to allow and to forbid; and God will approve these your appointments, and they shall be regarded by men as if they were from God." For the apostles had special gifts of the Spirit, and were the ambassadors of God and of Christ. The doctrine of the apostles should therefore be to all Christians the rule of what they should do and what they should leave undone. The same is taught in other words, Matt. xviii. 18. This is somewhat differently explained by Morus, p. 284, 287.

(c) In John, xx. 23, Christ gives to his apostles, as ambassadors of God, full power to forgive sins, or to withhold forgiveness. The reason of this is to be found in the gifts of the Spirit promised ver. 22. The apostles did not indeed become omniscient and infallible by the possession of these extraordinary gifts; but they received power to free men from certain evils, which were regarded as punishments of sin, especially from sicknesses; and it is this power which seems to be here spoken of, and therefore not so much *de remissione peccatorum* *VERBALI*, (as theologians call it,) as *de remissione reali*. Thus the healing of the lame man, Matt. ix. 6, is derived from the power which the Messiah possessed of forgiving sins.

(d) The right to receive any one into the fellowship of the church, or to exclude him from it, did not belong to the apostles or to other teachers exclusively. Nor did the apostles ever exercise it, or claim it for themselves; but they left the exercise of it to the churches. Vide 1 Cor. v. 13; 2 Cor. ii. 6—10. That the church not only have the right, but are under obligation, to provide for the support of their doctrine and constitution, and to see to it that nothing is done contrary to them, is indeed unquestionable. And this is the foundation of Christian discipline—i. e., of all those public regulations and appointments by which the Christian doctrine and constitution, and a correspondent demeanour in the members of the church, are promoted and preserved. And this is according to scripture. But respecting the manner in which Christian churches shall administer this discipline, no general rules are given. This must depend upon the situation and circumstances of each particular church. The church may allow this right to be exercised by some particular persons—e. g., by its teachers; but these in such a case do not possess this right in and of themselves, but in the name of the church and as its representatives. In the Augsburg Confession and the Apology there is a particular chapter on the *power of the church* as exercised through its *teachers*. But many protestant teachers are dissatisfied with having their power limited to mere teaching and counselling. It is moreover a maxim in the protestant church, that church discipline should not have the form and effect of civil punishments. Vide Morus, p. 285, s. 8.

If therefore the phrase, *the power of the keys*, is to be retained, and this power is to be considered as belonging to the office of teaching, it must be understood to denote the right and duty of the teacher earnestly to exhibit before the impenitent and unconverted the consequences of their sins, the divine punishments; to admonish them, to counsel and exhort them to repentance; and, on the contrary, to comfort and console the penitent, and to convince them, with reasons drawn from the Christian system, of the mercy of God, and the forgiveness of their sins. This right is derived from the very object of their office, and cannot be denied. Cf. the texts relating to this subject, as cited by Morus, p. 283, n. 2, and p. 287, No. 2. And to these points are the rights and duties of teachers limited, according to the principles of the protestant church.

Note 1.—The more extended investigation of the doctrines of church government, of the primacy, of the rights of the church and its teachers, the relation of the church to the state, &c., which were formerly introduced into the theological systems, belong rather to canon law

or to church history. It will be sufficient here to make this one additional remark, that the uniting of persons in an ecclesiastical society produces no alterations in their lawful, civil, and domestic relations. Vide 1 Cor. vii. 20—24. The church is not a society which is opposed to the state; it rather contributes to advance the good ends of civil society. Hence the members of the church are always directed to yield the most perfect obedience to the government. Vide Luke, xx. 25; Rom. xiii. 1; 1 Pet. ii. 13—17. The true Christian should not indeed conform to the world (the great body of unrenewed men), and ought to keep himself unspotted from the world; still he should not, of his own accord, relinquish his worldly station and calling, so far as it is not sinful.

[Note 2.—On the general subject of this article, cf. Hahn, s. 613, ff. Neander, Kircheng. i. b. 1 Abth. s. 346. Bretschneider, b. ii. s. 785, ff.—Tr.]

ARTICLE XIV.

OF THE TWO SACRAMENTS—BAPTISM AND THE LORD'S SUPPER.

SECTION CXXXVII.

OF THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL.

I. *Different uses of the term "Sacramentum."*

(1) *In the earliest times of the church.* Even Tertullian employed the term *sacramentum* with reference to Baptism and the Lord's Supper (*sacramentum aquæ et eucharistæ*), and many of the Latin teachers after him. But neither Tertullian nor the other ancient fathers employ it exclusively with reference to these; but they were accustomed also to apply it to other things, to such especially as they elsewhere called *mysteria*. Hence we find that in Tertullian the terms *mysterium* and *sacramentum* are used to denote the whole Christian religion and its particular doctrines. The doctrine of the Trinity, of the Incarnation of Christ, &c., are called alternately *mysterium* and *sacramentum*. The same is true of all the rites and ceremonies practised by Christians, so far as they are the types of spiritual things, and have a special significance, or a secret sense, or are kept private.

But from whence is this use of *SACRAMENTUM* derived? Not from the ancient Latin significations of this word, according to which it denotes the military oath, or a sum of money deposited, but from the ancient Latin versions of the Bible—e. g., the Vulgate. In these the Greek *μυστήριον* is frequently rendered by the word *sacramentum*. And since this Greek term was used

respecting all secret and unknown things, and designated the higher religious truths, the secret sense of a thing, &c. (vide Introduction, s. 6), the term *sacramentum* was employed in ecclesiastical Latin in all these senses. And it was adopted the more willingly by the fathers, because they were accustomed to compare the doctrines and rites of Christianity with the doctrines and ceremonies of the pagan mysteries, in order to secure for them a higher regard and authority among the heathen. The texts of the Vulgate on which this use is founded are the following—viz., Dan. ii. 18, 30, where Nebuchadnezzar's unknown dream is called *sacramentum*. Tob. xii. 6, 7; B. of Wisdom, ii. 22; Ephes. iii. 3, 9, where it stands for the Christian system, and its particular doctrines. Ephes. v. 32; Rev. i. 20; xvii. 7, &c. The fathers now called everything standing in any relation to religion, *sacramentum*, and extended it especially to all religious rites which have a secret sense or anything symbolical, and which are the external and sensible signs of certain spiritual things not cognizable by the senses. Respecting the meaning of this term, cf. G. J. Vossius, Disp. xx. de Baptismo; Amst. 1648. Gesner, Thesaur. Lat. h. v. Windorf, Index Latin. Tertull. t. vi. p. 500. The primary sense, therefore, of the term *sacramentum*, is, as Morus justly observes, *sacrum signum*, or *significatio rei sacræ*.

(2) The rites of baptism and the Lord's Supper have always been justly regarded in the Christian church as the most important acts of religious service, and as possessing a peculiar, mystical efficacy. But to many other usages which have gradually become prevalent in the church, and which were not instituted by Christ himself, a great significance and efficacy was attributed; and they were supposed to contain deep religious mysteries. To all these the term *sacramentum* was applied, in the sense in which it was used by Augustine—viz., *Sacramentum est visibile signum rei sacræ, sive rei divinæ invisibilis*. In this way all the rites of the church might be reckoned as belonging to the sacraments, and this was actually done.

Now after the twelfth century the schoolmen began to contend about the number of the sacraments, and at length most of them settled upon seven (as a sacred number), which they regarded as the most important and efficacious, and to which, by way of eminence, they gave the name *sacramenta*. These were first distinctly stated by Peter of Lombardy, in the twelfth century, as *baptism, the Lord's Supper, confirmation, (confirmatio catechumenorum), ordination, extreme unction, auricular confession (sacramentum penitentiae), and wedlock*. He was followed in this by most of the teachers in the

Romish church, and they endeavoured to support their opinion even from the Bible. This doctrine was not, however, publicly acknowledged until the Council at Trent, in the sixteenth century. It must be acknowledged that this selection does not reflect much credit upon the sagacity of the one who made it; and it proved the occasion of a great accumulation of ceremonies, and confirmed the people in the delusion that Christianity consists essentially in ecclesiastical rites, and that those invented by men have equal authority with baptism and the Lord's Supper, which depend upon divine appointment, and possess equal power and efficacy.

(3) These perversions induced the protestant theologians of the sixteenth century, especially those of the Lutheran church, to use the word *sacramentum* in a more limited sense than that in which it had been previously taken, and so to determine its meaning that it should no more include all the rites which had been formerly denominated *sacramenta*, but merely baptism and the Lord's Supper. Hence the doctrine of seven sacraments was publicly established in the Romish church by the Council at Trent, in opposition to the protestants; and it was there maintained that all the seven were instituted by Christ, and were sacraments in the same sense with baptism and the Lord's Supper. It is however expressly said, in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession by Melancthon, that nothing depends upon the use of the word, or upon the number, if the thing itself is only rightly understood, and human institutions are not made of equal authority with those of God. *Nemo vir prudens de nomine et numero rixabitur*. Cf. Morus, p. 276, s. 5.

The Lutheran theologians have adhered closely to the use of this word in the narrower sense adopted in the sixteenth century. But the reformed theologians have often used it in the wider sense, after the ancient manner—e. g., they frequently call the Levitical ceremonies and all the types of the Old Testament, *sacraments*. Many among the catholics (Bellarmin, and more lately Oberthür) have expressly allowed that baptism and the Lord's Supper are the most general and important of the sacraments, and that they therefore approached the protestants more nearly than the Council at Trent. Oberthür (in his *Idea Bibl. Eccles. Dei*, vol. ii.) confesses that Christ expressly and immediately appointed only two sacraments, but insists that he conferred upon the church and the priesthood the power to add others. The assertion made by some that baptism and the Lord's Supper are even in the New Testament denominated *μυστήρια*, is without foundation. For the *οἰκονομὸς μυστηρίων* Θεοῦ (1 Cor

iv. 1), is one who teaches the doctrines which God has revealed to men, and of which they were before ignorant. Vide chap. ii. 7.

II. *Development of the idea which is connected in the Lutheran church with the term "Sacrament;" and the marks by which Sacraments are distinguished from other ceremonies.*

(1) By the word *sacraments* is understood, in the Lutheran church, those religious rites and ceremonies which God himself has instituted in the holy scriptures, by which certain spiritual blessings are represented and actually communicated. Luther defined a sacrament, in this narrower sense, as follows:—*It is an observance appointed by God, in which one makes use of a visible thing, which has the divine word of command and of promise.* Cf. Morus, p. 274, s. 2, n. 1.

The essential characteristics of a sacrament are therefore the following—viz.,

(a) Sacraments are external religious acts.

(b) They are among those acts which are positively instituted—i. e., they are such as stand in no essential connexion, from their internal nature, with religion and the welfare of men, (like prayer, for example.) And all the religious acts which have these two characteristics are called *ceremonies*.

(c) They are instituted and appointed by God himself.

(d) They serve not only to exhibit or represent to the senses the spiritual blessings which flow from God and Christ, but actually to communicate them.

In every sacrament, therefore, there are two parts;—the visible thing (*materia*, or *res terrena*), which affects the senses, as the bread, wine, and water; and the invisible thing (*res*, or *materia celestis*), which is typified and imparted by the external sign. But respecting the manner in which the sacraments exert their power and produce their effect, protestant theologians have not agreed; nor have even the Lutheran theologians agreed among themselves. In this point, however, they coincide, that the sacraments do not exert a *mechanical* or *miraculous* power, as some catholics and enthusiasts have maintained; for in that case they must act irresistibly; but some of them contend that they have a *physical* power, or a power analogous to physical (*physico-analogam vim*); while others say, that they have merely a *moral* effect. It is the same here as in the controversy respecting the power and efficacy of the divine word. These religious services stand in the most intimate connexion with the *essential doctrines of the Christian system*, and they can in themselves produce no effect upon those who have no knowledge of these doctrines, or no conviction of their truth—i. e., no *faith*. The truths of

religion which are herein represented, and which should be deduced from these ceremonies, produce their effect in the same way (or rather the Holy Ghost produces through them an effect in the same way) upon the heart of man, as they are accustomed in other cases to do, when they are heard, read, &c.; only in these sacraments they are not taught by words, but in different ways are rendered obvious to the senses. All which has been before said respecting the operations of grace through the Word of God, s. 129, seq., is therefore equally applicable to this subject. Cf. especially with reference to the Biblical doctrine, s. 131. Melancthon, therefore, well observed in the Augsburg Confession, Art. vii., that Augustine truly said, *Sacramentum esse verbum visibile*; for, he adds, *ritus oculis accipitur (ut moveat corda), et est quasi pictura verbi, idem significans quod verbum*. Now in the same way in which God exerts his power through the word, when it is heard or read, in the very same way does he act through the Word (the *truth*), when in other ways and by external rites it is represented to the senses.

(2) *Inferences from this representation of the Lutheran theologians.* From this limitation of the idea of *sacramentum* it follows that only baptism and the Lord's Supper can properly be regarded as sacraments. For the characteristics of the sacraments have been so settled that they can all apply only to these two; and other ceremonies are excluded from the number. By these distinctions are excluded,

(a) The five other sacraments of the Romish church, because the third and fourth of the characteristics above mentioned do not belong to them; or at least one or the other of these two characteristics is wanting. Morus shews this particularly with regard to each one of the five Romish sacraments, p. 275, s. 4, in the Note.

(b) The washing of feet (*pedilavium*), which was regarded by some as a religious rite appointed for all the members of the Christian church in all ages, because Christ washed his disciples' feet, (John, xiii. 5,) and because it appears from 1 Tim. v. 10, that this rite was practised in the first Christian church. But this act was *symbolical*, and Christ designed by it to inculcate upon his disciples, after the oriental manner, the duty of Christian love, condescension, and readiness to serve others. Vide ver. 12, seq. It was never appointed by the apostles as a rule for all Christians in all ages. By degrees, as customs altered, and another mode of thinking prevailed, it fell into disuse in most of the Western churches. Still it was long retained in the Eastern churches, and in some of them is common to this day. Even in the West, it has been revived by some of the smaller churches—e. g., by a part of the

Mennonites; and it is now practised by some, though not all, belonging to the society of United Brethren. They, however, do not insist that it is an essential Christian rite, which must be observed by all Christians; and which should again be introduced into all Christian churches, after it has now fallen into disuse; but they leave every one to his own judgment respecting it.

(c) The Jewish religious rites, such as offerings, sacrifices, &c. For Paul says that they did not effect the forgiveness of sin before God, although they were instituted by him, Heb. ix. 9; x. 11. So far as they *typified* spiritual blessings, (vide s. 90, III. 7,) they might be called sacraments in the old sense.

(d) Especially have circumcision and the passover been considered as sacraments, and called, by way of distinction, *sacramenta Veteris Testamenti*, and compared with baptism and the Lord's Supper. But many modern theologians have decided that they cannot be called sacraments in the sense of the Lutheran church. For although they were commanded by God, they were attended by no promise of spiritual blessings. Circumcision related merely to external good, the possession of Canaan, the posterity of Abraham, &c., Gen. xvii., and not to the forgiveness of sins, &c. On the contrary, it is assigned as the object of baptism, the initiatory rite of the Christian religion, to promote the *circumcision of the heart*, or moral improvement. Vide Col. ii. 11, 12. The passover was instituted merely to commemorate the deliverance of the Jews from Egypt. Still, although it is not declared in the scriptures that baptism and the Lord's Supper have come into the place of circumcision and the passover, yet both of the latter may be regarded as sacraments, so far as they typified spiritual blessings. For it was expressly said to Abraham at his circumcision, that the great promises made to him and his posterity should be fulfilled, (Gen. xvii. 21,) and among these were *spiritual* blessings. And all the offerings and festivals of the Jewish religion, and especially these two, which were the most solemn, are said in the New Testament to have a figurative sense. Vide 1 Cor. v. 7; John, xix. 36; and s. 90. Cf. Heilmann, *De finienda juxta sacramentorum notione*, in his "Opuscula," th. i. s. 433.

III. The Object of Christ in instituting these two Sacraments.

(1) The utility and necessity of religious rites may be inferred from the constitution of our nature. Man is not a mere spirit, but a being composed of reason and sense. And on this account there must be something in religion which will appeal to his senses, excite and sustain his devotion, and strengthen his zeal in piety. The

sensible representation of the truths of religion often makes a stronger impression upon men, as experience shews, than mere instruction; because their feelings are apt to be more strongly excited by anything which appeals to the senses than by that which addresses simply the understanding. Hence our religious services cannot be merely spiritual. Even ceremonies of human appointment have a great effect, and far more those which have divine authority, and, like baptism and the Lord's Supper, are accompanied with special promises.

Religious rites in general contribute much also to the support of religion itself; since by their means the solemn and public profession of religion is renewed, and even children are from their youth up accustomed to them, and are bound to their observance. A religion without external religious rites, and without the aids of sensible exhibitions of its truths, would be as liable to become obsolete, as the different systems of philosophy. The truth of this remark is confirmed by the history of the church. In the oriental church, Christianity was indeed very early disfigured by many false doctrines; but the profession of Christ, and the essentials of his religion, still continued, until Mohammed and his adherents succeeded in abolishing Christian worship, together with baptism and the Lord's Supper. It is therefore very necessary that these religious rites should be maintained; and the opponents of Christianity proceed very wisely when they endeavour to bring them into disuse and contempt. For the doctrines to which they relate must soon share the same fate.

(2) But it is equally important, on the other hand, that religion should not be overloaded with external rites, and that they should be as few as possible; for when they are multiplied their effect is weakened, and they are soon regarded with indifference and contempt. This is proved by the example of all religions, and even of the Christian religion, when it has been burdened with ceremonies. Christ endeavoured by his doctrine to withdraw men more and more from what is external and sensible, and to promote internal, spiritual worship, as an affair of the heart. Cf. John, iv. 23, 24. Hence he appointed but few ceremonies. An additional reason for this was, that at the time when Christianity was founded, the religious ceremonial both of the Jews and of the heathen nations was looked upon with coldness, or even with contempt, by the more cultivated and thinking part of the public; on account of the great multiplicity of its rites, and the superstition with which it was attended. Even a great portion of the religious Jews at that time felt the burden of the Jewish ceremonial law to be very oppressive. Cf. Acts, xv. 10; Matthew, xxiii. 4.

A new religious institution, therefore, prescribing but few, simple, and easy rites, would on this very account commend itself to the Jews and the heathen. Cf. Matt. ix. 14—17.

Considered in this respect, these two sacraments of Christ have great advantages. They are natural, simple, and *universally applicable*. They are therefore peculiarly appropriate to an institution which is designed to be universal. It is otherwise with the Jewish ritual, which is not adapted to all men, countries, and times. Indeed it was not designed by God for all men, but only for a particular period, and that for a limited time. Christ, however, has not forbidden the introduction of other religious usages; for an increase of them may often be indispensable to the maintenance of united religious worship. But he has left this to the discretion of his church, which may appoint and modify them according to the circumstances. Those, however, which Christ has instituted should serve as models and patterns, in point of simplicity, for all other Christian ceremonies.

CHAPTER I.

THE DOCTRINE OF CHRISTIAN BAPTISM.

SECTION CXXXVIII.

NAMES, INSTITUTION, AND ORIGIN OF CHRISTIAN BAPTISM; WITH OBSERVATIONS ON JOHN THE BAPTIST AND THE JEWISH BAPTISM OF PROSELYTES.

I. Names of Baptism in the Bible.

(1) Τὸ βάπτισμα, from βαπτίζεν, which properly signifies to immerse, (like the Germ. *taufen*,) to dip in, to wash, (by immersion.) In the Syriac and Chaldaic (which Christ used) this is denoted by the words, כְּבִיל, כְּבִירָה, כְּבִילָה, (Buxtorf, Lex. Chald. p. 849, 850.) Hence the washing of vessels with water is called βάπτισμα, Mark, vii. 4. And instead of νέμεσθαι in ver. 3 of the same chapter, we have in ver. 4, βαπτίσωμαι so also of the washing of hands, Luke, xi. 38, seq. (In the New Testament the form ὁ βάπτισμός is never used for the religious rite of baptism, either of John or of Christ; but always τὸ βάπτισμα.) Hence it is often used tropically, (a) For what flows, or is communicated, to any one in full measure; as in Latin, *perfundere, imbue*, &c.—e. g., Acts, i. 5. (b) For severe sufferings which befall any one—e. g., Matt. xx. 22, 23; for these are often compared with waves which overflow any one; Ps. lxi. 2, 3. So among the Latins, *fluctus miseris, mergi malis*. Hence martyrdom is called by the ancients, *baptisma sanguinis*. In the

classics,—e. g., in Plato,—a drunken person is said to be βαπτισθείς, *vino imbutus, mersus*.

(2) Καθαρισμός, John, iii. 25; because by washing purification is effected, and baptism represents purification from sins, and is designed to promote this end in the one who is baptized. Hence Josephus (xviii. 7) employs καθαίρειν in respect to the baptism of John. Perhaps, too, 2 Peter, i. 9, (καθαρισμός τῶν πάλα ἀμαρτιῶν, coll. Eph. v. 26) belongs in this connexion.

(3) Τὸ ἵδωρ, because baptism was administered with water; John, iii. 5, coll. Acts, x. 47; Eph. v. 26, seq.

(4) Among the church fathers one of the oldest names was φωτισμός, from the instruction which the subject of this rite received in connexion with his baptism, as Justin the Martyr (Apol. i. 61) explains it. The Syriac, too, translates τοὺς ἀπὸ φωτισθέντας (Heb. vi. 4), *those once baptized*, which version Michaelis follows, though it is a doubtful rendering. Baptism is moreover called by the church fathers, σφραγίς, *sigillum*, (*character Christiani*), χάρις, *charisma*, ἔνδυμα ἀφθαρσίας, &c. τ. λ.

II. Institution of Baptism, and the principal texts relating to it.

Jesus, even during his life upon the earth, required those who wished to become his disciples to be baptized by his apostles; John, iii. 22, coll. ver. 5 of the same chapter, and chapter iv. 1, 2. But at that time none but Jews were received into his church and baptized; as was the case also with John in his baptism. Shortly before his ascension to heaven, he first gave the commission to his apostles to admit *all* (πάντα ἔθνη) into the Christian church, and to baptize them without distinction; Matt. xxviii. 18—20, cf. Mark, xvi. 15, 16. They were to be made disciples of Jesus Christ, or professors of his religion (μαθητεύειν) in a twofold manner—viz., by baptism and by instruction. They were to be baptized in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—i. e., by baptism they were to be obligated to accept and obey the doctrine which acknowledges and receives Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Whoever, therefore, is baptized, declares by this rite that he acknowledges Father, Son, and Spirit for his God, that he will obey his laws, and that he expects protection and blessing from him; and God, on the other hand, promises and grants to him the enjoyment of all the benefits which the gospel of Christ enjoins upon us to expect from the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For a more full explanation of this formula, vide s. 35, I., and Morus, p. 275, s. 2, 3. It is the opinion of some that Christ did not design in this passage so much to prescribe a precise formula,—in which case he would rather have said, “Bap-

tize ye, and say, *I baptize thee in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit*,"—but that he merely intended to teach what is the meaning and object of this rite. That this command of Christ was obeyed by the apostles may be seen from the Acts and Epistles. The other important passages concerning the object, design, and effect of baptism—e. g., John, iii. 5; Titus, iii. 5; Acts, xxii. 16; Gal. iii. 27; Rom. vi. 3, 4; Ephes. v. 26; 1 Pet. iii. 21, &c., will be explained in the following sections.

III. *Origin of Christian Baptism; the Baptism of John, and the Jewish Baptism of Proselytes.*

(1) John baptized before Christ appeared publicly as a teacher, and Christ even suffered himself to be baptized by him. The baptism of John is described, equally with the baptism of Christ, as a divine institution, and as performed under divine authority; John, i. 33, (God sent him to baptize,) and Luke, vii. 30, where it is called a divine institution (βουλὴ θεοῦ), and Matt. xxi. 25, seq.

(2) But although this is a divine institution, we must still seek among the prevailing practices and expectations of the Israelites the more immediate reason why just this and no other form of initiation was then introduced by John and Christ. From the passage, John, i. 25, it is manifest that the Jews (the Sanhedrim and the Pharisees) expected that the Messiah and his herald Elias would baptize. Cf. Lightfoot on this text. And so, many even among the learned (the Pharisees and Sadducees) suffered themselves to be baptized by John (Matt. iii. 7); which probably would not have been the case if baptism had been to them a strange and unheard of thing. The Israelites, like many other nations, had different forms of lustration and washings with water, which were clearly prescribed by their law, by means of which they sanctified, consecrated, and cleansed themselves from impurities. Vide Wetstein on Matt. iii. 6. As, now, the Messiah was to bring about a general reformation, and to establish a new constitution, into which every one must be solemnly initiated, and to which he must be consecrated; as, moreover, it was the universal expectation, according to the prophets, that he would cleanse men from their sins, which was exactly typified by the washings in the Levitical law; it does not seem unnatural that just this form of initiation should have been expected by the Jews, and should, in fact, have been chosen by John and Christ, according to divine appointment.

If, now, the *baptism of proselytes* was customary among the Jews at or before the time of Christ, many things could be explained still more clearly from this circumstance. The Talmud and its interpreters relate that the prose-

lytes, as well circumcised, as uncircumcised, were initiated by baptism into the worship of the one true God, and that this was a symbol of purification from sin, and of the renunciation of heathenism; and that they were then considered as *born again*—exactly the expression used by Christ (John, iii.) and by Paul (Tit. iii.) respecting Christian baptism. Vide s. 126, II. The Talmudists make this practice very ancient, and place it as far back as the time of Moses, and even further, (which probably is going too far, as their way is.) The oldest passage respecting a religious cleansing, or sort of baptism, occurs in Jacob's history, (Gen. xxxv. 2,) when he puts away the idols in his house, and builds an altar to Jehovah. This passage may certainly have induced the Israelites to adopt this custom. So much is certain, that as early as the second century proselyte baptism must have been very customary; since in the Dissertations of Epictetus (ii. 9), published by Arrian, βαπτισμένος signifies a Jewish proselyte, and παραβαπτισθείς, one who had not sincerely embraced Judaism. Others, however, are inclined to think that *Christians* are here meant, and that Epictetus confounded them with the Jews. For these reasons, Dantz firmly maintained that the baptism of proselytes was, as it were, the prelude of the baptism of John and of Christ; and he is followed by Michaelis, Less, and others. Cf. his treatise *de antiquitate baptismi initiationis Israel*. in Meuschen's *N. T. e Talmude illustrato*, p. 133, f. and Wetstein on Matt. iii. 6.

There is much for and much against the opinion that proselyte baptism was customary in the first century, and even earlier. (a) *Against*. There is not found, even to the present time, one distinct evidence of it in any writer before, at, or shortly after, the time of Christ; not in Philo,—not in Josephus, even when he speaks of the conversion of the Idumeans, under John Hyrkan, to Judaism (xiii. 9), where he simply mentions circumcision,—not even in the Chaldaic paraphrases. Zeltner firmly opposes to Dantz this stubborn silence of the writers near the age of Christ. (b) *In favour*. The unanimous testimony of all the Rabbins,—the universality of this practice among the Jews of the second century, since it can scarcely be thought that they would have borrowed it from the Christians, who were so hated and despised by them,—the striking similarity of the Jewish expressions, concerning the baptism of proselytes, with those which occur in the New Testament respecting the Christian rite (*regeneratio*),—also the circumstance that Josephus, in his account of John the Baptist, does not express the least surprise at this practice as a new and unwonted ceremony. This last argument, however, is invalidated by the remark, that it is known to

have been expected that the precursor of the Messiah would baptize. Besides, it appears that the baptism of John did excite among the Jews some degree of surprise. This is seen from the question, *why baptizest thou then?* and from his being called *the Baptist*. Ziegler has lately maintained, with very probable reasons, that the antiquity of the Jewish baptism of proselytes ascends beyond the origin of Christianity. Cf. his *Theological Essays*, part ii. (Göttingen, 1804,) Num. 3, "Concerning the Baptism of John as the unaltered application of the Jewish Baptism of Proselytes, and concerning the Baptism of Christ as the continuation of that of John." But although much may be advanced in support of this opinion, it cannot be relied upon with certainty, since it is entirely destitute of clear contemporary evidence.

IV. *Was the Baptism of John different from Christian Baptism?*

Many theologians of the Romish church formerly maintained that there is a difference, but protestants usually take the opposite side, although some, especially the more modern, have again adopted the former opinion. The following observations may serve to settle the matter:—

(1) *The object of John's baptism was the same with that of Christian*; and from this it may be at once concluded that it did not differ essentially from the latter. John exhorted the persons baptized by him to repentance (*μετάνοια*) and to faith in the Messiah who was shortly to appear, and made these duties obligatory upon them by this rite, Matt. iii. 11; Luke, iii.; Mark, i.; John, i.; Acts, ii. 38. And as soon as Jesus publicly appeared, John asserted in the most forcible manner that he was the Messiah, and so required of all whom he had then or before baptized, that they should believe in Jesus as the Messiah. Now in Christian baptism, repentance and faith in Jesus as the Messiah are likewise the principal things which are required on the part of the subjects of this rite.

(2) *The practice of the first Christian church confirms the point that the baptism of John was considered essentially the same with Christian baptism*. For those who acknowledged that they had professed, by the baptism of John, to believe in Jesus as the Christ, and who in consequence of this had become in fact his disciples, and had believed in him, were not, in a single instance, baptized again into Christ, because this was considered as having been already done. Hence we do not find that any apostle or any other disciple of Jesus was the second time baptized; not even that Apollos mentioned in Acts, xviii. 25, because he had before believed in Jesus as Christ, although he had received only the baptism of John.

(3) But all those disciples of John who had not before acknowledged this truth, and had received the baptism of John or his successors in an entirely different signification, were properly considered at the time of the apostles as not being baptized, or as wrongly baptized, and all such were therefore required to be baptized expressly into Christ as the Messiah. This was the case with the Jews, who, according to Acts, ii. 41, were baptized into Jesus, among whom were many whom John had baptized, but who had not then recognised Jesus as the Messiah, and had even taken part in his crucifixion. This was likewise the case with those persons whom Paul (Acts, xix. 1—5) permitted to be baptized at Ephesus, although they had already received the baptism of John. There is in this place nothing that needs to be artificially explained. The meaning is, "That when they heard from Paul that it was essential to baptism that one should believe in Jesus as the Lord and Christ, (which they hitherto had not done, since the disciples of John who baptized them had said nothing to them about it,) they were then willing to suffer themselves to be solemnly obligated by baptism to the acknowledgment of Jesus." Vide Bengel's *Gnomon*, ad h. l. and Semler, *Diss. ad Acts*, xix. 1, seq. This was the more necessary at that time, as many of the disciples of John had entirely separated themselves from the Christians. These false disciples of John still continued to practise John's baptism into the approaching Messiah, but denied that *Jesus* was the Messiah. Even to the present day there are remnants of this sect in Syria and Arabia. Vide Norberg, *Von der Religion und Sprache der Zabier*, and Walch, *De Sabæis*, in the *Comment. Soc. Gott.* 1780 and 1781. There is much directed against the false disciples of John in the accounts given by the Evangelists respecting John the Baptist. Vide Storr, *Ueber den Zweck der evang. Gesch. und der Briefe Johannis*; Tübingen, 1786, 8vo; 2d ed. 1809. There is nothing therefore in the passages Acts ii. and xix. which favours the doctrine that those who had been baptized by John were required to be re-baptized, in order to admission into the church of Christ.

SECTION CXXXIX.

HOW AND BY WHOM BAPTISM IS TO BE ADMINISTERED; AND RESPECTING THE OPTIONAL AND UNESSENTIAL THINGS ATTENDING THE OBSERVANCE OF THIS RITE.

I. *Concerning Immersion, Affusion, and Sprinkling with Water.*

(1) It is certain that in Christian baptism, as in the baptism of John, only water was used by Christ and his apostles. Vide John, iii. 5;

Ephes. v. 26. But after baptism in itself considered, and simply as an *opus operatum*, came to be regarded as essential to salvation, the question was started, Whether, in the want of water, baptism could be performed with any other material—e. g., wine, milk, or sand? The question must be answered in the negative, since to do this would be contrary to the institution of Christ. For any one to be prevented necessarily from being baptized does not subject him to condemnation, but only the wilful and criminal refusal of this rite.

(2) *Immersion* is peculiarly agreeable to the institution of Christ, and to the practice of the apostolical church, and so even John baptized, and immersion remained common for a long time after; except that in the third century, or perhaps earlier, the baptism of the sick (*baptisma clinicorum*) was performed by sprinkling or affusion. Still some would not acknowledge this to be true baptism, and controversy arose concerning it, so unheard of was it at that time to baptize by simple affusion. Cyprian first defended baptism by sprinkling, when necessity called for it, but cautiously and with much limitation. By degrees, however, this mode of baptism became more customary, probably because it was found more convenient; especially was this the case after the seventh century, and in the Western church, but it did not become universal until the commencement of the fourteenth century. Yet Thomas Aquinas had approved and promoted this innovation more than a hundred years before. In the Greek and Eastern church they still held to immersion. It would have been better to have adhered generally to the ancient practice, as even Luther and Calvin allowed. Vide Storck, Doct. Christ. Pars theoret., p. 291. If it is asked, however, if immersion is so essential that one who has been only sprinkled is not to be considered as properly a baptized person, it may be answered, No! Nothing more is essential to the external part of baptism than that water be used, (Acts, x. 47; John, iii. 5.) and that the subject, by the solemn use of this rite, be consecrated to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and be pledged to obey the Christian doctrine, Matt. xxviii. 19. The washing with water is considered as the symbol of the purification of sins, and this can be signified as well by affusion as by immersion. Hence, even in affusion, the external significance of the rite is retained. And this is the reason why many in the Western church, and even in the protestant church, have contended that this rite should be administered, not *per adspersionem*, but *per largiorem aquæ affusionem*.

(3) There is no command given concerning the question, whether immersion or affusion should be performed only once, or more than once; this therefore is in itself optional. In

the Greek church we find the *threefold* immersion earlier and more prevalent than in the Latin; whence the Greeks objected to the Latins. Basiliius and Hieronymus say that this was practised in conformity with an ancient tradition; and if it was not common in the first church, perhaps the controversies with the Antitrinitarians in the third century might have given the first occasion for it. In the African church it was already common in the times of Tertullian and Cyprian, and in the apostolical constitutions it was so ordained. At the fourth church council at Toledo, in the year 633, this threefold immersion was first established by ecclesiastical authority in the Latin church, in opposition to the Arians.

(4) It is also optional whether the head, the forehead, or the breast, be wet with the water; and in this respect the one who administers this sacrament must govern himself according to the usages of his own particular church.

II. On the use of Formulas in Baptism.

The formulas used in administering baptism have always been very different. In the Greek church it is still common to say, as formerly, *Baptizetur hic*, or *hæc* (*servus*, or *serva Dei*) *in nomine*, &c. In the Latin church the subject is addressed, *I baptize thee in the name*, &c. The formula adopted by some of baptizing in the name “of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost,” is liable to be misunderstood, as it might be interpreted to mean that there are three gods. It has appeared strange to some that we find in the New Testament no passage from which it plainly appears that the words used Matt. xxviii., *in the name of the Father*, &c., were used in the apostolical church. For we always find only, *εἰς Χριστόν* or *Ἰησοῦν*—*εἰς ὄνομα Κυρίου* or *Ἰησοῦ*—e. g., Rom. vi. 3; Gal. iii. 27; Acts, ii. 38; x. 48; xix. 5. The opinions on this subject are not unanimous. (1) We might say, with some, that although the formula in Matthew xxviii. were not used in the apostolical church, but it was merely said *in the name of Jesus*—i. e., into the profession of Christ and his doctrine—yet this was entirely the same with the other, because it comprehended the profession of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, since whoever was baptized into Jesus by this act professed his belief in the whole doctrine of Christ, and therefore in that which he taught concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Basiliius endeavoured to explain the thing in this way. (2) Others (and among the rest, Facundus Hermianensis, De Tribus Capit. i. 3) are of opinion that it does not follow from these places that they did not fully employ the prescribed formula in baptism; but that *Christian* baptism was so named in distinction from the baptism of John, and

from the Jewish proselyte baptism, since one who had received this proselyte baptism, or had wrongly understood that of John, was not baptized into Christ. This can be reconciled very well, at least with Acts, xix. 5, and with some other places. Vide s. 138, II. But in addition to these there is a third reason. (3) In the ancient Christian church immediately after the time of the apostles, the words prescribed by Christ at the establishment of this rite were certainly used, (Just. M. Ap. 1, 80.) It may therefore be rightly inferred that it was the same at the time of the apostles; and that it is right and proper to continue in this use. It is not, however, forbidden to unite with this other formulas which are suitable, and which serve to explain the design of this rite, and to excite pious feelings. The teacher will of course govern himself in this matter according to the circumstances, the constitution, and usages of the particular church to which he may belong.

III. *By whom is Baptism to be administered?*

In ordinary cases, certainly by the teachers of religion; for it is their appropriate business and calling to lead disciples to Christ, (μαθητεύειν,) and this duty is also committed to them by the church and government. We find, therefore, that baptism in the apostolical church was always administered by the teachers. Vide John, iv. 2; Acts, x. 48; 1 Cor. i. 16. But although this μαθητεύειν is the appropriate business of teachers, still they have no exclusive right to it, as this is nowhere given to them in the New Testament. But in case of necessity, and when no teachers can be obtained, baptism may be administered by any Christian, and is valid if it is performed according to the institution of Christ. Vide s. 136, II. 2. This has been the doctrine and practice which has universally prevailed in the church.

IV. *How far a knowledge of Christian Doctrines is essential in the subjects of Baptism.*

This knowledge must certainly be presupposed in adults before they can be baptized. For how could they solemnly profess, as they do in baptism, to believe, and pledge themselves to obey, a doctrine respecting which they were wholly ignorant? We find, therefore, even in the writings of the New Testament, that the candidates for baptism were previously instructed. But this instruction was by no means particular; it was confined to the main, fundamental truths of Christianity; the doctrine of one God; the principal articles respecting Christ; that he is the Messiah; and that through him we receive forgiveness from God; also concerning the Holy Spirit promised to Christians, and the indispensable necessity of repentance and holiness: these are the principal truths in which

the candidates for baptism were briefly instructed. When they were sufficiently acquainted with these truths, and had professed them from the heart, they were allowed baptism, and received afterwards more complete instruction both in these and the other Christian doctrines. Cf. Acts, ii. 41; viii. 12, 36, seq.; ix. 17, 18; x. 34—48, where in the words of Peter we have an example of the instruction commonly given before baptism. Cf. Heb. vi. 1, seq. In the great addition of new converts in the first period of Christianity, this preparatory instruction could not possibly be very long or particular, especially as the teachers of religion were yet few. Accordingly, the confessions of faith to be made in baptism were at first very short and simple; such, for example, was the *symbolum apostolicum*, so called; but this was gradually enlarged by the addition of new distinctons, by which the orthodox endeavoured to distinguish themselves from heretics. The instruction of catechumens and the time of probation preceding baptism were by degrees increased and prolonged; and for this there was good reason. For as the number of Christian proselytes constantly increased, and multitudes were pressing into the church, greater caution became necessary in admitting them. This led to the appointment of fixed periods for the probation of new converts before baptism.

V. *Usages incidental to Baptism, but not essential to its Validity.*

Many of these are very ancient, but they may all be dispensed with without affecting the validity of Christian baptism, because they are not commanded by Christ. In Christian archæology and church history they are more fully exhibited than they can be here. We mention only some of those which are still common among us.

(1) The sign of the cross appears to have been first introduced in connexion with baptism in the fourth century, and is intended to be a solemn memorial of the death of Christ; Rom. vi. 3.

(2) The imposition of a name; this was also done in connexion with Jewish circumcisions.

(3) The laying on of hands, as a symbol of the communication of the Holy Ghost, or of the gift of sanctification, which in this way is solemnly sought of God for the subject of baptism, and promised to him. This is mentioned even by Tertullian.

(4) Sponsors at baptism. Tertullian (De Bapt. ch. 18) mentions these as being present at the baptism of children; but they were also concerned in the performance of this rite for adult persons; just as sponsors were called in at the rite of circumcision among the Jews. Such only, however, as belong to the Christian

church can be employed for this service; heathens, Jews, Mahomedans, and others who are not members of the Christian church may be present at the rite, but not as valid sponsors.

(5) The subjects of baptism must renounce Satan. This denoted originally an entire renunciation on their part of heathenism and of heathen superstitions, and also of the entire disposition which had before prevailed within them, as far as it was opposed to Christianity.

(6) Exorcism. The first traces of this practice appear in Africa, in the third century, as we learn from Cyprian's letter, although a foundation for it was laid as early as the second century. It had its rise in various opinions, in a great measure superstitious, respecting the physical agency of the devil upon men, and in the idea that evil spirits may be driven off by the use of formulas and certain charmed words. It was at first practised only at the baptism of heathen, who were regarded as persons possessed by the devil; but it came afterwards to be employed at the baptism of the children of Christian parents. Vide Kraft, *Ausführliche Historie des Exorcismus*; Hamburg, 1750. Concerning the other usages in baptism, vide, besides the ancient authors, (e. g., Vosii *Disertatt.* cf. s. 137, I. 1.) Calixtus, *Diss. de Antiq. Ritibus Bapt.*; Helmstädt, 1650; Noesselt's historical investigation and illustration of the usages common in baptism, published in the weekly "Anzeiger" at Halle, 1764, No. 28—32.

Note.—The rite of exorcism has been properly abandoned in most places in the protestant church. Although it is well explained in the Lutheran church, as a confession of the natural corruption of indwelling sin and of redemption from it, and in various other ways, still it is calculated to promote superstition and serious error in the community at large; and, what is most important, to excite contempt among the lightly disposed. Morus gives the same opinion, (p. 257, note 3.)

It may be remarked, in general, that some of the usages common in many places at infant baptism are not at all suitable to children, and have been transferred, without much judgment, to their baptism, from that of adult persons. Among these inappropriate services we may place the *confession of faith*, and the renunciation of the devil. Instead of these, it would be more appropriate and profitable to have a sincere prayer, in which the new member of the Christian church should be commended to the care and blessing of God; and at the same time a feeling exhortation to parents and other spectators, in which they should be impressively reminded of the duties which they owe as Christians to their children, and those entrusted to their watchful care. Much depends in things of this nature upon the teacher, who, even where

the rites are not exactly suitable, can obviate mistake and remove ignorance by proper explanations. Even the best formulary in baptism will affect spectators but little if they see that the teacher uses it without any emotion, and repeats it with a heartless voice and manner. The teacher needs to be on his guard against performing the duties of his office—especially those which frequently recur, as the Lord's Supper and baptism—in a merely mechanical way. When he performs religious services with a cold heart, it cannot be expected that others present should engage in them with warm devotion. A teacher who discharges his duties in this manner must lose in the good opinion of his hearers; and the blame is his own if he at last becomes contemptible in their view.

SECTION CXL.

OBJECT, USES, AND EFFECTS OF CHRISTIAN BAPTISM.

The uses and effects of baptism are divided, as in the sacraments in general, into *internal* and *external*.

I. *External Advantages and Effects of Baptism.*

By means of this rite we are received as members of the visible Christian society, and consequently become partakers of all the privileges belonging to Christians. It is therefore, considered in this light, the solemn initiatory rite of admission into the Christian church, (*sacramentum initiationis*.) This is mentioned expressly in the New Testament as the design and object of baptism. As soon as a person was baptized he was considered as a member of the church, (*ἅγιος, μαθητής, πιστεύων*.) Acts, ii. 41, 44, and entitled to all the rights of other Christians. 1 Cor. xii. 13, "Whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; *εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν*"—i. e., we are united by baptism into one church, and have, as members of it, equal rights. Vide ver. 12, 27. Whence Paul says, Eph. iv. 4, 5, there is *ἓν βάπτισμα*, (one common baptism,) and *ἓν σῶμα*, (one church,) and *μία ἐκκλησία* of Christians; and Gal. iii. 27, "As many of you as have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ"—i. e., are Christians, belong to the school of Christ, and are therefore obligated to confess him for your Lord and Master, to obey him, and to follow his example.

II. *The Internal Advantages and Effects of Baptism.*

(1) In the old ecclesiastical writers we find many extravagant and unscriptural assertions respecting the effect of baptism, especially in the instructions which they gave to catechumens and new converts—e. g., in Gregory of Nazianzen,

Cyril of Jerusalem, and even earlier, in Irenæus and Tertullian. Cyril of Alexandria went so far as to say that the water became changed (*μεταστοιχειούσθαι*), by the divine power of the Holy Spirit, into an entirely different element. All this, indeed, admits of being explained according to scripture; but it is still apparent that Christians began very early to attribute to baptism a magical efficacy, by which it produces its effect through its own inherent virtue, and independently of the use of the word of God, and by which it acts, not only upon the soul, but upon the body also. Hence they made use of it in order to heal sicknesses, to banish evil spirits, &c. During the middle ages, these superstitious notions prevailed more and more, and were even adopted by the schoolmen into their systems. We find, e. g., in Thomas Aquinas, the doctrine that a *character indelibilis* is acquired in baptism—an opinion which Augustine had before held; also the scholastic doctrine that by baptism native depravity is so far done away that only *concupiscentia* remains, and that even this loses the form of sin. Protestants have in every way endeavoured to separate the scriptural doctrine from these superstitious notions; yet there are not wanting incautious expressions on this subject even among some protestant theologians.

(2) In the New Testament this magical effect is nowhere ascribed to baptism, as if faith were imparted to man by baptism without his being himself active in obtaining it; as if he received, through this external rite, the forgiveness of sins, readiness in good works, and eternal salvation. Neither has Luther taught such a doctrine. On an adult person, who has no knowledge of the word of God or of the Christian doctrine, baptism can have no efficacy simply as an *opus operatum*. Its effect on adults depends on their being instructed in the divine word, and the connexion of baptism with this instruction. To this divine word, *and the divine efficacy connected with it*, (s. 130, 131,) does the power properly belong to renew the heart of man, and to make it susceptible of the benefits and privileges which Christianity promises, and not the mere external rite of baptism. This we are distinctly taught in the holy scriptures. So Peter (Acts, ii. 38) exhorts his hearers to suffer themselves to be baptized *εἰς ἄφῃν ἁμαρτιῶν*, but he expressly requires, as an essential condition, the *μετανοεῖν*, (which is effected by God through the use of Christian doctrine;) and it is the same in the baptism of John, Mark, i. 4, seq. So, Acts, xxii. 16, Paul was called upon to be baptized and to be washed from his sins; but the condition was *ἐπικαλεσάμενος τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου*. Several texts relating to this point should be here more particularly considered.

(a) John, iii. 5, "Whoever is not born of water and of the Spirit cannot enter into the

kingdom of heaven"—i. e., whoever does not take upon himself the obligation to live in an entirely altered and renewed temper of mind, which is effected through baptism by the aid of the Holy Spirit, has no part in the saving blessings of Christ's spiritual kingdom, (forgiveness of sins and eternal blessedness.) Vide s. 126, II.

(b) Titus, iii. 5, where Paul means to say, God had bestowed salvation upon them (*ἔσωσεν*) by leading them to embrace Christianity. We become participators in these Christian blessings in a twofold way; *first*, διὰ λουτροῦ παλυν-
γενεσίας: so baptism is called as far as one *externally* receives it, and especially as far as he is engaged, by means of it, to lead a new life, and receives strength for this end: *secondly*, καὶ διὰ ἀνακαινώσεως Πνεύματος ἁγίου—i. e., through that entire change and renovation of heart which we owe to the Holy Spirit. This renewal he effects through the Christian doctrine, s. 130, 131. The meaning is, "the renovation of our hearts, which is effected by the Holy Spirit, is bestowed upon us by the free and undeserved grace of God. He assists us to obtain this blessing by means of Christian baptism, in which we become obligated to lead a new life, and receive strength so to do, and also by the entire renewal of our hearts, which we owe to his Spirit."

(c) 1 Pet. iii. 21. It is said concerning baptism, that it delivers or frees us from the punishment of our sins, (*σώζει*;) not, however, as an *external washing*, but inasmuch as we pledge ourselves in this rite, and are assisted by it, to maintain a good conscience, and inasmuch as it is the means by which we receive and appropriate to ourselves the gracious promise of the forgiveness of sins through Christ, which is elsewhere called *μετάνοια ἁγώνων*.

The scriptural doctrine of the internal advantages and effects of baptism may be embraced in the following points:—

FIRST. When we are received by baptism into the number of the followers of Jesus Christ, we sacredly bind ourselves to believe his doctrine in its whole extent, its commands, and its promises; to embrace it as true, and therefore punctually to obey it in all parts, to live pious and godly lives, according to his precepts, and to imitate his example. For he only who does this is worthy of the name of a Christian, and can lay claim to the blessedness promised to believers. Vide 1 John, ii. 4; iii. 3. Peter calls this, in his first epistle, chap. iii. 21, *συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θεόν*, and makes this one object of baptism. *Ἐπερώτημα* is properly *stipulatio*, and so denotes any solemn obligation which one assumes (before God). Hence the meaning here is: "By baptism we take upon ourselves the sacred obligation, in the presence of God, to maintain a good conscience,

to be watchful against sin, and to strive after holiness." The passage, Romans, vi. 3, 4, seq., teaches the same thing, coll. Col. ii. 12, 13, "We are, like Christ, buried as dead persons by baptism, and should arise, like him, to a new life"—i. e., by baptism we obtain the assurance of the pardon of sin on account of the death of Christ; and so, when we are baptized, take upon ourselves the obligation to die to sin in a spiritual manner, as Christ died and was buried bodily, &c. The image is here taken from baptized persons as they were *immersed*, (*buried*), and as they *emerged*, (*rose again*;) so it was understood by Chrysostom. Since immersion has been disused, the full significance of this comparison is no longer perceived. So then by baptism we *profess* to receive Christ as our *teacher*, *Saviour*, and *Lord*—i. e., we thus bind ourselves to embrace and obey his doctrine, confidently to trust his promises, to expect from him all our spiritual blessedness, and to render him a dutiful obedience. This is what is meant in the New Testament by being *baptized in the name of Christ*. Vide Morus, p. 246, s. 4. But since now all these blessings which we owe to Jesus as Messiah, or Saviour and Lord, are blessings which God bestows—blessings which, according to the Christian doctrine, are derived from *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit*; so in baptism we bind ourselves to believe in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as our God, to look for our salvation from them, and to acknowledge and adore them as the only authors of it. Hence the command of Jesus to baptize in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is designed to express the religious connexion in which we stand to them, and our duty to pay them religious homage.

SECONDLY. Through baptism we receive the assurance that the divine blessings which the Christian doctrine promises concern even *us*, and that even *we* may participate in them; or, in other words, these blessings are by this rite particularly applied to our own personal state, and we learn in faith to appropriate them to ourselves. As any one, on being formally admitted as a citizen of a town, in taking the oath of citizenship, and in going through the other rites of initiation, receives the confident assurance that he has now a title to all the rights and privileges of citizenship; so it is with the Christian in baptism. It is the same, in this view, with baptism as with circumcision. This Paul calls (Rom. iv. 11) a *σημειον* and *σφραγίδα* for Abraham and his posterity—i. e., a token of assurance and a proof that God was favourably disposed towards him, and justified him on account of his faith. So baptism is to every one the token of assurance that he may partake in all those spiritual blessings which Christianity promises. Whoever, therefore, is baptized

receives the assurance that his sins are forgiven him for the sake of Christ—that God, for the sake of Christ, looks upon him with favour and regards him as a child, and that he, in faithful obedience to the commands of Jesus, (and by enjoying the constant aid of the Holy Spirit which is promised,) may securely expect eternal blessedness; Acts, ii. 38; Gal. iii. 27; Mark, xvi. 16. Hence Peter, in his first epistle, chap. iii. 21, compares the water of baptism to the water of the deluge, (as the Jews also called their washings and purifications spiritual floods; *ἀντίτυπος*, *image, likeness*.) Even as the pious at the time of the deluge (ver. 20) were *bodily* delivered; so are those who are baptized with water *spiritually* delivered from sin and its penalty.

Conclusions from the foregoing, and some remarks designed to illustrate certain theological distinctions and terminologies respecting baptism.

(a) It is justly maintained that baptism tends to awaken, enlarge, and confirm our faith, and that by means of it we receive power and impulse for a new spiritual life. This effect is produced in regard to both the objects which belong to Christian faith, the *law* and the *gospel*. Still this is not wrought through any miraculous or magical influence of baptism, or of the Holy Spirit in baptism; for,

(b) This effect of baptism depends upon the Word of God united with baptism; or the divine truths of Christianity and the divine power inherent in and connected with them. Cf. Ephes. v. 26, "Christ purifies and sanctifies the members of the church in baptism through the Word"—i. e., the whole gospel system in its full extent, its *precepts* and *promises*. The latter are made to us in baptism; and at the same time we pledge ourselves to obey the former, and receive strength so to do. The means, therefore, by which baptism produces these effects, or rather, God through baptism, is, the Word. It is the same in the Lord's Supper. It is accordingly rightly said that "God, or the Holy Spirit, operates in baptism upon the hearts of men;" excites good feelings, resolutions, &c.—namely, *through the Word*. Hence the effect of baptism is properly an effect which God produces through his word, or through the contents of the Christian doctrine, which is visibly set forth, represented, and appropriated to us in baptism, for the sake of making a stronger impression upon our heart. Baptism may be thus called, *verbum Dei visibile*. Vide s. 137, II. In the same manner, therefore, as God operates upon our hearts, through the Word and in the use of it, when we hear or read it, does he also operate in this visible presentation of the same truth, by the external rites of baptism and the Lord's Supper. And so we may apply to this subject all which is said in the twelfth

article respecting the operations of grace, both in the statement of the Biblical doctrine (s. 130, 131) and of the different theories of theologians in the succeeding sections. But this effect is not *miraculous*, not *magical*, not *irresistible*, but suited to our moral nature.

(c) According to the ancient scholastic division, two things must be considered in baptism, *materia* (better, *res*) *terrestris*, that which strikes the senses externally—the water; and *materia celestis*, the invisible thing which is represented by the visible sign, and conveyed through it. This is the Holy Spirit, and his power and agency; or, more definitely, it is that which in baptism is effected in us by God, or by the Holy Spirit, through the divine Word.

Note.—Augustine expresses himself very justly concerning the efficacy and power of baptism, (De Bapt. i. 13, 18,) “It has indeed the power to effect regeneration (change of heart) in men; but it does nothing for man’s salvation, if there is in him any *hindrance*, (*obstaculum*.)” Luther too follows him in this, and says, very appropriately and justly, especially in his large catechism, “that the divine word and instruction must not be separated from baptism, and that without the former, and faith in it, the water is nothing but water, and can in no wise benefit the subject.” Vide Morus, p. 250, n. 4.

(d) Baptism is frequently represented as a *covenant* which is established between God and men; hence the expression, *to stand in his covenant of baptism*, and others of the same kind. This name is derived from *circumcision*, and the covenant of God with Abraham established by it; also from 1 Peter, iii. 21, where *ἐκπύημα* is translated *covenant* by Luther. Cf. Heb. viii. 10, seq. The thing intended by this name is true, if it is rightly understood. God solemnly promises to men, in baptism, the enjoyment of all the blessings which are promised in the Christian doctrine; and man solemnly binds himself in the same rite to yield obedience to God and the Christian doctrine; and in order to this, receives strength and assistance from God. Any one, therefore, who has not broken this engagement, or forfeited this gracious assistance which is promised, stands still in the covenant of baptism. For baptism is the testimony, the assurance of pardon—the pledge and proof of this and all other Christian blessings.

SECTION CXLI.

OF THE NECESSITY OF BAPTISM, AND WHETHER IT MAY BE REPEATED.

I. *The Necessity of Baptism.*

(1) AN internal and absolute necessity of baptism cannot be affirmed. For the water of

baptism, in and of itself, and the rite itself, as an external act, have no power to renew or save men. This effect depends solely upon the agency of God, through the Christian doctrine, united with baptism. Since, then, it is one of the *positive* rites established by Christ, and has no internal or essential efficacy, it is no otherwise necessary than because it has been commanded (*necessitas præcepti*.) But Christ has commanded that all who would be his disciples should be baptized. Any one, therefore, who acknowledges Jesus Christ as a divine messenger, and regards his authority, is under obligation to obey his precept. Christ brought a charge against the Pharisees, (Luke, vii. 30,) that they had rejected the divine appointment (*βουλὴ Θεοῦ*) concerning the baptism of John. He required baptism of Nicodemus, (John, iii. 3, 5, 7,) and commanded the apostles to baptize all whom they would make his disciples, (Matt. xxviii.; Mark, xvi.)

It would be false, however, to assert that baptism is absolutely essential to *each and every man* in order to salvation. Theologians therefore hold, with truth, that if a man is deprived of baptism without any fault of his own, his salvation is not endangered by this omission. Even that familiar passage, Mark, xvi. 16, “Whoever believes and is baptized is saved, but he that believes not is punished,” is not against, but in favour of this view. For punishment is here threatened only to the unbelieving, who wilfully reject Christian truth, and not to those who, without their own fault, remain unbaptized; hence *βαπτισθεῖς* is not repeated in the second member. For an unbeliever should not be baptized; and even if he should be, it could do him no good. Just so it is in John, iii., where *γέννησις ἐκ πνεύματος* is represented as the principal thing (ver. 6—8), and the *γέννησις ἐκ ὕδατος* as useful only so far as it tends to promote the former.

(2) *Sketch of the history of this doctrine.* The most opposite opinions have prevailed from the earliest times respecting the necessity of baptism.

(a) Already in the second century some denied that baptism is necessary for every Christian, and that it is the will of Christ that each and every one should be baptized. They maintained, that those who have otherwise sufficient faith have no need of baptism. Of these Tertullian speaks, (De Bapt. ch. 12—14.) Some Socinians agreed with these, and maintained that baptism is not properly applied to such as are born of Christian parents, but that it is an external rite of initiation, by which those of other religions are to be introduced into the Christian church—an opinion to which many who are of a Pelagian way of thinking assent. It is true, indeed, that there is an entire want

of express testimony and evidence from the apostolical age concerning the baptism of those born of Christian parents. This inquiry has been lately revived; and Teller (Excurs. i. on Burnet, "De fide et officiis") is of the opinion that those descended of Christian parents were not baptized, but were considered as born within the lap of the church. That this, however, was done, is implied in the whole design of baptism, as expressed by Jesus and the apostles, s. 140, and may also be concluded from the analogy of circumcision, and the uniform practice of the ancient church after the apostolical times. There is a work, in which, with a boldness not to be found elsewhere, the entire needlessness of baptism is maintained, its establishment by Christ denied, and the whole thing given out as an invention of Peter, for the sake of making himself pleasing to the Jews; it is entitled, "Die Taufe der Christen, ein ehrwürdiger Gebrauch, und kein Gesetz Christi," published 1774. The author was C. C. Reiche. An answer to this was written by J. E. Troschel, "Die Wassertaufe ein Gesetz Christi;" Berlin, 1774.

(b) Among the old catholic fathers in the Christian church there always prevailed very high ideas respecting the necessity and advantages of baptism. They were accustomed, however, to defer baptism as long as possible (*procrastinare*); and this is recommended even by Tertullian, De Bapt. c. 18;) and many would not be baptized until just before their death—e. g., Constantine the Great. They supposed that baptism removes, in a kind of miraculous way, all the sins previously committed; while, on the other hand, the sins committed subsequently to baptism could be forgiven only with great difficulty, or not at all; and so they imagined that one baptized shortly before death, or one who dies a martyr, (for martyrdom, in their view, has the same efficacy,) goes out of the world as a man without sin, and is saved. They therefore delayed very much the baptism of new converts, and prevented them from the enjoyment of this sacrament, entirely contrary to the appointment and meaning of the apostles, who baptized new converts immediately, and often many thousands in one day, respecting whose conduct and integrity they could not possibly have been thoroughly informed before; Acts, ii. 41; xvi. 15, 33, coll. Acts, viii. 13. Vide Baumgarten, De procrastinatione baptismi apud veteres; Halle, 1747.

(c) When now the position, *extra ecclesiam visibilem non dari salutem*, with all its consequences, become more and more prevalent, especially after the time of Augustine, and in the Western church (vide s. 128, II. and 135, I.), they began to maintain the doctrine of the absolute necessity of baptism in order to salvation; because

baptism is the appointed rite of initiation or reception into the church; and they gave out, that whoever is not baptized, and so is not a member of the visible church, could not become partaker of eternal happiness. So Augustine had before judged, not only respecting the heathen and the children of heathen parents, but also the children of Christian parents who die before baptism. He was followed by the schoolmen. After this time they began very much to hasten the baptism of children; and now, for the first time, the so-called *baptism of necessity* (administered when a child was thought in danger of dying) became common. It happened also not unfrequently, that the children of unchristian parents (e. g., of Jews) were forcibly baptized against their own and their parents' will, on the ground that they were thus put into the way of salvation; of this we find many examples in earlier times. That this is contrary to the sense and spirit of the holy scriptures may be seen from this, that circumcision was appointed on the eighth day, and one who died before was not considered, on this account, as shut out from the people of God.

II. Is Christian Baptism to be Repeated?

(1) The doctrine now prevalent in the church is entirely just, that baptism is not to be repeated when one passes over from one *Christian* sect or particular communion to another. For,

(a) Baptism, considered as an external religious rite, is the rite of initiation and solemn reception into the *Christian church in general*. The subject of baptism pledges himself to the profession and to the obedience of the doctrine of Jesus in general, and not to any one particular church. No one of these particular communions (such as they have always been) is in exclusive possession of the truth (vide. s. 134, II, 2); but in this all agree, that they hold themselves pledged to profess the pure Christian doctrine (i. e., what they, according to their views, understand as such.) Every sect binds its own baptized to this; and hence it is, in this view, the same thing, wherever and by whomsoever one is baptized. And Paul taught the same thing when he said, 1 Cor. i. 12, seq., that one is not pledged by baptism to any man or to any sect, but to the profession of Christ.

(b) The power or efficacy of baptism depends not upon the sect or the man by whom it is administered; man can neither increase nor diminish this efficacy. Vide 1 Cor. i. 12.

(c) We find no example during the times of Christ or the apostles to prove that proper Christian baptism was ever repeated; although we find some examples, even at that time, of great sinners and of persons excommunicated.

(d) We do not even find that the baptism of John was repeated, (although, at the present

time, the Sabæans in the East yearly repeat it;) and the same is true of Jewish proselyte baptism. The examples Acts ii. and xix. do not bear upon this point. Vide s. 138, IV.

(c) Finally, the uniform phraseology of the holy scriptures teaches clearly the same thing, since it is always said concerning Christians who were received into the church, *that they had been baptized (baptizatos esse)*, because it took place once for all; not merely *that they were baptized (baptizari;)* Rom. vi. 31; Gal. iii. 27. It is a thing which had been performed. It is different with the Lord's Supper: this is a rite to be repeated; 1 Cor. xi. 25, seq. Therefore, only when an essential mistake has been committed—when, e. g., anything belonging to the essentials of baptism, as the use of water, or proper instruction concerning the object of this rite, has been neglected or altered, or if it has been administered by one not a Christian; vide Acts ii. and xix., s. 138, IV.; in such cases only must it be renewed, as baptism then ceases to be true Christian baptism.

(2) The opinions respecting repeating baptism were different even in the ancient Christian church. Already in the second century they were accustomed in Africa (as appears from Tertullian, De Pudic. c. 19; De Bapt. c. 15,) to rebaptize heretics, and the same was done in many provinces of the East. This was not the case, on the other hand, in Rome, and in the other European churches; here they simply laid hands upon those who were restored, when they were received back; and appealed for this to the apostolic tradition, that whoever has been baptized according to the command of Christ is rightly baptized, although it may have been done even by a heretic. In the third century there arose a vehement controversy on this point between Stephanus, Bishop of Rome, and the African party, whose usage Cyprian zealously defended. But they could not agree, and each party still adhered to its previous usage. These opinions, however, were abandoned by degrees in the African church, as in most others; they were, however, revived in the fourth century by the Donatists, and other fanatics of the succeeding century, who would acknowledge no baptism as valid which was administered by a heretic, or any teacher who did not stand in fellowship with them. The same opinion was revived by the enthusiastic sect known by the name of *Anabaptists*, in the sixteenth century. They, however, altered their theory afterwards to this, that they merely rejected infant baptism, and admitted only adult persons to baptism; and this is still the doctrine of the Mennonites and the other Anabaptists; hence they rebaptize those who were baptized in infancy, because infant baptism is not regarded by them as valid, and those bap-

tized in this way only are considered by them as not baptized. They therefore reject the name of *Anabaptists*, (*Wiedertaüfer*.) The opinions of all Anabaptists of ancient and modern times flow partly from unjust ideas of the power and efficacy of baptism, and partly from erroneous opinions respecting the church. It is true, indeed, that many who have denied that baptism should be repeated have held these same erroneous opinions, but they would not admit the consequences which naturally result from them.

(a) The Africans of the second and third centuries held this point in common with their opponents, that forgiveness of sin and eternal happiness are obtained by means of baptism, and the Holy Ghost by means of the laying on of the hands of the bishop; and indeed both imagined that a sort of magic or miraculous influence belongs to these rites. Vide s. 139, IV. The Africans concluded now, that as heretics do not hold the true Christian doctrine they are not to be considered as Christians, and consequently that their baptism is not Christian baptism, and that they, therefore, like unchristian persons, are not susceptible of the Holy Ghost.

(b) The Donatists, now, maintained plainly and decidedly that the church can consist only of holy and pious persons, and that this genuine Christian church could be found only among themselves, (vide s. 135, II.;) wherefore they rebaptized all who came over to their sect. For they maintained that the *gratia baptismi* does not exist among heretics; that the ordination of teachers out of their own communion is invalid; that others have not the Holy Ghost, and cannot therefore baptize in a valid manner;—in short, it was their opinion that the efficacy of the ordinances depends on the worthiness of him who administers them.

(c) The Anabaptists of the sixteenth century proceeded from the same position, that the church is a community of mere saints and regenerated persons. They and their followers therefore rejected infant baptism, as it could not be known as yet concerning children whether they would live pious or ungodly lives; nor could children promise the church that they would live righteously. Adults only, in their view, might therefore be baptized. Cf. the work written by an Anabaptist, entitled "Ueber die moralischen Zwecke und Verpflichtungen der Taufe," which, aside from this point, contains much which is good; translated from the English; Leipzig, 1775—8. Vide also D. A. J. Stark, Geschichte der Taufe und der Taufgesinnten; Leipzig, 1789, 8vo.

[Note.—On the general subject of baptism, cf. Bretschneider, Dogmatik, b. ii. s. 672, ff. Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 556, s. 122, ff. The literature of this doctrine is here very fully exhibited.

For the early history of this doctrine, cf. Neander, K. Gesch. b. i. Abth. ii. s. 533—63; also b. ii. Abth. ii. s. 682, ff.; for the more recent history, cf. Plank, Gesch. der protest. Lehrb. b. v. th. 1.—[Tr.]

SECTION CXLII.

OF THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS.

MANY of the ancients and moderns have disapproved of infant baptism. It was first expressly dissuaded by Tertullian (De Bapt. c. 18), although he does not entirely reject it, as it was at that time in common use. But it was also quite common then to *delay* baptism; and those who approved of this could not at the same time approve of infant baptism. Vide s. 141, I. Infant baptism was also rejected by the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century, and their followers, for reasons mentioned in s. 141, ad finem. Mich. Servetus, too, in the sixteenth century, would have no one baptized under thirty years of age. There is no decisive example of this practice in the New Testament; for it may be objected against those passages where the baptism of whole families is mentioned—viz., Acts, x. 42, 48; xvi. 15, 33; 1 Cor. i. 16, that it is doubtful whether there were any children in these families, and if there were, whether they were then baptized. From the passage Matt. xxviii. 19, it does not necessarily follow that Christ commanded infant baptism; (the μαθητεύειν is neither for nor against;) nor does this follow any more from John, iii. 5, and Mark, x. 14, 16. There is therefore no express command for infant baptism found in the New Testament; as Morus (p. 215, s. 12) justly concedes. Infant baptism has been often defended on very unsatisfactory *à priori* grounds—e. g., the necessity of it has been contended for, in order that children may obtain by it the faith which is necessary to salvation, &c. It is sufficient to shew, (1) That infant baptism was not forbidden by Christ, and is not opposed to his will and the principles of his religion, but entirely suited to both. (2) That it was *probably* practised even in the apostolic church. (3) That it is not without advantages.

I. *Proofs of the Lawfulness and Antiquity of Infant Baptism.*

(1) That infant baptism, considered as a solemn rite of initiation into the church, cannot be opposed to the design and will of Christ, may be concluded from his own declaration, Matt. x. 14, "Suffer little children to come unto me and forbid them not, τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ." This is indeed no command for infant baptism; but if children may and ought to have a share in the Christian church, and in all Christian privileges (βασιλεία

Θεοῦ), it cannot be improper to introduce them into the Christian church by this solemn rite of initiation. Indeed, if it is according to the design of Christ that children should have a share in the rites and privileges of Christians from their earliest youth up, it must also be agreeable to his will solemnly to introduce them, by the rite of initiation, into the nursery of his people. Cf. 1 Cor. vii. 14.

(2) Christian baptism is so far similar to circumcision as that the one was the rite of initiation into the ancient church, the other into the new; s. 137, II. ad finem, and Morus, p. 253 note. But Christian baptism represents and imparts far greater spiritual benefits than circumcision. Now we know that the sons of Jews and proselytes, according to divine command, were circumcised on the eighth day, when they certainly had as yet no idea of the intent and meaning of this religious rite. According to this analogy, children among Christians may be baptized, even during those years when they cannot as yet understand anything of the design of the rite, or make any profession of their faith. At least, this analogy must have been very clear to the first Christians, and to the apostles, who themselves were Jews. Were therefore in the times of the apostles a whole family was baptized, would not the children be baptized too? And did not Paul say without limitation that *all* were baptized, at a time when there were those grown up in the Christian society who were born of Christian parents. Vide 1 Cor. i. and xii., and Gal. iii. Again were it entirely decided that Jewish proselyte baptism was common during the life of Christ, this circumstance would establish the position still more; for the children of proselytes were also baptized. But even if proselyte baptism was not introduced until the end of the second or beginning of the third century, and was adopted in imitation of Christian baptism, even in this case it might still be concluded that at that time the baptism of infants must have been common among Christians.

(3) The most decisive reason is the following: Christ did not indeed ordain infant baptism expressly; but if, in his command to baptize *all*, he had wished children to be excepted he must have expressly said this; Matt. xxvii. Since the first disciples of Christ, as native Jews, never doubted that children were to be introduced into the Israelitish church by circumcision, it was natural that they should include children also in baptism, if Christ did not expressly forbid it. Had he therefore wished that this should not be done, he would have said so in definite terms.

(4) That infant baptism was very common shortly after the times of the apostles, both in the Eastern and Western churches, admits of no

doubt, if all the historical data are compared. Vide Morus, p. 251, not. ad s. 10. Some have endeavoured to find evidence for this practice even in the writings of Justin the Martyr and Irenæus; but they are not sufficiently decisive on this point.* The most weighty evidence that can be produced, from the oldest church fathers and from church history, is the following—viz.,

(a) From Tertullian (De Bapt. c. 18) it is clearly seen, that already in his time the baptism of infants was very customary in Africa and elsewhere, although he himself does not speak favourably of this practice.

(b) In the time of Cyprian, in the third century, there arose a controversy concerning the day when the child should be baptized, whether before the eighth day. But there is no question on the point whether children ought to be baptized; in this they were all unanimously agreed.

(c) Augustine calls infant baptism *apostolica traditio*, and says, *totam ecclesiam id traditum tenere*.

(d) But far more important is the testimony of a much earlier, and therefore more valuable witness—viz., Origen, of the third century, who says in his Comm. in Ep. ad Rom. vi., that the church had received this as a tradition from the apostles, (*παράδοσις ἀποστολική*.) Here it might indeed be objected that the church fathers appeal much too freely to apostolic tradition, for the sake of giving to their own opinions and to the appointments of the church the more authority. But if infant baptism was not practised in the oldest church, it is hardly conceivable how it should have become so general a short time after, and this too without any controversy or contradiction. When Origen was born, about the year 185, it was universally prevalent in the Christian church, and he was, as he says himself, a baptized child. If it was not customary at the time of the apostles, we must suppose that afterwards single individuals or churches began to baptize children. But in those times in which they adhered so strictly, even in the smallest trifles, to ancient usage, such an innovation could not possibly have taken place without great excitement, controversy, contradiction, and without occasioning many councils. These effects were produced by some very insignificant matters, but we cannot find the least trace of opposition to the first practice of infant baptism. There can, then, be no time mentioned in which the baptism of infants was first introduced after the death of the apostles. Therefore it must have existed from the beginning. Neither Tertullian nor Pelagius knew of a later origin of it,

when the former censured it, and the latter denied that it is necessary to procure the forgiveness of sins for children. For the history of infant baptism and its opponents, vide Guil. Wall, *Historia Baptismi Infantum*, and John Walch, *Historia Pædobaptismi*, Sæc. iv. priorem; Jenæ, 1739.

II. The Uses and Effects of Infant Baptism.

Although children at the time of their baptism know nothing respecting this rite, and are not capable of any notion of it, and can make no profession, (and these are the principal objections on the other side,) still it does not follow that infant baptism is without advantages, any more than that Jewish circumcision was. It has twofold advantages:

(1) *For the children themselves.* The advantages to them are both *present* and *future*.

(a) The present effect, as far as it appears clearly to us, is principally this, that by this means they are admitted into the nursery of the church, and even while children enjoy its rights and privileges, as far as they are capable of so doing. This is sufficient; and there is no need of adopting the doctrine about a *children's faith*, so far at least as that implies anything which can exist without comprehension and capability of using the understanding. Vide s. 121, II., and Morus, p. 249. In the general position, that just as *far* as they have subjective capacity, and as *soon* as they have this, God will work in them that which is good for their salvation, there is not only nothing unreasonable, but it is altogether rational and scriptural. It is also certain that we cannot surely tell how soon, or in what way and by what means, this subjective capacity may be shewn and developed.

(b) As soon as their mental powers begin to unfold themselves in some degree, children are capable of an obvious *inward, moral* effect of baptism, or of God in and through baptism. In the Christian instruction imparted to them they must therefore be continually referred to this event; it must be shewn them that *they* too have obtained by baptism a share in all the great and divine blessings and promises which are given to Christians, and that they are solemnly obligated by baptism, through God's assistance and guidance, to fulfil all the conditions on which Christians receive these great promises. In the youthful age this means is exceedingly efficacious in exciting pious reflections, and it operates upon the whole succeeding life. It is on this account (as Morus well observes) a very suitable and commendable practice in the protestant church, that the children, before they approach the Lord's Table for the first time, are thoroughly instructed in the doctrinal and practical truths of Christianity,

* [The evidence from Irenæus is thought valid and incontrovertible by Neander; vide K. Gesch. b. ii. Abth. ii. s. 549, 550.—Tr.]

to the acceptance and obedience of which they are obligated by baptism. This is called the *confirmation*, (of the covenant of baptism.) It has upon many, as experience teaches, the most salutary efficacy through their whole life, and it is the duty of the evangelical teacher to lay out all his strength upon this instruction, and to make it, as far as he can, appropriate and practical. And if in some the advantages of it do not appear immediately, still in late years they are often seen. The good seed sown in the heart often lies a long time concealed before it comes up. Baptism cannot indeed exert any *compulsion* upon children, any more than when one is enrolled, as a child to a canonry, or as an academic citizen. They must act according to their own conscientious conviction, choice, and determination, after they come to the exercise of their understanding.

(2) *For the parents, relatives, or guardians of the children.* To these, too, is the baptism of infants eminently useful in many respects; and it may be said that this advantage alone is a sufficient reason for instituting infant baptism. For (a) the assurance is given by this rite to parents, in a solemn and impressive manner, that the great privileges and promises bestowed upon Christians will be imparted to their children also, and thus religious feelings, pious thoughts and resolutions, are awakened and promoted in them. (b) By this rite they are engaged and encouraged to educate their children in a Christian manner, in order that their children may receive the privileges bestowed upon them, and attain one day to the actual exercise and enjoyment of them. These duties should be urged upon parents by the Christian teacher, especially at the time when their children are baptized; and he may find instruction respecting the manner in which this should be done in the passages above cited. Respecting the *usages* properly connected with infant baptism, vide s. 139, ad finem.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

SECTION CXLIII.

OF THE NAMES OF THE LORD'S SUPPER; AND THE OCCASION AND OBJECT OF ITS INSTITUTION.

I. *Names of the Lord's Supper.*

(1) *The scriptural names.* (a) Κυριακὸν δεῖπνον, the festival which Christ appointed, and which is held in his honour, and is commemorative of him, 1 Cor. xi. 20. Hence the common appellations, *the Lord's Supper*, *cæna do-*

mini, or *sacra cæna*, because it was instituted at supper time. Entirely synonymous with this is the phrase (b) Τράπεζα Κυρίου, 1 Cor. x. 21, where we also find the name ποτήριον Κυρίου. With these the term *κλῆσις τοῦ ἁγίου*, Acts, ii. 42, is frequently mentioned. But this seems rather to apply to the *feasts of love*, (Agapæ,) after which the sacrament of the Supper was frequently, though not always, administered in the primitive church. Cf. ver. 46, μεταλαμβάνειν τροφῆς. The term δωρεὰ ἐπουρανίου, Heb. vi. 4, is rendered by Michaelis *heavenly manna*, and applied to the Lord's Supper. This term seems, however, to denote more generally the unmerited divine favours conferred upon the primitive Christians.

(2) *The ecclesiastical names of this sacrament.* These are very many: some of the principal are the following:—

(a) Κοινωνία, *communio*—a festival in common. This name is borrowed from 1 Cor. x. 16, where, however, it denotes the profession which Christians make, by partaking *in common* of the Supper, of their interest in Christ, of the saving efficacy of his death for them, and their own actual enjoyment of its consequences.

(b) Εὐχαριστία and εὐλογία, (for these terms are synonymous.) This sacrament is so called because it is designed to promote a *thankful* remembrance of Christ, and of the divine favours bestowed upon us through him. He himself commenced the Supper by a *prayer of thanks*, which has always been justly retained in administering this ordinance. The appellation *eucharistia* (*eucharist*) was used even by Ignatius, Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, and Tertullian. [This name seems also to be of scriptural origin, and to be taken from the phrase ποτήριον εὐλογίας ὃ εὐλόγουμεν, used by Paul.—Tr.]

(c) Σύναξις, σύναξις ἁγία. This signifies, primarily, a *collection*; then, a *collection for celebrating the Lord's Supper*, and finally, the *Lord's Supper itself*. This name was probably taken from 1 Cor. xi. 18, 20, συνερχομένων ἡμῶν.

(d) Λειτουργία [primarily, *ministerium*], then, *the sacrament of the Supper*, as the principal act of religious service, especially on account of the *sacrifice* of Christ which is there commemorated, since λειτουργία signifies, by way of eminence, that part of religious service which consists in *sacrifice*.

(e) Μυστήριον, *cæna mystica* and *missa*; so this sacrament was called, because the catechumens were excluded from it, and none who were not Christians could be present when it was administered. They were sent away by the deacons with the words, *Ite, missa est, (ecclesia.)* *Missa* signifies properly *dismissio catechumenorum et penitentium*.

(f) There are other names, which were taken from *sacrifices*, and the *offering* of sacrifices—

e. g., προσφορά, *oblatio*, θυσία, θυσία ἀνάμικτος, *altare, sacramentum altaris*, &c. Many such names are found in the ancient liturgies. Vide Morus, page 271, note 2. Christ instituted the Supper chiefly in commemoration of his *death*, or his offering up of himself for man; and he employs in doing this the terms borrowed from sacrifices. Now it was customary for the Christians who had most possessions to bring food and drink to their love-festivals, and from the remnants of these *gifts* (προσφορά) they held the Supper in commemoration of the sacrifice of Christ. This gave the first occasion for comparing this sacrament with an *offering*; and this was done the more willingly by Christians, as it was often objected against them, by Jews and heathens, that they had no sacrifices. And by degrees they became accustomed to regard the Lord's Supper not merely as a festival in memory of the sacrifice of Christ, but as an actual repetition of this sacrifice—an idea which gave rise afterwards to the grossest errors. The first traces of these opinions are found in Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, and still more in Cyprian, Augustine, and others. Vide Ernesti in “Antimuratorius,” in his “Opusc. Theol.” p. 80; and with respect to these ecclesiastical names in general, Casaubon, Exerc. in Baron.—Ex. 16, p. 445.

II. *Texts relating to the Lord's Supper, and the occasion and object of its Institution.*

(1) The institution of the Supper is described in the following texts—viz., Matt. xxvi. 26—28; Mark, xiv. 22—24; Luke, xxii. 19, 20. Luke is more full and distinct in his narrative than the others; in John there is nothing said respecting it, since he presupposed it as already well known. Paul, however, gives an account of the institution of the Supper, and agrees most nearly with Luke, 1 Cor. xi. 23—25. He is speaking of the disorders which had crept into the Corinthian church in their observance of the Agapæ, and of the Lord's Supper in connexion with them; and takes this opportunity to discourse at large (in the entire passage from ver. 17th to 34th) respecting the design and the efficacy of the sacrament of the Supper, and the proper mode of celebrating it. Cf. 1 Cor. x. 16, 17. Theologians are not agreed among themselves whether the passage, John, vi. 50, seq., where Christ speaks of the eating of his flesh and drinking his blood, relates to this sacrament. Vide Morus, p. 269, note D. As the Reformed theologians often appealed to this passage in behalf of their theory, the Lutherans (e. g., even Ernesti) would not allow that it could be used to explain the language in which the Supper was instituted. So much is certain, that nothing is said in this passage itself respecting the Lord's Supper, since this was not yet in-

stituted. But the terms here used have a striking resemblance with those employed at the institution of the Supper; and since this discourse of Jesus produced at the time a great sensation on account of its remarkable phraseology, it can hardly be supposed that his disciples would forget it, or that it should not have occurred to their minds when terms so similar were employed at the institution of the Supper. They, doubtless, could explain many things in this whole transaction from their recollections of this discourse. This will appear the more probable if we consider that these words of Jesus, recorded by John (chap. vi.), were spoken shortly before the passover, (ver. 4;) that the images employed by him were taken from the custom of eating the flesh of the victims at the festivals attending the sacrifices, and especially at the passover, the most solemn of them all; and that it was exactly at the passover that the Supper was instituted by Christ. But allowing that these words may be used to illustrate those employed by Christ on the latter occasion, the Lutheran opinion is not invalidated. For every Lutheran will allow that it was a great object in the establishment of the Lord's Supper to remind us, in an impressive manner, of the body of Jesus offered, and his blood shed for us, and to exhibit and convey to us the great blessings which we owe to him. Now in John, σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα Χριστοῦ plainly denote the doctrine of Jesus so far as he offered up his body, and shed his blood for the good of man. Vide John, vi. 51, 63. *To eat and drink* of this body and blood is the same as πιστεῖν εἰς Χριστὸν τὸν ἐσταυρωμένον. Vide ver. 47, 50, 51, 56. What food and drink are to the body, as contributing to its nourishment and vigour, the same is a living faith in this doctrine to the soul; *spiritual nourishment, pabulum animi*. This language, then, is to be understood to denote “the truth of Christ's sacrifice or atonement, and the inward experience of its benefits.” And this was the very object of the Lord's Supper—viz., to preserve the memory of the death of Christ, visibly to set it forth, and to convey its benefits to those who partake of this sacrament. It cannot, therefore, be denied that the passage in John (so far as it is figurative and symbolical) serves to illustrate the language in which the Lord's Supper was instituted, and indeed the whole nature of this ordinance. Cf. especially Storr, *Doctrinæ Christianæ pars theoretica*, p. 314, seq.

(2) *What was the occasion of Christ's instituting this festival? What was the immediate cause of his doing it?* He was accustomed to take occasion, from the circumstances by which he was surrounded, to give instruction; and at the passover everything was symbolical, and the father of the family (the character which Christ now sustained among his disciples) referred every-

thing back to the events in the life of the ancestors of the Jewish nation. It seems now that this Jewish passover gave the first occasion to Christ for instituting his Supper.

(a) Christ abolished the ancient dispensation, (*παλαιὰν διαθήκην*); consequently all the Jewish festivals, sacrifices, and the solemnities connected with them, were set aside, and among these the passover, one of the principal festivals of the Jewish church. This was done, as we are taught everywhere in the New Testament, by the death of Christ. Still it could not be denied that this and other Jewish festivals had many advantages, and that they tended to keep alive a sense of the divine benefits, and to awaken pious feelings. Vide s. 137, III. 1. Besides, it was altogether customary, both among the Jews and the heathen nations, to have sacrificial festivals standing in immediate connexion with religion; hence Paul objects to it that Christians who drink from the cup of the Lord, and eat at the table of the Lord, should drink from the cup and eat from the table of idols, 1 Cor. x. 15—21. Still it cannot be properly said that the common sacrificial festivals among the Jews and heathen furnished Christ the principal or only inducement to institute his Supper, as was asserted by Cudworth, in his work, "*De vera notione sacræ cænæ*," which is found in his "*Systema Intellectuale*," accompanied by Mosheim's remarks—an opinion to which Warburton and others have acceded. It is also false to assert that the Lord's Supper is properly a *sacrificial festival*, like the Jewish passover, although it is a *cæna religiosa*, or *sacra*, and although it may be compared, and is in fact compared by Paul (1 Cor. x.,) with these festivals. Vide Morus, p. 261, note; and p. 271, note 2. It is more just to say that Christ merely took occasion from the Jewish sacrificial festivals, and especially from the passover, all of which were now abolished, to institute this festival, to maintain among his followers the memory of his offering up of himself. But in entire conformity with the spirit of his religion, and of all his other institutions, he left it undetermined at what times it should be held, and how often it should be repeated. He simply said, *Do this, as oft as ye do it, in remembrance of me*, 1 Cor. xi. 25.

(b) The passover was designed to commemorate the rescue of the Israelites from Egypt, and their deliverance from many afflictions; and was to be repeated by their descendants as an occasion for thankful remembrance of the divine favours. Vide Exodus, xiii. 9, coll. xii. 26, 27. It took its name from this circumstance—viz., פֶּסַח, *feast of deliverance*, or *rescue*. In the same way was the Christian festival designed to promote the grateful remembrance of Christ, on

account of the deliverance from sin and its punishment, and all the other spiritual blessings which we owe to him, and it was to be repeated, εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν; Luke, xxii. 19; 1 Cor. xi. 24, 26. Hence Paul says, 1 Cor. v. 7, τὸ πάσχα ἡμῶν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐτίθη, Χριστός. He does not, indeed, here mean the Lord's Supper itself; but still it is very easy to see from this passage the intimate connexion of these ideas. The words, however, by which the Supper was instituted, *This is my body*, &c., cannot be explained from the formula used at the celebration of the passover, *This is the bread of suffering which our fathers ate*, &c.; for this formula was not adopted until after the destruction of the second temple; neither can it be found in the Talmud, as Schottgen has shewn, (Hor. Talmud. ad Matt. xxvi. 26,) and also Deyling, (Obs. Miscell. P. i. Exerc. iv. p. 221.) The words of Christ on this occasion are rather to be compared with the Mosaic formula employed at the solemn sanctioning of the law, at which time sacrifices were also offered; Exod. xxiv. 8, *Behold the blood of the covenant, which the Lord hath made with you*. Cf. Morus, p. 260, note 2.

(c) Christ did not institute his Supper during the continuance of the passover, but after it was finished, in order to give his new ordinance an additional solemnity from its connexion with the passover, and at the same time to make it entirely distinct from the latter. This example was so far imitated by the ancient Christians, that while they celebrated the sacrament of the Supper in connexion with the *Agape*, or *feasts of love*, they yet observed it as a separate festival, after the former was ended. At the social festivals of the Jews, at the passover, &c., a cup was passed round, over which thanks were said, while the cup was drank to the praise of God—a custom which we find in other ancient nations. Cf. Psalm cxvi. 13; 1 Chron. xvi. 1, seq.; also the ποτήριον δαιμονίων, 1 Cor. x. 21. It was with this ceremony that Christ concluded the passover, Luke, xxii. 17. And now, after they had eaten, (ἐξελόντων αὐτῶν, according to Matthew and Mark, or μετὰ τὸ δεῖναι, according to Luke and Paul,) he again offered a prayer of thanks, as was customary at the commencement of a festival (εὐχαριστίας), in order to distinguish this ordinance from the one which had preceded, and then distributed the bread and passed round the cup the second time. He took the materials for this sacrament from what remained of bread and wine (as the ordinary drink of the table) after they had eaten. And this was entirely conformed to his design, that the rite commemorative of him should be as simple as possible, and such that it could be often observed, and in any place, without much trouble or difficulty. In this respect the Lord's Supper differs

widely from the Jewish passover, where everything was complicated and circumstantially arranged. Vide Exod. xii. 3, seq.

Note.—Christ recommended the observance of the Supper, not merely to the apostles, but to all Christians. Vide Morus, p. 259, s. 1, ad finem. Nor was it his meaning that they should merely sometimes remember him at their ordinary social meals, and while they partook of the bread and wine on the table, think of his death; on the contrary, the apostles understood the words, *Do this in remembrance of me*, to relate to all Christians; and they distinguished this festival from all other social festivals, and introduced the observance of it into all the Christian churches. This appears especially from 1 Cor. xi. 23, 24, coll. x. 16, where it is also described as an ordinance of Christ, and indeed as one which Paul himself, as well as the other apostles, had received immediately from Christ. It is said expressly, ver. 26, that this ordinance should be observed until the end of the world, (ἄχρις οὗ ἔσθῃ ὁ Κύριος.) The Supper was designed to be a perpetual sermon on the death of Christ until he shall come again to bring his followers into the kingdom of the blessed; and every one who partakes of it is supposed hereby to profess that he believes Christ died *even for him*. There have always, however, been some who have supposed that this institution is needless, or that the precept to observe it does not extend to all Christians: the Pauliciani, e. g., supposed that *bread* and *wine* are here figurative terms, denoting the doctrines of Christ, which nourish the soul. So the Socinians, and several fanatical sects.

(3) *More particular explanation of the object of Christ in instituting the sacrament of the Supper.*

(a) *The chief object of Christ.* From what has been already said, it appears that this festival was designed to be in commemoration of Christ,—of all the blessings for which we are indebted to him, and especially of his death, from which these other benefits all proceed. This is evident from the very words in which this ordinance was established, *σῶμα ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν δεδομένον*, (or, as Paul has it, *κλώμενον*, *ῥαβ*, *ledere*, *vulnerare*, to which the *breaking* of the bread alludes,) and *αἷμα ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*, (or *περὶ πολλῶν*, according to Mark and Luke,) *ἐκχυνόμενον*, *εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν*. Christ often repeated these words during the eating and drinking of the Supper, and interchanged them with others of the same import; and hence we may account for the different phraseology recorded by the different evangelists. The same thing is evident from the express declaration of Paul, 1 Cor. xi. 26, “So often as ye partake of this festival, you profess yourselves among the number of those who believe that Christ suffered death for their sakes,”

(*θάνατον Κυρίου καταγγέλετε.*) Cf. 1 Cor. x. 16, and also the fine paraphrase of this passage given by Morus, p. 259, s. 3, n. 1.

But this needs more particular explanation. On the day of Christ's death the ancient Mosaic dispensation ceased, and the new covenant, or the new dispensation instituted by God through Christ for the salvation of men, commenced. The memorable event of that day, which had such vast consequences, he and his apostles celebrated by this festival, and he commanded them to continue to observe it in future time. It is therefore the uniform doctrine of the apostles that the new dispensation of God (*καινὴ διαθήκη*) began with the death of Christ, and was thereby solemnly consecrated. Cf. the texts cited s. 118, II. 1. Hence Paul says, Heb. ix. 14, 15, that even as Judaism was inaugurated by sacrifices, so was Christianity also, by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. And now as Moses, Exod. xxiv. 8, calls the blood of the sacrifice by which the Mosaic laws and the whole Mosaic institute was consecrated and received a solemn sanction, *the blood of the covenant*, so does Christ, with a most indisputable reference to this expression, denominate his death,—his blood which he shed, *the blood of the new covenant*; and the words *τὸ αἷμα καινῆς διαθήκης* (or, as Luke and Paul plainly have it, *τὸ ποτήριον* (*ἔστι*) *ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη ἐν τῷ αἵματι μου*) are to be regarded as explanatory of the words *τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ σῶμά μου, τὸ αἷμά μου*.

The meaning therefore is, “ye celebrate, while ye eat this bread and drink this wine, the memory of my body offered up, and of my blood shed for you, by which the new covenant, the new dispensation for the good of the world, whose founder I am, is consecrated.” The sacrament of the Supper is therefore a significant sermon on the death of Jesus, and requires, in order to a proper celebration of it, a personal experience of the benefits of this death.

Christ says, “drink ye *all* of it; for it is my blood.” By this he means that they should so divide the wine among themselves that each should receive a portion of it. He himself did not partake of the sacramental bread and wine; for his body was not offered, nor his blood shed, for his own sake; and those only for whom this was done should eat and drink of it. The *τοῦτο ἔστι σῶμα* and *αἷμα* refers, therefore, principally to the *act* itself, like the following *τοῦτο ποίετε*—i. e., this act (which you shall hereafter repeat) shall serve to impress your minds with the great importance of my body offered up for the good of men, and of my blood shed for their sake, and shall remind you of all the salutary consequences flowing from my death, and shall convey these benefits to you personally. It is not, therefore, the then present and living body of Jesus which is here spoken of, but the body

which was sacrificed—i. e., Christ, so far as he died for us. This is illustrated by the formula used by Moses respecting the passover, Exod. xii. 11, 27, פָּסַח דָּוָא—i. e., by this act you solemnly commemorate the deliverance from Egypt. And as the passover was appointed and first celebrated shortly before this deliverance, so was the sacrament of the Supper instituted and celebrated just before the death of Christ; and as the former was to be repeated in commemoration of the great event on account of which it was first instituted, and for the sake of awakening grateful and religious feelings, so it was also with the latter. This analogy seems to have been perfectly understood by the apostles, and hence they do not inquire of Christ, as they were accustomed to do in other cases.

(b) But in connexion with this principal object, Christ had also others in view, all of which, however, are related to this, and depend upon it. Especially does it appear to have been an object with Christ in this ordinance to make plain, and impressively to recommend to his disciples that great precept of his religion, *Love one another, as I also have loved you*, 1 Cor. x. 17; xii. 13. He designed that by this symbol his disciples should mutually pledge their cordial love. It is a thing well known by old experience that friendships are founded, cherished, and sustained by social festivals. Of this fact many of the ancient legislators and the founders of religions availed themselves in the appointment of festivals; and this was also done by Moses. In many of the Oriental nations, therefore, the guest who had but once eaten with them, even if it had been only bread and salt, and who had drunken with them, was considered as a pledged and unalterable friend; and it was in this way that the league of friendship and of mutual service was contracted.

This noble custom was now made more general, and, as it were, consecrated, by religion, or the association of religious ideas. All the followers of Christ were to unite in this celebration, and to hold this festival in common, and without any distinction, in memory of their great benefactor and Saviour. For the followers of Christ were required to love each other as brethren, and this *for Christ's sake*—i. e., because it is the will and the command of Christ, their common Lord. Vide Joh. Gottlob Worb, Ueber die Bundes-und Freundschaftssymbole der Morgenländer; Sorau, 1792, 8vo.

But we must remember, in connexion with this, the uniform doctrine of the New Testament, that Christ in his exalted state is as near to all his followers, at all periods, even until the end of the world, (Matt. xxviii. 20,) and that he equally guides and supports them as when he was with his disciples, by his visible presence, upon the earth. Vide s. 98. He was

visibly present when he first held this festival with his disciples then living, and he then took the lead. But while he commands all his followers to continue to observe this rite until his visible return, he gives them the assurance that they stand equally under his inspection, and enjoy equally his care, with those who lived with him while he was upon the earth. Theologians say truly, *Christus præsentiam suam suis in sacra cæna declarat* ADSPECTABILI pignore. So certainly as they see the bread and the wine, even so certain should it be to them that he still lives, and that he is especially near to them, as he was formerly to his disciples while upon earth.

Note.—From what has now been said, it appears (a) that the theory of the substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ in the sacramental symbols is not essential, or is not to be looked upon as the great point in this doctrine, and that it cannot be decisively proved from the words of Christ. The reformed theologians take *εἶναι* here in the sense of *signifying, shewing forth*—a sense in which it is indeed often used—e. g., Sept. Gen. xli. 26, 27; Gal. iv. 24; Rev. i. 20. Christ himself uses *ἐστί* in a similar connexion, instead of *σημαίνει*, John, xv. 1. The objections to this explanation which are of any weight may be seen in Storr's "Doctrina Christiana," p. 305, seq. Cf. also s. 146. This particular theory ought never to have been made an article of faith, but rather to have been placed among theological problems. Vide s. 146.

It also appears from the foregoing that we are not to suppose in the sacrament any actual offering up of the body of Christ, repeated every time the sacrament is observed. This false idea became gradually prevalent in the Romish church. Vide No. I. of this section, ad finem. This sacrament may indeed be called, as it is by the fathers, a *sacrifice*, but only in a figurative sense. For Christ offered up himself once for all, Heb. ix. 25—28; and the Lord's Supper is the means of appropriating to each one the benefits of this one sacrifice. It is taught, however, by the Romish church, that the priest offers to God, as a literal atoning sacrifice, both for the dead and the living, the sacramental symbols, which become, by consecration and transubstantiation, the real body and blood of Christ. From this doctrine respecting *masses* many other false ideas have originated.

SECTION CXLIV.

OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS ESSENTIAL AND UNESSENTIAL IN THE CELEBRATION OF THE ORDINANCE OF THE SUPPER.

SOME things pertaining to this ordinance are *essential*—i. e., of such a nature that without them the whole act would not be the true Lord's

Supper; others are *unessential*, or *contingent*. The latter depend upon the circumstances of time, place, society, &c.; and with regard to these things we feel ourselves justified in deviating even from that which was done on the first institution of the Supper, since these are regarded as indifferent matters, Christ having given no express precepts respecting them. Thus all agree that the *time of the day* in which it is observed is unessential, although Christ observed it in the evening; the same as to the posture at table, whether *sitting* or *lying*; and with respect to the place, whether it be a public or a private house; and other things of the same kind.

But on some points opinions are divided. In the protestant church the use of the *bread* and *wine* (*materia*, or *res terrestres*, *elementa*, *symbola*) is reckoned among the essential things; and the use of them too in such a way that each of the elements shall be *separately* (*separatim*) taken. Protestants, too, contend that none but real Christians may partake of the Lord's Supper. Other things are regarded by them as unessential. These points will now be briefly considered, and illustrated by some historical observations.

I. The use of Bread and Wine in the Lord's Supper.

(1) With regard to the *nature* of the bread to be employed in this sacrament, the opinions of theologians have been diverse.

(a) It has been asked whether the bread should be *leavened* or *unleavened*, or whether this is a *point of indifference*. In the protestant church the latter opinion is maintained, and justly, since Christ left no precept respecting this point. So much is beyond doubt, that at the institution of the Supper Christ made use of *unleavened* bread, because no other was brought into the house during the celebration of the Jewish passover, still less was any other kind eaten. We have indeed no express information respecting the custom of the primitive Christians in this respect; but from all circumstances it appears that they regarded it as a matter of indifference whether leavened or unleavened bread is employed. They came together almost daily to partake of the Supper, and they carried with them the bread and wine for this festival. In this case they took the bread which was used at common meals, and this was leavened bread. Epiphanius (Hær. 30) notices it as something peculiar in the Ebionites, that once in the year, at the time of the passover, they celebrated the Lord's Supper with unleavened bread. It was customary at a subsequent period in the Oriental church to make use of leavened bread, yet not always and in all places. In the Western church, on the contrary, unleavened bread was

more commonly (though not always) employed; and Rabanus Maurus, in the ninth century, declares this to be an apostolical tradition in the Romish church. There was, however, at this time, no *law* upon the subject, either in the Eastern or Western church. But in the eleventh century a controversy arose on this point between the two churches, as the Patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Cerularius, reproached the Western church for the use of unleavened bread, and made it heresy. After this period it was contended in the Romish church that no other than unleavened bread should be used, and this was so established by many papal decretals. The opposite ground was taken by the Greek church, and is still maintained at the present day. Vide Joh. Gottfried Herrmann, *Historia Concertationum de Pane Azymo et Fermentato in Cœna Domini*; Leipzig, 1737, 8vo.

(b) Another thing which must be considered unessential is the *breaking* of the bread, which was done at the first institution of the Supper, according to the custom of the Jews, who baked the bread thin, and were accustomed therefore to break, instead of cutting it. We see, however, from 1 Cor. xi. 24, (coll. x. 17, *εἰς ἄρτος*, from which pieces were *broken off*.) that this custom was retained in the primitive Christian church, and was regarded as emblematical of the wounding and breaking of the body of Jesus. It would have been better, therefore, to have retained this custom afterwards, for the same reason that the custom of immersion is preferable in performing the rite of baptism. Luther at first declared in favour of the breaking of bread, though he afterwards altered his opinion. It has been customary in the Romish church, especially since the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, to cut the host or holy wafer in a peculiar way, so as to represent upon it the crucified Saviour, and to make the pieces more and more small, that no one might receive too much of this costly food.

(2) In respect to the *wine*, it has been commonly supposed that Christ used such, in the institution of the Supper, as was mingled with water. For it was very customary with the orientalists to drink mingled wine *at table*, and one was regarded as quite intemperate who drank *pure wine*, (*merum*.) Still this is very uncertain, since water and wine were frequently drunk separately at table. In the ancient church, however, the custom prevailed in most places of mingling water with the sacramental wine. It was also determined how much wine should be taken; though this was variously settled. Diverse allegorical significations were given to the mingling of these two elements. E. g., it was said that the wine is the symbol of the *soul* of Christ, and the water of the *people* who

are united with him, &c. Such allegorizing is seen even in the writings of Cyprian. Clement III. expressly enacted in the twelfth century that the wine should be mingled with water. This was not insisted upon by Luther, on account of the superstition connected with it. The colour of the wine is also indifferent, nor is it certain that Christ used the red wine.

(3) In order to the right celebration of the Lord's Supper, neither the bread nor the wine must be taken without the other, but both must be used, (*communio sub utraque specie*), though one separately from the other, (*separatim*.)

(a) As to the latter point, it is probable from the institution of the Supper by Christ that he distributed each of the elements *separately* to his disciples. But we find that in some of the Oriental churches an exception was made in behalf of some sick persons, and that bread merely dipped in wine was given them. The same thing was done in the West, especially during the tenth century, where, in some places, the bread only was consecrated, and then dipped in the wine, and so given to the communicants—a practice which was justly condemned.

(b) It is also a well-founded opinion, that the cup should not be withholden from any who partake of this sacrament. Vide Morus, p. 272, n. 3.

From 1 Cor. xi. 26; x. 16, 21, it appears, undeniably, that in the apostolic church all Christians partook both of the bread and the wine. And this was the practice throughout the whole Christian church during the first ten centuries. The Manicheans, who abstained wholly from wine, did not use it even at the Lord's Supper; but they were strongly opposed by the teachers of all other parties—e. g., Hieronymus, Leo the Great, &c. Particularly important is a decree of Pope Gelasius I., of the fifth century, against some sectarians, who used only bread in the celebration of the Supper. He calls their practice *grande sacrilegium*, and is very strong in his opposition to it.

But when the doctrine of transubstantiation began to prevail in the West, especially after the eleventh century, the schoolmen suggested the question whether, considering that the bread is changed into the body of Christ, the blood is not also there, and so, whether it is not enough to partake merely of the bread? This question was answered in the affirmative; and it was suggested as an additional reason in behalf of this opinion, that drink may be easily spilled, and that it is more difficult to lose any portion of the bread. This ground was taken even in the twelfth century by Hugo of St. Victor and Peter of Lombardy, and in the thirteenth century was defended with great zeal by Thomas Aquinas. Some churches in the West began, therefore, to introduce the custom of withholding

the cup from the laity, and giving it only to the clergy. The first examples of this occurred in some English churches about the middle of the twelfth century. The scarcity and dearness of wine in northern Europe during this period may have furnished an additional motive for this practice. It was not until the thirteenth century that these examples were followed in France and Italy. Still this observance did not become universal either in this or the following century, although it was becoming more and more prevalent in the churches in the West. This doctrine *de communione sub una* was zealously opposed by Wickliff and Huss and their adherents; and this led the Council at Costnitz, 1415, wholly to interdict the use of the cup by the laity. It was established by that Council, "that in each of the two elements the whole body of Christ is truly contained." This doctrine has been maintained in the Romish church ever since this period, although many theologians, and even some of the popes, have objected to it. Luther and Zuingle adopted the principles of Wickliff and Huss, and introduced again the general use of the cup into their churches, and hence the decisions of the Council at Costnitz were re-enacted by the Council at Trent in the sixteenth century. Besides the older works of Leo Allatius, Schmid, Calixtus, on this subject, cf. Spittler, *Geschichte des Kelch's im Abendmahl*; Lemgo, 1780, 8vo.

II. *By whom should the Lord's Supper be observed? who should administer it? and may it be celebrated in the Private Dwellings of Christians?*

These questions come under the general inquiry respecting what is essential and not essential in the observance of the Lord's Supper.

(1) None but actual members of the Christian church can take part in the Lord's Supper: those who are not Christians are excluded from it. On this point there has been an universal agreement. For by this rite we profess our interest in the Christian church, and our belief in Christ. Vide 1 Cor. x. 17; xi. 26. The passage, Heb. xiii. 20, seems also to belong in this connexion. Every actual member of the church may therefore be admitted to the enjoyment of this ordinance, without distinction of regenerate and unregenerate persons, (though this is denied by some.) This is evident from the fact that it is the object of the Supper to make an *external* profession of Christian faith, (vide s. 145, I.;) and because it may be, and is designed to be, a means of promoting a change of heart, and often produces this effect. As unregenerate persons are not excluded from hearing the divine word, neither should they be from partaking of this sacrament. Nor do we find that persons who gave no evidence of a regenerate mind, and who were yet members of the

visible church, were excluded from the sacrament in the primitive Christian church; although such persons were advised to abstain from the sacrament, so long as their hearts were not in a proper frame, still it was left to their own consciences. Since, therefore, a mixed multitude of good and evil must be allowed in the visible church, it is the same as to the Lord's Supper. Christ himself admitted Judas to the first celebration of this ordinance; and thus taught us our duty with regard to this subject. Many have indeed denied that Judas, the betrayer of Christ, partook of this sacrament with the other disciples; but from Luke, xxii. 20—22, the fact appears too plain to be denied. This is admitted even by Augustine on the third Psalm. This fact is important, since many conscientious Christians, and even teachers, have had great doubts as to uniting with unconverted men in this ordinance, and have become separatists.

In respect to children, however, it is maintained that they are excluded from partaking of the Lord's Supper. It was common in Africa, in Cyprian's time—i. e., in the third century—to give the sacramental elements even to children; and this custom was gradually introduced into other churches. But in the twelfth century this practice fell into disuse in the West, although in the East it continues to the present day. The passage, John, vi. 53, is appealed to in behalf of this practice. Vide Peter Zorn, *Historia Eucharistiæ Infantium*; Berlin, 1736, 8vo. It cannot be said that the exclusion of children is expressly commanded by Christ, because there is nothing about this subject in the New Testament, nor do we read that in the apostolic church they were excluded from the sacrament. (The children of the Israelites were not excluded from the feast of the passover.) Yet as children were not admitted during the first centuries of the Christian church, (except in Africa in the third century.) we judge that they cannot have been admitted in the apostolic church; for in that case this practice would not certainly have been disused in all the churches. The cause of the exclusion of children is, plainly, that they cannot as yet understand the importance of the transaction, and must be unable to distinguish this religious festival from a common meal; 1 Cor. xi. 29. It would thus become to them a merely formal and customary thing, and make no salutary impression.

(2) *By whom should the Lord's Supper be administered?* As the administration of the other religious rites of the church is entrusted to the teachers of religion, it is proper and according to good order that this also should be administered by them. This, however, is by no means their right *exclusively* and necessarily, but only *ordinis et decori causa*, as Morus well observes, p. 272, ad fin. In extreme cases, therefore,

where no regular teachers can be obtained, this sacrament may be administered by other Christians to whom this duty is committed by the church. Vide s. 136, II. 2; s. 139, III. This has been uniformly maintained by Luther and other protestant theologians. In the ancient Christian church it was as regularly administered by the teachers as baptism. Justin the Martyr (Apol. i. 85, seq.) says that the *προεστώτες* consecrated and distributed the elements; and Tertullian (De Cor. Mil.) says, *nec de aliorum manu quam PRÆSIDENTIUM sumimus*.

(3) The question has been asked, Whether *private communions* (e. g., in the case of sick persons) may be permitted, and whether they accord with the objects of the Lord's Supper? This has been denied by some modern writers, particularly by Less, in his "*Praktische Dogmatik*," and by Schulze of Neustadt, "*Ueber die Krankencommunion*;" 1794. Cf. the work "*Ueber die Krankencommunion, mit besonderer Hinsicht auf ihren Missbrauch und ihre Schädlichkeit*;" Leipzig, 1803, 8vo; in which, however, the practice is not wholly rejected. These writers have been led to make their objections by seeing the frequent abuse of private communions, by knowing that they are frequently resorted to from pride, or from some superstitious ideas with regard to their efficacy. Hence they have been led to maintain that it is essential, in order to a right celebration of the Lord's Supper, that it should be held in common by the mixed society of Christians constituting a church, and that private communions cannot be regarded as constituting the Lord's Supper.

This opinion, however, has been justly rejected by many theologians—e. g., by Doederlein. The following reasons have been urged against it—viz.,

(a) It is doubtless true that in the apostolic church the Lord's Supper was commonly and regularly celebrated in the *public* assemblies of Christians; 1 Cor. xi. 20—34. And this must always remain the rule, from which there can be no exception in respect to those Christians who are able to attend the public meetings, but who refuse so to do, either from pride or self-will. There may, however, be an exception made in behalf of Christians who are necessarily detained from attending on the public ordinances of divine service—e. g., in the case of sick persons. And it would be, as Morus well remarks, inconsistent with the rule of love, which is one of the chief commands of Christ, if sick persons should be prevented from partaking of the Lord's Supper in their own houses.

(b) A *public place* cannot be made essential to the proper observance of the Lord's Supper, for it was held at its first institution in a private

house; nor is the number of Christians present at all important, since it was first celebrated only by a select few of the five hundred disciples of Christ then living; but everything depends upon the feelings and character of the communicants. The Christian who in this act commemorates the death of Jesus, professes his relation to the church, and forms pious resolves and purposes—he truly celebrates the Lord's Supper whether he performs this act in public or private.

(c) Even in a private dwelling a profession may be made, by this act of faith in the death of Christ, before the teacher and others present, 1 Cor. xi.; and persons not present still learn that such a profession has been made. This object of the Lord's Supper is therefore attained even by the private celebration of it. There was a regulation among the Bohemian brethren in the fifteenth century, (about the year 1461,) that when a sick person desired the Lord's Supper, other members of the church should partake of it with him, *in order that it might be a true communion*—an example which is worthy of imitation! And even among us this might be done without great notoriety, by admitting the near relations, acquaintances, or friends of the sick person, or those occupying the same house; and they, too, might perhaps receive a salutary impression from such a celebration of this ordinance. The assertion of Less, that private communions were unheard of in earlier Christian antiquity, is not true. Justin the Martyr says (Apol. 2), “that the deacons first distributed bread and wine to those present, and then carried it to the absent.”

III. Unessential Rites in the Administration of the Supper.

It is important that the Lord's Supper, so far as it is an *external rite*, should be so administered as to distinguish it from common and ordinary repasts, as a special festival in commemoration of Christ. This is called by Paul, 2 Cor. xi. 19, διακρίνειν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Κυρίου. This may indeed be done without any external ceremonies; and it cannot therefore be said that such external rites and usages are essential to the ordinance. Still it is wise, and adapted to promote the ends for which the Supper was instituted, to employ such external solemnities as will remind the communicants of the great object of this festival, and give it an obvious and marked distinction from other meals. Here, however, caution must be used, lest superstition should be encouraged by the introduction of these ceremonies, and they should be supposed to possess some special power.

Christ distinguished this ordinance from the passover, which immediately preceded, by offering up a prayer of thanks, (εὐχαριστήσας, or

εὐλογήσας,) which was probably one of the brief thanksgivings common among the Jews, as neither of the evangelists have thought necessary to record the words. He then stated briefly the object of this ordinance. In both of these particulars, the example of Christ is properly followed in the administration of the Supper. It is customary to offer thanks to God, briefly to state the object of this ordinance, and thus solemnly set apart the bread and wine to this sacred use. Vide 1 Cor. x. 16, ποτήριον εὐλογίας, ὃ εὐλογοῦμεν—i. e., the wine in the cup, which we consecrate to this use by the prayer of thanks. It is also said elsewhere respecting those who thank God for the enjoyment of other food, that they partake of it μετ' εὐλογίας, 1 Tim. iv. 5; Luke, ix. 16.

This solemn opening of the Supper with prayer and reference to the command of Jesus, is called *consecration*, and is proper and according to the will of Christ. *Consecration*, therefore, in the Lord's Supper, consists properly in a solemn reference to the object of the Supper, and in the devout prayer accompanying this, and not in the repetition of the words, *this is my body and this is my blood*. These words are uttered merely in order to make the nature and object of the ordinance then to be celebrated properly understood; so our symbolical books uniformly teach. Hence these words were frequently repeated by Christ during the celebration of the ordinance, and were used alternately with other expressions. This consecration is not to be supposed to possess any magical or miraculous power. Nothing like this was attributed to this rite by the older church fathers, who used *consecrare* as synonymous with ἀγιάζειν and sanctificare, to set apart from a common, and consecrate to a sacred use. By degrees, however, a magical effect was attributed to consecration, and it was supposed to possess a peculiar power. This was the case even with Augustine. And when afterwards the doctrine of transubstantiation prevailed in the Romish church, it was supposed that the change in the elements was effected by pronouncing over them the blessing, and especially the words of Christ, *this is my body*, &c.

Besides this, there are various other contingent and arbitrary usages, some of which are good, and adapted to promote the ends of this ordinance, and others are extremely liable to become perverted into means of superstition. More full information on this point may be obtained from Christian Antiquities. Many of the rites introduced by the Romish church have been retained in the Lutheran church, such as the singing of the words of consecration, the marking of the bread and wine with the cross, the holding a cloth beneath, &c. These and other usages originated for the most part in the

doctrine of transubstantiation, and the extravagant opinions respecting the external holiness of the symbols resulting from this doctrine. They admit, however, of a good explanation; and where they are customary, and must be retained, they ought to be so explained by the religious teacher. *Marking with the cross*, e. g., should remind us that this ordinance is held in commemoration of Christ crucified, &c.

SECTION CXLV.

OF THE USES AND THE EFFICACY OF THE LORD'S SUPPER; AND INFERENCES FROM THESE.

We must here presuppose much of what was said, s. 140, respecting baptism. The uses and efficacy of the Lord's Supper, as of baptism, are twofold—viz., *external and internal*, and may be easily deduced from the design of this ordinance, as stated s. 143.

I. External Uses and Efficacy.

By celebrating the Lord's Supper, a person publicly professes himself to be a member of the external Christian church, and as such receives and holds all the rights belonging to Christians, to the enjoyment of which he is introduced by baptism. For Christ enjoined this sacred duty only upon his followers. Every one, therefore, who partakes of the Lord's Supper, by so doing professes that he is a real member of the external church, that he believes in Christ, and yields him reverence. Hence Paul says, 1 Cor. x. 16, that bread and wine are *κοινωνία αἵματος καὶ σώματος Χριστοῦ*. Paul here, and in this whole passage, teaches that the symbols (bread and wine) stand in the most intimate connexion with the body of Christ slain on the cross for our sins, and are the means by which we become partakers of the benefits of this death, and testify our interest in them. The meaning is, Whoever celebrates the Lord's Supper becomes partaker of the body and blood of Christ, and professes the same; or, By this ordinance he gives it to be understood that he believes in Christ, and especially that he believes that Christ offered up his body and shed his blood for him; and he thus becomes partaker of the benefits of this sacrifice. The terms *κοινωνοὶ θυσιαστηρίου*, spoken of those offering sacrifice, ver. 18 of the same chapter; also *κοινωνοὶ δαιμονίων*, ver. 20, are used in the same way, and are explained ver. 21, by the phrase *μετέχειν τραπέζης Κυρίου καὶ δαιμονίων*. The opposite of this is seen ver. 14, "flee idolatry," have no fellowship with idolaters! and ver. 17, "while we all eat of one and the same bread, (a portion of which is broken for each,) we profess to be all members of one body"—i. e., of one church. The same is taught by the passage 1 Cor. xi. 26, "for as often as ye par-

take of the Lord's Supper, *τὸν θάνατον Κυρίου καταγγέλλετε*," i. e., you thus profess yourselves to be of the number of those who believe that Christ died for the salvation of man.

II. Internal Uses and Efficacy.

(1) With regard to the effects of the Lord's Supper, as well as of baptism, there were various mistakes, even among the earlier fathers. Vide s. 140, II. The opinion is very ancient, that the holy spirit so unites himself with the symbols when they are consecrated, that they are transmuted (*μεταστοιχειοῦνθαι, trans-elementari*,) into an entirely different element, become the body and blood of Christ, and possess a power and efficacy which cannot be expected from mere bread and wine. These thoughts occur even in the Apostolic Constitutions, in Irenæus, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basilus the Great, Ambrosius, and others. It was on this account that the invocation (*ἐπίκλησις*) of the Holy Spirit was introduced in many places before the holding of the Supper. Vide Morus, p. 202, n. 2, 6. They say also that the bread and wine, through the invocation of the name of Christ, and by the power of the same, are sanctified, so that they no more continue what they were, but receive a special spiritual and divine power. So say, e. g., Theodotus, (as quoted by Clemens of Alexandria,) Tertullian, and others. Hence we often find in the ancient liturgies, both oriental and occidental, frequent invocations of the Holy Spirit of God and of Christ, in which they were entreated to unite themselves with the bread and wine, and to communicate to them this power.

At a very early period, therefore, a kind of magical and miraculous effect was ascribed to this ordinance, and it was supposed that as an external act it has a mechanical agency, not only upon the *soul* for the remission of guilt and punishment, but also upon the *body*. It is very often said by some of the fathers after the fourth century, in conformity with this latter opinion, that this sacrament has power to heal the sick, to secure one against magical arts and the assaults of the devil, and even to effect the salvation of the souls of those who are dead. Hence originated the *missæ pro defunctis*, and innumerable other superstitious opinions and practices, which fruitfully multiplied, especially in the Western church, during the dark ages, and which were then brought by the schoolmen into a formal system.

(2) This magical or mechanical efficacy is never ascribed in the New Testament to the Lord's Supper. The opinion that man obtains faith, remission of sin, and new spiritual power, merely by the external celebration of this ordinance, as an *opus operatum*, and by an external participation in the sacramental symbols, without being himself active in repentance and faith,

receives no countenance from the sacred writers. The same is true respecting baptism and the other means of grace. The efficacy of the Lord's Supper upon the human heart stands in intimate connexion with the divine word, and with the power inherent in the truths of the Christian doctrine. Without the knowledge and the proper use of the word of God, this ordinance, in itself considered, and as an external rite, has no efficacy. And so the effect which the Lord's Supper has upon the human heart is not magical, miraculous, and irresistible, but in accordance with our moral nature; exactly as we have represented it to be with baptism, s. 140, coll. Art. xii. s. 133.

It is therefore truly said that the Holy Spirit acts upon the hearts of men through the Supper, or through the bread and wine, and that he by this means produces faith and pious dispositions. But he produces this effect through the word, or through the truths of Christianity exhibited before us and presented to us in this ordinance. The effect of the Lord's Supper is, therefore, an effect which is produced by God and Christ, through his word, or the truths of his doctrine, and the use of the same. In the sacrament of the Supper the most important truths of Christianity, which we commonly only hear or read, are visibly set before us, made cognizable to the senses, and exhibited in such a way as powerfully to move the feelings, and make an indelible impression on the memory. Hence this sacrament is justly called *verbum Dei* VISIBLE. Some of the most weighty doctrines of religion which are commonly taught us by *audible words*, through the outward ear, are here inculcated by *external visible signs and actions*.

Among the doctrines more especially exhibited in the Lord's Supper is the doctrine of the redemption of man by the death of Christ, and the universal love of God shining forth from this event, (Romans, viii. 32; John, iii. 16,) and all the duties both to Christ and our fellow-men which result from it. The contemplation and application of these important truths, to which we are excited by the Lord's Supper, awaken in the hearts of pious Christians the deepest love and gratitude to God and Christ, and a readiness to comply cordially with their requirements. And it is only when we possess this disposition and this temper of mind that we are truly susceptible of the influences of divine grace through the word, s. 130, 131; it is then only that we can expect to enjoy that special presence and aid of Christ which he has promised at his Supper. Vide s. 143, ad finem. These are the things which, according to the scriptures, are essential to the proper efficacy of the Lord's Supper; and we need not trouble ourselves with inquiries respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the symbols.

Hence it appears that the internal efficacy of the Lord's Supper, or of the word of God through the Supper, is twofold.

FIRST. This ordinance is the means of exciting and strengthening the *faith* of one who worthily celebrates it, so far as he refers to the divine promises, and stands firm in the conviction of their certain fulfilment. Vide s. 123. For we are reminded by this ordinance,

(a) Of the *death* of Christ. He instituted this ordinance on the day of his death, and the breaking of the bread and pouring out of the wine represent the violence done to his body and the shedding of his blood. Vide s. 144, I. 1.

(b) Of the *causes* and the salutary results of his death—the founding of a new dispensation, the forgiveness of sins, and our title to everlasting happiness. Vide Heb. viii. 6, seq.

(c) Of the special guidance and assistance which Christ has promised to his disciples until the end of the world. Vide s. 143, ad finem.

(d) Any one who from the heart believes these great truths of Christianity, obtains in the Lord's Supper the personal appropriation of these benefits procured through Christ's death—i. e., he receives in the Lord's Supper the most solemn assurance and pledge that Christ shed his blood *for him and on his account*, and that *he therefore may participate in all the salutary results of his death*.

This is the *κοινωνία αἵματος* and *σώματος* Χριστοῦ, 1 Cor. x. 16, or the spiritual enjoyment of the body and blood of Christ. It should be as certain to us as that we see the bread and wine, that Christ died for us, and that he still cares for us, as he did formerly for his disciples while he was upon the earth, and still promotes our eternal welfare. This is the true inward enjoyment which may be experienced at the table of the Lord.

SECONDLY. In this way does this ordinance contribute to maintain and promote piety among believers. The contemplation of the death of Christ, of its causes, and the great and beneficial results which flow from it, fills our hearts with gratitude and love to God and Christ, and makes us disposed and ready to obey his precepts. In this frame we are prepared to enjoy those divine influences upon our hearts, and that assistance of Christ, which it is promised we shall enjoy at the Lord's Supper.

Again; Christ inculcates the love of God and the love of our neighbour as the two great precepts of his doctrine. Of both these duties we are reminded by this sacred rite, and derive from it new motives to perform them. All Christians without distinction are required to participate in this rite—high and low, rich and poor, to eat in common of one bread and drink of one cup. As followers of Jesus they are all brethren, and all equal, and mutually bound to live in peace,

friendship, and brotherly love. All share equally in the rights which Christ purchased for them. Christ is the Lord and Master of them all, and is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Cf. 1 Cor. x. 17; xii. 13, "For whether we be Jews or Greeks, bond or free, we are all baptized into one body, and made to drink into one spirit (*ἐποτίσθημεν*)"—i. e., we partake of one festival, so that we compose but one church (*εἰς ἓν σῶμα*), and are mutually obligated to cherish the most cordial brotherly love and harmony of feeling, *ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματος*. Cf. 1 Cor. vi. 17; Ephes. iv. 3, 4. It was one object even of the Mosaic sacrificial feasts to bind more strongly the band of friendship and brotherly love among the Israelites. But here we have *χρεῖττονες ἐπαγγελίας*. Vide s. 143, I. 3.

From these remarks respecting the object and efficacy of the Lord's Supper, several important practical consequences may be derived.

(1) Whoever partakes of the Lord's Supper takes upon himself the sacred obligation to live in all respects conformably to the rule given in the gospel, and there made the condition of enjoying the salutary consequences of the atoning death of Jesus. Theologians therefore say that in enjoying the Lord's Supper a covenant is made with God, since man engages, on his side, to yield obedience to the divine precepts, and God, on his part, promises, assures, and actually imparts to men his benefits; as it is in baptism, s. 140, ad finem.

(2) Since the uses and the effects of the Lord's Supper are not magical, miraculous, or irresistible, but entirely adapted to the moral nature of man, he only can derive the proper benefits from this rite who falls in with the moral order above mentioned. Therefore,

(3) Whoever devoutly contemplates the great truths of salvation represented and made present to us in the Lord's Supper, and suffers himself to be excited by these means to feelings of lively gratitude to God, to diligence in the pursuit of holiness, and to a truly Christian temper in all respects, he fulfils, on his part, the design of this rite. It follows from this, of course, that this festival in commemoration of the death of Christ can be properly celebrated only in the exercise of a grateful heart, and of pious reverence.

But, on the other side, the communicant must endeavour to remove from his mind all *superstitious fear* and *scrupulous anxiety* about this ordinance. These fears are often cherished by the incautious expressions which religious teachers sometimes use; and even by theologians has this rite been called TREMENDUM MYSTERIUM. Reverence and love for God do indeed go together; and in *this sense* such representations are proper. But anxiety and slavish fear are inconsistent with love, 1 John, iv. 19, *φόβος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν*

ἀγάπῃ. The celebration of this festival should rather be a cheerful occasion; and it should promote pious and thankful joy, since it brings to our mind an event so fraught with happy consequences for us.

What Paul says on this subject, 1 Cor. xi. 27—29, and 34, is very true, but often misunderstood. He speaks here of the external conduct of the communicants, so far as it indicates his internal disposition or state of heart. Many of the Corinthians partook of the Lord's Supper without thinking at all of its great object. They did not regard it as a religious rite, but rather as a common meal, (*μὴ διακρίνοντας σῶμα Κυρίου*, ver. 29.) They permitted themselves those disorders and excesses in which many think it right to indulge at common meals,—quarrels, gluttony, drunkenness, &c.; ver. 17—22. This is called by Paul *ἀναξίως ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν*—i. e., *indecore, in an unbecoming, improper manner*, so as to shew by one's conduct an irreligious disposition, an indifference with regard to this important rite, and a contempt for it. Paul pronounces this to be in the highest degree *wrong*, and therefore *deserving of punishment*, *ἐνοχος ἔσται σώματος καὶ αἵματος Κυρίου*, ver. 27—i. e., worthy of punishment on account of the body and blood of Christ undervalued by him; and ver. 29, (coll. ver. 34,) *κρίμα ἐαυτῷ ἐσθίει καὶ πίνει*, he draws upon himself divine judgments on account of his improper observance of this ordinance.

(4) The observance of the Lord's Supper does not require, therefore, in the pious Christian, any severe and anxious *preparation*; he may partake of it at any time with advantage, as he may at any time die happily. And the unconverted man has no other exercises and preparations to go through than those which in general he must go through in order to his conversion, (*μετάνοια*.) It is with reason, however, that Paul makes it the duty of every Christian carefully to examine his feelings and his conduct before approaching the table of Christ. 1 Cor. xi. 28, *δοκιμαζέτω ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτόν, καὶ οὕτως* i. e., after he has examined himself) *ἐκ τοῦ ἁγίου ἐσθίετω* cf. ver. 31. The meaning is, "Let him examine himself, to see whether he approaches the Lord's Supper with pious feelings, really designing to do what this action implies"—viz., make a profession of the death of Christ in the fullest sense of this term.

Note.—Times for *confession*, or rather, for *preparation* for the Lord's Supper, may and should be employed for the purpose of this personal self-examination. These occasions should also be improved for the purpose of shewing the evils which result from a thoughtless partaking of the sacramental Supper, according to 1 Cor. xi. It must not, however, be said that every unconverted man receives the Lord's Supper to

his own eternal condemnation. This is not a scriptural doctrine. Vide 1 Cor. xi. 32. Nor does it belong to the teacher to exclude any one from this ordinance because he regards him as unconverted, even supposing him to have power so to do. Vide s. 144, II. It is his duty, however, to warn such a person, and represent to him his case, as Paul does, 1 Cor. xi.

(5) *How often should the Lord's Supper be celebrated?* Christ gave no definite precepts on this point, and this was very wise. Everything mechanical, confined to a particular time or a particular place, is contrary to the spirit of Christianity. Christ has therefore left it for every Christian to determine, according to his conscientious conviction and judgment, how often he will freely repeat this solemn observance. And thus in this respect also does this Christian ordinance differ from the passover and other religious ceremonies of the Israelites. It is to be expected of every sincere Christian that, finding how salutary these communion seasons are in their influence upon him, he will welcome their return, and wish them to be often repeated. But to the question, *how often?* no answer, from the nature of the case, can be given which will apply to every individual. In the early Christian church they were accustomed to celebrate the Lord's Supper almost *daily*. But the too frequent repetition of this ordinance will be apt to produce coldness and indifference with regard to it. This perhaps had been the case in Corinth; cf. 1 Cor. xi. 20—30. The zeal with which this ordinance was first observed gradually abated, and for this reason, among others, that but few good fruits were seen to result from it. At the time of Chrysostom and Augustine, the observance of the Supper had become far less frequent. Between the sixth and eighth centuries it was customary, especially in the Western church, for every Christian to commune at least three times during the year; and this was even established as a rule by many ecclesiastical councils. In the protestant church no laws have been passed on this subject; and this is as it should be.

SECTION CXLVI.

THE VARIOUS OPINIONS AND FORMS OF DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE PRESENCE OF THE BODY AND BLOOD OF CHRIST IN THE LORD'S SUPPER HISTORICALLY EXPLAINED; AND ALSO A CRITIQUE RESPECTING THEM.

I. *History of Opinions respecting the Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper.*

(1) It may be remarked, in general, that the opinions of the ancients on this subject, from the first establishment of the Christian church until the eighth century, were very diverse. After the

eighth century there were some controversies respecting the *mode and manner* of this presence of Christ; and in the thirteenth century, one of the many theories on this subject was established as orthodox. The church fathers in the first centuries agreed on many points relating to this matter, and on other points differed, without, however, mutually casting upon each other the reproach of heterodoxy.

The first germs of the Roman-catholic, the Lutheran, and the Calvinistic theories, are found already in their writings; but it was not until a later period that they were developed, and new consequences deduced from them. We cannot therefore conclude, when we meet with expressions in the ancient fathers which sound like those which are used in our own times, that they adopted the *whole theory* of one or the other modern party. Their ideas are so vague, their expressions so indefinite and unsettled, that each of the dissenting parties in modern times may frequently discover passages, even in the same father, which seem to favour its own particular theory.

In the sixteenth century, when the catholics, Lutherans, and the reformed theologians were in controversy with each other on this point, each party collected passages from the fathers, in order to shew the antiquity of its own theory; thus Melancthon in opposition to Œcolampadius, and the latter against the former. In the seventeenth century, many controversial books passed back and forth between the learned Roman-catholic theologians of France and the reformed theologians of France and the Netherlands, in which Nicole, Arnaud, and others, endeavoured to prove, on one side, the antiquity of the doctrine of transubstantiation; and Albertinus, Claude, Blondell, Laroque, and others, attempted, on the other side, to secure the authority of the ancients in behalf of the doctrine of the reformed church. Ernesti also, in his *Antimuratori*, (Opus. Theol. p. 1, seq.) has collected many passages from the ancients in behalf of the Lutheran theory, and in opposition to *transubstantiation*, &c.; also in his “*Brevis Repetitio et Assertio Sententiæ Lutheranæ de Præsentia Corporis et Sanguinis Christi in Sacra Cæna*,” (Opus. Theol. p. 135, seq.) which is one of the most important modern works on the Lutheran side. It was called forth by Heumann's “*Proof that the Doctrine of the Reformed Church respecting the Lord's Supper is correct and true*,” Eisleben, 1764. It is a very easy matter, however, for any one to find his own ideas expressed in the vague and indefinite phraseology of the fathers. The testimony of the sacred writers in favour of the essential part of the doctrine of the Lutheran church has been exhibited partly by Ernesti, and partly by Storr, in a

very plain and lucid, though brief manner, in his "Doctrinæ Christianæ pars Theoretica," p. 305—318.

[The later works of most value on this department of historical theology are, Phil. Marheinecke, *Sanctorum Patrum de Præsentia Christi in Cœna Domini, Sententia Triplex*; Heidelberg, 1811, 4to. Neander, *Kirch. Geschichte*, b. i. Abth. ii. s. 577—596; Abth. iii. s. 1084; b. ii. Abth. ii. s. 697—712; Abth. iii. s. 1394. Cf. Gieseler, b. i. s. 96; b. ii. s. 15, 17. A full account of the literature of this doctrine, in all periods, may be found in Hahn's *Lehrbuch*, s. 570, ff.; also in Bretschneider's *Syst. Entw.* s. 728, ff.—Tr.]

(2) *Sketch of the history of this doctrine from the second to the ninth century.*

(a) The fathers of the second century proceeded on the principle, which is in itself true, that the Lord's Supper must be considered as entirely different from an ordinary repast. Justin the Martyr says, (*Apol.* i. 66,) οὐ κοινὸς ἄρτος, οὐδὲ κοινὸν πόμα. They, however, entertained, even at that early period, many ideas respecting this ordinance which have no scriptural authority. Neither in the writings of the apostles, nor in the words of Christ, is there any trace of the opinion that a certain supernatural and divine power is imparted, in a miraculous and magical way, to the symbols, and that in this manner the Lord's Supper exerts an agency upon men. But this opinion (which resembles that entertained by many respecting the water in baptism) is found very frequently in the writings of Justin, Irenæus, (*iv.* 34,) Clemens of Alexandria, and other fathers even of the second and third centuries; and it is entirely in accordance with the spirit and taste of that age, which beheld everywhere something magical and mysterious, and could not be contented unless it found something surpassing comprehension. In order to express their opinion that the bread and wine are *changed* by the divine power, or by the Holy Spirit, and thus obtain a new virtue and efficacy, totally different from that which naturally belongs to them, they used the terms μεταβάλλεσθαι, μεταβολή, μεταμορφοῦσθαι, μεταστοιχειοῦσθαι, μεταστοιχείωσις, μεταποίησις.

Still they did not suppose any such change in the elements, that they cease to be bread and wine—i. e., they did not believe in *transubstantiation*, in the proper sense of the term; neither does the Grecian church, which employs these terms, especially μεταβολή, but still opposes the doctrine of the Romish church. Some of the fathers understood these terms in a perfectly just sense, and meant only to say that the bread and wine cease, by consecration, to be common bread and wine.

(b) Again; it was maintained that the *Word*

of God (Λόγος Θεοῦ) is added to the bread and wine thus ennobled and endowed with divine power. If by the Word of God is meant the *Christian doctrine*, it is very true that the efficacy of the Lord's Supper is connected with it, and depends upon it. Vide s. 145. So it was understood by many of the ancient fathers, e. g., Irenæus. But some of them understood by ὁ Λόγος, the *divine nature of Christ*. And from the fact that this Logos was united with the man Jesus and his human body, they were led to the idea, that after the same manner he is united with the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper. And they endeavoured to illustrate this union of Christ with the sacramental bread and wine, from the union of the two natures in his person.

In this comparison, which was made by Justin the Martyr, we find the true origin of the doctrine concerning the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the elements on his table. Vide Morus, p. 263, n. 4. According to this view, Christ is present in a supernatural way in the symbols, and in an entirely different manner from that in which, according to his promise, he is everywhere present with his disciples, until the end of the world.

(c) After this period the idea became more and more current that communicants in partaking of the visible bread and wine also partake of the invisible body and blood of Christ. Especially did this idea prevail after the fourth century. Thus, e. g., Gregory of Nyssa affirms, "that as the body of Christ, by his union with the Logos, was so changed and transformed as to become participator in his divine glory, so also the sacramental bread εἰς σῶμα τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου μεταποιεῖται." Chrysostom and Cyril of Jerusalem also say that we must believe the divine declaration, that we receive the body and blood of Christ in the sacramental elements, although this may seem to be opposed to the evidence of our senses.

But although this doctrine seems to approach very nearly to transubstantiation, these fathers did not yet teach that there is any change of the elements by which they lose their own nature, and cease to be bread and wine; on the contrary, they often taught in other passages that the elements retain their own natural properties, that when partaken of by us they become assimilated to the nature of our bodies, that in the Supper we do not receive the *natural* body of Christ, but only the significant signs of it, that we ought not to stop short with the mere sign, but to turn our thoughts to that which is signified and imparted by it. There are many passages of this import in the writings of Origen, of Augustine, Theodoret, and others.

But in subsequent periods, the conceptions which prevailed on this subject, even in the

Grecian church, became more and more gross and sensual; as appears from the writings of John of Damascus in the eighth century, and others. Still the opinion that the consecrated bread and wine *lose their substance* was not received in the Greek church; nor is it known among them to the present day, although they employ the term *μεταβολή* to denote the change. Vide Kiesling, *Hist. Concertationum Græcor. et Latinor. de Transubst.*; Leip. 1754.

(3) *History of this doctrine from the ninth to the sixteenth century in the Western church.*

It is known from Beda Venerabilis, that during the eighth century there were violent contests in the Western church respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper, and on the question *how* the elements are changed. And even at that time they began to give various explanations of the passages found in the writings of the earlier Latin and Greek fathers on this subject. After the ninth century, the tone and taste which began to prevail made it certain that of different theories on any theological point, that which is the most gross and material would gain the predominance.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the following opinion, first distinctly advocated by Paschasius Radbertus, a monk at Corvey, in the ninth century, should have received so general approbation—viz., “that after the consecration of the bread and wine nothing but their *form* remains, their substance being wholly changed, so that they are no longer bread and wine, but the body and blood of Christ. Their form continues, that no one may take offence at seeing Christians eating human flesh and blood.”

This doctrine was not, indeed, current at that time, for it caused much commotion, and was strongly opposed by the monk Ratramnus, and John Scotus Erigena, and many others. They did not deny the *presence* of the body and blood of Christ; but they taught that this *conversio* or *immutatio* of the bread and wine is not of a *car-nal* but a *spiritual* nature; that these elements are not transmuted into the real body and blood of Christ, but are *signs* or *symbols* of them. In many points they approximated to the opinion of the Reformed theologians.

As yet the councils and popes had determined nothing on this subject. In the meanwhile the doctrine of Paschasius became more and more general during the tenth and eleventh centuries. When therefore Berengarius of Tours, in the eleventh century, attacked this doctrine, he was strongly resisted, and obliged to take back his opinion. He denied any transmutation of the elements; but maintained that the bread and wine are more than mere *symbols*, and that the body and blood of Christ are really present in

the Lord's Supper. In short, he took a middle course between Paschasius and Scotus, and came very near, in the main points of his doctrine, to the Lutheran hypothesis. Vide Lessing's work, Berengarius von Tours; Braunschweig, 1770, 4to.

After the twelfth century the theory of Paschasius was further developed by the schoolmen, and carried out into its results. Even Peter of Lombardy, in the twelfth century, declared himself in behalf of this opinion, although he still speaks somewhat doubtfully respecting it. The inventor of the word *transubstantiatio* is supposed to be Hildebert, Bishop of Mans, in the eleventh century. Before him, however, the phrase *commutatio panis in substantiam Christi* had been used by Fulbert, Bishop of Chartres. This term became current in the twelfth century through the influence of Peter of Blois. It was not, however, until the thirteenth century that this dogma became universally prevalent in the Romish church. At the IV. *Concilium Lateranense*, 1215, under Pope Innocent III., it was established as the doctrine of the church, and confirmed by the Council at Trent, in the sixteenth century, in opposition to the protestants. According to this doctrine, this transmutation is produced by the *sacerdotal consecration*. Vide Calixtus, *De Transubstantiatione*; Helmstädt, 1675.

(4) *Principal opinions respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the sacramental elements, among the protestant theologians, since the Reformation.*

There were three forms of doctrine on this subject which for many centuries had prevailed in the Western church—viz., (a) the theory of *transubstantiation*, advanced by Paschasius Radbertus, which afterwards became the prevailing doctrine of the church; (b) the theory, that the bread and wine are *merely symbols* of the body and blood of Christ, advocated principally by Joh. Scotus Erigena; (c) a theory which takes a middle course between the other two, maintaining that the body and blood of Christ are actually present in the sacramental elements, but without any transmutation of their substance; supported by Berengarius in the eleventh century. These theories continued, though under various modifications, after the sixteenth century, and were designated by the characteristic words, *transubstantiatio*, *figura*, *unio*. The Greek church still adhered to its old word *μεταβολή*.

Both the German and Swiss reformers were agreed in rejecting the doctrine of transubstantiation as wholly unfounded. In this too they were agreed, that the body and blood of Christ are really present in the sacramental elements, and are imparted to the communicant when he

partakes of the bread and wine; since Christ is near to all whom he counts his own, imparts himself to them, counsels and guides them.

But in explaining the manner of this presence they differed from each other. Luther had a great attachment to many of the scholastic opinions and distinctions, and at first entertained a very high idea of clerical power and the pre-eminence of the priesthood. He therefore retained the doctrine of the schoolmen, *de præsentia reali et substantiali*, in such a way, however, as to exclude transubstantiation. His doctrine at first was, that "*in, with, and under (in, cum, and sub, terms which he took from Bernhard) the consecrated bread and wine, the true and essential body and blood of Christ are imparted to the communicant, and are received by him, although in a manner inexplicable by us, and altogether mysterious.*" He held, therefore, that the body of Christ, which in its very essence is present in the sacred symbols, is received by the "communicant, not *spiritually* merely, but (and here is the point of difference between him and the Swiss Reformers) *realiter et substantialiter*; so that both believing and unbelieving communicants partake of the real, substantial body and blood of Christ; the former to their salvation, the latter to their condemnation. The bread and wine are visibly and naturally received, the body and blood of Christ invisibly and supernaturally; and this is the *unio sacramentalis*, such as takes place only in this sacrament. In one passage he explains this *unio sacramentalis* by the image of heated iron; and in employing this illustration, borders close upon the error of *Consubstantiation*. He says also that what the bread and wine do or suffer, the same is done or suffered by the body and blood of Christ—they are broken, distributed, poured out, &c. By degrees, however, he abandoned these views, and was content with affirming the *real presence* of the body and blood of Christ in the sacramental elements, and with an indefinite *manducatione orali*.

The doctrine of the Swiss theologians, on the contrary, as exhibited by Calvin, who in some respects modified the view of Zuingle, was this: "The body and blood of Christ are not, *as to their substance*, present in the sacramental elements, but only *as to power and effect*; they are *vere et efficaciter* represented under the bread and wine; *dari non substantiam corporis Christi in sacra cæna, sed omnia quæ in suo corpore nobis beneficia præstitit.*" Accordingly the body and blood of Christ are not present in *space*, and are not *orally* received by communicants, but *spiritually*, with a kind of *manducatio spiritualis*. Zuingle, however, maintained that the bread and wine are *mere* symbols of the body and blood of Christ, and seemed wholly to reject the idea of his real presence in these symbols.

Many of the Reformed theologians did not, therefore, at first assent to Calvin's doctrine, and many, even subsequently, adhered to that of Zuingle.

Calvin, then, designed to take a middle course between Luther and Zuingle. Luther appealed to the words in which this rite was instituted, especially to *ἐστί*. He referred also to the divine omnipotence, by which the body of Christ might be made substantially present in many places at once. Cf. Morus, p. 266, s. 8. This was wholly denied by the Swiss theologians, as being contradictory. They contended, also, that there is no occasion or use for this substantial presence and communication of the body and blood of Christ, since it cannot contribute to make one more virtuous, pious, or holy. With regard to *ἐστί* they remarked that, according to common use, even in the New Testament, it often means *to signify, shew forth*, (vide s. 143;) and the subject here requires that it should be so understood, since otherwise Christ is made to say what is untrue.

Luther, however, adhered to his opinion, especially after it became the subject of controversy. Melancthon was more calm and impartial, and wished to promote peace between the two parties. He therefore took the ground, especially after Luther's death, that it is better merely to affirm the *presence* and *agency* of Christ in the sacred symbols, without attempting minutely to define and limit the manner of this presence. He was not favourable either to the *præsentia corporalis Christi*, or to the *manducatio oralis*, but only affirmed *præsentiam realem et efficacem Christi in sacra cæna*. He therefore chose a middle way between Luther and Zuingle, and very nearly agreed with Calvin, who also pursued this middle course.

Many of the more moderate Lutheran theologians agreed with Melancthon, and seemed with him to incline to the side of Calvin. On the other hand, the zealots for the Lutheran theory insisted upon all the distinctions which Luther adopted, and even on some points went further than Luther himself. But in the electorate of Saxony the party of Melancthon became more and more numerous, and after his death the dreadful Crypto-Calvinistic controversies and persecutions broke out, (A. D. 1571.)

These and other controversies and disorders in the Lutheran church, and the necessity of doing something to establish the Lutheran form of doctrine, led to the adoption of the *Formula of Concord*, in the year 1577, which was then made a standard of faith, and adopted as an authorized symbol. In this the most minute boundary lines are drawn between the theories of the Lutheran and the Reformed church, by applying the new distinctions introduced into the doctrine of the union of the two natures in

Christ, and the *communicatio idiomatum*. Vide s. 103, II., and s. 104. The Lutheran theologians of that period, especially Andreä, Chemnitz, and their followers, endeavoured to shew, by the theory of the intimate union of the two natures in Christ, and the *communicatio idiomatum* resulting from it, how Christ, as God-man, might be everywhere present, even as to his bodily nature, and that therefore he might be present at the sacrament of the Supper, and might unite himself with the elements, and through them with the communicants, and thus act upon them. This doctrine was called *ubiquitatem corporis Christi*, and the advocates of it were named contemptuously by their opponents *Ubiquitistæ*. The manner of the union of the body of Christ with the bread and wine was declared to be a mystery, (*mysterium unionis sacramentalis*.) And on this account the framers of the *Formula of Concord* would not decide positively of what nature it is, but only negatively, what it is not. It is not a *personal union*, as it is explained to be by many of the older fathers, (vide No. 2,) nor is it *consubstantiatio*; still less is it a union in which a change of the substance is effected, (*transsubstantiatio*;) nor is it a union in which the body and blood of Christ are included in the bread and wine, (*impanatio*;) but of an entirely different nature from any of these mentioned, and one which exists only in this sacrament, and therefore called *sacramentalis*. Cf. Plank, Geschichte des Protestantischen Lehrbegriffs bis zur Einführung der Concordienformel.

But these fine distinctions established in the *Formula of Concord* were never universally adopted in the Lutheran church. And especially in those places where this formula had no symbolic authority were its subtleties rejected. Many of the Lutheran theologians are more inclined to the moderate theory of Melancthon, or rather, have approximated towards it. Morus truly remarks (p. 268, n. A.) that the whole theory established in the *Formula of Concord* respecting the omnipresence of the human nature of Christ, from the union of natures in his person, is *justo subtilior*.

II. Critical Remarks on these different Hypotheses.

(1) All the different theories here stated are attended with difficulties. Transubstantiation contradicts the testimony of our senses, and has no scriptural authority, since these symbols are called in the scriptures *bread* and *wine*, and are therefore supposed to have the substance of bread and wine.

With regard to Luther's theory, there is the difficulty above mentioned, that there appears to be no object or use in the substantial or corporeal presence of Christ; though this objection in itself is by no means decisive, since there are many things whose utility we cannot under-

stand which are yet useful. But besides this, there are other objections to the Lutheran theory. If the substantial body and blood of Christ are present in the sacramental elements, and are received by the communicants, how, it might be asked,

(a) Could Christ, at the institution of the Supper, give his real body to his disciples to be eaten by them, and his real blood to be drunken by them, while they saw this body before their eyes, and he, yet alive, sat with them at table?

(b) How can the body of Christ be present, as to its very substance, in more than one place at the same time? and what object is answered by such a supposition? The conclusions deduced from the doctrine of the union of natures afford no satisfactory answer to these questions.

(c) How can the theory of the substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ, and of their being eaten and drunken by communicants, be reconciled with the words in which this supper was instituted? For Christ did not speak of his body then living upon the earth, which they saw before their eyes, and of the blood flowing in it; still less of his glorified body in heaven, but of his body slain on the cross, (*ὡς ἵπτον διδόμενον*), and of his blood there shed, (*αἷμα ἐκχυνόμενον*.) If, therefore, the substantial and corporeal presence of Christ were meant, it must be the substance of that martyred body and of that perishable blood. But in this case we cannot understand how either of these can be still present, and imparted to communicants.

Difficulties of this nature induced Melancthon, as has been before remarked, to modify the Lutheran doctrine, and to adopt a theory less repulsive. But the theory of Calvin, though it appears to be so easy and natural, is also attended with difficulties; for even he admits of the presence of the body and blood of Christ, only not as to their substance, but, according to his view, believers alone receive the body and blood of Christ. But as soon as I admit that the body of Christ is present to believers only, this cannot be reconciled with 1 Cor. xi. 27, 29, as the opponents of Calvin have always remarked.

The better way, therefore, in exhibiting either the Lutheran or Calvinistic doctrine, is, to avoid these subtleties, and merely take the general position, that *Christ, as man and as the Son of God, may exert his agency, may act wherever and in whatever manner he pleases*. He therefore may exert his power at his table as well as elsewhere. This is perfectly scriptural, (vide s. 98 and s. 143, ad finem;) and it is also the sense and spirit of the protestant theory. And this doctrine respecting the *nearness* of Christ, his *assistance* and *strengthening influence*, in his present exalted state, secures eminently that proper inward enjoyment which Lutheran and Reformed Christians, and even catholics, with all their

diversity of speculation on this point, may have alike in the Lord's Supper. Christ, when he was about to leave the world, no more to be seen by his followers with the mortal eye, left them this Supper as a visible pledge of his presence, his protection, and love.

(2) There are some theologians who think that the whole doctrine respecting the presence of Christ is destitute of proof, and is derived merely from the misunderstanding of the passage, 1 Cor. xi., and from the false interpretation of it given by the fathers. Their hypotheses, it is said, have not been sufficiently examined, but have been too credulously admitted, and other theories have been built upon them, after they had been previously assumed as true. This opinion might be called the *Pelagian* theory; not because it can be shewn that it was held by Pelagius himself, but because it has been usually adopted by those who are of the Pelagian way of thinking respecting the influences of grace. On this subject, vide Art. xii. They contend that in partaking of the Lord's Supper we are *merely* reminded of Christ, especially of his body offered and his blood shed on our account. According to this view, his body and his blood, while we thus commemorate his death, are present to our thoughts, in the same figurative way as the body of a deceased friend or benefactor may be present to our minds when we are thinking of him. This view is contrary to the New Testament; for it comes to nothing more than a mere remembrance of Christ, and an assistance from him, improperly so called. Vide s. 98.

They go on to say that Paul, indeed, in 1 Cor. xi. 27, 29, uses the words *σῶμα καὶ αἷμα Χριστοῦ* with reference to this ordinance; but that he does not affirm that the communicant eats the body or drinks the blood of Christ, but merely the bread and wine, ver. 28; and that although the ancient Christians sometimes spoke as if the body and blood of Christ were really received by communicants, (as was very natural, in accordance with John, vi.,) yet the same is true here which was spoken by Cicero, (Nat. Deor. iii. 16,) *Cum fruges CEREREM, vinum LIBERUM dicimus*, (panem, corpus Christi, vinum, sanguinem Christi,) *genere nos quidem sermonis utimur usitato; sed quem tam amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo vescatur, Deum (corpus Christi) credat esse?*

The difficulties in the way of this Pelagian theory, which leaves the Lord's Supper a mere ceremony, are stated by Morus, p. 267, note 5. He shews very clearly that this theory is not in the spirit of the other Christian ordinances. Cf. Storr on this article, in his System. The attempts of many modern writers who have discussed this point (those, e. g., cited by Morus, p. 266, s. 7, in the note) come to the same thing; for to many of them the doctrine of the nearness of Christ and his assistance—i. e., of his uninterrupted

activity in behalf of his followers, is extremely repugnant, because they do not see how they can reconcile it with their philosophical hypotheses, which, however, are wholly baseless. But this doctrine is clearly taught in the holy scriptures, and is one of the fundamental truths of apostolical antiquity.

(3) Many moderate protestant theologians are now of opinion that nothing was plainly and definitely settled by Jesus and the apostles respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the sacramental elements, and that this doctrine cannot therefore be regarded as essential, but rather as problematical. Formerly this doctrine, relating merely to the manner of this presence, was regarded as a fundamental article of faith; hence each of the contending parties adhered zealously to its own theory, regarding it as the only scriptural one, and looking upon all who thought differently as heretics. This was the cause of that unhappy and lasting division which took place in the sixteenth century between two churches which agreed on fundamental doctrines, and which ought mutually to have tolerated their disagreement on this particular point. So judged Melancthon, and disapproved of the violent controversies of his age. Even in his learned writings he passed briefly over topics of this nature, and assigns as the reason of his not going more deeply into them, "*ut a questionibus illis juventutem abducerem.*"

Speculations respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ have not the least influence upon the nature or the efficacy of the Lord's Supper. What the Christian needs to know is, the object and the uses of this rite, and to act accordingly. Vide s. 145. He must therefore believe from the heart that Christ died for him; that now in his exalted state he is still active in providing for his welfare; and that hence it becomes him to approach the Lord's table with feelings of the deepest reverence and most grateful love to God and to Christ. Upon this everything depends, and this makes the ordinance truly edifying and comforting in its influence. These benefits may be derived from this ordinance by all Christians; and to all who have true faith, or who allow this ordinance to have its proper effect in awakening attention to the great truths which it exhibits, it is a powerful, divinely-appointed means of grace, whatever theory respecting it they may adopt,—the Lutheran, Calvinistic, or even the Roman-catholic transubstantiation, gross as this error is.

It is obvious, then, that all subtle speculation respecting the manner of the presence of the body and blood of Christ should have no place in popular instruction, but should be confined to learned and scientific theology. In the present state of things, however, these disputed points cannot be *wholly* omitted in public teaching.

But the wise teacher will skilfully shew that he does not regard these as the principal points in this doctrine, according to the views just given; in such a way, however, that even the weak will not be offended. It will be best for teachers, in the practical exhibition of the theory of the Lutheran and Reformed churches, to proceed on the principle before laid down—viz., “that Christ, in his present state of exaltation, as God and man, can exert his power when and where he pleases; and that, as he has promised to grant his presence, his gracious nearness and assistance to his true followers till the end of the world, they may rejoice in the belief that it will be especially vouchsafed to them during this solemn festival in commemoration of him.” This principle is wholly scriptural.

ARTICLE XV.

ON DEATH, AND THE CONTINUANCE AND DESTINY OF MEN AFTER DEATH; OR THE DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE LAST THINGS.

SECTION CXLVII.

OF DEATH.

I. *Different Descriptions and Names of Death.*

(1) No logical definition of death has been generally agreed upon. This point was much contested in the seventeenth century by the Cartesian and other theologians and philosophers. Since death can be regarded in various points of view, the descriptions of it must necessarily vary. If we consider the state of a dead man, as it strikes the senses, death is the cessation of natural life. If we consider the cause of death, we may place it in that permanent and entire cessation of the feeling and motion of the body which results from the destruction of the body. Among theologians, death is commonly said to consist in the separation of soul and body, implying that the soul still exists when the body perishes. Among the ecclesiastical fathers, Tertullian (*De Anima*, c. 27) gives this definition: *Mors—dissunctio corporis animæque; vita—conjunctio corporis animæque*. Cicero (*Tusc. i.*) defines death, *discessus animi a corpore*. The passage, Heb. iv. 12, is sometimes cited on this subject, but has nothing to do with it. Death does not consist in this separation, but this separation is the consequence of death. As soon as the body loses feeling and motion, it is henceforth useless to the soul, which is therefore separated from it.

(2) Scriptural representations, names, and modes of speech respecting death.

(a) One of the most common in the Old Testament is, *to return to the dust, or to the earth*. Hence the phrase, *the dust of death*. It is founded on the description, Gen. ii. 7, and iii. 19, and has been explained in s. 52, 75. The phraseology denotes the dissolution and destruction of the *body*. Hence the sentiment in Eccles. xii. 7, “The body returns to the earth, the spirit to God.”

(b) A withdrawing exhalation, or removal of the breath of life. Vide Ps. civ. 29. Hence the common terms, ἀφῆκε, παρέδωκε τὸ πνεῦμα, reddidit animam, ἐξέπνευσεν, expiravit, &c.

(c) A removal from the body, a being absent from the body, a departure from it, &c. This description is founded on the comparison of the body with a tent or lodgment in which the soul dwells during this life. Death destroys this tent or house, and commands us to travel on. Vide Job, iv. 21; Is. xxxviii. 12; Ps. lii. 7, where see my Notes. Whence Paul says, 2 Cor. v. 1, the ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σαρκῶς will be destroyed; and Peter calls death ἀπόθεσις τοῦ σαρκώματος, 2 Pet. i. 13, 14. Classical writers speak of the soul in the same manner, as κατασχόντων ἐν τῷ σώματι. They call the body σῶμα. So Hippocrates and Æschines. 2 Cor. v. 8, 9, ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.

(d) Paul likewise uses the term ἐκδέσθαι in reference to death, 2 Cor. v. 3, 4; because the body is represented as the garment of the soul, as Plato calls it. The soul, therefore, as long as it is in the body, is clothed; and as soon as it is disembodied, is naked.

(e) The terms which denote *sleep* are applied frequently in the Bible, as everywhere else, to death. Ps. lxxvi. 7; Jer. li. 39; John, xi. 13, et seq. Nor is this language used exclusively for the death of the pious, as some pretend, though this is its prevailing use. Homer calls *sleep* and *death* twin brothers, *Iliad*, xvi. 672. The terms also which signify *to lie down, to rest*, (e. g. καθεῖμαι, occumbere,) also denote death.

(f) Death is frequently compared with and named from a *departure, a going away*. Hence the verba *eundi, abeundi, discedendi*, signify, *to die*; Job, x. 21; Ps. xxxix. 4. The case is the same with ὑπάγω and πορεύομαι in the New Testament, Matt. xxvi. 24, and even among the classics. In this connexion we may mention the terms ἀναλινεῖν and ἀνάλυσιν, Phil. i. 23; 2 Tim. iv. 6, which do not mean *dissolution*, but *discessus*. Cf. Luke, xii. 36. Vide Wetstein on Phil. 1.

Note.—We have before remarked, in the Article respecting *Sin*, that death, when personified, is described as a ruler and tyrant, having vast power and a great kingdom, over which he reigns. But the ancients also represented it under some figures, which are not common among us. We represent it as a man with a

scythe, or as a skeleton, &c.; but the Jews before the exile frequently represented death as a hunter, who lays *snare*s for men; Ps. xviii. 5, 6; xci. 3. After the exile they represented him as a man, or sometimes as an angel, (the angel of death,) with a cup of poison, which he reaches to men. From this representation appears to have arisen the phrase, which occurs in the New Testament, *to taste death*, Matt. xvi. 28; Heb. ii. 9; which, however, in common speech, signifies merely *to die*, without reminding one of the origin of the phrase. The case is the same with the phrase *to see death*, Ps. lxxxix. 49; Luke, ii. 26.

II. *Scriptural senses of the words "death" and "to die;" and the Theological distinctions to which they have given rise.*

(1) Death frequently denotes the *end* or the *destruction* of everything. It is therefore applied to countries and cities which perish. The inhabitants of them are compared with dead men. The restoration of them is compared with resurrection from the dead. So Isaiah, xxvi. 19, 20; Ezek. iii. 7, seq.

(2) Hence arise the figurative modes of speech, *to be dead to anything*, as *to the law*, *to sin*, &c.; Gal. ii. 19; Rom. vi. 2, 5, &c.

(3) But this term is used with great frequency in a *moral* sense—e. g., *to be dead to all goodness*, *to be dead to sin*—i. e., to be disqualified for all goodness by the sin reigning within us, Ephes. ii. 1, 5; v. 14. Likewise the opposite, *to live*, *to be alive for goodness*—i. e., to be active in virtue and capable of performing it. (*Mors et vita spiritualis et moralis*.)

(4) Death is conceived to be the substance and sum of all misery; and the punishment of death as the severest punishment. Accordingly, death denotes (a) every unhappy condition in which human beings are placed, as to body and soul. The opposite, *life*, denotes *welfare*, *prosperity*, Ezek. xviii. 32; xxxiii. 11; Rom. vii. 10, 13. (b) *Punishments*, as the unhappy consequences of the transgression of the law. In this sense, *death* is frequently used in Syriac and Chaldee, and death in the New Testament; Rom. i. 32; 1 John, iii. 14; James, v. 20. (c) The Jews called the punishments of the lost in hell *the second death*—i. e., the death of the soul, which follows that of the body. Traces of this use are found in Philo, in the Chaldaic paraphrases of the Old Testament, and very frequently among the Rabbins. In this sense is *ὁ δεύτερος θάνατος* used in Rev. ii. 11; xx. 6, 14; xxi. 8. Vide Wetstein on Rev. ii. So, too, *ὁ δεύτερος, ἀπώλεια*, &c. &c.

From these various senses of the word death theologians have taken occasion to introduce the division of death into *temporal* or *bodily*, *spiritual*, (by which is meant a state of sin and in-

capacity for virtue,) and *eternal*, (the punishments of eternity.) The latter is what is otherwise called the *second death*, *mors secunda*, *cujus nulla est finis*, as Augustine remarks. Vide s. 79, No. 2. The Bible, too, gives the name of death (*mors spiritualis*) to the state of sin, inasmuch as it is (a) an *unhappy* state, and (b) a state which incapacitates sinners for all goodness. Hence sinners are said, Ephes. ii. 5; Col. ii. 13, to be νεκροὶ ἐν παραπτώμασι, partly because they are unhappy in consequence of sin, (vide the opposite,) and partly because they are dead to all goodness, or are incapacitated for it. Hence, too, those sinners who are secure, ignorant, and regardless of the misery and danger of their situation, are said to *sleep*, or to *dream*, Jude, ver. 8, (ἐν νηπιάζομενοι.)

III. *The Universality or Unavoidableness of Death; also a Consideration of the Question, whether Death is the Punishment of Sin, and how far it is so.*

(1) Death is *universal* and *inevitable*. None in the present state are excepted. This is the uniform declaration of scripture. Ps. xlix. 8—12; lxxxix. 49; Rom. v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 22; Heb. ix. 27. Christ himself was not excepted from this general lot of mortality, (though he submitted to it of his own accord,) John, x. 17, 18; since Paul declares, Heb. ii. 14, seq., that he became man, that he might be able to die for our good.

Some exceptions to this general lot are mentioned in scripture. (a) In ancient times, Enoch, of whom it was said, Gen. v. 24, that God *took him*, because he led a pious life. Some of the fathers incorrectly understood this passage to mean, *that he died*. Cf. Heb. xi. 5. Elias is another exception, 2 Kings, ii. 11. Similar narratives are found among the Greeks and Romans, from which we learn that it was a common notion among the ancient people that men who were especially beloved by the Deity were removed from earth to heaven alive, or after their death. (b) In future times. Those who are alive at the day of judgment, according to Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 51, coll. 1 Thess. iv. 15, shall not die, (κοιμηθήσονται,) but shall be changed (ἀλλαγήσονται)—i. e., their body, without previous dissolution, (death,) shall be ennobled by a simple renovation or change; since this mortal body is incapable of the enjoyment of heavenly blessedness; ver. 50, 53, 54, coll. 2 Cor. v. 2—4, ἐπενδύσασθαι οὐκ ἄχρῳ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, (to be clothed.)

(2) The mortality of the human body is expressly derived in the record of Moses, Gen. ii. 17, also chap. iii., from the taste of the forbidden fruit, or of the poisonous tree. It was by this means that our first parents themselves became mortal, and thus propagated their disor-

dered and dying bodies to all their posterity. Vide s. 74, 75, 78. The universality and unavoidableness of death is therefore, according to the scriptures, the result and consequence of the transgression of the first parents of the human race. And so, in all cases, the Bible derives death from the sin of the first man. Rom. v. 12, "Through one man came sin into the world, and death by sin, and so death became universal among men, (εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους διῆλθε.)" 1 Cor. xv. 21.

Here the question is thrown out, *whether the death of the posterity of Adam is to be regarded as the punishment of his sin?* To this the answer commonly given by theologians is, that with regard to the wicked, death is to be regarded in the light of a punishment, but not with regard to the pious, but that to them, on the contrary, it is a benefit. Since as the latter are, by means of death, translated into a more happy condition, it must be looked upon as a benefit as far as they are concerned; and so the scripture represents it. Vide s. 148. Still (a) death does not cease to be a great evil, *in itself considered*, to the whole human race, and even to the pious. Hence Paul denominates it ὁ ἐχθρός, 1 Cor. xv. 26; and considers it one of the calamities befalling our race, with regard to which even the pious man cannot be indifferent. He says expressly, 2 Cor. v. 4, that even to the Christian it is no pleasant thing to be *unclothed*—i. e., stripped of his body by death; but that he would rather be *clothed upon*—i. e., be invested with his heavenly body immediately, without the intervention of death. (b) When it is said that death, in the posterity of Adam, is the punishment which they must undergo on account of his transgression, the term *punishment* is used in that general sense in which it is employed in common life, and often in the scriptures. But if it be taken in the strict philosophical sense, (in which punishment always presupposes *personal* guilt,) death can be properly called the punishment of sin only in reference to our first parents themselves; with regard to others, it is indeed the *consequence* and *result* of the sin of our first parents, but not properly its *punishment*. Vide s. 76, III., s. 78, III. 3, &c. This was remarked by many of the church fathers, especially before the time of Augustine; and they therefore objected to calling the death of the posterity of Adam the punishment of sin. Vide s. 79, No. 1, 2. (c) When it is said of Christ that he frees or redeems men from (bodily) death, the meaning is, that men owe it to him, in general, that the terrors of death are mitigated with regard to those who believe on him; and in particular, that our bodies are restored at the resurrection. Cf. John, xi. 25, 26. This is what is meant by the *redemptio a morte corporali per Christum*, s. 120, coll. s. 111,

II. 1. From the necessity itself of dying we could not be freed, unless God should produce an entirely new race of men. Cf. Cotta, Theasæ Theologicæ de Novissimis, Speciatim de Morte Naturali; Tübingen, 1762. [Also the treatise of Dr. Wm. Bates, "On the Four Last Things," and particularly on Death," chap. iii. and iv.—Tr.]

SECTION CXLVIII.

OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE CONTINUANCE OF THE HUMAN SOUL, AND ITS STATE AFTER DEATH.

It is the doctrine of Christ that the life of man is not bounded by this earthly state, but that, although he does not exist solely for the future, his life extends into eternity. The general doctrine of the Bible respecting the destination of man, as a rational and moral being, has been already exhibited in the Article on the Creation of Man, s. 51, II.; and it was there shewn to be holiness, and temporal and eternal happiness standing in the most intimate connexion with it. The superiority of our knowledge of the state of man after death, in comparison with that possessed by the ancient world, is not to be ascribed so much to the progress of science as to the work of Christ, and the influence of the Christian doctrine. Those who lived before Christ were not indeed wholly destitute of knowledge respecting this important truth; indeed, many heathens, both before and after the time of Christ, suggested very important arguments in behalf of immortality; still they were unable to attain to anything more than a high degree of probability on this subject. Vide s. 149. Every impartial man must concede that Christ has high claims to gratitude for what he has done in relation to this subject, even if he does not allow that he has disclosed anything new with regard to the future state of man.

(1) He has connected this truth most intimately with the other practical truths of religion, and referred all the rest to this in such a manner as no teacher before him ever did. And now, any one who acknowledges the divine authority of Christ, and of the Christian religion, obtains a satisfactory *certainly* respecting this doctrine, which at best can be rendered only highly *probable* by the light of nature. And from believing this doctrine, all religion comes to possess for him a new interest; and he finds in it the greatest consolation in sufferings and hardships of all kinds—the most effectual encouragement to holiness, and the greatest dissuasive from sin.

Note.—The strongest philosophical proofs in behalf of immortality are derived from the impossibility of reconciling the destruction of the whole man with the object of his existence, and

with the divine attributes. Vide s. 149. But a satisfactory certainty on this subject, and a conviction of the truth of immortality raised above all doubt, cannot be attained in this way. For the simple fact that we, by our reason, cannot reconcile any two things, does not prove that they are irreconcilable; nor can we conclude as to the reality of anything, merely from the fact that it is to be wished for by us. Cf. Seneca, who says, Ep. 102, *Philosophi rem hanc gratissimam PROMITTUNT, magis quam PROBANT*.

(2) By the plain instruction which Christ has given respecting this subject, and the obvious reasons he has adduced for it, he has made it universally intelligible, and in a very high degree comprehensible, even by the great mass of mankind. He has done this especially by the connexion in which he has placed it with the history of his own person, by which everything is rendered more obvious, and receives a greater and more lively interest. Vide s. 120. Hence the remark of Paul, 2 Tim. i. 10, is very true, that Christ by his doctrine has taken away the power of death, so that it is no more to be feared; he has made us certain of blessedness, and for the first time placed the doctrine of eternal life (*ζωή και ἀφθαρσία*) in a clear light (*φωτισμός*). Cf. Einiges, Ueber das Verdienst der christlichen Religion um die Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele; Flensburg und Leipzig, 1788, 8vo.

The following are the chief points of Christian instruction respecting the life of the soul after death:—

I. *Scripture Proof of Immortality, and what is implied in it.*

In death, the *body* only dies; but the soul survives the body, and lives on uninterruptedly, and is immortal. Here belongs the text, Matt. x. 28, where Christ says that tyrants and persecutors have power only over the body, and can kill that only, but have no power to kill the soul, over which God alone has rule and power. Again, Luke, xvi. 19, the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, ver. 22, 23, seq.; Luke, xx. 38, “God is not a God of the dead, but of the living.” Also many passages in John, in which Jesus promises an immortality, and that too of blessedness, to his true followers, and assures them that in death their souls shall not perish—e. g., John, v. 24; viii. 51; chap. xi.; xii. 24—26; xiv. 2, 3, where he says that in his father’s house there are many mansions, and that he was going to prepare a place for them, and to bring them thither unto himself, (by death.) Cf. the promise given to the malefactor on the cross, Luke, xxiii. 43.

But he always connects this doctrine with that respecting his own person. He it is to

whom we are indebted for this truth; without him we should not have had it. He is the purchaser and the giver of life, and of a blessed immortality; whoever believes in him, although he may die, yet lives; John, xi. 25, 26. With this the doctrine of the apostles agrees. Vide 2 Cor. v. 1—10; 2 Tim. i. 10; 1 Thess. iv. 13, seq.; Phil. i. 23; 1 Pet. iv. 6, departed Christians (*νεκροί*) are regarded by men as evil-doers, and as miserable persons, who have been justly persecuted and punished; but their spirit is introduced by God into a happy life. So Matt. x. 28.

It pertains essentially to the immortality of the soul that our *self-consciousness* will remain, and that we shall then have the conviction that our state after death is the consequence of the life that now is; as the parable, Luke, xvi. 22, seq., plainly shews. Cf. Luke, xx. 27, and John, viii. 56, Ἀβραάμ—εἰδὲ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν, καὶ ἰχάρῃ. Cf. also 2 Cor. v. 8, 9, and the other texts cited by Morus, s. 2, note.

The doctrine respecting the *sleep of the soul* does not agree with the declarations of Christ, and is directly opposed to them. Some have maintained that the soul after death remains, for a time at least, in a state of insensibility and unconsciousness, which they compare with sleep. Vide s. 150, where some of the texts to which they appeal are examined. They suppose that it is first awakened from this sleep at the last day, when it is reunited to the body. The state in which they suppose the soul to be in the meantime is called *lethargus*, and those who hold this doctrine are called *ὑποψυχισταί*, and those who wholly deny the immortality of the soul, *ψυχοπαννυχισταί*. They support their doctrine in part by an appeal to some figurative representations in the holy scriptures respecting the kingdom of the dead, by which it is set forth as the land of silence, darkness, and forgetfulness; and in part by the common experience that our souls do not feel and receive sensations except through the body and the organs of sense, and that when the brain is injured, consciousness and memory often wholly disappear. To this it is justly objected, that it is impossible to conclude, without the greatest fallacy, merely from the present constitution of man, in which soul and body are intimately connected, how it will be hereafter, when the soul and body shall have been entirely separated.

Christ and the apostles held no principles that could lead to the doctrine of the sleep of the soul. They rather regarded the earthly body which we inherit as the nearest spring and source of human depravity, and of the sins arising from it, and of all consequent pain and misery. Vide s. 77, II. According to this doctrine we obtain by death a release from many sufferings; the disembodied spirit can exert its

energies more freely than before, and enters upon a far greater and wider sphere of action. Cf. Rom. viii. 23, ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος, Rom. vii. 5, 18, 23, 24, σῶμα θανάτου, 1 John, iii. 2. Vigilantius, in the fifth century, was accused, though unjustly, by Hieronymus, of holding this opinion respecting the sleep of the soul. In the twelfth century it was condemned by Innocent III. In the sixteenth century it was advocated again by some anabaptists and Socinians, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, by Christopher Artobe, John Heyn, and others.

II. The Connexion of the Life to Come with the Present.

On this point, Christ and the apostles teach,

(1) That the life after death is an immediate continuation of the present life. The soul is not altered in death, but takes along with it its dispositions, its habits, and whole tendency, into the future world. The life to come, taken in connexion with the present, make together one whole, even as manhood is only the continuation of youth. Morus *et alii* observes, *tenore continuo necti finem vitæ et initia futuræ sortis*.

(2) That the life to come is to be regarded as the *consequence* of the present, since the consequences of all our present dispositions, inclinations, and actions, continue there. Death determines the destiny of men in the future world. It is here that man lays the foundation either for his future happiness or misery; this is the state of probation, that of retribution. All this is taught in the New Testament, sometimes literally, and at other times figuratively—e. g., it is sometimes represented under the image of *sowing and reaping, a contest, and the crowning, &c.* Vide Luke, xvi. 25; Hebrews, ix. 27; Rom. ii. 5—12; 2 Cor. iv. 7; v. 10; 1 Tim. vi. 18, 19; Gal. vi. 7, 10, “What a man sows, that shall he also reap; he that follows his carnal appetites shall reap φθοράν; the pious Christian, ζωὴν αἰώνιον.”

III. The Intermediate State between Death and the Judgment.

The restoration of the body (the raising of the dead) will not take place until the end of the world, the last day of the present constitution of things—a period which no one knows beforehand. Vide s. 151, seq. And then will every one, for the first time, receive the *full measure* of reward or punishment allotted him, according to his conduct in the present life. Vide Luke, x. 12; Rom. ii. 16; 2 Cor. v. 10.

Before this time shall arrive, the disembodied spirit will be in a certain *intermediate* state. The exact nature of this state is not indeed particularly described to us, and we are unable

even to conceive of it distinctly; but so much the Bible plainly teaches, that immediately after death the soul passes into that state for which, from the nature of its previous life, it is prepared. Immediately after death, retribution begins; the pious are happy, and the wicked miserable, each in exact proportion to his feelings and actions. Vide Luke, xvi. 22—25, (the parable respecting Lazarus.) This truth, too, is always placed by Christ himself and his apostles in intimate connexion with his own person—e. g., Luke, xxiii. 43, “To day shalt thou be with me in paradise.” Phil. i. 23, ἀναλῦσαι καὶ σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι; 2 Cor. v. 8, ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐνδημῆσαι πρὸς τὸν Κύριον.

In what the rewards and punishments of this intermediate state will consist cannot be determined, nor whether, in addition to those which are natural—the necessary consequences of action and feeling,—there will also be, even then, those which are positive and result from the free appointment of God. As to those who are lost, the Bible teaches us only this, that their punishment—their whole state of misery—will commence immediately after death; Luke, xvi. 22, seq. And for this we have the analogy of what the New Testament teaches respecting the miserable intermediate state of the evil spirits, which will last until the day of judgment, 2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude, 7. Vide s. 63. For the fate of lost men is described as one and the same with that of evil spirits. Vide Matthew, xxv. 41. On the other hand, the happy intermediate state of the pious commences also immediately after death. The texts in proof of this are cited by Morus, p. 289, s. 1, note 2. Their blessedness is likened to that of the holy angels; hence they are called by Jesus himself ἰσαγγέλτοι, Luke, xx. 36.

Since, now, the destiny of man is decided immediately after death, and since among men such a decision is usually made by a *judgment* and *sentence*, there is no more proper way of representing this arrangement of God with respect to the future destiny of men than by comparing it with a judgment, since it has the same effect as a formal judgment. This has given occasion to the division of judgment into *particular* or *preceding* (*judicium particulare, or antecedens*), which denotes nothing more than the determining of the fate of men immediately after death; and *universal* or *subsequent*, (*judicium universale, or consequens*.) It is respecting the former that Paul speaks, Heb. ix. 27, “It is appointed to all men once to die, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο κρίσις”—i. e., then follows the determination of their destiny, whether it shall be happy or miserable. Cf. 2 Cor. v. 10. The Pharisees also, according to Josephus, (Antiq.

xviii. 2,) taught that the soul is immortal, and after death is *judged under the earth*, and rewarded or punished according to its works.

According to the doctrine of the New Testament, therefore, there is no third place, or medium, between heaven and hell, or between being happy and miserable, although there are very different degrees both of the one and of the other. The intermediate condition of which we have spoken must not be understood to imply this got footing very early in the Christian church. Vide s. 150. And this gave rise to the custom of *praying for the dead*, since men were foolish enough to imagine that there is room to obtain an alteration in the yet undecided destiny of departed spirits, while in truth their destiny must depend solely upon their own actions during the present life. This custom had become very general in the fourth century, and was at that time opposed by Aërius, presbyter of Pontus, as we learn from the testimony of Epiphanius, (Hær. 75,) who is very indignant against him on this account. It was also opposed by the Spanish presbyter, Vigilantius, in the fifth century, in reply to whom Hieronymus wrote a violent book. This doctrine was afterwards brought into connexion with that respecting *purgatory*, (vide s. 150;) and then followed *masses for souls*, as sacrifices for the departed. There are also some traces of *prayers for the dead* even among the Grecian Jews—e. g., 2 Macc. xii. 43—46, *ὑπὲρ νεκρῶν προσεύχασθαι*.

Note.—From what has now been said, it appears that death, so far as it is the transition to a higher and more perfect life, and the means of bringing us to the enjoyment of it, ought not to be terrible to us, but should rather be regarded as a benefit. Those only, however, can regard it in this light who have lived here according to their destination, who have obtained the forgiveness of their sins (*δικαιούμενοι*), and who go out of the world with pious and godly dispositions. Vide 2 Cor. v. 6—10; Phil. i. 21, 23; John, xiv. 1—4; 1 John, iii. 2, 3; 1 Peter, i. 4, 5, &c.

SECTION CXLIX.

HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE VARIOUS OPINIONS WHICH HAVE PREVAILED IN ANCIENT AND MODERN TIMES RESPECTING THE CONTINUANCE OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH; AND THE PROOFS DRAWN FROM REASON IN FAVOUR OF IT.

I. Ideas of Rude Nations.

THE ideas of most rude heathen nations respecting the state of man after death are indeed dark and obscure, as well as their ideas respecting the nature of the soul itself, which they regard as a kind of ærial substance, resembling

the body, though of a finer material. Vide s. 51, I. 3. Still it is found that the greater part of mankind, even of those who are entirely uncultivated, though they may be incapable of the higher philosophical idea of the immortality of the soul, are yet inclined to believe that the soul survives the body, and continues either for ever, or at least for a long time. Their susceptibility for this faith, and their inclination to it, depend upon the following circumstances—viz.,

(1) Upon the *love of life*, which is deeply planted in the human breast, and operates powerfully, and leads to the wish and hope that life will be continued even beyond the grave.

(2) Besides the traditions in behalf of this faith which uncultivated nations received transmitted from their fathers, they often had *dreams*, in which the dead appeared to them speaking and acting; and in this way they found their wishes, and the traditions they had received from their fathers, confirmed anew, so that the hope of immortality was always sustained in them, and never extinguished. Thus Homer represents (Il. xxiii. 103, seq.) that Achilles first became convinced that souls and shadowy forms have a real existence in the kingdom of shades, by the appearance to him of the departed Patroclus in a dream. So too it is represented in the parable of Christ, Luke, xvi. 27, where the rich man wished that Lazarus might be sent to appear before his living brethren, since if one of the dead should teach them respecting the state and destiny of the dead, they would believe. Moreover, these visions were often regarded as divine,—ὄραφ ἐκ Διὸς ἐστὶ, Il. i. 63.

But we find that many heathen nations, long before they had any philosophy, or enjoyed the light of revelation, or before they endeavoured to prove the immortality of the soul by arguments drawn from reason, still possessed a firm belief of the continuance of the soul. So it was with the Egyptians, the Indians, the Thracians, the Celtæ, the ancient Germans, the ancient Greeks and Romans, and so it is with many of the rude heathen nations of our times. Vide Meiners, Geschichte aller Religionem, s. 174, f. Hence we find *necromancy* practised among the most barbarous people of all ages; (vide s. 66;) and the prevalence of this presupposes, of course, a belief in the existence of the soul beyond the grave. Vide Scripta Varii Argumenti, Number iii., “Origo opinionum de immortalitate animorum apud nationes barbaras atque a cultu veri Dei alienas.”

II. Ideas of the Jewish Nation.

(1) Many have maintained that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is not taught in the Old Testament. This was especially maintained by many Socinian writers of the sixteenth

and seventeenth centuries. Others have gone so far as to construe the supposed silence of the Old-Testament writers on this subject into a formal denial of the doctrine, and have attempted to justify their opinion by some texts in which it seems to be said that all is over with man at his death—e. g., Eccl. iii. 19. seq.; Is. xxxviii. 18; Ps. vi. 6; xxx. 10; lxxxviii. 11; cxv. 17; Job, vii. 7—10; x. 20—22; xiv. 7—12; xv. 22. The Fragmentist of Wolfenbüttel attacked the divine authority of the Jewish religion in the most odious manner by these objections. Cf. the fourth Fragment from Lessing's *Beyträgen zur Geschichte und Literatur aus der wolfenbüttel'schen Bibliothek*, th. iv. s. 484, f. On the other hand, Warburton (*Divine Legation of Moses*) derived one of his main proofs of the divine mission of Moses from this his supposed silence on the subject of immortality. Moses, he argues, being sustained in his legislation and government by immediate divine authority, had not the same necessity that other teachers have for making use of threatenings and punishments drawn from the future world, in order to furnish motives to obedience.

(2) But even if it were true that there is no text, either in the books of Moses or the writings of a subsequent period, in which the immortality of the soul is distinctly mentioned, it would by no means follow that this idea was at that time wholly unknown among the Israelites. Even from this supposition we must draw the contrary conclusion. For, not to mention that the Israelites and their ancestors were in Egypt, where this faith was very ancient, (according to Herodotus, ii. 123, the Egyptians were the first who entertained it,) it is proved that the Jews held this doctrine (a) From the laws of Moses against *necromancy*, or the invocation of the dead, which was very commonly practised by the Canaanites also, (Deut. xviii. 9—12,) and which, notwithstanding these laws, was for a long time afterwards retained among the Israelites, as appears from 1 Sam. xxviii., and the prophets. (b) From the appropriate ancient Hebrew name for the kingdom of the dead *לְאֻמִּים* (*l'olam*), which so often occurs in Moses and the other books of the Old Testament. That Moses did not in his laws hold up the punishments of the future world to the terror of transgressors, is a circumstance which redounds to his praise, and cannot be alleged against him as a matter of reproach, since other legislators have been reproached with being either deluded, or themselves impostors for doing this very thing. And Moses did not design to give a system of theology in his laws.

(3) But from passages in his writings it may be seen that this doctrine was not unknown to him. These passages have been collected by different writers with different success. Vide

Michaelis, *Argumenta pro Immortalitate Animi*, è Mose Collecta, in *Syntagm. Comment. t. i.*; Göttingen, 1759. Lüderwald, *Untersuchung von der Kenntniss eines künftigen Lebens im Alten Testamente*; Helmstädt, 1781. Semler, *Beantwortung der Fragen des wolfenbüttel'schen Ungenannten*. Seiler, *Obserr. ad psychologiam sacram*; Erlangen, 1779.

The following texts from the writings of Moses may be regarded as indications of the doctrine of immortality—viz., Gen. v. 22, 24, where it is said respecting Enoch, that because he lived a pious life, *God took him*, so that he was no more among men. This was designed to be the reward and consequence of his pious life, and it points to an invisible life with God, to which he attained without previously suffering death. Vide s. 147, iii. 1. Gen. xxxvii. 35, Jacob says, "I will go down into *לְאֻמִּים* unto my son." We have here distinctly exhibited the idea of a place where the dead dwell connected together in a society; vide s. 150. In conformity with this idea we must explain the phrase *to go to his fathers*, Gen. xv. 15; or, *to be gathered to his people*, (more correctly, *to enter into their habitation or abode*,) Gen. xxv. 8, xxxv. 29; Num. xx. 24, &c. In the same way many of the tribes of North-American savages express their expectation of an immortality beyond the grave, by saying respecting one who is dead, that he will now see his father, grandfather, great-grandfather, &c.

Paul argues from the text, Gen. xlvii. 9, and similar passages, where Jacob calls his life a *journey*, that the patriarchs expected a life after death, Heb. xi. 13—16. Only he says, very truly, *πρόβαδον ἰδόντες τὰς ἐπαγγελίας*. In Matt. xxii. 23, Christ refers, in arguing against the Sadducees, to Ex. iii. 6, where Jehovah calls himself the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, (i. e., their protector and the object of their worship,) long after their death. It could not be that their ashes and their dust should worship God; hence he concludes that they themselves could not have ceased to exist, but that, as to their souls, they still lived. Cf. Heb. xi. 13—17. And this passage was interpreted in the same way by the Jews after the time of Christ. Vide Wetstein, ad. h. l.

In the subsequent books of the Old Testament the texts of this nature are far more numerous. Still more definite descriptions are given of *לְאֻמִּים*, and the condition of the departed there; e. g., Is. xiv. 9, seq., also in the Psalms and in Job. Vide s. 150. Even in these texts, however, the doctrine of the reward of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked in the kingdom of the dead is not so clearly developed as it is in the New Testament; this is true even of the book of Job. Vide s. 151. All that we find here with respect to this point is only

obscure intimation, so that the Pauline *ἀνάστασις* *ῥόντες* is applicable, in relation to this doctrine, to the other books of the Old Testament as well as to those of Moses. In the Psalms there are some plain allusions to the expectation of reward and punishment after death, particularly Ps. xvii. 5; xlix. 15, 16; lxxiii. 24. There are some passages in the prophets where a *revivification of the dead* is spoken of, as Is. xxvi. 19; Dan. xii. 2; Ezek. xxvii. But although these do not teach a *literal* resurrection of the dead, but rather refer to the restoration of the nation and land, still these and all such figurative representations presuppose the proper idea that an invisible part of man survives the body, and will be hereafter united to it. Very clear is also the passage Eccl. xii. 7, "The body must return to the earth from whence it was taken, but the spirit to God who gave it," evidently alluding to Gen. iii. 19.

From all this we draw the conclusion that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was not unknown to the Jews before the Babylonian exile. This appears also from the fact that a general expectation existed of rewards and punishments in the future world; although, in comparison with what was afterwards taught on this point, there was at that time very little definitely known respecting it, and the doctrine, therefore, stood by no means in that near relation to religion and morality into which it was afterwards brought, as we see to be the fact often in other wholly uncultivated nations. Hence this doctrine is not so often used by the prophets as a motive to righteousness, or to deter men from evil, or to console them in the midst of suffering. But on this very account the piety of these ancient saints deserves the more regard and admiration. It was in a high degree unpretending and disinterested. And although the prospect of what lies beyond the grave was very indistinct in their view, and although, as Paul said, they saw the promised blessings only from afar, they yet had pious dispositions, and trusted God. They held merely to the general promise, that God their Father would cause it to be well with them even after death. Psalm lxxiii. 26, 28, "When my strength and my heart faileth, God will be the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever."

But it was not until after the Babylonian captivity that the ideas of the Jews on this subject appear to have become enlarged, and that this doctrine was brought by the prophets, under the divine guidance, into a more immediate connexion with religion. This result becomes very apparent after the reign of the Grecian kings over Syria and Egypt, and their persecutions of the Jews. The prophets and teachers living at that time (of whose writings, however, nothing has come down to us) must therefore have given to their nation, time after time, more instruction

upon this subject, and must have explained and unfolded the allusions to it in the earlier prophets. And so we find that after this time, more frequently than before, the Jews sought and found in this doctrine of immortality and of future retribution, consolation and encouragement under their trials, and a motive to piety. Such discourses were therefore frequently put in the mouths of the martyrs in the second Book of Maccabees—e. g., vi. 26; vii. 9, seq., coll. xii. 43—45. Cf. also the Book of Wisdom, ii. 1, seq.; and especially iii. 1, seq., and the other apocryphal books of the Old Testament.

At the time of Christ and afterwards this doctrine was universally received and taught by the Pharisees, and was indeed the prevailing belief among the Jews; as is well known from the testimony of the New Testament, of Josephus, and also of Philo. Tacitus also notices this firm belief of the Jews in the immortality of the soul. In his history (ver. 5) he says, *animas prælio aut suppliciiis peremptorum æternas putant*. Cf. an Essay comparing the ideas of the Apocryphal books of the Old Testament on the subjects of immortality, resurrection, judgment, and retribution, with those of the New Testament, written by Frisch, in Eichhorn's Bibliothek der Biblischen Literatur, b. iv.; Ziegler's Theol. Abhand., th. ii. No. 4. Flugge, Geschichte des Glaubens an Unsterblichkeit, u. s. w., th. i. But the Sadducees, and they only, boasting a great attachment to the Old Testament, and especially to the books of Moses, denied this doctrine, and, at the same time, the existence of the soul as distinct from the body.

But Christ did more to illustrate and confirm this consoling doctrine than had been before done among the Jews or any other people; and he first gave to it that high practical interest which it now possesses. Vide s. 148, at the beginning.

III. Philosophical Arguments.

As soon as they began in heathen nations to philosophize, and to investigate more closely the doctrines relating to God and the nature and destination of man, they saw the importance and great practical interest of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. It was found to exist already as a popular belief, but they now endeavoured to give it philosophical proof and demonstration. Here, as in other things, the Greeks distinguished themselves above other nations. They laid the first ground of those philosophical proofs which were afterwards enforced anew by Christian philosophers, and corrected and further developed. In the varied web of proof in our modern philosophical schools, the chief threads, and, as it were, the entire material, are of Grecian origin. According to the testimony of Cicero, the first Grecian philosopher who investigated this subject was Phere-

cydes; but according to Diogenes Laërtius, it was Thales. The followers of Socrates, however, did the most for this doctrine, and especially Plato, in his *Phædon*. The Platonic arguments are found collected in the *Tusculan Questions* of Cicero (i. 23), and also briefly stated in his *Treatise, De Senectute*, c. 21, seq. With regard to these proofs, it is difficult for us, with our present ideas, to see how the soul, separated from the body, could maintain its own subsistence or personality, since, according to Plato, it is only a part of the soul of the world, to which, after death, it will return.

There were, however, some among the Grecians who denied, or at least doubted, the immortality of the soul. Among these was Epicurus. The stoics contended, indeed, for the continuance of the soul after death, but not for its absolute immortality, with regard to which they were accustomed to speak doubtfully; as, for example, Seneca often does in his epistles. The opinions of Aristotle on this subject are doubtful; many of his disciples have concluded from his principles that the soul is not immortal—e. g., among his old followers, Dicaearchus; among the later Aristotelians, Averrhoës, in the twelfth century, and Peter Pomponatius, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in his book, “*De Animi Immortalitate*,” edited anew by Prof. Christi. Gottfr. Bardili; Tübingen, 1791, 8vo. He endeavours in this work to shew that, according to the principles of the Averrhoistic-Aristotelian philosophy, the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated on natural grounds.

Even among Christians there have been some who have denied the immortality of the soul. There was, for example, an Arabian teacher, in the third century, against whom Origen wrote, who maintained that the soul dies with the body, but is again raised with it at the last day; an opinion which was revived in the seventeenth century by William Coward, a London physician. Still more strange is the opinion of H. Dodwell, who, in a work published in London, 1706, contended that souls are naturally mortal, but become immortal only by means of Christian baptism.

The opinions of some of the grosser materialists of modern times are well known—e. g., of Toland, Helvetius, de la Mettrie, and the author of the *Système de la Nature*, who were followed in this by many of the so-called philosophers who wrote during the French Revolution; also many of the sceptics, who thought nothing could be determined on this subject—e. g., Hume.

A few words respecting these philosophic arguments themselves. It has been justly remarked by philosophers of modern times, especially by Wolf, that three things are involved in the immortality of the soul: (a) the uninter-

rupted continuance of the substance of the soul; (b) the continuance of its consciousness; and consequently (c) the lasting recollection of the soul, that its state after death is a consequence of that which preceded. This is very true; but long before these philosophers wrote, all these points were taught in the Christian doctrine, as we have already seen in s. 148. Cf. the single passage, Luke, xvi.

These philosophical proofs are either *metaphysical*—i. e., drawn from the idea which we have of the *nature* and *attributes* of the human soul; or *moral*—i. e. deduced from the relation between God and the human soul, or, which is the same thing, from the attributes and designs of God, and the destination of man as a moral being, as learned from the attributes of God. The foundation for all these arguments was laid by the Greeks, and by those who drew immediately from them. In modern times, however, they have been revised and rendered more accurate, and better adapted to the prevailing systems of philosophy.

(1) The *metaphysical* proofs are derived from the *simple* nature of the soul, (its immateriality,) from its inherent and essential activity, and from the maxim that *simple* things and elementary powers do not perish. Vide Cic. de Senectute, 21, seq. None but God *can* destroy the essential being of the soul; but it cannot be shewn that he either will destroy it or wishes so to do. But from this argument nothing more than the bare *possibility* of the immortality of the soul could be shewn. But this possibility, if it depends merely upon the will of God, is quite as obvious, even if the soul has not that absolutely simple nature which is ascribed to it. In general, a complete metaphysical proof is impossible, because we know so little of the true nature of the soul. The doctrine of the *simplicity* of the human soul, in the strict philosophical sense of this term, is a mere philosophical hypothesis. Vide s. 51, I. 3, note.

(2) The moral proofs are far more conclusive, though still not strong enough wholly to exclude all doubt and solicitude. Vide the introductory remarks to s. 148. Some of these moral proofs were urged by Plato and Cicero, in the passages above cited. The supposition of the mortality of the soul contradicts all our ideas of the attributes of God—his wisdom, goodness, and justice. Is the duration of man limited to the present life, then the destination of man, and the designs of God with regard to him, are the most inexplicable riddle, and everything is full of contradictions. But if this life is not the last, decisive state of man, but is to be regarded only as a state of education, trial, purification, and preparation for a future life, then the plan and connexion of things becomes clear and obvious. We are moral beings, and find in our souls capa-

cities for ever increasing moral improvement, and we feel a longing after immortality, in order to make higher advances in that moral and spiritual perfection in which the attainments of the best during the present life are so imperfect. These capacities and this longing are to be regarded as promises from the Creator. For were they never to be satisfied, he would not have placed them in the soul, as it could not have been his design to deceive us. If our souls are not immortal, then the beasts, which have merely an animal nature, and no rational and moral part, are far better in their condition than we, to whom a higher destination has plainly been given; for they can develop their constitutional capacities, and can satisfy the innate propensities of their natures. And shall not we, the nobler creation of God, be able to develop the far more perfect spiritual and moral powers which he has given us, and to satisfy our spiritual wants?

The whole system of the rights and duties of moral beings would appear to be a web of incongruities if the present life were the only one. And, in fine, the disorder and injustice which are obvious in the destiny of men in their earthly life almost irresistibly compel us to admit this doctrine to be true, and to console ourselves in the midst of these disorders by the belief of it. The manifest disorders of the present state occasioned great difficulty to all thinking men of former times, who did not fully and distinctly admit the truth of a future life and future retribution. Vide Job, xxiv. 1, seq.; Eccles. viii. 10, 11, 14; ix. 1—3. Vide s. 71, especially No. VI. ad finem. Cf. L. H. Jacob, Beweis für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele aus dem Begriffe der Pflicht; Züllichau, 1790, 8vo. This proof is drawn out on the principles of the Kantian philosophy, and was written in answer to the prize-question proposed by the Stolpic Institute at Leiden, "Whether there are any duties which, on grounds of reason, a man would feel himself bound to perform if he did not believe the soul to be immortal?"

Note.—The following are some of the principal modern writers on the immortality of the soul:—Clark, Sherlock, Addison, Reinbeck, Canz, Reimarus, Vornehmste Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion, 10 Abhand. Spalding, Die Bestimmung des Menschen. Jerusalem, Betrachtungen über die Wahrheiten der Religion, th. 1, 6 Beytr. Noesselt, Vertheidigung der christlichen Religion. Mendelsöhn, Phædon. Villette, Unterredungen über die Glückseligkeit des künftigen Lebens. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, and the work of Jacob above cited. The history of this doctrine has been given by Oporin, Franz, Cotta, Hennings, and Flugge, with which cf. Struvius, Historia Doctr. Græcor et Romanorum Philos.

de Statu Animarum post Mortem; Alten, 1803, 8vo. Simon, Geschichte des Glaubens an die Fortdauer der Seele nach dem Tode, an Gespenster, u. s. w.; Heilbronn, 1804, 8vo. Nic. Aug. Herrich, Sylloge Scriptorum de Spiritibus Puris et Animabus Humanis Earumque Materialitate, Immortalitate, et Statu post Mortem, deque Anima Bestiarum; Regensburg, 1790, 8vo.

[Matth. Claudius. Wandsbecker, Bote, th. v. Hahn, Lehrbuch. s. 634, ff., and his history of this doctrine, s. 641, ff.—Tr.]

SECTION CL.

OF SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE VARIOUS OPINIONS RESPECTING THE PLACE OF DEPARTED SOULS, AND THEIR CONDITION THERE.

I. *The Place of their Abode.*

(1) AMONG many rude nations, and also among some which are cultivated, (e. g., in America, Thibet, and Hindostan,) the opinion is found to prevail that the soul passes from one body into another, sometimes another human body, sometimes that of beasts, or even into plants and trees. This was called *μετεμψίχσις*, by Pliny, *transfiguratio*. Originally this transmigration of souls was not regarded as a matter of retribution, or as a means of purification. This turn was not given to the doctrine until a period of higher cultivation. It came to be understood in this light, for example, by Pythagoras and Plato among the Greeks. The belief in this doctrine seems rather to have rested, at first, upon a certain supposed analogy in nature, where one body is observed always to pass into another, and even when it seems to perish only alters its form and returns in a different shape. This belief may have also sprung in part from the almost universal idea that every thing in the whole creation is animated by a soul, especially everything possessing an internal life and power of motion—e. g., plants.

This doctrine of the transmigration of souls has also been held in modern times by many of the Jews. Vide Eisenmenger, Entdecktes Judenthum, th. ii. c. 61. It cannot, however, be shewn that this opinion prevailed among the Jews at the time of Christ, particularly among the Pharisees, either by the passages of the New Testament cited in favour of it, or by those from Josephus, Antiq. xviii. 2; Bell. Jud. ii. 12.

Among Christians, this notion has met with but little favour; and it has without reason been ascribed to the Gnostics, Manicheans, and even to Origen. The reason of its being ascribed to the latter was his belief in the pre-existence of the soul (vide s. 57, II. 1)—a belief which in some philosophical systems is intimately connected with the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul. Since the seventeenth century this

has been again regarded as a probable doctrine, on account of some analogy in the material world, and has been again advocated by Helmont, Edelmann, Lessing, (Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts.)

[*Note*.—The doctrine of the transmigration of souls has received new light from the investigations which have been made of late in Eastern literature. A deeply interesting exhibition of this subject is given by Fred. Schlegel in his "Philosophie der Geschichte," b. i. s. 147. He there shews that this is one of the most fundamental doctrines of faith in the Eastern world—that it rests upon a religious basis, and even in the earliest periods was connected with the idea of retribution and sanctification. The soul, it is supposed, after having been soiled and corrupted by its contact with the body and the world, must expiate its sins by wandering, for an appointed cycle, through various forms of uncongenial matter. By enduring these penal sufferings for a long time it becomes purified, and prepared to mingle again in the original, pure fountain from which it proceeded. At the bottom of this whole belief lies the deep and just feeling, that after man has wandered so far from God, in order to approach him again he must travel with great labour through a long and dreary way; and also the conviction, that nothing which is imperfect or stained with sin can enter into the pure world of blessed spirits, or be for ever united with God.—Tr.]

(2) Far more general was the opinion among the ancient nations that the abode of departed spirits is *under the earth*; because the dead are laid beneath the ground, and their body returns to the dust. The souls there separated from their bodies were regarded as a sort of aerial beings, or *shades*, (εἰδωλα, umbræ.) Vide s. 66, II. coll. s. 59, I. Taken as a whole, the ancient Eastern nations and the Greeks agreed in this point; while still it is not necessary to suppose that the latter borrowed their ideas from the former.

This place was denominated by the Hebrews לֹא־אֵשׁ, by the Greeks, ᾠδης—the word by which the LXX. always translate לֹא־אֵשׁ. The term ᾠδης is explained by Plutarch (De Is. et Osir.) by ἄνδρες, ἄφαντον, dark, where one sees nothing. It is allegorically explained by Plato, in his Cratylus, as the invisible world, because the place is unseen. Neither of these terms is used in the scriptures to signify exactly the grave, still less the *place of the damned*; nor are they used in this sense by any of the fathers in the first three centuries. Vide s. 96, I. The same place is called among the Hebrews הַמָּוֶת, as in Homer, ἔνδον γαίαν, ἐνδὸν κεύθεσσι γαίης, and the entrance to it is placed by the Greeks in the extreme west. Where the sun goes down, and his light and fire are extinguished, there, it was

naturally supposed, is the place where all things perish, and where darkness reigns.

Both the Hebrews and Greeks describe this *under-world* as a great kingdom, and both use the phrase, *gates of death*, or *Hades*. Cf. Homer. Here, according to the ideas of men in the *earliest ages*, the shades of the good and the bad dwell together, without any distinction or any marked separation. Thus it is where לֹא־אֵשׁ is introduced in the Old Testament—e. g., Is. xiv., where there is a kind of distinction of rank, and kings sit upon thrones; but where nothing definite and clear is said respecting a distinction in the places of the pious and the wicked. Thus in Homer, too, even those who are punished are in the same place with the other shades, Odys. xi. 575, seq.

But after a time these places in the lower world were divided, and the residences of the righteous and the wicked were conceived of as separate. Thus *Tartarus* among the Greeks, which, during the time of Homer and Hesiod, was regarded merely as the prison of the Titans, became gradually the universal abode of the damned. So it is with Plato and others, who are followed by Virgil, Æn. vi. In the same way did the conceptions of the Jews on this subject become more developed in later periods. According to Luke, xvi. 23—26, both the rich man and Lazarus are in Hades, but a *wide gulf*, (χάσμα μέγα,) as it is figuratively represented in the parable, separates the fields of the blessed from the place of the damned; no one may or can pass from the one to the other. The Jews too, in imitation of the Greeks, called the place of punishment, where wicked men and angels are reserved unto the day of judgment, Τάρταρος. Vide Joseph. Bell. Jud. ii. 7; 2 Pet. ii. 4; where Τάρταρος appears. Cf. s. 63, II.

From this it appears that the sacred writers retained the phraseology common among their contemporaries, in order to be more easily understood by them, and to make a stronger impression upon their minds. They, however, used all this only in the way of figure and figurative representation, by which they designed to set forth the most important truths with regard to the state of departed spirits; as any one may see from Luke, xvi., 2 Pet. ii., &c.

The whole kingdom of the dead is described by the ancients in a threefold method—viz., (a) as a dark, desolate, silent region, the land of forgetfulness, rest, and inactivity; since the dead rest silently in the grave under the earth, and are cut off from all connexion with the living world. Cf. the texts cited from the Old Testament, s. 149, II. (in init.) This gave rise to the idea respecting the *sleep of the soul* in after times. (b) Again it was described as a kingdom full of motion and activity, and as resembling as nearly as possible the present

world. Cf. Isaiah, xiv. (c) But in process of time these two representations were connected together in a great variety of ways.

Now the sacred writers, and Christ himself, often make use of figurative expressions, borrowed from these ideas, though they also frequently exchange them for others which are more literal. Thus what Christ represents in Luke, xxi., under the image of a steep walled grave, he describes elsewhere without a figure—viz., that the states of men in the future world will be very diverse, but exactly apportioned, both as to happiness and misery, according to their conduct in this life; and that it will not depend upon the choice of men to pass from one state to the other. Cf. Matt. xxv. The hindrances here are as great and insurmountable as a deep chasm is to one who would pass from one place to another. Cf. s. 148, I.

The ancient languages were still more deficient than those of the present day in philosophically definite expressions for objects beyond the cognizance of the senses. Indeed, many things could not be so much as conceived of without a symbolical representation; hence such are often found even in the writings of Plato, and other Grecian philosophers. According to this method, one could not indeed teach in so exact and definite a manner; but he would make a stronger impression upon the feelings and desires, and succeed better in awakening religious dispositions among those who were unacquainted with philosophical language. This hint is very important for the religious teacher. If he follows the method of instruction pursued in schools of philosophy, and adopts their phraseology, he will accomplish but little, and often be entirely unintelligible to his hearers. He must follow the example of the Bible, and make use alternately of figurative and literal representations. In fact, the whole representation of the invisible world must be figurative and symbolical, even when we make use of the most literal expressions in our power. It is all a mere comparison of the invisible world with something like it in the world of sense. For what the apostle said, "eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard," &c., is literally true in application to this subject.

With regard to Orcus, and the different views entertained on this subject among Christians, cf. Cotta, *De Inferno ejusque Sede*; Tübingen, 1775. As to the ideas of the Hebrews, cf. the works of Ziegler and Ammon, *Ueber das Todtenreich der Hebræer*; Erlangen, 1792. Cf. also, an *Excursus* of Heyne on the fourth *Æneid*, and other works cited below.

Note.—To any unprejudiced observer it cannot but appear a great excellence in the Bible, and especially in the New Testament, that it takes no part in the absurd conceptions which

have often prevailed on this subject, and from which the greatest philosophers are not altogether free—e. g., Plato. And, on the other hand, the Bible is equally deserving of praise for not exhibiting pure truths in metaphysical language, and making them the object of dry and curious speculation, but, on the contrary, in the highest degree intelligible, so that their practical application is obvious to every one.

(3) But many believed that departed souls remain in or about the graves or dwellings of the dead, either for ever, or for a long time. So many nations of different degrees of cultivation. The opinion was formerly very widely diffused, that departed spirits linger for a long time around the dead body, or at least sometimes return to it from the kingdom of the dead; and hence, in part, the belief in spectres, s. 66, II. These ideas prevailed to some extent among the Jews and many Christians; and even at the Council of Nîmègue, in the year 313, it is forbidden to kindle a light in burying-grounds, lest the spirits of the saints should be disturbed.

II. *Opinions respecting the state of Departed Souls.*

(1) It is apparent from what has been said, that, according to the ideas of the ancients, the employments, the state and life of departed souls, resemble the life of men in this upper world—an idea in which many germs of truth are involved. We find nothing said respecting the sleep of the soul either in the Old or New Testaments, nor in the earliest monuments of other nations. Vide s. 148. Quite as foreign from the conceptions of the earliest periods is the idea that the dead have no recollection of their earthly life, and take no interest in human affairs. The opposite of this is clear from the earliest records—e. g., from Homer (*Odys. xi. coll. II. xxii. 389, 390*), and from the holy scriptures, (*Is. xiv., Luke, xvi.*) It was for this reason that so many nations believed that the dead sometimes return, appear to men, and have personal intercourse with the living. And hence too the error of *invoking the saints*. These superstitious conclusions, however, are not favoured by the doctrine of Christ. Vide Luke, xvi. 27—31.

It was very natural, even for nations having no direct revelation, to come to the thought that the shades in Hades recognise each other, have mutual intercourse, and perpetuate the friendship begun in the present life. This idea might, indeed, like many others, have been abstracted from the mere *phantoms of a dream*. For in dreams our departed friends appear to be cognizable, as Patroclus did to Achilles, even as to his eyes, voice, and stature, *II. xxiii. 66, seq. 107*. This may be justified also by an appeal to scripture, Luke, xvi.; Heb. xii. 23, and Revelation. The soul, indeed, is no longer

regarded as a fine material substance, as it often was in ancient times; but these delightful views lose nothing on this account, as some have most unphilosophically supposed. For one may be recognised otherwise than by his body, and may be loved, too, otherwise than corporeally. Why then should not departed souls recognise each other, even when they no longer possess bodies?

(2) In the childhood of nations, the ideas of men have been commonly very vague and indefinite with regard to the *happy* or *miserable* state of departed souls. Cf. Meiners, *Geschichte der Religionen*, s. 174—178. With regard to what the Israelites in the earliest times knew on this subject, while they yet saw the promises in an obscure distance, cf. s. 149, II. Many of the heathen nations represented the state of the dead, not indeed as wholly miserable; still they regarded it as not altogether desirable, and often as rather worse than better, in comparison with their state in this world. Achilles in Hades does not speak of death very favourably, but would rather till the field on earth, as a day labourer, than rule all the hosts of the shades; *Odys.* xi. 487. For the *Elysium* in Homer is not as yet the residence of the departed souls of men, but only the abode of heroes or demigods.

But by degrees they advanced to more enlarged and correct conceptions. The Greeks then supposed that good men participate hereafter in the joys of Elysium, and that crimes are punished in Hades. At first, however, only the grosser offences were supposed liable to punishment there, and in Homer, one offence only—*perjury*; *Il.* iii. 278; *xix.* 259, 260. This indicates the great simplicity and the very defective ideas on moral subjects which still prevailed, since only the very grossest crimes were regarded as worthy of punishment. Afterwards, in the greater advance of cultivation, and the higher perfection of moral ideas, the number of crimes punished in Hades was very much increased; and at length it was believed that every virtue is there rewarded and every vice punished. So it is represented by Plato, and other Grecian philosophers; so also, in imitation of them, by Virgil, *Æneid*, vi. Vide Heyne, *Excurs.* 1 and 8.

A gradual development of ideas is also noticed among the Israelites. In general, the great multitude among them, as among other people, formed very gross conceptions respecting the joys and pains following death, and regarded them as merely *corporeal*, since they were unable to conceive of any other. Many understood literally the expressions, *to be in Abraham's bosom*, *to sit down at table with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*; the more enlightened, however, used them only as figurative expressions, as Christ himself always understood and

explained them in his instructions—e. g., Luke, xvi.

(3) The doctrine respecting an *intermediate state* of departed souls, and respecting *purgatory*. Cf. s. 148, III., and Morus, p. 290. Such a state, in which the fate of men is undecided until the day of judgment—a state which is neither heaven nor hell, neither being blessed nor damned, was supposed by many of the church fathers—e. g., Justin the Martyr, Irenæus, and Tertullian. Only some eminent saints and martyrs, it was supposed, come at once into heaven; and only the grossest sinners go at once into hell. This intermediate state they call, taking the appellation from Luke, xvi., *Sinum Abrahami*. To this they referred the text, 1 Pet. iii. 19, τὰ ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύματα. Vide s. 96. Thither Christ went, and rescued from thence the patriarchs and other pious men who had died before his atonement was made. This place was afterwards called *limbus* (*superior* or *exterior pars inferni*) *patrum*; and a *limbus infantium* was also supposed (and is still believed by the Romish church) into which children go, because they are not actually condemned, having committed no *peccata actualia*, while still, in consequence of original sin, they are unable to attain to the blessed vision of God.

The foundation for the doctrine of purgatory is found even in the second and third centuries. Its origin may be traced back to the Pythagorean or Platonic philosophy. Souls, according to Plato, are a part of the divine nature, which, however, are confined in the body, as in a prison. Vide s. 74, I. ad finem. Now, even after the soul of man is disembodied, there still cleaves to it much sin and impurity, acquired from its contact with the body, and this impurity is regarded by Plato as a natural *sickness*. It cannot therefore, immediately on leaving the body, return again to its original source. With some, the disorder is *incurable*, and these are *the lost*, who go at once to *Tartarus*; with others, it is curable, and these are purged and purified in Hades. This process Plato compared with purification (καθάρσις) by water, air, and fire; and represented this state as an intermediate one. Vide Plato, *Phædon*, c. 62; and Virgil, *Æneid*, vi. 735—751, and Heyne, *Excurs.* xiii.

This, with many other Platonic doctrines and fables, was early transferred to Christianity. We find traces of it among the Gnostics, (according to the testimony of Irenæus, ii. 51, seq.) in the writings of Clement of Alexandria, in the second century, and of Origen, in the third. But after the fourth century it was more widely diffused through the Latin church. It is found in Hieronymus, Lactantius, Ambrosius, and even Augustine; the latter of whom, however,

though he speaks of *ignis purgatorius*, regards the subject as doubtful. In the sixth century this doctrine was taught by Gregory the Great, in the eighth by Beda, Boniface, and others. It was supposed that those Christians only who commit no deliberate sin after baptism are exempt from this punishment, or such as become martyrs, or who, by assuming the monastic life, have made atonement for their sins. Gross offenders—those who, according to Plato, are irrecoverably disordered, pass immediately after death into hell. Those who have not sinned so grossly, (who are recoverable,) or whose repentance commences in the present life, but remains imperfect, although they are not eternally condemned, yet do not attain at once to the enjoyment of God. Such persons, it was supposed, need to be purified and to make expiation for their sins by the endurance of certain penalties appointed by God, conceived of under the image of purifying by fire. The advocates of this view endeavoured to support it by such texts of scripture as the following—viz., 1 Cor. iii. 13, (as by fire;) Jude, ver. 23; Malachi, iii. 2; 2 Macc. xii. 39.

This doctrine became connected with many opinions and practices equally unscriptural, especially with offering prayer for the dead, and making satisfaction to relieve them from punishment; and also with the doctrine of the Lord's Supper as a sacrifice for the dead—a doctrine which prevailed during the eleventh and twelfth centuries; at which time, also, masses offered in order to free souls from purgatory became common. As early as the eleventh century, the feast of *all souls* was appointed by Pope John XVIII. This doctrine was now adopted by the schoolmen into their systems—e. g., by Peter of Lombardy, Thomas Aquinas, and others. The most frightful representations were given of purgatory, founded upon stories of the apparition of souls from thence, &c. The theologians, too, contended respecting the place, manner, and duration of this punishment. And the council at Florence, in 1439, gave this doctrine the authority of a formal article of faith. As such, it still continues in the Romish church, and was re-established by the council at Trent.

This doctrine, however, of the Romish church respecting purgatory, as it has been gradually developed by the schoolmen, and as it was established by the council at Florence, differs in two essential points from the old Platonic notion which was adopted by Origen and other church fathers—viz., (a) According to Origen and the Platonists, all without exception are subjected to this purification, although some need it more, and others less. But according to the opinion of the Romish church, those only go into purgatory who, though they have been baptized and believe, are not of perfect virtue.

(b) According to Origen and the Platonic idea, the whole design of this suffering is to promote the moral improvement and perfection of men; but according to the conception of the Romish church, it is designed to make atonement and expiation for sin.

Note.—Works on this subject. (a) *Historical*: Jac. Windet, *Στοιματὲς ἐπιστολικός* de Vita Factorum Statu ex Hebræorum et Græcorum comparatis Sententiis concinnatus; Londini, 1663—64. *Système des Anciens et des Modernes sur l'Etat des Ames séparées de Corps*; à Londres, 1757, 2 tom. 8vo. Thom. Burnet, *De Statu Mortuorum et Resurgentium*; London, 1757; against which, and in behalf of the Romish doctrine, there were treatises written by Muratori, Columna, and others. Baumgarten, *Hist. Doctrinæ de Statu Animarum separatarum*; Halæ, 1754. Cotta, *Recentiores quædam Controversiæ de Statu Animi post Mortem*; Tübingen, 1758. (b) *Philosophical and doctrinal* works: Wernsdorf, *De Animarum separatarum Statu, earumdemque cum Vivis commercio*, in his "Collec. Disputt." tom. i. No. 15. The best and latest works on the state of the soul after death are collected by Löscher, Dresden, 1735. Meier, *Philosophische Betrachtung vom Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode*; Halle, 1769. J. E. Schubert, *Gedanken vom ewigen Leben, und Zustand der Seele nach dem Tode*; Jena, 1747. J. C. Lavater, *Aussichten in die Ewigkeit*; Zurich, 1773, 3 th. 8vo. Other works are cited s. 160.

SECTION CLI.

WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD BY THE "RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD;" THE MEANING OF THE WORD "RESURRECTION;" AND WHAT IS TAUGHT RESPECTING IT BY THE JEWS.

I. *What is understood by the Resurrection of the Dead.*

By this is meant, the revivification of the human body after it has been forsaken by the soul, or, the reunion of the soul hereafter with the body which it had occupied in the present world. Death was compared with sleep, and the dead body with a sleeping person, שכיב, *schûmêdénêes*, s. 147, I. Hence the terms which literally signify *to awake*, *to rise up*, *to rise out of sleep*, are also used to denote the resurrection of the lifeless body—e. g., in Hebrew, *קם, הָקָם*, and in Hellenistic Greek, *ἀνίστημι, ἀνάστασις*, (with the Rabbins, *הָקָם*, *הָקָמוֹ*, and *הָקָמוֹ* *ἐκ νεκρῶν*). Of the *literal* sense of these terms, examples may be found everywhere; cases of the derived signification occur where these terms are used with the qualification *ἐκ νεκρῶν*—e. g., where the resurrection of Christ is spoken of, and that of others

whose body is to be restored like his. Vide John, v. 21, 28; 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4, 20, 53.

The Jews were also accustomed to speak of the resurrection of the dead under the image of a *new* or *second birth*, to which they were led by the passage Is. xxvi. 19, "The earth will again bring forth her dead." Vide Michaelis's Commentary on Heb. i. 5. Again, ἀνάσθημι was used even by the ancient classical Greeks to denote the returning of the dead to life. So it was in Homer, Il. xxi. 54, seq., where Achilles says, "What a wonder! all the Trojans slain by me shall again arise from the kingdom of the dead, (ἀναστήσουσιν.)" Cf. Il. xxiv. 756. Cicero and Livy designate this idea by the phrase *ab inferis existere*. In Æschylus, the term ἀνάστασις is used for the same thing.

But the same terms which signify *arising*, and the *being awakened from sleep*, also denote figuratively, (1) a restoration to a more happy condition, in opposition to a state of *fall* and *prostration*. In this general sense they are used in two ways—viz., *physically*—e. g., a sick man rising from his bed and recovering his health is said ἀνάσθημι, Is. xxxviii. 9; and again in a *moral sense*, used with reference to the reformation of a man who *rises* from his *fall*. And so (2) the terms *resurrection from the dead*, and *being raised from the dead*, denote, figuratively, (a) external and physical restoration to a happy condition, *death* being the representative of *misery*, and *life of happiness*—e. g., Is. xxvi. 19, 20; Ezek. xxxvii.; where the subject is the restoration of the Jews after a long and terrible persecution, and the reward of the virtuous. Cf. Dathe, a. l. (b) A moral restoration or renovation of men—e. g., Eph. v. 14, ἔγερτε . . . ἀναστα ἐκ νεκρῶν, coll. i. 19, 20, and Rom. viii. 10, &c.

II. Doctrine of the Jews respecting the Resurrection of the Dead.

(1) There are obvious traces of the doctrine that the soul will survive the body, even in the oldest Jewish writings, (vide s. 149, II.;) but of the doctrine, that the body will hereafter be raised to life and the whole man be restored, there are no very clear intimations in the earliest writings. There is nothing in these writings which is inconsistent with such a doctrine, or opposed to it; but neither, on the other hand, was there, in those early ages, any distinct information or revelation communicated on this subject. The passage, Job, xix. 25, seq., is indeed cited in behalf of this opinion, and such a construction of this passage is strenuously vindicated by Michaelis and Schultens. According to the Vulgate, which Luther for the most part follows, this passage very clearly teaches this doctrine; and many persons, having been

accustomed to this rendering from their youth, are startled by any doubts with respect to it. But,

(a) It is remarkable, that neither the ancient Jewish teachers, nor Christ or his apostles, ever appealed to this passage which appears so plain to us. This explanation, therefore, appears to have been unknown to them, nor can there be found any trace of it in the Septuagint.

(b) It is not in itself probable that this doctrine should have been at once so clearly revealed in so ancient a writing. This would be contrary to all analogy. For knowledge of this kind has always been gradually developed, and the revelations made to man follow in regular gradation one after another.

(c) If Job had such distinct expectations and hopes, it is hard to account for it that he did not earlier express them, that he did not oftener console himself with them, and that he constantly recurs to his old complaints and doubts, which would have been entirely set aside and answered by the knowledge of any such doctrine.

(d) Nor can it be accounted for that his friends should have replied nothing to the statement of such a doctrine as this, since they take up, one by one, all his remarks, his complaints, and his consolations, and refute them. Would they, now, have passed by unnoticed this most important of all his arguments?

(e) From many passages in the book of Job it is clear that he was indeed acquainted with a life after death (he speaks of שָׁמַיִל); but there is no satisfactory evidence that he believed in a state of retribution beyond the grave. Vide ch. xiv. 7—12; vii. 6; ix. 25; xvii. 11—16; xvi. 22, seq.

(f) The common translation of this passage, according to which it is made to teach so plainly the doctrine of the resurrection, does violence to the words of the original, and is contrary to the whole *usus loquendi* of the Bible. This Michaelis perceived. He therefore alters the text, and, by a comparison with the ancient dialects, makes out an artificial rendering, according to which the passage treats of the resurrection.

The most natural construction of this passage is, to understand it as relating to Job's restoration to health and recovery from sickness, which he so ardently wished and hoped for. Vide Morus, p. 293. This text would then be illustrated by one still more plain in the same book, viz., ch. xlii. 25. He refutes the national prejudice which his friends were continually objecting against him, that sickness and other external calamities are always to be regarded as the consequence of sins committed by the sufferer. He pleads that even piety and rectitude are not always exempt from these calamities. It is on this account that he cherishes the hope, which he elsewhere expresses, that God will justify

him in the view of his enemies and accusers, by an entire restoration; and this hope becomes here so strong that it leads him to look upon his recovery as certain. Cf. Eichhorn's Essay, *Hiob's Hoffnungen*, in his "Allgemeinen Bibliothek. der biblischen Literatur," b. i. s. 367; also Henke, *Narratio Critica de Interpretatione loci, Job, xix. 27*, in *Antiqua Ecclesia*, Helmst. 1783, 4to., (in his "Opusc.")

According to this view, the text may be translated as follows:—"I know that my Redeemer lives. And ere long, he, who now lies in the dust, will arise, (he who is deeply bowed down by sickness and pain will recover;) although my skin is consumed, I shall yet in this body see God, (i. e., have in him a gracious God, be blessed and restored by him;) as a *friend* shall I see him, and no more as an adversary. I wait, full of longing desire, for his help. Then shall ye say, when my innocence is clear, why did we persecute this man?" Ilgen, in his work, "*Jobi antiquissimi carminis Hebraici natura atque virtutes*," p. 161, seq., thus translates: "*Vivit, scio enim, causæ meæ patronus. Qui contemptus in pulvere jacet, victor caput attolet. Hærebo adhuc in cute, dira hac vi contusa: ex hac cuticula videbo Deum. Quem ego mihi videbo propitium, quem hisce oculis cernam animo non alienatum. O quam enecat renes desiderii ardor!*"

There are no distinct intimations of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body in the writings of Moses, or in the Psalms; for Ps. xlix. 15, does not relate to this subject, still less does Ps. civ. 29, 30, though cited by Theodoret as one of the proof-texts of this doctrine. Isaiah is the first writer who compares the restoration of the Jewish people and state with a resurrection from the dead; ch. xxvi. 19, 20. In this he was followed by Ezekiel at the time of the exile, ch. xxxvii. From these passages, we must conclude that something respecting this doctrine was known at that time among the Israelites; still they do not seem to have seen it in that clear light in which it was afterwards revealed; since in that case the prophets would probably have mentioned it oftener and more distinctly in their writings. But the text, Dan. xii. 2, leads very plainly to this doctrine, for here is something more than a mere civil restoration. "Those who lie asleep under the earth will awake; some to eternal life, others to everlasting shame and contempt."

Judging then from the writings of the Jews, they appear to have been destitute of any complete knowledge of this doctrine until the exile, and indeed for a considerable period after. Still, there is nothing in the Old Testament which contradicts this doctrine, it is only not plainly revealed. For where it is said, (e. g., Psalm lxxxviii. 10,) "that the dead shall not rise again

and praise God," it is plainly meant that they will never return to this upper world, and into the society of men living upon the earth; they can never again, in company with us, and in the circle of the living, praise God. Cf. Ps. vi. 6, xxx. 10; Is. xxxviii. 18, coll. ver. 20.

(2) It was not, then, until the Babylonian exile, and more especially after this period, that this doctrine was developed and diffused among the Jews. We are not acquainted with the more particular occasion which led to this development, or what prophets or teachers after Daniel were employed in giving this doctrine a wider circulation. For just in this place there is a great gap in the doctrinal history of the Jews, since no writings of the prophets or teachers of this period have come down to us. So much only is known on this subject from the information which has come down to us—viz.,

(a) About the time when the Jews came under the Grecian dominion, the doctrine of a future retribution was more developed among them than it had before been, and was employed by them in a practical way, as a means of consolation under suffering and persecution. Vide s. 149, II.

(b) It is known also, that even at that time the doctrine of the *resurrection of the body* was most intimately connected with the doctrine of retribution. It was then taught that the perfect and happy condition of man would first commence, when his soul should be hereafter united again to his body. They did not therefore commonly separate these two things in their conceptions, but always connected the thought of the continuance of the soul after death with the idea of its future union with the body; indeed, they supposed that the blessedness of man could not be complete until his soul should be reunited to his body. Hence they comprehend under the term *ἀνάστασις*, the entire future condition of man. For according to the doctrine of the Jews, with which the holy scriptures accord, man is not merely in this life a being compounded of sense and reason, but he will continue the same in the life to come, except only that, in the case of the good, there will be none of that preponderance of sense over reason which has its foundation in our earthly bodies. Cf. the Essay, "*De nexu resurrectionis J. C. è mortuis et mortuorum*," in *Scripta Varii Argumenti*, Num. ix.

Thus we find it, for the first time, in the second book of Maccabees, where the martyrs are made to express the hope, by which they were consoled, of a coming resurrection—e. g., vii. 9, *εἰς αἰώνιον ἀναβίωσιν ζωῆς ἡμᾶς ἀναστήσει*, and ver. 14, *πάντων ἀναστήσεσθαι ὑπὸ Θεοῦ*, and *ἀνάστασις εἰς ζωὴν*, also verses 23, 29, 36, but especially chap. xii. 43—45, where it is said it would be foolish to pray for the dead if they did not rise again. And so we find, both among the

later Jewish and earlier Christian writers, that there is no distinction made between immortality and the resurrection, but that both are considered as the same thing. Vide the passages from the Rabbins cited in Schöttgen's *Hor. Heb. ad Joh. v.* It is the same frequently in the New Testament—e. g., Matt. xxii. 31, where the ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν is argued from the fact, that God calls himself the *God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, even after their death; although, according to our present usage, in which resurrection and immortality are distinguished, this fact would only prove the continuance of the soul after death. Again, 1 Cor. xv. 32, εἰ νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται, φάγωμεν καὶ πίωμεν, κ. τ. λ. But wherever ἀνάστασις σώματος, or σώματος is spoken of, the resurrection of the body and its connexion with the soul are alone intended.

The Jews, therefore, would regard the restoration of man as incomplete unless his body were restored. They believed the latter essential to the entire restitution of man, because in the present life he consists of both soul and body. And as the body here participates in our virtues and vices, and their consequences, so they supposed it would hereafter participate in our reward or punishment. Hence they represent the intermediate state in which the soul exists without the body, as an imperfect state. It is compared by them to *nakedness*, (and the same is done by *Plato*,) e. g., in the Chaldaic paraphrases, Job, xxxviii. 14, &c. So Paul, οὐ γυμνοὶ ἐμῇ δόξῃ μεθα, 2 Cor. v. 2—4.

The greater part of the Jews formed very gross conceptions respecting the rewards and enjoyments of the blessed in the future state, and many of them perverted the doctrine of the resurrection of the body to suit these conceptions. For they were for the most part better acquainted with the grosser corporeal pleasures than with the higher spiritual joys, for which indeed they had but little taste or capacity. They thus pictured to themselves the future life as entirely resembling the present, except in being exempt from all sufferings and unpleasant sensations. They believed that men would eat and drink, and satisfy their other animal appetites, in the same way there as here. Doctrines like these were taught by many of the most distinguished Rabbins who lived after the time of Christ, and even by Maimonides. It is said in Rev. ii. 7, and xxii. 2, 14, that the *tree of life* is placed in heaven, and its fruit is there eaten, as the means of obtaining immortality. This representation is figurative; but many of the Jews understood such descriptions literally, and believed in a kind of food for angels or gods, like *nectar* and *ambrosia*. It was against such gross material representations, which have no necessary connexion with this doctrine, but which were often associated with it, that the Sadducees directed

their wit; and they made these incongruities ridiculous. This was their object when they proposed to Jesus the case of the woman who had several brothers, one after another in succession, for husbands, Matthew, xxii. 24, seq.

Others, better instructed, separated from their conceptions of the future state these grosser indulgences, and thus escaped this ridicule. They taught that we shall hereafter possess a more refined body, which will not be dependent for its nourishment upon food, and which will not propagate the race. This was the opinion of most of the Pharisees at the time of Christ, and the same was afterwards maintained by most of the Jewish teachers. For when Christ said that “the risen saints would not marry, but be as the angels of God,” the Pharisees entirely assented, Matt. xxii. 30, coll. Luke, xx. 39, and the texts cited from the Rabbins in Wetstein on Matt. xxii. 30. With regard to the use of food, Paul says expressly that it will entirely cease in the future world, Θεὸς κοιλίαν καὶ βρώματα καταργήσει—i. e., he will take them away, and enable us to do without them.

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body was therefore common among the Jews at the time of Christ and the apostles. Vide Matt. xxii.; Luke, xx.; Acts, xxiii. 6—8. So, in John, xi. 24, the Jewess Martha speaks of the resurrection of the dead as a thing well known and undoubted. Josephus indeed (Ant. xviii. 2) expresses himself doubtfully with regard to the Pharisees—“they believe that the soul is immortal, and can easily return to life (ἀναβιώσαι);” and again, (Bell. Jud. ii. 7,) “they maintain that the souls of the pious pass into other bodies, (μεταβαίνειν εἰς ἕτερον σῶμα.)” Here Josephus, in his usual manner, so represents designedly the Jewish doctrine, that the Greeks and Romans, to whom the resurrection of the body appeared absurd, should suppose the transmigration of souls to be intended, while at the same time the Jews should understand that the resurrection of the dead was spoken of. But from the texts cited from the New Testament, it appears that the Pharisees, like the other Jews, believed in a resurrection.

There were some among the Jews of the opinion that the *wicked* would not receive a body in the future world. Josephus says, in the passage cited, that even the Pharisees believed that the souls of the wicked would not pass into other bodies, (i. e., that the wicked would not rise again,) but that they would be eternally punished. It may perhaps be that this was taught by some at the time of Josephus; but during the first century it was the more prevailing belief, even among the Pharisees, that both the righteous and the wicked would share in the coming resurrection. For in Acts, xxiv. 15, Paul says expressly that he agrees with the

Pharisees and other Jews (in opposition to the Sadducees) in maintaining the ἀνάστασιν, and that not only of the righteous, but also of the wicked (δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων.) But frequent traces of this opinion are to be found in the Chaldaic Paraphrases, and in the writings of the Rabbins after the time of Christ, although it never became general among the Jews. This opinion came naturally from the idea that the happiness of the good would be incomplete without the body; and so it was made a part of the wretchedness of the wicked not to come again into possession of a body. Another cause of this opinion is the allegorical explanation which they gave to some passages in the Old Testament—e. g., Ps. i. 5, יִשְׁכַּב וְלֹא יָקִים, Sept. οὐκ ἀναστήσονται οἱ ἀσεβεῖς. Indeed, many maintained the entire annihilation of the wicked, both as to soul and body. Vide Theod. Dasovii Dissert. qua Judæor. de resurrectione mortuorum sententia explicatur, c. 4; also Menasse ben Israel, De Resur. Mort., l. iii.; Amst. 1636, where many of the Jewish fancies respecting the resurrection of the dead are collected together. This opinion respecting the non-resurrection of the wicked has found advocates even among Christian writers, especially of the Socinian party.

Note.—The term ἀνάσθηαι ἐκ νεκρῶν is used once in the New Testament to denote the return of a departed soul to the world, and its re-appearance in its supposed body of shade—viz., Luke, xvi. 31, coll. ver. 27, 28, 30; like the sense in which the phrase *ab inferis exsistere* is sometimes used.

(3) Since the doctrine of the future resurrection of the *body* was not very plainly taught in the books of Moses, or elsewhere in the Old Testament, (as it seems not to have been fully revealed in those earlier ages,) it is not to be wondered at that some of the Jews took occasion, or derived a pretext from this, either to deny this doctrine, or to doubt respecting it. This was done not merely by the Sadducees, who denied in general that the soul of man is of a nature different from his body, and that it can continue after death, (vide Acts, xxiii. 8, seq., and Josephus, in the passage before cited,) on the ground that this doctrine is not taught by Moses, or in all the Old Testament; but also by other Jews, especially those, it seems, who had imbibed the Grecian (the Pythagorean or Platonic) philosophy, or who at any rate entertained ideas respecting the *body* similar to those taught in this philosophy, making it a *prison* for the soul, from which it is freed by death when it returns to God.

Thus, according to Josephus, (Bell. Jud. ii. 7,) did the Essenes believe. They seem, therefore, not to have maintained the resurrection of the body, although they believed in the immor-

talities of the soul. Even Josephus carefully avoids the words ἀνάστασις and ἀνίστημι when he describes the doctrines of the Pharisees and Sadducees, and expresses himself ambiguously, in order not to displease the Greeks and Romans, for whom he principally wrote, and to whom the doctrine of the resurrection of the body would appear not only new, but, according to the principles of the philosophy prevailing among them, offensive and absurd. And so Paul was ridiculed at Athens by the Grecian philosophers when he taught the resurrection of the dead, Acts, xvii. 32, coll. xxvi. 6—8, and ver. 23, 24. At a later period, Lucian and Celsus employed their wit against the same doctrine in Origen and others; and Pliny says, (Hist. Nat. ii. 7,) that if it is impossible for God to destroy himself, it is equally impossible for him, *mortales eternitate donare, et in vitam revocare defunctos*. There have always been some among the modern Jews who have been inclined to the doctrine of the Sadducees, and who have frequently been opposed by the Rabbins. Vide Wetstein on Matt. xxiii.

SECTION CLII.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

I. What Christ and the Apostles have done for this Doctrine, and respecting the Doubts of some Christians.

At the time of Christ and the apostles this doctrine had already become prevalent among the Jews, s. 151, II., although it was not clearly revealed in their older religious books. Through Christ it was now for the first time distinctly established anew, and revealed on divine authority. In those very discourses of our Saviour in which he designs to prove himself divine in the highest sense, he plainly and definitely brings forward this doctrine as a constituent part of his religious system—e. g., Matthew, xxii.; John, v., viii., xi. Without this explanation and positive assurance on his part and that of his disciples, this doctrine would still have been doubtful. But those who regard Christ and his apostles as being what they profess to be, ought not and cannot be any longer in doubt.

Christ and his apostles, however, corrected the false notions on this subject, which at that time prevailed among at least a large portion of the Jews, and made the whole matter more obvious and intelligible. But this doctrine has derived a special interest and demonstration from the fact that it is placed in the most intimate connexion with the history of the person of Christ, and that he is represented as the one to whom we are indebted for this benefit. It is

most intimately connected with his death, his resurrection, and his exalted state in heaven. Vide s. 119, ad finem, and s. 120, I. The apostles rested the doctrine of our resurrection mainly upon that of Christ, (cf. 1 Cor. xv.; 1 Thess. iv. 14;) they preached through Jesus (ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ) the resurrection of the dead, Acts, iv. 2; and hence they call him *the first that rose from the dead*; Acts, xxvi. 23; 1 Cor. xv. 20, et alibi. And from this Paul argues that if it is acknowledged that Christ rose from the dead, there can be no reason to deny or think it impossible that there should be a general resurrection of all men, 1 Cor. xv. 12, seq. Cf. Mosheim, Diss. "Qua docetur Christum Resurrectionem Mortuorum Corporum, Qualem Christiani Credunt, e Tenebris in Lucem Revocasse et Demonstrasse," in his Dissertations "Ad Hist. Eccl. Pertinent," vol. ii. p. 586. Cf. also the Essay, "De Nexu Resurrectionis Christi e Mortuis et Mortuorum," in "Scripta Varii Argumentii," Num. ix.

But this doctrine has been doubted or denied by many Christians in modern times.

(1) It appears from 1 Cor. xv. and 2 Timothy, ii. 18, that even during the life of the apostles there were Christians to whom this doctrine seemed doubtful, if they did not wholly deny it, because it did not accord with their preconceived opinions, although it cannot be shewn that they at the same time denied the immortality of the soul. These may have been either Gentile converts (for this doctrine was peculiarly offensive to the heathen, vide s. 151, ad finem,) or converts from Judaism, who had agreed on this point with the Essenes or the Sadducees. To the latter class belong Hymenæus and Philetus, λέγοντες τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἥδη γεγενῆσθαι. They probably understood the term ἀνάστασις, as used in the Old Testament and by Christ, to signify *the introduction of a person into a better state, or improvement of life*. Vide s. 151, I. This they supposed was already accomplished by Christ, and that a resurrection in the literal sense is not to be looked for. Hence Paul endeavours (1 Cor. xv.) in part to obviate the objections of the Sadducees and Gentiles, and in part to separate and distinguish the true doctrine from the gross and earthly conceptions of many of the Jews.

Still the opinion that there will be no restoration of the body has always found place among some Christians, especially among the Gnostics, who were led to reject this doctrine by their views respecting matter, and by their method of interpreting scripture. So thought Manes, in the third century, and his numerous followers in after times; also the Priscillianists in Spain; likewise Hierax at the commencement of the fourth century, who would allow of only a spiritual resurrection, or a resurrection

of the soul. And so in all succeeding ages there have always been those among Christians who have either secretly doubted or openly rejected this doctrine. Cf. Dr. Hammer, *Mortuorum in Vitam Revocatio, Sermonibus Christi Historicæ Interpretationis ope Vindicata*; Lips. 1794.

(2) In modern times, many protestant theologians—e. g., Eckermann, Henke, Ammon, &c.—have endeavoured to explain away from the New Testament the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, notwithstanding the many clear passages by which it is supported. They have maintained that this dogma is no part of the Christian system. It was, in their view, through mere condescension to the prevailing opinions of the Jews that Christ and the apostles employed the common language on this point, which must accordingly be understood in a different sense—viz., a sense agreeing with the philosophical ideas prevailing in the nineteenth century. There is not, however, the remotest hint, in all the words of Christ and the apostles, that they meant to be understood figuratively; and if this method of interpretation were adopted, nothing of the Christian system would be left behind. That the words of Christ and the apostles are to be understood literally on this subject is plain from this, that it is affirmed of Christ that he himself now possesses a body in his heavenly state in the kingdom of the blessed, and that we shall hereafter resemble him in this respect, and possess a body which will be like his glorious body, s. 153.

II. Biblical Representation.

The principal texts of scripture which relate to this subject are, John, v. 21—29; vi. 39, 40; Matthew, xxii. 23, seq.; 1 Cor. xv.; Acts, xxiv. 14, 15; 1 Thess. iv. 13; Phil. iii. 21. With regard to the principal points taught in these passages, we remark,

(1) The raising of the dead is ascribed expressly to Christ, and it is represented as the last work which will be undertaken by him for the salvation of man. Paul says, 1 Cor. xv. 22, seq., "As through Adam all die, so through Christ shall all be made alive; through him shall death, the last enemy, be conquered; and then shall his work as Messiah be completed, and he will lay down his government." Christ himself said that he had received power for this purpose from the Father; John, v. 21, "The dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and live. For as the Father ζῶν ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ (i. e., is the original source of all life, and possesses, as Creator, all-quicken power) he hath given to the Son also power to quicken the dead." And in John, xi. 25, where he is about to raise the lifeless body of Lazarus, he says respecting himself, that he is ἡ ἀνάστασις καὶ ἡ ζωὴ, the one who would raise the body, and

give life to the dead. Cf. 1 Thess. iv. 14, and Rev. i. 18, ἔχει κλεῖς τοῦ ᾗδου καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

(2) All the dead will hereafter be raised, without respect to age, rank, or moral character in this world. So the New Testament teaches throughout; especially in opposition to the opinions of some Jews, s. 151, II. 2, ad finem, coll. s. 120, I. 2, note. So 1 Cor. xv. 22, ἐν Ἀδὰμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκουσι, to which is opposed ἐν Χριστῷ πάντες ζωοποιήσονται. Acts, xxiv. 15, ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων. And Christ himself says, John, v. 28, 29, "All who are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of man, and those who have done well shall rise, and those who have done evil, shall be condemned." (i. e., ἐκπορεύονται εἰς ἀνάστασιν ζωῆς, (i. e., εἰς ζωὴν,) those who have done evil, εἰς ἀνάστασιν κρίσεως. This was a common mode of speech among the Jews, (vide Macc. vii. 14, coll. xii. 43, ἀνάστασις εἰς ζωὴν,) which is obviously taken from Dan. xii. 2.

(3) The resurrection of the body, however, will not take place before the end of the world, or the general judgment. This, too, was the common doctrine of the Jews at the time of Christ; hence Martha says, John, xi. 24, "that she knows her brother will rise at the last day, (ἐν τῇ ἰσχυρῇ ἡμέρᾳ.)" And this opinion is everywhere confirmed by Christ. In John, v. 21, he not only connects the resurrection and judgment most intimately together, but in John, vi. 39, 40, he expressly promises his followers, ἀναστήσω [εἰς ζωὴν] ἐν τῇ ἰσχυρῇ ἡμέρᾳ. And so in 1 Cor. xv. 22—28, the resurrection is placed in obvious connexion with the παρουσία of Christ, after which the end of the world will immediately come; and in 1 Thess. iv. 15, it is said that those who survive the παρουσία of Christ will not attain either sooner or later to the enjoyment of heavenly blessedness than κοιμηθέντες; but that the dead and living will meet Christ at the same time, that they may be for ever with him. Cf. Rev. xx. 11, seq. The resurrection of the dead, then, will take place when the Christian church on earth shall cease; but this, according to the clear declarations of Christ, shall last until the end of the world.

This cannot be reconciled with the hypothesis of Priestley, who attempts to shew that the resurrection will take place immediately after death. The same hypothesis has been advocated in a work entitled, "Auferstehung der Todten nach der eigentlichen Lehre Jesu Christi," by Joh. Fr. des Cotes, court preacher at Nassau; and still better in the "Beyträgen zur Beförderung des vernünftigen Denkens in der Religion," 2tes, Heft, s. 76, f., and 3tes, Heft, s. 39, f. It is indeed true that the disembodied existence of the soul beyond the grave is comprehended in the writings of the Jews and of the New Testament, under the term ἀνάστασις; but this is not all which is comprised

in this term; and the ἀνάστασις will not be complete and perfect until the body also is raised. Vide s. 151, II. 2.

Again; these Pauline texts are opposed to the opinion of the Chiliasts, that there is a *two-fold* resurrection; an earlier, that of the pious, and a later, that of the wicked, or of the heathen. An ἀνάστασις πρώτη is, indeed, mentioned in Rev. xx. 5, 6, but the phrase admits easily of another interpretation.

(4) As to the *manner* in which the resurrection will take place, the New Testament gives us no definite information by which our curiosity can be wholly satisfied; and this, doubtless, because such information could be neither intelligible to us nor of any use. The whole matter lies beyond the sphere of our knowledge. In speaking on this subject, Christ and the apostles sometimes make use of expressions which are figurative, (and of such there were many current among the Jews,) and sometimes they content themselves with proving the possibility and intelligibility of the thing, in opposition to doubters and scoffers, and with making it plain by examples.

(a) Among the more figurative representations and expressions, at least among those in which there is some intermixture of what is figurative, the representation contained in John, v., is commonly reckoned—viz., the representation that the voice of Christ will penetrate the graves in order to awaken the dead. The image is here that of a sleeper who is aroused by a loud call; and some understand the representation as so entirely figurative that they exclude any audible or perceptible sound. It cannot, however, be shewn that Christ meant to exclude these. For in the resurrection of Lazarus, of the young man at Nain, and the daughter of Jairus, the voice of Christ was heard by them, and was the means of raising them to life. Still the voice, merely as such, is not the efficient cause of the work, but the almighty power accompanying it; and so it is said of God, when he produces any effect by his creative power, that *he speaks, his voice sounds forth*.

The Jews supposed that the dead would be awakened by the *sound of a trumpet*. Traces of this opinion are to be found in the Chaldaic paraphrasts. At first this representation belonged only to the figurative phraseology of prophecy; for the people were commonly assembled by the sound of the trumpet, as was the case in the assembling at Sinai; and, in general, a trumpet was used to give signs and signals—e. g., for an onset in battle, &c. Afterwards, this representation was literally understood, and the size of the trumpet was supposed to be a thousand yards, and that it was blown seven times. Vide Wetstein and Semler on 1 Cor. xv. 52. In this passage Paul uses

the term ἐν ἑσχατῇ σάλπιγγι, (σαλπύσει γάρ,)—νεκροὶ ἐγερθήσονται. The same poetic phraseology is employed in 1 Thess. iv. 16, "Christ will come with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and ἐν σάλπιγγι Θεοῦ (the trumpet given him by God), καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἀναστήσονται."

In this representation there is much, indeed, which is figurative, and which belongs to the prophetic imagery, (as in Matt. xxiv. and in the Apocalypse,) and we are not now able to determine the meaning of all the particular traits in this picture. But the great thought which we must hold fast is very obvious—viz., Christ will solemnly and visibly appear in his majesty, and by his divine power raise all the dead. In other passages this truth is literally expressed—e. g., Phil. iii. 21, where it is said that Christ will do this by the power by which he is able to subdue all things to himself—i. e., by his ἐνέργεια, his omnipotence, which surmounts all difficulties and hindrances, and brings to pass what appears to men impossible.

(b) The *possibility* of the resurrection of the dead is illustrated by Paul, in opposition to those who regarded it as impossible or contradictory, 1 Cor. xv. 35, seq., by comparing it with events of common occurrence in the natural world, which seem to us less wonderful only because they are common. "How is it possible," it was asked, "that the dead should be raised?" (πῶς ἐγείρονται νεκροί.) He replies: "The grain of corn cast into the ground cannot rise (ζωοποιεῖται) until it die," (ἀποθάνῃ, vide John, xii. 24.) 'This appears unintelligible; and we should regard it as impossible if we did not see it actually accomplished. Why then should not God be able to raise men, and from their present bodies to produce others? This is a fine comparison to illustrate the possibility of this event. Again; he shews, by the example of Christ, that the dead *can* be raised, ver. 12—14. And so the apostles always—e. g., Acts, iv. 2, καταγγέλλειν ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ τὴν ἀνάστασιν νεκρῶν. Cf. Morus, Diss. Inaug. ad 1 Cor. xv. 35—55; Lipsie, 1782.

Note.—Many modern writers also have endeavoured in various other ways to shew the *possibility* of the resurrection, and in this have availed themselves of the observations of naturalists. The common fault with these comparisons is, that either the alleged facts are untrue and imaginary, or have nothing resembling the resurrection. It must be considered a fault of the first kind, to endeavour, as Fecht, Von Frankenau, and others, have done, to illustrate the resurrection by the alleged *palingenesis* of plants, or their restoration from their ashes, by means of a chemical process, which, in fact, is nothing more than an exhibition of the image of the plant. Vide Wiegleb, Natürliche Magie.

It is a fault of the other class to apply to this subject the observation, that there is only one mass of matter upon the earth, and that nothing is lost, nothing perishes, but still revives again, only under forms which are ever new. But this revivification is very different from the resurrection of the dead; for in the former case there is no consciousness of the previous state. The inanimate body of a man may furnish nourishment to a beast of prey or to a vegetable, so that its parts will become incorporated with those of the beast or the plant, and contribute to their nourishment and growth; but is this resurrection? The principal thing in the resurrection is the reunion of the soul with the body.

But if these attempts have not succeeded, it is equally vain to attempt, by reasons *à priori*, to prove the *impossibility* of the restoration of the body. Respecting the question, whether our souls will remain after death without a body, nothing can be definitely determined by philosophy; but the negative opinion is not only liable to no philosophical objection, but has in its favour this fact, which is universally observed, that the different *species* of beings are not essentially altered, or as it were made anew, through all the changes to which they are subject, but still preserve their peculiar and characteristic features; so that the wonderful gradation in the works of God is preserved unbroken. Thus there are beings *wholly spiritual*, (as the angels are described to be in the scriptures;) there are beings *composed of reason and sense*, (as men, and perhaps many in other worlds;) and, finally, there are animate beings, consisting wholly of sense, and having no moral nature, (such as the beasts.) Since, now, the latter class subsists by itself, and is so separate from the foregoing that there is no example of a mere animal becoming a rational being, it may from this analogy be expected that it will be the same with man, and that, even in the future world, he will not become a merely spiritual being, but remain, as now, compounded of spirit and matter, and consequently will hereafter become again possessed of a body.

SECTION CLIII.

DOCTRINE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT RESPECTING THE NATURE OF THE BODY WHICH WE SHALL RECEIVE AT THE RESURRECTION; AND THE OPINIONS OF THEOLOGIAN'S ON THIS POINT.

I. *Difference of the Future Body from the Present.*

THAT there is a difference between the two in respect to their entire constitution and the objects of their existence, we are taught by the New Testament. The body received at the resurrection will be *immortal*, and is designed for

an entirely different world from the present. The chief characteristic of the resurrection-body is placed by the New Testament in its ἀφθαρσία, and its other excellences are derived from this. Vide the texts cited by Morus, p. 292, note 8. It cannot therefore be wholly constituted like our present body, which is designed only for this world.

One of the most important texts on this subject is 1 Cor. xv. 50, σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα βασιλείαν Θεοῦ κληρονομεῖν οὐ δύναται—i. e., man, in the present imperfect state of his body, (Theodoret well says, ἡ ζήτητή φύσις,) is incapable of heavenly bliss. For the mortal body (φθορά—i. e., σῶμα φθαρτόν,) cannot partake of eternal life, (ἀφθαρσία, immortality.) Blood, according to the conception of the whole ancient world, is found only among men and other animals who are nourished by the food of our earth, and not among the immortals, who do not taste of this food. The gods, therefore, in the opinion of the ancient Greeks, had no blood, (they were ἀνάνιμοι,) and were immortal, because they ate no bread and drank no wine.

In Homer, (Il. v. 341, seq., vi. 142,) men are called, in opposition to the gods, βροτοί, *those who eat the fruit of the field*. The body of the gods was regarded by them as a true body, and in human form, but only framed more perfectly, and from a finer material; it was by no means that shadowy body ascribed to departed souls. Vide s. 150, s. 66, II. And so was the body of those raised up at the last day conceived of, as no mere shadowy form, but as a true body, though without flesh and blood.

The Greeks supposed that their gods ate a food peculiar to themselves, *nectar and ambrosia*; and so the great multitude of the Jews supposed that those who are raised to be inhabitants of heaven partake of a kind of heavenly food. Vide s. 151, II. 2, and s. 59, II., respecting angels. There have always been Christians who have maintained the same thing; and even in modern times some have expressed themselves at least doubtfully on this point—e. g., Michaelis. But the passage, 1 Cor. vi. 13, (already cited, s. 151,) teaches exactly the contrary. The gods of the Greeks were supposed to marry and to indulge in the sexual propensities; and some Jews imagined the same thing with regard to the angels and those raised from the dead; but this idea is rejected by Christ, Matt. xxii. 30. Cf. the sections before cited.

Here, then, is a separation between what is true and false in the prevailing popular conceptions, which is worthy of notice. In these conceptions, there is often much which is true, and the germ of truth, which is fully developed. But the learned often mistake in rejecting certain ideas merely because they are the common con-

ceptions of the people. Not so Christ; he only distinguishes between what is false and true in these conceptions.

Respecting the nature of the heavenly body, and its difference from the earthly, Paul expresses himself very fully in 1 Cor. xv. 35, seq., ποίῳ σώματι ἔρχονται; sc. *é sepulcris*. (a) He takes a comparison from a grain of wheat, from which an entirely new body is developed, whose form and properties are very different from those of the seed sown. (b) God makes material things in very different forms and with different constitutions, on account of their different destination. The body of fishes, of birds, and of beasts, is not the same; their nature and attributes are wholly different, ver. 39—41. And so must our heavenly body be organized differently from the earthly, because it has a different end. (c) The heavenly body will have great pre-eminence over the earthly. Ver. 42, seq., σπείρεται (i. e., *sepektur*, sc. σῶμα) ἐν φθορᾷ—i. e., φθαρτόν, *perishable*. The sequel is to be explained in the same way: for ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ read ἀτιμόν, *deformed, disfigured*; ἀσθενές, *feeble, powerless*; ψυχικό, *carnal, animal*; because in this life the animal propensities must be indulged. But when it is raised it will be a body ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ—i. e., ἀφθαρτόν, *immortal, indestructible*; ἐνδοξόν, *beautified, glorious*; δυνατόν, *strong and mighty*; and πνευματικόν, *spiritual*, exempt from everything which is imperfect in the material body;—in short, our earthly body is, like Adam's, *from the earth*, (ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκόν;) the future body will, like that which Christ now possesses, be a *heavenly body*, (ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.)

And here Paul makes the observation, that Christ had not *at first* (πρῶτον, while he here lived upon the earth,) that more perfect spiritual body, (πνευματικόν,) but that which was natural (ψυχικόν,) and *afterwards* (ἔπειτα, after his ascent to heaven) that which was spiritual. Therefore he did not possess it immediately after his resurrection, while he was yet upon the earth, for he then ate and drank, John, xxi., but he first received it when he passed into the heavens. Cf. s. 97, II.

That our body will be like that of Christ is plainly taught, ver. 49; φορέσωμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου [Χριστοῦ]; and still more plainly, Phil. iii. 21, "Christ will transform (μετασχηματίσει) our earthly perishable body (σῶμα ταπεινώσεως) into the resemblance of his heavenly body, (σῶμα δόξης.)" Cf. Rom. vi. 9. This heavenly body is commonly called *glorified*, for so δεδοξασμένον is translated. This translation, however, may give occasion to unfounded accessory conceptions with regard to the splendour &c. of the heavenly body. The simple idea conveyed by this expression is, *glorious*,

excellent, perfected, ennobled. Vide Morus, p. 292, n. 8.

Those who are alive at the last day will not indeed *die*, like other men, s. 147, II. Still, according to the doctrine of Paul, their bodies must undergo a *change*, like that which it was necessary for the earthly body of Christ to experience before it entered the heavens. Vide 1 Cor. xv. 51, πάντες μὲν οὐ (non sollicitanda lectio,) κομιζομένους, πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγασόμενοι—i. e., their bodies must be changed, in order that they may be adapted to their future destination and abode, and be no more perishable and destructible. For the mortal body must become immortal, ver. 53, coll. 2 Cor. v. 4; 1 Thess. iv. 15, seq. In Phil. iii. 21, this change is expressed by the word μετασχηματίζειν. Some of the Jews also appear to have maintained that such a change would take place with those alive at the last day. Vide Wetstein on 1 Cor. xv. 54.

Such is the doctrine which we are plainly taught in the New Testament respecting the constitution of our future body. Let not, therefore, the Christian doctrine be charged with all the absurdities and fancies which dreaming heads have suggested respecting the nature, form, size, and uses of the spiritual body, nor with the fictions even of some theologians respecting *corpore pellucido, penetranti, illocali, invisibili, præfulgido, impalpabili*, &c. From the texts already cited, as well as from others, it is plain that the more perfect body which we shall hereafter receive will contribute very much to our heavenly blessedness, as, on the other hand, our present frail body greatly conduces to our present suffering and imperfection. But *how far* our glorified body will affect our future blessedness cannot be definitely determined from the holy scriptures. Vide Morus, p. 299, 300, s. 10.

Note.—The Bible says indeed plainly, that the bodies even of the wicked will be again raised, but it nowhere informs us particularly what their nature and state will be. The first Christian teachers, however, imagined without doubt that their state would be such as to aggravate the sufferings of the wicked; as they supposed, on the other hand, that the body which the righteous would receive would contribute to the heightening of their joys and blessedness.

II. Identity of the Future with the Present Body.

Notwithstanding the difference between the body which we now have and that which we shall possess hereafter, it is still taught in the schools of theology that our future body will be, in substance, the same with the present. Vide Morus, p. 291, seq., s. 3, note 6. This,

however, is denied by some, who maintain that the body which believers will receive at the resurrection will be entirely new, of a totally different kind, and not having a particle of the present body belonging to it. So in modern times have some Socinian theologians taught; also Burnet in his work, *De Statu Mortuorum et Resurgentium*, c. 9; likewise Less, in his "Praktische Dogmatik," and others. They ground their opinion upon the fact that the parts of our body in the process of time, and in the ordinary course of nature, became incorporated with many thousand other human bodies. To which, therefore, they ask, of all these thousand, do they appropriately belong? And if every human body should again receive all the parts which ever belonged to it, it would be a monster.

In order to obviate these difficulties, it is justly remarked by others, that there is no reason to suppose that each and every part of the earthly body will be hereafter raised, but only that its finer elementary materials will be restored. For the grosser parts of the body, which appear to exist only for the filling out of the whole, and for holding it together, (like the stones for filling up in a building,) are in constant flux, and fall off from the body while yet it cannot be said that we have lost our body or received a new one. In respect to these grosser parts, our body in early childhood was totally different from our present body, and in old age it will be different from that which we now have. Still we call it, through these different periods, *our* body, and regard it as being the *same*. In common language, we say, with *our eyes* we have seen, or with *these hands* we have done, what took place twenty or thirty years ago. In this way we may speak of *identity* in a more general and popular sense, and, understood in this sense, the identity of the body through all the periods of its existence may be spoken of without impropriety. It is not implied in this that the body will be hereafter constituted of precisely the same materials which it here possesses, nor that it will again have the same form, limbs, and organs, which it now has, but that, from all the parts of which our present body is composed, the most fit and the most noble will be chosen by God, and of these the heavenly body will be constructed.

What conceptions the first Christian teachers formed as to the *manner* of this, we cannot clearly ascertain; nor is it possible that, while we remain upon the earth, we should be able to understand this matter fully. So much, however, is plain, that the inspired teachers did not believe that an entirely new body would be hereafter created for us, but that there would be a kind of identity, in the popular sense of the term, between the heavenly and earthly body.

Such is the implication of the terms so often employed by them, to *awaken* or *call forth the dead from their graves*, (vide John, v. 28, 29;) also of the representation that the sea and Sheol should give up their dead, Rev. xx. 13, seq.; and especially of the passage, 1 Cor. xv. 35—38. It is here plainly implied, that the present mortal body contains the germ of the heavenly body, in the same way as the germ of the plant lies in the seed, from which, after it is dissolved and dead in the earth, the plant is developed, and, as it were, *raised to life*. Hence, according to Paul, the future body has at least as much in common with the present as a plant has with the seed from which it springs. It will be still the same body which we shall hereafter possess, only beautified and ennobled (*μετασχηματίζον*), Phil. iii. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 42, 52, 53. This is thus expressed by theologians: there will be a *renovation* of one and the same substance, and not the production of a wholly new material. Vide Morus, p. 291, 292, note 6, ad s. 3. Some modern writers have endeavoured to illustrate this matter by the application to it of the whole of Bonnet's Theory of Development; but this is not contained in the words of Paul, although his doctrine bears some resemblance to it.

The church-fathers are not entirely unanimous in their opinions respecting the identity of the body. The earlier fathers gave no very definite opinion on the subject, but contented themselves with saying in general that we should receive again the same body; so Justin the Martyr, and Athenagoras, and Tertullian, in their books, *De Resurrectione*. They appear, however, to have had rather gross conceptions on this subject. Origen, in the third century, was the first who philosophized with regard to the heavenly body, and undertook to determine accurately respecting its nature. He defended the resurrection of the body against those who denied it, and taught at the same time that the substance of the human body—the essential and characteristic form by which it is to be discerned and distinguished from others—remains unaltered. He also controverted the opinion of some who supposed that those who are raised will again be invested with the same gross, material body as before. It was his opinion that the grosser parts will be separated, and that only the germ or fundamental material for the new body will be furnished by the old. He and others expressed their views by the following formula—viz., we shall hereafter have *ὡμα τοῦτο (idem) μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοιοῦτο (ejusmodi)*, De Prin. ii. 10.

But such a statement was far from being satisfactory to many at that period, and especially to the gross Chiliasts. They wished to keep alive the hope of having still the same flesh as at pre-

sent, in order to their eating, drinking, &c. So Nepos, Methodius, Theophilus of Alexandria, and others. With these Hieronymus, in the fourth century, agreed, and opposed the opinion of Origen, contending that the same body would be raised, with the same limbs and nerves, and with flesh and blood in the proper sense, and even with distinction of sex, although he did not, indeed, affirm that the animal and sexual appetites would be indulged in the heavenly world. Epiphanius, however, who was a declared opponent of Origen, says expressly that the bodies of the raised must have teeth, since otherwise they could not eat. What kind of food they would have he did not pretend to say, but left for God to determine.

The opinion of Origen was adopted, in the fourth century, by Gregory of Nazianzen, Basilus, Chrysostom, and all the opponents of the Chiliasts. Those who maintained the resurrection of the body in its grosser parts were all, with the exception of Hieronymus, Chiliasts. The opponents of Origen, among the Greeks and Latins, began now to insist, that not merely the resurrection of the body (*corporis*) should be taught, but also *carnis* (*crassæ*). The older fathers used *corpus* and *caro* interchangeably (as was also done in the older symbols), and intended by the use of these terms to denote only that there would be no new creation of a body, since both of these terms, according to the Hebrew *usus loquendi*, are synonymes; as when we speak, in reference to the Lord's Supper, of the *corpus* and *caro Christi*. But since the term *caro* implies, according to the same idiom, the associated idea of *weakness* and *mortality*, it was abandoned by many who wished to use language with more precision, and instead of it, the phrase *resurrectio corporis* was adopted. It was on this account that the Chiliasts insisted so much the more urgently upon retaining the terms *σάρξ* and *caro*.

Note.—Works on this subject, Cotta, Theses Theol. de Novissimis, in Specie de Resurrectione Mortuorum; Tub. 1762. Hermann, Pflug, Beweis der Möglichkeit und Gewissheit der Auferstehung der Todten, 1738. On the history of this doctrine, besides the works of Hody and Burnet, cf. Ge. Calixtus, De Immortalitate Animi et Resurrectione Carnis, and especially, W. A. Teller, Fidei Dogmatis de Resurrectione Carnis, per quatuor priora sæcula enarratio; Halle and Helmstädt, 1766, 8vo; with which, however, the student should compare the additions and corrections made by Ernesti in his "Neues Theol. Bibliothek," b. ix. s. 221—244. [Cf. Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 658, s. 152. Neander, All. K. Geschichte, b. i. Abth. iii. s. 1088, and especially 1096; also b. ii. Abth. iii. s. 1404—1410.—Tr.]

SECTION CLIV.

OF THE LAST APPEARING OF CHRIST BEFORE THE
END OF THE WORLD; THE VARIOUS OPINIONS ON
THIS SUBJECT; ALSO RESPECTING THE MILLEN-
NIAL KINGDOM, AND THE UNIVERSAL CONVER-
SION OF JEWS AND GENTILES.

I. *The Last Appearing of Christ.*

CHRIST often spoke of his future coming (*πα-ρoυσία*), using this phrase in different senses. It sometimes denotes figuratively the destruction of the Jewish state, and the consequences of this event, particularly the advantages which would result from it to the Christian doctrine and church; as the spiritual kingdom of Christ could not be truly established in the earth until this event should take place; Matt. xxiv. and xvi. 27, 28. Again, it denotes his *visible* appearing to judge the world; Matt. xxv. 31, seq. When Jesus spoke of his appearing, his disciples during his life commonly conceived at once of his coming to establish an earthly kingdom. And when he spoke of his coming at the destruction of Jerusalem, they supposed that he would then, with his followers, destroy the hostile Jerusalem, triumph over his opponents, and commence his new earthly kingdom.

The 24th of Matt. was for the most part understood in this way by many at that time. With this they then connected the idea that the *end of the world* was near at hand, because, according to the opinion of the Jews, Jerusalem and the temple would stand until the end of the world. Vide s. 98, II. 3. Hence in the passage, Matt. xxiv. 3, the disciples of Jesus connect the two questions, *when will the temple be destroyed?* and, *what are the signs of the end of time?* In what Christ said, Matt. xxiv., he referred to the diffusion of his new religion, the establishment and confirmation of his spiritual and moral kingdom, on which the destruction of Jerusalem would have a favourable influence. Vide Matt. x. 23; Luke, xii. 40. But he said this in part in the style of prophetic imagery, as in Matt. xvi. xxiv. To these questions Christ replied with great wisdom and forecast—to the first, in Matt. xxiv. 4—25, 30; and to the second, Matt. xxv. 31—46. He taught them plainly only so much as it was needful for them to know at that time. The rest he taught them in prophetic figures, which were not as yet entirely intelligible to them, and the meaning of which they afterwards learned. Their false expectations were not therefore cherished and approved, but neither were they prematurely contradicted. Full information on this subject was among those things which they were not then able to bear, and respecting which they were to receive more full information after the ascension of Christ to heaven;

John, xvi. 12. And this more full information they actually received. For from that time they abandoned their expectations of a Jewish kingdom, and thenceforward looked for no other coming of Christ than that at the general judgment. As to what Christ and his apostles taught respecting the nature and extent of his spiritual and heavenly kingdom, vide s. 97—99.

II. *The Belief of a Millennial Kingdom of Christ upon the Earth, or Chiliasm.*

(1) *Origin of this belief.* The Jews supposed that the Messiah at his coming would reign as king upon the earth, and would reside at Jerusalem, the ancient royal city. The period of his reign they supposed would be very long, and therefore put it down at a thousand years, which was at first understood only as a round number. Respecting the Jewish ideas of the Messianic kingdom, cf. s. 89, and s. 118, I., together with Wetstein's selections from Jewish authors on Rev. xx. 2. This period was conceived of by the Jews as the return of the golden age to the earth, and each one formed to himself such a picture of it as agreed best with his own disposition, and that degree of moral and intellectual culture to which he had attained. Many anticipated nothing more than merely sensual delights, others entertained better and more pure conceptions, &c.

The same remark applies to many of the Judaizing Christians. Although Jesus had not yet appeared as an earthly king, yet these persons were unwilling to abandon an expectation which to them was so important. They hoped, therefore, for a second coming of Christ to establish an earthly kingdom, and transferred to this kingdom everything which the Jews had expected of the first. The apostles wholly abandoned this opinion after the ascension of Christ, and expected no other coming than that at the judgment of the world, 1 Cor. xv., and elsewhere. The fact, however, that these Jewish ideas had taken deep root in the minds of many Christians in the apostolic age, may be argued from 1 Thess. iv. 13, seq., ch. v., and 2 Thess. ii.

Many have endeavoured to find this idea even in the Apocalypse, especially xx. 1—8. But John does not there speak of Christ reigning visibly and bodily on the earth, but of his spiritual dominion, resulting from the influence of Christianity, when it shall at length be universally diffused through the earth—a kingdom which will last a *thousand years*, used as a round number to denote many centuries, or a long period. Thus does it appear that even during the first century there were many opinions upon this subject among Christians which deviated widely from the doctrine of the apostles.

[*Note.*—The scriptural ideas upon which the belief in a millennium rested are more specifically stated by Neander, Kirchengesch. b. i. Abth. iii. s. 1089. As the world was made in six days, and, according to Ps. xc. 4, *a thousand years* is in the sight of God as *one day*, so it was thought the world would continue in the state in which it had hitherto been, for six thousand years; and as the Sabbath is a day of rest, so will the seventh period of a thousand years consist of *this millennial kingdom* as the close of the whole earthly state.—Tr.]

(2) In the second century, the doctrine of the future earthly kingdom of Christ became more and more widely diffused, and in a large portion of the Christian world it was finally predominant. Its first zealous advocate was Papias, in the second century; and he was followed by Justin the Martyr, Tertullian, and most of the Montanists. This doctrine was also adopted by some of the heretics—e. g., by Cerinthus. It was not, however, held by all in the same manner. Most taught that the church would have to suffer much from Anti-christ (the seducer and persecutor); and that Christ would then visibly return and destroy his power; 2 Thess. ii. Then, it was supposed, all worldly power would cease, the pious be raised from the dead (*πρώτη ἀνάστασις*), assemble in Jerusalem, and standing under Christ, their king, would reign with him a thousand years.

As to the pleasures then to be enjoyed, the conceptions of some were very gross, those of others more chastened. In forming their pictures of this period they drew largely from the Apocalypse, which they interpreted in many different ways. Origen, in the third century, was the first who wrote in opposition to this doctrine, and who gave a different interpretation to the texts of scripture to which appeal was made by the Chiliasts. On this account, this doctrine fell into disesteem among the learned. In the third century, Dionysius, Bishop at Alexandria, wrote against Chiliasm in opposition to Nepos, Bishop in Egypt, and in his work denied that John wrote the Apocalypse, because his opponents were accustomed to derive their doctrine principally from this book.

[*Note.*—It was in Phrygia, the seat of the spirit of religious enthusiasm, that Chiliasm chiefly prevailed; and from thence it spread. Here belonged Papias, Ireneus, Justin the Martyr, &c. Two causes contributed to prevent this doctrine from becoming more universally prevalent in the early church—viz., opposition to Montanism, and the influence of the school at Alexandria. The visionary conceptions which the Montanists entertained and inculcated respecting what would take place in the millennium, brought the whole doctrine into disrepute; and all the opponents of Montanism opposed

these gross Chiliastic conceptions as belonging essentially to that scheme. The allegorizing method of interpretation adopted by the teachers of the Alexandrine school enabled them to avoid the gross conceptions of the millennium to which those who adopted the literal mode of interpretation were led. By applying this principle to the interpretation of the Apocalypse, they could take away the support which the Chiliasts derived from it without excluding the book from the sacred canon.—Tr.]

(3) The seed of the doctrine of gross Chiliasm has always remained in the Christian church. This doctrine, however, has shewn itself in different forms, and has been taught sometimes in a more visionary manner, and at other times less so. Respecting the time when this millennial kingdom will commence, there has been no general agreement of opinion. Many suppose it will take place before the resurrection; others, not until afterwards.

At the time of the Reformation this belief in a millennial, earthly kingdom of Christ was revived and widely spread by the enthusiastic anabaptists, Thomas Münzer and his adherents. They themselves wished to establish this kingdom of Christ with fire and sword, and to put an end to all worldly power; they encouraged rebellion. Hence Luther and Melancthon set themselves against this doctrine with great zeal and earnestness. Vide Augsb. Conf. Art. xviii. It shewed itself again, however, in the protestant church.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth century Spener was charged with teaching Chiliasm; but he was far removed from this. He only expressed frequently the hope that the spiritual kingdom of Christ would not only continue in the world, but would be much more widely diffused than it now is, and hereafter would become absolutely universal. And this expectation (*spes meliorum temporum*) is perfectly accordant with the holy scriptures. This is the point to which all the middle part of the Apocalypse refers—viz., from chap. xii. 18 to xx. 10, the victory of Christ over heathenism, and all sin and corruption on the earth, and the general diffusion of Christianity; after which the end of the world and the kingdom of the saints will follow, chap. xx. 11—xxii. 5. This, one might call (if he wished) *Biblical Chiliasm*; in this there is nothing of enthusiasm; and even for those who do not live to see this period the anticipation of it is consoling and animating.

But Petersen, who came from the school of Spener, at the end of the seventeenth and commencement of the eighteenth century, inculcated in his writings various enthusiastic ideas on this subject. The same doctrine was taken into favour about the same time by Burnet, in England, in his work, “De Statu Mort. et Resurg.” At

a later period, Bengel, in Germany, went a great deal too far in many points in his interpretation of the Apocalypse. So, many theologians of Wurtemberg, Crusius and his disciples, and Lavater in Switzerland.

A good development of the history of this doctrine is contained in Corrodi's "*Kritische Geschichte des Chiliasmus*;" Frankfort und Leipzig, 1781—1783. It was principally occasioned by Lavater's views on this subject.

[*Note.*—Neander, in his history of this doctrine, (b. i. Abth. iii. s. 1090,) suggests the important caution that we should not allow ourselves, through disgust at the extravagant visions of enthusiasts about the millennium, to decide against what we are really justified in hoping and expecting as to the future extension of the kingdom of Christ. As the Old Testament contains an intimation of the things of the New, so Christianity contains an intimation of a higher order of things hereafter, which it will be the means of introducing; but faith must necessarily come before sight. The divine revelations enable us to see but a little, now and then, of this higher order, and not enough to form a complete picture. As prophecy is always obscure until its fulfilment, so must be also the last predictions of Christ respecting the destiny of his church, until the entrance of that higher order.

There are three degrees in the manner of holding this doctrine, described as *crassus*, *subtilis*, *subtilissimus*, according to the proportion in which enthusiastic and visionary conceptions are mingled with the scriptural idea of the future kingdom of the Messiah. The lowest kind is characterized by the belief of the *visible* appearance and reign of Christ upon the earth, a resurrection of the saints before the general judgment, and their living with Christ in the enjoyment of worldly splendour and luxury for a thousand years. In this form it was held by many of the ancient Montanists, and by the anabaptists in the sixteenth century. The more refined and scriptural doctrine of the millennium, as held by Spener, Vtringa, and others, excludes the idea of the visible appearance of Christ, and does not insist upon the definite period of a thousand years, but only holds to the future universal extension of the spiritual kingdom of Christ. Cf. Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 665.—Tr.]

III. Future Conversion of Jews and Gentiles.

The doctrine of the universal conversion of the Gentiles, and especially of the Jews, to be hoped for hereafter, has been for the most part taught by the advocates of the grosser kind of Chiliasm. Still the former doctrine stands in no necessary connexion with the latter. And many protestant theologians, who are far from

assenting to any unscriptural views of the millennium, have adopted this doctrine—e. g., Michaelis, Koppe, and others still more lately. But some theologians connected with both of these doctrines other opinions which do not entirely accord with scripture, or which at least are not in all parts clearly demonstrable from scripture—e. g., Burnet, Bengel, Crusius. Hence Ernesti and his whole school were very much opposed to this doctrine, and would not at all allow that even the remotest hope of the conversion of the Jews is authorized by the New Testament.

It has happened with regard to this subject, as it often does in all the departments of human knowledge, that opinions in which there has been an intermixture of what is erroneous and incapable of proof have been on this account entirely rejected, instead of being carefully sifted, in order to separate the true from the false, that which may be proved from that which is incapable of demonstration. The doctrine itself of the future conversion of the Jews involves nothing questionable or enthusiastic, if it be understood only to imply that the apostles believed and taught that the Jews would hereafter abandon their prejudices and their hardness of heart, possess a taste and susceptibility for Christianity, and cordially unite themselves with the Christian church. When this will take place, and by what means it will be brought about, the apostles determine nothing; and with regard to these points nothing is known. But an expectation of this event is found in their writings.

Two things on this subject are certain—viz., (1) That it was always a current doctrine among the Jews that all the Gentiles would at last become incorporated in the kingdom of the Messiah; and with reference to this event they explained many passages in their prophets, which, when read impartially, plainly teach this very thing—e. g., Ps. xxii. 28; Is. ii., xii., xl.—lxvi.; Zech. xiv. 9, 16, coll. Rev. xv. 4. And this same hope is clearly expressed by Paul, especially in Rom. xi.

(2) The Jews, at the time of the apostles and afterwards, explained many passages in their prophets as referring to the future restoration of their people at the time of the Messiah, (Deut. xxx.) and these passages are referred in the New Testament, and by Paul, to the same event; from whence it is clear that the apostles taught and inculcated the same thing with the ancient prophets—e. g., Isaiah, x. 21; lix. 20; Jer. xxxi. 1, seq.; Hosea, iii. 5; Zech. xiv. 6; ix. 10. These passages, indeed, have all been differently interpreted in modern times. Cf. Doederlein's work, "Giebt uns die Bible Hoffnung zu einer allgemeinen Judenbekehrung?" But the Jews understood

these passages to refer to the restoration of their nation, and the New Testament gives them the same explanation. This is historically certain; and upon this everything depends, when the question is, *Whether the New Testament teaches this doctrine?* Vide Schöttgen, in the book, "Jesus, der wahre Messias;" Eisenmenger, *Entdecktes Judenthum*; and Koppe on Rom. xi.

We may come now more easily to the examination of the celebrated passage, Romans, xi. 25, seq. Ernesti and others understand the *πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται* thus: all "Israel can be delivered;" but this does not accord with ver. 31, *ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεῖθωσι*, and ver. 32, *τοὺς πάντας, ἐλεήσει*. We cannot render these clauses, *in order that God CAN have pity*; no, he will *actually* have mercy upon them. Nor can we see any reason, according to this interpretation, why Paul should adopt such a high and elevated tone with regard to a matter which is self-evident, or how he could call this *μυστήριον*. It is also equally unintelligible, if this were all, what should have induced Paul so solemnly to celebrate and magnify the divine wisdom, ver. 33—36. But everything is plain and consistent if Paul is understood here to speak the language of prophecy. He proceeds on the ground of the expectation universally prevalent among his countrymen, and authorized by the ancient prophets; he rectifies their ideas with regard to their future restoration, discards their false conceptions, their hopes of earthly good, and then says, with great assurance, that *all* Israel will hereafter be converted to Christ, as all the Gentiles will come to worship him; although, when he wrote, there was no human probability of either of these events. But in all this he does not give the least countenance to the enthusiastic conceptions frequently entertained on this subject. He does not fix any definite time. But theologians have often been unwilling to allow that Paul affirmed the final conversion of the Jews, because enthusiastic ideas have often been connected with this doctrine, or because they have regarded this event as either impossible or improbable, since after the lapse of eighteen centuries there are no signs of its accomplishment.

The sentiment of this passage is as follows: "I must propose one other important subject for your (i. e., the Gentile converts) consideration—a subject with which you have been hitherto unacquainted, and which has therefore been disregarded by you—in order that you may not be proud of your advantages over the unbelieving Jews: namely, some of the Jews will continue unbelieving until all the Gentiles who are chosen by God (*πλήρωμα ἐσθῶν*) shall have believed in Christ. (This will therefore first take place.) But when this is first brought

about (*καὶ οὕτω* for *καὶ τότε* or *ἐπειτα*, vide Koppe)—i. e., when all the Gentiles have first become believers, (now follows the *μυστήριον*,) *then will the nation of the Israelites also experience salvation*, (*σωθήσεται*), by embracing the Christian faith. For thus it is said in the scriptures,—The Deliverer (Messiah) will come out of Zion (David's line), and then will I free Jacob from his sins, (Is. xlix.)" Cf. Koppe on this passage. Paul here quotes the same passages of the Old Testament from which the Jews had always proved that an entire restoration of their nation was predicted by the prophets; though he did not understand them, as they often did, to refer to an external, civil restoration.

SECTION CLV.

OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT, AND THE END OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD.

I. The General Judgment.

THE following texts may be considered as the most important relating to the last judgment—viz., Matt. xxv. 31; John, v.; 2 Thess. i. 7—10; 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17; 2 Pet. iii. 7—13; 1 Cor. xv.; and Rev. xx. 11. In illustration of this doctrine, it may be observed,

(1) According to the uniform doctrine of the scriptures, the judgment of the world will follow immediately after the general resurrection; and then will be the *end of the world*, or of its present constitution. Cf. 1 Cor. xv.

(2) This doctrine of a general judgment of the world was also prevalent among the Jews at the time of Christ and the apostles; although they frequently associated with it many incorrect notions. This doctrine, as well as that of future retribution and resurrection, was, without doubt, more and more developed and illustrated, under the divine guidance and direction, by the prophets and teachers of the Jewish nation who lived after the exile. Vide s. 149, II. 2. This was done more particularly at the same period of time in which those other doctrines were developed. But there are also passages in Daniel which allude to this event—c. g., chap. xii.

Before the exile the doctrine of the judgment *as a solemn, formal transaction at the end of the world*, was not clearly taught. At that time the Jews held only the general truth, that God is the righteous Judge of the world, who in his own time would pronounce righteous sentence upon all men, according to their deserts, and bring all their works, even the most secret, to light. Vide Ps. ix. 5—9; Eccles. ix. 9; xii. 13, 14. The doctrine which was afterwards developed among the Jews, and in the form in which it existed among them at the time of Christ, was expressly authorized and confirmed by him

as true, and as constituting a part of his religious system; in such a way, however, as to exclude the false additions of the Jewish teachers.

(3) The holding of this judgment as well as the raising of the dead is commonly ascribed in the New Testament to Christ, and represented as a commission or plenipotentiary power, which the Father had given to the man Jesus as Messiah. Thus it is said, Rom. ii. 16, Θεός (cf. ver. 6) κρινεῖ τὰ κρυπτά ἀνθρώπων διὰ Ἰησοῦ, and Christ himself says, John, v. 22, 25, κρίσιν πᾶσαν δέδωκε τῷ υἱῷ. Vide Matthew, xvi. 27; Acts, x. 42; xvii. 31. Cf. s. 98, II. 3, and Morus, page 294, note 8; and page 296, note 3. Christ himself assigns it as the reason why God had entrusted to him the holding of this judgment, that he is *a man*, (υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου;) John, v. 27, coll. Acts, xvii. 31, ἀνθρώπου. God has constituted him the Judge of men, because he is man, and knows from his own experience all the sufferings and infirmities to which our nature is exposed, and can therefore be compassionate and indulgent; Heb. ii. 14—17, coll. 1 Timothy, ii. 5.

(4) *Names given in the scriptures to the last judgment.* The time of this judgment, and the judgment itself, are called in the passages already cited, ἡμέρα (ἡ) Κυρίου or Ἰησοῦ, Χριστοῦ, κ. τ. λ.; also ἡμέρα μεγάλη (ἡ) (ἡ) Jude, ver. 6; κρίσις (sometimes written κατακρίσις), κρίμα, παρουσία Χριστοῦ, 1 Thess. iv. 15; 2 Thess. ii. 1; ἐσχάτη ἡμέρα, John, vi. 39, 40, 44. Hence the ecclesiastical name of this transaction, *judicium extremum*, or *novissimum*, the last judgment, because it will take place at the end of the world that now is. The term, *the last judgment*, is not used, however, in the New Testament. Nor are the phrases ἐσχάτη ἡμέρα and τὸ ἐσχάτον τῶν ἡμερῶν used exclusively with reference to the end of the world. They often designate merely *the future, coming days*—e. g., 2 Timothy, iii. 1; 2 Pet. iii. 3; like עתידות, Genesis, xlix. 1. They sometimes also denote *the last period of the world, or the times of the Messiah*—e. g., Heb. i. 1; 1 Pet. i. 20, like τέλει αἰῶνων, αἰῶν μέλων, Heb. עולם הזה.

(5) *The time of the judgment, or of the end of the world, and its signs or precursors.* Vide Morus, p. 304, s. 13. According to the assurance of the apostles this time is unknown. Yet many of the Jewish Christians at the times of the apostles supposed that it would take place immediately after the destruction of Jerusalem and of the Jewish state, because the Jews believed that their temple and city would stand until the end of the world. Vide s. 98, II. 3. But the apostles never affirmed this; they never pretended to the knowledge of a divine revelation respecting the time, but contented themselves with saying, that it would come suddenly and unexpectedly, *like a thief in the night*; 1 Thess.

v. 2; 2 Pet. iii. 10. In the first of these texts, Paul shews that this event was not so near as some at that time supposed; and in the second, Peter shews that the actual coming of this event could not be doubted, merely because it seemed to some to be long delayed. In 2 Cor. iv. 14, Paul considers himself and his contemporaries as being among those *whom God would raise from the dead through Christ*; he did not therefore expect himself to survive the judgment of the world, although from other passages it might seem that he at least wished he might. It is not by chance that the declaration of the apostles—that they could not determine the time and the hour of this event, is so clearly preserved to us. Were there any reason to charge them with the opposite, to what contempt would their doctrine be exposed!

As to the signs and precursors of this event nothing can be very definitely determined from the New Testament; nothing certainly by which we can draw conclusions with any safety with regard to the precise time of its occurrence. No indications pointing definitely to the day and hour can be expected, especially for this reason, that the coming of this event is always described as sudden and unexpected. Cf. 2 Pet. iii. 10. Even with regard to the far less important revolution among the Jewish people, in the overthrow of their state, it is said (Matt. xiii. 32) that the exact time when it would take place no one but God knew, not even the angels, nor the Son of man in his humiliation. And yet there have never at any period been wanting persons who have undertaken to determine definitely the time and hour of this event. They have commonly reasoned from some, and often very arbitrary, explanations of the Apocalypse, and from calculations drawn from the same. This ingenious search after the time and hour of the fulfilment of the divine predictions is not according to the mind and will of Christ, since it usually leads to the neglect of what is more important; and besides, nothing is gained by it. Vide Acts, i. 7.

In the earliest age of the church many supposed that the end of the world would follow immediately upon the destruction of Jerusalem. When this event was past, other calculations were made. In the tenth century the opinion was very prevalent in the Western church that the end of the world was near at hand, because, according to Rev. xx. 3, 4, the millennial kingdom should commence after a thousand years. This belief had the effect, upon the multitudes who adopted it, to render them inactive; they squandered and consumed their goods; they suffered their houses to go to ruin; and many families were reduced to want. Hence, in the eleventh century there was more building and repairing done than at any other period.

From this we may conclude that the way to promote the conversion of men is not, as it were, to compel them to it by the fear of the proximity of the last day. Even in modern times many theologians, and those too of some celebrity, have entered into calculations of this kind, drawn chiefly from the Apocalypse—e. g., Bengel, Crusius, and others.

What we are definitely taught on this subject in the New Testament may be stated as follows:—The Christian church will hereafter be subjected to great temptation from heathen profaneness, from false, delusive doctrine, and extreme moral corruption, and will seem for a time to be ready to perish from these causes; but then Christ will appear, and, according to his promise, triumph over this opposition; and then, and not till then, will the end of the world come; Christ will visibly appear and hold the general judgment, and conduct the pious into the kingdom of the blessed. This is the distinct doctrine of Paul, 2 Thess. ii. 3—12, and is taught throughout the Apocalypse, xii. 18—xxii. 5, and this is sufficient for our instruction, warning, and comfort.

(6) As to the *nature* of the general judgment, and the *manner* in which it will be conducted by Christ, we can state on scriptural authority only the following particulars:—

(a) That Christ will pronounce sentence upon *all* men, even on those who have lived in paganism, Rom. ii. 6, seq.; Acts, xvii. 71. Vide s. 98, II. 3. Final sentence will then, too, be pronounced upon the evil spirits, Jude, ver. 6; 2 Pet. ii. 4; Matt. xxv. 41. For other texts, cf. Morus, p. 294, not. 1 and 3.

(b) This sentence will be *righteous* and *impartial*, 2 Tim. iv. 8. Every one will be judged according to the light he has enjoyed, and the use he has made of it. Those who have had the written law will be judged according to that; the heathen, according to the light of nature, Rom. ii. 13—16. Those who have had greater knowledge, and more opportunities and powers for doing good than others, and yet have neglected or abused them, will receive a severer sentence, &c.; Matthew, x. 15, 11, 23, 24; 2 Thess. i. 5. Morus, p. 294, note 4.

(c) This will be the *final* and *irrevocable* sentence, by which rewards will be bestowed upon the righteous, and punishments allotted to the wicked, for their good and evil actions, and the thoughts of the heart; Matt. xxv. 31—46; 2 Cor. v. 10; 1 Cor. iv. 5; Rom. ii. 6, 16.

Note.—It has for a long time been disputed among theologians, whether the judgment of the world will be an *external, visible, formal* transaction, or whether the *mere decision respecting the destiny of man*, the actual taking effect of retribution, is represented under the image of a judicial proceeding, like what is now common

among men? The reasons alleged on both sides of this question are stated by Gerhard in his *Loci Theologici*. Cf. Morus, p. 295, note 1. The latter opinion is adopted by many theologians at the present time—e. g., Eckermann, Henke, and others, who contend that this whole representation was intended by Christ and the apostles to be merely *figurative*, and should be so understood. It is clear, however, from the New Testament, unless its language is arbitrarily interpreted and explained away, that the first Christian teachers everywhere represent the judgment of the world as a solemn, visible transaction, distinct from *retribution*; though its more particular nature cannot be distinctly determined or made plain to us; and is therefore described in the New Testament, for the most part, by figures. This is very well expressed by Morus, p. 295, s. 6. If the New Testament taught the contrary opinion, its doctrines would not be consistent with each other. For, according to the New Testament, man will possess a *body*, even in the future life, and continue to be, as he now is, a being composed both of *sense* and *reason*; and so there, as well as here, he will have the want of something *cognizable by the senses*.

With regard to this subject, as well as many others, the Bible is accustomed to connect figurative and literal phraseology together, and to use these modes of speech interchangeably, in order to render clear and impressive to our minds many things which could not otherwise be represented plainly and forcibly enough. Thus it is, for example, in the discourses of Christ on this subject, Matt. xvi. 27, seq., and chap. xxv. By all which he has there said in a figurative style, the idea should be impressed that Christ will visibly appear in a majestic manner, pronounce some *innocent* and others *guilty*, and treat them accordingly. In the courts of the ancients it was a custom to place the former on the *right* hand, the latter on the *left*; and every one who heard this discourse of Christ knew what he meant by this representation. He taught the same truth without a figure, when he declared that some should be pardoned and made happy, and others pronounced guilty and punished.

II. Scriptural Doctrine respecting the End of the World.

(1) Even the ancient Hebrews believed that as the world had a beginning it would also have an end; and so their prophets speak of the *growing old* of the heavens and the earth. They teach that hereafter the whole material creation will become unfit for its purposes, and useless to its inhabitants, and that God will then lay by the aged heavens, like an old, worn-out garment, and create a new heaven and a new earth.

Vide Ps. cii. 10—12, where this is described, in opposition to the eternity and unchangeableness of God. Cf. Heb. i. 10—12.

Our seeing the constant fluctuations and changes of all things, the wasting and falling away of the hardest rocks, and other observations of a similar nature, may lead to the same thought, and give it confirmation.

Hence we find, even in the Old Testament, such expressions as the following: *until the heavens are no more, until the sun and the moon are no more*—e. g., Job, xiv. 12. So in Ps. lxxii. 5, 7, 17, where a time far removed is expressed by this phraseology; for this period was naturally conceived of as far distant, since changes of this nature are found by experience to require a long time. Moreover, in the prophets, such expressions as *the destruction of the heavens and of the earth, the growing pale and darkening of the sun and moon*, are often used figuratively, to denote great changes in the world, the calamity and downfall of particular states and countries, &c.—e. g., Is. xiii. (respecting Babel; chap. xxxiv.; Ezek. xxii.; Rev. vi.; Matt. xxiv. 29, seq. On the contrary, the phrases *new heavens, new earth, the clear shining sun*, &c., are used to denote the welfare and returning prosperity of states—e. g., Isaiah, lvi. 17; lxvi. 22; xlii. 10, et passim. But these very figurative expressions presuppose the literal idea.

(2) From these more general ideas and expectations respecting great changes hereafter to take place in the universe, there was developed among the Jews and other nations the more definite idea of the future destruction of the world, and especially of our earth. Everything, it was supposed, would be hereafter shattered and destroyed, but not annihilated; since from the ruins of the ancient structure there would come forth again a renewed and beautified creation. Philo says, (*De Vita Mosis*, tom. ii. p. 144, ed. Mangey,) *νέα ἀναφαίνεται ἡ γῆ, μετὰ κάθαρσιν, the earth shall appear new again, after its purification*, even as it was after its first creation. He calls this renovation *παλιγγενεσίαν, νεωτερισμὸν τῶν στοιχείων, &c.*; as the Greeks also denominated the same thing, *παλιγγενεσίαν τῶν ὄλων*—an expression used by the stoics with reference to this subject. This end of the world was not then described as its entire destruction or *annihilation*.

Now Christ and the apostles taught the doctrine of the end of the world very distinctly and plainly, and sanctioned what was previously known on this subject by their own authority. Vide Matt. v. 18; Luke, xxi. 33; 2 Pet. iii.; 1 Cor. xv.; Rev. xx. 11, et passim. But among the Jews and some others the doctrine prevailed that this change would be effected by a *general conflagration*. This belief in such a conflagration did not at first rest upon any arguments

drawn from a profound knowledge of natural philosophy; such, for example, as the supposition of a fire burning in the centre of the earth, or the approximation of a comet, as many modern writers have thought, but they were first led to this belief, and afterwards confirmed in it, by thoughts like the following: *Water and fire* are the two most powerful and efficient elements, by which the most violent changes are produced in the earth, and by which desolations and renovations are effected. Now we find traditions among all nations respecting great floods of water, and the desolations occasioned by them in the earliest times. According to Moses, the water originally covered the whole earth, and the dry land issued from thence, and then followed Noah's flood. It was now the expectation that hereafter the other still more fearful element—the *fire*, which even now often causes such terrible desolations, would effect a still more amazing and universal revolution than that effected by the water, and that by this means the earth would be renewed and beautified.

It was by such analogies as these that this traditionary belief was confirmed and illustrated among the heathen nations where it prevailed. It was afterwards adopted by many philosophers into their systems, and advocated by them on grounds of natural philosophy. Thus, for example, Heraclitus among the Greeks contended for such a conflagration and regeneration of the earth by means of fire; and so after him the stoics. Cf. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 46; and Seneca, *Quest. Nat.* ii. 28—30.

This doctrine of the perishing of the world by fire was unquestionably prevalent among the Jews at the time of Christ and the apostles, although Philo does not accede to it in his book *Περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου*. The arguments which he there brings against it are, however, extremely meagre, built partly upon arbitrary metaphysical reasoning and partly upon a play on the word *κόσμος*.

In one passage of the New Testament this doctrine is very distinctly stated, 2 Pet. iii. 7—13. It cannot be thought that what is here said respecting the burning of the world is to be understood figuratively, as Wetstein supposes; because the fire is here too directly opposed to the literal water of the flood to be so understood. It is the object of Peter to refute the boast of scoffers, that all things had remained unchanged from the beginning, and that therefore no day of judgment and no end of the world could be expected. And so he says that originally, at the time of the creation, the whole earth was covered and overflowed with water, (*Gen. i.*) and that from hence the dry land appeared; and the same was true at the time of Noah's flood. But there is yet to come a great *fire-revolution*. The

heavens and the earth (the earth with its atmosphere) are reserved, or kept in store, for the fire until the day of judgment; ver. 10, at that time the heavens will pass away (*παρέρχεται*) with a great noise, the elements will be dissolved by fervent heat, and everything upon the earth will be burnt up. The same thing is taught in ver. 12. But in ver. 13, Peter gives the design of this revolution; it will not be an annihilation, but "*we expect a new heaven, and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness*"—i. e., an entirely new, altered, and beautified abode for man, to be built from the ruins of his former dwelling-place, as the future habitation of the pious. Cf. Rev. xxi. 1, seq. This will be very much in the same way as a more perfect and an immortal body will be reared from the body which we now possess. The passage, Rom. viii. 19, seq., also treats of this renovation and beautifying of the world. Vide Morus, p. 303, note 5. Cf., with regard to the subjects here discussed, Süsskind's "Magazin für christliche Dogmatik und Moral," 10tes St. No. 2, respecting the Jewish ideas of the Messiah as the governor of the world and the raiser of the dead; and No. 3, the declarations of Jesus, in which he ascribes to himself the raising of the dead, the judging of the world, and a kingdom at the end of the world.

SECTION CLVI.

OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF HELL, OR ETERNAL CONDEMNATION.

I. Scriptural Names and Representations of these Punishments, and of the Place where they will be inflicted.

ACCORDING to the doctrine of the Jewish nation at the time of Christ—a doctrine which he himself receives as true, and expressly authorizes and confirms—the wicked are miserable, and the righteous happy, even immediately after death. Cf. what was said respecting the intermediate state s. 150. Still it is not until after the day of judgment that the perfect blessedness of the righteous or the entire misery of the wicked will properly commence, and they enter upon the state of full retribution. The former will then go to an abode of joy, the latter to a place of sorrow. Vide Wetstein on Matt. xxv. 46. The condition of wicked men and of the fallen angels before the day of judgment is described by the sacred writers as like that of malefactors while yet in prison, before the final judicial sentence is pronounced upon them.

The place in which they are confined is properly called *Τάρταρος*, and it is a part of Hades—the invisible world in which bad angels and ungodly men are reserved until the day of judgment. Vide s. 150, I. 1. This place is also

called *ζόφος*, or *σκότος*, in the epistle of Jude and in 2 Pet. ii., and *φυλακή* in 1 Pet. iii. 19. Even in this place the wicked are represented as indeed unhappy, but their complete misery will not commence until after judicial sentence has been pronounced upon them.

The place of punishment *after judgment* is not revealed in the scriptures, nor is it known distinctly whether the Jews conceived of it as *under* the earth, or as entirely beyond the boundaries of our planet. The term *ᾠδης* is not used in the scriptures to designate specifically *this* place, for *ᾠδης* and *ᾠδης* are the names given to the kingdom of the dead, where the righteous and the wicked both abide after death. Vide s. 150, I. The more appropriate designations of this place are *κῆμη πυρός καὶ θείου*; Rev. xx. 10, 15; and *γεέννα*, Matt. x. 28; v. 22; on which place cf. Wetstein.

The names given to these punishments themselves, both before and after judgment, are in part figurative, and many terms which were commonly applied by the Jews to this subject are retained in the New Testament. These images are taken from death, capital punishment, tortures, prisons, &c.; and it is the design of the sacred writers, in using such figures, to awaken the idea of something terrible and fearful; future punishment, they mean to teach, will awaken in men the same feelings of distress as are produced by the objects employed to represent it. Some of the more general and literal names of this punishment are *ὁλεθρος αἰώνιος*, 2 Thess. i. 9; *ὁργὴ μέλλουσα*, Matt. iii. 7; *κόλασις αἰώνιος*, Matt. xxv. 46; *βάσανοι*, Luke, xvi. 24, 25. The more figurative names are *θάνατος*, John, viii. 51; xi. 26; *θάνατος δεύτερος*, Rev. xx. 6, &c. Vide s. 147, II.; *σκότος* and *ζόφος τοῦ σκότους*, Matt. xxv.; Jude, ver. 6, seq.; *πῦρ αἰώνιον*, *φλὸς πυρός*, Matt. xxv. 41; xviii. 8; 2 Thess. i. 9; *the worm which dies not*, Mark, ix. 44, where the comparison is taken from Isaiah, lxvi. 24; *πορεύεσθαι ἀπὸ Θεοῦ*, in opposition to *beholding the countenance of God*, Matt. xxv. 41; *having no rest day nor night*, Rev. xiv. 11, &c.

Many of the Jews, and some even of the church fathers, took these terms in an entirely literal sense, and supposed there would be literal fire &c. in hell. But nothing more can be inferred with certainty from the words of Christ and the apostles than that they meant by these images to describe great and unending misery. The name adopted by the schoolmen, *damnatio æterna*, is founded upon Heb. vi. 2, where we find *κρίμα* (i. e., *κατάκριμα*) *αἰώνιον*. Cf. 2 Thess. i. 9.

II. Nature of Future Punishments.

It is certain from the plainest declaration of the holy scriptures (cf. s. 155), and may also

be proved on grounds of reason, that the happiness or misery of the future world stands in most intimate connexion with the present life. The rewards and blessedness of the world to come are to be regarded as the salutary and happy consequences of the present life and conduct of men; and, on the contrary, the punishments there to be endured, and future misery, as the sad and fatal consequences of their character and actions in this world. Our future good or evil estate is dependent upon our present life and character.

The divine punishments are divided into *natural* and *positive*, or *arbitrary*, and both these kinds belong to future punishment. Vide s. 31, 86, 87.

(1) Among *natural* punishments we may reckon the following—viz.,

(a) The loss or deprivation of eternal happiness, *pæna damni*, Matt. vii. 21—23, ἀποχωρεῖτε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ. Matt. xxii. 13; xxv. 41: in all of these texts the representation is figurative. Cf. 2 Thess. i. 9, δίκην τίσουσιν—ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ Κυρίου—i. e., removed from Christ, and from the happiness which he enjoys.

(b) The painful sensations which are the natural consequence of committing sin, and of an impenitent heart, *pæna sensus*. These punishments are inevitable, and connected as closely and inseparably with sin as any effect with its cause. From the consciousness of being guilty of sin arise regret, sorrow, and remorse of conscience, and it is these inward pangs which are the most grievous and tormenting. The conscience of man is a stern accuser, which cannot be refuted or bribed, and the more its voice is disregarded or suppressed here upon earth, the more loudly will it speak hereafter. For man will then be no longer surrounded, as he is in this world, with external circumstances, which distract the mind, and prevent him from seeing the heinousness of sin, and from reflecting on his unhappy situation. He will pass at once from the noise and tumult of the things of sense into the stillness of the future world, and will there awake to reflection. He will then see how he has neglected the means of improvement and salvation, and to what irreparable injury he has thus exposed himself.

Add to this, that the propensity to sin, the passions and evil desires which in this world occupy the human heart, are carried along into the next. For it cannot be supposed that they will be suddenly eradicated as by a miracle; and this is not promised. But these desires and propensities can no longer find satisfaction in the future world, where man will be placed in an entirely different situation, and surrounded by a circle of objects entirely new; hence they will become the more inflamed. From the very nature of the case it is plain, therefore, that the

state of such a man hereafter must necessarily be miserable. Shame, regret, remorse, hopelessness, and absolute despair, are the natural, inevitable, and extremely dreadful consequences of the sins committed in this life.

(2) But there are also, according to the most incontrovertible declarations of the scriptures, *positive* or *arbitrary* punishments—i. e., such as stand in no natural and necessary connexion with sin. Vide Morus, p. 297, note 2. This is, indeed, denied by those who will not allow that God inflicts any arbitrary punishments. Vide s. 31, 86, 87. But even if they suppose they can make their opinion appear probable on philosophical grounds, they ought not still to assert that the doctrine of positive punishments is not taught in the Bible. All the ancient nations who believed in the punishments of hell regarded these punishments, at least the most severe and terrible of them, as *positive* or *arbitrary*—i. e., as depending on the will of the Legislator; as, on the other hand, they regarded the rewards of the pious as not merely natural, but principally arbitrary.

There are, in fact, but few men in such a state that the merely natural punishments of sin will appear to them terrible enough to deter them from the commission of it; and so, for this reason, if for no other, the doctrine of positive punishments should be retained in popular instruction. Experience also shews that to threaten positive punishment has far more effect, as well upon the cultivated as the uncultivated, in deterring them from crime, than to announce and lead men to expect the merely *natural* consequences of sin, be they ever so terrible. Hence we may see why it is that the New Testament says little of natural punishments, (although these beyond a question await the wicked,) and makes mention of them in particular far less frequently than of positive punishments; and why, in those passages which treat of the punishments of hell, such expressions and images are almost always employed as suggest and confirm the idea of positive punishments. Cf. No. I. of this section ad finem.

Those, therefore, who consider Jesus to be a teacher of truth, in whose mouth there was no guile, must necessarily believe also his often repeated declarations on this subject. It is very inconsistent in some modern philosophers and theologians to admit of positive *rewards* for the pious, and yet deny positive punishments for the wicked. We are, indeed, compelled to admit positive rewards, because those which are merely natural are not sufficient to complete the measure of our happiness. If the positive rewards are probable on grounds of reason, how can it be said that positive punishments are impossible and contradictory? It was, moreover, the prevailing doctrine among the Jews at the time of

Christ, that punishments are for the most part positive, and that they affect even the body. Hence the words of Christ, ἀπολέσαι ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, Matt. x. 28. For since the impenitent will be again clothed with a body at the resurrection, this body must participate in their punishment, as the body of the righteous will participate in their reward.

As to the question, *In what these positive or corporeal punishments will consist?* no definite answer can be drawn from the Bible, because it is plainly intended that all the representations made of this subject should be understood figuratively and by way of comparison—i. e., these punishments will consist of pains like those, e. g., arising from fire or from a gnawing worm. We are so little acquainted with the state in which we shall be hereafter, and with the nature of our future body, that no strictly literal representation of future punishments could be made intelligible to us. Even the place in which the wicked are confined will contribute much to their misery, also the company of other sinners, and of evil spirits—a circumstance particularly mentioned in Matt. xxv. 41.

Note.—The efforts of those who have endeavoured to persuade even the common people and the young that no *positive* divine punishments are to be expected in the world to come, have ever had a most injurious tendency, as the history of all ages will shew. For the deep-rooted expectation of such punishments among all nations has always been a check upon the more gross outbreaks of sin. It was from this expectation that the oath derived its sacredness and inviolableness. It is often said by Cicero and others, that all philosophers, both Greek and Roman, are agreed in this, that the gods do not punish, *deos non nocere*. But as soon as this opinion of the philosophers began to prevail among the people, it produced, according to the testimony of all the Roman writers, the most disastrous consequences, which lasted for centuries. No subsequent efforts could ever succeed in awakening a fear of divine punishments in the minds of the great multitude. Hence resulted the deplorable degeneracy of the Roman empire. Truth and faith ceased, chastity became contemptible, perjury was practised without shame, and every species of luxurious excess and of cruelty was indulged. To this corruption no philosopher was able to oppose any effectual resistance; until at length its course was arrested by Christianity.

Among Christians themselves such efforts have always been followed by similar disastrous consequences.

(1) The papal sale of indulgences, which became general during the twelfth and the succeeding centuries, and especially after the cru-

sades, had a tendency, in the same way, to diminish the fear of positive divine punishments, because it was supposed one might purchase exemption from them. The result of this delusion was equally deplorable in this case as in the one before mentioned; the greatest immoralities prevailed throughout Christian lands; until this evil was arrested by the reformation, and the fear and the love of God were both awakened anew in the hearts of Christians.

(2) A similar result took place in England in the latter half of the seventeenth century, when some rationalist philosophers, during the reign of Charles II., undertook to emancipate the minds of men from the fear of positive divine punishments. The effect of their efforts is well known from history. Frivolity of spirit, immorality, sins of impurity, and all the dreadful consequences of forgetting God, suddenly prevailed.

(3) The principles of these English philosophers were gradually diffused through France by the writings of Voltaire, Diderot, and others; and after 1740, they were also adopted and disseminated by some even in Germany. The history of our own times shews us sufficiently what has been the result of these principles here.

It is agreeable to the gospel—it is, indeed the very spirit of the gospel, to represent God as *Love*. It is also right for the evangelical teacher, indeed, it is his duty, to preach respecting the infinite love of God, especially as it is manifested in Jesus Christ. In this his whole heart should live. But he must never forget to teach in what order and on what conditions alone man becomes susceptible of these proofs of the divine favour. The gospel itself, though at a loss for words sufficiently to magnify the infinite love of God, represents also his penal justice in a light extremely terrifying to all who do not fall in with this prescribed order, and threatens them with the most severe and inevitable punishments in the world to come. Both of these views should therefore be connected together. Cf. the small work written by Jacobi, *Was soll ich zur Beruhigung meiner Seele glauben? Was soll ich hoffen bey den mannichfaltigen Meinungen der Gelehrten?* 1790; s. 83—96.

III. *The Justice and Necessity of the Punishments of Hell; the Sins which being Condemnation in their train; and the different Degrees of Punishment.*

(1) That there will be punishments in the future state has been believed by nearly all men who have reflected impartially upon the world, the destiny of man as a moral being, and upon the attributes of God. It is obvious to every one that the earth is not the theatre of the divine justice, and that the lot of man here below is not justly apportioned to his moral conduct.

The greatest criminal often goes unpunished, and lives, perhaps, in external peace and prosperity; and the pious, good man is often unrewarded, lives in adverse external circumstances, and frequently is severely persecuted. All this, now, appears to contradict our ideas of the divine justice, goodness, and wisdom, and makes the destination of man an inexplicable riddle.

As soon, therefore, as men came to believe in a future life, and began to reflect upon the disproportion which now exists between the moral character and the happiness of men, the thought would naturally suggest itself to their minds that the proper theatre of divine justice will be first opened in the world to come, and that the punishment of the sinner there may be as confidently expected as the reward of the righteous, since in this way only can either the justice or goodness of God be vindicated. Vide the Article on Providence, especially s. 71, VI., ad finem. Also Michaelis, Ueber die Lehre von der Sünde, s. 314. Such, accordingly, is the uniform representation of the New Testament. Vide 2 Thess. i. 5, seq.; Rom. ii. 6, seq.

(2) *Causes of condemnation.* According to the conceptions of men possessing only a very limited and imperfect knowledge of moral things, it is only a few of the grosser crimes which are punished after death. In proportion as their ideas on moral subjects become enlarged and perfected, the number of offences which they regard as liable to punishment is increased, and they come at length to the just result that every sin must be punished. Vide s. 150, II. 2. And so, according to the express doctrine of the New Testament, all *irreligiousness* (an ungodly disposition, forgetfulness of God, ἀσέβεια), every transgression of the divine precepts, all kinds of vice and moral corruption, will be inevitably punished in the future world; and this punishment will be inflicted not only upon those who, like Jews and Christians, have the express written law of God, but also upon the heathen, who have merely the law of nature. Vide Rom. ii. 6—16; Gal. iv. 8; Matt. xxv. 41, seq.; 1 Cor. vi. 9; 2 Pet. ii. 1—3.

Especially is ἀπιστία or ἀπειθεία represented as a cause of condemnation. So Mark, xvi. 16, “he that believeth not is condemned.” John, iii. 18, and ver. 36, ὁ ἀπειθῶν τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ ἀπολεῖ αὐτόν. By this unbelief is meant, the deliberate rejection of the doctrine of Christ, and disobedience to his precepts, against one’s better conviction. It includes also apostasy from the Christian doctrine when it has been once received and acknowledged as true; Hebrews, x. 26, 39. Everything therefore which draws after it punishment in the future world may be comprehended under ἀπιστία and ἀνομία—a criminal disbelief and transgression of the divine precepts. Whoever, then, is

ἀπιστός or ἀνομός, will be unhappy hereafter, however different the degrees of unhappiness may be. On the contrary, πίστις and ἐννομός βίος (ἐνσέβεια) will be followed by blessedness, however great the difference in degree may be. It will be understood, of course, that among the *unbelieving* who will be punished those are no included who have no opportunity to become acquainted with the divine will or with the Christian doctrine, or who are naturally incapacitated for this; in short, those who do not believe without any fault of their own—e. g., children and many of the heathen. Vide s. 121.

Note.—As to the *number* of those who will be saved and lost, the Bible says nothing definitely. When, on a certain occasion, the question was proposed to Christ, *Whether the number of the saved would be small?* he gave an answer, according to Luke, xiii. 23, seq., of the following import:—“Ask not such questions from an idle curiosity, but act as if thou wert alone among many thousands.” There are, indeed, *many* who will be saved, (cf. ver. 28, 29, and Rev. vii. 9,) but among them there will be many whose lot it was supposed would be different; and not all of those who account themselves the heirs of salvation, and are so esteemed by others, will be found in this number, ver. 29, 30. It is often distinctly affirmed by Christ, that among those who profess his name there are many who will not obtain eternal life, although he desires to lead all to salvation. E. g., Matt. xx. 16; xxii. 14, “many are called, but few are chosen”—i. e., many who hear me suffer themselves to be instructed in my doctrine, and become externally professors of my religion (κλητοί); but few, however, belong to the number of the chosen saints, the elect, those who are well-pleasing in the sight of God, who do that which is commanded them, who are what they should be. It is the same as to Matt. vii. 13, 14, where Christ shews that the way in which many teachers lead the people is not the right way for attaining salvation—i. e., their instruction is not true and salutary, although followed by the majority of men (*latavia*); the right and sure way which he points out meets with less approbation (it is narrow and forsaken, trodden by few), because it is more difficult and requires many sacrifices. For there were at that time but few who believed on him, and kept his commandments with the whole heart.

(3) As there are future punishments, they must be *different in degree*. Vide Morus, p. 298, s. 9. This might be concluded *a priori*, and might be reasonably expected from the justice of God; for there are different degrees in sin, and one is greater than another; (vide s. 81, II.;) and hence punishments, both natural and positive, must be proportionately varied. Now this is the uniform doctrine of Jesus and the

apostles. The more knowledge of the divine will a man has, the more opportunity and inducement to avoid sin, the greater the incentives to faith and virtue which are held up before him, by so much is his responsibility increased, and the greater will be his punishment if he does not make a faithful use of his advantages. "The servant who knows his Lord's will, and does it not, deserves to be beaten with many stripes." "To whom much is given, of him will much be required." Matt. x. 15; xxiii. 15; Luke, xii. 46. Hence Paul says that the heathen who act against the law of nature will be punished; but that the Jews will be punished more than they, because they had more knowledge, and *more was given to them*.

But we can go no further than this general rule, that this difference of degree will be apportioned *κατὰ γνώσιν, πίστιν, and ἔργα*. For God alone is able rightly to appoint punishments, and to fix their degree, since he alone is able by his omniscience to determine infallibly the degree of sin and its ill desert. It may therefore be, that many whom we regard as utterly *damnable* may not in God's judgment deserve damnation, or not that degree of it which we award them. Others, on the contrary, to whom we might adjudge reward, may appear in the eyes of God to deserve severe punishment.

SECTION CLVII.

DURATION OF FUTURE PUNISHMENTS; REASONS FOR AND AGAINST THEIR ETERNAL DURATION.

Reasons in favour of the Eternal Duration of Future Punishments, and what is, or may be, objected against these Reasons.

(1) *From the holy scriptures.* In the New Testament, the punishments of hell are expressly described as *eternal*. In Matt. xxv. 41, 46, we find *πῦρ αἰώνιον* and *κόλασις αἰώνιος* opposed to *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*: in both of these sentences, therefore, must *αἰώνιος* be taken in the same sense, *per legem disjunctionis*. And so, if in connexion with *ζωή*, it means *unending, eternal*, it must mean the same in connexion with *πῦρ*. In accordance with this must other texts be explained; as where it is said respecting the fallen angels, that they are bound in *δεσμοὶ αἰδίου*, Jude, ver. 6, coll. 2 Pet. ii. 4; Rev. xiv. 11; *ὁλεθρὸς αἰώνιος*, 2 Thess. i. 9; Mark, ix. 44, 46; Rev. xx. 10. So in John, iii. 36, where it is said respecting unbelievers, *μένει ἡ ὁρμή Θεοῦ—οὐκ ὀφείλει ζῶν*. In Matt. xxvi. 24, Christ says respecting Judas, "that it would have been better for him never to have been born."

With regard to these texts we shall here subjoin some observations.

(a) On the texts in which *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* are used. These are regarded by some as not decisive. For *αἰών* and *αἰών* are used to denote any long duration or period of time. Sometimes they refer to the *past*, and denote *ages gone by, ancient days, antiquity*; thus, *πύλαι αἰώνια*, Ps. xxiv. 7, 9; *ἔτη αἰώνια, years of antiquity*, Ps. lxxvii. 5; *χρόνοι αἰώνιοι*, Rom. xvi. 25; *αἰὲν αἰώνος*, Acts, iii. 21. Sometimes they refer to *future* time, and are applied to everything which lasts long, although in time it may come to an end, or has come to it already. For the Hebrews and other ancient people have no one word for expressing the precise idea of *eternity*. Cf. s. 20, III., respecting the eternity of God. Thus Paul, 2 Cor. iv. 18, opposes *αἰώνιον* to *πρόκαιρον*. Thus *διαδύχην αἰώνιος* is used with reference to the Mosaic institute, although it came to an end, Ex. xxxi. 16; the same as to *ἱερατεία αἰώνος*, Num. xxv. 13.

From this, as some suppose, it follows, that *κόλασις αἰώνιος* may mean either the pain and condemnation *ordained by God of old* (as Christ says, with regard to the blessedness opposed to it, that it was *προητοιμασμένη*, Matt. xxv. 34, 41), or misery and happiness *long continued, lasting for ages*, without yet designating a duration absolutely endless; or both of these senses may be comprehended under this expression. In the invisible world, everything is *αἰώνιον* and *αἰδίου*. There, according to the conceptions of all nations, time is not measured by years and short human periods, as it is here in the world, but by long periods, by ages.

To this some add the remark, that *πῦρ* and *κόλασις αἰώνιος* properly denote the *place*, the kingdom, the residence of the lost—the state of condemnation; as *βασιλεία Θεοῦ* and *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* denote the *place*, the abode of the blessed. This place, they say, may be *eternal*, because it will never be without occupants, or persons who endure punishment on account of sin. There will always be two different kingdoms, one of happiness, the other of misery, the distinction between which will never be removed, and which can never be united. But from this it does not follow that every person who has once been there, or suffered punishment, will remain there for ever.

(b) As to the phrase, *their worm dieth not*, &c., Mark, ix., this, it is said, occurs also in Is. lxvi. 24, with reference to the unhappy fate of the idolatrous Israelites, and is transferred here to the punishments of hell. Since, however, in the former case it does not denote an absolute eternity of suffering, but only its dreadfulness and long continuance, so it is at least *possible* it may mean the same here. And as to the term *μένει* in John, iii., the idea of eternity is still less implied in this. As used

by John, it may stand for *ἐλαυ*, and denote only the certainty and inevitableness of future punishments.

(c) In the passage with regard to Judas, Matt. xxvi., the language employed, it is said, may be *proverbial* and *popular*, not admitting of a strict construction. It is as much as to say, "such an one makes himself extremely miserable; well would it be for him had he never been born!"

But those texts in which there is a clear contrast between *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* and *κόλασις αἰώνιος*, cannot be so easily explained away as some suppose. And if any one considers them impartially, and without attempting to prevent their obvious meaning, he will not fail to derive from them, as Morus justly observes, (p. 300, ad finem,) "*idea sempiternitatis, non autem longi temporis.*" For since *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* in all the other discourses of Jesus is understood, without contradiction, to denote a blessed life lasting *for ever*, there is no reason for understanding it differently here. And if *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* here means *eternal life*, then, *per legem disjunctionis*, must *κόλασις αἰώνιος* denote *eternal, unending* punishment. And the other texts relating to this subject must now be explained in accordance with these.

(2) Other arguments *à priori* have been employed in behalf of the eternity of future punishments.

(a) The guilt (*culpa, reatus*) of sin, it is said, is *infinite*, and its punishment must therefore be the same. The injured majesty of the law-giver is *infinite*, and hence punishment for the injury must be infinite too. This argument was employed by many of the schoolmen—e. g., Thomas Aquinas, and has also been urged by Mosheim, and other modern theologians.

Answer.—There is no *infinite reatus peccatorum*, nor can the object against which sin is committed be made in every case the measure of its criminality or ill desert; certainly this cannot be done with regard to God. Vide s. 81, ad finem.

(b) Every sin is followed, to all eternity, by injurious consequences to him who commits it; as every virtue or good action is followed by good consequences. The wicked, therefore, must be miserable to all eternity, and endure the punishment of their sins.

Answer.—This is very true, as far as *natural* punishments, or the *natural* evil consequences of sin, are spoken of. And if these are meant when the eternity of future punishments is mentioned, then indeed must they be called *eternal*, since something will always be detracted from the happiness of the sinner for his having sinned, even if he repents, and all positive punishments are removed from him or re-

pealed, as it cannot be otherwise than that the *natural* consequences of sin should always remain. Those who have sinned will always stand proportionably below others in point of happiness, as there are degrees both of blessedness and misery.

Here, however, two things should be remarked—viz., *first*, all the consequences of our actions cannot be imputed to us, and so all the evil consequences of our actions cannot be regarded as *punishment*, especially in case it was impossible for us to foresee these consequences, or when we sinned unintentionally. *Secondly*. Divine Providence has wisely ordered it, that good and useful consequences shall often result even from the sins of men, and these consequences are equally *unending*—e. g., through the unbelief of the Jews the heathen are saved, according to Paul, Rom. xi. This now should be taken into consideration, in mitigation of the guilt and punishableness of many sins.

(c) Another argument in behalf of the eternity of future punishments is drawn from the *scientia media Dei*. Vide s. 22, I. With regard to some men, God foresaw that if they continued here upon the earth they would sin without cessation. Since now these persons are such, as to their whole constitution and disposition, that they would go on for ever to sin, they are justly punished for ever. This argument was employed by Fulgentius and Gregory the great; and it has been again used of late by Drexel, Baumgarten, Troschel, and others.

Answer.—It cannot be reconciled with our ideas of justice that sins which were never actually committed should be punished as if they had been committed. If a human ruler should punish an individual for crimes of which he was never actually guilty, but which he knew with certainty he would perpetrate if he had means, time, and opportunity, it would doubtless be pronounced unjust and tyrannical. The fact, too, is very questionable, whether there are any men who would go to sin without interruption, in every possible situation and under all circumstances in which they might be placed in this world. Nothing like this is taught us in the Christian doctrine. According to this, God punishes only τὰ ἔργα, or ἃ ἔπραξεν ἕκαστος. Rom. ii. 6; 2 Cor. v. 10.

(d) The eternity of the punishments of hell is inferred by others from the *bias to sin*, which will continually acquire strength in those who are lost, and finally make repentance impossible. It is often seen, even here upon the earth, how deeply this propensity to sin takes root when it is long indulged, and how difficult, and indeed impossible, repentance becomes. Besides, the use of the *means of grace* is confined to the present life. Hereafter there will be no preaching

of the word of God, and no sacraments, and the grace of God will no longer be there given to bring men to repentance.

Answer.—In these statements there is much which is vague and incapable of proof.

First. The state of things in the future world is very different from the state here. The reason why the bias to sin takes such deep root, and why reformation is so difficult in the present world, often lies in the external circumstances by which man is surrounded, and which make an irresistible impression upon his senses. As soon as these objects can be removed, or the impression which they make upon the senses can be weakened, it is seen that reformation becomes more easy. But now in the future world the spirits of lost men will no longer be surrounded by these external objects, which prove so exciting to the senses; so that, even if the impression before made upon them by these objects should for awhile remain, they must still, from the very nature of the human soul, become weaker and weaker in the absence of these excitements. It would seem, therefore, that sometimes, at least, the propensity to sin must gradually decrease in the future world, especially when we consider that those who are lost, being no longer deceived by external and sensible objects, and being no longer withdrawn from reflection as when upon the earth, will now see and deeply feel the evil consequences of sin.

Secondly. From hence we may conclude, if the use of reason is not wholly denied to the damned, and if their moral nature is not wholly destroyed, that it is not improbable that even in hell they *may possibly* conceive an abhorrence of sin, and renounce their love for it, although the word of God is not there preached, nor the sacraments there administered. Morus, p. 301. The knowledge which they will carry with them from this life into the next cannot be entirely obliterated; nor can it be supposed that God will compel them to sin, or so entirely withhold from them his grace that they will not be able to come to the knowledge of their sins, and to renounce the prejudice and wickedness cherished during the present life. For God to do this would be to punish sin with sin, and to be himself the author of new offences. It may be asked, then, whether the end of the divine punishments, to promote the actual reformation of those upon whom they are inflicted, may not be attained even in the case of those who will hereafter be condemned?

Thirdly. But should any one say that these punishments will be so severe, and will cause so great pain, that they will rather drive those upon whom they are inflicted to despair, distraction, or fury, than promote their repentance, he does not consider that such a statement can

hardly be reconciled with our ideas of the justice and goodness of God. These ideas do not permit us to suppose that he will punish any one as an offender from whom he himself has withdrawn all opportunity for repentance and all freedom of action. He only can be rightly punished who enjoyed freedom, but would not employ the means and opportunities for reformation which were offered him.

II. *Arguments for the Finiteness of Future Punishments, and Objections to these Arguments.*

Besides what is commonly said to invalidate the prevailing opinion of the eternity of future punishments, the following arguments are often employed to support the opinion that they are finite in duration. These arguments are of very unequal weight.

(1) *Arguments from the New Testament.*

(a) The advocates of this opinion appeal to the declaration of Peter, Acts, iii. 21, where *χρόνος αποκαταστάσεως πάντων* are spoken of, which God had before promised by the prophets. This is understood by many to denote the future recovery of lost spirits and men to a happy condition, which is on this account called *restoration*.

(b) The finiteness of future punishments is inferred by others from the efficacy and universality of the merits of Christ. There is no reason, they say, to limit the salutary consequences of his work merely to the present life. It will continue to be efficacious in the future world if man is only *willing* to reform. Such is the reasoning of many, and they refer to 1 Cor. xv. 22—28, where *θάνατος* denotes *misery* and the *punishment of sin*; and also other texts.

Answer.—From the New Testament, however, no clear argument can be derived in behalf of the finite duration of future punishments; for,

(a) The passage in 1 Cor. xv. treats of *death* in the literal sense, since *θάνατος* is there opposed to the resurrection of the dead, and it is there expressly said that Christ, in raising the dead to life, will conquer this last enemy of the human race. Cf. s. 98, ad fin. This is therefore described as his last great work for the good of the human race. And so, judging from this passage, one could expect no influence of Christ, or of his work for the good of men, beyond the grave.

(b) That the passage referred to in Acts iii. does not relate to this point is beyond all question. Vide Ernesti's Programm on this text, in his "Opusc. Theol.," p. 477, seq. Cf. s. 97, ad finem. The meaning of this passage is as follows:—"The heavens have received Christ, or retain him within themselves, as long as (*ἄχρις οὗ*) the happy period of the New Testament continues." He will not come again to found an earthly kingdom. In ver. 20, these *χρόνοι*.

ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων are called *καιροὶ ἀναψίξεως ἀπὸ Κυρίου*, and in Heb. ix. 10, *καιρὸς διορθώσεως*. Thus it is said in Matt. xvii. 11, Ἡλίας (i. e., John) ἀποκαταστήσει πάντα, where the phrase is taken from the Sept. Version of Mal. iv. 6. Πάντα refers to everything which needs reformation in religious affairs, and to everything which is predicted by the prophets. Cf. Morus, p. 301.

(c) Nor is there in the discourses of Jesus a single passage which encourages the hope that there will be a termination of future punishments. Cf., e. g., Luke, xvi.

(2) *Arguments from reason* for the finite duration of future punishments. The principal of these are drawn from our ideas of the divine attributes, the *goodness, wisdom, and justice* of God. How can it be reconciled with these attributes, it is asked, that God should make so large a number of his rational creatures for ever miserable? How can God, who is love itself, punish his creatures *eternally* because they have lived *a few years only* in a thoughtless, wicked, and irrational manner? This seems to be wholly disproportionate. Again it is asked, how could God create beings whose eternal misery he foresaw?

To these questions it may be replied,

(a) That although the views expressed in them are in general true, yet our limited understanding is unable to determine, *in particular cases*, what is to be expected from the divine goodness, wisdom, and justice, and what is accordant with these attributes, and what otherwise. And so, although it may *appear* to us to be agreeable to the goodness and the other attributes of God to put a period to the punishments of hell, still it does not follow that he must necessarily, or will actually do this. Did we not see it to be a fact, that God has created a world in which there is so much physical and moral evil, we should proceed to argue, on this principle, that it would be inconsistent with his perfections to give such a world existence, and should think that we had reasoned conclusively.

(b) Again; in reply to the above questions it may be said, that God does not look merely at single individuals, but has respect to the whole of his creation, and that he must prefer the welfare of the whole to that of a few. The offender himself may not always be benefited by the divine punishments visited upon him, but *his example* may yet serve for the warning of others, and thus conduce to their good. Cf. Rom. ix. 17, 23. Thus the eternal punishments inflicted upon some may perhaps serve, through all eternity, to deter from sins many other beings in the boundless empire of God—good angels, and men redeemed, and perhaps still other classes of beings not belonging to this world. By this punishment, therefore, a good may be done

for many which will overbalance the evil inflicted on a few. The subject is exhibited by Michaelis in this light in his work, “Von der Sunde,” s. 325, seq. Plato, in his Gorgias, near the end, ascribes a similar thought to Socrates; “he believed that the irreclaimable part of mankind would be eternally punished, as παραδείγματα, ἵνα ἄλλοι δρώντες, φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίνωνται.” There is much probability in this thought. The force of it, however, some endeavour to invalidate, by saying that it is conceiving of God too narrowly, and too much after the manner of men. God cannot be wanting in other means by which this object could be more easily and surely attained. Again; it is very much to be doubted whether the example of persons condemned to eternal punishment would have such a powerful effect upon all, and actually deter them from sin. This effect is not certainly produced upon many here in this world, who believe most confidently in the eternity of future punishments. Moreover, it is an imperfection belonging to human legislators and rulers, and not therefore to be transferred to the supreme legislator, that the punishments inflicted by them often serve merely for the warning of others, and cannot secure the reformation of those who are punished. Vide s. 31, No. 2, respecting the positive justice of God.

SECTION CLVIII.

RESULT DRAWN FROM COMPARING AND EXAMINING THE DIFFERENT ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE ETERNAL DURATION OF FUTURE PUNISHMENT; AND A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THIS DOCTRINE.

I. *Result of the Reasons for and against this Doctrine.*

(1) THERE is not a single text in the New Testament, either in the discourses of Christ or in the writings of the apostles, which clearly authorizes the hope of an entire and universal removal of all future punishments; but exactly the opposite of this sentiment is expressly affirmed in many passages. Vide s. 157, I. 1, and II. 1.

(2) The following remarks, drawn partly from scripture and partly from reason, may serve to illustrate and confirm what we are taught in the Bible respecting the duration of punishment in the future world. There are two kinds of punishment which the wicked will be made to suffer—viz.,

(a) *Natural punishment.* As every action morally good is followed by endless good consequences to him who performs it, so it is with every wrong action. This is founded in the wise constitution of things which God himself

has established. When, therefore, *natural* punishments are spoken of, it is obvious to reason how an eternal duration of them may be affirmed. Indeed, reason cannot conceive it to be otherwise, since there is no promise of God, either in the holy scriptures or elsewhere, that the natural evil consequences of sins once committed will ever cease. In order to this there must be some incomprehensible miracle performed, and this God has not promised to do. Hence, as far as natural punishments are concerned, their eternal duration may be affirmed, both on grounds of scripture and reason. Cf. s. 157, I. 2.

(b) *Positive punishments.* With regard to these we may conceive that they may be removed; indeed, much can be said, on grounds of reason, to render this opinion *probable*. To hope that God would remove the positive punishments of sins, in case the sinner, even in the future life, should come to the knowledge of himself, and truly repent, would seem to be agreeable to the divine goodness and justice. That the repentance of the sinner in the future world is absolutely impossible is not taught in the scriptures. Vide s. 157, 1, 2, coll. s. 63, II. Note, respecting the fallen angels. And that even these miserable beings are by no means wholly excluded from the active proofs of the goodness and justice of God is evident from the fact that the Bible expressly teaches that the lot of some of the damned will be more light and tolerable than that of others. Vide Matt. xi. 22, 24; x. 15; Luke, xii. 48. The phrase *κόλασις αἰώνιος* may perhaps relate therefore merely to the *natural* punishments of sin, and not to the positive. Still it cannot be shewn that this phrase does and must refer exclusively to these natural punishments, and it is still possible that both these kinds of punishment may be comprehended in its meaning. In short, no arguments which are merely *philosophical* furnish anything more than a certain degree of probability on this subject; they cannot enable us to decide anything definitely with regard to it. We know too little what the positive punishments of the future world will be, to speak decidedly with regard to them. Where the object is unknown to us, we cannot pronounce decidedly that the predicate of *eternal duration* may not be applied to them. But allowing that positive punishments may be wholly removed from one who may have actually repented, still the natural evil consequences of sin will not therefore, of necessity, come to an end. These may, indeed, become more light and tolerable to one who has repented, but even such an one can never be happy in the same degree as another who has never sinned. Such an one will always stand on a lower point of happiness than others, and

there will always be a great gulf fixed between him and them.

(3) The wisdom which Christ and his apostles always shewed in exhibiting this doctrine should be imitated by all Christian teachers. In our practical instructions we should never indulge in speculations, or suffer ourselves to enter upon the investigation of learned questions which the unpractised cannot understand, and will but too easily misconstrue and pervert. Even the distinction between natural and positive punishments cannot be made perfectly plain to the unlearned; and hence it is never insisted upon in the sacred scriptures; and that positive punishments will ever wholly cease in the future world can be shewn incontrovertibly neither from the Bible nor any other source. It is moreover impossible to prevent the doctrine of the finite duration of future punishments, let it be stated ever so guardedly, from being perverted in various ways by the great mass of mankind, to their own injury.

Let the teacher, therefore, adhere to the simple doctrine of the Bible; the more so, considering how little we know of the future world, and how liable we are, through our ignorance, to mistake. Had more full disclosures on this subject been necessary or useful for us in the present life, they would have been given to us by God either through nature, or direct revelation, or in both these ways. But since he has not seen fit to do this, let the Christian teacher exhibit faithfully and conscientiously that only which Christ and the apostles taught on this subject, without either adding anything to their testimony, or diminishing aught from it.

Note.—Some modern writers, who admit that *eternal* punishments are threatened in the Bible, but who are unable to reconcile this doctrine with their preconceived philosophical or theological principles, have hit upon the thought that God has merely threatened these eternal punishments, in order to deter men more effectually from sin, and to sustain more firmly the authority of his law; but that it depends upon himself to what degree he will fulfil his threatenings. In executing the sentence, he can and will, it is said, abate something from the severity of the punishment threatened. So thought Tillotson, in his Sermon on the Pains of Hell. And this view has appeared not improbable to many German theologians—e. g., Bushing, Bahrdt, (in his “Dogmatik,”) Less, and others.

But such a supposition is unworthy of God. Human legislators do, indeed, in consequence of their weakness, sometimes resort to such expedients, in order to sustain the authority of their laws. Still such measures, even among men, are generally followed by injurious consequences, and are rarely adopted except by weak

princes. But with regard to God, who is faithful and true, such a supposition is incongruous. Nor does he need any such expedients, since he cannot want for means to effect this object, without going contrary to his veracity. Besides, the whole strength and efficacy of all the threatenings connected with the divine laws would by this supposition be diminished. For men are always inclined enough to believe that they shall not, after all these threatenings, be dealt with so strictly and severely, because they have been accustomed to see some abatement of the penalty annexed to human laws, when it comes to be inflicted. But against so hurtful a mistake the holy scriptures labour with the greatest earnestness, and everywhere insist upon the doctrine of the divine veracity, and the unfailing fulfilment of the divine threatenings; e. g., Heb. iv. 12, 13.

II. *Sketch of the History of this Doctrine among Christians.*

Cf. Burnet, *De Statu Mortuorum et Resurgentium*; also, J. A. Dietelmair, *Hist. Antiquior Commenti Fanatici de ἀποκατάστασις πάντων*; Altorf, 1769, 8vo; and Cotta, *Historia succincta Dogmatis de Pœnarum Infernalium Duratione*; Tübing. 1774.

(1) We are not to expect any deeply-learned and philosophical investigations and distinctions, with regard to this subject, from the simplicity of the earliest Christian period. The teachers were then contented with the simple doctrine of the apostles which has been already exhibited, and they made use of this with the most happy success in their didactic and hortatory discourses. Afterwards, since the second century, when they began to mingle the philosophy of the schools with Christianity, they fell into speculation upon this doctrine. Some undertook to define the idea of αἰώνος more accurately, and to shew that it does not necessarily imply punishments which are strictly *unending*. Others insisted upon the literal meaning of this term, and would have it taken in its strictest sense. Thus two parties were formed. These might perhaps have found some points of union, or at least of approximation, if they had properly considered the distinction between *natural* and *positive* punishments. But no traces of this distinction can be found in most of the ancients; certainly they did not see it, and all the consequences which can be derived from it, with sufficient distinctness.

(2) The doctrine that the pains of hell are *finite* in duration was first clearly taught by some of the Christian teachers of the Alexandrine school in the second century. They obviously derived their mode of representation from the principles of the Platonic philosophy. Plato regarded punishments merely as *med-*

ciinal, designed to effect the cure of the disorders of men. He supposed that all spirits and souls not wholly irreclaimable would be morally purified and renovated by means of punishments, and would in this way attain to happiness; which, however, would be very different as to its degree. But still he, as well as Socrates, believed in the unending punishment of the irreclaimable. Cf. s. 150.

Even in Clement of Alexandria we find a clear exhibition of these Platonic ideas. Cf. *Strom.* 4 and 6. But Origen, in the third century, taught still more plainly, ἀποκατάστασιν δαιμονίων καὶ ἀσεβῶν ἀνθρώπων, and πρὸς αἰῶρον εἶναι κόλασιν ἀσεβῶν ἀνθρώπων, and endeavoured to establish this doctrine by many arguments. In the works of his which are still extant, there are passages which are clearly of this import—e. g., in his works, “*Contra Celsum*,” v. 15; “*De Principiis*,” ii. 5. *Homil.* 19, in *Jerem.*, and Athanasius and other ancient writers, are agreed that he taught this doctrine. Some modern writers have undertaken to dispute this, though without sufficient reason.* Origen was followed in this doctrine by many of the learned Grecian fathers—e. g., Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and others of the school of Origen. Even in the Latin church this opinion was widely disseminated in the fourth century, as we learn from Augustine and Hieronymus.

But in opposition to these, the doctrine of the *eternity* of future punishments was affirmed by other equally distinguished teachers—e. g., Gregory of Nazianzum, Basilus, John of Constantinople, and among the Latins, by Hieronymus, Augustine, and others. Even in the fourth century Origen and his adherents were severely reproached on account of this and other doctrines which had been already freely circulated. At length the ecclesiastical anathema was pronounced upon this doctrine. Among the opponents of the school of Origen and of their doctrine on this subject, Theophilus of Alexandria, in the fourth and fifth centuries, was especially distinguished. The doctrine of Origen was therefore condemned by the fourth council at Carthage, in the year 398, and afterwards by many other councils, and in opposition to it the doctrine of the *eternity* of future punishment was established as the faith of the church.

(3) Still the doctrine of the limited duration of future punishment has never wanted defenders. Even during the dark ages and among the

* [Neander, while he concedes that Origen taught this doctrine, thinks it is one of those points respecting which his opinion afterwards changed. Cf. Neander, *Allg. Kirch. Gesch.* b. i. Abth. iii. s. 1098.—Tr.]

schoolmen there were some who took this ground, especially Scotus Erigena in the ninth century, and the Abbot Raynaldus in the twelfth. But the great majority of teachers during this period held fast to the opposite opinion, and endeavoured to confirm it by new arguments; so, e. g., Thomas Aquinas and others.

But this doctrine of the limited duration of future punishment fell into very ill repute in the Western church, on account of its being professed by some of the enthusiastic and revolutionary parties in the sixteenth century, (e. g., by the Anabaptists,) and from its being intimately connected with their expectations and schemes. The mere profession of the doctrine came to be regarded as implying assent to the other extravagances of these parties, and as the signal for rebellion. Hence it is rejected in the symbolical books of the Lutheran church as an Anabaptistical doctrine; Augs. Confess. Art. xvii. In the form in which this doctrine was held by these sects it deserves the most unmingled disapprobation. Again; among the ill-famed Christian free-thinkers—e. g., the Socinians—there were some who professed it. In modern times it has been the same. This doctrine has been advocated in the protestant church both by men who have stood in suspicion of enthusiasm, (e. g., Peterson, Lavater, and others,) and by some of the free-thinkers in philosophy and theology, although for very different causes, and on very different grounds, by these two classes.

The principal advocates of the common opinion on this subject, in modern times, are, Mosheim, in the Appendix to his Sermons; and among the philosophers, Leibnitz, Baumgarten in his *Dogmatik und Vindiciæ Penarum Æternarum*; Halle, 1742; Schubert, *Vernünftige Gedanken von der Endlichkeit der Höllenstrafen*, 3te Aufg. Jena, 1750; Heinr. Meine, *Gute Sache der Lehre von der unendlichen Dauer der Höllenstrafen*; Helmstädt, 1748; Schlitte, *Ueberlegung der beiderseitiger Gründe für und wider die unendliche Unglückseligkeit der Verbrecher*, &c. Cf. also Michaelis, *Von der Sünde*, &c.

The principal advocates of the doctrine of the limited duration of future punishments are, Soner, (in an acute philosophical work, to which Leibnitz replied; vide Lessing's *Beyträge zur Geschichte und Literatur*, 1r Beytr., Braunschweig, 1773, s. 201;) Eberhard, *Apolo- gien des Sokrates*, th. i. and ii.; Gruner, *Theol. Dogm.* p. 636; Basedow, *Philætheie*, s. 539; Steinbart, *System*, u. s. w. A work entitled *Ueber die Strafe der Verdammten und deren Dauer*; Leipzig, 1782; is composed with much reflection. The arguments on both sides are examined, and a middle course between them is chosen. Some have supposed that the wicked,

after enduring the punishments of hell for a season, will be at last annihilated, and have called this *mortem æternam*. Vide s. 151, ad finem. But according to scriptural usage, *θάνατος*, or *ὁ ἀεὶς αἰώνιος*, or *δευτερος*, is not annihilation, but eternal condemnation.

ON ETERNAL BLESSEDNESS.

SECTION CLIX.

INTRODUCTION TO THIS DOCTRINE; AND EXPLANATION OF THE SCRIPTURAL PHRASEOLOGY WITH REGARD TO IT.

I. *Grounds for expecting a happier life hereafter.*

THAT a more happy life is to be expected after death appears, even on grounds of reason, in a high degree probable, if either the present state of human life is considered, or the attributes of God, his goodness, justice, and wisdom. Cf. the arguments in behalf of the immortality of the soul, s. 149. Man and his destination are the most insolvable riddle, if he has received existence merely for the present life. And this riddle can be explained only on the supposition that the period of man's existence extends beyond the grave, and that there will properly begin the happy state where the pious will reap the fruits of what they have sown.

The destination of man, as a moral being, is, holiness and proportionate happiness. As to holiness or moral perfection, it is and remains extremely defective during the present life; and even those who make the greatest advances in moral excellence still fall very far short of that high standard which is set up before them and which their own inmost feeling tells them they ought to attain. And as to *happiness*, it must be confessed that no one in the present life is perfectly happy, either as to body or soul, although there is implanted in all by the Creator a disposition to seek for happiness, and an inextinguishable thirst to enjoy it. But how scanty and miserable is the satisfaction of this desire in the present life, even with those who in the judgment of others are enviably happy! Beautifully and faithfully is this described in Ecclesiastes—a book which contains the true philosophy of life.

It is true, indeed, that agreeable sensations, both bodily and spiritual, are enhanced in their value and charm by being connected with unpleasant sensations, if the unpleasant only go before, and the pleasant follow after. Thus to the convalescent man, after he has endured great sufferings in his sickness, the mere cessation of pain is an exquisite delight, while to those who have felt none of these sufferings it

is no source of pleasure. But an order exactly the reverse is common in the life of men here upon the earth. The most cheerful time is that of youth; then we have the full power and bloom of life. The older we grow, the more we become entangled in business, burdened with cares, oppressed with griefs and distresses, infirmities of body and mind, perhaps with poverty and disgrace. How sad were the lot of man if he had no future and happier life to expect!

How many men are born with intellectual faculties and powers which they can never fully develop here, either because they die early or are wholly destitute of the means and opportunities for development and cultivation. Now if existence ceases with death, this sum of powers is wholly lost. But since our Creator does not give us even our *bodily* powers in vain and for no end, how much less can he have imparted the higher intellectual and especially *moral* faculties without design!

It is no wonder, therefore, that the expectation of a more happy state after the present life has, as it were, forced itself so universally upon reflecting men. But equally universal and equally well grounded is the hope of an *unending continuance* of this future happy state. For if it is not to continue for ever it ceases to be a truly happy condition. To foresee the end of a state of bliss would be of itself enough to disturb the happiness which we might for a time possess, and to embitter its enjoyment; and when it should actually come to an end, it would leave us far more miserable than we were before we had experience of this blessedness. For one who is born and brought up poor and in a state of servitude will not feel his situation to be so miserable and oppressive as a rich or great man, who is cast down from his elevation and brought into the same condition, will find it to be.

Great and inestimable, therefore, is the merit of Jesus Christ in giving to this doctrine of an eternal blessedness beyond the grave that firmness and certainty which it cannot receive from arguments of reason, by which it can be rendered only probable; and also in referring everything, as he does, to this future life. Vide John, xx. 23; 1 John, ii. 25; Rom. ii. 7, and s. 148. Except for Christ we should have no satisfying certainty to lift us above all doubt. But now this doctrine is placed in the most intimate connexion with the history of his person, since he always represents himself as the one through whom we attain to the possession of this eternal happiness, and in whose society we shall enjoy it. Cf. the sections above cited, also s. 120, II.

II. Nature and Names of Future Blessedness.

On this subject we have no very clear and de-

finite knowledge, nor can we have in the present life. Men, indeed, usually conceive the joys of heaven to be the same as, or at least to resemble, the pleasures of this world; and each one hopes to obtain with certainty, and to enjoy in full measure, beyond the grave, that good which he holds most dear upon earth—those favourite employments or particular delights which he ardently longs for here, but which he can seldom or never enjoy in this world, or in the enjoyment of which he has never been fully satisfied. Hence rude men, living only in the indulgence of their passions and appetites, have always expected to find in heaven the uninterrupted enjoyment of sensual delights of every kind. The indolent man, or one who is exhausted by severe labour, regards rest and freedom from employment as the highest good, and places the chief blessedness of heaven in this. But one who reflects soberly on this subject will easily see that the happiness of heaven must be a very different thing from earthly happiness. This last is of such a nature as to be soon followed by disgust and satiety. We should be very unhappy, if we should live for ever in the richest profusion of the highest earthly delights and joys, even could we continue in perpetual and never-fading youth. For all earthly joys and delights of which we know anything by experience, are of such a nature that after they have been enjoyed for a short time they lose their relish, and then follows satiety. Experience daily confirms the truth of what is said by the preacher, that everything upon earth is *vanity and vexation of spirit*. If it were appointed to us in our *present condition* to live *for ever* upon the earth, in the full enjoyment of all it can afford to please and charm, our lot were indeed pitiable. Had we tasted all possible earthly pleasures, and were there none now left which could attract us by their novelty, satiated with a joyless life we should wish ourselves dead, and even this wish, to our sorrow, would remain unsatisfied; even that rest, or rather indolence and torpidity, which is so highly praised and so ardently longed for by some drones, would, long continued, render us perfectly miserable, and at length become wholly intolerable.

Cicero very justly remarks, that the blessed gods, according to the notion which the Epicureans entertained of them, could not possibly be happy, being without employment, and having nothing to think of, through all eternity, except *belle est mihi*. Hence the bliss and joys of the future world must be of an entirely different kind from what is called earthly joy and happiness, if we are there to be *truly happy for ever*.

But since we have no distinct conceptions of those joys which never have been and never will be experienced by us here in their full extent, we have of course no words in our language to

express them, and cannot therefore expect any clear description of them, even in the holy scriptures. Cf. Morus, p. 298, s. 7, ad finem, and p. 299, note 1. Hence the Bible describes this happiness sometimes in general terms designating its greatness, (as Romans, viii. 18—22; 2 Cor. iv. 17, 18,) and sometimes by various beautiful images and figurative modes of speech, borrowed from everything which we know to be attractive and desirable.

The greater part of these images were already common among the Jewish contemporaries of Christ, but Christ and his apostles employed them in a purer sense than the great multitude of the Jews. The Orientalists are rich in such figures. They were employed by Mohammed, who carried them, as his manner was, to an extravagant excess, but at the same time said expressly that they were mere figures, although many of his followers afterwards understood them literally, as has been often done in a similar way by many Christians. If all which is figurative is taken away, the main idea which is left is that of *great felicity*, which, as it is expressly said, will transcend all our expectations and conceptions. Vide 1 John, iii. 2; Col. iii. 3, ζῶν ἡμῶν κέρυτται. The passage 1 Cor. ii. 9, *eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, &c.*, (which is taken from Isa. lxiv. 4,) does not properly relate to this subject. Judging from ver. 7, 8, the subject here treated of is the Christian doctrine, which was before unknown, and which is not the product of human invention. Still the whole passage leads to this, that God made these extraordinary provisions through Christ, in order to bring us to the enjoyment of an unspeakable bliss. Cf. also 1 Cor. xiii. 2.

The following are among the principal names of future happiness, both literal and figurative:—

(1) *The literal appellations.* Ζωή, ζῶν αἰώνιος, which, according to Hebrew usage, signifies, a *happy life, vita vere vitalis, eternal well-being*. Hence the term ὀργή Θεοῦ is opposed to it—e. g., John, iii. 16, 36; also κατάκρισις, κόλασις, &c. τ. λ. Δόξα, δόξα Θεοῦ, reward, Rom. ii. 7; v. 3. Ἀφθαρσία, δόξα, τιμὴ καὶ ἀφθαρσία, Rom. ii. 7; and εἰρήνη, ver. 10. Αἰώνιον βάρος δόξης, an eternal reward of full weight, 2 Cor. iv. 17. Σωτηρία, σωτηρία αἰώνιος, Heb. v. 9, &c.

(2) *Figurative representations.* Among these is the name *heaven*. The abode of the departed saints is a place which, to us who live upon the earth, and while we remain here, is invisible and inaccessible, beyond the bound of the visible world, and entirely separated from it; there they live in the highest well-being, and in a nearer connexion with God and Christ than here below. This place and state cannot be designated by any more fit and brief expression than that which is found in almost every lan-

guage—viz., *heaven*; this, therefore, is frequently employed by the sacred writers. It is there that the highest sanctuary or temple of God is situated—i. e., it is there where the omnipresent God reveals himself most gloriously. That, too, is the abode of the higher spiritual creation of God. Thither was Christ translated; he calls it the *house of his Father*, and says that he has there prepared an abode for his followers, John, xiv. 2, coll. s. 23, II., and s. 97, II.

This place was never conceived of in ancient times, as it has been by some modern writers, as a particular *planet*, or *world*, but as the wide expanse of heaven, high above the atmosphere, or starry heaven; hence it is sometimes called the *third heaven*, as being neither the atmosphere nor starry heaven. Vide 2 Cor. xii. 2. The remark of Morus is good, p. 297, note 4, “*Illud in caelo esse, magis indicat statum conditionemque hominis, quam locum certum.*”

Another figurative name is *paradise*, taken from the abode of the first man in his innocence. Vide vol. i. s. 52, ad finem. From this it is transferred to the abode of the blessed. Luke, xxiii. 43; 2 Cor. xii. 4; Rev. ii. 7; xxii. 2.

Again: this place is called the *heavenly Jerusalem* (ἐπουράνιος, καὶνή, ἡ ἁγία); because the earthly Jerusalem was the capital city of the Jews, the place of the royal residence, and the seat of the divine worship, Gal. iv. 26; Heb. xii. 22; Rev. iii. 12. Βασιλεία οὐρανῶν, or Θεοῦ, Matt. xxv. 34; James, ii. 5; βασιλεία ἐπουράνιος and αἰώνιος, 2 Tim. iv. 18; 2 Pet. i. 11; συμβασιλεύειν τῷ Χριστῷ, 2 Tim. ii. 12—i. e., to be distinguished, honoured, and happy, as he is,—to enjoy royal felicity. Cicero says, *tum nos regnare videbamus*. The stoics say, *omnem sapientem regnare*. Κληρονομία and κληρος, (according to the Heb. שָׂרָה and חֵרֶת, *possidere, to attain to possession*,) the possessing and fully enjoying happiness, as the ancient Israelites did Palestine. Hence κληρονομία τετηρημένη ἐν οὐρανοῖς, 1 Pet. i. 4; Heb. ix. 15. *To sit down at table with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*—i. e., to share with the pious of antiquity in the joys of salvation; *to be in Abraham's bosom*—i. e., to sit next to Abraham, Luke, xvi. 22; Matt. viii. 11. Vide Wetstein, ad h. l. Σαββατισμός, or ἀνάπαυσις, ἀνεσις, Heb. iv. 10, 11, where it denotes the happiness of pious Christians, both in this life and that to come. Στέφανος δικαιοσύνης, the reward of piety, 2 Tim. iv. 8; Phil. iii. 14.

(3) As to the abode of perfected and happy men *after the judgment*, when their souls will be again united with their bodies, the opinions of men have been very different. It is of chief importance to notice that it is always described in the New Testament as a very delightful and happy place. Moreover, the apostles teach distinctly that this earth, after the present state of things is ended, will be renewed, and fitted for the

ordinary residence of those whose souls will be again united with their bodies, in short, of the saints who will be raised. Vide 2 Pet. iii. 13, where he speaks of a *new heavens and a new earth*. Hence it is said in the Apocalypse, that the New Jerusalem in heaven (i. e., the abode of the departed souls of the pious) will, after the resurrection, (when their souls will be again united with the body,) be let down (*καταβιβείν*) to the earth, (now renewed and beautified.) Rev. xxi. 1, seq., coll. Rom. viii. 18, seq.

SECTION CLX.

WHAT DO REASON AND SCRIPTURE TEACH AND LEAD US TO EXPECT, IN A GENERAL VIEW, AS TO THE REAL NATURE OF FUTURE BLESSEDNESS?

The sum of what we are taught by reason and scripture on this point may be comprehended under the three following particulars:—(a) We shall hereafter be entirely freed from the sufferings of this life; (b) Our future blessedness will be a continuation of the happiness of this life; (c) But it will also be increased by the addition of many new joys, which stand in no natural or necessary connexion with our preceding condition in this life.

I. Entire Freedom from the Sufferings and Adversities of this Present Earthly Life.

This is often expressed in the Bible by words which denote *rest, repose, refreshment*, after performing labour and suffering affliction—e. g., *ἀνεις, ἀνάπαυσις, σαββατισμός*, (not *inactivity*, entire freedom from employment, or indolence; vide s. 159;) vide 2 Thess. i. 7, “God will give to you, who are troubled, *ἀνενν*.” Heb. iv. 9, 11; Rev. xiv. 13, “they rest from their labours,” where *κόποι*, like *labores*, signifies *molestiæ afflictions*, and not *employments*. Cf. Morus, p. 299, n. 1. Cf. also Rev. vii. 17, “God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes.”

This exemption from the evils of the present life includes, according to the New Testament,

(1) Deliverance from the earthly body, the seat of the lower principles of our nature and of our sinful corruption, and the cause of so many evils and sufferings, 2 Cor. v. 1, 2; 1 Cor. xv. Vide s. 153.

(2) Entire separation from the society of wicked and evil-disposed persons, who in various ways injure the righteous man, and embitter his life on earth; 2 Tim. iv. 18, *ῥύσεται με ἀπὸ παντὸς ἔργου πονηροῦ*, (i. e., men who do evil.) It is hence accounted as making a part of the felicity of Christ in heaven that he is there separated from sinners, (*πεχωρισμένος*,) Heb. vii. 26.

(3) Everything here upon the earth is inconstant, and subject to perpetual change; and in-

capable of satisfying our expectations and desires. Everything is vanity. Even the pleasures and joys of this life are of such a nature that they lead to satiety and disgust when they are long continued. Vide s. 159. But in the world to come it will be different. The bliss of the saints will continue without interruption or change, without fear of termination, and without satiety;—*στέφανος ἀθάνατος, ἀμάρτος, ἀμάρτος, a crown ever new and beautiful*, in opposition to the fading crowns of earthly victors; 1 Pet. i. 4; v. 10; 2 Cor. iv. 16, 18; Luke, xx. 36; 1 John, iii. 2, et passim. From hence it is also manifest that the joys of the pious in the future world will be capable of a constant increase, an ever-progressive enlargement. For everything uniform and stationary produces satiety and disgust. In the heavenly world, then, there will be no sameness and stagnant uniformity of joy.

Note.—The question is here asked, whether the pious, in the future world, will be entirely delivered from natural depravity, or the preponderance of sense over reason? Whether their obedience to God, and their virtue, will be so entirely confirmed that they will be for ever free from all danger of sinning? If we would agree with the holy scriptures we must answer this question in the affirmative. The whole analogy of Christian doctrine implies that this will be so; and so clearly that it does not need any further proof. That the state of the saint in the future world will be one of secure and confirmed holiness may also be deduced incontrovertibly from the doctrine of the perfectionment and ennobling of the body. The seat of carnal appetite and of sin is in the earthly and mortal body; and from this we shall then be freed, and shall possess, like Christ, a heavenly body, s. 77, and s. 153. According to 1 Cor. xv., our body will no more then be *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, but *πνευματικόν*. There is no need therefore of resorting to purgatory to explain how man may be hereafter purged from hereditary depravity. The *possibility* of sinning will, however, still remain, as it was with man in his original innocence, and as it is with the holy angels. But the blessed saints in heaven will not *wish* to sin; for the preponderance of sense will then be entirely removed; nor will they any longer meet with those external hindrances, those allurements to sin, which obstructed their piety here upon the earth. On the contrary, they will there have the strongest attractions and motives to piety, more enlarged views, good examples, &c. And these means are sufficient to confirm the saints in goodness.

II. Continuance of the Happiness of the Present Life.

When the soul leaves the body it will retain the consciousness of whatever passed within it

while here upon the earth. It carries along with it, into the future world, the ideas, the knowledge, the habits, which it possessed here. And so it takes also good and evil from this life into the next, as its own property, and there receives the fruit of it. It is therefore certain that a part of the heavenly blessedness will consist in the consciousness and recollection of the good enjoyed and performed in the foregoing life, and in that cheerfulness and peace of mind which will proceed from the thought of this. As to the wicked, the case will be reversed. This, now, is one of the *natural* good consequences or rewards of virtue and piety; and the opposite is one of the natural evil consequences or punishments of sin. Vide s. 156, 157.

From what has now been said, it follows of course that there will be a *difference of degree* (*diversitas graduum*) in the happiness of saints in heaven. The happiness of all will be equally eternal, but not equally intense. The more good actions, such as are acceptable in the sight of God, one has performed, the nobler his virtues were, the greater the difficulties and hindrances which he had to overcome, the greater will be his reward. That this should be otherwise neither the goodness nor justice of God permit us to believe. Thus, for example, two men, one of whom had devoted his whole life to virtue and piety, while the other had put off reflection to a late period, and then first renounced his former sins, could not possibly be equal to each other in reward. Vide s. 127, II. In short, the happiness of each individual will be exactly apportioned to his susceptibility of happiness. Great and various as may be his capacity or susceptibility for the enjoyment of happiness, just so great and various will his happiness certainly be hereafter. The very different talents, powers, and knowledge of men, and the use they have made of them, also make a great difference as to the capacity for happiness.

All this is perfectly accordant with the Christian doctrine. Cf. the parables, Matt. xxv. 14, seq., and Luke, xix. 16—19; also 2 Cor. ix. 6, "he who soweth sparingly shall reap also sparingly; and he who soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully;" coll. Gal. vi. 7; 1 Cor. iii. 8, "every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labour, (*κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον κόπον*); Rom. ii. 10, "to him who worketh good, glory, honour, and peace, will be given, *ἰουδαίῳ πρῶτον*, (since from his greater knowledge he could do more good,) *καὶ Ἕλληνι*," in opposition to the punishment spoken of ver. 9.

This sentiment is not contrary to the declaration of Christ, *the last shall be first*, &c., Matt. xix. 30; xx. 1—16, the parable of the labourers in the vineyard. For all which Christ there says has respect to the mercenary question of Peter, *What shall we receive in return?* In

opposition to this, Christ teaches that men must not undertake to prescribe to God when and how he shall bestow rewards; in their dealings with him they must not insist upon recompence; for men have deserved no reward at the hand of God which they can claim as a right. They ought rather, conscious of their own unworthiness, to expect this reward, with humility and submission, only because God, of his mere good mercy, has promised it. Cf. Cotta, *De Diversis Gradibus Gloriæ Beatorum*; Tub. 1773.

Note 1.—The Christian doctrine requires of every one who desires to partake of eternal happiness that he should possess a humble and unpretending spirit, and should be deeply convinced that he *deserves* nothing by his good deeds, and has not so merited the rewards of the world to come that he can claim them as his right. This disposition is finely represented in Matt. xxv. 37, seq., where Christ says, that the pious will be hereafter surprised to find themselves so rewarded, as they will not be conscious of having done any thing to deserve such rewards. On the contrary, the wicked, ver. 44, suppose they have done much good, but are notwithstanding sent away into the place of torment. Vide especially Luke, xiii. 26, seq.

Note 2.—According to the Christian doctrine, such actions only as flow from grateful love to God and Christ can be consistently rewarded, for these virtues only are recognised by scripture as having any good desert. Hence in Matt. xxv. 35, 36, Christ himself specifies such deeds as are active proofs of faith in him, and of grateful love to him. Vide s. 124, 125, respecting good works. One who does good from impure motives has, as Christ says, already received his reward.

III. *Positive Rewards in the Future World.*

Besides being exempt from all earthly trials, and having a continuance of that happiness which we had begun to enjoy even here, we have good reason to expect hereafter other rewards and joys, which stand in no natural or necessary connexion with the present life. For our entire felicity would be extremely defective and scanty, should it be confined merely to that which we carry with us from the present world, to that peace and joy of soul which result from reflecting on what we may have done which is good and pleasing in the sight of God; since even the best man will always discover great imperfections in all that he has done. Our felicity would also be incomplete were we compelled to stop short with that meagre and elementary knowledge which we take with us from this world,—that knowledge so broken up into fragments, and yielding so little fruit, and which, poor as it is, many good men, from lack

of opportunity and without any fault on their part, never here acquire. Besides the natural rewards of goodness, there must, therefore, be others which are *positive* and depending on the will of the Supreme Legislator.

On this point almost all philosophers are for the above reasons agreed, even those who will admit of no *positive punishments* in the world to come. But for want of accurate knowledge of the state of things in the future world, we can say nothing definite and certain as to the nature of these positive rewards. Vide s. 159, I. In the doctrine of the New Testament, however, positive rewards are considered most obviously as belonging to our future felicity, and as constituting a principal part of it. For it always represents the joys of heaven as resulting strictly from the *favour of God*, and as being *undeserved* by those to whom they are given. Hence there must be something more added to the natural good consequences of our actions, something which cannot be considered as the necessary and natural consequences of the good actions we may have before performed. But on this subject, we know nothing more in general than this, that God will so appoint and order our circumstances, and make such arrangements, that the principal faculties of our souls—reason and affection, will be heightened and developed, so that we shall continually obtain more pure and distinct knowledge of the truth, and make continual advances in holiness.

The following particular remarks may be of some use in illustrating this subject:—

(1) In this life God has very wisely allotted various capacities, powers, and talents, in different ways and degrees, to different men, according to the various ends for which he designs them, and the business in which he employs them. Now there is not the least reason to suppose that God will abolish this variety in the future world; it will rather continue there in all its extent. We must suppose, then, that there will be, even in the heavenly world, a diversity of tastes, of labours, and employments, and that to one person this, to another that, field in the boundless kingdom of truth and of useful occupation will be assigned for his cultivation according to his peculiar powers, qualifications, and tastes.

A presentiment of this truth is contained in the idea, which was widely diffused throughout the ancient world—viz., that the Manes will still prosecute, in the future life, the employments to which they had been here accustomed. At least, such arrangements will doubtless be made by God in the future life, that each individual will there develop more and more the germs implanted within him by the hand of the Creator; and will be able, more fully than he even could here, to satisfy the wants of his

intellectual nature, and thus to make continual progress in the knowledge of everything worthy of being known, of which he could learn only the simplest elements in this world; and he will be able to do this in such a way that the increase of knowledge will not be detrimental to piety, as it often proves on earth, but rather promotive of it. To the sincere and ardent searcher after truth it is a rejoicing and consoling thought that he will be able hereafter to perfect that knowledge which here has so many deficiencies. Vide 1 Cor. xiii. 9, seq.

But there is danger here of going too far, and of falling into those strange conceptions of which we find so many examples in the writings of Lavater. Various as the tastes and wants of men in the future world will doubtless be, they will still be in many respects different from what they are here; because the whole sphere of action, and the objects by which we shall there be surrounded, will be different. We shall there have a changed and more perfect body, and by this single circumstance shall be freed at once from many of the wants and inclinations which have their seat in the earthly body. And this will also contribute much to rectify, enlarge, and perfect our knowledge. Many things which seem to us very important and essential during this our state of infancy upon earth, will hereafter doubtless appear in a different light; we shall look upon them as trifles and children's play, and employ ourselves in more important occupations, the utility and interest of which we may have never before thought of.

Some theologians have supposed that the saints in heaven may be taught by *immediate divine revelations* (*lumen gloriæ*); especially those who may enter the abodes of the blessed without knowledge, or with only a small measure of it,—e. g., children, and others who have died in an ignorance for which they themselves were not to blame. On this subject nothing is definitely taught in the scriptures; but both scripture and reason warrant us in believing that provision will be made for all such persons in the future world. Vide s. 126, II.

Note.—In the popular exhibition of the whole doctrine of future blessedness much prudence and caution are requisite; and the teacher must pay careful attention to the difference of education and intellectual culture among his hearers. This is particularly necessary with regard to the point introduced in the foregoing paragraph. The importance which the learned and educated man attaches to the culture of his *intellectual* powers, and to the increase of knowledge, may easily lead him into the mistake of insisting, even in his religious discourses, too much on the importance of this *for every one*, and of representing it as constituting a chief part of the

employments and joys of the future life. But the great mass of mankind have but little taste for this intellectual culture. They even associate with it the idea of severe labour and toil, because thinking and learning are so difficult to them. It is the same as to the expectation of *increased activity* hereafter. This has no charm for the great mass of mankind, because their bodily labours are so oppressive. They find more satisfaction in the idea of *rest* and *refreshment*, with regard to which, however, they should be taught that the rest of heaven is not a state of entire inactivity. Vide s. 159. They prefer to hear of the cessation of all their pains, and the drying of all their tears. Cf. Rev. vii. 17, &c. It is therefore very necessary, in presenting this subject before popular assemblies, to have regard to the different wants, conceptions, and dispositions of men, and thus to imitate the example of Christ and the apostles.

(2) A principal part of our future happiness will consist, according to the Christian doctrine, in the enlargement and correcting of our knowledge respecting God, his nature, attributes, and works, and in the salutary application of this knowledge to our own moral benefit, to the increase of our faith, love, and obedience. There has been some controversy among theologians with regard to the *vision of God*, (*visio Dei intuitiva*, or *sensitiva*, or *beatifica*, or *comprehensiva*.) The question is, whether the saints will hereafter behold God with the eyes of the glorified body, or only with the eyes of the mind—i. e., merely know him with the understanding. On this point there was dispute even in the ancient Oriental church among the Nestorians, some of whom advocated the bodily vision of God, and were on this account blamed by others. Even in the Latin church, too, there was controversy on this point among the schoolmen, and the different theological schools of the Romish church. And this was transmitted to the protestant church of the seventeenth century; since Musæus, and other theologians of Jena, rejected the doctrine of the bodily vision of God, which was, on the other hand, advocated by the theologians of Wittenberg.

But in the scriptures God is always represented as a Being *invisible by the bodily eye* (*ἀόρατον*), as indeed every spirit is. Vide s. 19. The texts of scripture which speak of *seeing God* have been misunderstood; they signify, sometimes, *the more distinct knowledge of God*, as we speak of knowing by seeing, of seeing with the eyes of the mind; so John, i. 18; iii. 2; iv. 12, col. v. 20; 1 Tim. vi. 16; and Paul uses *βλέπειν* and *γινώσκειν* as synonymous, 1 Cor. xiii. 12, 13, col. v. 10.—Again, they express the idea of *felicity*, the enjoyment of God's favour, the being thought worthy of his

friendship, &c. Still more frequently are both of these meanings comprehended under the phrase *to see God*. The image is taken from oriental princes, to see whose faces, and to be in whose presence, was esteemed a great favour. Cf. Matt. v. 8; Heb. xii. 14, "Without holiness οὐδεὶς ὀψεταὶ τὸν Κύριον." The opposite of this is, to be removed from God and from his face.

But Christ is always represented as one who will be *personally visible* by us, and whose personal, familiar intercourse and guidance we shall enjoy. And herein Christ himself places a chief part of the joy of the saints, John, xiv., xvii., &c. And so the apostles often describe the blessedness of the pious, by the phrase *being with Christ*. To his guidance has God entrusted the human race, in heaven and on earth. And Paul says, 2 Cor. iv. 6, we see "the brightness of the divine glory in the face of Christ,"—he is "the visible representative of the invisible God," Col. i. 15. Vide s. 120, respecting the office of Christ.

(3) According to the representation contained in the holy scriptures, the saints will dwell together in the future world, and form, as it were, a kingdom or state of God. Cf. Luke, xvi.; xx. 38; Rom. viii. 10; Rev. vii. 9; Heb. xii. 23. They will there partake of a common felicity. Their enjoyment will doubtless be very much heightened by friendship, and by their confiding intercourse with each other. We must, however, separate all earthly imperfection from our conceptions of this heavenly society. But that we shall there recognise our former friends, and shall be again associated with them, was uniformly believed by all antiquity. Vide s. 150, II. 2. This idea was admitted as altogether rational, and as a consoling thought, by the most distinguished ancient philosophers. Cf. the speech of the dying Socrates, recorded by Plato, and translated by Cicero in his Tusculan Questions, i. 41. This too was the opinion of Cicero, as may be seen from his treatise, *De Senectute*, c. 23, and *De Amicitia*, c. 3, 4.

And yet there have been Christians, and even teachers, calling themselves *Christian* teachers, who have blamed, and even ridiculed, other Christians for comforting themselves under the loss of those who were dear to them, by cherishing the joyful hope of seeing them again, and renewing after death the friendship here formed. Even reason regards this as in a high degree probable; but to one who believes the holy scriptures it cannot be a matter of doubt or conjecture. For,

(a) The scriptures assure us that we shall hereafter see Christ, and shall enjoy his personal intercourse and friendship. So John, xiv. 3, "I will take you to myself; where I am, there

shall ye be also." Cf. 1 Pet. i. 8. According to John, xvii. 24, we shall be high witnesses and participators of his glory.

(b) Paul says expressly, 1 Thess. iv. 17, that we shall be with Christ, *in company with our friends who died before us* (*ἀμα οὖν αὐτοῖς*); and this presupposes that they shall recognise them, and have intercourse with them, as with Christ himself. Paul advises that Christians should comfort themselves, under the loss of their friends, by considering that they are at home with the Lord, and that they shall be again united together.

The objections made against this opinion are of no weight. It is said, for example, that the body of the saints will be entirely changed, and cannot therefore be recognised. But it would need to be proved that this change is of such a nature as to make it impossible to recognise a person to be the same whom we before knew. And even were this allowed, it is not merely through the body that we can recognise each other. Even friends here upon the earth, who have never seen each other's faces, disclose themselves by conversation and agreement of soul. Indeed, we can, even upon earth, through the instrumentality of others, become again acquainted with old friends whom we had forgotten. And why may not this be the case in the world to come?

Again: it is objected that Christ himself says, Matt. xxii. 30, that the relation of persons connected by marriage will cease in the heavenly world. It is said, moreover, that the love which exists between husband and wife, and also between parent and child, is rather of a bodily than a spiritual nature, and therefore will wholly cease when this gross earthly body is thrown off.

ANSWER.—It is true, indeed, that this connexion and love, so far as it is founded in the distinction of sexes and in blood-relationship, will cease; there will be no wedlock, no sexual propensities, and no gross material bodies in the heavenly world. But friendship, in virtuous and pious minds, does not depend upon these circumstances, but rather upon conformity of intellectual tastes and dispositions. Whatever, therefore, is merely sensual and corporeal in love and friendship here upon the earth, will there fall away; but whatever is *spiritual*, which is the essential and nobler part of friendship, will remain, and constitute a great part of the bliss of heaven. Cf. Less, *De beatorum in cœlis Consortio*, in his *Opusc. Theol.* p. ii., p. 329, seq.; also Ribbeck's *Sermons* on this subject; and Engel's little work, "*Wir werden uns wiedersehen*." Villaume, in his *Inquiries* on some Psychological Questions, denies, in his second essay, (whether, in the future life, we shall remember the present,) that we shall

hereafter have any recollection of our lives on earth, because he regards memory as a *bodily* faculty, affected and often destroyed by bodily injuries. But here he mistakes the exercise of a power for the existence of the power itself. He also denies that friends will recognise each other in the life to come.

Note.—The question is asked, whether the pleasures pertaining to the body, and bodily employments, will continue in the life to come? There can be no hesitation, if we follow the scriptures, in answering both these questions in the affirmative. For what purpose will saints in the life to come have a body again, if it is not to be still the organ through which they will feel and act? It is therefore justly concluded that the pleasures and employments of heaven are not merely spiritual, but also *bodily*. Paul too says, according to the most natural interpretation of the passage, Rom. viii. 18, seq., that all nature will be ennobled and beautified for the residence of the friends of God; and that they will dwell in a world which will minister pleasure to the refined senses of the spiritual body.

But in what these corporeal pleasures and employments will consist cannot now be understood by us, because we know nothing of the nature of the future body, of its organs, or of the objects by which we shall then be surrounded. So much is certain, however, that these will be different from corporeal pleasures and employments here upon the earth. This is clearly taught in the New Testament. E. g., Christ says, Matt. xxii. 30, that the saints, at the resurrection, will be like the *angels of God*, (as we justly conceive of them;) "they will not marry, nor be given in marriage," because the end of marriage, the propagation of the race, will no longer exist. Nor will the glorified body be nourished and sustained by eating and drinking. Vide 1 Cor. xvi. 13; cf. s. 153. Hence it is obvious that Christ employed the phrase, *to sit down* (at table) *with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, which was common among his contemporaries, in a figurative sense.

The following are some of the most important or most celebrated works on the life eternal, and the joys of the blessed above—viz., On the History of this Doctrine, Burnet; also Cotta, in his "*Historia dogmatis de vita æterna*." Vide s. 149, ad finem. This subject is treated doctrinally and philosophically in Cotta's "*Theses Theol. de vita æterna*." Tubing. 1758. A poetical delineation of this doctrine may be seen in Lavater's "*Aussichten in die Ewigkeit*." In this work, while we find many very beautiful and happy thoughts and fine observations, we feel the want of just interpretation of scripture, and calm and unimpassioned investigation. He gives himself entirely to the wing of his bold

imagination, and treats the subject rather as a poet than a philosopher. A more strictly philosophical and theological investigation of this subject is found in the work of C. L. de Villette, *Unterredungen über die Glückseligkeit des zukünftigen Lebens*, translated from the French into the German, and accompanied with a Preface, by Spalding. Berlin, 1766, 8vo. Cf. also

Carl Wilhelm Goldhammer's *Betrachtungen über das zukünftige Leben*, u. s. w., 2 thl.; Leipzig, 1791; a work written with warmth of feeling and in a popular manner. The scriptural grounds of this doctrine are briefly and thoroughly investigated by Storr, in his *Comment. de beata Vita post Mortem*, p. 75, tom. ii. of his *Opusc. Academica*.

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
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
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